Introduction

Slurring is a type of hate speech meant to harm individuals simply because of their group membership. It not only offends but also causes oppression. Slurs have some strange properties. Target groups can reclaim slurs, so as to express solidarity and pride. Slurs are noted for their “offensive autonomy” (they offend regardless of speakers’ intentions, attitudes, and beliefs) and for their “offensive persistence,” as well as for their resistance to cancellation (they offend across a range of contexts and utterances). They are also noted for their “offense variation” (not all slurs offend equally) and for the complicity they may induce in listeners. Slurs signal identity affiliations; they cue and re-entrench ideologies. They subordinate and silence target members and are sometimes used non-derogatorily. Slurs raise interesting issues in the philosophy of language and linguistics, social and political philosophy, moral psychology, and social epistemology. The literature on slurs also connects to socio-psychological theory, critical race theory, and legal philosophy. There are two main types of questions: those of a social nature and those of a linguistic nature. In the first category are questions such as, “What social and psychological effects do slurs create and how do they create them?” In the second category we ask, “What sort of linguistic properties do slurs have and what do those properties tell us about theories of language, reference and meaning?” Researchers also try to accommodate the answers to these questions with a unified theory (i.e., to explain how the linguistic properties of slurs bring about harm). Others are concerned with the social significance of slurs, their relation to harm and discrimination, and how to remedy them. One related question is whether slurring utterances are constitutive of (or cause) harm. This underpins debates on free speech and specifically the legal question of whether slurs should be regulated speech. Other linguistic problems are definitional. How do slurs differ from pejoratives, insults, swear words, and offensive behavior? Within the realm of evaluative language, how do slurs compare to Fregean “coloring” and hybrid terms such as moral, “thick,” and evaluative terms?

General Overviews

Sosa 2018 is a wide-ranging collection of contributions on slurs and offensive terms more generally. Other useful resources are Symposium on Slurs, Special Issue on Slurs, and a section on “Emotions, Language, and Hate Speech” in Forlè and Songhorian 2016. Further papers on slurs and non-derogatory uses are collected in Cepollaro and Zeman 2020. Finkbeiner, et al. 2016 is a collection of contributions on various linguistic features of pejoratives and slurs. McGowan 2019 is a book-length monograph examining the mechanisms underpinning racist hate speech, sexist speech, pornography, and micro-aggressions and makes the case that oppressive speech not only causes but also constitutes harm. Kennedy 2002 is a monograph dedicated to the N-word, highlighting its variety of uses in a multitude of contexts, including in the courtroom, on campus, in appropriated uses in-group, in the arts and entertainment fields, and as an argument against abandoning the N-word. Allen 1983 is a book-length sociological analysis of the origins and evolution of slurs in the context of the social relations conducive to ethnic conflict. Anderson, et al. 2013 offers a general overview discussing racial slurs, hate speech, and generics in the context of the relationship between language and race. Hom 2010, Anderson and Lepore 2013, DiFranco 2014, and Bianchi 2013 provide surveys and overviews of general features of slurs and their relationship to pejoratives.

A brief and accessible description of notable problems that slurs raise and their argument as to how prohibitionism solves these problems. Among these are variable offense, use of slurs in reports or by speakers not having contempt for targets, and restrictions on appropriation.


An introduction to the moral and epistemic harms done with racial slurs, hate speech, and racial generics. Has the advantage of bringing together disparate phenomena, but the methodology and theoretical frameworks—prohibitionism, speech-act theory, generics semantics—are only partially connected.


A general introduction to slurs, surveying three approaches: semantic, pragmatic, and the non-linguistic theory of prohibitionism. Written in Italian.


A collection of articles focused on non-derogatory uses of slurs. Some focus more specifically on the outcome and/or process of how slur words are reclaimed by target group members. Others offer more general accounts, focusing on the instability of slurs, the difficulty in blocking them, and other controversial cases. Editors’ Introduction: “The Challenge from Non-Derogatory Uses of Slurs” (pp 1–10).


A general survey of the theories about and the main characteristics of slurs and pejoratives.


A collection of articles covering the state of the art in the linguistic research on pejorative constructions. Some papers are concerned with identifying pejoration in different linguistic domains. Others are concerned with the question of what types of speech acts and uses are made with slurs.


A collection of short papers on various properties (e.g., the evolution of slurs, their offense variation, their behavior under negation, and their relation to evaluative language and generics.


A survey of the linguistic features of pejoratives, and the major theories—nominalism, contextualism, inferentialism, presupposition, conventional implicature, and thick semantic externalism.

The linguistic question is whether the effects of slurs are due to what they mean, and if so, whether that meaning is semantic or pragmatic. The consensus is that slurs express negative attitudes by casting targets in a negative light, and this explains why they are offensive. Content-based theories try to capture this as a matter of derogatory content. Non-content-based theories deny this, explaining the offense as a matter of sociological or psychological facts. The hard question for content-based theories is, “What kind of content do slur-based attitudes contribute to the overall meaning of slurring utterances?” Various answers have been given. Saka 2007, Richard 2008, and Jeshion 2013 (all cited under Expressivist Semantics) model slurs as expressing contempt, whereas for Camp 2013 (cited under Non-Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts) they signal allegiance to derogatory perspectives, and for Nunberg 2018 (cited under Pragmatic Accounts) they signal affiliation with a bigoted group. For Hom 2008, slurs encode group stereotypes; for Hom and May 2013 (both cited under Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts), they work as fictional terms. Slurs have also been modeled by analogy with expressive meaning and moral terms. Content-based theories are divided into semantic and pragmatic accounts. Semantic accounts explain slurs’ offense as derived from linguistic properties they have by virtue of their conventional meaning or broadly semantic content. Pragmatic accounts claim it derives from contextual factors or conversational phenomena governing the use of slurs. However, as in the more general semantics-pragmatics, there is controversy as to what falls within the scope of semantics and whether or not that is restricted to truth-conditional content. For some, the derogatory content exhausts the meaning of a slur term: they are thus univocal, non-hybrid theories. For others, the derogatory content is just one component mixed with others as part of a complex package: they are thus hybrid theories. Hybrid and non-hybrid theories differ with respect to the nature of the derogatory content and whether or not they take this content to affect the truth conditions of the utterances in which a slur term occurs. This feature is often contrasted with the contribution made by a slur’s neutral counterpart. For Hom 2008 and Hom and May 2013, slurs and neutral counterparts differ in meaning, with the derogatory content exhausting the slur’s truth-conditional contribution. By contrast, for Richard 2008, Jeshion 2013, Camp 2013, and Bach 2018 (cited under Non-Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts), slurs and neutral counterparts are truth-conditionally equivalent. For them, the slur’s derogatory content is non-truth conditional. This reflects different intuitions about truth. Camp 2013 (cited under Non-Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts) and Jeshion 2013 (cited under Truth-
Conditional Semantic Accounts: Critique of Truth-Conditional Accounts) allow that sentences containing slurs can be true. Hom 2008 and Hom and May 2013 claim that they are always false. Saka 2007 and Richard 2008 argue they are neither true nor false. The underlying question is whether responding “true” or “false” to slurring utterances makes one complicit in bigotry.

Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts

Hom 2008 and Hom 2012 provide a truth-conditional semantics that captures the derogatory content of slur terms as a property of the contemptibility of targets. This framework is later developed in Hom and May 2013, Hom and May 2014, and Hom and May 2018, which consider the role of oppressive ideologies in the semantics of slurs. The key hypothesis here is that slurs work like fictional terms. This explains the distinction from neutral counterparts: slurs and neutral counterparts target the same individuals but do not refer to the same individuals. They differ in extension and thus differ in meaning. The motivation for a distinction in meaning comes from the fact that moral facts falsify the predication of a slur: no one deserves to be subject to negative moral evaluation merely because of one’s group membership, thus the utterance is always false. The derogatory content exhausts the truth-conditional contribution made by a slur term. Diaz-Leon 2019 develops an inferentialist truth-conditional account in response to critiques to Hom-style semantics. Other accounts provide different arguments for the distinction between slurs and neutral counterparts. For example, DiFranco 2015 argues that compound slurs raise difficulties for semantic accounts that take slurs and neutral counterparts to be equivalent, whereas Caso and Lo Gercio 2016 argues that these cases can in fact be accommodated. Other accounts focus on the truth-aptness features of slurs. Picardi 2006 argues that slurs and pejoratives contribute the derogatory content as part of what speakers are saying. Miščević 2011 argues that slurs are truth-apt and explains their semantics as containing stereotypical properties. Neufeld 2019 develops an essentialist model of the semantics of slurs and shows that this view receives robust empirical support from cognitive psychology.


Argues that the compositional slurs that DiFranco raises as counter-examples to truth-conditional theories of slurs are not in fact counter-examples and can be explained in a way that does not deviate from those theories.


Defends an inferentialist/descriptivist account. Argues that a slur’s meaning is a description to the effect that targets ought to be subject to discriminatory practices because of negative properties they are assumed to have according to an ideology. Claims bigots and non-bigots share the same inferential dispositions when grasping the meaning but have different beliefs about whether or not anyone satisfies the description. Claims superiority over Hom’s radical semantic externalism in solving problems that Hom’s approach cannot.


Argues that compositional slurs (“slanty-eye”) and iconic slurs (“ching chong”) encode truth-conditional content about the target (e.g., diet, attire, and physical features) other than group membership. This poses a problem for neutral counterpart theories that hold that slurs and neutral counterparts are truth-conditionally equivalent, since a uniform treatment of their truth-conditions becomes problematic.


Defends combinatorial externalism, which says that a slur semantically encodes group stereotypes, ideologies, and institutions of oppression. This is a descriptive propositional content predicated by targets. Argues that slurs are always false because no one is inherently contemptible for belonging to a target group. Sets out eight criteria of adequacy, arguing that extant theories fail to meet them all but that an externalist semantics explains them all.


Argues that slurs and pejoratives raise an issue insofar as some occurrences seem to make a truth-conditional contribution, whereas others are best accounted for non-truth-conditionally. Argues that extant theories fail to provide a unified solution for the puzzle,
whereas a truth-conditional semantic analysis is fit to explain that slurs and pejoratives are a semantically unified class.

Argues that slurs predicate contemptibility of targets. This includes factual, affective, and normative properties inherited from false ideologies about target groups. Because no one falls under the extension of the concept encoded by a slur, this generates null extensionality. This captures semantically what is wrong with slurs, thus vindicating the moral innocence thesis that no individuals ought to be evaluated negatively based on their group membership.

Argues against identity-based theories that allow slurs and their neutral counterparts to be truth-conditionally equivalent. Explains instead slurs’ offense as residing in truth-conditional content.

Argues that slurs are fictional terms whose meaning and reference are fixed relative to a supporting oppressive ideology. The ideology creates an illusion so that people under its grip are misled into thinking that targets are worthy of contempt. Thus, slurs encode a pejorative concept PEJ(G) glossed as “ought to be the target of negative moral evaluation because of being a member of a group G.”

Defends, contra Richard 2008 (cited under Expressivist Semantics), a cognitivist approach in which slurs are meaningful and truth-apt. Their semantics consists in ascribing negative properties to the target that are delineated through an associated stereotype.

Argues that slurs are a species of similar terms in that they encode “mini-theories,” which represent an essence-like element that is causally connected to a set of negative stereotypical features of a social group. But because there is no essence that is causally responsible for stereotypical negative features of a social group, slurs have null extension, and hence slurring sentences are either meaningless or false.

Argues that pejoratives contribute to “at-issue” content and that this is what enables the possibility of “refusing to endorse” an assertion with a pejorative.

**Critique of Truth-Conditional Accounts**

Critical discussions of semantic accounts involve several points of contention (e.g., the distinction versus equivalence between slurs and their neutral counterparts; the nature of the derogatory content; intuitions about truth and variability in projection behavior). Jeshion 2013 raises objections for stereotypes semantic accounts. Sennet and Copp 2015 raises objections for semantic accounts that endorse a semantic distinction between slurs and neutral counterparts. Marques 2017 raises objections for the fictionalist account of slurs presented in Hom and May 2018 (cited under Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts). Diaz-Legaspe 2018 is concerned with uses of slurs with a restrictive reference. Croom 2015 raises objections for semantic accounts committed to the equivalence between slurs and neutral counterparts. Cepollaro and Thommen 2019 raises objections for truth-conditional accounts on the basis of slurs’ projective behavior.

Argues against a truth-conditional account of slurs by treating cases where projection fails as meta-linguistic uses of slurs. Argues against Hom and May 2013 (cited under Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts), which attempts to explain why speakers are misled into thinking that the derogatory content projects out by treating slurs as fictional terms.


Argues that slurs and their neutral counterparts are not co-referential and thus differ in meaning. Introduces the notion of a “conceptual anchor” to explain empirical data about the relationship between slurs and their neutral counterparts.


Argues that when slurs have a more restrictive reference than neutral counterparts this poses problems for theories that take the two to be co-referential or truth-conditional. Distinguishes two kinds of slurs: (a) “normalizing” slurs and (b) “out-group” slurs. Only (a) have a restricted reference.


Rejects the idea that stereotypes should be incorporated into the semantics of a slur. Audience members need not have a similar stereotype. While many stereotypes contain positive or neutral features, slurs are exclusively negative. Some slurs have no corresponding stereotype (e.g., the Yiddish “Shiksa”). Acknowledges that group stereotypes are often raised to salience by slurring utterances but explains this as a perlocutionary effect.


Argues against Hom and May 2018 and its fictionalism about pejoratives on the basis that there is no analogy between pejorative and fictional discourse: the former implicates that the speaker is committed to racist ideologies, but the latter does not implicate that the speaker is committed to the fiction. Discusses the status of non-derogatory, non-appropriated uses.


Debunks a series of semantic arguments establishing that slurs and neutral counterparts differ in extension (and thus differ in meaning) and extends objections to arguments establishing they have the same extension. Rebuts Hom and May 2013 (cited under Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts), which objects to non-semantic views, in particular the conventional implicature account of slurs.

Non-Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts

These are hybrid accounts that incorporate the derogatory content as part of a more complex package including other components. One constant of this package is a descriptive component asserting group membership, which slurs typically share with their neutral counterparts. The question is this: “What else beyond predicating group-membership do slurs seek to achieve?” Theories differ in how they treat this additional, “other” component, and whether or not it infects intuitions about truth. For Hornsby 2001, it involves a gesture. For Camp 2013 it involves a perspective. For Bach 2018 it is an evaluative side comment. For Predelli 2013; Predelli 2017; Corazza 2018; Diaz-Legaspe, et al. 2019; and Diaz-Legaspe 2019 the “other” component involves features of register. And for Jeshion 2013 (cited under Expressivist Semantics), this “other” component is an expressive one. Despite these differences in the nature of the “other” component, there is broad consensus that the derogatory component does not make any difference to the truth conditions of the sentences in which slurs appear. It is thus a non-truth-conditional component, and the truth of the descriptive content is enough to judge slurring utterances as true. For others, however, no slurring utterance can ever be true, such that responding “true” or “false” to a slurring utterance is enough to make listeners feel complicit (e.g., Hornsby 2001, Saka 2007 [cited under Expressivist Semantics], and Richard 2008 [cited under Expressivist Semantics]).

Argues that slurs differ from neutral counterparts in that they impute contemptibility to targets. This is an implicit, evaluative side comment loaded into the slurs’ semantics. A slur thus expresses two independent propositions in a compressed way: the evaluative proposition is a function of the classificatory proposition. Contrasts loaded semantics with hybrid expressivism, which takes slurs to express a dual content: a descriptive content and an expressive content.


Argues that slurs conventionally signal a derogatory perspective on the target group. The perspective is based on stereotypical properties and images of and attitudes toward targets. The perspective is non-defeasible, resists cancellation, limits deniability, induces cognitive and social complicity in listeners, and so is treated as semantic (though not truth-conditional).


Recasts Predelli 2013 in terms of a pluri-propositionalist theory. The character of a slur term contributes to the “official content” or what is said, whereas the bias contributes to the “reflective content” or a generalized conversational implicature.


Considers various candidate definitions of the term “slur.” Argues in favor of the register approach to slurs. According to this approach, slurs are referential terms for groups marked by register features that link their use to contexts where these groups are discriminated against. According to the author, uses of slurs constitute discriminatory acts.


Defends a pluralist-meaning account. Argues that slurs are lexically marked with particular features of register (i.e., usually marked as slang and vulgar) and always marked as impolite and derogatory. The result is a pluralist-meaning account that combines: (a) a descriptive component identifying the target’s group membership; (b) an expression of negative attitudes; (c) a use-theoretic component that concerns a rule-of-use regarding the fittingness to a discourse situation; and (d) lexical metadata.


Argues against both expressivist and inferentialist treatments of slurs in favor of a representationalist view. Argues that using slurs is like making an offensive gesture while uttering their neutral counterpart. This is no different than ordinary descriptive terms accompanied by a tone, inflection, or gesture in order to communicate further negative attitudes.


Develops a theory of bias according to which slurs come equipped with a character and a bias. The bias is a constraint conventionally assigned to a slur term that fixes its relationship to the context of use of that term, namely a context in which the speaker expresses a negative attitude toward the target. This is a non-truth-conditional dimension of meaning.

Builds on Predelli 2013 and analyzes slurs (and register more generally) in terms of constraints on the class of contexts of appropriate use.

Expressivist Semantics

There are two ways of capturing the expressive dimension of slurs. One is via the connection with evaluative talk, including moral terms (e.g., “good” and “wrong”) and thick terms (e.g., “courageous” and “lewd”). The other is via the connection with expressive terms, including pejoratives (e.g., “prick” and “moron”), expletives (e.g., “damn”), swear words and vulgarities (e.g., “fuck” and “shit”). The first avenue explores the connection with the literature in meta-ethics in order to extend a hybrid expressivist framework of moral terms to slurs. What these terms have in common is that they are hybrid terms, of which one is an expressive or evaluative component. In the case of slurs, in addition to identifying the target’s group membership, the speaker is expressing an attitude of contempt toward targets. Differences arise depending on how we understand “expressing” (e.g., what the expressive content amounts to; how it relates to the classifying, descriptive content; and whether or not it affects truth-conditions). Saka 2007 offers one of the first expressivist accounts of slurs. Richard 2008 is concerned with characterizing the nature of the contemptuous way of thinking involved in slurs and capturing their illocutionary potential. Richard 2016 is concerned with incorporating the illocutionary effects of a slur term as part of its conventional meaning so that it becomes part of what is said. Jeshion 2013 develops a three-tiered expressivist semantics where the key explanatory component is the speaker’s expression of contempt toward target groups. Jeshion 2018 argues that slurs dehumanize targets by treating them as inferior and that the moral structure of contempt is critical in rebutting various objections made to expressivism. Jeshion 2016 argues that expression of contempt is also critical in explaining how slur words are created and how bigotry is formed. Green 2016 advocates an expressivist treatment of slurs as “expressive artifacts,” which combine representation and expression.


Argues that slurs and neutral counterparts are semantically equivalent but differ in that slurs convey a conventional, though non-truth-conditional, expressive component. Responds to various challenges to expressivism and draws parallels between slurs and metaphors, contrasting their expressive powers.


Defends a three-tiered expressivist semantics that encodes: (a) a group-designating component (truth-conditional); (b) an expressivist component that captures the speaker’s expression of contempt (non-truth-conditional); (c) an identifying component that provides a reductive classification of the target. Argues against the objection that expressivism cannot explain: (i) derogatory variation; (ii) derogatory autonomy; and (iii) non-derogatory uses and other special uses, including non-literal uses and approbatives such as “hottie.”


Argues that words come to function as slurs because they are used with behavioral manifestations of contempt that crystallize into the conventional meaning of words. Contempt also explains how slurs help promote bigotry by spawning shared identities among those who use slurs as superior, thus enabling in-group/out-group construction.


Rebuts three kinds of objections to Jeshion’s 2013 expressivist framework concerning: (a) absence of affect; (b) transpersonal normative power of slurs; and (c) targets’ identities. Key is the moral structure of contempt such that the properties on which contempt is grounded are fundamental to the target’s identity as a person. By reductively classifying targets as unworthy of respect, users of slurs dehumanize them both through thoughts and actions.

Argues in chapter 1 that slurs’ offense resides in performative and expressive aspects that are inherent to a contemptuous way of thinking of targets and thus are part of what is said with a slur. This mode of thinking ties together attitude and classification so that we cannot identify the target without endorsing the contempt proffered on the basis of their group membership. This is a misrepresentation that renders slurs non-truth-evaluable.


Defines the meaning of a slur as constituted by an “interpretive common ground” among speakers who share a range of attitudes about targets. Being competent with a slur requires making all the presuppositions that constitute the term’s interpretive common ground. But one can understand a slur without endorsing the full range of attitudes that constitute its meaning. This explains why non-slurring uses are still offensive.


Argues that slurs express an attitude complex involving (i) a belief that predicates the target’s group membership and (ii) a cognitive-affective attitude of expressing disdain toward the target; (i) is truth-conditional, but not (ii), which makes the utterance neither true nor false. Shows how this, together with socio-pragmatic factors, can explain friendly uses of slurs, appropriation, reports of slurs, variable offense, distinction from pejoratives, pejorative verbs, and adjectives.

Hybrid Expressivism: Slurs, Moral Terms, and Evaluatives

Discussions about the evaluative nature of slurs first emerged in the meta-ethics literature. A core task is to define the meaning of moral terms, and whether or not they are truth-apt and belief-expressing. This is often approached by means of the close relationship between slurs and pejorative terms more generally. Key to this analogous relationship is the idea that both slurs and moral terms are dual-content expressions in that they express a descriptive content and an expressive content. Differences arise from how the expressive content is treated, and whether or not the analogy with slurs is apt for explaining moral terms, in particular with respect to their embedding versus projection behavior. Barker 2000 offers an early hybrid expressivist treatment of slurs. Barker 2014 develops the conventional implicature view in a cognitivist expressivist framework. Copp 2001 defends a realist-expressivist view of moral language and connects this to slurs. Copp 2009 responds to criticism of the hybrid expressivist view developed in Copp 2001. Boisvert 2008 motivates the parallel between slurs and moral terms. Hay 2011 argues that pejoratives are a better model for moral terms than slurs. Schroeder 2014 argues that slurs do not have a closely analogous relationship with moral terms. Fletcher 2014 criticizes the parallel between slurs and moral terms. Cepollaro 2016 is concerned with the relationship between slurs and thick concepts (e.g., “lewd” and “brave”).


Argues that slurs share with moral terms a dual content: a descriptive component identifying the target’s group membership and an expressive component of contempt toward the target. Both slurs and moral terms convey the specific moral attitude by way of conventional implicature. Since (a) and (b) remain independent, this explains why non-racists can accept (a) but reject (b).


Offers a conventional implicature theory of value-sentences on the dual-content model of slurs. Argues that making sense of conventional implicature as a mode of unsaid content requires accepting a form of pure, non-hybrid expressivism about statements of correctness of illocutionary acts. This is a cognitive expressivist view which explains expressive talk as truth-apt and belief-expressing.

Defends hybrid expressivism, which analyzes moral terms according to the same pattern as slurs. Slurs are understood to directly describe targets as belonging to a certain race or ethnic group, and directly express the speaker’s contempt toward those having this property.


Argues that slurs and thick concepts make different predictions with regard to reference and extension. Defends the “objective” view, according to which slurs’ evaluative content is not about the speaker’s mental state (“the speaker despises the target class”) but expresses a negative judgment of the target (“the target class is despicable”) and argues that it is more successful in accounting for the complicity of slurs.


Argues that moral terms are similar to slurs/pejoratives in that their use can both ascribe a property and express a relevant “conative attitude.” They are both “dual-use” expressive terms that have a descriptive component of ascribing a property in the same way ordinary descriptive predicates do and an expressive component that is associated with a relevant non-cognitive attitude.


Argues that moral terms are treated on the model of slurs in that both conventionally implicate that the speaker has a suitable attitude: a moral attitude and a derogatory attitude, respectively. The view combines a standard truth-conditional semantics regarding the contribution that slurs make to truth-conditions and an expressivist account that captures their derogatory significance.


Explores the extent to which moral terms, or their deployment in utterances, convey the speaker’s attitudes partly by critically examining the putative parallel with slur terms.


Argues that pejoratives are a better model for moral terms than slurs because their descriptive component is non-detachable and, when embedded, the negative attitudes are attributed to the reportee. In contrast, slurs have detachable descriptive components and they can be used by speakers to express their own negative attitudes even when reporting the beliefs of others.


Contrasts slurs and moral talk in terms of their projection behavior. Though the moral attitudes expressed with moral terms project out, they do contribute to truth-conditional content. In contrast, the attitudes expressed with slurs project through attitude verbs but do not affect truth-conditional content. Abandons the idea that “core” content characterizes truth conditions and that secondary content can affect truth-conditional content.

**Conventional Implicature Accounts**

Another way of treating the expressive component of slurs is via an analogous relationship to expressive terms, including pejoratives, expletives, swear words, and vulgarities. All are evaluative, rather than descriptive, in that they serve primarily to express the speaker’s attitudes, emotions, and feelings, about something or someone. Differences arise depending on whether or not the expressive content of slurs exhausts their linguistic meaning and whether or not they also convey a descriptive content. For example, Hedger 2012 develops the parallel between slurs and expressive terms. Hedger 2013 argues that the offensive content of slurs is exhausted by the expressive component. Croom 2014a argues against a purely expressive treatment of slurs. Croom 2014b proposes a hybrid approach

Offers a relevance-theoretic analysis on how the offensive attitude of slurs derives from the meta-linguistic knowledge that the word is derogatory. This raises an expectation of relevance that is satisfied by drawing an indeterminate range of assumptions associated with the cultural stereotype.


Argues that Hedger 2012 and its pure expressivist account of slurs is inadequate. Suggests that an adequate account should also incorporate also a descriptive component into the meaning of slurs.


Argues against “pure expressivist” accounts of slurs (as defended by Hedger 2012), claiming that they do not capture appropriated uses of slurs.


Argues that in addition to predicating group-membership of targets, slurs invoke a complex of historical facts and social attitudes. Explains slurs’ offense in terms of the impact of the invoked content on the hearer. Distinguishes slurs’ offense from their derogation.


Argues, contra Potts 2007, for the existence of expressive modifiers (which take expressive-type terms as their arguments) and mixed expressives including slur terms (which contribute both descriptive and expressive content), which are not predicted by Potts’s logic of conventional implicature. Extends Potts’s logic with new tree-admissibility conditions so that it can account for the semantics of sentences containing such expressions.


Explains the meaning of slurs in terms of use conditions (i.e., the conditions under which an expression can be uttered felicitously). Argues that use conditions can be fulfilled or not in a context and models this formally as a set of contexts.

Argues against objections that expressives are invariably speaker orientated. Argues that non-speaker-orientated readings can occur outside of attitudinal predicates. This motivates an account based in pragmatic perspective shifting.


Argues that slurs and expressive terms (e.g., “damn”) share an expressive content in that they display the speaker’s attitude but lack descriptive content. This renders slurring sentences non-truth-apt, explaining why speakers refuse to assent to the truth of a slurring sentence, while they accept corresponding sentences containing a neutral counterpart. Discusses slurs’ projection behavior as a challenge for truth-conditional semantics.


 Discusses slurs’ projection behavior and their behavior in logical inference relations. Concludes that a pragmatic account such as a conventional implicature view is inadequate to explain this behavior and that a semantic account is preferable.


Argues slurs are conventional devices for issuing directives (e.g., to adopt a perspective). The resulting semantics includes an at-issue content denoting the target’s group-membership, and a not-at-issue directive content. This is claimed to help hearers cognize better target group members. Implements this proposal formally using Pottsian machinery developed for conventional implicature items.


Extends Potts 2007 logic for supplementary conventional implicatures to accommodate a wide range of expressive constructions, including slurs, in several languages. Slurs are analyzed as objects with conventionally implicated expressive meanings that provide the main content of their utterances.


Argues that pejoratives and expressive terms share an expressive meaning that is separated from the descriptive content. Treats the derogatory content of pejoratives as “not-at-issue”—that is, a conventional implicature that typically projects to become the speaker’s commitment with the entire utterance. Identifies several properties of expressives that justify their treatment as a separate dimension of meaning.

Presupposition Accounts

In the presuppositional camp, the derogatory content is also presented as taken-for-granted. Presuppositions are often hard to tell apart from conventional implicatures. Macià 2002 offers the first presuppositional analysis of pejoratives. Schlenker 2007 offers a two-dimensional dynamic semantics, which treats slurs like expressives. Cepollaro 2015 examines two types of presuppositional analysis of slurs. Cepollaro and Stojanovic 2016 defends a unified presuppositional account of slurs and thick terms. Marques and García-Carpintero 2020 defends an expressive presuppositional account that makes room for a normative dimension specific to affective attitudes.


Discusses two ways to articulate the presupposed content: a subjective one (“the speaker despises the target class”) and an objective one (“the target class is despicable”). Also, suggests that cancellability should not be taken as a matter of degree but as a clear-cut feature of projective content.

Defends a unified presuppositional account of slurs and thick terms, which are treated as “hybrid evaluatives.” Both kinds of terms encode a descriptive (truth-evaluable) content and presuppose some evaluative content. This analysis allows us to explain the main features of both slurs and thick terms.


Argues (contra Kaplan) that certain phenomena regarding the validity of arguments involving pejoratives (and other expressives) can be accounted for using the notion of presupposition. Shows how to extend the presuppositional analysis to other expressions with pure non-truth-conditional meanings such as greetings (“Hello”). Written in Spanish.


Argues that slurs presuppose a derogatory normative component of the target (i.e., “one must derogate group G on account of their having features F1 . . . Fn only if group G has F1 . . . Fn, and contempt fits a group with such features.”) Such expressive presuppositions are not just propositions on the common ground but require the conversation to be governed by norms specific to affective attitudes and their expression. Discusses attitude reports, cancellation, and non-derogatory uses.


Argues that slurs carry a presupposition that is (i) indexical, (ii) attitudinal, and (iii) sometimes shiftable. Thus, in using a slur the speaker presupposes that contextually they have a negative attitude toward the target group, but sometimes this attitude can be attributed to someone other than the speaker.

**Pragmatic Accounts**

These embrace the equivalence between slurs and their neutral counterparts and explain the difference between them as deriving from what else gets done by using the slur rather than its neutral counterpart. This is often defined by reference to usage conventions governing the use of a slur such that it is linguistically inappropriate to address someone with a slur unless one has contempt for the target group. Differences arise depending on the nature of the derogatory content and the mechanisms for implementing it. Most popular pragmatic accounts are conventional implicature accounts which hold that the derogatory content is conveyed as backgrounded content in that it is presented as taken for granted. Alternative accounts posit other types of pragmatic inferences, including routinized conversational implicatures. Nunberg 2018 argues that slurs offend because they are words that bigots use, so they derive their power from the speaker’s association with the attitudes of a group who owns the word. Bolinger 2017 contends that slurs are comparable to impolite behavior and that by choosing to use a slur the speaker signals that she is endorsing the negative attitudes associated with the slur. Rappaport 2019 defends a relevance-theoretic account of slurs in terms of “showing” that the speaker has negative attitudes toward the target. Croom 2008 sketches a pragmatic view of slurs that explores their relationship to metaphor. Corazza 2004 argues that epithets express multiple propositions, among which the derogatory content is expressed as a pragmatic presupposition.


Offers a relevance-theoretic account in terms of conversational implicature. Argues that when the speaker choses to use a slur instead of its neutral counterpart, they convey their derogatory attitudes toward the target.

Argues that slurs’ offense derives from the speaker’s contrastive preference for using a slur over its neutral counterpart. By choosing a slur the speaker signals that she is endorsing the associated negative attitudes. The signal can convey offensive content, regardless of the speaker’s intentions, and hearer’s uptake. However, the signal is defeasible if the speaker is ignorant about the associated attitudes or is unaware of a neutral alternative to the slur.

Defends a multiple-proposition theory according to which epithets express an “official proposition,” which affects truth-conditional content and a background proposition in the form of a pragmatic presupposition. Discusses anaphoric constructions in which the epithet functions like an attributive anaphor in that it inherits its value from the subject and attributes a typically negative property to them.

Draws on Camp’s work on metaphor and argues that slurs involve inaccurate “characterization” of the target. Contrasts this view with Hom 2008 (cited under Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts) and its semantic view of slurs.

Like Nunberg 2018, Horn argues that slurs’ offense lies in the metadata. Discussed in more detail under Non-Content Theories.

Argues that slurs are not special: they offend because they are words bigots use. The offense does not reside in linguistic meaning but in metadata (i.e., encyclopedic knowledge about who uses the term). The conventional meaning of a slur is linked to the social practice of using it to signal the speaker’s affiliation with a bigoted group. This gives rise to a “ventriloquistic implicature” that exploits the maxim of manner.

Explains three features of slurs: descriptive, evaluative, and affective. The descriptive feature is part of a thin semantics where slurs and neutral counterparts denote target group membership. The evaluative feature is accounted for in terms of a relevance-theoretic notion of showing. Speakers implicate their negative attitudes toward the target group by ostensibly producing natural indicators that they belong to a group of speakers who share that negative attitude. The affective feature is accounted for through similar psychological processing present in curse words.

Slurs as Conventional Implicature
The conventional implicature view is a dual-content theory that models slurs as contributing two kinds of content: (a) a descriptive content that identifies the salient referent as belonging to a target group, and (b) an expressive content that captures the speaker’s expression of a contemptuous, derogatory attitude toward targets. Content (a) is asserted, thus truth-conditional; (b) is conventionally implicated, thus non-truth-conditional. There are various mechanisms for implementing the conventional implicature depending on the general commitments of the theoretical framework within which the account is developed. What is common to all is that the expressive component has the status of being taken for granted, and so it is not something that can be easily challenged, questioned, and denied. Sennet and Copp 2017 is concerned with how slurring occurs in the privacy of a bigot’s thoughts. Lycan 2015 argues that slurs and neutral counterparts are truth-conditionally equivalent but differ in that slurs lexically presume a derogatory belief or attitude about the target group. Whiting 2013 argues that slurring is done not by what is said but by the way it is said. Williamson 2009 argues against an inferentialist treatment of slurs and in favor of a referentialist semantics. Whiting 2008 provides an inferentialist treatment of slurs combined with Gricean pragmatics. Vallée 2014 develops a multi-propositionalist theory that explains the difference between slurs and neutral counterparts in terms of cognitive significance.

Argues that slurs lexically presume a contemptuous attitude about the target group. Lexical presumptions are carried by the choice of words, so choosing a slur over its neutral counterpart is inappropriate unless certain factual and normative assumptions are made. These presumptions are lexicalized into the conventional meaning of the slur, over and above truth-conditional content, so they are not compositional and non-truth-conditional, though sometimes they are cancellable.


Defends an "implicated way of thinking" view to explain: (i) how pejorative "concepts" function in thought and (ii) how derogatory language relates to bigoted thought. Argues that bigots and non-bigots represent the targets in different ways. Bigots misrepresent them as deserving contempt, and when using a slur, they conventionally implicate that they think of the target in contemptuous ways. The difference is in what is implicated, not in sense or reference.


Argues that slurs and neutral counterparts share the same "official content" in that they say the same thing and thus share the same truth value, but they differ in that slurs conventionally implicate contempt for the target group. Discusses embedding of slurs under negation and propositional attitudes.


Responds to Williamson 2009 and its challenge that inferential role semantics cannot account for slurs by proposing an inferentialism supplemented with Gricean pragmatics. Inferentialism explains slurs’ semantics, which is limited to inferences that speakers are disposed to draw from uses of slurs, and these are the same inferences they are disposed to draw from their neutral counterparts. Thus, slurs and their neutral counterparts do not differ semantically but rather in pragmatic associations.


Explains the difference between slur and neutral counterparts in terms of the attitude that is conventionally implicated by using a slur. Defends this view against objections that apply both to cognitivist and non-cognitivist versions of it and raises objections for combinatorial externalism and prohibitionism.


Argues that inferentialism is inadequate, since being disposed to reason according to a slur’s inferential role is not necessary to understand a slur or have a pejorative concept. Defends a referentialist semantics on which slurs and neutral counterparts have the same reference but differ in that slurs conventionally implicate a derogatory content about the target group. Considers the role of pejoration in thought and the relative priority of language and thought.

The Social Nature of Slurs

In contrast to content-based theories locating the offense of slurs in their meaning, we can locate slurs in another camp that focuses on their social nature in how they bring about harm and offense. Non-content theories define slurs’ offense by reference to social prohibitions on uses of slurs and socio-linguistic facts regarding which groups tend to use slurs. Anderson and Lepore 2013a and Anderson and Lepore 2013b argue that prohibitionism is not a linguistic but a social matter related to social practices. Social and historical factors are also at the forefront of speech act theories that focus not on what slur terms mean but on what they are used to do. This involves uncovering the mechanisms by which slurs affect social relationships between interlocutors both at the level of the conversation and beyond it. Social factors are also critical in creating the conditions for reclamation projects and other non-derogatory uses of slurs. Social structures and social norms are also critical to the mechanics of gendered slurs and sexist speech.
Non-Content Theories

Prohibitionism is the most notable non-content theory, arguing that slurs offend because they are taboo words. Anderson and Lepore develop their theory in Anderson and Lepore 2013a and Anderson and Lepore 2013b. These highlight strengths of a prohibitionist account and weaknesses of rival accounts. Anderson 2016 uses prohibitionism to explain the persistence of slurs’ offense in indirect reports. Allan 2016 argues that reporting a slur need not be taken as slurring. A related approach is proposed by Lepore and Stone 2018, which stresses the role of imaginative projects infected by listeners’ salient experiences and derogatory associations. Pullum 2018 provides a lexicographical analysis explaining slurs’ offense by virtue of their associations. Horn 2018 is concerned with the relation between slurs and taboo words.


Examines whether or not a report of a slurring use counts as a slur in itself. Concludes that it does not. Evaluates the role of intentions in determining whether the offense is warranted.


Argues that slurs are offensive not because of what they mean but because they are “taboo” words. Using a slur breaks social norms and conventions, so it is the violation of relevant edicts surrounding their prohibition that causes offense. Prohibitions are placed on slurs by the target group or others who represent the group. Discusses objections to extant accounts.


Defends prohibitionism against objections and raises further objections to extant theories (expressivism, inferentialism, externalist semantics), in addition to the ones discussed in Anderson and Lepore 2013a. Among the virtues of prohibitionism, the authors mention the ability to explain offense variation, appropriation, and restrictions on appropriation.


Argues that reports containing slurs offend because of a general prohibition on tokening a slur word. So, the offense is attributed to the reporter, since they violate the prohibition. Argues that the prohibitive norms placed on slurs block semantic and pragmatic mechanisms from doing their work in reports.


Examines the linguistic landscape of taboo avoidance and its role in meaning change. In the case of taboo words, Horn’s principle “Avoid Homonymy” blocks a word’s sense or uses even when no confusion would occur.


Argues that slurs and neutral counterparts differ in “tone,” where tone is defined as a demeaning perspective (i.e., an intuitive way of thinking delineated by negative stereotypes about targets). This is a psychological construct prompted by listeners’ salient experiences and social and historical associations that infects their judgment and shapes their responses in a way that complements or transcends the speaker’s intentions. Explains reclamation as a difference in tone.

Argues against content-based accounts that incorporate the disparaging content of slurs into their lexical meaning (e.g., Hom 2008, cited under Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts), and also against expressivist accounts relying on the analogy between slurs and swear words and expletives. Focuses instead on metadata facts about the slur words, which are not part of its meaning.


Args that expressivist and prohibitionist accounts cannot adequately explain slurs’ toxicity. To explain their emotional and psychological harm, such accounts need to be complemented with a neuro-psycho-social model similar to that proposed for curse words.

Speech-Act Theories

Speech-act accounts focus not on what slur terms mean but on what we use them to do. This involves taking on board contextual and conversational phenomena in order to determine the kinds of illocutionary and perlocutionary acts that speakers perform in using slurs. This is important when we consider the variability in slurs’ pattern for projection and embedding in complex utterances such as conditionals, negations, reports, and modals, among others. Camp 2018 examines how the broader discourse structure in which slurs are embedded affects the variability in prominence of the derogatory acts performed with slurs. Thinking of slurs as actions we perform is also important in making sense of the idea that slurs are tools of oppression and subordination. Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt 2018 argues that slurs are a way of grabbing power in conversation, and this changes the power dynamics among interlocutors, depriving targets of their conversational rights and lowering their discourse status. A fundamental question at the forefront of work on oppressive speech is whether or not we can make a case that hate speech and oppressive speech more generally do not only cause harm by changing listeners’ beliefs and attitudes but are constitutive of harm. McGowan 2009 discusses two models of oppressive speech as constituting harm. McGowan 2012 shows how harm occurs in informal racist hate speech and discusses consequences for regulating it. McGowan 2018 discusses applications to micro-aggressions, stereotype threat, offhand sexist remarks, and general implications for free speech principles. Langton 2012 provides a pragmatic model of hate speech and pornography that makes room for illocutionary and perlocutionary acts of advocating hatred and inciting desire. Kukla 2014 is concerned with how social context and discursive conventions can subvert the uptake that is given to certain speech acts based on the social relationship between speaker and target. Simpson 2013 elaborates on McGowan 2009 and its claim that speech can yield identity-based oppression by altering the permissibility facts both in conversation and beyond. Bianchi 2019 argues that the social role of both speaker and hearer are key in understanding under what conditions acts of slurring subordinate and under what conditions listeners can object. Bianchi 2014 shows how a speech-act account accommodates properties of derogatory epithets in terms of illocutionary acts and perlocutionary effects. Bianchi 2018 reframes Lepore and Stone 2018 as a perspectival account of slurs in terms of a speech-act account, focusing on their use in performing acts of assault and propaganda. Bianchi 2019 raises objections to Langton 2012, an account of hate speech and pornography. Penco 2018 draws attention to a specific act of “calling for joint responsibility” to the extent that speakers influence their interlocutors to share the derogatory commitment that slurs carry. Tenchini and Frigerio 2016 defends a multi-speech-act view of slurs. Meibauer 2016 argues that insulting is the primary illocutionary act performed with slurs.


Discusses three types of illocutionary acts: (a) assault-like speech such as persecuting and degrading acts; (b) propaganda-like speech of inciting and promoting racial discrimination, hate, and violence; and (c) authoritative subordinating acts of enacting and legitimating systems of racial oppression.


Args that slurs are harmful because they are used to perform acts of assault and propaganda. Explains several properties: derogatory autonomy, complicity of addressees and bystanders, appropriation, generality of derogatory speech, and the harm inflicted both on targets and bystanders of slurs. Discusses the causal versus constitutive distinction of harm.

Argues that a solution to the authority problem for speech act accounts of slurs must include not only the social role of the speaker but also that of the hearer. Hearers must be in a dominant social position in order to either license or object to the speaker's authority. Target group members, having a low status, cannot easily object.


Argues that slurs are used to perform two distinct but coordinated speech acts: (i) predicating group membership and (ii) expressing a commitment to the appropriateness of a derogating perspective on the group. Argues that the variability in intuitions about truth and in projection depends on factors such as the conversational focus, the speaker's purposes, and discourse structure, which determine the variability in prominence of the two acts across different contexts.


Discusses the normative statuses that speech acts institute and introduces the concept of “discursive injustice.” Treats gender-based oppressive speech acts as “performatives.” Argues that for performatives to have force, they must have “uptake.” Argues that how an audience uptakes a speech act determines what speech act it turns out to be (i.e., what normative statuses it actually succeeds in instituting).


Argues that pornography and hate speech perform illocutionary and perlocutionary acts of inciting desire and advocating hatred. This changes hearers' beliefs but also their attitudes, feelings, desires, altering norms of behaviors. Explains how these changes come about via a normative and psychological accommodation of attitudes such as desire and hatred. This captures constitutive and causal harm of hate speech and pornography.


Argues that central to a model of oppressive speech is the notion of “exercitive,” which enacts permissibility facts, thereby changing what is permissible to do later on. Distinguishes two kinds of exercitive acts: (a) standard Austinian exercitives, which require the speaker's authority, and (b) covert exercitives by which speakers need not intend to alter permissibility facts nor need the authority to enact norms.


Argues that racist hate speech is like “Whites Only” signs in that both constitute illegal acts that enact discriminatory norms. This happens through the mechanism of a covert exercitive that alters conversational norms in sneaky ways, which in turn alter broader social norms in equally sneaky ways. It is the enacting of broader social norms that makes hate speech especially harmful.


Argues that oppressive speech constitutes harm by enacting norms that prescribe harm. An utterance can simultaneously be a move in two norm-governed activities: (i) a conversational exercitive that enacts permissibility facts for the conversation and (ii) a covert exercitive in the social interaction that alters permissibility facts for that interaction.

Argues that slurs are devices for indicating an illocutionary force of insulting the target. Slurring is a subtype of insulting, and insulting is a subtype of expressive speech acts. Argues contra Tenchini and Frigerio 2016 that the insulting act is a dominant illocutionary act.


Argues that using a slur or pejorative amounts to performing two speech acts: (a) describing the target in an improper way; and (b) an act of “calling for joint responsibility.” The speaker is asking their interlocutors to share a commitment to the presupposed content, and this explains why refusing to endorse a slur is necessary to reject its implicit commitment.


Argues that offense variation can be explained by the notion of a speech act that assigns an unjust power imbalance in the conversational game. The offense is proportional to the perceived unjustness of the power imbalance. Introduces the notion of social and dialogue roles and makes links to conversational games and their use in oppressive speech. Argues that semantic and prohibitionist accounts cannot explain the data. Explains silencing and reclamation.


Discusses the “asymmetric pliability” argument to the effect that it is easier to introduce sexist presuppositions and expectations into a conversation than it is to remove them. Generalizes this asymmetry to one between making things salient and un-salient in speech.


Defends a multi-speech-act account of slurs according to which the speaker uttering a slur makes two different speech acts: one predicating group membership of the target and the other an expressive act.

Reclamation

Reclamation is the process by which some slur terms lose their potential for offense and can begin to acquire a new, non-derogatory meaning and start to be used with a new convention of use that serves a different purpose for the in-group community (e.g., to express solidarity and camaraderie). This is an important social and political tool of re-empowering the targets and attenuating the stigma associated with uses of slurs. The success of reclamation projects is limited, however. It typically remains local within the in-group community, and even there it may be subject to slurring uses by in-group members. The focus has been in identifying the various mechanisms that enable reclamation and the various obstacles that may hinder the process. Jeshion 2020 distinguishes between “pride reclamation” and “insular reclamation” and “insular reclamation.” Popa-Wyatt 2020 argues that reclaimed acts assign in-group members a powerful role and create feelings of empowerment. Burnett 2020 explains reclaimed slurs in terms of a “persona”-based semantics. Hess 2020 explains non-derogatory uses of slurs in terms of the social practices in which they are embedded. Brontsema 2004 contrasts three types of reclamation projects depending on whether or not the stigma associated with slurs can be separated from the slur word. Anderson 2018 explains various illocutionary acts involving the N-word within the African American speech community to the extent they are related to several communities of practice. Bianchi 2014 explains in-group uses on the same pattern as ironic self-deprecation. Herbert 2015 discusses the structural obstacles that might hinder reclamation projects. Ritchie 2015 explains the appropriation of slurs on a parallel pattern with plural indexicals. DiFranco 2017 examines the moral implications of reclaiming slurs. Onos 2015 argues that non-derogatory uses of slurs help target members socialize and establish a sense of identity. Gaucher, et al. 2015 is concerned with the question of positive social change surrounding the SlutWalk movement.

Argues that non-derogatory uses of the N-word involve an illocutionary act of “addressing,” whereby the target is presented as worthy of praise or recognition. These uses are tied to the speaker’s insider status and are restricted to members of the relevant “community of practice.” “Addressing” contrasts with a negative illocutionary act of “calling” whereby the target is presented as contemptible; this is analogous to “name calling.”


Argues that appropriated uses of slurs echo derogatory uses in ways that suggest the speaker’s dissociation from the offensive content. This takes the sting from the characteristic contempt of out-group uses.


Distinguishes three reclamation projects: (i) the appropriated term is inseparable from pejoration, so reclamation is opposed because the linguistic ownership is seen as belonging to the out-group; (ii) the appropriated term is separable from pejoration, so reclamation is supported because it neutralizes the value of the term; (iii) the appropriated term is inseparable from pejoration, but reclamation is supported because the term exploits its stigma for confrontational purposes.


Defends a semantic account of slurs based on the notion of “personae.” For example, “dyke” is associated with a negative anti-mainstream persona and “lesbian” with a favorable mainstream persona. Argues that semantic puzzles can be resolved by combining a theory of personae and a theory of how listeners’ beliefs about their interlocutors’ ideologies affect utterance interpretation.


Argues that reclamation is a useful moral tool, helping targets to maintain their self-respect and non-targets to show solidarity with targets, thus helping the construction of group identity and autonomy.


Rejects the notion that the term “slut” is inherently derogatory and can never be empowering. Argues that it can be successfully re-appropriated and can lead to positive change in the context of social justice movements.


Argues that reclamation seeks to subvert oppressive social norms against target groups and to bring into being new discursive conventions governing the uptake of speech acts deploying slurs. When it succeeds, the speech act deploying a slur ceases to be perceived as oppressive. But sometimes the subversive force is not recognized or is distorted, so it serves instead to reentrench the norms it sought to subvert.


Explains non-derogatory slur uses in terms of the social practices in which they are embedded. Whereas derogatory uses are indexed to a practice of discrimination, non-derogatory uses are indexed to a subversive, non-derogatory practice of satire. Argues that most
non-derogatory uses are available only to in-group speakers, though the social identity of speakers is not a decisive factor since in-group uses may still be derogatory.


Argues that reclamation is a process of linguistic creativity that after imitation and diffusion results in a new linguistic convention. Distinguishes between “pride reclamation” (“queer”) and “insular reclamation” (N-word). Both have a similar structure including: “polarity reversal,” “weapons control,” and “identity ownership.” They differ in the intended visibility. Pride reclamation seeks to redefine the group identity as one deserving of equal respect. In insular reclamation targets seek to establish camaraderie rather than to transform the out-group attitudes and norms.


Examines uses of slurs between ethnic groups within the black racial category in the United States, arguing that slurs play a role in identity formation for the second generation. Non-derogatory uses of slurs are a tool for socialization among young in-group members.


Gives a speech-act account of reclamation. Dominant groups deploy slurs as linguistic weapons to achieve power over a target group. The weapon is a speech act that assigns a low power role to the target. By self-labeling, target group members create a new speech act only accessible to them. This assigns in-group members a powerful role and creates feelings of empowerment. It also makes it hard for out-group members to use the slurring speech act.


Argues that the semantics of pronouns such as “we” can help explain why appropriation of slurs is restricted to in-group members and why it cannot straightforwardly extend to out-group members.

Other Non-Derogatory Uses of Slurs

Although slurs are used to attack they can also acquire context specific positive uses. How can this be the case? Some accounts seek to explain both the derogatory and non-derogatory uses of slurs within a unified theory. Croom 2011, Croom 2015, and Croom 2018 offer empirical analyses of slurs for Italian Americans and Asian Americans respectively. Allan 2015 examines various uses of the N-word in Pulp Fiction: some of these uses are derogatory while others are non-derogatory. Cepollaro 2017a explains reclaimed and in-group uses in terms of polysemy. Cepollaro 2017b extends the echoic account of Bianchi 2014 (cited under Social Nature of Slurs: Speech-Act Theories) to explain the variability of thick terms. Belleri 2015 examines non-derogatory, non-appropriated uses of slurs. Beaton and Washington 2015 is concerned with the derogatory and non-derogatory uses of the Brazilian Portuguese term “slum-dweller.” Bolinger 2020 is concerned with contested slurs.


Argues that most occurrences of the N-word in Pulp Fiction are uttered by an African American to or about another African American to express solidarity. The same holds when a white friend addresses an African American. When it is used by a white person to another it shows disrespect. Concludes that the destructive power of slurs is determined in context and not by the lexical form.

Defends a lexical indexicality model that explains both the derogatory meaning of the Brazilian Portuguese term *favelado* ("slum-dweller"), and its reclaimed meaning, which is contextually limited and requires simultaneous access to the pejorative meaning. This is explained in terms of a movement within the indexical field between pejorative and ameliorated meanings.


Argues that whether or not a slur has a derogatory effect is not a matter of the speaker’s intentions, beliefs, or feelings.


Explains "contested slurs," which are terms that some speakers of a language consider derogatory but are stubbornly viewed as non-derogatory by a non-trivial group of speakers. This requires acknowledging that linguistic communities contain significant sublinguistic variation. If derogation is semantic, then contested slurs must be treated as a speaking past: the stubborn are right that as they use it, the term is non-derogatory. Non-semantic views that locate derogation in the uptake effects of slurs avoid this conclusion, which is a good reason to prefer them.


Explains reclamation in terms of authoritativeness rather than in-groupness: this explains how out-groups can, under special circumstances, use slurs non-derogatorily. Contrasts reclaimed and non-reclaimed slurs with cases of polysemic formal and non-formal personal pronouns in Romance languages.


Argues that echoic theory of appropriation in Bianchi 2014 (cited under Social Nature of Slurs: Speech-Act Theories) can account for the variability of thick terms (i.e., the phenomenon in which speakers can use a negative thick term in a positive way and vice versa).


Argues that slurs are both descriptive and expressive and that we need a family resemblance conception of category membership to understand their use in discourse. Contrasts derogatory and appropriated uses of slurs.


Provides a systematic and empirical analysis of slurs for Italian Americans. Employs a family resemblance account of slurs to explain both their derogatory and appropriative uses.


Provides the first systematic and empirically informed analysis of slurs for Asian Americans that accounts for both their derogatory and appropriated uses.

**Gendered Slurs and Sexist Speech**

Slurs are present in sexist speech. Ashwell 2016 is concerned with the nature of gendered slurs and whether or not they have a descriptive content that ensures the equivalence with neutral counterparts. McConnell-Ginet 2012 argues that slurs are understood as constitutive of unfair gender and sexual practices. Manne 2017 is concerned with the problem of misogyny and the noxious effects of
sexist and misogynistic speech. Fasoli, et al. 2015 examines the social acceptability of sexist slurs (“bitch”) and sexist objectifying slurs (“hot chick”) across different types of relationships (work versus affective relationships), and as a function of the speaker’s gender (man versus woman). Diaz-Legaspe 2018 focuses on the normalizing role of gendered slurs.


Argues that words such as “slut”, “bitch,” and “sissy” are more similar to slurs than insults in that they lack a descriptive correlate that has the same extension as the slur itself and that normative factors determine the extension of “slut” or “bitch.” This poses a problem for accounts that require a descriptive, “neutral” counterpart. Also suggests that racial and ethnic slurs might have this feature.


Argues that gendered slurs work by pointing to a particular behavior or disposition to behave in a certain way that deviates from what is socially expected from members of the neutral class.


Argues that sexist slurs in Italian are judged more offensive and less socially acceptable than sexist objectifying slurs, both in work and affective relationships. Sexist objectifying slurs were less acceptable when used by men than by women.


Defines misogyny as a property of practices, institutions, artworks, and cultural environment, rather than a psychological property. Examines the various moves and forms that misogyny can take, showing how it is instrumental in upholding patriarchal norms and perpetuating harmful practices. Explains misogyny as the patriarchy’s “law-enforcement” and sexism as its “ideological” branch. Considers the role of sexist and misogynistic speech and behavior against women in power.


Argues that gendered slurs exhibit an asymmetry in insult potential depending on whether: a) they target women or men, b) are second-versus third-person uses, or c) represent the diachronic shift of derogation over time. Also explains how slurs target sexual minorities and have the effect of policing gender and sexual conformity, thus “naturalizing” the harm against them.

A Taxonomy of Derogatives

Slurs are derogative devices whose primary function is to offend and insult. But many pejoratives offend and insult. What makes slurs different? A series of papers is focused on a variety of linguistic properties of slurs and related phenomena such as pejoratives, stereotypes, generics, put-downs, and insults more generally. The focus has been on the linguistic mechanisms for implementing the derogatory content of slurs compared to the other phenomena. Other work has been focused on the social and psychological nature of insults and offense (e.g., Neu 2008 (cited under Insults, Taboos, Racist Humor, Non-Verbal Derogation).

Slurs Versus Pejoratives, Put-Downs, Stereotypes, Generics, Racist Images, and Memes

Carrus 2016 examines the interaction between assertions containing slurs and corresponding denyals. Cella 2016 analyzes the semantic content of slurs in terms of an expressive component and a generic component. Croom 2015 is concerned with racial slurs and stereotypes in the workplace. Archer 2015 draws a parallel between slurs and verbally aggressive acts such as put-downs, insults, and backhanded compliments. Croom 2013 discusses empirical data of three kinds of slur uses. Yoon 2015 shows the systematicity of slurs co-occurring with expressive terms in Korean. Embrick and Henricks 2015 is concerned with the social implications of using racial
slurs and stereotypes. Jackson 2015 examines how structural oppression helps naturalize a rhetoric of violence through the use of slurs, racist talk, racist images, and memes. Čupković 2015 examines Croatian slurs targeting the identities of ethnic and other social groups. Weissbrod 2015 discusses the effects of anti-Semitic slurs as used by celebrities and public figures from the point of view of translation studies.


Introduces the notion of “facework scale” to explain the variety of uses of slur words. This refers to face-enhancing and face-threatening strategies. These explain various uses of the N-word, including slurring uses, in-group uses, and unsuccessful cases of (re-)appropriation. Explains how facework moves can ensure plausible deniability by manipulating others’ views about targets without appearing to be impolite.


Discusses the usefulness of the notion of “at-issueness” for a debate on the lexical semantics of slurs. Concludes that even if a family resemblance conception of category membership could account for non-standard uses of the Italian slur “froccio,” it cannot account for the related semantic normativity problem.


Distinguishes two offensive dimensions of slurs: (i) a negative expressive component about the target group, which is encoded in the semantic content, and (ii) a social generic component about that group, which is conversationally implicated.


Distinguishes between the (a) paradigmatic derogatory uses, (b) non-paradigmatic derogatory uses, and (c) non-derogatory in-group uses. Discusses over twenty features of African American Vernacular English (AAVE), suggesting that this speech pattern is distinctive of working-class African Americans and so is indicative of their racial identity.


Examines the strengths and weaknesses of a context-insensitive proposal about the relationship between racial slurs and stereotypes in the workplace.


Distinguishes between racial, ethnic, and regional slurs. This classification depends on whether the stereotypical characteristics targeted involve speech, appearance, character, occupation, place, and religion. Argues that a diachronic analysis of slurs explains how they can change their semantic features (e.g., they can originate from either descriptive or expressive words, and they can lose their negative characteristics).


Argues that racial slurs and stereotypes are always judged as negative and derogatory regardless of the context they are used in. They both function as symbolic resources to exclude minorities from resources and opportunities.

Focuses on two structuring levels: (a) the institutionalization of citizenship and (b) civic literacy though formal education of African Americans.


Reports two tendencies of use in this context of journalism: (a) explicitation, accentuation, and intensification; and (b) humorous framing.


Examines combinations of expressives with varying (conflicting) attitudes. Examines the constraints that underpin the compatibility, or degrees thereof, of multiple expressives such as slurs, epithets, anti-honorifics, intensifiers, and mitigators. The analysis supports Pott’s (2005) multidimensional account of expressives.

Insults, Taboos, Racist Humor, Non-Verbal Derogation

Neu 2008 introduces the psychology and sociology of insults. Anderson 2018 examines various forms of insults, including slurs as a paradigmatic case. Milić 2018 gives an objectivist view of when an utterance counts as an insult. Berkovski 2017 advances a subjectivist view of when something counts as an insult. Allan 2017 examines the conditions under which a behavioral act counts as insulting. Anderson 2015 surveys philosophical views on racist and sexist humor. DiFranco 2017 covers the nature of iconic non-verbal pejoratives. Roache 2016 considers the nature and ethics of swearing.


Argues that the offense arises from perlocutionary effects. Distinguishes between intentional versus unintentional insults and contrasts insults and banter.


Surveys philosophical views on racist and sexist humor. Asks whether including racial slurs in humor automatically makes it less funny or unfunny. Asks whether finding a joke funny requires endorsing the stereotypes it expresses. Connects to the literature on testimonial injustice, which is the denial of credibility to a speaker due to a hearer’s prejudice.


Argues that both slurs and insults involve interpretive open-endedness that draws the audience into a collaborative process and where the speaker has latitude in how much is left up to the imaginative abilities of the hearer. Rebuts objections to prohibitionism about the discursive role of slurs.


Defends the idea that the offense of insults depends on the addressee’s personal standards of offense. Argues that slurs have a structure identical to that of insults: namely, having a target that the speaker wishes to demean and seeking to persuade the audience, through an appeal to their emotions, to help him or her to do so.

Argues that iconic non-verbal pejoratives differ from arbitrary non-verbal pejoratives and ritualized animal threat signals (e.g., a wolf’s snarl), which do not threaten targets through iconographic depiction. Racist caricatures, however, disparage their targets by inviting the audience to entertain negative images of them. For example, “blackface” performers promulgated an unflattering image of African Americans by means of make-up, costumes, and vocal impersonations.


Defines a linguistic act as insulting if (and only if) it is (i) assessed as demeaning to the addressee and (ii) relative to the standard of the target social group. Argues that the relevant standard to explain offense is an objectivist standard shared by the target group.


Defines insults as failures of respect. A key dimension in understanding insults is how to construe the addressee’s state upon being insulted. Distinguishes between “feeling insulted” and “being insulted.” “Feeling” insulted is not necessarily a sign of being genuinely insulted.


Distinguishes swear words from slurs and argues that the former are more acceptable than the latter, whether used or mentioned. Explores the nature of swearing in relation to taboos, impoliteness, and breaches of etiquette.

### Hate Speech and Social Harm

Slurs are a type of hate speech and thus used to oppress and subordinate targets. This is critical in understanding the kinds of oppressive acts that slurs are used to perform and the conditions for determining whether they merely cause harm or are constitutive of harm. Motivating this distinction is critical to making a case for regulating hate speech. This requires showing that slurs do not just harm within the limits of a specific conversation, but they also alter social norms and strengthen ideologies. Targets are also socially disempowered by being silenced. This disempowerment is also a feature of hate speech, offhand sexist remarks, and pornography, among others.

### Hate Speech and the Problem of Authority

Slurs and hate speech normalize subordination of targets by shaping their social identities to be powerless. How can speech do this? Speakers do not always have the authority necessary to subordinate others. One explanation is to connect speech with structurally oppressive social arrangements. Tirrell 1999 argues that slurs are bully words that draw from systems of oppression, and their harm is adequately captured in terms of unjust social and discursive practices rather than speakers' psychology. Tirrell 2012 is concerned with the role of slurs in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Tirrell 2017 applies a medical conception of toxicity to speech practices. Maitra 2012 distinguishes two notions of authority that are able to explain acts of subordination achieved with informal hate speech. Langton 2015 argues that social norms can arise without special authority by following rules of accommodation. Langton 2018 defines a weaker notion of authority that is adequate to explain the harm achieved with informal hate speech. McGowan 2019 circumvents the authority problem with her notion of “covert exercitives.”


Argues that social norms can arise without special authority by following rules of accommodation. Generalizes the rules of accommodation to both cases of sustaining preexisting norms and creating new norms such that something that was lacking before is supplied in the moment. Discusses the implications of norm enactment in relation to anti-Semitic propaganda and pornography.

Argues that hate speech and propaganda can gain authority informally via presupposition accommodation. A speaker presupposes authority. If hearers fail to block this kind of speech, the speaker acquires enough authority to enable them to subordinate—to make directives legitimating discrimination or exercitives depriving people of rights and power. Proposes a weaker notion of authority relative to a subject domain, jurisdiction, or comparative rivals.


Argues that ordinary instances of racist speech can be authoritative and thus subordinating targets. Although hate speakers lack the authority to subordinate or rank targets as inferior, they can nevertheless do so in two ways: (1) by attaining authority “derived” from someone else’s basic (positional) authority; and (2) by being “licensed” as an authority by their audiences who fail to challenge the presumed authority.


Chapter 3 distinguishes between standard exercitives and conversational exercitives in terms of their different conditions for success and the different sorts of permissibility facts enacted. The former require the speaker’s authority, but the latter do not. Argues for a notion of “standing” (i.e., that participants are socially positioned in having a status conferred by others—and that standing can also be licensed).


Provides an inferentialist framework in which slurs license a pattern of inferences governed by three commitments: (1) identificatory commitments identifying target group; (2) assertional commitments subsuming stereotypes; and (3) expressive commitments about the value of slurring speech. Discusses the persistence of slurs’ derogatory force in a wide range of contexts and their “reductive classification” component. Explains hearers’ complicity as a consequence of omitting to challenge bigots. Explains reclamation as reorganizing the inferential structure associated with a slur to enable targets’ empowerment.


Argues that slurs are “action-engendering” and derive their force from systems of oppression and discrimination. Shows how the slurs used in the Hutu propaganda against Tutsi in the Rwanda genocide help enact power, grant permissions to hate and kill, and rationalize crime. They have five functions: (a) identifying the target, (b) expressing negative attitudes toward them, (c) licensing inferences from the imposition of that category, and (d) establishing insider/outsider status.


Argues that the concept of toxicity helps to shed light on the mechanisms by which speech acts and discursive practices can inflict harm.

**Hate Speech and Ideology**

Slurs are intricately related to ideology and propaganda. They draw their force from the systems of oppression and subordination they are tied to and that they promote. Authors seek linguistic mechanisms by which slurs achieve social and political effects. Kukla 2018 develops a speech-act account of the pragmatic and social functions of slurs. Davis and McCready 2020 argues that the power of slurs derives from their power to invoke complex sociohistorical and ideological assumptions. Stanley 2015 is concerned with the role of slurs and coded speech (e.g., use of “dog whistles” in propaganda). Saul 2018 defends a view of implicit dog whistles as covert
Saul 2017 examines the noxious effects of Trump’s rhetoric. Cepollaro and Torrengo 2018 is concerned with how slurs differ from dog whistles. Cepollaro 2017 is concerned with how slurs contribute to spreading discrimination.


Shows how the presuppositional analysis of slurs helps explain the spread of discrimination. Explains the complicity and propaganda power of slurs as an effect of their derogatory content being presented as not open to discussion.


Argues, contra Stanley 2015, that slurs differ from code words such as “welfare queen.” The argument is that for code words the association between the lexical item and an additional social meaning is not as systematic as it is for slurs.


Argues that the power of slurs relies on background ideological assumptions. Distinguishes slurs’ offense from their derogation. Discusses some controversial cases of slurring (“Nazi”) and cases of misgendering.


Argues that an important function of slurs is “to produce subjects who occupy social identities carved out by pernicious ideologies” (p. 1). Argues that slurs work as a kind of “interpellation” that derogates and subordinates targets, reducing their identity to a generic identity. Shows how slurs and ideologies work in tandem to constitute and strengthen one another.


Argues that the pernicious effects of dog whistles succeed if the intended perlocutionary effects on the audience are not recognized as intended. These effects are not about propositions which need to be added to the common ground and they also need not be consciously available to their audience. They can sometimes be blocked.


Introduces a new linguistic device—so-called racial fig leaf—which is critical to explain the pernicious effects of political discourse. Racial fig leaf is an additional utterance that provides just enough cover to give reassurance to the audience that the main utterance (and the speaker who utters it) is not racist. Argues that fig leaves play a central role in shifting norms about what counts as racist.


Chapter 4 argues that slurs function like dog-whistle code words (e.g., “welfare queen”) in that both are pernicious devices that convey derogatory content as “not-at-issue.” This makes it more difficult to challenge or cancel since it becomes part of the conversation’s common ground without being explicitly up for consideration in the way at-issue content is.

Hate Speech and Silencing

A disempowering effect of slurs is the silencing of targets. These papers relate this to silencing effects of hate speech and pornography and has received a lot of attention in the literature. The following are selective references. Langton 1993 discusses the silencing effects of pornography in a speech-act frameworks. Hornsby 1995 covers the disempowering effects of silencing. Hornsby and Langton 1998
argues that pornography silences women’s speech. Jacobson 1995 disputes Austin’s claim that performing an illocutionary act requires uptake and considers the implications for free speech. Bird 2002 is concerned with whether or not the notion of “uptake” is necessary to understand the kinds of illocutionary acts being performed. Maitra 2009 introduces the notion of “communicative disablement” to explain the kinds of wrongs produced with pornography and racist hate speech. West 2012 argues that the silencing effects of hate speech have implications for free speech regulation. Langton 2017 explores the extent of the analogy between pornography and the law. Antony 2017 raises problems for Langton’s account of pornography as a constitutive act of subordination. McGowan 2003 introduces the notion of “conversational exercitive” to explain the harms of pornography. McGowan 2017 explores a variety of types of silencing caused by pornography. Nielsen 2012 addresses the difficulty of responding to hate speech. Lackey 2018 explores the connection between silence and the duty to object to what we perceive to be false, unwarranted, or harmful. Tanesini 2018 argues that silence can be used to voice dissent. Tanesini 2018 defends a commitment-based view of assertion in order to make sense of the idea of silencing. Wieland 2007 is concerned with the problem of authority in explaining the harms of pornography.

Argues, against Langton, that pornography does not constitute subordination: “there is no procedure accepted by women that constructs a subordinating speech act, and thus no procedure that grants pornographers the authority to subordinate women.” (pp 84)  
Argues that the problems that Langton’s account faces in explaining pornography as a constitutive act of subordination derive from conflating a normative notion of authority and a non-normative notion of power.

Argues, contra Hornsby and Langton 1998, that uptake is usually not necessary for illocution, nor is it required for the act of refusal that Hornsby and Langton focus on.

Argues that silencing is a form of disempowerment since the silenced person cannot do with speech the things that they might have wanted to. Introduces the notions of “inefﬁability” and “inaudibility” as complementary aspects of the kinds of wrongs involved in silencing. Connects silencing to debates about free speech to the extent that a speaker who is silenced is deprived of the benefits that free speech is supposed to protect.

A reply to Jacobson 1995. Argues that pornography prevents women from deriving from the benefits of speech that are warranted by freedom of speech protections. Introduces the notion of “illocutionary disablement” to deﬁne speech acts in which a woman’s intended illocutionary act is not fully successful because it fails to secure uptake.

Argues that the free speech principle involves locution, not illocution, and claims that the Hornsby-Langton line of argument has paradoxical consequences that could be avoided by giving up on the indispensability of uptake for performing illocutionary acts.

Argues that in order to understand why objecting to false or harmful speech is a luxury for many, we need to expand our current frameworks to include non-ideal features of communication. This requires making room for concepts such as power, social status, and oppression.

Argues that speech and pornography can subordinate by unfairly ranking women as inferior, depriving them of rights and powers, and legitimating discriminatory behavior toward them. Discusses the implications for women’s free speech rights. This is a classic piece that brought to philosophers’ attention MacKinnon’s 1987 claim that pornography constitutes the subordination of women by distinguishing between illocutionary and perlocutionary harms and silencing.


Explores the analogy between pornography and the law. Argues that pornography is like the law in that it has authority to subordinate, set norms, and silence. However, unlike the law, this authority emerges informal ways, determined by the attitudes of its consumers and of bystanders, including the state. It is bound to a contextually-determined domain, a jurisdiction, and a contrast class, and it consists of epistemic authority and practical authority.


Provides a Gricean analysis of silencing as “communicative disablement” by means of which speakers are unfairly deprived of the benefits that speech offers. Distinguishes different ways in which speakers may be silenced communicatively and as a moral wrong. Maitra contrasts this view with Hornsby and Langton 1998 and its speech-act account of silencing as illocutionary disablement. Extends this argument to discussion of the wrongs of pornography and those of racist hate speech.


Raises five objections to Langton 1993 and its speech-act approach to the harms of pornography and argues that these challenges can be avoided by adopting a notion of “conversational exercitive.” Shows how this can explain covert changes to the bounds of conversational permissibility. This happens without expressing the content of the permissibility facts being enacted without the speaker intending to be enacting such facts and without the hearer recognizing such facts.


Discusses four types of silencing that pornography (or its consumption) may cause, and identifies two mechanisms by which pornography might enact norms that prescribe silencing, and thereby be constitutive of harm.


Argues that the “more speech” remedy to harmful speech is empirically inadequate in that targets do not talk back. The legal treatment of such speech contrasts with that of begging. In the case of begging it is easier to respond because the law protects privileged people from harassment in public, while placing on the less privileged people the heavy choice between responding to or accepting their own subordination.


Argues that eloquent silences are silences that are communicative acts that (a) function as illocutions and (b) are intended to communicate. They acquire their eloquence through defying standing expectations and thus serve as acts of dissent. Describes some features of eloquent silences that explain their effectiveness, in some contexts, in expressing dissent.

Argues that successful asserting requires the speaker to undertake a twofold commitment: an accountability and answerability commitment. Speakers are silenced in their attempts to assert because despite their attempts to undertake those commitments, they are unable to make themselves accountable and/or answerable for the contents they express.


Argues that if racist hate speech silences other speech by interfering with its production/distribution, comprehension, and consideration, then it can be taken to undermine freedom of speech. This should offer special considerations against permitting hate speech.


Recasts the Hornsby-Langton line of argument in terms of linguistic conventions. Argues that this way of conceiving their argument solves the so-called Authority Problem but risks an unwitting defense of a rapist’s lack of *mens area*, which is an intolerable result.

**Undoing the Harms of Hate Speech**

How should we resist and remedy hate speech? We can identify mechanisms that block or undo the harm. We also look for models that explain how these mechanisms work. McGowan 2018 argues that mechanisms explaining how speech causes harm can be employed to enact egalitarian norms. Langton 2018 argues that the harms of hate speech can be undone by removing the authority that such speech presupposes. Tirrell 2018 develops a parallel with epidemiological models to explain ways of inoculating the harms of toxic speech. Russell 2019 considers how speaking up can undermine subordination. Lepoutre 2019 defends an account of counter-speech. Rahman 2015 considers strategies of deflecting the negativity carried by uses of slurs. Sbisà 2007 is concerned with the possibility of undoing speech acts. Caponetto 2018 explores the conditions under which we can undo certain speech acts.


Discusses three main ways in which speech acts can be undone (i.e., annulment, retraction, and amendment) and argues that only illocutionary acts are susceptible to being undone.


Argues that hearers can block the default process of accommodation involved in hate speech by removing the speaker’s authority and undermining the force of their speech acts. Blocking can “retroactively undo” the harms by bringing what is implicit into the open and making the “back-door” speech acts misfire. Discusses barriers or handicaps on blocking—epistemic, structural, and normative—which make blocking possible but difficult (or not possible at all).


Argues that it is difficult to reverse conversational norms enacted by “ignorant speech” (i.e., speech that disseminates or promotes falsehoods) because of the asymmetric pliability of such norms. The proposed account is based on a twofold claim: (i) positive counter-speech is generally more effective than negative counter-speech; and (ii) counter-speech should be conceived of as a strategy that operates diachronically, as it may preempt as well as follow ignorant utterances.


Claims that counter-speech cannot simply undo the effects of harmful speech, since complete reversals of the conversational score are not possible. Argues that just as speech can covertly enact harmful norms, it can also covertly enact egalitarian norms and
surreptitiously reshape the social world for the better.


Examines strategies that some target groups have developed to lessen the negative effects of slurring.


Considers five ways in which speaking up can be effective against acts of subordination: (a) refusing to accommodate, (b) broadening the conversation, (c) questioning the context set, (d) adding equality to the context set, and (e) preemptively subordinating the subordinators.


First to discuss the possibility of undoing speech acts in an Austinian framework.


Develops the analogy between remedies for toxic speech and an epidemiological model of inoculations and antidotes in terms of individual protections and collective actions seeking “herd immunity.” Among various strategies of “more speech,” the most promising is that of challenging the expressive commitments underlying toxic speech. This requires a meta-level challenge to the viability and value of the mode of discourse itself and promises to improve social practices.

**Legal Regulation of Hate Speech**

The harm in hate speech, including slurs, raises questions of legal regulation. The focus is on clarifying the notion of harm in speech such that it requires a legal response. To make progress we must define what hate speech is and the phenomena in its scope. For example, the notion of “fighting words” is legally protected. But hate speech has been seen to clash with one’s right to freedom of opinion and expression. Another approach to arguing for the necessity of a legal response to hate speech has been pursued by critical race theorists who have focused on the harms and oppression experienced by the victims.

**Harm in Speech and Free Speech**

The challenge in making a case for legal regulation is demonstrating that hate speech does not just cause harm by merely changing people’s beliefs and attitudes but causes harm that requires legal protection. The challenge is even harder to meet, especially given the First Amendment protections for free speech in the United States. Maitra and McGowan 2012 is a collection of papers on oppressive speech and its relationship to debates about freedom of speech. Waldron 2014 analyzes the harms caused by hate speech and defends legal regulation of hate speech in the United States. Barendt 2019 is concerned with the question of whether hate speech causes or constitutes harm. Brown 2017a and Brown 2017b provide a definition of “hate speech” and consider possible remedies. Altman 1993 argues that the wrongs produced with hate speech, including slurs, involve treating the targets as moral subordinates. Maitra and McGowan 2010 is concerned with the implications of racist speech on free speech debates. Hornsby 2014 argues that justifications of free speech relate to the value of illocutionary acts.


Defends a middle ground between opponents of all hate speech regulation and proponents of sweeping regulation. This requires recognizing that hate speech involving racist, sexist, or homophobic slurs constitutes subordination. This wrongs the targets by treating
them as moral subordinates. Slurs are thus not only an expression of hatred or contempt but also a mechanism of putting the targets in their place and treating them as having inferior moral standing.


Argues for a weak consequentialist interpretation of Waldron’s argument to the effect that hate speech causes harm. Hate speech may be banned because of its harmful tendencies to endanger targets’ dignity and social cohesion.


Provides a conceptual analysis of the ordinary term “hate speech.” Rejects the assumption that hate speech has a single meaning, in favor of an analysis that allows for semantic multiplicity. Rejects that emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate must be part of the essential nature of hate speech. This enables phenomena to qualify as hate speech but need not involve the literal meaning of “hate.”


Argues that hate speech is better analyzed as a family resemblance concept. This means that remedies of hate speech should be sensitive to the heterogeneous collection of expressive phenomena that fall under the category of hate speech.


Claims that justifications of free speech relate to the value of illocutionary acts not just locutionary acts. Argues against the major reasons behind the libertarian idea that actual serious harm cannot accrue from the presence of hate speech in a community where freedom of speech prevails.


A collection of contributions focusing on oppressive speech and its implications for free speech debates. The primary concern is defining what makes speech harmful, what kinds of speech are harmful, what kinds of harm it produces, how speech brings about these harms, what remedies are available, and whether or not harmful speech should be regulated. The distinction between causal and constitutive harm is critical to arguments about regulating hate speech.


Argues for the claim that significantly obligation-enacting utterances should not be covered by the First Amendment and that racist speech acts may fall outside the scope of a free speech principle.


Argues that the harm of hate speech consists in compromising the dignity of targets. This is the basic social standing that entitles everyone to equal treatment in society. It considers the legal implications of hate speech by contrasting the European and the US legal system regarding free speech regulations and whether or not they should be legally regulated as incitement to “hate crimes.”

Critical Race Theory

Work in critical race theory has advanced arguments for the necessity of a legal response to hate speech. The focus has been to draw attention to various forms of oppression from the viewpoint of the targets and discuss the implications of regulating oppressive speech for free speech debates. Matsuda, et al. 1993 is a collection of essays in critical race theory that argues for the recognition of hate
speech as a social problem that requires legal regulation. Delgado 1993 connects racist speech to racism, power, and structural subordination. Matsuda 1993 provides a narrow definition of actionable racist speech which requires a legal response. Lawrence 1993 argues that racist hate speech causes social harms such as racial discrimination, racial violence, subordination and disempowerment of targets. Crenshaw 1993 is concerned with the question of intersectionality in the case of women of color. Delgado and Stefancic 2004 is a companion volume to Matsuda, et al. 1993, which extends the various kinds of harms of hate speech and connects slurs to systems of oppression and discrimination.


Examines the question of intersectionality of race and gender subordination in the context of violence against women of color. Discusses the arguments from defense and prosecution in the case of the misogynistic interpretation of the lyrics of 2 Live Crew.


Draws on insights from psychology, sociology, and political theory to explain the harms of hate speech and the tensions between legal remedies and the first amendment. An earlier version appeared in 1982 in Harvard Civil Rights–Civil Liberties Law Review 17:133–181.


A companion volume to Words That Wound (1993), which extends the various kinds of harms of hate speech, including immediate psychological harms and long-term structural harms. Argues that slurs conjure up entire histories of discrimination.


Argues that racist hate speech causes social harms such as racial discrimination, racial violence, subordination, and disempowerment of targets. Examines the injury and exclusion experienced by black students in the wake of the Ujamaa incident.


Discusses the implications of regulating hate speech for the right to freedom of speech, especially in the United States. Seeks to eliminate oppression and challenge inequalities and social/institutional practices. The methodology is a so-called outsider jurisprudence in that it prioritizes the experience of the victims.

Empirical and Experimental Findings
Discussions of slurs have mostly been theoretical in the sense of providing the mechanisms by which they achieve their intended effects. Recently, however, more attention has been paid to empirical evidence of both qualitative and quantitative analyses of certain use patterns of slurs, the experimental work of the perception of offense that slurs cause, as well as the self-empowering effect that re-appropriation enables. Cepollaro, et al. 2019 empirically investigates the variation in offense between slurs and insults across different syntactic positions. Spotorno and Bianchi 2015 discusses the pros and cons of online versus offline empirical studies. Panzeri and Carrus 2016 examines experimentally whether the offensive component of slurs is non-displaceable. Galinsky, et al. 2013 tests empirically a reappropriation model based on the empowering effects of self-labeling. Carnaghi and Maass 2007 investigates the automatic reactions between derogatory group labels versus category labels. Greenberg and Pyszczynski 1985 argues that overhearing derogatory ethnic labels can lead to negative evaluations of the target. Greenberg, et al. 1987 replicates the negative effect of overhearing slurs in courtroom settings. Saucier, et al. 2015 reports findings of different categories of slurs that produce varying levels of perceived offensiveness and any number of aggressive responses. O'Dea, et al. 2015 examines the variation in perception of offense. Jay and Jay 2015 measures taboo word fluency and connects taboo word use and personality traits. Henry, et al. 2014 argues that cultural taboos emerge concerning insults against low-status groups. Technau 2018 empirically investigates the frequency of different modes of use across slurs, pejoratives, and expressives. Fasoli, et al. 2015 examines how gendered slurs affect their victims.

Tests the hypothesis that category labels and derogatory group labels equally activate stereotypes. Finds that for heterosexual participants derogatory labels activate less favorable associations than those activated by category labels. By contrast, homosexual participants reacted in the same way to category and derogatory labels. Heterosexuals are in particular negatively affected by derogatory group labels.

Provides empirical support that slurs offend more than insults in isolation but are less offensive when they are predicated of targets. This is because slurs have a descriptive content denoting group membership, in addition to the negative evaluation shared with insults. This is taken to be compatible with hybrid accounts but not with expressivist and speech-act theories. Also finds that slurs and insults are less offensive for indirect reports rather than direct uses and argues that this goes against prohibitionism.

Empirically tests the variation in offense of gendered slurs when uttered by men toward women, both in work contexts and intimate relationships.

Argues that group power increases targets’ willingness to label themselves with a derogatory term: targets feel more powerful after self-labeling, and observers perceived their group as more powerful. Increased perceptions of power help attenuate the stigma attached to the slur term after self-labeling.

Confirms empirically that ethnic slurs activate negative schemata about members of a targeted minority group. For example, when a black debater lost the debate, the ethnic slur would lead to lower evaluations of his skill than had he been white and lost.

Replicates the effect found by Greenberg and Pyszczynski 1985 in a courtroom setting where the defense attorney and defendant are evaluated differently depending on whether or not they are associated with the target. When the defense attorney is black, and the defendant white, the attorney was referred to as “shyster” or “nigger.” The white defendant was evaluated negatively when defended by a black who was the target of slurs.


Argues that the perception that a group is of lower status in society is associated with the perceived offense of insults targeting that group. People perceive slurs against a low status group as extremely offensive, which is mediated by the expectations that low-status targets would be emotionally reactive to the insult.


Argues that expressives and pejoratives are found to be generated at higher rates (and much earlier) than slurs. Female-related slurs (e.g., “bitch”) are generated at high rates, suggesting that they transitioned from sexist slurs to general pejoratives or are used as expressives. Taboo fluency is positively correlated with neuroticism and negatively correlated with agreeableness and conscientiousness.


Replicates the effect found by Greenberg and Pyszczynski 1985 in a courtroom setting where the defense attorney and defendant are evaluated differently depending on whether or not they are associated with the target. When the defense attorney is black, and the defendant white, the attorney was referred to as “shyster” or “nigger.” The white defendant was evaluated negatively when defended by a black person who had been the target of slurs.


Argues that slurs used among friends are perceived as less offensive than between strangers. Equally, the appropriated use “nigga” is perceived as less offensive. Ratings of offense are correlated with individual differences relating to the justification and suppression of prejudice. Finally, individuals observing uses of slurs are more or less offended depending on the context and their beliefs about the social appropriateness of expressing prejudice.


Provides experimental findings that offense survives in conditionals and questions but diminishes in indirect reports and is almost nullified under negation. The reason why negated slurs are rated as not offensive is that negation is interpreted as metalinguistic. These findings are taken to support a pragmatic approach of slurs in line with presuppositional accounts.


Discusses empirical evidence that men respond with physical aggression when targeted with slurs. Suggests that male beliefs about honor are associated with the perception of slurs as offensive and their likelihood of responding physically, especially for slurs that directly challenge their masculinity.

Argues that empirical studies are critical to illuminate theoretical debates such as the dispute between content based versus non-content based, and the echoic approach to slurs. Suggests that a useful experimental investigation of slurs is the domain of cognitive and affective neuroscience, in particular the investigation of how the human mind handles negative stimuli.


Argues that slurs are more frequently used in contexts among friends than enemies. Distinguishes between hate speech as the central use of slurs, and other pejorative uses (mobbing, insulting), parasitic uses (banter, appropriation, comedy, youth language), neutral mention (academics, PC), and unaware uses.