

Phenomenal Concepts and Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument

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Abstract

David Papineau argued that phenomenal concepts are inconsistent with Wittgenstein's private language argument, and that the problem is with Wittgenstein's argument. Against Papineau, we argue that phenomenal concepts are consistent with Wittgenstein's private language argument. Inconsistency can appear when either Wittgenstein's argument or phenomenal concepts are incorrectly or restrictively understood.

Key words: Jackson's argument, phenomenal concepts, zombies, Wittgenstein, private language argument, analytic pragmatism

Introduction

In a recent paper Papineau (2011) argues that "phenomenal concepts" are inconsistent with Wittgenstein's private language argument. At first sight this claim is plausible, because it is plausible that the use of phenomenal concepts supposes the use of introspection, and Wittgenstein, as it is thought, argued against introspection, which from his point of view is not public and, which is equivalent for him, meaningless.

Unlike some Wittgensteinians who reject the phenomenal concepts, Papineau, however, thinks that the problem is with Wittgenstein's argument, not with the phenomenal concepts. According to Papineau, Wittgenstein is setting the bar for meaningfulness too high. In particular, Papineau thinks, for Wittgenstein only the use of an exterior "objective" criterion would allow making the act of identification of an experience, for instance, of the experience of high blood pressure, meaningful (see § 2).

We will argue that such understanding of Wittgenstein is very restrictive and Papineau's own argument in favor of phenomenal concepts can be understood as Wittgensteinian.

In our view, according to Wittgenstein's private language argument an act of identification of an experience (or a thing), in particular a linguistic act of its identification is public and meaningful if and only if it is a correct use of concepts, or rules (for Wittgenstein this is the same). A phenomenal concept can be *elaborated* on the basis of a phenomenal experience as a rule for its immediate (direct) identification (typifying, representation, or description – in the given context we consider these terms as synonymous). That being said, there is an intimate connection between a phenomenal experience and the corresponding genuine phenomenal concepts. The former *aliments* the latter; and the latter (or their applications) are *anchored* in the former. The use of an exterior (from the third-person point of view) public criterion is not necessary, though in principle always possible. This possibility reflects, we think, another (more ontological than semantic) side of Wittgenstein's private language argument: the rules of a genuine language are natural, or can be naturalized. These rules govern what Wittgenstein calls "language games" (that is, natural normative practices).

Following Papineau we take as an example the experience of *seeing something red* (not seeing a concrete red object. This simplification permits us to exclude from consideration the non-phenomenal concept of an object and to focus on the phenomenal concept).

Prima facie, the phenomenal, or more precisely perceptual¹ concept of seeing something red (or simply the concept of red) is an expression of the essence of the perceptual experience of seeing something red, that is, a "representation" of how it looks. The phenomenal concept of seeing something red allows identification of the experience of seeing something red as the experience of seeing something red.

Notice that there cannot be one-to-one correspondence between an experience and a concept describing this experience. A visual perceptual experience can be described by means of different phenomenal concepts, such as the concept of (seeing) something colored, the concept of such and such a color (for example, red) the concept of a kind of a color (for example, a nuance of red), and so on.

At the same time it is obvious that not every concept can be applied to a given experience. For instance, an experience cannot be simultaneously described by the concept of red and also by the concept of blue. This is forbidden by the "philosophical grammar" of color. A concept ought to be appropriate, that is, it ought not to contradict the philosophical grammar.

Beside the *condition of appropriateness*, which excludes non-appropriate concepts, for example, an application of the concept of blue wherever the concept of red can be applied, there is the *condition of adequacy*. An *adequate concept* is intimately related to reality, is alimanted by it; grasps it in its concreteness. (For more about these two conditions on concepts see Benoist 2010/2011.)

The adequate concepts allow us to learn and to represent things as they indeed are. According to Jocelyn Benoist (2010/2011), the (corresponding) adequate representations or descriptions

¹ We use the term "phenomenal concept" for properly phenomenal concepts, such as, for example, the concept of a kind of pain, as well as for the perceptual concepts. This is justified because there is a relatively close relation between them, which in the given paper is not considered.

are not only true but also exact (justes – *in French*).² In the case of an adequate representation of a thing “sa réalité perce en quelque sorte alors à travers sa vérité” (“in a way its reality pierces through its truthfulness” (*our translation*)) (Benoist 2011, p. 58). *The explanatory gap* between an adequate representation or the corresponding concept and reality is closed.³

Papineau, however, it seems, understands experience as already conceptualized (see below). This dispenses him from reflection about how a concept is being elaborated on the basis of an initially non-conceptualized experience and how the gap between them is being closed. More generally, it seems that Papineau is somehow committed to classical representationalism and the myth of the *Given*, criticized by Jocelyn Benoist (see for example, Benoist 2011, p. 94).⁴ For him, the experience of seeing something red is what is *given*. And this (one and *the same*) experience can be referred to by concepts of two different kinds - neurological and phenomenal.⁵ For Papineau, these concepts do not reflect different aspects of an experience. We would say that they are considered as appropriate but not as anchored into experience. So, as we think, Papineau does not take into consideration the condition of the adequacy for concepts.

1. Frank Jackson's argument and phenomenal concepts

A famous thought-experiment by Frank Jackson (Jackson 1986) is as follows. Imagine a scientist, Mary, who knows everything there is to know about the experience of seeing red from the scientific third-person point of view. However, Mary has spent her whole life in a black and white laboratory and has never seen colored things.⁶ One day she is shown a red rose, and she learns something new, namely what it is like to see something red.

On the basis of his thought-experiment Jackson proposes the following argument in favor of dualism of properties.

² In the spirit of the Wittgensteinian pragmatism Benoist notices that the notion of “success” is deeper than that of truth. He understands success as (a successful) following of a “normatively constituted way”. We interpret this as a correct rule-following in the Wittgensteinian sense. (Benoist 2010/2011, p. 70, footnote 1.) We also interpret the “exact” representations as “successful” ones.

³ We use the terms « epistemic gap » and « explanatory gap » as synonymous, because, when one uses a concept to identify a certain reality (hence closing an epistemic gap between them), at the same time one describes and represents the reality with the help of this concept (hence closing an explanatory gap between them).

⁴ Together with Benoist we reject the metaphysical idea of a “naked reality” as a definite (or indefinite) *Given*, in an absolute sense independent from the subject. We also reject the classical representationalism according to which the access to reality is possible only by means of a representation which plays a role of a screen between the subject and reality, and keeps reality at a distance from the subject. Metaphysical realism (or the myth of the *Given*) is the flip side of representationalism. (Benoist 2011, p. 94.)

⁵ Papineau understands the psycho-physical identity of the kind “experience = neurological process” in a very, let us say, literal sense, in which one property (materialistic) can be substituted in place of another (experiential). Such kind of identity is supposed to be established on the basis of an empirical correlation between the two properties. The deep nature of the identity remains hidden.

⁶ Notice that Jackson presupposes that one can know everything there is to know about the material properties of the experience of seeing something red without having seen any colored objects. In our view, this presupposition is false (see also below).

Before Mary is shown a rose she knows everything about the material properties of the experience of seeing red (premise 1). Then she learns that this experience has one more property – the phenomenal aspect of the experience, that is, what it looks like to see something red (premise 2). Therefore the new property she learns about is a non-material one (conclusion).⁷

One can argue that Mary does not gain any new knowledge, that is, premise 2 is false (this is, for example, Lewis's (1990), Nemirow's (1990), and Dennett's (1992) point of view and also the current point of view of Jackson (2007) himself, who has now come to Lewis-Dennett's *a priori materialism*⁸). One can also argue - and this is Papineau's point of view – that the claim that Mary gains some new knowledge is ambiguous. The ambiguity consists in neglecting a distinction between concepts and properties. Though Mary gains some new knowledge it is not clear what is the nature of this knowledge. And Papineau like many physicalists argues that when Mary is shown a red rose she learns something new about concepts, not about the properties of the experience of seeing red. So, the premise 2 of Jackson's argument would be false.

More precisely, for Papineau, first of all, Mary acquires a new – phenomenal – concept, and then she learns that this concept refers to the experience of seeing red, that is, has the same referent as her scientific concept of the experience of seeing red. This is knowledge at the level of concepts, not at the level of properties of the experience. Such a materialistic position is *conceptual dualism*.⁹

However, we think, conceptual dualism is not a satisfactory position, because the so-called explanatory gap problem, that is, the problem of explanation of phenomenal properties of experiences in terms of their neurological properties, moves to the conceptual level. In addition, one can argue that conceptual dualism entails dualism of properties and, therefore, cannot be a materialistic solution to the problem. One can also argue that new knowledge (if it is indeed new knowledge, as it is supposed by Jackson (1986) and Papineau) cannot be purely conceptual.¹⁰ There is always a new property which a phenomenal concept refers to.

⁷ In principle, from the very beginning one could just appeal to intuition that the phenomenal aspect of the experience is a non-material property of it (and on this basis to declare that dualism is true). Jackson's thought-experiment and argument serve to reinforce this impression.

⁸ The *a priori* materialists also reject the *conceivability* of zombies.

We oppose *conceivability* to arbitrary imaginability. The latter does not obey the appropriate rules. For instance, it is obvious that in a very broad sense zombies are imaginable. However it might not be obvious that they are *conceivable*.

⁹ Conceptual dualism is compatible not only with materialism but also with dualism of properties. Dualists claim that phenomenal concepts refer to non-material phenomenal properties. Though our position, as will be clear, is, in a sense, intermediary, it is still materialistic. We only reject the traditional "metaphysical" (non-normative) materialism of classical objects in favor of a deeper materialism of "natural" normative practices.

¹⁰ Stalnaker (2006) argued that one cannot know about all physical properties of a subjective experience in the absence of a subjective element. A purely "objective" non-contextual (Stalnaker's term) knowledge from the third-person point of view is incomplete. From this point of view Mary's phenomenal knowledge is a completion of her previous incomplete knowledge about the material properties of the experience of seeing something red.

Therefore, when Mary is shown a red rose she indeed learns about a new property of the experience. This does not necessary imply that dualism is true, since one can argue that in her black and white laboratory, being deprived of any phenomenal experience, Mary cannot gain knowledge about all material properties of the experience of seeing red (see footnote 10), or one can argue, as Lewis and others did (see above), that she does not gain any new knowledge when she is shown a red rose.

Notice that in addition to the semantic ambiguity “concept/property” underlined by Papineau, Jackson’s argument contains other ambiguities. It is not clear, for example, what is understood by the material (or physical) property. It is not clear whether it is possible to gain knowledge about all material properties of an experience. And if so, it is not clear whether gaining such knowledge is possible using only the third-person point of view, without direct access to the phenomenal character of the experience or, at least, to a close phenomenological experience (from the first-person point of view). (As we said in footnote 6, in our view this is not possible.)

It seems to us that such ambiguities are unavoidable in thought-experiments which describe non-actual situations. By consequence, a philosophical argument cannot always be supported by a thought-experiment (though the latter can illustrate the former). In particular, one can argue that judgments elicited by many thought-experiments fail to provide evidence for the premises of philosophical arguments (Machery 2011).

The genuine concepts, not pseudo-concepts, must be anchored in reality, must be *alimented* by it (Benoist 2010/2011, 2011). However, not all concepts used in thought-experiments are connected with reality. By the very nature of thought-experiments, some concepts used in a thought-experiment could be anchored only in this thought experiment, not in reality. Therefore judgments elicited by a thought-experiment can be anchored only in the thought-experiment, too. There could be no real facts corresponding to such judgments.

We distinguish here between a judgment and a fact which the judgment is about. If a judgment is a result of a real experience (and is knowledge), this distinction is not important. If a judgment is made within a thought-experiment, the distinction is essential. A judgment elicited by a thought-experiment could refer to an imaginary, not real fact (fictional judgments are analogous). Such a judgment cannot be used to support the premises of a philosophical reasoning.

Concerning Jackson’s thought-experiment, the intuition that Mary gains some new knowledge about the properties of the experience of seeing something red (or just some new knowledge) cannot be used to deduce that dualism of properties (or just conceptual dualism) is true.

For the physicalists Lewis and Nemirov Mary acquires the capacity of a direct identification of the experience of seeing red, that is, some “know-how”, not “knowledge that”. Notice that if one understands the concept as the capacity of identification, Mary acquires a new concept (due to a direct access to the experience), which can be called (if we adopt Lewis’ and Nemirov’s point of view, that it is said about some pure “know how”), an “instinctive

concept". She could use this concept, for example, when imagining something red (which she was not able to do before).¹¹

It seems to us that Lewis's and Nemirow's position is a step toward phenomenal concepts, which, in the first approximation, can be considered as intermediary concepts between theoretical concepts allowing one to obtain "knowledge that" and "instinctive concepts", or "know-how". Some philosophers even consider phenomenal concepts as a composition of theoretical concepts and "know-how".¹²

Lewis's and Nemirow's argument does not take into account the properly phenomenal aspect of a phenomenal experience. To demonstrate that Mary also gains some new "knowledge that" it is proposed that we modify Jackson's thought-experiment. In place of Mary, Marianna enters into play. The only difference between them is that Marianna is shown not a red rose, but a piece of red paper, and she is not told that it is red.

For Papineau, there seems little doubt that Marianna acquires some new "knowledge-that" as well as some new knowledge-how. Let us assume that she denotes her experience with the symbol *F* or the word *senso*. Then one can say that Marianna acquires a new concept – a phenomenal concept *F* (*senso*) -, or "know-how", because she cannot, for example, form the non-indexical judgment "Everybody else I know has had *F* (experience *senso*) before" with the help of her theoretical concepts. In addition, when Marianna is told that what she denotes by the symbol *F* is the experience of seeing red, that is, the same that she denoted by a theoretical concept, she gains some new "knowledge that". This is knowledge at the level of concepts.¹³

In the thought-experience with Mary it may look as if Mary gained some new knowledge about properties of the experience of seeing red. In reality she, too, gains some knowledge about concepts used for the identification of the experience.

This was Papineau's position.

For Papineau "concepts like *F* are perceptual concepts. They are concepts that we can form as a result of having experiences of a certain type and which refer to the phenomenal nature of those experiences." (Papineau 2011, 176.) It sounds as if for Papineau the experience was already typified (conceptualized) *before* any application of concepts to it. A perceptual concept of a certain kind would be formed as a result of having a perceptual experience of the

¹¹ Strictly speaking, one should distinguish between a concept applied in reality and "the same" concept applied in imagination (for example, one can be able to apply a concept in reality, but not in imagination, and *vice versa*), though one can establish a relation between them. We do not consider this question here.

¹² Notice also that for "fundamental pragmatists" (Brandom's (2011) term) *knowledge-that* is a species of *knowledge-how*.

¹³ Notice that knowledge that a phenomenal concept refers to a certain kind of experience is also knowledge about this experience, namely, that the experience can also be described by the phenomenal concept, so (if we take into account the condition of adequacy (see above)) that it has some new aspect which cannot be taken into account by a scientific concept.

It seems to us that if the phenomenal concepts were concepts *sui generis*, as Papineau takes it, that is, if there was an explanatory gap at the level of concepts, strictly speaking it would not be possible to establish that the concept *F* has the same referent as the neurological concept.

same kind. Anyway, it seems that Papineau does not take into account the very process of the formation of a concept.

If Marianna has the experience of seeing something red for the first time, this experience cannot be already conceptualized. She must possess the reflective/introspective capacities and she must apply them to form a perceptual concept on the basis of the experience (perhaps as a result of many repetitions of the experience) - the capacity to identify the experience. This concept cannot be acquired automatically, as a simple pale (conceptual) copy of the experience. The formation of a concept is a process. And this means that this formation can be either correct or not, meaningful or not. In the latter case a concept will not be formed at all. This is, we think, the case of a meaningless introspection, criticized by Wittgenstein.

According to Papineau, Jackson's argument *proves* the existence of phenomenal concepts, which are concepts *sui generis*. This is conceptual dualism.

In our view, and, we think, for Wittgenstein, conceptual dualism (in the strict sense) as well as ontological dualism is an unsatisfactory position, which contradicts to Wittgensteinian understanding of concepts (including the phenomenal concepts) as naturalized rules. Phenomenal concepts understood as concepts *sui generis* could not be naturalized, and, by consequence, they would be inconsistent with the naturalistic part of the private language argument (which Papineau actually claims but for a different reason. As we already said above, we think that the private language argument supposes that (1) every meaningful language obeys rules, and (2) all rules are natural, or can be naturalized. In summary, every meaningful language obeys natural rules. So the argument is not simply semantic, but also ontological), which, we think, supposes that an exterior criterion of a phenomenal experience is, in principle, possible (though it is not necessary to identify the experience (Papineau thinks that for Wittgenstein the availability of an exterior criterion is necessary to make an experience meaningful (see below)))¹⁴.

Perhaps one can argue that though there is a difference between phenomenal and non-phenomenal concepts, it is not important. The mechanisms of formation of the concepts of both kinds are the same or similar. (The argument can be constructed by analogy with Williamson's argument concerning the difference between *a priori* and *a posteriori*. (Williamson, "How Deep..."). See also below.)

Papineau also applies the conceptual dualism view to give a materialistic response to the zombies argument, proposed by dualists, according to which zombies, that is, beings which are physically and functionally identical to human beings but lack consciousness or have only

¹⁴ Wittgenstein says: "If someone says he *knows* something, it must be something that, by general consent, he is in a position to know". (W, *OC*, 555) That is, knowledge is public. But this "public" character of knowledge (and the same is true for application of concepts) does not suppose the effective availability of an exterior "public" criterion.

a pale copy of consciousness, are *conceivable*, and, therefore, the properties of consciousness are non-physical, that is, materialism is false.¹⁵

A materialist answer is that conceivability implies only the conceptual possibility. Zombies do not exist (not only in the actual world, but also in “possible” worlds). The illusion of their existence might appear only because there is no *a priori* relation between theoretical and phenomenal concepts. According to the *a posteriori* materialists, this relation between them is established *a posteriori*. The phenomenological/physical identities are *a posteriori necessities* in the sense of Saul Kripke.

According to Williamson, from the epistemological point of view the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* is meaningful but superficial. The cognitive mechanisms underlying the acquiring of *a priori* knowledge and *a posteriori* knowledge are essentially the same. (Williamson, “How Deep ... “..) In both cases the experience plays a role which is more than simply *enabling*, but less than simply *evidential*. (It seems to us that this double role of experience is also manifested in the case of phenomenal judgments (phenomenal knowledge).¹⁶)

It seems that this is in accord with the later Wittgenstein and also with the Wittgensteinian position of Jocelyn Benoist, for whom the genuine concepts are anchored in reality and alimented by it. And this means that the question about the conceivability of zombies, if it is a conceptual question, cannot be a purely *a priori* one. It is not obvious that zombies are conceivable according to the appropriate natural rules, which themselves cannot be purely *a priori*. That is, *a priori* materialism could join the *a posteriori* materialism (the distinction between them is superficial). Of course this junction is impossible within a pure thought experiment.

That is why we think that, strictly speaking, conceptual dualism is false. Zombies are conceivable only if the phenomenal concepts are understood in an approximate, abstract sense, that is, if their very nature is ignored. The distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual, and consequently, between concepts and properties, is relative.

2. Phenomenal concepts and private language argument

Papineau quotes §§ 270 and 271 from *Philosophical Investigations* by Wittgenstein, which from his point of view support his thesis that Wittgenstein’s private language argument is inconsistent with phenomenal concepts.

¹⁵ There is a close connection between the “zombie” argument and Jackson’s argument. Both are based on the intuition that all physical properties of an experience can be completely separated from the experience itself (its phenomenal aspect).

¹⁶ In other words, in spite of the obvious difference between theoretical and phenomenal concepts the mechanisms of their acquiring are essentially the same. Paraphrasing Williamson, from the epistemological point of view, there is no essential difference between theoretical knowledge (using theoretical concepts) and immediate knowledge (using phenomenal concepts) about phenomenal experience.

In §§ 270 and 271 Wittgenstein says :

270. Let us now imagine a use for the entry of the sign "S" in my diary. I discover that whenever I have a particular sensation a manometer shews that my blood-pressure rises. So I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus. This is a useful result. And now it seems quite indifferent whether I have recognized the sensation *right* or not. Let us suppose I regularly identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least. And that alone shews that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show. (We as it were turned a knob which looked as if it could be used to turn on some part of the machine; but it was a mere ornament, not connected with the mechanism at all.) And what is our reason for calling "S" the name of a sensation here? Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language-game,— And why a "particular sensation," that is, the same one every time? Well, aren't we supposing that we write "S" every time?

271. "Imagine a person whose memory could not retain *what* the word 'pain' meant—so that he constantly called different things by that name—but nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain" — in short he uses it as we all do. Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism.

Papineau interprets Wittgenstein in the sense that the use of the symbol S is meaningless until it is established (with the help of a manometer) that it is associated with a high blood pressure. He writes (Papineau 2011, 181-182):

Wittgenstein explicitly considers the idea that some later a posteriori discovery might show that some putatively private term has a legitimate use. He considers some would-be private linguist who gives the private name "S" to a kind of sensation. The linguist later notices that his private judgments that S correlate with his high blood pressure reading on a manometer. Does this legitimate the use of "S" by giving us a public criterion to measure it against? Wittgenstein is clear that, while this introduction of a public criterion might succeed in giving "S" a meaning which relates it to blood pressure, the supposed earlier connection with a sensation is of no significance. What has happened is that the term now has a public meaning, in virtue of the new criterion, not that it always referred to a sensation. The supposed connection with a sensation is an idle part, "a knob which looked as if it could be used to turn on some part of the machine; but it was a mere ornament, not connected with the mechanism at all."

Let us compare Papineau's interpretation of Wittgenstein ("the supposed earlier connection with a sensation is of no significance") with what Wittgenstein indeed says. In reality he says just the opposite: "So I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus." There is a sensation the symbol S refers to. It does not depend on whether the manometer is used or not, though its use allows one to establish the physiological nature of the sensation. So, the use of S cannot be completely meaningless; it is meaningless at the reflective level, but not at the instinctive one. The exterior criterion does not establish the meaning, but does confirm that there is a meaning. And it makes the meaning explicit, conscious, or reflective (and in this sense "public") from the exterior (scientific) point of view, but not from the first-person point of view. That is why the exterior criterion, or roughly speaking the third person point of view, is useful.

Wittgenstein writes: "And now it seems quite indifferent whether I have recognized the sensation *right* or not. Let us suppose I regularly identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least." It is said here about the lack of the meaning on the reflective/introspective and only reflective/introspective level. And on different occasions the symbol S refers to "the same" particular sensation; because this is supposed by its use. (The identity is contextual.) The symbol S plays the role of a rule (a word) of a language.

In § 271 Wittgenstein imagines "a person whose memory could not retain *what* the word 'pain' meant—so that he constantly called different things by that name". In this case also one can say that this is not important, if the word "pain" is used in accordance with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain (see § 271). The person knows *instinctively* (and only instinctively) what the word "pain" means.

The exterior criterion permits one to introduce the use of the symbol S in the domain of the reflective consciousness (but this use does not amount to the first-person reflection of the instinctive experience). If earlier the person used the symbol instinctively (but not arbitrarily, not meaninglessly), within an instinctive "language game", now she can attribute to such a use the following explicit meaning: "My blood pressure is high".

What has been said above does not mean that the person cannot develop a properly phenomenal reflective/introspective concept (the first-person point of view) and use it to refer to her experience not instinctively, but reflectively/introspectively.

Wittgenstein's example with a person whose memory cannot retain what the word "pain" meant presupposes that such a person is exceptional and usually we are able to retain what the word 'pain' means. That is, for Wittgenstein the reflective (introspective) use of the term "pain" (not only instinctive) is not meaningless.

This is corroborated by other texts of Wittgenstein. We have chosen by chance § 177:

Ich möchte sagen: »Ich erlebe das Weil«. Aber nicht, weil ich mich an dieses Erlebnis erinnere; sondern, weil ich beim Nachdenken darüber, was ich in so einem Fall erlebe, dies durch das Medium des Begriffes ›weil‹ (oder ›Einfluß‹, oder ›Ursache‹, oder ›Verbindung‹) anschau.

In translation:

I should like to say "I experience the because". Not because I remember such an experience, but because when I reflect on what I experience in such a case I look at it through the medium of the concept 'because' (or 'influence' or 'cause' or 'connexion'). (PI 177)

We interpret Wittgenstein's "Nachdenken" as reflection/introspection in the sense of *making explicit*, not in the sense of the classical *look inwards*. Papineau uses the expression *look inwards* and does not specify how he understands introspection. Nor does he refute Wittgenstein's critiques of introspection.¹⁷

¹⁷ We interpret Wittgenstein's "introspection"/reflection as *making explicit (explicitation)* of underlying rules. Wittgenstein himself writes about introspection, for example, the following: "(...) It makes sense to ask : 'Do I really love her, or am I only pretending to myself?' and the process of introspection is the calling up of memories; of imagined possible situations, and of the feelings that one would have if ..." (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 587) "When you were swearing just now, did you really mean it?' (...) And the answer may be given as a result of introspection and is often some such thing as: 'I didn't mean it very seriously', 'I meant it half jokingly' and so on (...)." (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 677)

As is known, some philosophers interpret Wittgenstein's position about introspection as expressivism. For example, they quote in favor of expressivism the following words: "The verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it." (Wittgenstein 1953, 1958, § 244.) In our view, in this paragraph Wittgenstein describes the process of formation of the *concept* of pain and its use ("pain-behavior"). The meaning of the pain is uncovered not by a "look inward"; it is elaborated; it is learnt. And it is not in crying, but in a "pain-behavior"

For Wittgenstein a correct introspection is a look through the medium of a concept (in § 177 *durch das Medium des Begriffes 'weil'*). This “look” is not Kantian. The concept does not create an epistemic gap between a thing-for-us (conceptualized) and a thing-in-itself (non-conceptualized). On the contrary, it allows us to grasp a thing and to grasp it as it is, that is, in its very reality. For instance, the concept “because” allows one to grasp the experience of using the word “because”.

One can use “because” instinctively, by analogy with the use of the symbol *S* in the example from § 270, but one can also use it reflectively (introspectively), as it is meant in the example from § 177.

What has been said above is applicable to the perceptual experience of seeing something red. “Seeing something red” is already a conceptualized experience, a result of the elaboration of the phenomenal concept of “seeing something red” and its application. Papineau does not deny that for Wittgenstein ordinary language can describe phenomenal experiences, and the word “red” refers to red. However, he thinks that for Wittgenstein the use of phenomenological terms, in particular, the term *sensio* (the symbol *F*) cannot be introspective. In disagreement with Papineau, we think that for Wittgenstein Marianna would be able to elaborate a correct reflective/introspective use of the term *sensio*. This term would be meaningless only in the case of an arbitrary, not obeying any rules “inward gaze”.

Papineau justifies the possibility of a direct (immediate) identification of a phenomenal experience by means of phenomenal concepts (without using any exterior criterion) with the help of the following theory of contentful judgments (see Millikan 2000). We have a “shelf-supply” of many different categories (or “ready-made concepts”) for *potential* concepts. The categories are distinguished by the kind of information we are inclined to attach to them. They allow for the identification of some objects whose concepts we do not have. For instance, having only the *animal species* ready-made concept (“category”) we might be able to use it to form the concept that is locked on to the *species* “horse”, that is, the concept of a horse. (Notice that this allows one to extend the initial stock of available concepts and, by consequence, makes possible the identification of a broader class of objects.)

(in agreement with Wittgenstein’s slogan “the meaning is the use”): “(...) A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. //’So you are saying that the word ‘pain’ really means crying?’ – On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.” (§ 244)

One can apply the reasoning of § 244 to the process of formation of a phenomenal concept by Marianna. This process could be more or less easy, more or less quick. It would depend on Marianna’s preliminary knowledge; it could not be always instant, as Papineau seemingly supposes. It is supposed that before Marianna is shown a piece of red paper she did not have any preliminary phenomenal knowledge. So, it seems to us that it will not be so easy for her to form the concept of red as a result of her new experience. Conversely, if she had a broad enough phenomenal knowledge of colors she could form some new phenomenal concepts in a purely *a priori* way. (See also David Hume’s position about the possibility of *a priori* identification of a new nuance of a color (see below).)

Papineau applies the mentioned theory of contentful judgments to phenomenal concepts and experiences. A “shelf-supply” of types of experience could permit one to identify a new kind of experience (without using any exterior criterion).¹⁸ (Let us remember here that according to David Hume in some cases the *a priori* identification (or imagination) of a new nuance of a color would be possible if one had knowledge of a broad enough range of its nuances. (Romano 2010) That is, the concept of a color is not purely empirical. There is color logic.) Roughly speaking, we agree with this theory. But let us notice that in the cases of Mary and Marianna there is no such “shelf-supply” of phenomenal categories for potential phenomenal concepts. Both scientists have never seen any colored objects before they are shown a red rose.

Papineau opposes this theory of contentful judgments to another approach, according to which contentful judgments are constituted by rules governing such judgments. Papineau takes it that such rules require “some publicly applicable standards” (Papineau 2011, p. 182. See also below).

It seems to us that the first approach to contentful judgments is in reality a theory of contentful judgments based on the notion of rule-following understood in the pragmatic Wittgensteinian sense: a rule can be applied in a new situation without using any rule for its application. The role of the rule is played by the “ready-made concepts” (or “shelf-supply” of categories for potential concepts).¹⁹

By contrast, Papineau’s interpretation of the second approach to contentful judgments is not, in our view, Wittgensteinian. In particular, Papineau writes: “There must be some publicly applicable standards by which we can determine whether a subject is using the relevant terms in accord with their meaning”. (Papineau 2011, 182.) If by “publicly applicable standards” Papineau means some pre-established standards, then they are just the rules for the application of a rule, criticized by Wittgenstein (and already by Kant).

Papineau’s argument in favor of phenomenal concepts (the first approach) is, in essence, Wittgensteinian. Wittgenstein’s solution to the rule-following problem amounts to his private language argument. This means that phenomenal concepts are consistent with the private language argument. By contrast, Papineau’s conceptual dualism, we think, is inconsistent with Wittgenstein. If conceptual dualism is false, how should one understand the psycho-physical identity? In the next paragraph we make some suggestions.

3. The psychophysical identity as a pragmatically mediated semantic relation

¹⁸ At the same time, it seems, Papineau implicitly supposes that the identified experience is already conceptualized. For example, he writes: “When we first have a new kind of experience, we take a potential experience concept from the appropriate shelf and lock it onto the type of experience at hand” (Papineau 2011, 183).

¹⁹ Papineau writes: “My ability to refer to horses does not involve rules of any kind.” (Papineau 2011, 182) In our view, this is false.

Brandom (2008) develops an “analytic pragmatism” and, in particular, a “meaning-use analysis”. There are three principal elements of this analysis: PV-suff, VP-suff and PP’-suff. PV-suff means that the practice P is sufficient to *introduce* the vocabulary V, VP-suff – the vocabulary V is sufficient to *specify* the practice P, PP’-suff – the practice P is sufficient to *elaborate* another practice, P’ (this corresponds to the Wittgensteinian pragmatic projection allowing one to extend the initial practice P). The so-called *pragmatically mediated semantic relation* VP-*pmsr*-PV’ between the vocabularies V and V’ is such a relation that the vocabulary V is sufficient to specify the practice P, which, in turn, is sufficient to introduce the vocabulary V’.

Brandom distinguishes between the semantic and pragmatic meta-vocabularies. The former allows one to say in other terms what is said in a given vocabulary. The latter allows one to say *what it is one must do* to count as saying what is said in a given vocabulary. That is, the pragmatic meta-vocabulary specifies the corresponding action, practice.²⁰

For instance, a non-indexical vocabulary cannot be a meta-semantic vocabulary for an indexical vocabulary. As was shown by Perry and Lewis the former does not have the same expressive power as the latter.

For example, the indexical “now” is not synonymous (not semantically equivalent) to the indexical expression “time of using the word ‘now’”. However, a use of the non-indexical could indicate what it is one must do to count as expressing what is expressed by the indexical. The corresponding practical rule has the form: (1) If, at time t, speaker S wants to assert that some property P holds of S at time t, it is correct to say “P holds of *me now*.” (2) If a speaker at time t asserts “P holds of me now”, the speaker is committed to the property P holding of S at time t.

What Russell and others considered as being an equivalence, “I (my name is S) have the property P now = S has the property P at time t, where t is the time of the assertion of S”, is a pragmatically mediated semantic relation.

Let us remember that some philosophers considered phenomenal concepts as indexical concepts (which strictly speaking is false, because such an approach does not take into consideration *qualia* – the properly phenomenal aspect) or as concepts which resemble the indexical concepts and generalize them (that is, take *qualia* into consideration).

Using this analogy with indexicals, one can suppose that a neurological vocabulary can play the role of a pragmatic meta-vocabulary for a phenomenal vocabulary.²¹ The psycho-physical identity of the kind “pain is excitement of C-fibers”, or “experience of red = neurological process B” is, using Brandom’s terms, a pragmatically mediated semantic relation between a

²⁰ We share Brandom’s and Price’s view that one can speak about naturalism if one can *specify* in naturalistic terms the corresponding discursive practice.

²¹ We suppose that, roughly speaking, concepts are words and use the terms “vocabulary” and “concept” (or “system of concepts”) as synonymous.

phenomenal vocabulary (concepts) and a neurological vocabulary (concepts). The problem of the explanatory gap appears if and only if this relation is violated or ignored. (Pris 2009)

A phenomenal concept *represents, describes, or makes explicit* the corresponding experience (“practice”). A neurological concept *specifies* it (that is, represents it in a more mediated way); it is a rule to follow to reproduce it. Both concepts are anchored in experience and alimented by it. This establishes a relation between them, which is the pragmatically mediated semantic relation, expressed by the psycho-physical identity.²² Such identity is normative, because the corresponding practice is normative. One can also speak about the identity as a “language game” in the sense of Wittgenstein. The difference between the psycho-physical and physico-physical identities is not essential because the two have one and the same nature of language games, or normative practices.

Conclusion

Phenomenal concepts are consistent with Wittgenstein’s private language argument. They are natural (or naturalizable) rules (capacities) for direct identification of phenomenal experiences, including the identification of “what they look like”. Such rules/concepts can be formed essentially on the basis of experience. However, the mechanism of their formation is not different from that of non-phenomenal concepts. Conceptual dualism plays only a superficial role. The supposition that the phenomenal concepts are *sui generis* concepts is wrong.

Wittgenstein’s “private language” is a “language” which does not obey any rules (or obeys some supernatural rules). If the subject uses a language based on concepts, let them be phenomenal, it will be public (in the sense of the possibility of communication) and meaningful. Papineau’s own argument in favor of the possibility of direct identification of a new phenomenal experience with the help of a stock of shelf categories for potential concepts is, in essence, Wittgensteinian (by applying categories we follow rules). Papineau thinks that the use of phenomenal concepts can be made public. At the same time he thinks that such use contradicts Wittgenstein’s private language argument. In our view, this is because Papineau understands Wittgenstein in a restrictive sense supposing that meaningfulness is always determined with the help of an exterior (“public”) criterion.

The notion of a language game as a normative practice²³ allows one to understand identity, in particular the psycho-physical identity, as a normative identity, as an identity depending on

²² One of Brandom’s examples of a pragmatically mediated semantic relation is the relation between algebraic formulas and geometric figures within Descartes’ algebraic geometry (Brandom 2008).

²³ In (Pris 2008) one of the authors of this paper (F.-I. Pris) speaks about Wittgensteinian “normative naturalism”. Meredith Williams uses the same term (Williams 2011). Notice also that the “intentional realism” by Jocelyn Benoist (2011) is normative in the sense that any reality (for example, physical or phenomenological) is identified within a context or a point of view according to such and such a norm (concept). According to Benoist there is no pre-normative, that is, non-conceptual contact with reality. (Benoist 2011, p. 113.) Robert Brandom’s normative pragmatism – a synthesis of pragmatism and rationalism also - is a normative naturalism. (Already for American pragmatists who synthesized pragmatism and empiricism “the nature (...) is through and through a rational nature – not just the part of it that is intelligible as experience.” (Brandom 2011, p. 9)

context.²⁴ Brandom's analytic pragmatism, we think, permits us to express this idea even more explicitly and analytically in terms of a pragmatically mediated relation between vocabularies (we say "concepts"), having different expressive powers.

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²⁴ For example, Jocelyn Benoist (2011) also understands identity as a normative identity.

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