

H. Odera Oruka on Moral Reasoning

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H. Odera Oruka, Professor of Philosophy at University of Nairobi, was an active member of the World Futures Studies Federation. Just a few months before his death on 9 December 1995, he had organized and hosted the 14th World Conference of the Federation, the first such conference to be held in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Federation members were actively engaged, from a multiplicity of disciplinary perspectives, with calculating what the future would look like. Not being determinists, they realized that there was always a possibility of multiple futures, depending on which trends continued forward in uncontrolled momentum, or were purposely changed by human decisionmaking and commitment to goals. Such approaches to futures were particularly attractive to Odera Oruka's own idea of his role as a philosopher.

It is worth exploring the longstanding preoccupation with the future that can be found throughout Odera Oruka's writings, especially the writings to be found in a retrospective collection of his essays on which he was working at the time of his death, *Practical Philosophy: In Search of An Ethical Minimum*. Such a search will give us an accurate picture of Odera Oruka as an ethicist and a futurist. At the end of the Introduction, he dedicates the book "to the futures – to the future African philosophers and all future thinkers and workers for human justice and better environment."¹ As he explains, the future "is not a given and unalterable fate. There are always many possible futures. Depending on our actions today we can maximize the possibility of some futures, while minimizing the possibility of others."² Insofar as future catastrophes can be predicted, he insists, humanity has the moral obligation to do everything it can to prevent such catastrophes.

This practice of tracing the future results of actions of which we are presently engaged, in order to determine whether a change of course is needed, is not something that Odera Oruka had to go to a university to learn. It is a practice across Africa. Odera Oruka first learned of the practice growing up in the Nyanza province of Western Kenya, and his later professional interest in recording the wisdom of Kenyan sages was partly based on his long-standing interest in practices of questioning the future.³ For example, when Odera Oruka took me to meet Nicholas Dere Omolo, on the outskirts of Kisumu, we questioned Omolo on his methods of philosophizing with his community members. He gave the example of a neighbor's son who was brought to him because he had been behaving badly, neglecting his studies while engaging in drunkenness and debauchery. Omolo soberly led the youth, step by step, to consider the full repercussion of his actions. If such behaviors were to continue, where would the young man end up? What would happen to others who would be affected by his actions? When the future scenario of his continued bad behavior became fully realizable in his imagination, he realized the importance of his actions, and fully reformed his ways.⁴ When

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Odera Oruka takes up Futures Studies, it is not to embrace a foreign way of thinking, but to find the international complement to the local approach well known and practiced by Africans.

East Africa has a great tradition of prophets. However, prophets are misunderstood if they are thought to foresee the future through some mystical insight. Chaungo Barasa, who was included as a sage in Odera Oruka's book on sage philosophy, argued during his interview with Odera Oruka that prophets base their predictions on insight and foresight. Barasa insists on the point because he wants to show that a prophet can be a philosopher and not just a religious figure. As Barasa says of Elijah Masinde, a famous hero and prophet of the Bukusu people of Kenya: "I think here was a wise man who was inquiring into prevailing reality of that time and summing up what it would hatch into the next day."⁵

Barasa's insights are echoed by anthropologists who study prophets. Charles Ambler argues that prophets are not miraculous predictors of events, since they observed changes that would have been publicly noticeable. Their special talent was that they "possessed a vision of how communities should face those events and thus shape the future."⁶ Kennell Jackson complements those ideas by noting that prophets not only point to future misfortunes, but "simultaneously point to the correct behavior and communal remedies."⁷ The remedies might include rebellion against the status quo with the goal of social revitalization and moral restoration.⁸ As Ambler would say, elders couched their prophecies in terms that would encourage or deter certain courses of action in the present.⁹ According to these descriptions, prophets are futurists. Seeing a possible future which seems to them to be distressful, they try to influence present action so that an alternative future will result. The prediction itself becomes a motivator.

Olufemi Taiwo is also interested in the intersection between philosophy and prophecy. The salient features of prophecy, according to him, are that the prophet holds dissenting views which at his or her own time are considered to be wrong. The prophet-dissenter warns of the "dire consequences that would result if the conditions he highlighted were not radically altered."¹⁰ As time unfolds, the person is then seen to be wise if events prove him or her right. He therefore thinks people can draw an analogy between prophets and social scientists, insofar as they both engage in description, explanation, and prediction. Just as failures to heed warnings of Biblical prophets led to destruction, failure to heed the warning of social scientists could lead to "social dislocation and crisis in the community."¹¹ Both prophet and social scientists are "motivated by a commitment, a moral vision that the situation that has provoked 'Isaiah-like warning of unhappy consequences' is wrong, and that the consequences foretold are undesirable."¹²

As an academic philosopher and ethicist, Odera Oruka would use reason to extrapolate the probable consequences of trends which he noticed in society at large. His approach, like the sages and prophets, was also intuitive, based on his own estimation of the signs of the times. But he also consulted statistical analyses of economic and sociological trends and at times carried out his own exhaustive studies of trends. But he did not consider himself a soothsayer or even a scientific know-it-all. He humbly stated that, despite his membership in World Futures Studies Federation, "we can only guess but we cannot rightly claim to know" what the future centuries hold.¹³ His constant interest in the future was grounded in his concern for injustices existing in our world right now, and how best to encourage people to change the current destructive trends. As he explained in an interview with Kai Kresse in 1993, the philosopher has a special duty to warn people so that they understand the implications of their present actions.¹⁴

A common theme throughout several of Oruka's essays, especially in "On Philosophy and Humanism in Africa" is that the ultimate standard of moral good is humanism.¹⁵ By "humanism" he means upholding the quality and security of human life. He argued that for human beings to be capable of being rational moral agents, they need basic needs filled. Without doing so, human beings would find themselves resorting to self-survival at all costs in a Hobbesian fashion, at which stage we could no longer expect them to abide by moral rules, whether interpersonal or international. In "The Future of Philosophy and Religion in a Scientific World," he outlines the main factors necessary for creating an atmosphere of rationality, in which human beings could make the best decisions for themselves and for the planet. First, it must be an atmosphere free from fanaticism, religious and racial; it must be free from poverty, both economic and intellectual; and it must be free from envy and intolerance.¹⁶

To focus on the need to be free of poverty, we may turn to his book, *The Philosophy of Liberty*, where Oruka goes into more detail to explain how intellectual freedom presupposes political freedom, which itself presupposes economic freedom. Oruka speaks of primary needs for survival and secondary needs for advancing or enriching life. He explains that we "need freedom only because we have certain needs to fulfil and freedom is a condition for such a fulfillment."¹⁷ Intellectual freedom means that a person has the ability and opportunity to seek and exercise his or her knowledge. But to do so, a person must have political freedoms such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly. But economic freedom, defined as the ability to fill bodily needs while being free of exploitation, would be needed in order to have an effective political freedom that can fulfill needs and get things done.¹⁸ As Oruka explains,

If a poor man comes to discuss with a rich man there is a clear possibility that the former, if being economically dependent on the latter, may be forced to suppress some of his opinions which the rich man might not tolerate. There is even a likelihood that in exchange for material help the poor man may support opinions which he thinks are false. Limitation of political freedom by economic dependence holds true between individuals as between nations. Economically poor nations shape their political opinions to please their economic superiors.¹⁹

Here we get some glimpse into the struggles that a futurist-prophet who criticizes his or her society will run into, when the futurist-prophet insists on having meaningful dialogues about important issues that may challenge the powers that be. Those in power may not want to listen to criticism.

But Oruka was always coming up with strong reasons why rich nations, no matter how reluctant, should change their ways. In his article "The Philosophy of Foreign Aid," he argues that if the world community agrees that people have a right to life, then implicit in that right is the right to physical security, health, and subsistence. Such rights are inherent in the person as a person, not as a citizen of a particular country. A government's right to sovereignty cannot override the individual's right to life. Therefore citizens of rich countries cannot argue that they have an option on whether or not to aid starving persons. Therefore, foreign aid is ethically obligatory and not just international charity. Individuals who accept foreign aid should not have to feel self-pity, nor should countries have to pay back such so-called favors by giving rich nations their beneficial trade or ideological zones, since the aid is not a favor in the first place but a duty.²⁰

Orika thought that the best motivation for filling the basic needs of others was moral. He tried to show through rational philosophical argument that we are all saddled with duties toward each other. Nevertheless, he realized that such motivation was not effective with all people. He therefore often appealed as well to self-interest as a motivator, and it was in this capacity that he most often turned to the pondering of possible future scenarios. In his essay "Achievements of Philosophy and One Condition for the Future of Humanity," he ponders a future world in which the growth of frustrated, poverty stricken, alienated people, parallels the historical improvement of technological weapons of mass destruction. In such a situation, he imagines two possible future scenarios. One scenario is that some poor countries will become so weak that they will ask foreign governments of rich countries to come in and govern them in exchange for aid. This would in fact result in a recolonization. The second scenario is that poor countries, rejecting recolonization, would spark off a North-South global confrontation, that might culminate in a world war. If the war became nuclear, it would spell the death of humanity.²¹

How realistic are these two scenarios? It could be said that the recolonization scenario is already happening. The International Monetary Fund, or IMF, and the World Bank, although not directly taking over the reins of other governments, get their way by threatening to cut off funding if certain policies are not implemented. In his introduction to *Practical Philosophy*, Orika argues that "the IMF and the World Bank have become power-sharers in, if not altogether the bosses of, the Third World nations that they aid."²² As for the confrontation scenario, Orika cites as possible evidence, former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda's resistance of IMF policies, back in 1987. However he admits that in general he can only point to ripples of anger and statements of resistance. Even so, he warns the international community to give these small signs serious attention.

Orika squarely faced the problem confronting many ethicists of how to get people who do not care to care. His appeal to future scenarios is a strategy similar to Plato's in the *Republic*. Plato has Socrates argue in the first nine books that the reason to be morally good is to gain intrinsic, inner happiness from our own good actions and concomitant peace of mind. However, speculating that not everyone will respond to this kind of argument, he appends Book Ten. In Book Ten, he tells the story of the pains and horrors to which immortal souls will be subjected in the afterworld, if they fail to live morally in this worldly life. If concern for inner harmony and integrity is not an effective motivator, fear of pain and other horrible consequences is relied on. This is an appeal to an even more blatant form of self-interest. Likewise, it can be argued that Orika's recurrent mention of future possible horrors of angry, starving people trying to kill the rich, is an attempt to reach the complacent well-off people who are not convinced by his other arguments regarding why all human beings deserve a minimum of basic ethical treatment which includes filling their basic needs. Indeed it could be argued that this is a major occupation of futurists in general: trying to get the general populace to go along with an inherently good idea and all its entailed extra work and sacrifice, from a motivation to avoid larger catastrophes later on.

The psychological effectiveness of promulgating Orika's second scenario is unclear. To tell citizens of rich countries that they might have to fear military encounters in the future can just encourage them to spend more on weapons to protect their privilege. In the meantime, world hunger is made worse because of all the money drained off into arms expenditures. It is an uphill battle to encourage people to realize that their safety may be better protected by sharing or by restructuring the global economy to be fairer, than by arming themselves. Nevertheless several dedicated lobbyist groups in the United States, such as Bread for the World, have dedicated themselves to spreading that message to Congress, with some small

success. Unfortunately, it is easier for Congress to follow the route of the re-colonization scenario and use their power to extort cooperation from now dependent African states, than it is to pursue Oruka or Bread for the World.

Oruka notes that not all people heed warnings of the future, no matter how scientifically proven the future dangers are. For example, he points out that while science has shown that cigarette smoking leads to cancer, people continue to smoke. He also notes that no matter how many times it is shown that fatal road accidents in Kenya and Nigeria are caused by carelessness, excessive drinking, and speeding, few drivers heed the warning based on such studies.²³ It is indeed a shame that some Kenyan drivers have not heeded such studies by now and brought down the rate of road carnage. Oruka himself died on the roads in Nairobi in December of 1995, as a truck ran him over as he crossed the street. In the same month, five other University of Nairobi faculty and administrators also died in a car crash. With the rate of accidents so high, it becomes difficult to sort out genuine accidents from planned collisions, making it easy to knock off political dissidents. Speculation on Oruka's death abounded.

In such a world seemingly oblivious to the dangers inherent in present action, what is the role of the philosopher? As Oruka explains in similar self-interested strategy, philosophers must work to ensure the survival of humanity, because, philosophy has a future only if humanity has a future. There is an urgent need to create a philosophy of human survival. But what kind of special contribution can philosophy make to solving the world's problems? Oruka explains that philosophy, with its call for an unending search for truth, will have us strive to find solutions. The solutions must avoid the trap of scientism by emphasizing both knowledge and values. Oruka suggests that philosophers must have an epistemological or axiological ground to their discourse if they are to contribute to discussion any more than the average person.²⁴

Oruka insists, perhaps cynically, that people should turn away from religion and to philosophy to find solutions to the world's problems. Religion, he insists, has no vested interest in finding long-term solutions to people's problems, since religion survives and thrives by being somewhere for people to turn to when they have unbearable problems. If religions were to succeed in providing the world with real solutions to its problems, they would put themselves out of business.²⁵ In his essay "Philosophy and Humanism in Africa," Oruka states that what Africa needs is critical and dialectical philosophy, which would arrive at tentative conclusions, and experimental projects to improve Africa. Africa does not need ethno-religious solutions which tend toward dogmatism. He sees the main function of moral and social philosophy as applying rigorous analytical and synthetic reasoning to the moral problems of the day. Philosophers should devote themselves to liberating the African Republic of Inhumanity and Death or preventing its spread. They best do that by postulating alternatives "to the current prevailing and dehumanizing ethics of political might."²⁶ Oruka could agree with Tsenay Serequeberhan, who says:

To systematically query this failure [of African political independence] is then the central theoretic task of the present for those of us concerned with Africa and its possible *futures*. Thus today, fundamental questions of philosophy and politics are not only appropriate and necessary, and that which evokes thought if the Continent is to surmount the many difficulties that its *various* and *differing* people share. This then, in my view, is the fundamental task of contemporary African philosophy.²⁷

In his essay "Philosophy and Humanity Today," Oruka insists that people need both instinct and insight to avoid either self-destruction or destruction from external factors. In the 1980s, he expressed concern that given the rate of militarization and moral decay, humanity would be lucky to survive another fifty years. The world needs to be humanized. Three main threats to freedom, on his view, are fear, greed, and false pride, which is the basis of racism, sexism, and colonialism. He suggests that a strengthening of the United Nations General Assembly could help the cause of world peace, and he exhibits hope that the autocratic era of the 1970s and 1980s in Africa will soon be replaced by the rebirth of a global democratic spirit. He insists that philosophers should set themselves the task of bringing such a spirit to birth.²⁸

Anyone familiar with other strands in Oruka's thought may wonder, with this emphasis on solving the immediate and dire problems of Africa, where his great interest in sage philosophy fits in. Oruka was not so much of a futurist that he neglected Africa's heritage. His extensive interviewing of rural sages witnesses to his great interest and valuing of African traditions and his aversion to the unthinking assimilation process which has encouraged many African youths to turn their interest away from knowledge that is particularly rooted in Africa. However it must be noted that his interest in the sages was not as living relics of days gone by. He instead was interested in the philosophic sages as critical thinkers engaged in shedding light on and solving the problems of their communities, by critically drawing upon their traditions as well as practicing their own form of creative insight. A project he had just finished before his death involved interviewing sages regarding their own attitudes and the attitudes of members of their communities toward family planning. Oruka was convinced that the past failure of outside experts in implementing family planning programs was due to misunderstanding the beliefs and desires of the members of the communities at issue. He was satisfied with the results of his extensive study, which he was sure would lead to a more effective family planning policy.²⁹

As he explained in his essay "Traditions and Modernity in the Scramble for Africa," it is good to improve on African resources, but not to discard them. "Progressive modernization" should entail humbly searching to see what is worthwhile in a value system, whether our own or not. After such a search, we can decide what is worth preserving. This may be contrasted with other versions of "progressive modernization" which take for granted that everything African must be discarded.³⁰

Oruka was the head organizer for the World Congress of Philosophy held in Nairobi in 1991. His choice of philosophical priorities as well as futurist method was apparent in the structure of the conference, and the theme of the plenary sessions on how to apply philosophical concern to avert ecological disaster.³¹ In his writings on environmental ethics, he uses a strategy similar to the strategy he uses when he addresses issues of poverty, hunger, and war. He appeals to enlightened self-interest. In his essay "Philosophy and the Environment," he argues that division of the world into First, Second, and Third Worlds does not make sense in environmental terms, since the world is destined to one common future. For example, water pollution and the nuclear threat will not necessarily stop at national boundaries or regional zones. Therefore enlightened self-interest will help to get citizens of the world to pull together to protect one common environment.³²

Oruka argues against theorists like Garrett Hardin who suggest that as a matter of lifeboat ethics, the affluent can save themselves and the environment while letting the poor die. He argues that the affluent have denied the reality of the extent of global interdependence, economically and environmentally. He argues for this in his essay, "Parental Earth Ethics." As he explains, "One problem with Hardin's thesis is that it is given as if there are no debts or

common wealth between the boaters and the swimming millions.”³³ He suggests that the world is like a kinship family, in that “the life conditions of any one member of the family affect all of them, both materially and emotionally.”³⁴ Perhaps Hardin imagines that he and his affluent society can do perfectly well by closing its borders and forgetting the rest of the world. However, not even most economists in prosperous countries advocate such a path of action. Perhaps they know too well that such a strategy would hurt the economy and ecology of their own countries.

For the most part, Oruka maintains that anthropocentric ethicists can acknowledge that future human existence depends on biodiversity and that the environment must be protected for the benefit of future generations. He refers to the African Center for Technology Studies as one organization that accepts the importance of environmental preservation to foster sustainable development. Yet he is not wholly satisfied with anthropocentric motivations for environmental preservation. He cites authors who consider animals and plants as moral patients who nevertheless deserve moral consideration, since they can be the recipients of cruelty and unjust harm. Likewise he alludes to a traditional African worldview which, while allowing that human beings are superior to other parts of nature, suggests that some plants and animals cannot be harmed because of their relationship to an invisible spiritual reality. In these brief considerations he suggests that denying any intrinsic value to nature other than human beings is implausible, although he shies away from holding a deep ecology position which would give animals and plants specific rights. He explains his view on this topic in his essay, “Eco-Philosophy: An Essay on Environmental Ethics.”³⁵

His concern for the environment and world poverty are connected. In fact, he argues that over-consuming, made possible by the existence of affluence, harms the environment. Such wasteful consumption which goes beyond human needs endangers the long-term needs of consumers as well as the needs of the rest of humanity. That such wasteful consumption goes on while one third of the world’s population is starving is morally wrong. Oruka suggests that national and international legislation be drafted and enacted to limit overconsumption and to enhance the chances of under-consumers to have access to adequate food and water.³⁶

In an essay in which he reflected upon his life’s calling as a philosopher, “My Strange Way to Philosophy,” Oruka discussed his own interests in philosophy. He saw his goal to be to clear current and future obstacles to philosophy, wisdom, and justice. He did this by exposing and analyzing three evils: socio-economic deprivation, cultural-racial mythology, and the illusion of appearance. He places an emphasis on the evil of social-economic deprivation because poverty and hunger are, according to him, the greatest constraint on mental development and creativity. The evil of the illusion of appearance concerns people who pursue style over substance and are distracted and fooled by the glitter of surfaces. Oruka shows a readiness to wage “philosophic war with factors and values which promote social and economic disadvantage and oppression of people.”³⁷ On the positive side, he names three vehicles to a fruitful philosophy: freedom of thought, inspiration, and destiny, not on some preordained state-to-be, but on a concern with our own origin and future, to guide personal and community self-definition.³⁸

Few philosophers can parallel Odera Oruka’s ability to pinpoint the specific problems facing Africa and our globe. His tenacity in bringing up the moral and normative dimension of future trends is to be admired, and few philosophers would be able to call his prescriptions into question. Indeed, which one of us can argue that the eradication of poverty, hunger, narrow-mindedness, environmental degradation, and injustice should not be the top priority of all individuals and communities?

In Africa, as Taiwo has argued, the sign that a sage was a wise prophet is when his or her predictions, which received scorn or skepticism were later shown to be true. One of the last papers that Odera Oruka wrote before his death pointed to a prediction he had made in a paper written in 1988 that had become true within his lifetime. In the paper of 1988, "Ethnicity and Identity," he pointed to three possible futures for South Africa at the time. Of the three, he argued for the sagacious solution to "increase the happiness and allay the fears of all races" rather than to continue the domination of one race over another.³⁹ As he later noted: "This third solution, I am happy, is the one which South Africa eventually came to adopt."⁴⁰ Oruka took pride in seeing his prophecies come true in his own life. He was happy that in at least one case, a country had followed what he had judged would be the most rational and moral option for the future.⁴¹

Notes

1. H. Odera Oruka, *Practical Philosophy: In Search of an Ethical Minimum* (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1997), p. xvii.
2. Ibid.
3. See H. Odera Oruka, ed., *Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill Publishers, 1990 and Nairobi: ACTS Press, 1991). See also Gail M. Presbey "Ways in Which Oral Philosophy is Superior to Written Philosophy: A Look at Odera Oruka's Rural Sages" in *APA Newsletter on Philosophy and the Black Experience*, Fall 1996; "African Sage-Philosophers in Action: H. Odera Oruka's Challenges to The Narrowly Academic Role of the Philosopher," *Essence: An International Journal of Philosophy (Nigeria)* (Vol. 1, No. 1, June 1996); and "Who Counts as a Sage? Problems in the Further Implementation of Sage Philosophy," *Quest: Philosophical Discussions*, Vol. XI, Nos. 1 and 2, 1997. See also the many essays in Kai Kresse and Anke Graness, eds., *Sagacious Reasoning: Henry Odera Oruka in memoriam* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1997).
4. Nicholas Dere Omolo, interviewed by H. Odera Oruka and Gail Presbey, 19 November 1995, in Omolo's home near Kisumu, Kenya. Interview in English, on tape, in possession of Presbey.
5. "Interview with Chaungo Barasa," in Kresse and Graness, *Sagacious Reasoning* p. 77; also in Odera Oruka, *Sage Philosophy*, p. 151.
6. Charles Ambler, "What is the World Going to Come to?: Prophecy and Colonialism in Africa," in David M. Anderson and Douglas H. Johnson, *Revealing Prophets: Prophecy in Eastern African History* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1995), pp. 225–228.
7. Kennell Jackson, in Charles Ambler, "What is the World Going to Come To?," p. 232.
8. See Michael Adas, quoted in Anderson and Johnston, *Revealing Prophets*, p. 13.
9. Ambler, op. cit., p. 230.
10. Olufemi Taiwo, "On the Misadventures of National Consciousness: A Retrospect on Frantz Fanon's Gift of Prophecy," in Lewis R. Gordon et al., eds., *Fanon: A Critical Reader* (Cambridge Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), p. 255.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 256.
13. H. Odera Oruka, "Philosophy and the Environment," opening address to the World Congress of Philosophy, Nairobi, Kenya, 21 July 1991, unpublished.
14. Odera Oruka, *Practical Philosophy*, p. 217.
15. H. Odera Oruka, "On Philosophy and Humanism in Africa," in *Practical Philosophy*, ch. 13; also in Mourad Wahba ed., *Philosophy and Civilization: Proceedings of the First Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference* (Cairo, 1978) and *Philosophy and Social Action* (V, 1979).
16. Odera Oruka, *Practical Philosophy*, p. 72.
17. Odera Oruka, *The Philosophy of Liberty: An Essay on Political Philosophy*, Revised ed. (Nairobi: Standard Textbooks Graphics and Publishing, 1996), p. 51.
18. Odera Oruka, *Philosophy of Liberty*, pp. 66 & 72.
19. Ibid., p. 70.

20. Odera Oruka, "Philosophy of Foreign Aid," in Kresse and Graness, eds., *Sagacious Reasoning*, esp. pp. 49–51. Also see Odera Oruka, *Practical Philosophy*, Chapter 8; and *Praxis International* No. 8, January 1989.
21. Odera Oruka, *Practical Philosophy*, pp. 101–102.
22. *Ibid.*, p. xiii.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 71–72.
24. *Ibid.*, ch. 9.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
27. Tsenay Serequeberan, "Reflections on *In My Father's House*," in *Research in African Literatures* 27(1) (1996), p. 110.
28. Odera Oruka, *Practical Philosophy*, ch. 12.
29. Henry Odera Oruka, *Ethics, Beliefs and Attitudes Affecting Family Planning in Kenya Today: A Final Report*. Report commissioned by USAID, 1995.
30. Odera Oruka, *Practical Philosophy*, ch. 25.
31. H. Odera Oruka, ed., *Philosophy, Humanity, and Ecology: Philosophy of Nature and Environmental Ethics* (Nairobi: ACTS Press, 1994), p. ix.
32. Odera Oruka, "Philosophy and the Environment." Based on his opening address to the World Congress of Philosophy, Nairobi Kenya, 21 July 1991, unpublished.
33. Odera Oruka, *Practical Philosophy*, p. 147.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
35. *Ibid.*, ch. 24.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 265.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 284.
38. Odera Oruka, *Practical Philosophy*, pp. 283–284.
39. H. Odera Oruka, "Mahatma Gandhi and Humanism in Africa," in Kresse and Graness, *Sagacious Reasoning*, 133–138. Reference to "Ethnicity and Identity" in J.J. Ongonga and K.R. Gray eds., *Bottlenecks to National Identity: Ethnic Cooperation Towards Nation Building*, Professors' World Peace Academy, Nairobi, 1989, pp. 1–8.
40. Oruka, "Mahatma Gandhi," p. 136.
41. I would like to thank Patrick Dikirr and Gilbert Ogutu of University of Nairobi for giving me the original impetus for addressing the futurist aspect of Odera Oruka's academic works. I also thank the Philosophy Department at University of Nairobi for agreeing to host me.