In the final chapter, the relationship between probabilism as a form of moral theology and the emergence of a mathematical understanding of probability in the second half of the seventeenth century, particularly in relation to the work of Caramuel, is explored.

Schuessler’s volume contributes to a recent resurgence in scholarly interest in probabilism. His work takes some provocative stands in relation to the positions of other scholars in the field, and throughout the volume he raises several important issues for further consideration. Readers of this journal might well find Schuessler’s views on these matters thought-provoking, but they will also benefit from his attention to some lesser-known Jesuit figures in the history of probabilism, such as Anthony Terill.

Christopher P. Gillett
The University of Scranton, Scranton, PA, USA
christopher.gillett@scranton.edu
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It is not uncommon for thinkers to be studied through a lens that does not correspond to their real intellectual interests. One paradigmatic case is John Locke, who, judged merely in light of his Essay concerning Human Understanding, is considered above all as a philosopher of knowledge and language when in reality he was an erudite whose field of fundamental interest was theology and politics. Research into John Wallis also falls into this academic malady of paying scant attention to the facts. As Jason M. Rampelt states, “there is presently no intellectual biography of John Wallis and, while this book is not a comprehensive one, it presents the main themes which ought to be present in any account of his thought” (5). Only recently has Wallis been properly recognized as a philosopher absorbed in the issues of his time, the seventeenth century. Until now, the prevailing view has been to regard Wallis solely as a mathematician. Rampelt reminds us that the principal monographs on Wallis have been dominated by this mentality. Thus, Wallis has never found a place within the general histories of philosophical thought. Nor in the general histories of science has he been afforded his due as a scientist beyond his mathematical works. In line with this trend, his theological
writings have received equally scant attention. Correcting this shortcoming is the principal aim of the book by Rampelt, which “gives a more comprehensive account of the philosophy behind the mathematician [...] offering a richer picture of early modern philosophy as it resided in its late-scholastic and university contexts” (5–6). Thus, the fundamental merit of the book here presented. Along with this work, in recent years a more complete view of Wallis is beginning to take hold, going beyond his mathematical work and exploring the philosophical, theological, and political aspects of his thought. In this regard, Rampelt mentions the monographic issue of *Notes and Records: The Royal Society Journal of the History of Science* 72, no. 2 (2018), which includes a number of papers on Wallis as a natural philosopher, mathematician, theologian, politician, etc.

The book consists of three parts. The first describes the academic training, largely Scholastic, which Wallis received at Emmanuel College at Cambridge, and his early public career in London as secretary to the Westminster Assembly and his participation in the first meetings of the Royal Society of London, prior to his royal appointment by King Charles II. The Westminster Assembly was the Calvinist Synod held in Westminster Abbey (London) between 1645 and 1652 that settled the disputes, both doctrinal and ecclesiological, arising in the heart of the Church of England. Theology and science are the two salient aspects of his intellectual interests, as was equally the case for other *virtuosi* participating in the nascent Royal Society. One lesser known aspect of this early stage in the intellectual life of Wallis was the reception of the Scholastic philosophy of Francisco Suárez, particularly the theory of distinctions of reason, which according to Rampelt would exercise a significant influence on Wallis’s epistemology (cf. 8). The second part of the book deals with aspects of Wallis’s academic career: as the Savilian Professor of Geometry at Oxford; as a doctor in theology concerned with the principal questions of English Calvinism of the time (the Divine will and God’s decrees, the Trinity, ecclesiology as a metaphysics of Presbyterianism, etc.); as a teacher (geometry as *Solidior philosophia*), university pastor and protector. The third and final part delves into the mathematical work of Wallis, his innovations and most important debates (particularly with Hobbes), explaining its origins and significance by virtue of its relation with fundamental philosophical principles.

In this brief outline, we are limited to a succinct consideration of what we believe is the principal contribution of the Rampelt’s book: the importance Wallis gives to a logical consideration of language, which given its narrowness, is unable to encompass the full richness found within things. This in fact was the underlying idea of the medieval doctrine of *distinctio rationis* by Thomas Aquinas (who drew a clear distinction between *res significata* and *modus*.
significandi), subsequently enriched by Suárez with his theory of ratio ratiocinantis and ratio ratiocinatae.

Wallis studied at Emmanuel College, considered the Puritan seminary of England. There, he studied a philosophy which we could consider Scholastic, the teaching of which followed the classical order from logic to physics to metaphysics and ethics, not lacking in “consulting the schoolmen on such points” (33) (C. Scriba, “The Autobiography of John Wallis,” Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 25 [1970]: 17–46, here 28). The 1637 library catalogue of Emmanuel College gives us a precise idea of the type of philosophical teaching imparted there. In addition to a substantial collection of works by Thomas Aquinas and some editions of Aristotle, particularly Physics, with a commentary by Averroes, the library included many texts by the late Scholastics, including nine works by Francisco Suárez, such as Disputationes metaphysicae (cf. 33). Guided and encouraged by Benjamin Whichcote, one of his tutors at Emmanuel College, himself immersed in a profound study of the late Scholasticism, Wallis studied closely some of these works. Wallis also had access to the personal library of Richard Holdsworth, Master of Emmanuel College in 1637, which included works of Scotus, Ockham, Albertus Magnus, and various commentaries of the Liber sententiarum by Peter Lombard. It comes as no surprise that Wallis himself would refer to the Scholastic philosophy found at Emmanuel College as “then [the philosophy] in fashion in University” (38) (Scriba, “The Autobiography of John Wallis,” 29).

Following this “philosophy in fashion,” Wallis wrote his first philosophical theses, taking inspiration to no small degree from important Scholastic notions. The most important of these theses was his Thesis tertia: Quantitas non differt realiter a Re Quanta, defended in 1639, but not published until 1642. Although Wallis resolves this question in a manner contrary to Suárez, the theme (and the title of the thesis itself) emulates DM 40, 2, entitled Utrum quantitas [...] sitresdistincta a substantiamateriali. Wallis also intended in this thesis to critique the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation (cf. 38). Here, Suárez would have contested the thesis of the identity of quantity and material substance, primarily in defence of the dogma of Eucharistic transubstantiation (cf. Disputationes metaphysicae [DM], 40,2,8). We thus have an idea of the importance of theological questions, posed Scholastically in the earliest works by Wallis, albeit reaching conclusions quite different from those of Catholic Scholasticism.

Nevertheless, the philosophical question where the Scholastic influence on Wallis is most clearly perceived is in Suárez’s doctrine of distinctio rationis ratiocinatae and distinctio rationis ratiocinantis (with and without foundation in re respectively, according to Suárez), present from the first paragraph of the thesis tertia. According to Rampelt, the doctrine of the distinctions of reason
permits an understanding of the relation between concepts, to be found in the mind, and things in the world (cf. 35). This fundamental consideration leads Wallis to assign great relevance to the distinction between a logical-linguistic and an ontological mode of engagement with philosophical questions.

To sum up, we cannot but value highly the work here presented. It seems we need only add an observation about certain imprecisions regarding the exact location of distinctiones rationis in the Disputationes metaphysicae by Suárez. Specifically, distinctio rationis ratiocinantis is dealt with in DM 7,1,4, not in DM 7,18, as Rampelt says. Furthermore, distinctio rationis ratiocinatae is found in DM 7,1,5, not in DM 7,19, as Rampelt also claims. With this we wish nothing more than to contribute to enhance the already considerable scientific merit of this book.

Leopoldo J. Prieto López
Universidad Francisco de Vitoria, Madrid, Spain
leopoldojose.prieto@ufv.es
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Caroline R. Sherman

Both chronologically and thematically, this book covers much more than its modest title suggests. Not only does it offer a meticulous study of the early modern developments of cy-près—a common law doctrine that gives judges the power to redirect charitable gifts to a new purpose. In fact, the first two chapters feature a broader intellectual history of ancient and medieval Christian attitudes towards wealth and gifts, while the third analyzes the development of the civil and canon law doctrine on the reinterpretation of gifts and testaments in the continental ius commune tradition. This long introduction is necessary to understand why the author cannot agree with the traditional account about the historical origins of cy-près. When the first cy-près rulings start being documented in the seventeenth century, common law judges claimed authority from the ius commune in applying the doctrine. Ever since, this argument from authority has been taken as corresponding to historical reality. However, Sherman argues that some of the most distinctive features of cy-près rulings, including the possibility that the judge completely ignores the rights of the heirs, cannot be retrieved in the ius commune doctrine about changing the purpose of gifts. In medieval canon law, the so-called conversion