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13 An invariant of human experience is the yearning for understanding. We struggle to make sense
14 of the particulars we are suspended in and we preserve the resultant good. One such good thing:
15 we think about things and make things that we think of. One good thing about this back-and-
16 forth between mind and matter is THEORY: theories of things. Theories are subjective generals
17 that help us deal with particulars.

18 We talk and we think of talking. In telling and listening and in thinking about talking, we
19 abstracted the essence—a theory—of talking, i.e. grammar. Grammar, not unlike any good
20 theory, was useful in talking properly. In the spirit of preserving good things, we started
21 teaching grammar, very early. This tradition of nurturing theory abstracted from practice, from
22 the practice of planned perception (experiments), continues to this day: we teach calculus (a
23 theory of change) early in high school.

24 Thinking about scientific theories led Professor F. William Lawvere to abstract a theory
25 of the development of scientific theories (Lawvere, 1994). Lawvere’s functorial semantics of
26 algebraic theories spells out how the essence (theory) of a given category of particulars is
27 abstracted, how the thus abstracted theory is interpreted to obtain models with which particulars
28 can be compared, and how generalization depends on a doctrine (viewpoint). Changing the
29 doctrine, as James Clerk Maxwell emphasized, brings different phenomena into view. Given the
30 correspondence between

31 Particulars – Properties – Theory – Models – Doctrine

32 and

33 Stimuli – Sensations – Concepts – Percepts – Self

34 which is a well-defined reflection of cognition in mathematical knowing (Posina, 2020), I
35 thought scientists committed to solving the mind-matter problem would readily recognize a
36 solution to their problem in Lawvere's functorial semantics, and begin to study *Conceptual*
37 *Mathematics: A First Introduction to Categories* (Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009), a good textbook
38 for learning the science of the relations between particulars and generals that is at the core the
39 mind-matter problem.

40 The times are a-changing. Given the ease of building extremely large and useful lookup
41 tables, theory—scientific theorization—appears to be in danger: scientists are subscribing to faith
42 (Nature Editorial, 2016). As though this is not sad enough, scientists are parading flashy
43 speculations as scientific theories of the relations between things and thoughts (see Posina,
44 2019). What does it take for scientists to take a break from selfies and renew their respect for
45 serious thought (cf. Geman and Geman, 2016)? Just in case professors find studying textbooks
46 below their pay grade: Roderick MacKinnon studied textbooks long after his tenure at Harvard
47 and was soon rewarded with a Nobel Prize. More importantly, is it pedagogically ethical not to
48 teach Conceptual Mathematics—our scientific understanding of abstracting theories and building
49 models—to high school students, who may or may not want to participate in the practice of
50 science, but are surely thinking about things and making things made-up in their minds (e.g.
51 kites, music, and family)? In education we trust.

52 Added rationale for introducing Conceptual Mathematics in high school curriculum is
53 provided by what I learned from studying Conceptual Mathematics: (i) Every change of any
54 object [of a category] preserves its essence; based on these natural transformations, objects are
55 represented for ever more refined understanding needed to create: make imagined real, anew.
56 (ii) The way we ought to reason about things varies with the nature of things. (iii) The

57 comprehensibility of our universe, which befuddled Einstein, is made possible by reflective
58 parts; reality consists of parts that are reflective of reality. In light of the moral significance,
59 practical value, and the heartwarming success of literacy drives, Education has no excuse not to
60 make our scientific understanding common knowledge!

61 Conceptual Mathematics is also the needed corrective of the common misunderstanding
62 of mathematics. We all begin mastering abstraction early in childhood (e.g. GRANDMOTHER).
63 Addressing the commonplace question ‘what is it good for?’ is a mathematical method of
64 defining objects (Lawvere and Rosebrugh, 2003, pp. 26-29; Lawvere and Schanuel, 2009, p.
65 334). In addition to true or false and numbers, purpose, subjectivity, and qualities, which are
66 often cited as difficulties in solving the mind-matter problem, are all suitably positioned in
67 mathematical reflections of reality (ibid. pp. 84-85; Lawvere, 2007).

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