

Suicide As Unfreedom And Vice Versa

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1.1. Introduction

In this paper, I problematize the *suicides out of despair* (hereafter *sod*) as *statements of unfreedom*. The paper is divided into six sections. The first section introduces the problem and situates it within the existing scholarship. The second section puts forward the first of the two arguments the paper engages: suicide as unfreedom. In this section, the situational and *essent'ial*¹ ontology of suicide is briefly discussed and then I proceed to classify two major forms of unfreedom emergent from the *historical ontology* of human social life: slavery and bare life². The third section of the paper problematizes unfreedom as freedom corrupted both from the perspectives of Heideggerian *essent'ial* ontology and Badiouian situational ontology through set theoretical models of freedom/unfreedom. Subsequently three sets of unfreedom: heteronomy, atomy and bare life and one set of freedom vis-à-vis autonomy is logically derived and discussed. Freedom is presented as a directive idea helpful in doing away with unfreedoms. Then the second of the two problems – unfreedom as suicidal- is briefly discussed. The concluding section draws that despite the emergent historical reality having framed human social life as unfree, we could still be hopeful in recovering freedom as the *essent'ial* ontology of the human species and the *evental*³(*événementiel*) potential of the situational ontology of life is not fundamentally unfree.

In the following two paragraphs, I discuss the distinctions between *sod* and suicides out of choice (hereafter *soc*) and then I discuss how suicides are accounted for in various disciplinary and theoretical positions. After the brief discussion on various approaches to suicide, I elaborate what I hold as unfreedom, contrasting it from freedom, from the positions of situational and *essent'ial* ontology. Through the discussion, I arrive at a thesis that not just the despair driven suicides are impelled by conditions of unfreedom but also *unfreedom is suicidal*.

Soc differ from *sod*, as the *sod* is resentment over the victims' status of unfreedom to live⁴, whereas the *soc* is expression of freedom to die. The *sod* victims would not have committed suicide had they either been habituated with the situations of despair or felt that the situations were being subdued or overcome. If suicides happen in clusters among marginalized communities, it could likely be despair driven suicide. *Sod* could be a final statement of suffering, despair, grief, frustration or anger by its enactor and often it is the voice of despair from within *the victim community*.

Soc on the other hand need not have been prompted by any conditions of unfreedom, but by a decision to end one's life. That one is unwilling to live because of either personal reasons or social conditions⁵ or even out of realization that life is worthless to live ahead. The personal or political reasons for *soc* can range from loss of interest to continue living, to expressing one's freedom to end one's life, to even a spiritual, or ideological decision to stop living. *Soc* could also be expression of a person's resistance to certain conditions of social life against which, she could express her protest with her self-inflicted death. *Socs* can be distinguished from *sods* because under the conditions of *socs* there would be no suicidal unfreedoms. There were *socs* among prehistoric communities just as they are among the late modern societies;⁶ however, under varying conditions. For instance, the suicides of suicide bombers are mostly *socs*. The categorization of suicide as *soc* and *sod* should not be taken too

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far as they are only a categorization for convenience. Suicides in reality are fuzzy categories. They are both in degree *sods* and *socs*.

It is argued that those *sods*, which occur in clusters, are especially likely to occur under conditions of unfreedom. The suicides reported among aboriginals, small and/or marginal farmers, manual labourers, the unemployed, or other marginalized communities might well be mostly *sod*⁷. It is endemic in countries like Australia, Canada, New Zealand and USA that suicide rates among aboriginals is about three to five times higher than that of the mainstream⁸. Most of the aboriginal victims of suicide are reported to be either adolescents or persons in their early youth⁹. Unlike the predictions¹⁰ made by Durkheim, the rise in the rural suicide rates is higher than that of urban suicides, throughout the world, compared to the rates of earlier decades¹¹, even if there are a few exceptions. Studies suggest that the rate of suicide in rural areas of the third world countries rose steeply from the introduction of structural adjustments which were made in late 1980s and early 1990s¹², whose fundamental fallacies are evident by now. It has been observed by scholars that the rates of growth of rural suicides are not 'normal'¹³. If we take India as a case in point for third world suicides, it can be observed that among Indians, suicides are highly prevalent among lower middle class people, small farmers, and manual labourers and other populations that are *being* marginalized. Though unreported, suicides increase among adivasis¹⁴, dalits¹⁵ and poorer sections of India¹⁶. Indian rural suicides, for instance, have sharply risen since 1991, the year, which coincides with the beginning of the structural adjustment regime¹⁷. Increases in suicides among already marginalized communities are a strong indication of the acceleration of their experiences of despair.

Studies of suicides in the third world countries reveal that humiliation, loss of honour, economic failures, indebtedness, crop-failures (especially while using genetically modified seeds), rising cost of agricultural inputs disproportionate to the return of income, inability to meet marital expenses of one's daughter or sister (dowry related expenses), chronic physical illness, etc., individually and in combination with other factors such as disputes with spouses and in-laws, internal migration and its associated discomforts, etc., are some of the immediate reasons for suicidal decisions. The recent suicide studies, in general, observe the pattern of suicide among economically affluent societies is demographically different from those of poorer ones. Among the middle class populations of affluent societies suicides among the elderly is on the rise, whereas, among the people living in ghettos and among the lower middle class of the affluent societies, the youth suicide rates are higher. The studies of suicides in the west show that largely youth suicides have familial precedence¹⁸. In the 'developed' nations, unlike the 'developing' ones, schizophrenia, drug abuse, recent economic loss(es), limited social support, or isolation in old age, etc., are cited as the reasons for most of the suicides¹⁹. The point I forge ahead is not a case for increasing rural suicides but to figure out that more than rurality or urbanity, it is the actual and felt²⁰ unfreedoms that lead one to *sod*. Though suicides are committed in the affluent north and the impoverished south for different immediate reasons, and despite every *sod* being irreducible singular acts with irrepeatable unique features, the *sods* worldwide have the same underlying universal reason²¹: unfreedom. The universality of the condition that leads one to suicide is not in conflict with the particularity of the contexts under which the *sods* happen. Recognizing the underlying cause is important because, that which triggers by abject despair is indicative of serious deterioration of human social life at large, a despair that is artificially engineered as if it were the only possible economics.

1.2 Approaches to suicide in academic literature

Suicide studies, often referred as *suicidology*, are a vast field of research with both conflicting and complementary theoretical streams. Most of the recent studies of suicide are from the field of epidemiology²². Epidemiologists view suicide as a contagious psychiatric disorder²³. Psychiatrists focus on the aspects of adverse childhood conditions²⁴, mood disorders²⁵ and other clinical psychiatric aspects. Psychiatric research into suicide is biased towards developing diagnostic systems²⁶. Sociological studies concentrate on the collective aspects of suicide such as its statistical pattern of recurrence²⁷, social fact²⁸, shame²⁹, excessive individualism³⁰, and social exclusion³¹. Psychological

theories of suicide, on the other hand, focus on the personal dimensions of anomy, guilt, despair or exclusion³². Psychological theorists ponder the developmental³³, familial³⁴, stress related³⁵, hopelessness,³⁶ interpersonal,³⁷ and rational³⁸ dimensions of suicide. They often concentrate on the variables such as depression, self-esteem, the locus of control, emotional disturbance and recent stressors³⁹.

Present-day sociologists belonging to various schools of generative structuralism unlike their predecessors, integrate the agency centred psychological and microsociological aspects with its structural counterpart and probed the '*structural*' aspects of suicide⁴⁰. Trying to explain suicides sociologically, Giddens hybridizes Durkeimian sociology of anomie and Halbwachsian psychology of the individually experienced 'social isolation' of the suicidal, and offers his theory of structuration, within which he identifies psychological and sociological factors nondually culminating in suicides⁴¹. There are also sociological studies concentrating dimensions of *Werther effects* and media contagion of suicides⁴². Studies from gender theorists reveal how gender disparity and the social construction of masculinity takes its suicide toll among men⁴³. Suicidology also has a wide reserve of contributions from the fields of biology, and neurology. Neurologists explore brain processes such as serotonin dysfunction, which may result into impulsive suicide⁴⁴. There have been occasional attempts to explain that suicides have the genetic basis⁴⁵. There are also attempts by economists who theorize about suicide. Economic theories mostly draw their logic from the philosophy of utility and rational choice⁴⁶. However, the studies, despite their breadth, have either serious limits, as they subject the query to the rigid constraints of their discipline, or if they wax transdisciplinary or interdisciplinary, as they fall beneath the sheer weight of the complexities of such endeavours.

2.1 Suicide as Unfreedom

Irrespective of whether suicides happen out of choice or despair, to use the language of structuralism, the statement of suicide has its morphology, syntax and structural aspects of grammar at its broadest level. Looked from its generative angle, it has its contextual meanings, praxis, generative grammar and micro aspects of practices. In other words, there are structural aspects, facticities⁴⁷ and the particularities of contexts specific to the suicide, and the exchanges between the aspects mentioned above⁴⁸. However, studies conducted from the perspectives of structuralism, post-structuralism, or those woven from the microsociological aspects lead us astray as they do not help us to understand the underlying reasons that let such a structure or nonstructure to emerge.

Before delving further into the issue I must, for the sake of clarity and efficiency, make the following propositions:

1. Clusters of suicides⁴⁹ of despair happen among those sections of people thrown out of time and space. Throwing out the politically disadvantaged from place and time happens, because space and the time, in the social contexts, are political constructions construed as disadvantageous for the outliers within the history-power-state regime⁵⁰. Time, as Negri puts it, is not merely a measure but, "the global phenomenological fabric," the base, the substance and the flow of production, the production of the social, in its entirety⁵¹.

2. Mostly suicides happen because of intense subjective suffering. The intense suffering could at least be credited to the conspiracies of their *dominant alterity*⁵² - the oppressing 'others' - to hurt someone. Ironically, the suicidal 'intense suffering' is not altogether unrelated to the horizons, the existence, and the processes of the love of the *dominant alterity*⁵³. In other words, the play of the *politics of jouissance*⁵⁴ of the *dominant alterity* and its instruments of power⁵⁵ could not be written off as clean or discrete.

3. Suicides in clusters happen among the victims as their life is carried away by the adventitious storms of figurations⁵⁶ that disposition them into unknown destinies⁵⁷. Or, more simply put, so-called progress or development which sets their lives on unknown, uncertain paths. And,

4. Fundamentally, suicides are both statements of protest and despair in reaction to lives which have been turned into 'unfree bare life'⁵⁸. Reducing a human into bare life is to equate his or her life with the reality of simply being alive, not unlike a plant; contemptible, quite opposite to what defines the principles of life: freedom⁵⁹.

Being thrown out of space and time, being subjected to the politics of *jouissance* of the *dominant alterity*, being carried away by the storms of figurations, and being left to resist despair with their nothing but bare-life are signs of unfreedom.

Unfreedoms are clear, freedom is obscure⁶⁰. While *sods* clearly instantiate unfreedom, freedom is difficult to isolate as it is about life and the rightful living, both which defy encapsulation. Life is obscure; death is clear. Unfreedom is concrete and observable because it has distinct, obvious effects: suffering, revolt, resignation and habituation. Unfreedom, as Žižek puts it is being caught into a forced choice⁶¹. The idea of freedom is abstract, but clearly directs us politically, despite its abstract nature. The notion of Freedom is an axiomatic one by which we recognize unfreedoms. In other words, freedom is the socially and politically recognized construct whereby we determine, by counter-example, what is unfreedom.

2.2 The situational and 'essent'ial ontology of freedom/unfreedom

Freedom is situationally emergent and sustainable, through human action; nevertheless it is fundamental property and *active aspect* of the human species and its praxis⁶². Freedom has its foundation in human care-structure and its engagement. Quoting from Heidegger, Dallmayr observes:

"Freedom," ... "is not merely what common sense is content to let pass under this name: the caprice, occasionally present in our choosing, of moving in this or that direction. Freedom is not mere arbitrariness in what we can and cannot do; nor, on the other hand, is it the mere submission to a requirement or necessity (and thus to an ontic standard or object). Rather, prior to all such 'negative' or 'positive' construals, freedom is engagement in the disclosure of beings as such"⁶³

Heidegger further clarifies, "freedom is not governed by human inclination"; and "man does not 'possess' freedom as property," on the contrary "freedom, or freedoms, or existent revelatory *Da-sein* possesses man"⁶⁴. This Heideggerian observation indeed takes us closer to Badiou's nonsubstantial ontology.

Seen from the perspective of nonsubstantial ontology, freedom is emergent from situations and activities. For instance, Badiou holds that freedom is a contingent reality emergent out of the situational elements constituting it in infinite ways⁶⁵. However, it can also be noted the situational ontology of Badiou and 'essent'ial⁶⁶ ontology of Heidegger share their meaning, as Heidegger, too, construes freedom as the condition or grounding of the possibility of *Dasein*⁶⁷. The essent'ial and situational ontology are indeed equiprimordial because neither *essent* nor situation can exist without the other.

2.3 Forms of unfreedom: precapitalist slavery and late capitalist bare life

Slavery in the historical past and bare-life in the late modern present are major types of unfreedom, both came into existence from the usurpatory malice of the power elite. Both unfreedoms, though emerged under different historical ontologies, separated by epochs and episteme they share a commonality: the forced state of exception, unfreedom. Slavery is a status where the slave has no right or ownership while over whom, any or all the powers connected to the right of ownership are exercised. Bare life, on the contrary, is a redundant life that has lost its utility for the dominant, therefore excepted from the political life. Slaves were not considered 'fully human'⁶⁸ on the other hand bare life remains included in politics as the exception, that is, as something included solely

2.5. Unfreedom: subversion of citizenry

Bare life is unfreedom; it is the state of exception⁷⁸, a state of being excepted from the totalised empire⁷⁹. By the phrase ‘state of exception’ I would like to suggest the subversion of a particular citizenry and withdrawal of citizen rights especially that of the people living in lower strata of the economy and society. In this paper I am not discussing the state of exception in the West or about the ‘exception’ of those who are labelled as terrorists or refugees, rather I concentrate on the global state of exception of the lawful but marginalized citizens of the nation-states and the bare life being imposed on the humans not yet born. The ‘State of exception’ of the marginalized in the nation-states, I argue, is the direct fallout of exceptional privileges avowed by and rendered to the transnational corporations and their logic⁸⁰. In other words, the marginalized are thrown out from their existential spatio-temporality and made further a subject of *transnational nonsovereign*⁸¹ *sovereignty*.

For Schmitt, the sovereign is the one who decides over the state of exception⁸². The nation-states having lost their decision making power to the representatives of the corporate, through the global agencies of trade, commerce, and finance, though having ceased to remain as the sovereign power, it has emerged as the genie that takes orders from the global corporate power. The corporate has emerged into the sovereign reducing nation-states to being the instruments of its command⁸³. It seems, unlike Foucault’s prediction that the subtle biopower or will replace violent sovereign power, there has emerged a new corporate sovereignty that combines both bio and sovereign powers through reconstituting the erstwhile sovereign state into its instrument and itself operating in the domains of value and utility. It is brutal and convincing at the same time. It promises prosperity and remain ruthless when it is threatened. Unlike the sovereign states, the new corporate sovereign is spatially global, and temporally futurized. In other words, notwithstanding its spatial expansion at the planetary scale, the corporate regime has already colonized the future with its long-term investments, global treaties and exclusive rights over forms of knowledge, and even over the codes of life. As Negri points out, “the traditional relationship of time and space is definitely overturned. Space is temporalized” – the globe is futurized. Negri adds, “it is a condition of the constitutive realization of time”⁸⁴. As its spatial expansion has already contributed to the politics of exceptions globally, its temporal colonization extends to politics temporally for the times yet to come, which Francis Fukuyama *jouissantly* proclaimed as “the end of history.”

Being trans-spatial and trans-temporal the corporate sovereign is powerful enough, not just to contain plurality and freedom in the present and the local, but to wipe out the possibilities of rhizomatic multiplicities and silence the undercurrents of contradictions in every zone of space-time to come. *This is suicidal*. The corporate sovereign with its totalizing spatio-temporality implodes into every space-time pushing out its infinite sets of multiplicities of social dynamics which forces its participants into bare-life. Its spatial expansion has already extended the politics of exceptions globally; all that is to be seen is the total colonization of future and its politics too. The expansion is fatal. It is cancerous. It grievously hurts life in the world. It brings politics and the plurality of thought to a grinding halt.

The Empire of Corporate sovereignty indeed is a new hybrid of bio and sovereign powers. Corporate sovereignty, unlike that of the state sovereignty is abstract and multiple. The Empire has already emerged into a multiheaded hydra with its all-pervading presence world-wide, and extending its roots into the future. The Empire of corporate sovereign, since being an entity with “[n]o soul to damn: no body to kick”, goes unquestioned even when it creates the worst forms of bare life⁸⁵. In the words of Hardt and Negri, the corporate empire is a *nonplace* of politics that is at once unified and diffuse in such a way that it is impossible to distinguish any inside from outside—the natural from the social, the private from the public, the sovereign from the bio⁸⁶. Through creating the Empire,

“[w]e have thus arrived at a series of distinctions that conceptually mark the passage from modern to imperial sovereignty: from the people to the multitude, from dialectical opposition to the management of hybridities, from the place of modern sovereignty to the non-place of Empire, from crisis to corruption”⁸⁷.

While the corporate entity has to use its sovereign and biopowers for its spatio-temporal colonization, it lets the machine fuelled with biopower by setting the consumerist’s ambitions and competition for the opportunities which the corporate entities throw at its will for its survival. The people who are deprived of their space-time and reduced to bare-life could hardly become consumers and as they could not even be ‘qualified’ to grab the competitive opportunities. They remain outside the emergent corporate space-time. Suicides are reactions against such a deprivation of their freedom to live.

Historically, the unfreedoms let wealth be amassed at the top and risks at the bottom⁸⁸. The risk bearers are the victims of the advancing politics of exception. *Sod* is often the *strategy*⁸⁹ of the *habitus*⁹⁰ subjectivated to the *fields*⁹¹ of bare life. Through their last breadth, the victims yell at the order of things in the world. While a few shout at the *dominant alterity* that shirks responsibility for the marginalized and leaves them only death as an option, while others face the reality of the bare life, helplessly. The clusters of *sod* are the last breath of the political at the turn of life becoming apolitical: an acute subversion of citizenry. With the containment of politics life becomes bare life. Suicides happen when there is a transition from political life to bare life. Once one is reduced to bare life and when that fact is internalized there will be no suicide. Dogs and cats do not deliberate on suicide. Similarly, if bare life could ‘successfully’ thrust upon, then there would be no despair driven suicide from the rock bottoms of the social world.

3.1 Unfreedom as freedom corrupted: elements and their corrupt forms that constitute freedoms and unfreedoms

In the following paragraphs, I describe the elements that frame the situations of unfreedoms drawing on the concepts of freedom from Agamben, Badiou, Bookchin, Foucault, Heidegger, and others, and reconstitute them into the perspectives of set theory⁹² in order to explicate how unfreedoms are combinations of corrupt forms of the elements that make up freedom. Set theory unlike the theories that claim ‘what there is’ is capable of presenting the “structure of what any situation *says exists*”⁹³. Corruption, explained in the words of Hardt and Negri, “contrary to desire, is not an ontological motor but simply the lack of ontological foundation of the biopolitical practices of being”⁹⁴. In Heideggerian terminology, corruption is concealment and distortion that hides the ‘essence of truth’; i.e., freedom⁹⁵. For Badiou, evil is nothing but corrupt truth⁹⁶. Further, he confirms, “[i]f Evil exists, we must conceive it from the starting point of the Good”⁹⁷. *The Empire is evil. Unfreedom is freedom corrupted.*

3.2 The elements that constitute freedoms and their corrupt unfreedoms

Situations of freedom (δ) I hold is a fuzzy set having the elements of *Ecology of freedom* (EoF), *Projectival openness* (PO), *Care of the self* (CoS) and *Authenticity* (A) ($\delta = p\{ \text{EoF, PO, CoS, A} \}$ ⁹⁸). Of these four fuzzy elements *Care of the self* is the individual dimension of freedom, *Ecology of freedom* is the transindividual freedom of collective amplitude; *Authenticity* and *Projectival openness* are mixed situations where the former has individual accomplishment with collective import and the later is collective accomplishment with individual import. The fuzzy set can be imagined as a spiral set by the care of the self expanding into the horizon of the ecology of freedom.



Fig. 2.The Fuzzy set of freedom

4.1 Set theory, fuzzy sets and their significance

Set theory is the formal theory of nonunified multiplicities⁹⁹. Set theory mathematically discloses that being is inconsistent multiplicity as the elements forming sets can be transfinitely reconfigured especially because every element in a set is a transfinite set in itself and because of the null set, which incite infinite multiplicities further¹⁰⁰. The null set, the void of a situation, Badiou clarifies, is not simply what is not there, but what is necessary for anything to be there¹⁰¹. The void is not the absence, but that which is not counted, yet, that is, infinitely vibrant, indeterminately multiple, transfinitely variant, profusely different from other voids and torrentially differentiating. Further, the vibrant inconsistency can never be done away with as there exists no totality or absolute that is set of all sets¹⁰². In addition, the entirety of the set cannot determine singular events of the multiplicity, therefore it is indeterminant. This implies that, fundamentally ontology is, boundless: free. However, when elements also exist in their corrupt form, they are boundlessly free: free to be unfree – infinitely unfree. The infinite corruption into unfreedom has to be countervailed with infinite freedom. The infinite corruption has its historical ontology to fake its substantiality. The historical ontology, if unquestioned naturalizes corruption: unfreedom.

Distinguishing classical set theory from the fuzzy set theory Tursken remarks:

In Fuzzy sets and logics, every word, concept or proposition is allowed to be a *matter of degree*¹⁰³. In the mathematical treatment, generally, words, propositions and sentences are represented by sets. Sets specify the meaning associated with words, or sentences. Naturally, sets can be represented either as two-valued classical sets or as fuzzy (infinite)-valued sets. Once words are represented by sets, the associated meaning of words gains a *description* in terms of the mapping that is chosen, i.e., crisp or fuzzy. Words represent concepts that are generated and formulated in our "minds" as a result of our perceptions¹⁰⁴.

Tursken further makes it clear that "[i]n terms of mathematical expressions, the basic expressions of each combination generate a Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF), and a Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF), in classical set and logic theory where "AND", "OR" are mapped in a one-to-one correspondence to set symbols " \cap ", " \cup ", respectively". While in the classical set theory CNF and DNF are equivalent, in fuzzy set theory these one-to-one equivalences breakdown. This in turn invites additional "Laws of conservation" in fuzzy set theory. In fuzzy sets, "words and propositions are represented by sets that are verified fuzzily"¹⁰⁵. The elements of the fuzzy set are fuzzy and have properties of other elements¹⁰⁶. Elements of Fuzzy sets share their boundary with other elements and are present in degrees. Fuzzy subsets are a collection of objects with unsharp boundaries¹⁰⁷. The fuzzy theory is a non-reductionist theory that captures the grey granules between black and white and helps us to cope with the complexity of phenomena¹⁰⁸. Fuzzy truth-hood is a "degree of truth-hood, beyond

the binary truth. Elements of fuzzy sets are words rather than numbers. Fuzzy logic is about computing with words¹⁰⁹. Described below are the fuzzy elements and their corrupt forms that constitute the freedom and unfreedom sets respectively.

4.1.1 Fuzzy element one: the ecology of freedom and its corruption

Ecology is fuzzy; it is both a rhizomatic,¹¹⁰ deterritorialized zone of flux and a field of tension with undercurrents of contradictions and conflicts. It is both the nonhierarchical or holonic¹¹¹ pattern and a balance of relatedness of everyone/everything with every other in infinite ways and the hierarchized zones of conflict where everyone/everything is in constant conflict with every other. Ecology is what Badiou calls the “infinite alterity” which is “infinite and self-evident multiplicity”¹¹². *Being in, being found in and being in conflict with the ecology* is the fundamental human condition¹¹³. Ecology is emergent out of what Ardent qualified by “care for the world”¹¹⁴ and contradictory self-interests. The Ecology part of the ‘*Ecology of freedom*’ is a condition emergent out of the flux and mutability¹¹⁵ of situations and the autonomous resoluteness of individuals and interest groups. Ecology of freedom is the freedom possible within the fuzzy ecology and its live tension. It is the *unwon tension* between the rhizomatic mutuality and the undercurrent conflicts that sustains the ecology, and the freedom in it. As Heidegger holds “freedom is a particular property of man and that man is a particular being within the totality of beings”¹¹⁶. Ecology is at stake when the multiplicity of ecology, its conflictual undercurrents, its rhizomatic relatedness is reduced to the aggregate of isolated units. On the contrary Ecology is composed not of units but of dimensions, or rather directions in Brownian motion¹¹⁷. Loss of ecology is loss of freedom. For instance, the disturbance of a forest eco-flux¹¹⁸ through deforestation denies the freedom of the beings in the wild to survive. Here ecology is at stake as its rhizomatic mutuality is violated by the conflicting undercurrents of the interests of certain humans, mostly power elites. Similarly, *ecology of freedom* when it violates those who live in the social ecology are deprived of their freedom. The following words of Tarz instantiate such a deprivation of the *ecology of freedom* of aboriginals:

To understand Aboriginal suicide one has to understand Aboriginal history: their way of life has been destroyed, resulting in a loss of structure, cohesion and meaning. The legacy for the present generation is a loss of basic communal values. The continuing effects of that history on today’s Aborigines are more important to the understanding of Aboriginal suicide than any psychological, sociological or medical theories. To ignore, or worse, to deny that history is to obfuscate the origins, causes and nature of a current problem and to forestall any possible alleviation¹¹⁹.

Aboriginals lose their ecology when their ecology is broken down by the ‘civilizations’ outside.

Bare life happens when the *ecology of freedom* is lost under the state of exception. Bare lives are lives lost to the narcissist conquests of the *dominant alterity*. Narcissist absorption of ecology does not always happen as blunt and open selfish consumption of the ecology, but also through tactics of multicultural tolerance, which could be a deceitful form of narcissist disavowal and mashing of the underlying social antagonism and “monotony of today’s global life”¹²⁰.

What Giddens calls ‘the space-time distantiation’ and ‘colonization of the future’ does not happen in a social vacuum. That happens in the social ecology, as an invasion of colonial intent destabilizing the native social ecology, and reconfiguring combinations of elements that constitute that ecology.

Ecology of freedom is lost where only the powerful, strong and the maneuvering could survive. Super powers and the Empire emerge only at the cost of ecology of freedom. When ecology of freedom is protected meek, gentle, honest and simple can survive. Within the ecology of freedom poverty and powerlessness would not become unlivable.

4.1.2. Fuzzy element two: the *projectival openness* and its corruption

Projectival openness too, like the other constituent elements, is inherently fuzzy because being projectival is both conducive and contradictory to openness. It is also fuzzy in terms of sharing its boundary with other elements constituting freedom. *Projectival openness* is the ontological condition¹²¹ of human existence that emanates both from their innate species character and situationally¹²² contingent *eventals*. In this limited sense, *projectival openness* is both substantial¹²³ and contingent: fuzzy. Heidegger uncovers its substantial ontology, and Badiou makes its situational ontology evident¹²⁴. Having projects and being open to the world and to oneself is the transcendental characteristic of human freedom¹²⁵. However, the seriality of situations and the projectival openness could also *enframe* the social and its constituents as it could liberate.



Fig. 3¹²⁶ Openness

Openness is constrained with every restrictive territory of individualized exclusive and prohibitory ownership, while at the same time having a space, a territory, is conducive for projectival openness too. In the emergent knowledge economy since the abstract entities like ideas, thoughts, information and knowledge are legitimately owned, the extent and depth of constraint on the *openness* is severe. Such constraints restrict humans not just from being projectively open but also restrict the abstract entities like art-forms, software or genetic substances to have their own free-projectival-evolution¹²⁷. For instance, seeds not only have slipped out of farmers' nurturing and proliferation; they are restrained even from their natural free-projectival-evolution as they gradually become the prerogative of breeders, genetic engineers, and commercial seed growers¹²⁸. The closure of seeds into the domain of corporate production brings unfreedom at least in three domains: (1) it unfrees the farming community from domestic and international open exchange of seeds; (2) it makes farmer participation, in both plant breeding and seed saving redundant and (3) it ends strong public breeding programmes¹²⁹. Seed politics already restrained the natural evolution of seeds as well as claiming lives of third world farmers¹³⁰. Giddens remarks that Nature is 'scientized' and 'colonized' and even pushed to its 'end'¹³¹. This means there are few, if any, aspects of the natural world that have been untouched by the narcissistic- "anthropocentric interests of pure science, or from the profit-maximizing interests of applied corporate 'science'"¹³². It should be resented that the closure and its related unfreedoms are artificially pushed on the world while the technology is ripe for openness and transparency, that is indeed ironic. The artificial containment of seed's natural potential from regenerating and keeping the claim of exclusive restrictive ownership of the gene codes does not just remain smart business. It affects the social ecology. In this regard Kuyek, a seed scientist observes:

The seeds we plant are thus profoundly social: they reflect and reproduce the cultural values and social interests of those who developed them. If they are widely distributed, as with the high-yielding and high response varieties of the Green Revolution, they can effect massive social transformation"¹³³.

The social ecology under the culture of gifting, sharing and interdependence is dramatically different from that of restrictive and conventional consumerism. Under the new regime of *restrictive consumerism*, consumers' rights are limited to the act of consumption¹³⁴. They are restricted by law from sharing, modifying or reinventing the product or service they have bought. *Restrictive*

consumerism is an emergent phenomenon in the field of digital production such as software, music and other digital art forms. Consumers under the regime of new ‘*license raj*’¹³⁵ buy user licenses and not the product, so, they have only limited rights, the right to consume*¹³⁶. However, without having rights over ideas, thoughts, information and knowledge it will not be possible to claim their freedom, especially when knowledge and ideas in their entirety, could be claimed as sole properties of corporate powers¹³⁷. Therefore, the devotees of free knowledge like the ones of the free-software foundation *counter-jouissantly* claim over knowledge and restrict it to those who restrict knowledge flow, as one may have to be free to say, “no freedom for the enemies of freedom”¹³⁸.

Under conditions of openness there would be no prohibitory ownership. The openness provides a lush environment for diversity and spontaneous evolution: the survival of the possible. Its opposite, the closeness devolves through its cherished principle: the survival of the fittest where in fitness is hardly anything more than the art of closing the others.

4.1.3. Fuzzy element three: the *care of the self* and its corruption

‘*Care of the self*’ is self mastery. It is the freedom where an individual resists subjectivation passed to the interior from the outside. It is a gate-keeper somewhat of guarding one’s interiority from being subjectivated by the social exterior. When one is overpowered by that power which operates through those microstrategies, that turn the self into a prisoner, into its own agent of disciplinary practice one is subjectivated¹³⁹. *Care of the self* is a freedom in relation to oneself where in one “assumes an independent status and allows a relation to oneself to emerge and constitute an inside which is hallowed out and develops its own unique dimension: ‘*enkrateia*’, the relation to oneself that is self mastery:

Is a power that one brought to bear on oneself in the power that one exercised over others’ to the point where the relation to oneself becomes ‘a principle of internal regulation’ in relation to the constituent powers of politics, the family, eloquence, games and even virtue¹⁴⁰.



Fig. 4¹⁴¹. An Indian version of Self Mastery

Through *care*, one reclaims one’s own time and space¹⁴². *Care* is enabling one to ‘get free of oneself’ from being subjectivated in the ‘games of truth’¹⁴³. ‘*Care of the self*’ is a fuzzy field wherein the compassionate acceptance of the other and resistance to the subjectivation would be persistently having its unwon tension of dialectics. Corruption happens when either of the poles declares its victory: the pole of narcissist resistance, or the pole of subjectivation.

Care of the self had its variants in traditions of Greek and Christianity. Foucault had talked about them in his last lectures. Care of the self in the Christian tradition is its practice of exhaustive ‘confession,’ austere penance or verbalization of one’s sins and ‘evil thoughts’ to one’s superior in order to flush out devil from one’s inner thoughts. Foucault observes this as a techniques¹⁴⁴ of self renunciation. For Greeks the careful self cultivation is *epimeleia heautou*, translated as ‘care of the self’. ‘*Care of the self*’ as practiced by ancient Greeks for Foucault is constitution of a self through ethically correct action. ‘*Care of the self*’ is exercise of autonomy where one resists all techniques of dominations. It is conscious enhancement of one’s irreducibility into the structure.

The Buddhist meditations, practices of yoga, practices of *kalari*¹⁴⁵, Jain practices of extreme self constraints, self-inflicted mendicant life are a few to mention the practices of ‘care of the self’ that were practiced as means of establishing a relationship of oneself with oneself equivalent to the similar Greek and Christian practices.

The care of the self of a nation-state¹⁴⁶ is lost when its political elite, its media and its people are carried away by the tactics of economic hit men and other maneuverers. When a population or community lost its critical conscience to be aware of or incapable of questioning the games played on them they have lost their ‘care of the self’. The loss of ‘care of self’ is sleep walking into the ‘games of truth’.

4.1.4. Fuzzy element four: *Authenticity* and its corruption

Authenticity is being resolutely true to oneself where as ‘care of the self’ is being alertful against the world that may convert one identical to itself. Authenticity, as conceived by Heidegger, shares its border with the ‘*care of the self*’. One, *dasein*, is free and authentic, Heidegger holds, as much as one has resoluteness to resist the socially sanctioned, habitually enforced averageness of daily-life and remain true to the ‘call of the conscience.’ Whereas Foucault emphasizes the resistance to the ‘games of truth’ and subjectivation, Heidegger’s idea of *authenticity* is focused on achieving the most extreme possibilities of *dasein*¹⁴⁷. Being Authentic is the mode of being free and open [*Erschlossenheit*] wherein *dasein* emerges independent from¹⁴⁸ the world and its ideology, its history, nature,¹⁴⁹ and even from God¹⁵⁰ owing to explicit understanding of its ontological condition that gets it over to the resoluteness [*Entschlossenheit*] which also reshapes its habituated norms and practices¹⁵¹. However, according to Heidegger, authentic resoluteness is not merely holding up the “the call of conscience” but also “calls into a situation,” and being is “intrinsically permeated by world and others”¹⁵². The unwon fuzzy tension of authenticity thus happens between the polls of conscience and situation:

Seen as authentic mode of self-being, resoluteness does not cut *Dasein* loose from its world, nor reduce it to a free-floating ego. How could this happen-given the fact that, as authentic openness, resoluteness is nothing but the authentic mode of being-in-the-world? Actually, resoluteness prompts *Dasein* to deal in a concerned manner with things at-hand and to nurture with solicitude the co-being (*Mitsein*) with others (Heidegger as quoted by Dallmayr)¹⁵³.

Being authentic in Heideggerian sense is to bear the inner dialectic tension of being ‘authentic co-being’ and resolute *dasein*.¹⁵⁴ While ‘*care of the self*’ is the dialectics of inner resistance against subjectivation, *Authenticity* is realization of the ontologically prevalent freedom of existence.

There are other versions of authenticity. To be authentically human from the Buddhist perspective is to be relived from the myth of ego-essentiality and the delusions about the absolute. An authentic human being, according to this understanding, reclaims humaneness and compassion through the realization of non-essentiality of self and impossibility of the absolute¹⁵⁵. The impossibility of the absolute and non-essentiality of oneself if realized makes one responsible and convinces one of the futility of greed and concurrence. It is from the awareness and realization of one’s non-permanence (*anicca*) and ego-nullity (*anatta*) one suspends ego-nurturance and emerges into an authentic being (*nibbana*). Craving for permanence, ego-essentiality, expansive ego-nurturance, craving for the Absolute and internalization of collective social ignorance are, from this perspective, inauthentic. From Buddhist perspective inauthenticity causes suffering to the inauthentic humans and the world around them. Buddhist perspective of authenticity is a counter concept challenging its competitive spiritual position that authenticity is the realization of the super soul (*Brahman*) in oneself (*atman*) and oneself in the super soul whose inauthentic existence is the universe. Buddhist version of authenticity was an attempt to purge the pre-Buddhist spirituality from its idealism that often took the form of essentialism.



Fig. 5. The Budhahood: authentic realization of freedom

4. 2. 1. The freedom/unfreedom sets

The corrupt forms of the elements constitute situations of unfreedom. The elements become corrupt when the dialectic tensions are resolved, and either of the pole gains its victory over the other. In other words, there could be no freedom in either thesis or anti-thesis, rather freedom is possible only in the generativity of dialectics and praxis, that which has no end. For instance, under bare life (β) dialectics and praxis is forced to be at its end as the elements that otherwise constitute freedom are under the state of exception: $\beta = p\{EoF^e, PO^e, CoS^e, A^e\}$. However, the set of β would not remain silenced into exception forever because every element that constitute β are sets in themselves, each having their own creative voids of infinitely differentiating null sets and the set as a whole has its own creative voids, the voice of the other, other than the apparent elements¹⁵⁶. As neither null can ever be




Fig. 6. Sets of Unfreedoms and their elements

The narcissistised, beguiling and impostor elements that fake the elements that constitute freedom, and traps its victims into various forms of unfreedoms leaving themselves and their ‘others’ into bare-life. Some prominent forms of unfreedoms into which individuals and societies are trapped are the following sets: Atomy (ω)= $p\{EoF^n, PO^n, CoS^n, A^n\}$ where in the elements are narcissistised ; and heteronomy (ψ)= $p\{EoF^c, PO^c, CoS^c, A^c\}$ where in the elements are constrained. Unfreedoms are mutually related and they reinforce each other. Freedom is a set that has no trace of unfreedoms: $\delta = p\{\beta', \omega', \psi'\}$ wherein the fuzzy tensions that are still prevalent let one to be alert fully aware and resolute.

4.2.2 The heteronomy set: (ψ)= $p\{EoF^c, PO^c, CoS^c, A^c\}$ ¹⁵⁸

Heteronomy for instance, is a totalizing unfreedom, a post-political totality, and draws its justification from its omnipotent ideological premise. It is “advent of the same”¹⁵⁹ and “indifference to

differences”¹⁶⁰. Heteronomy terrorizes by imposing the total and unqualified power of a truth¹⁶¹. Totalizing [t]error always comes from the ‘desire for the omnipotence of the True’ while truth in reality could never be complete¹⁶². It was the idea that all history is the history of class struggle that gave the ideological fuel to the Marxist totalitarian regimes; Nazism drew the justification for its totalizing endeavor from its ideology of struggle between races. Badiou notes: “[f]undamentally, Nazism was a thorough going ethics of Life. It had its own concept of ‘dignified life’¹⁶³,’ and it accepted, implacably, the necessity of putting an end to undignified lives.” Heteronomy finds its justification from the ‘universalizing pole’ of ‘ethics’ in the name of some collective ‘Good,’ the ecological pretext wherein the unpretended, genuinely ecological ethics would be on the ‘differential pole’ attuned to the irreducible alterity of the Other¹⁶⁴.



Fig. 7. The all seeing eye of the Empire

The totalizing Empire, the *corporatocracy*¹⁶⁵ of the present day too, very much like the totalitarian nation-states, draws its justification from its ideological position: the market fundamentalism. Ideological logicalities replace free thought and subjectivate people and constitute them as a part of a single impersonal movement of total domination¹⁶⁶. The totalizing logic, though false, is affective and could bring the world into its self-fulfilling prophecy. Arendt sarcastically puts it, “we have learned that the power of man is so great that he really can be what he wishes to be”¹⁶⁷. Historically, totalizing regimes take away the lives of innocents: ‘infidels,’ ‘witches,’ Jews, homosexuals, gypsies, intellectuals etc¹⁶⁸. The present regime too takes away the lives but through a *penapticon* model of biopolitics in which the victims are caught in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers of their own death¹⁶⁹. In the totalizing regimes of nation-states and Empire, we see in common is the *ecology* will be brought under control on the pretext of the ideological fictions the regimes hold; *openness* will be constrained so, there will be opening only in the direction the ideology allows; *care* will be manipulated into an internal instrument that resist every other competing ideology to keep one subjectivated to the reigning ideology; *Authenticity* would also be fudged into being resolutely ideological. The price of heteronomous total power is the eradication of human and natural plurality¹⁷⁰. Ironically, heteronomy flourishes on the ethical predication based on recognition of the other which, Badiou recommends should be purely and simply abandoned¹⁷¹.



Fig. 8. Fuzzy sets of Heteronomy, Atomy and Bare life

Totalization, sameness, closeness and reduction are forms of corruption. Unfreedom is sustained through corruption. Corruption is mathematical fraudulence. The corrupt mathematics is that bears unfreedom. Corruption is the ideology of the biblical serpent. Under heteronomy the ecology of thought is subjectivated, openness is constrained, differences are contained, and authentic existence from everydayness is forbidden.

4.2.3 The Atomy Set: $(\omega) = p \{EoF^n \cdot PO^n, CoS^n, A^n\}$

Atomy, unlike heteronomy and bare life is a double-edged, and deceptive form of unfreedom. Atomy can be found in exploitation of the other - the ecology, or in ecology subordinated to the logic of the same¹⁷², corruption of *Care of the self* into egoistic resistance, or self-perpetuating hedonism, and also, the *authentic* existence subverted to resolute conquest of the other or absorbing the other into oneself in the pretext of the 'infinite responsibility for the other.' Atomy $(\omega) = p \{EoF^n \cdot PO^n, CoS^n, A^n\}$.



Fig. 9¹⁷³. The atomous self love of narcissus

Atomy is often misrecognized as autonomy and freedom. The double edges of atomy are: the Heideggerian resoluteness egotised, and Levinasian 'infinite responsibility for the other' narcissistised. Atomy is the 'self-interest' that sustains the totality of Smithian 'invisible hand'. Though, the Levinasian alterity is apparently responsive to the difference of the other, as Badiou puts it: "[a]nd this simply because the finitude of the other's appearing certainly *can* be conceived as resemblance, or as imitation, and thus lead back to the logic of I the Same"¹⁷⁴. Often it is the 'exporting democracy, or the 'civilizing mission' that brings forth the worst forms of unfreedoms. The 'infinite responsibility for the other' unlike Arendt's 'care for the world' frames an absolute other outside the ego and transposes narcissism from outside in. Badiou exposing the narcissism inbuilt in the logic of alterity, says quite succinctly:

What I cherish is that me-myself-at-a-distance which, precisely because it is 'objectified' for my consciousness, founds me as a stable construction, as an interiority accessible *in its exteriority*. Psychoanalysis explains brilliantly how this construction of the Ego in the identification with the other - this mirror-effect - combines narcissism (I delight in the exteriority of the other in so far as he figures as myself made visible to myself) and aggressivity (I invest in the other my death drive, my own archaic desire for self-destruction)¹⁷⁵.

Atomy, in short, is selfishness and free fulfilment of sovereign self at the cost of the other. Atomy is reified as if it were autonomy within the social construction of the mythology of individuality.

Under the corruption of atomy, self as the self-sameness emerges as the dominant ideology. Self-sameness is corruption. Narcissism has its root in the ideology of self-sameness. The Corruption is understood par excellent in the treatises of Buddhism where it is said:

Just as the word 'chariat' is but a mode of expression for axle, wheels, and the chariot-body and other constituents in their proper combination, so a living being is the appearance of the groups with the four elements as they are joined in a unit. There is no self in the carriage and there is no self in man¹⁷⁶.

Further developing the above argument *Theravada Buddhism* recognizes that totalization and narcissism are two sides of the same coin.

4.2.4 The Bare Life Set: $\beta = p\{EoF^e, PO^e, CoS^e, A^e\}$



Fig. 10¹⁷⁷ & 11¹⁷⁸. Bare life under captivity and everyday life

Of all unfreedoms, the one, which could explain suicides happening in clusters among the relatively marginalized, is bare life (β) that happens under the state of exception. The unfreedom of bare life is however, exasperated by the prevalence of other forms of unfreedoms either in the arena of their alterity or among the victims themselves. It is not the status of being immersed into the bare life that invites victims to suicide, rather suicide emerge as an option while the transition to bare life is under process and the '*ecology of freedom*' of the victims is being scuttled off. As already pointed out, the politics of exception in bare life is operational through excepting the *ecology of freedom* (EoF^e), *Projectival openness* (PO^e), *care of the self* (CoS^e), and *Authenticity* (A^e)

4.2.5 Freedom, unfreedoms and their relation

The relationship between freedom and unfreedoms can be shown as it is in the fuzzy cognitive map (fig.4). A plus (+) in the figure indicates that there is causal increase. A minus (-) refers to causal decrease.




Fig. 12 Fuzzy cognitive map

5. Unfreedom is suicidal

I allotted more space to the idea of unfreedom than to suicide in this essay because unfreedom is a more fundamental condition of human existence than suicide is. Suicide is a dramatic case point that illustrates unfreedom. The act of suicide is just one among many other forms of unfreedoms. What is more unbearable than the death by suicide is being habituated into unfreedoms and continuing

a dead life. This essay is not written to express the voice of the dead and gone, but to express the voice of those who still live in the unfree world. Unfreedom is suicidal. It will wipe away life from the planet.

6. Concluding Remarks

Ironically, as long as we witness suicides in the sites of bare life, we could still see an unsilenced resistance even at the cost of lives. The suicides at the sites of bare life would end once the realities of the bare life are habituated; that continues to happen with slavery. With the loss of value of their lives, suicides, too, lose their political value. Killing of a bare life is not a homicide; similarly, self-inflicted deaths of the bare life ceases to be counted as suicide once the actuality of bare life matures into its completion¹⁷⁹. However, even in the acute subjectivation to bare life there can be possibilities of resistance and collective action as there are historical instances where such a reduction into bare life has been turned into a cause for political agency¹⁸⁰. Even within the course of events that leads to bare life there can be “revolutionary pathos of an entirely new beginning” of turning bare life into a political-life¹⁸¹. As argued by Žižek, “a true act [could] not only retroactively change the rules of symbolic space; is also disturbs the underlying fantasy”¹⁸².. Freedom is freedom from the fantasy.

7. Afterword

Whom does this paper address? Is it for those who dedicate their lives for suicide prevention social work? Is it an academic reserve for the sociologists? Is it a philosophical treatise addressing abstract issues of freedom, unfreedom, atomy, autonomy, etc.,? Is it for policy makers, politicians and others to forge ahead new frame works of policy decisions? Is it for the discipline bound suicidologists? Is it for communities of bare life that would like to make out what is happening around them? Is it for the sons, daughters and significant others of the suicidal victims? Is it for the victims themselves? This question puzzles me as the paper looked from any of the above said points of view is deficient. However, the paper has resources for all of them, which they may have to draw from it in their own ways.

Primarily, I am addressing myself. Here I expose the struggle I go within myself in the context of my observations and readings. However, this may be useful for others too.

For Social Workers, the paper introduces a broad perspective of suicide as unfreedom and vice versa. To work on suicide is to work on unfreedoms. The paper also outlines, however, leaving a lot to the readers imagination what could exactly unfreedom be? Its exactness is in its refusal to be precise. Instead of precision fuzzy exactness is discussed.

Policy makers, these days emerged into promoters of unfreedom and bare life. The paper may help them to look at their stand reflexively. They may have to check whether they promote ecology of freedom, projective openness, care of the self and authenticity. They may have to think a lot and plan ahead to reduce unfreedoms taking direction from the percepts of freedom. This may be applicable to the politicians too, among those who still remain for the cause of wellbeing.

Communities that face bare life and its iron grip may find a reason to be political and resist the figurations of bare life and refigure them as freedom. They cannot just sit and expect that things would one day become alright. It won't. They have fundamental reality of situational and substantial ontology on their side. They are not alone in their struggle. No one other than themselves would effectively question the historical ontology of unfreedom. In this struggle, the social workers could be their associates.

Those who are about to end their lives losing it to the conditions of bare life may draw reasons for living and fighting the bare life, atomy and heteronomy that continue to take tolls.

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¹ Essents = “existents,” “Things that are” (Heidegger, 1999:ix,1). Essent’ial is different from essential. Essentialism falsely attributes essence to social constructions. For example, gender difference has no essence in it. However, there exists essent’ial sex difference.

² Bare life is human life deprived of its politics. I am borrowing the phrase from Agamben. Prof. Gurukkal’s comment: Is it not superfluous to reduce forms of unfreedoms to two ? What about the multiple forms of servitude and different modes of human subjection that involve a variety of definitions of freedom >< unfreedom representing historical setting of humans’ being ?

³ Hallward’s translation of Badiou’s word *événementiel* (Hallward, 2003:xvii). It is ‘sudden emergence’, rupture-twist-turn, political outbursts “spring up” in spaces uncounted and uncovered by existing institutions of state or social processes. Eventals are always unique and singular. However, they can start the figurations of change which Badiou calls fidelity. Richard Stallman’s realization of ‘freedom’ in software production and modification is one such evental. The free software movement is its fidelity.

⁴ Nevertheless, the *sod* need not always be the suicides of unfreedom. However, massive and serial suicides that happen in the same geographical location or among the persons belonging to similar socio-economic stature, or ethnic communities with a pattern of relative uniformity if attributed to wholly to impulsive decisions reacting to the singularities of immediate unpleasant instances or neurological conditions we will be committing errors of methodological solipsism, or empirical fallacy whether or not committing other methodological fallacies.

⁵ Satyagraha’s sometime end in suicide. For instance, Irom Sharmila Chanu a poet, painter and a staunch Gandhian woman undertook a fast unto death demanding the repeal the Armed Forces Special Power Act, 1958 of the Government of India, and died on November 4, 2000. Suicides are seen respectable in Jaina traditions. In Japan too suicide is often seen as moral act (Young, 2003)

⁶ Kiemo, 2004:10. Kiemo documents that among prehistoric nomads it was common that sick and elderly choose to die to prevent death endemically spreading as for them death is contagious.

⁷ Prof. Gurukkal’s comment: The argument in the case of aboriginals cannot be easily borne out by existing anthropological knowledge.

⁸ Krebs, 2005; Middleton, 2003; Pesonen, 2001; Shiva, 2003:88; Simpson & Conklin, 1989

⁹ The classification of adolescent and youth are made based on the age of the persons. Aboriginals, especially those who suffer the conditions of bare life die early and become part of work force earlier. Tarz, 1999; Kiramayer, 2004; Hunter, 2002

¹⁰ For Durkheim, suicides are social facts that happen while individuals out of excessive individualism scuttled off from forms of social attachments and social regulation or, when they are excessively regulated. Durkheim pointed out protestants, who are relatively more individualized are more susceptible to suicides than Catholics and Jews of his time as the later were more bound together by tradition. Unlike Durkheim’s prediction, that the individualized and urbanized committing suicide, suicides happen among the aboriginal and rural folks for whom communitival bondedness still matter. It is not because of anomie (normlessness), altruism, egoism (insufficient integration with the society) rather because of various sorts of unfreedom such as inability to meet personal and collective expectations, shame, incapacity to cope with the emergent social and economic order, being reduced to worthless, and having no means to compete for survival etc (Durkheim, 1951)

¹¹ Davis, 2007:12-13; Middleton, 2006: 1991-92

¹² The structural adjustment policies though were put in the mouths of those who pretended as if they were economists who were indeed conspirators hired by of the leading power elites and corporations. They were pushing the policies through their Economic Hit Men who were assigned the job of spreading

unfreedom everywhere in the name of freedom. Perkins, 2004; White, 2007; Hong, 2000:59; Ritzer, 2007:181. Also watch

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6RBQF5uelpo>

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=29GhXsx7-Rs>

¹³ Herring, 2005:9

¹⁴ Indigenous people of India

¹⁵ The 'untouchables'

¹⁶ Madhu, 2005:160; Tarz, 1999: 89; Shiva, 2003:104

¹⁷ Patnaik, 2003:22,25; Stone, 2002

¹⁸ Kiemo, 2004; Gallagher, 2002; Cutler, 2001

¹⁹ Bhatia, et. al., 2000; Bhatia., et al., 1957; Prasad., et al., 2006; Pionetti, 2005; Sathish, 2006; Mishra, 2006; Herring, 2006; Newman, 2007; Corsby, Rhee & Holland, 1977; Suri,K C, 2006; Patnaik, 2007; Patnaik, 2003; Mohanty, 2004; Singh, 2006; Vaidyanadhan, 2006; Reddy, 2006; Sridhar, 2006; Rao & Suri, 2006; Jeromi, 2007; Mohanakumar & Sharma, 2006.

²⁰ Prof. Rajan Gurukkal's opinion on this sentence: The unfreedom need not be felt by all the suicide victims of Sod variety. Unfreedom is what you discover and abstract from the ontology of the social life. The suicide victim could have felt the despair. In the case wherein Unfreedom becomes objectively realised by the subject, despair will transform into agitation turning suicide an act of dissent or protest

²¹ The 'real' for Bhaskar is the underlying structure that are not spontaneously apparent in the observable pattern of events. However, they can be deciphered through practical, theoretical, scientific or philosophical investigations (Bhasker, 1989). For Badiou it is "being, in a situation, in any given symbolic field, the point of impasse, or the point of impossibility, which precisely allows us to think the situation as a whole (Badiou, 2001:121)." In Bhasker, the 'real' has the generative mechanisms whose manifestations are seen in the 'actual' domain. Bhasker holds that events (not in the badiouvian sense of 'event') and behaviours are at the domain of the actual. In the domain of actual events and patterns of events are observable. The domain of 'empirical' the third domain consists of what we experience (Bhasker, 1978). Badiou revolutionizes the 'actual' set of situations from which his 'real' emerges. Actual for badiou is not something in which reality is subdued and perverted, rather, it is the field for the eventual reality.

²² Kosky, 2002:80

²³ Leenaars, 2004; Yufit, 2005

²⁴ Brodsky and Stanley, 2008

²⁵ MacLeord, 2004, Catanzaro, 2002

²⁶ Lester, 2002:12

²⁷ Durkheim 1951, Maskill, 2005

²⁸ Durkheim, 1951

²⁹ Tangney, 1995: 1132-1145; Hastings et. al., 2002: 67-80; Sheff, 2000: 13-27

³⁰ Lester, 1997; Lester, 1982

³¹ Tubergen and Utee, 2006

³² Halbwachs, 1978

³³ Oquendo & Mann, 2008

³⁴ Brendt & Melhem, 2008

³⁵ Currier & Mann, 2008

³⁶ Abramson, et al., 2002

³⁷ Davila, 2005

³⁸ Silverman, 2000

³⁹ Lester, 2002: 12

⁴⁰ Giddens, 1965

⁴¹ He justifies that such an integration would be methodologically superior as the new hybridised approach would not only explore the question of why in certain social situations individuals kill themselves, but also would find its converse: why do others, in a great range of social situations, not display suicidal behaviour? - *ibid*; Giddens, 1984:8

⁴² Marsden, 2000; Jamieson, 2003

⁴³ Connell, 2005; Scourfield, 2005

⁴⁴ Sanchez, 2007; Mann, 2003

⁴⁵ Westefeld, 2000

⁴⁶ Hamermesh & Soss, 1974

⁴⁷ For Heidegger facticity is the state in which *dasein* exists. Facticity, Agamben explains, “is not the factuality of the *factum brutum* of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of *Dasein*’s Being-- one which has been taken up into existence, even if proximally it has been thrust aside.” -Agamben, 1991: 177-242

⁴⁸ Ricoeur, 2005:90

⁴⁹ Suicides occurring in demographic clusters.

⁵⁰ Cosmological time emerges from cosmological events. Similarly, social time emerges from the events constituting the social. The events in the human arena are essentially political either concretizing the politics of the history-power-state regime or dysfunctioning that (Badiou, 2005: 13-18; Badiou, 2005: 252).

⁵¹ Negri, 2005: 29. Prof. Gurukkal’s comment on this sentence: Space in its very nature is temporal and time spatial. The concept of time-space homology borrowed from physics, has implicitly served as a point of departure for the recent social studies with one eye upon temporality and the other on spatiality. The inter-relationships between human life and social structure (time-place) make unfreedom better understood. In social perspective there is only a historically contingent space-time, a space constructed, worked and practised by temporally specific social relations.

⁵² Alterity is the other in whose context the illusion of self becomes possible. It is the state of being the other. The theory is proposed by Immanuel Levinas to counter Heidegger’s idea of *Dasein*. The weakness of the idea of ‘alterity’ though not visible seen from the elite perspective, it is obvious from the position of subaltern. The conscience of the subaltern is that of their alterity. Take the euphoria of growth and development of the 1990s. They were indeed something engineered from outside by economic hit men and their employers. That had constituted the mentality of every one subordinated. The alterity, unlike Levinas presented it, seen from the positions of marginality is dominant one. The dominant alterity that is responsible for one’s status of unfreedom need/should not be responded with ‘infinite responsibility’ as Levinas instructs. The patronizing responsibility towards ones other comes from one’s privileged position within the hierarchies of dominance. A corporate white young male executive or CEO can speak of his infinite responsibility towards a marginalized aboriginal woman or her community, but not vice versa!

⁵³ Badiou, 2001:66

⁵⁴ *Jouissance* is inward politics of secret enjoyment of dominance over one’s other. It is a Lacanian terminology later reconstituted to mean inward politics by Žižek.

⁵⁵ State, its bureaucratic instruments and the party mechanisms are such instruments of power of the *dominant alterity*, mostly the corporate. There is *politics of jouissance* as Žižek observes in the pro-corporate but anti-poor legislations and its implementation where the mechanisms of parties and their bureaucratic appendages do not just do their ‘duty’ for duty’s sake out of the claimed objectives of development or economic growth but for the hidden gratification it brings (Žižek, 2005:120-121)

⁵⁶ Figuration is the process through which figures emerge into view (Deleuze, 2003:98). Elias presents figuration as the structuration process of mutuality and inter-affectiveness (Elias, 1978: 261). Here the figuration of the *dominant alterity* stifling its marginalized other is indicated.

⁵⁷ Elias, 1978:134

⁵⁸ “Bare life” is life excluded from politics. Agamben holds that in being excluded from properly-qualified political life, “bare life” is thrown into a more basic and fundamental political relationship with the sovereign power that excluded it (Neal, 2007:4). In Agamben’s words, “bare life in the political realm constitutes the original -- if concealed -- nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception” (Agamben, 1998:7). Bare life (*zoe*) is an exception within the political life (*Polis*): an inclusive exclusion (Agamben, 1998:8)

⁵⁹ Badiou, 2001:12

⁶⁰ Badiou notes, “Injustice is clear, justice is obscure.’ Also, he remarks, “That it is easier to establish consensus regarding what is evil rather than - regarding what is good (Badiou, 2005d:52)”

⁶¹ Žižek, 1995:75

⁶² Madhu, 2005:13, 17

⁶³ Dallmayr, 1984:216

⁶⁴ Heidegger, 1949:301

⁶⁵ Hallward, 2003:166

⁶⁶ According to Ralph Manheim, translator of Heidegger's "An Introduction to Metaphysics" Essents = "existents," "things that are" (Heidegger, 1999: 1f)

⁶⁷ Dallamy, 1984:219

⁶⁸ Tallant, 2005:1377

⁶⁹ Agamben, 1998:10.

⁷⁰ Perelman, 2000:14; Arendt, 1998:85

⁷¹ Keenland, 2006:3

⁷² *ibid*:4

⁷³ Piersen, 1977:152

⁷⁴ Giddens, 1990:64

⁷⁵ Giddens, 1991:242

⁷⁶ Jessop, 2002: 98

⁷⁷ Adam, 2006 :125

⁷⁸ State of exception is hidden ground of modern democracies. Within the state of exception all juridical order is suspended ,leaving no normative or juridical criteria on the basis of which to decide what the structure

of any emergent political order should look like (Agamben, 2005; Kisner, 2007:222-253). For Agamben, 'sate of exception' is a 'sovereign exceptionalism' which is not simply an oppressive abuse of what should otherwise be a properly-balanced relationship between liberty and security, subject and sovereign. Rather, exceptionalism is the very structure of the sovereignty itself (Neal, 2007:4)

⁷⁹ Hardt & Negri, 2000:380

⁸⁰ Under new legislations of 'special economic zones (SEZ)' third world countries sanction 'reverse of land reforms' by which, governments acquire lands and distribute them at a nominal cost to the global 'investors' along with exclusive privilege over the host countries' labour and resources. Not just these privileges were endowed on investors but also the special economic zones are declared free from interference by regular legislations regarding trade unions, labour welfare and other norms regarding customs check. For instance, the legislation regarding SEZ in India states: " A Special Economic Zone shall, on and from the appointed day, be deemed to be a territory outside the customs territory of India for the purposes of undertaking the authorized operations " (Govt. of India, 2005:Part II. Sec.1. Item.56). Indian act makes the SEZ free from otherwise obligatory legislations regarding trade unions, industrial and labour disputes, welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident funds, employers' liability, workmen's compensation, invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits (Govt. of India, 2005:Sec.49). Further, the act prescribes exemption from state taxes levies and duties to the developer or entrepreneur (Govt. of India, 2005:sec.50; sec. 54.h). Further, the Government of India commit for the 'IT industries' in the zones: twenty-four hours uninterrupted power supply at stable frequency in the Zone, reliable connectivity for uninterrupted and secure data transmission; provision for central air-conditioning system etc. (Govt. of India, 2006: part II, Sec.3, sub sec. I, item.3). There are many such provisions exist under the new legislations which, for want of time I have not sufficiently researched.

⁸¹ Foucault, 1980: 105

⁸² Schmitt 1985: 19-22

⁸³ Dahl, 1999; Fisker, 2007:23-24

⁸⁴ Negri, 2005: 34

⁸⁵ Coffee, 1981

⁸⁶ Hardt & Negri, 2000:188

⁸⁷ *ibid*:203

⁸⁸ Beck, 2004: 35

⁸⁹ The word strategy is used here in Bourdieuan sense. Bourdieu often explain social life with game metaphor. Field for Bourdieu is the live life context which can be metaphorically compared to the field of a football game. The field in the football game is not just the ground on which players play but also the live interaction that exists in the game. Every play contributes something internal to the player, which bourdieu calls habitus. It is from the habitus the strategies flow out when one is engaging in the game.

Strategy here is the momentary response in the field from the habitus of the player. The strategy, in this sense is not a conscious decision but that one flows from one's habitus. Bourdieu, 1990: 15; 1992:128-9.

⁹⁰ Habitus is the habituated mindset- systems of durable, transdisposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures (Bourdieu, 1990: 53).

⁹¹ Bourdieu, 1990: 66-68. Bourdieu conceptualises 'field' (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:92) as the one that which destines the internal disposition of the *habitus*, as the magnetic field could effect the disposition of iron particles within its domain. Field is a space within which the effect of the field is exercised [Ibid: 100]. Unlike the

relationship between iron particles and magnetic field, in social fields he understands there are socially perpetuated values and capitals. The fields of law, literature, academics, and politics are examples for social fields. Capital

(worthiness or social valuation within a social relation) of a disposition is determined by the rules peculiar to each field. With this, he challenges identification of capital only with the economic capital and reduction of human

beings as *homo economicus*. With the conceptualisation of field, capital and their relatedness, Bourdieu presents the complex ways in which the objective/subjective structural/agency dimensions are deeply intrigued with one another

⁹² Set is an 'extension of a concept' (Badiou, 2005d:16)

⁹³ Emphasis original; Badiou, 2005d: 17

⁹⁴ Hardt & Negri, 2000:389

⁹⁵ Heidegger, 1993:73,125

⁹⁶ Hallward, 2003: xxxv; Hallward, 2001:xii-xiii

⁹⁷ Badiou, 2001:60

⁹⁸ The degree of truth of the statement "x possesses p" is denoted by P(x). By (x^e) exception of the fuzzy element x is referred to.

⁹⁹ Badiou, 2005d:11

¹⁰⁰ "Badiou argues that, in every situation, there is the being of the 'nothing'. He starts by stating that whatever is recognized as 'something', or as existing, in a situation is counted-for one in that situation and vice versa. By implication, what is nothing in a situation must go uncounted. However, it is not as though there is simply nothing in a situation which is uncounted — both the *operation* of the count-for-one and the *inconsistent multiple* which exists before the count are, by definition, uncountable. Moreover, both are necessary to the existence of a situation or presentation; precisely because they *constitute* a situation as a situation they cannot be presented within, the situation itself" (Badiou, 2005d:11)

¹⁰¹ Ibid: 12

¹⁰² Ibid:10,11

¹⁰³ Emphasis added

¹⁰⁴ Tursken, 2005:xi

¹⁰⁵ Ibid: 14

¹⁰⁶ Kosko, 1994:55; Turkmen, 2004: 15

¹⁰⁷ Fustier, 2006: 31; Turkmen, 2004: 40

¹⁰⁸ Fustier, 2006:30

¹⁰⁹ Zadeh, 1999

¹¹⁰ The metaphor of rhizome is borrowed from Deleuze. For Deleuze, rhizome is ecological multiplicity wherein "any point is connected to any other points and whose traits are not necessarily linked to the traits of the same nature; it brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even nonsign states. The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005:23).

¹¹¹ Holons according to Koestler is part and whole, the nodes which behave partly as wholes or wholly as parts according to the way we look at any entity (Koestler, 1967:48).

¹¹² Badiou, 2001:25,26

¹¹³ Arendt, 1998:23-25

¹¹⁴ Arendt, 1994:2; Villa, 1999:127

¹¹⁵ Bookchin, 1995:41

¹¹⁶ Heidegger, 2005:4

¹¹⁷ Deleuze & Guattari, 2005:23

¹¹⁸ Ecology is not a system but a flux.

¹¹⁹ Tarz, 1999:8

¹²⁰ Zizek, 2004: 69

¹²¹ Heidegger calls the ontological condition of the *dasein* being ahead of itself and projective as 'care structure' (Heidegger, 1978: 191, 284; Heidegger, 1977: 225).

¹²² Badiou Maintains that events enable "novelty in being" (Hallward, 2003: 114; Badiou 2005c: 209)

¹²³ By the word substantial I do not mean an immutable essence rather the 'innate human capacity' to respond to the events is referred to. I believe that the human capacity to respond to events and bring forth novelty is the extension of what Chomsky called the "language instinct." The innate human capacity is that to make fresh sense of herself and the world around and not being trapped into language games or socializations. Both freedom and unfreedom, fresh sensibility and being trapped into language games, the capacity to be linked with others and there by sociate and be a victim of the social- emanate from the species character of homosapians.

¹²⁴ The world, the being of beings, and *dasein* itself, for Heidegger, are projectively open [*entwerfen*] (Inwood, 1999:177). Projects, for Heidegger, flow from care-structure of *dasein*, wherein 'care' [*Sorge*] is 'properly the anxiety, worry arising out of apprehensions concerning the future and refers as much to the external cause as the inner state (Inwood, 1999:35) '. Care-structure lets the *dasein* be ahead of itself (Heidegger, 1978:193) in a mode of *projective openness* that includes but goes beyond the limits of personal existence (Zimmerman, 2000:141). Arendt, puts it: "man's 'nature' is only 'human' in so far as it opens up to man the possibility of becoming something highly unnatural, that is, a man (Arendt, 1973:455)". Heidegger's observation that Humans are more of the property of freedom than freedom theirs indeed is the harbinger of the late post-human situational ontology (Heidegger, 1949:301) later problematized by Badiou. Openness is an ontological reality not only because of the species potential of the homo-sapiens to be open to the situations around but also because of the multiplicities inherent in the situations that are potentially eventual (Badiou, 2005c; Badiou, 2001:67).

¹²⁵ Heidegger, 2005:18

¹²⁶Source: http://bp0.blogger.com/_F9j1lMEgVJA/R_kTG91C89I/AAAAAAAAABls/UpZywuqhpk/s1600-h/OpenSpaces.jpg

¹²⁷ Kuyek, 2004

¹²⁸ Poinetti, 2005: xii

¹²⁹ Kuyek, 2004:6

¹³⁰ Poinetti, 2005:101; Shiva, 2003

¹³¹ There is *jouissance of politics* in every declaration of end: end of history, end of nature etc., Giddens, 1998

¹³² Ekberg, 2007:348

¹³³ Kuyek, 2004:3

¹³⁴ Under *restrictive consumerism* it is illegal to share or modify a product or service if the license agreement has such a restrictive condition.

¹³⁵ Conventionally 'Licence raj' is a phrase used to refer excessive governmental control in licensing new projects. Here I have used the phrase to indicate license restrictions imposed on the consumers by the sellers and service providers.

* Conditions apply

¹³⁶ Stallman, 2002:47

¹³⁷ Exactly, such a monopolization of knowledge, ideas etc., is deprivation of ecology.

¹³⁸ Badiou, 2001:24

¹³⁹ Foucault, 1979: 202–3

¹⁴⁰ Deleuze, 2007: 83

¹⁴¹ Source: <http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v77/ErinLeptich/MSalexG.jpg>

¹⁴² Deleuze, 2007:89

¹⁴³ Foucault, 1990: 8

¹⁴⁴ Techniques for Foucault are: "the procedures, which no doubt exist in every civilization, offered or prescribed to individuals in order to determine their identity, maintain it, or transform it in terms of a certain number of ends, through relations of self-mastery or self-knowledge (Foucault, 1994:87)

¹⁴⁵ Kalari is a practice of self-mastery through various techniques developed. Kalari is the local variant of 'care of the self' in Kerala. The reminiscence of the practice is still prevalent in Kerala, India. However, that has been far reduced the present day just as a fashionable martial art of tourist attraction.

¹⁴⁶ However, the very idea of nation state is problematic, though there are instance of expression of freedom in creation of nation-states.

¹⁴⁷ Heidegger, 1992: 10E

¹⁴⁸ On this regard Heidegger says: *being free* is experienced as *becoming free*- from a bond. Breaking free, casting of fetters, overcoming constrictive forces and powers...(Heidegger,2005:15)

¹⁴⁹ Heidegger: Freedom from ... is independence from nature. By this we mean that human action as such is not primarily caused by natural processes; it is not bound to the natural processes and their necessity. The independence from nature can be grasped in a more essential way by reflecting that the inner decision and resolve of man is in certain respect independent of the necessity which resides in human fortunes (Heidegger,2005:4)

¹⁵⁰ Heidegger: freedom means independence from God, autonomy in relation to God. For only if there is such autonomy can man take up a relation to God (Heidegger,2005 :4,5; Dallmayr, 1984:213)

¹⁵¹ Ortega, 2005:28

¹⁵² Bernstein, 1985:105

¹⁵³ Dallmayr, 1984:214

¹⁵⁴ For Heidegger, to be authentic co-being is set the world free by enabling fellow beings to be in their own innermost potential. Ibid,215

¹⁵⁵ King, 1964

¹⁵⁶ Badiou, 2008, p.71; sec 8.13

¹⁵⁷ Russel's paradox; Ibid:42

¹⁵⁸ I would like to leave the particulars of the sets to the imagination of the readers. The implications are infinite and multiple. Trying to cover them all in this small paper would be filling the ocean into a bottle!

¹⁵⁹ Sameness is a myth. Self-sameness is impossible. If sameness is observed it is forcing oneself to accept the sameness. Advent of sameness happens as sameness is forced, heteronomized.

¹⁶⁰ Badiou, 2001:27

¹⁶¹ Hallward, 2001, xii

¹⁶² Badiou, 2001:36; Badiou, 2005d:50

¹⁶³ Badiou, 2001:36

¹⁶⁴ Badiou, 2001: 13; Hallward, 2001, xiii

¹⁶⁵ *Corporatocracy* is Perkin's word the collective power of the corporates, banks and the government that governs the world on behalf of the big transnational corporations through usurpation and deceit. (Perkin, 2004:xiii)

¹⁶⁶ Conovan, 2006:28

¹⁶⁷ Arendt, 1973:456

¹⁶⁸ Hardt & Negri, 2000: 110; Arendt, 1973

¹⁶⁹ Foucault, 2007:214

¹⁷⁰ Canovan, 2006:27

¹⁷¹ Badiou, 2001:25

¹⁷² Badiou, 2001:18

¹⁷³ Source: <http://www.hiddenmeanings.com/narcissus1.jpg>

¹⁷⁴ Badiou, 2001:22

¹⁷⁵ Badiou, 2001:21

¹⁷⁶ Carus, 2003: 115

¹⁷⁷ Source: http://img.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2007/06_01/gbayprisonersPA_468x338.jpg

¹⁷⁸ Source:

http://images.google.co.in/imgres?imgurl=http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/images/publications/reports/2005/top10_somalia.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2005/top10.html&h=540&w=700&sz=95&hl=en&start=19&um=1&usg=__GCU40FajRmegKueYemOG6SYExNI=&tbnid=MAKYahB2h8c-

¹⁷⁹ Agamben 1998:31. Prof. Gurukkal comments on this statement as: Studies show that a substantial number of people commit suicide in situations of inescapable traps, the threat of which was not altogether unknown, but somehow conveniently ignored under temptations. A good number of them with a lot of assets but acquired through corruption, embezzlement, destroyed themselves on sudden detection. Accidental murder, unexpected impregnation of an unwed woman, sudden exposure of the puffed-up self etc., cause self-destruction – where is bare-life in such cases ? It is unfreedom yes, but brought in as the self-imposed plight. This would mean that the argument holds good not in the case of all suicides, but only in the case of the suicides by the lower middleclass/poor and the literate, individualised, proletarianised adivasis.

¹⁸⁰ Martin Luther King, Mahatma Gandhi, Marx etc.

¹⁸¹ Arednt, 1973: 30

¹⁸² Zizek, 1999:200

Suicide as unfreedom and Vice-versa. Annexure




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
18/December/2008

*This document is an annexure of the article titled as "suicide as unfreedom and vice versa" available at:
<http://www.scribd.com/doc/6332438/suicide-as-Unfreedom-and-Vice-Versa>*

The diagram illustrates how the fuzzy set $p\{EoFe, PO_e, CoSe, A_e\}$ and its consequent 'event' would transform the world... a few possibilities are given...



The diagram illustrates strong cartel-corporate interests forcing unfreedom on the world



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