Self-love and sociability: the ‘rudiments of commerce’ in the state of nature

Peter Xavier Price

To cite this article: Peter Xavier Price (2018): Self-love and sociability: the ‘rudiments of commerce’ in the state of nature, Global Intellectual History, DOI: 10.1080/23801883.2018.1492422

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/23801883.2018.1492422

Published online: 28 Jun 2018.

Submit your article to this journal

View Crossmark data
Self-love and sociability: the ‘rudiments of commerce’ in the state of nature

Peter Xavier Price
Sussex Centre for Intellectual History, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK

ABSTRACT
Istvan Hont’s classic work on the theoretical links between the seventeenth-century natural jurists Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf and the eighteenth-century Scottish political economists remains a popular trope among intellectual and economic historians of various stamps. Despite this, a common criticism levelled at Hont remains his relative lack of engagement with the relationship between religion and economics in the early modern period. This paper challenges this aspect of Hont’s narrative by drawing attention to an alternative, albeit complementary, assessment of the natural jurisprudential heritage of eighteenth-century British political economy. Specifically, the article attempts to map on to Hont’s thesis the Christian Stoic interpretation of Grotius and Pufendorf which has gained greater currency in recent years. In doing so, the paper argues that Grotius and Pufendorf’s contributions to the ‘unsocial sociability’ debate do not necessarily lead directly to the Scottish school of political economists, as is commonly assumed. Instead, it contends that a reconsideration of Grotius and Pufendorf as neo-Stoic theorists, particularly via scrutiny of their respective adaptations of the traditional Stoic theory of *oikeiosis*, steers us towards the heart of the early English ‘clerical’ Enlightenment.

KEYWORDS
Christian political economy; commercial sociability; neo-Stoicism; *oikeiosis*; self-love; state of nature

1. Introduction

Intellectual histories of economic thought remain incomplete without acknowledging the pioneering work of Istvan Hont. His famous essay “The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the Theoretical Foundations of the “Four-Stages” Theory”, first published in 1990, remains a cornerstone of the field of study. The underlying premise of Hont’s work revolved around the intellectual tension between Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94). Commercial society was ‘invented’, Hont contended, when Pufendorf adjoined Hobbes’s intellectual method with Grotius’s modernised form of jurisprudence, thereby arriving at an explanatory model detailing the reasons why, and how, individuals in a state of nature eventually opted to enter into society. In time, Hont continued, Pufendorf’s model was to become the foundational basis for the great ‘Four-Stages Theory’ of societal
development synonymous with eighteenth-century Scottish political economists, most notably David Hume (1711–76) and Adam Smith (1723–90). As Hont elsewhere put it (in collaboration with Michael Ignatieff), the natural jurisprudential tradition was therefore the source of Smith’s central preoccupation with the issues of ‘needs’ and ‘justice’ in the seminal Wealth of Nations (1776):

Smith was simply transposing into the language of markets an ancient jurisprudential discourse, carried into modernity by Grotius, Pufendorf and Locke […] designed to show how an economy of abundance could be created in which this ancient jurisprudential antinomy between the needs of the poor and the rights of the rich could be transcended altogether.2

One of Hont’s most significant assertions regarding Pufendorf was that the jurist facilitated subsequent analyses of the historical emergence of commercial society purged of its theological connotations. Just as Grotius had inaugurated an international legal order liberated from confessional strife, so too, Hont argued, did Pufendorf flesh out an essentially secular, transnational commercial order, which subsequent political economists utilised in order to counter ‘neo-Machiavellian’ reason of state in its latest mercantile guise (encapsulated in the phrase ‘jealousy of trade’).3 In doing so, Hont contrasted Pufendorf’s sociable trajectory with a distinctly theological account of the genesis of commercial sociability which emerged in parallel in the late seventeenth-century. This was the Epicurean-Augustinianism of French Jansenists such as Pierre Nicole (1625–95) and Blaise Pascal (1623–62), who claimed that God’s redemptive plan for Fallen humanity revealed itself in the unintended socioeconomic utility engendered by individual selfishness and cupidity.4 In recent decades, it has become something of a commonplace to couple this Epicurean-Augustinian tradition with conventional, self-interest-based accounts of the genesis of modern economic thought.5 In large part, this is because of its perceived and actual compatibility with, among others, the ‘Passions and Interests’ model popularised by Albert O. Hirschman in the 1970s and the theory of spontaneous order which now pervades the contemporary social sciences.6 In many respects, Hont’s thesis did not deviate much from this approach. Consigning the theological rationalisation for the emergence of commercial sociability to the Augustinian-Epicureanism of Nicole et al., conversely, Hont’s reading of Grotius and Pufendorf was essentially secular in tone. Yet was Hont’s evaluation correct on this head?

This paper argues that there is strong reason to challenge this aspect of Hont’s thesis. In the first instance, any consideration of Grotius’s foundational influence demands acknowledgement of the jurist’s well-known theoretical inconsistency, the result of which is that he has become ‘posthumously all things to all men’.7 In turn, this variability has led to persistent, conflicting accounts about the nature of Grotius’s legacy, invariably revolving around whether or not he was an Epicurean or Stoic thinker, secular or Christian in his approach, or a Scholastic-Aristotelian as opposed to a ‘modern’ natural law theorist. This said, the foundational premise of this paper is far from novel. In unison with many scholars, it contends that Grotius’s theological and philosophical ambiguity originates, in large part, in the discrepancy between the self-interested and sociable aspects of his thought. Where it does differ significantly from extant analyses, however, is in its identification of both the initial locus and subsequent trajectory of this famous Grotian dichotomy. Specifically, this paper contends that the ‘self-interest versus sociability’
conundrum, which served as the blueprint for the eighteenth-century science of man, *homo economicus* and *homo socius*, was an unintended consequence of Grotius’s utilisation of Stoic *oikeiosis* in *The Rights of War and Peace* (1625). Furthermore, the article claims that Pufendorf’s theoretical perpetuation of the *oikeiosis* process, via a crucial detour through Hobbes’s state of nature, leads us to a markedly different conclusion to that which Hont proposed.

Why is this significant? *Oikeiosis* is a traditional Stoic term signifying, at its most rudimentary, the ethical disparity between one’s sense of ‘self’ and ‘other’. Additionally, *oikeiosis* shares its etymological root with the term *oikonomía*, which is today rendered in English as ‘economics’. Consequently, a growing number of studies acknowledge *oikeiosis* as a foundational principle in the history of Western political and economic thought. In recent times, for example, *oikeiosis* has become increasingly associated with early modern debates about cosmopolitanism, patriotism and the foundations of international ethics and international law, particularly in an eighteenth-century British context. From the perspective of this paper, however, what is most significant is the application of *oikeiosis* to Smith’s economic thought. According to Fonna Forman-Barzilai, Smith ‘embraced *oikeiosis* as an empirical fact’, yet rejected its cosmopolitan and teleological conclusions. Accordingly, she argues that Smith’s qualified adoption of *oikeiosis* is revelatory in the context of the classic *Das Adam Smith Problem*: that is, the perceived disparity between the ostensibly mechanistic and ‘self-interested’ economics of *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) and the ‘sociable’ meta-ethics of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1758). ‘Are the books consistent or continuous?’, Forman-Barzilai summarises. ‘And if not, which in Smith’s mind was prior? Was Smith primarily an ethical or an economic thinker? Were human beings driven primarily by sympathy or self-interest, virtue or vice? *Homo socius* or *homo oeconomicus*?’

Though I believe the tension is putatively artificial … I revisit the problem … to challenge economic interpretations of the Smithian self as driven primarily by egoism and utility considerations, and the tendency among non-specialists and in public discourse generally to reduce the Smithian self to ‘economic man.’ I argue that the self was complex for Smith, and often quite conflicted, struggling to negotiate tensions between its selfish and other-regarding tendencies.

To an extent, the present author agrees with Forman-Barzilai that the Stoic theory of *oikeiosis* shaped, in certain of its aspects, eighteenth-century debates about the historical advent of commercial society. Additionally, the present paper concurs with her analysis that a neo-Stoic reading of Smith yields a plausible (though hardly unequivocal) interpretation of the Scot’s political economy as a significant manifestation of the *oikeiosis* principle. Be that as it may, this work asserts that far more can and ought to be done to chart—in precise terms—the emergence and propagation of Stoic *oikeiosis* in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century economic discourse. This endeavour is important, because it sheds new light on well-worn, though as yet underdeveloped, inquiries into the moral-philosophical and theological foundations of eighteenth-century British political economy. Specifically, the paper claims that a neo-Stoic, or Christian Stoic, reading of the seventeenth-century jurists offers a theoretical counterpoise to the dominant neo-Epicurean-Augustinianism within which much of the era’s political economy is currently framed. Extrapolating one step further from these points, these pages contend that an
examination of the Grotian-Pufendorfian and neo-Stoic-*oikeiosis* trajectory does not necessarily lead inexorably to the eighteenth-century Scottish political economists, as is commonly supposed. Rather, they suggest that a reappraisal of these subjects steers us towards the very heart of the early English Enlightenment, vis-a-vis the Anglican establishment duo Bishop Joseph Butler (1692–1751) and Dean Josiah Tucker (1713–99).

As conventional analyses have it, of which Hont’s is perhaps the most exhaustive, two of the most important intellectual conduits for the transposition of Grotius and Pufendorf’s ideas to the eighteenth-century Scottish universities and beyond were, among others, Gershom Carmicheal (c. 1672–1729) and Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746); both of whom were predecessors of Smith on the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. Small wonder, then, that the seventeenth-century jurists are so often cited as the intellectual progenitors of eighteenth-century Scottish jurisprudence, natural law and, in the second half of the century, political economy. There is, however, a significant fly in the ointment regarding this analysis. As these pages will demonstrate, Butler and Tucker’s brand of English Christian political economy owed a substantial debt to the continental Protestant natural law tradition – a fact which extant analyses scarcely acknowledge, let alone account for. The reason for this lack of attention is hardly mystifying. It has long been established that Georgian clerics, most of whom were educated in the ancient English universities, were by and large left unexposed to influences from the Continental mainland. This is in stark contrast to the moderate Calvinism which became entrenched in Scotland and isolated, provincial – that is to say, dissenting – pockets of England. As Terence H. Irwin elaborates:

Both Scottish Presbyterians and English and Welsh Dissenters seem to have been exposed to Continental influences that did not affect English Anglican writers to the same degree. The study of Grotius and Pufendorf was entrenched both in Glasgow and in Philip Doddridge’s [1702–51] Dissenting academy, but English Anglican writers do not refer to them as often.

Crucially, however, Butler was a Presbyterian by birth and, famously, a later Anglican convert, meaning that he both conformed with, and diverged from, this configuration. This said, the final introductory premise of this paper is that the neo-Stoic variant of the natural law tradition became deeply embedded in the Oxford-educated Tucker’s political economy via Butler, whom Tucker served as private chaplain from 1739 until Butler’s death in 1752.

The links between Butler and Tucker have been noted transiently in extant histories of economic thought. However, it is only recently that the full implications of their intellectual and theo-philosophical partnership have begun to receive sustained treatment. Typically, Butler and Tucker’s contributions to eighteenth-century economic discourse have been analysed via means of their putative ‘emergence’ from the Newtonian natural theology tradition – a perception that is reinforced by Butler’s well-known correspondence with the Boyle Lecturer Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), which precipitated the former’s conversion to the Anglican ministry in the mid-1710s. This paper does not seek to disavow this exposition. The Newtonian natural theology tradition was indeed pervasive among the British intellectual classes during the eighteenth-century, especially among Georgian prelates, and Butler and Tucker were no exception to this. At the same time, however, these pages suggest that Butler and Tucker’s Newtonianism operated in tandem with what Marco Barducci has recently called the
neo-Platonism, neo-Stoicism, and Erasmian humanism [which] were … some of the main sources of Grotius’ ethics, epistemology, and theology, and [which] converged [at about the turn of the eighteenth-century] on the backdrop of the latitudinarian movement and of ‘England’s moderate mainstream Enlightenment’.

This said, our task in what follows is to adumbrate at least one significant ramification of this complex intermingling of narratives and traditions: namely that of the emergence of Butler and Tucker’s socioeconomic thought.

The present author is well aware that there is a great deal of scepticism regarding the plausibility of an association between early modern neo-Stoicism and eighteenth-century political economy, still more that it might be applied to Butler and Tucker’s ideas to any meaningful extent. Accordingly, this paper is intended as a response of sorts to these misgivings. To this end, the article proceeds in Section 2 with discussion of Grotius’s utilisation of Stoic oikeiosis in its ‘personal’ and ‘social’ forms, drawing particular attention to his distinction between animal, human and divine nature, which is an important leitmotif of the oikeiosis process. Its main contention is that the Grotian understanding of oikeiosis is a major signifier of the jurist’s ambiguous legacy, whether among his immediate and eighteenth-century successors or among present-day historians. Section 3 details Hobbes and Pufendorf’s various responses to Grotius, highlighting above all the latter’s co-option of important aspects of his two predecessors’ thought. Adapting Hont’s thesis, the section’s central argument is that Pufendorf’s ‘pre-commercial’ language of self-love and sociability gains far greater clarity when viewed through a neo-Stoic lens. Section 4 changes tack by turning to Butler’s iteration of oikeiosis in an eighteenth-century British/Anglican context. Specifically, it discusses the Butlerian reformulation of the ‘self-love versus sociability’ motif in terms of the disparity between ‘Brute Creation’ and ‘Moral Government’. This exposition culminates in Section 5 with Tucker’s Christian Stoic response to Bernard Mandeville’s Hobbesian and neo-Epicurean-Augustinian critique of commercial modernity, where it posits that Tucker’s economic thought is the logical highpoint of the oikeiosis process. The paper closes in Section 6 with a brief reappraisal of Butler and Tucker’s significance to the eighteenth-century ‘commercial sociability’ debate and the Scottish Enlightenment.

2. From ‘personal’ to ‘social’ Oikeiosis: Hugo Grotius

In the famous ‘Prolegomena’ to The Rights of War and Peace (1625), Grotius sets down the basis for his system of natural law. ‘Man is indeed an Animal’, he writes, but one of a very high Order, and that excells all the other Species of Animals much more than they differ from one another; as the many Actions proper only to Mankind sufficiently demonstrate:

Now amongst the Things peculiar to Man, is his Desire of Society, that is, a certain Inclination to live with those of his own Kind, not in any Manner whatever, but peaceably, and in a Community regulated according to the best of his Understanding; which Disposition the Stoicks termed oikeiosis. Therefore the Saying, that every Creature is led by Nature to seek its own private Advantage, expressed thus universally, must not be granted.

Many scholars contend that it is this passage which confirms that Grotius was basically a Stoic thinker, setting in train the great seventeenth- and eighteenth-century debate about man’s suitability for society (appetitus societatis) and the legal and juridical parameters around which his rights might be secured. Nevertheless, the theo-philosophical
foundations of Grotius’s thought remain a rather large bone of contention among specialists. Richard Tuck, for example, remains consistently forthright in his view that the Grotian scheme was anchored by the primacy of self-interest, since this approach was Grotius’s only credible means of refuting the challenge of post-Renaissance scepticism, particularly the contemporary renewal of interest in the ancient Academic Sceptic Carneades. On the other hand, Tuck’s interpretation has also been criticised for leaning too far towards scepticism or Epicureanism, with some scholars arguing that the jurist’s system sanctioned human sociability above all else, while others still claim that Grotius was finely poised between the two poles.

Ironically, it is precisely Grotius’s distinction between human and animal nature in the above-cited, alongside his utilisation of oikeiosis, which fuels much of the uncertainty as to where he himself stood on the matter. For while oikeiosis is often considered to be an unambiguously Stoic term, typically associated with Cicero and the third century Stoic Hierocles, a closer reading reveals that the phrase eludes any single, precise definition. Derived from the Greek root oikos (meaning the management of the private sphere or household), and loosely translated as ‘approbation’ or ‘familiarisation’, at its most basic oikeiosis connotes the conceptual space existing within all rational creatures between their self-interest on the one side and their concern for others on the other. Hierocles’s famous definition, based on an evocative theory of concentric circles, relays the image of rings expanding outwards from the immediate proximity of the innermost self, to one’s own family, to one’s friends and neighbours, to one’s local community, to one’s nation, and so on, until the final ring encompasses humanity as a whole. Based on this description, Julia Annas claims that oikeiosis is the most radically teleological component of the Stoic philosophy, in that it enjoins all rational beings to view the world (and indeed the universe) not from the limited standpoint of self-centeredness, but rather from the perspective of one’s relation to a greater whole. Insofar as this model has been applied to early modern political thought, scholars have ascribed the concept with various labels such as ‘Stoic universalism’, ‘Stoic naturalism’, ‘cosmopolitan providence’, the ‘providential design model’ or ‘providential naturalism’. However, the key point we are attempting to get across at this stage is that, during the early modern period, oikeiosis was generally invoked as a rhetorical adjunct for Stoic sociability and the sympathetic, benevolent affections. Furthermore, these categories were deemed to be the preserve both of cosmic and human nature, since, according to the ancient Stoics, they were essentially interchangeable.

In Christopher Brooke’s lucid treatment of the revival of early modern Stoicism, he contends that Annas’s definition of oikeiosis is particularly applicable to Grotius. This is because he sees a strong affinity between Annas’s deployment of the term and Cicero’s in Di finibus, which Grotius frequently appeals to in Rights of War and Peace. Specifically, Brooke approves of Annas’s distinction between ‘personal’ oikeiosis (linked to Cicero’s account in Di finibus III. 16–21) and ‘social’ oikeiosis (III. 62–71), which Jon Miller elsewhere describes as two ‘aspects of one fundamental impulse’. And yet, herein lies the rub. For while ‘social’ oikeiosis is evidently intended to be an outward-facing proposition, underscoring the individual’s care and concern for the collective common good, the opposite and opposing force within human nature is, of course, said to be ‘personal’ oikeiosis, which maintains that individual persons seek, reflexively, to place their self-preservation above all else. To a profound extent, then, this dichotomy is the wellspring of the ambiguity regarding Grotius’s true allegiance on this head. Did
the natural jurist position self-preservation at the forefront of his system? Or was it rather man’s impulse for society, the *appetitus societatis*, which was of greater import within the Grotian scheme?

Benjamin Straumann, who identifies the origins of Grotius’s thought in the Roman law tradition, generally agrees with Brooke that Grotius’s version of *oikeiosis* was essentially Ciceronian, and therefore anti-Epicurean, in origin. Straumann proposes further, however, that Grotius’s reformulation of the concept was distinctly anthropological in tone: that is to say that Grotius stressed the primacy of ‘social’ over ‘personal’ *oikeiosis* so as to ‘refute the Carneadean claim that all animals strive only for their own advantage’.

Put otherwise, while Grotius accepted the permanent presence of the individual’s drive towards their own advantage (*utilitatum suarum stadium*), by the same token, he did not preclude the existence of their opposing drive toward society. Explaining why the latter instinct was far more pronounced in humans than animals was, therefore, a central concern within the Grotian scheme:

> But it must be owned that a Man grown up, being capable of acting in the same Manner with respect to Things that are alike, has, besides an exquisite Desire of Society, for the Satisfaction of which he alone of all Animals has received from Nature a peculiar Instrument, viz. the Use of Speech; I say, that he has, besides that, a Faculty of knowing and acting, according to some general Principles; so that what relates to this Faculty is not common to all Animals, but properly and peculiarly agrees to Mankind.

For Grotius, then, following the Stoics and Aristotle, it was man’s capacity for reason and rationality (*recta ratio*), and especially his use of speech (*logos*), which inclined him towards society. For while animals and human infants evidently displayed an instinctive aptitude for ‘personal’ *oikeiosis*, it was only in the fully grown, mature adult that ‘social’ *oikeiosis*—defined as rationality’s *telos*—could be said to preside over one’s outward actions. In classical discourse, this notion was exemplified by the wise Stoic sage who had achieved true wisdom via slow and deliberative reflection. Analogically, it was by these means that the individual became increasingly cognisant of, and sympathetic to, the manifold concerns of others. Extrapolating from this, Grotius recognised as axiomatic the bifurcated character of rational human life. For, on the one side, he observed, individuals were clearly comprised of natural drives and instincts (*prima naturae/self-preservation*); yet on the other, humans also consisted of right reason and sound judgement (*honestum/society*). According to Grotius, natural justice (*ius naturalle*) was therefore any action that did not injure another person’s *suum cuique* (‘mine and thine’, or ‘may all get their due’). Furthermore, whether one spoke of the natural law in terms of *iura* (‘perfect rights’; the minimal moral foundation necessary for social life), or *aptitudines* (‘imperfect rights’; any level of morality unrelated to the necessaries of life), Grotius asserted that justice (*ius*), in its three significations, was an inherent moral characteristic in all humans irrespective of creed or race:

[First] Right signifies merely that which is just, and that too rather in a negative than a positive Sense. So that the Right of War is properly that which may be done without Injustice with regard to an Enemy. Now that is unjust which is repugnant to the Nature of a Society of reasonable Creatures …

[Second] … another Signification of the Word Right different from this, but yet arising from it, … relates directly to the Person: In which Sense Right is a moral Quality [*qualitas moralis*] annexed to the Person, enabling him to have, or do, something justly …
There is also a third Sense of the Word Right, according to which it signifies the same Thing as Law [lex], when taken in its largest Extent, as being a Rule of Moral Actions, obliging us to that which is good and commendable.\(^4\)

As Knud Haakonssen summarises, the underlying principle of Grotius’s conception of justice is therefore the cultivation of social relations; for without this there can be no prospect of living in peaceable society, nor of interacting with one’s fellow kind. Moreover, maintaining sociability requires that humans balance their ‘pure self-interest and social inclinations by entering into contractual relationships’, leading, in turn, to the development of Law (lex) in the guise of property relations, modes of living, structures of authority, the punishment of transgressions and so on.\(^4\)

Much more could of course be said about these and many other aspects of Grotius’s thought. In the context of this paper, however, the key point we are attempting to get across is Grotius’s identification of rights and obligations (which are essentially his conception of the foundation of natural law) with anthropological human nature, associated in turn with Stoic oikeiosis. That is to say that, while Grotius accepted the basic tenets of Christianity, arguing that natural justice (ius naturelle) was prescribed by God, he maintained further that humans unaided by religion were capable of reaching some form of consensus (concordia) regarding the contractual, and quasi-contractual, obligations upon which social life rested. In so doing, it is often remarked that Grotius’s main ‘achievement’ was, of course, that he separated theology from natural law, thereby facilitating on rational grounds the modern international legal order: that is, an order liberated from moral relativism and the threat of confessional strife.\(^4\) Yet what is perhaps most intriguing from our present standpoint is the way in which, via the psychological mechanisms of ‘personal’ and ‘social’ oikeiosis, the hierarchy between animal, human and divine nature effectively collapses, meaning that the Grotian appetitus societatis is essentially perceived in universalist terms. (This is not to suggest that Grotius demoted God’s status but rather that he elevated rational human nature).\(^4\) It is in this respect that Grotius may be labelled a neo-Stoic thinker; and, moreover, in a Lipsian vein, as Christopher A. Ford has argued quite persuasively.\(^4\) Yet despite this, Grotius’s ambivalence is of course never far away. As Hans. W. Blom observes, throughout his writing Grotius is consistently ‘evasive and eclectic at the same time, making his arguments acceptable to different ideological communities, precisely by avoiding taking sides’.\(^4\) It is the consequences of this aspect of Grotius’s thought for his intellectual followers that we are addressing in these pages.

### 3. The language of self-love and sociability in ‘pre-commercial’ society: Thomas Hobbes and Samuel Pufendorf

As we shall shortly see, it was left above all to Pufendorf to refine Grotius’s distinction between human and animal nature, and to better define the relationship between natural law and divine volitional law. Before doing so, however, we must first turn briefly to Hobbes, since it was he that Pufendorf was forced to circumvent in order to reach his very different, yet complementary, conclusions. While Hobbes agreed with Grotius that humans were given the world to use, he fundamentally disagreed that sociability was the overriding constituent of human nature. On the contrary, in Leviathan (1649) Hobbes infamously declared that equality among individuals in the state of
nature led to the condition of anarchy, which he based on ‘three principle causes of quarrel’: firstly ‘competition’, which ‘maketh men invade for gain’; secondly ‘diffidence’, which individuals offered up for their minimal level of ‘safety’; and lastly ‘glory’, which is man’s desire (more pronounced in some individuals) for ‘reputation’. Hereby it is manifest, Hobbes thereby concluded, ‘that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man’. 48

From this fundamental premise, there followed an unavoidably pessimistic social psychology accentuating humanity’s mutual untrustworthiness, and placing moral relativism and scepticism at its very core. Notwithstanding this major propositional disparity, Hobbes did, however, agree with Grotius that language was the bedrock of man’s rational faculties. This propensity accounted, for example, for the development of the arts and sciences and indeed all human civilisation. Yet by the same token, Hobbes declared that language was simultaneously the fount of lies, deceits and falsehoods, which ambitious men deployed in their pursuit of prestige and gain. Viewed from this perspective, human morals, far from being a series of a priori prescriptions (whether divine or otherwise), were, in truth, ‘self-imposed’ or ‘artificial’ constructs. Consequently, for Hobbes, morals did not necessarily conform to human nature tout court, for they were merely the prudential means of protecting oneself against innumerable random acts performed by others which might interfere with, or threaten, one’s own survival. 49 Accordingly, ‘Just Naturale [natural justice]’, Hobbes concluded,

is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own judgement, and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. 50

As is well known, Hobbes’s answer to this moral and intellectual impasse was distinctly political. Only by relinquishing a sizeable portion of one’s individual liberty, and placing it in the hands of the sovereign, could self-preservation among individuals be (said to be) mutually assured. In consequence, Hobbes asserted that the notion of moral authority was inter-subjectively the sovereign’s law, and this he labelled both the natural law and the social contract, so ‘that men perform their covenants made’. 51

The only way to erect … a common power, as may be able to defend [peoples] from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another … is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will … This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS … the great LEVIATHAN …

And he that carrieth this person, is called SOVEREIGN, and is said to have sovereign power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT. 52

Unsurprisingly, the scandalous nature of Hobbes’s position prompted most of his contemporaries and successors to label him an Epicurean-materialist; a moral relativist and sceptic far worse than any Renaissance humanist had been. 53 For if, as Hobbes appeared to be claiming, human nature was merely the sum-total of its animal passions and instincts, and if by extension the sovereign’s law was but a mere mirror and reflection of these ‘base’ principles, in what sense could a plausible distinction be made between the state of nature and civil society? Worse still, if humans were not sociable agents à la
Aristotle, the Stoics and Grotius, how could society’s moral and legal norms be conceived as the product of divine and/or rational endowment? Were social relations even possible within the Hobbesian scheme? Correspondingly, was the Grotian appetitus societatis little more than a vain fancy? These were some of the pressing issues Pufendorf faced.

Traditionally, Pufendorf’s ideas have been scrutinised through his adoption of the post-Baconian deductive sciences and Cartesian dualism, both of which facilitated the jurist’s central distinction between the physical world (entia physica), discoverable a posteriori, and the moral world (entia moralia), which Pufendorf believed was self-existent a priori. In either case, Pufendorf insisted that the physical and moral worlds were created by God. Crucially, however, it was only the latter which he equated with basic human nature, and this meant, as Grotius had showed, that the principle of self-preservation was an inherently moral faculty, contra Hobbes. Crucially, then, while Pufendorf clearly admired the author of the Leviathan, has Haakonssen has shown, his Lutheran pietism obliged him to reject the most incendiary aspects of the Hobbesian scheme, most notably its radically reductionist interpretation of self-preservation and its moral relativism.

Additionally, although Pufendorf ultimately sided with Grotius regarding the sociable content, though not necessarily the sociable foundation, of the natural law, he remained dissatisfied with the Dutch jurist’s allegedly ‘unsystematic’ method (i.e. its perceived affinities with pre-Renaissance scholasticism), alongside Grotius’s seeming over-reliance on mankind’s rational faculties at the expense of the higher authority of God.

To better understand how Pufendorf reconciled the disparities between Grotius and Hobbes, it may be beneficial to turn at this stage to the neo-Stoic interpretation of the jurist which has gained greater currency in recent years. Promulgated by the likes of Horst Denzer, Tim Hochstrasser, Fiammetta Palladini and Kari Saastamoinen among others, these scholars have drawn important attention to the Stoic inflections in Pufendorf’s major works Of the Law of Nature and Nations (1672) and The Whole Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature (1673). Denzer observed, for example, that there at least 310 references to Stoic authors in the latter treatise, which Hochstrasser sees as clear evidence of Pufendorf’s ‘eclectic method’ in ‘combining conceptual analysis of a modern author (Grotius), and of ancient Stoic insights, to rebut central contentions from [Hobbes].’ Be that as it may, it is vitally important to note that Pufendorf’s subversion of Hobbes’s scheme ultimately relied, paradoxically, on his adoption of Hobbes’s sovereign, which Pufendorf ultimately conceived as God. Because of this, the present author contends that the German jurist’s brand of Christian Stoicism was arguably even more Christian in its orientation than was Grotius’s. In the remainder of this section our task, then, is to unpack what this analysis entails in the context of Pufendorf’s theoretical anticipation of eighteenth-century notions of commercial sociability, à la Hont.

Like Grotius, Pufendorf’s Stoic affinities were palpable, though necessarily far more cautious. Confronted, unlike Grotius, with Hobbes’s potent brand of materialism and scepticism, he was forced to concede that the wellspring of the natural law was indeed individual self-preservation. Crucially, however, in Pufendorf’s mind, this admission did not necessarily imply that self-love was directly oppositional to Grotius’s broadly neo-Stoic thesis. Indeed, as he made abundantly clear in Of the Law of Nature and Nations: ‘Self-love and Sociableness ought by no Means to be made Opposites.’ This said, it was in
re-examining the variances between human and animal nature that Pufendorf made his decisive pivot back to Grotius’s foundational oikeiosis argument:

Man is an Animal extremely desirous of his own Preservation, of himself expos’d to many Wants, unable to secure his own Safety and Maintenance, without the Assistance of his Fellows and capable of returning the Kindness by the Furtherance of mutual Good… Now that such a Creature [as Man] may be preserv’d and supported … it is necessary that he be social… This then will appear a fundamental Law of Nature, Every Man ought, as far as in him lies, to promote and preserve a peaceful Sociableness with others, agreeable to the main End and Disposition of the human Race in general.61

The novelty of Pufendorf’s system, then, was that it achieved a shrewd synthesis of the Grotian oikeiosis principle and Hobbes’s state of nature. Adjoining Grotius’s modernised form of jurisprudence with Hobbes’s intellectual method, Pufendorf argued that it is precisely because individuals in a state of nature are so incredibly weak (imbecillitas), both in the moral and physical world, that they feel compelled to seek their own safety (salvum) within society. This recourse to mutual co-operation, by which means it is possible for human beings to survive and prosper even though they are most capable of inflicting damage upon themselves and their fellow kind,62 Pufendorf labelled socialitas (‘sociality’). Furthermore, for Pufendorf, this was the foundational (i.e. God-willed) principle of the natural law, which every human is obliged to cultivate and preserve in the interests of the collective – though in the first instance, and crucially, by preserving oneself.63 As Saastamoinen has thus put it:

In Pufendorf’s theory, the ultimate epistemological foundation of natural law, the one that gives us its end, is not human nature, but the idea that God wants the human species to survive… That God wants the safety of the whole human species… is the normative principle which Hobbes’ [and indeed Grotius’s] theory lacked, and which explains why we have an obligation to act peacefully even towards those who are able to hurt us.64

As noted at the outset of this essay, according to Hont, Pufendorf’s intellectual oscillation between Grotius and Hobbes constituted a watershed moment in the developmental history of the modern state. This is because, in Hont’s view, Pufendorf’s ‘Grotian’ ‘amendment’ to Hobbes’s state of nature resulted in the ‘invention’ of society in its recognisably ‘modern’ guise: namely ‘commercial society’.65 Whereas Hobbes’s doctrine was unambiguously political in character, and it therefore had little to say about trade and commerce,66 Hont contended that Pufendorf’s ‘partial reversal’67 of his predecessor’s conclusions facilitated the great eighteenth-century debate about the historical rise and progress of civil society and the economic dimensions increasingly associated with it. Although Pufendorf was unable to conceptualise what this scheme entailed in precise terms, for Hont, it was above all the jurist’s ‘reinstatement of utility as a force for social integration’—namely, Pufendorf’s theory about human weakness (imbecillitas) and neediness (indigentia) precipitating human industry (cultura)—which led humans away from the state of nature towards peaceful forms of social consensus and commerce.68

Yet, given all that we have discussed in the intervening pages, is it possible or indeed desirable to map the neo-Stoic characterisation of Grotius and Pufendorf onto Hont’s thesis?69 After all, one fundamental aspect of Hont’s narrative which is directly pertinent to the present discussion is his exposition of the jurists’ assessment of the disparity between human and animal nature (which we have endeavoured to elucidate in terms
of Stoic oikeiosis, whereas evidently Hont does not). Specifically, Hont draws attention to Pufendorf’s central contention that the relationship between humans and animals is one of paradoxical inferiority and superiority. 70 Whereas animals are superiorly equipped, argues Pufendorf, via their carnal appetites and instincts, to ensure their own survival, conversely man’s ‘exceeding Weakness’ precipitates his desire to move beyond the immediate vicinity of his own self-preservation, in an ‘insatiable Desire and Thirst for those Things which are altogether superfluous and unnecessary’. 71 According to Pufendorf (contra Grotius), then, this predilection accounted for man’s natural sociability in a secondary rather than a primary sense, in that it ensured the preservation of human society and the species at large in processes of time (custodia societatis humanae). Even more significantly, Pufendorf’s historicist claim that humanity’s increasing needs and wants precipitated material inequality in the ‘Natural State’ also served to confute Hobbes’s opposing contention that a state of equality (or natural liberty) existed among the earliest roaming families. For one thing, Pufendorf’s notion of ‘Paternal Authority’ or ‘Paternal Power’ over one’s own offspring immediately disavowed Hobbes’s claim. 72 This observation is highly significant since, as Straumann points out, parental authority—i.e. the notion that some form of natural hierarchy existed prior to the formation of civil society—was second only to self-preservation in the oikeiosis process. 73 Accordingly, for Pufendorf, it was wrong to assert that natural liberty among humans was antecedent to the developmental processes of history, civilisation, culture or commerce; rather natural liberty was a by-product of the aforementioned. Consequently, unlike Hobbes’s state of nature (and soon to be Locke’s), the Pufendorfian analogue was purely fictitious. This is a critically important point which we shall be obliged to return to in the context of Tucker below. 74

So far, these pages have claimed that significant aspects of Hont’s thesis are compatible with a neo-Stoic reading of Grotius and Pufendorf. Specifically, Pufendorf’s imbecillitas—indigentia—cultura scheme mirrors very closely Grotius’s implementation of the mechanical processes leading from ‘personal’ to ‘social’ oikeiosis, which subsequent theorists and present-day specialists alike appear largely to have missed. It is possible, for example, that Hutcheson overlooked this fundamentally important aspect of Pufendorf’s thought when he described the German’s scheme as an “Epicurean” conjecture. 75 The same might also be said, more recently, of Ian Hunter’s characterisation of Pufendorf’s model as an ‘Epicurean anthropology’ premised on the ‘radical separation of moral theology from politics and law’. 76 In sharp contrast, however, this essay asserts that there is ample evidence to suggest that Pufendorf was in fact a Christian Stoic thinker; not least because he insisted, far more so than did even Grotius, on the interconnected of divine authority and natural law, from which his notion of socialitas and the attendant offices of life (Officia) ultimately derived. As Haakonssen therefore summarises:

[Pufendorf’s] basic offices of life fall into three categories, that of being a human being tout court, that of being a member of a family (as spouse, parent, child, sibling master, servant), and that of being a member of a political society (as citizen, sovereign, all manner of magistrates, soldier, etc.). These three groups of offices provide the basis for Pufendorf’s tripartite division of his material into analyses of the specific natural jurisprudential relations of persons as persons, of ‘oeconomical’ (household) relations in the traditional sense, and of civic relations. Self-consciously inspired by Stoicism, this theory fitted directly into the
Christian Stoicism of the Enlightenment and lived on in the popular practical ethics of the eighteenth century as Pufendorf’s most pervasive legacy—though often on very different philosophical foundations.77

Here Haakonssen is of course referring to Pufendorf’s influence on the Scottish Enlightenment and the political economy synonymous with it. In the following sections, however, we will seek to divulge the natural jurisprudential and Christian Stoic legacy housed within the thought of the Anglican churchmen Butler and Tucker.

4. The disparity between ‘Brute creatures’ and ‘moral government’: Joseph Butler

Recognition of the Stoic tendencies in Butler’s thought has not been uncommon in the centuries since the publication of his major works in the first half of the eighteenth-century. It is only relatively recently, however, that scholars have begun to appreciate the full significance of the philosophical tradition to the wider Butlerian scheme. Terence Irwin has claimed, for example, that Butler’s ‘moral outlook’ and ‘appeal to nature … reasonably invites a comparison with the Stoics’.78 Even more compellingly in our context, A. A. Long writes that ‘in order to refute Hobbes and various contemporaries’ Butler’s ‘treatment of the two instincts – self-love and conscience – is too similar to the Stoic concept oikeiosis to be adventitious’.79 Additionally, both scholars draw important attention to Cicero’s influence on Butler, especially the Roman orator’s emphasis on the ‘reason of nature, which is divine and human law’, and which the later bishop of Bristol and Durham also subscribed to in large part.80 However, aside from one passing mention of Butler’s probable familiarity with Pufendorf’s Law of Nature and of Nations,81 the intellectual connections between Butler and the seventeenth-century jurists remains, to the present author’s knowledge, chronically underexplored.

For reasons which remain unclear, unlike Carmichael, Butler nowhere appears to have praised Grotius or Pufendorf, and neither did he give them significant pride of place within his scheme.82 We do know, however, that based on the lecture notes of Samuel Jones (c. 1681–1719), who was Butler’s tutor at the dissenting academy at Tewkesbury between c. 1712–14, Butler was well-versed in their ideas.83 Born in Wales and educated at Shrewsbury academy, the Presbyterian Jones had gone on to pursue his higher education at the University of Leiden in the United Provinces in 1706. There, under the tutelage of Jacobus Gronovius (1645–1716), Jacobus Perizonius (1651–1715) and Hermanus Witsius (1636–1708),84 he had familiarised himself with the Christian Stoic culture previously fostered by, among others, Justus Lipsius (who was a foundational Professor of history at Leiden at the tail end of the sixteenth century), Grotius (who entered the University at a precociously young age, and whose father was a friend of Lipsius himself) and Pufendorf (who spent many years at Leiden ruminating on the work of his predecessors following his escape from captivity under Charles X of Sweden in the late-1650s).85 Evidently, then, it was the Tewkesbury-Leiden connection which proved to be the initial inlet by which Grotius and Pufendorf’s ideas came into Butler’s mind.86

Alongside Jones’s ‘Dutch-style’ teaching, Butler was also an avid reader of various contemporary English works, including John Locke’s (1632–1704) Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690),87 Shaftesbury’s ethics and Samuel Clarke’s (1675–1729) Boyle
Extrapolating from this, it would be correct to say that Butler’s philosophy therefore drew from two distinct traditions: firstly the natural jurisprudential Grotian and Pufendorfian, and secondly the Newtonian natural theology of (especially) Clarke. The present author has elsewhere shown how Butler, by adjoining his Anglican pastoralism and his developing ‘science’ of social psychology, offered a profound contribution to economic discourse in early-eighteenth century Britain – a project his protégé Dean Tucker would ultimately see through to completion. Like Grotius and Pufendorf, Butler adopted a fundamentally anti-Epicurean conception of human nature, by means of equating human rationality with the social and benevolent affections. Additionally, because Butler accepted that self-love constituted one among a plurality of human affections, he hypothesised further that the moral authority of a ‘Higher principle’ was required in order to mediate the inward motives and outward behaviour of human beings. In his famous correspondence with Clarke, the youthful Butler had spoken of this principle in vague and imprecise terms by ascribing a moral function to human nature which he claimed was a part of humanity’s ‘original frame and constitution’. By the time of Fifteen Sermons (1726), however, Butler had developed this kernel of a theory into a workable account of the conscience, which he thereafter equated with ‘Reason and cool Reflection.

According to Butler, the ‘superior Faculty’ of the conscience assisted humans in checking their ‘Immoderate Self-love’, thereby ensuring the cultivation and propagation of peaceable human society (à la Grotius) and the species at large (à la Pufendorf). Taken together, these principles constituted what Butler called the ‘Commerce of Humane Life’. Recognising, as Pufendorf before him, that self-love and sociability ought by no means to be made opposites, Butler likewise claimed that ‘Self-love and Benevolence, Virtue and Interest are not to be opposed’, his main point essentially being that human moral and material existence is unitary rather than dialectical:

The Goodness or Badness of Actions does not arise from hence, that the Epithet, interested or disinterested, may be applied to them; […] but from their being what they are; Namely, what becomes such Creatures as we are, what the state of the Case requires, or the contrary.

Again, just as Pufendorf had earlier noted that self-love and sociability ought to be placed ‘into the contrary Scale’, in Sermon XII ‘Upon the Love of our Neighbour’ Butler adopted precisely the same metaphor. ‘The whole System, as I may speak, of Affections, Butler wrote: ‘The Case is here as in Scales: It is not one Weight, considered in itself, which determines whether the Scale shall ascend or descend; but this depends on the Proportion, which that one Weight hath to the other.

By measuring self-love and sociability one against the other in such fashion, then, Butler was evidently replicating the natural jurists’ respective adaptations of the Cicero-nian ‘personal’ and ‘social’ oikeiosis principle. Butler did, however, deviate from Grotius (in particular) in one important respect, in that he placed the theory of oikeiosis on a par with Revelation:

[The] Scripture, not being a Book of Theory and Speculation, but a plain Rule of Life for Mankind, has with the utmost possible Propriety put the principle of Virtue upon the Love of our Neighbour; which is that Part of the Universe, that Part of Mankind, that Part
of our Country, which comes under our immediate Notice, Acquaintance, and Influence, and with which we have to do. 99

Yet even here Butler was reiterating, to a profound extent, Pufendorf’s argument in Whole Duty of Man that religion was the ‘utmost and firmest Bond of Human Society’ (societatis vinculum). 100

As discussed above, the Grotian iteration of oikeiosis appeared to collapse the hitherto theologically strict hierarchical structure between God, humankind and animal, in the interests of peaceable corporeal society. 101 However, by reinstating God as (quasi-Hobbesian) sovereign, Pufendorf reinstated the authority of divine law, maintaining – far more unequivocally than did Grotius – that man’s rational and sociable faculties as ‘distinct from Brutes’ was ‘endow’d’ by God. 102 Nevertheless, because Pufendorf ultimately derived human society from the requirement of peace, stability and the cultivation of human society, his treatment of the relationship between God and conscience was in a sense secondary: a psychological-cum-meta-ethical strait between divine and natural law, rather than constituting its end. 103 By contrast, Butler was far more at pains to emphasise God’s superintendence over the oikeiosis process, primarily via the divinely-endued faculties of reason and reflection. Because of this, the Butlerian variant of commercial sociability ultimately depended on two distinct, yet interrelated, principles: firstly the notion of social harmony, or friendship, among humans (analogous to Grotius’s appetitus societatis and Pufendorf’s ‘sociality’); and second, the daily practice of loving God (ayam/love/agape). 104 As we have seen, for the natural jurists (particularly Grotius) the former was the fundamental bedrock of the natural law. Conversely, for Butler, who was of course an Anglican latitudinarian cleric first and foremost and a metaphysician-cum-social theorist second, it was the latter.

The psychological disparity between ‘self’ and ‘other’, and more importantly the role of the conscience in mediating the gamut of affections lying between the two poles, was discussed most exhaustively, then, in Fifteen Sermons. However, in an important chapter of The Analogy of Religion (1736), which was by far the more popular of the two works in Butler’s own day, the soon to be bishop of Bristol concocted a series of hypothetical scenarios underscoring his understanding of the oikeiosis process. Significantly, it was here too that Butler offered his schematic distinction between the ‘brute Creatures’ of the earth and the ‘Moral Government of God’ – a dichotomy which bore more than a passing resemblance to Pufendorf’s division between entia physica and entia moralia, and the paradoxical inferiority and superiority between humans and animals.

According to Butler, whereas brutes are evidently of ‘superior Strength’ to men, it is the faculty of reason which gives the latter the ‘Advantage and Superiority over’ the former. To supplement his point, Butler then proposes the following. Firstly, suppose, Butler writes, that there are two or three men ‘in a desolate open Plain, attacked by ten times the number of Beasts of Prey’. Secondly, he writes, imagine a case in which rational and irrational creatures are ‘of like external Shape and Manner’. Finally, Butler asks the reader to consider the likely fate of several men who ‘land on an Island inhabited only by wild Beasts’. In all three scenarios, Butler contends that, whether animals enjoy the numerical or physical advantage over humans, the latter can only survive and prosper if they utilise their rational and sociable instincts in the interests of the collective ‘Bonds of Union’:

[A] Number of Men, who, by the Regulations of civil Government, the Inventions of Art, and the Experience of some Years … would be really sufficient, to subdue the wild Beasts, and to
preserve themselves in Security from them [...] So that rational Animals have not necessarily the [physical or numerical] Superiority over irrational ones; but, how improbable soever it may be, it is evidently possible, that, in some [hypothetical] Globes, the latter may be superior …, [nevertheless] Reason has, in the nature of it, a Tendency to prevail over brute Force.\(^{105}\)

The final part of Butler’s scheme was thus to equate, unambiguously, the rational and sociable faculties of humans with God’s moral government. This he had delineated in Fifteen Sermons. ‘Brutes obey their Instincts of Principles of Action, according to certain Rules’, he wrote, ‘suppose the Constitution of their Body, and the Objects around them’. In turn this meant that animals were acting ‘suitably to their whole Nature’. Yet could the same quality be applied to human beings tout court, Butler pondered? Evidently not, for ‘Something further must be brought in to give us an adequate Notion of human nature, he wrote; ‘namely, that Conscience or Reflection, compared with [other affections and appetites] as they all stand together in the Nature of Man, plainly bears upon it Marks of Authority over all the rest’.\(^{106}\) According to Butler, then, it is precisely because humans are inherently rational and sociable that they are ethical and virtuous creatures, capable of coexisting peacefully in spite of the increasing complexities, if not even ‘Inconveniencies’ and ‘Incumbrances’, of new commercialised forms of social existence:

Fear, Resentment, Compassion and others; of which there could be no such Occasion or Use in a perfect State: But in the present we should be exposed to greater Inconveniences without them … They are Incumbrances indeed, but such as we are obliged to carry about with us, through this various Journey of Life.\(^{107}\)

Consequently, for Butler, whose philosophy prescribed to a basically Whiggish and pro-commercial understanding of the eighteenth-century church and state establishment, the oikeiosis principle was essentially tantamount to the defining Christian principles of ‘love of self’, ‘love of other’ and ‘love of God’, intertwined.\(^{108}\) Pufendorf’s ‘Bond of Human Society’ had now been rechristened ‘The Cements of Society’: a deliberately sanguine synonym for ‘commercial sociability’ in an increasingly materialistic, metropolitan – and indeed selfish – age.\(^{109}\)

5. ‘The centrifugal and centripetal powers’: Bernard Mandeville and Josiah Tucker

Like Grotius and Pufendorf, Butler was of course no theorist of market economies. Rather, Fifteen Sermons was originally conceived as a theological-cum-meta-ethical rebuttal of Hobbesian realpolitik, alongside ‘this whole set of writers’ who appeared to be following, to a greater or lesser extent, in Hobbes’s wake.\(^{110}\) As Bob Tennant elaborates, this passage, which Butler introduced as part of a preface to the second edition of the sermons in 1729, housed many ‘references, explicit or implicit, to Clarke, Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Locke, Wollaston, Fénelon, (and possibly Guyon), Bossuet, the Epicureans, Rochefoucauld … Cicero and the Stoics’, thereby providing a sense of the eclectic range of thinkers and ideas Butler was reacting to.\(^{111}\) Yet beyond the rather glaring omissions of Grotius and Pufendorf, Brooke adds further that an ‘absent presence on any such list’ was of course Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733).\(^{112}\)
The socio-psychological analyses of Mandeville, the son of a Dutch physician who settled in England in the 1690s, are complex, multifaceted and at times incredibly subtle. Accordingly, they have been scrutinised in detail and at length in a number of important studies, and need not be repeated here. Yet what is significant from our present standpoint is a brief consideration of the satirist’s dual-status as the eighteenth-century populariser of Hobbes and as the heir of the Baylean Epicurean-Augustinian model. This exposition is significant for two reasons: first, because it presents us with an interesting duplication of the Grotius-Hobbes-Pufendorf arrangement in an eighteenth-century British context; and second, because it serves as a springboard by which to analyse Tucker’s iteration of oikeiosis, which he did apply to a consideration of the market economy for the first time.

As is well known, the recalcitrant strength of Mandeville’s position rested on his uncompromisingly pessimistic account of self-love, which he argued was basically tantamount to ‘avariciousness’. Just as Hobbes before him, Mandeville dismissed the Aristotelian/Grotian notion that man was the zoon politikon. Instead, he sought to dispel the myth (as he saw it) that either reason or religion was capable of controlling the irresistible ebb-and-flow of humanity’s baser passions. This being the case, Mandeville’s acerbic criticisms of commercial modernity rested on three fundamental premises. Firstly, they positioned notions of morality not anteriorly to society, but rather as the product of artifice and convention; second, they emphasised the centrality of the human passions and interests; and lastly, they argued that humans were therefore innately self-centred, egoistic and selfish creatures.

On the one level, each of these properties was a clear re-articulation of Hobbes’s Epicurean-materialist scheme. Additionally, however, Mandeville’s system had also been filtered through an Augustinian and Baylean sieve, resulting in a particularly malignant analysis of human nature and society. Claiming that the putative transition from the individualised ‘self’ towards collective ‘society’ was fundamentally precarious, chaotic and ‘anti-social’ in nature, the Dutch-native speculated that the human instinct for survival was a matter of indirect influence, in the guise of flattery, persuasion, coercion and so on. Nevertheless, as far as Mandeville was concerned, there must have been some sort of providentialist explanation for this sequence of events since, given the vagaries of self-love, the unlikely formation of civil society could surely only be said to have transpired ‘from God, by miracle’. Hence the ‘doctrine of Epicurus’, Mandeville surmised, ‘that every thing is deriv’d from the Concourse and fortuitous Jumble of Atoms’ was only half of the explanation as to the origin of human social organisation. The rest must, therefore, be attributable – à la Nicole and Bayle – to God’s redemptive plan.

Mandeville’s system, and particularly its infamous exaltation of luxury and vice as the two main drivers of material progress, was clearly a dagger to the heart of the British commercial establishment. For, by fastening his Baylean-inspired scheme to the ‘Epicurean motif’, as Blom has usefully termed it, Mandeville positioned himself squarely at odds with idealistic, quasi-Stoic defences of the post-1688 commercial order associated with the likes of Shaftesbury (1671–1713), Joseph Addison (1672–1719), Richard Steele (1672–1729) and William Law (1686–1761) among others. As we have seen, Butler’s Fifteen Sermons was of course one such Stoic response to Mandeville, and perhaps the most potent given that it drew equally from Clarke’s epistemology in order to deal with Mandeville’s arguments on their own terms. Yet as these pages argue further, by
drawing the psychological mechanisms of oikeiosis firmly within the Christian framework, this enabled Butler to confute Hobbes and Mandeville’s radically reductionist interpretation of man as a passion-led and self-centred animal, while also fastening onto a strategy long-established by Grotius and Pufendorf to counter the sceptical arguments of their own day. As we shall see, it was precisely this iteration of Stoic oikeiosis that Tucker adopted as the basis for his developing science of political economy.

Tucker’s most conspicuous engagement with the oikeiosis principle appears in the ‘Preliminary Discourse’ to the unfinished Elements of Commerce and Theory of Taxes (1755), a work which was originally intended as didactic material for the then Prince of Wales and future King George III (1738–1820).\(^\text{118}\) Initially conceding that humans ’hath the Appetites of an Animal’, Tucker observes that as rational agents, they also have the additional ‘Temper and Affections’ of social beings. By the ‘gracious Contrivance of the Author of Nature’, he continues, providence has ordained that humans require mutual assistance in life in order to procure ‘Improvements’ within society. This is clearly important to them, Tucker posits, because just as nature intends that humans seek food in order to appease their appetite of hunger, so too does it prompt them to seek to better the society in which they live in order to ‘gratify’ their corresponding ‘social Instincts’. Tucker calls this the human ‘Prerogative’—that is to say, our ‘Set of social and benevolent Affections’—and what is more, he concludes, it is this familiar characteristic which most distinguishes us from the beasts.\(^\text{119}\)

In this opening passage, Tucker is clearly alluding to Butler’s insistence in Fifteen Sermons that the prospect of peaceable society is a fortuitous-cum-providential outcome of unintended consequences:

\[\text{[As] Persons without any Conviction from Reason of the desirableness of Life, would yet of Course preserve it merely from the Appetite of Hunger; so by acting merely from Regard (suppose) to Reputation, without any Consideration of the Good of others, Men often con-tribute to publick Good.}\(^\text{120}\)

Additionally, however, Tucker both qualifies and furthers Butler’s initial premise by admitting, far more readily than does his mentor, that society is potentially the chief cause of humanity’s woes, and therefore a double-edged sword. For though society may be the ‘best Means of procuring a Supply for [our] animal or natural Wants’, Tucker writes, so too does society entice us towards our desirous, passionate and multitudinous ‘artificial Needs’; and here Tucker is referring primarily to the excesses of luxury, which he believes are the by-products of our own and others’ misdirected self-love. In Tucker’s view, self-love is evidently ‘narrow and confined in its Views’, so that if it is left with no ‘Direction or Controll’ it will eventually ‘defeat its own Ends’ until ‘even Self-interest is loser’.\(^\text{121}\) However if directed into its proper channels, Tucker insists that self-love will serve the public good in ways which far exceed individual enterprise:

\[\text{[The] first ... Wants of Mankind [are] much better supplied by dividing the general Labour into different Branches, than if each Individual depended on himself alone for the Supply of [them.] And this [portioning out] of the common Labour [gives rise to] distinct Trades and Manufactures; and may therefore be considered ... [the] Rudiments of Commerce.}\]

\[\text{[... Therefore] as our present secular Happiness appears to arise from the Enjoyment of superior Wealth, Power, Honour, Pleasure, or Preferment, SELF-LOVE, the great mover}\]
of created Beings, determines each Individual to aspire after these social Goods, and to use the most probable Means of obtaining them.122

On the one hand, Tucker’s analysis in this passage is a clear anticipation of Smith’s famous iteration of the division of labour,123 which had had numerous historical antecedents ranging from Plato to, more recently, William Petty (1620–1687) and Mandeville himself. Viewed from the opposite chronological perspective, however, Tucker’s model is also none other than a Butlerian adaptation of Pufendorf’s foundational imbecillitas—indigentia—cultura argument.124 Specifically Tucker’s ‘first wants’—‘rudiments of commerce’—‘artificial needs’ configuration is plainly analogous to Pufendorf’s theory that (a) individual weakness and self-preservation (b) leads humans to thirst for the superfluities of life, which (c) precipitates human industry, the portioning of labour and sociality.125 At the same time, however, as an Anglican prelate, Tucker adheres most dutifully to Butler’s brand of neo-Stoicism when he states that in order to ameliorate (on a societal level) the worst excesses of ‘inordinate Self-love’, the Butlerian ‘Counter-Agent[s]’ of ‘REASON and REFLECTION’ must always be called on to ‘Aid the social and benevolent Principle’:

[So that] when the auxiliary Motives of Reason are called in Aid of social Love, or diffusive Benevolence, this latter becomes, in a good degree, a Counter-Agent to inordinate Self-Love. So that the Circulation of Commerce may be conceived to proceed from the Impulse of two distinct Principles of Action in Society, analogous to the centrifugal and centripetal Powers in the Planetary System.126

As these passages make clear, then, Tucker’s political economy ought to be construed as the theoretical highpoint of the oikeiosis trajectory chronicled within these pages. Snaking its way from Grotius and Pufendorf to Butler and Tucker—via crucial ‘concessionary’ detours through Hobbes’s state of nature and Mandeville’s post-lapsarian ‘Grumbling Hive’—Tucker’s ‘centrifugal’ and ‘centripetal’ powers, clearly borrowing from Newton’s Principia, are tantamount to the ‘opposing’ principles of self-love and sociability, in a didactic repetition of Grotius’s foundational ‘personal’ and ‘social’ oikeiosis argument. For it is plain to see that within the Tuckerian scheme, self-love is analogous to the centripetal power within human nature, tending naturally and therefore legitimately towards the innermost, ‘egoistic’ self. Concomitantly, sociability is the centrifugal power (again, conceived as the Grotian appetitus societatis or Pufendorf’s ‘sociality’), tending away from the innermost self towards what Forman-Barzilai has termed, albeit in the context of Smith’s economic thought, the ‘commercial cosmopolis’.127

Once again, however, just as in Butler’s example, Tucker’s conclusory act was to draw Grotius and Pufendorf’s theoretical foundations firmly within the Whiggish-cum-Anglican context. Borrowing from Pufendorf’s distinction between entia physica and entia moralia, and similarly from the Butlerian dichotomy between ‘Brute Creation’ and ‘Moral Government’, in the first instance Tucker proclaimed that God was ‘governor’ of both ‘natural [i.e. corporeal] Government’ and ‘MORAL GOVERNMENT’. Continuing in a Butlerian vein, Tucker insisted further, however, that because rational creatures were evidently ‘moral Agents’, they were duty-bound to mediate between the natural (self-preservative) and moral (sociable) worlds, in due proportion to the ‘natural Stint and Bound’ of their individual and collective social affections.128 Only in so doing, he concluded, could individuals locate their rightful place as fully socialised and ethical creatures within ‘this wonderful Fabrick’ of ‘the divine Oeconomy’.129
It is interesting to note that, like Butler, Tucker nowhere acknowledged Pufendorf’s influence (nor did he make any overt mention, incidentally, of Hobbes). By contrast, in the penultimate section of his magnum opus *The Treatise Concerning Civil Government* (1781), the clergyman was explicit about Grotius’s legacy. Written primarily against British rational dissenters, North American revolutionaries and the ‘metaphysical’ doctrine of universal natural rights which undergirded their various philosophies, Tucker laid contemporary calls for parliamentary reform and relief from the Test and Corporation Acts squarely at the feet of Locke.\textsuperscript{131} By contrast, placing Grotius alongside Aristotle and Cicero for the ancients and Richard Hooker (1554–1600) for the moderns, Tucker invoked the Dutch jurist’s work in a staunch defence of the established political order based on ‘limited Monarchy, and Constitutional, (though not…Republican) Whigg [ism]’.\textsuperscript{132} Tellingly, it was the famous *oikeiosis/appetitus societatis* passage from *Rights of War and Peace* Tucker saw fit to quote,\textsuperscript{133} after which he adduced that

> according to the Testimony of GROTIUS, Mankind are naturally inclined … to join in a social State, and to partake in the Blessings of a Body Politic … For [in] every Page, and every Line of his Treatise, concerning the *Rights of War and Peace* … he demonstrates … that private Subjects … are bound in Duty to pay a prompt and willing Obedience to all the Laws of [the] State … by which they are protected, except in those unhappy Cases … where the Laws of the State are manifestly and directly repugnant to the Laws of Nature, and of God.\textsuperscript{134}

Tucker’s invocation of Grotius in the *Treatise* leads us finally, then, to the clergyman’s decidedly Pufendorfian conclusion about the role and content of the natural law within his economic scheme. As has been shown elsewhere,\textsuperscript{135} at its core Tucker’s political economy was premised on the unavoidability of social subordination, rank and hierarchy as necessary prerequisites of modern commercial societies. It was for this very reason that his socio-economics was wedded so firmly to his defence of existing structures in church and state. In consequence, Tucker reproached the doctrine of inalienable universal rights on the basis that it superseded the natural and civilisational principles and protocols of economic progress. As J. G. A. Pocock demonstrated over three decades ago, Tucker’s stance on this score was borne out of his wholesale rejection of (in his view) the fundamentally ‘unhistorical character’ of the ‘Lockean compact’, resulting from the erroneous (because ‘antisocial’) ‘divorce of the individual from society brought about by the substitution of natural right for natural law’.\textsuperscript{136} As these pages have articulated further, however, Tucker’s position owed a substantial, if not fundamental, debt to Pufendorf’s fictive state of nature as outlined above.\textsuperscript{137} For whereas Hobbes and Locke, despite their differing conclusions, contended that a state of natural equality did exist among the earliest roaming families,\textsuperscript{138} conversely, Pufendorf’s state of nature confirmed Tucker’s contrasting view that hierarchies were natural to human beings *tout court*, whether in pre-civil or in advanced commercial societies. Consequently, for Tucker, history taught that ‘[h]umans were naturally sociable and unequal, yet mutually needy, some naturally submissive, some not; this was quite enough to account for and legitimate the emergence of both political society and hierarchy without “tedious [and] uncertain experiments” in contractualism’.\textsuperscript{139}

In closing we might add that, as far as Tucker was concerned, this explanation was also quite enough to account for the emergence of commercial society in tandem with the
political. For, again as Pocock succinctly worded it, Tucker’s economic scheme was pre-mised—perhaps uniquely, because unequivocally, among his contemporaries—on the fundamental basis that ‘the principles of economic progress are those of natural law’.  

Be that as it may, as this essay has attempted to inculcate in addition to this analysis, the Tuckerian variant of the natural law was decidedly Grotian, Pufendorfian and Butlerian in its orientation, constituting the highpoint of the hierarchical oikeiosis process:

Being such a beautiful and infinite Variety of Creatures one above another in the Scale of Life … It can surely be no Wrong to me, that I am not created an Angel: Nor is it any Injury to the Brute that he not made a Man. All Creatures were never intended to be of the highest Order … Subordinations, Gradations, and Dependancies throughout the whole System of Being; if the glorious Attributes and Perfections of the Deity are thereby more effectually displayed; if the Beauty of the whole Frame of Nature is rendered more grand and august by such a rich Variety; and if the Foundation of relative and social Duties require such a Constitution in the moral World; then consequently some must be higher, and some lower in the Order and Scale of Things: All cannot be alike, where it is required there should be so great a Diversity.

6. Conclusion

Building primarily on Hont’s thesis regarding the intellectual dynamic between Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf, this essay has attempted to advance two core arguments which require highlighting in conclusion. The first is to assert that the eighteenth-century ‘science of man’, revolving around a new ethics of commercial sociability (or ‘unsocial sociability’) and typically associated with the Scottish contribution to economic and social theory, can initially be traced back to Grotius’s foundational ideas in Rights of War and Peace. By itself this observation is hardly novel: in fact, it borders on a virtual tautology. Yet whereas recent analyses have tended to treat the ‘unsocial sociability’ trope in dichotomous ‘Epicurean-Augustinian versus Stoic’ terms, typically emphasising the predominance of the former over the latter, the novelty of this paper is that it has attempted to recast the debate, however tentatively, as a theoretical propagation of Grotius’s distinctive ‘personal’ and ‘social’ oikeiosis argument. This said, the article’s second main claim is that eighteenth-century British political economy ought not to be framed in exclusively Scottish, moderately secularising and primarily self-interest-based terms. Rather, by examining the kinship between Grotius and Pufendorf’s, and Butler and Tucker’s, respective iterations of the oikeiosis mechanism, these pages validate the existence of an alternative neo-Stoic trajectory, resulting in an overtly sociability-based Christian political economy.

What is the broader significance of this? The first answer to this question rests on the need to acknowledge Butler and Tucker’s theological contributions to eighteenth-century economic discourse and indeed the Scottish Enlightenment, which has hitherto remained underemphasised. Hont, for example, argued that whatever was left of Christian theology in Smith’s conception of commercial society was merely vestigial, and essentially a rejection, of Hutcheson’s neo-Stoic teachings. Similarly, Hume’s attempts to grapple with, and ultimately disown, Hutcheson’s Christian Stoicism are well documented. Yet, while it is important not to overstate Butler and Tucker’s influence, it is nevertheless worth remembering that the pair were much lauded among the Scottish moralists, and not least Hutcheson
himself. Indeed, Hutcheson, Hume and Lord Kames (1696–1782) all spoke admiringly of Butler in their published writings. Similarly, Tucker corresponded with Hume and Kames in the 1750s and 1760s on various issues related to trade and commerce, though most notably on the reciprocal dynamics between rich and poor countries in an increasingly competitive global market (indeed it is in this respect alone that Hont associates Tucker’s Christian providentialism with the Scottish Enlightenment). Thus, when Hume wrote to Kames of Tucker’s ideas that, ‘conformable to the character both of a divine and a philosopher, [he] draws an argument from the goodness of providence; but I think it may be turned against him’, we note the Scottish philosopher’s acknowledgement of Tucker’s Christian Stoic naturalism – albeit steeped in the scepticism for which Hume remains notorious. Viewed from yet another perspective, Tucker’s economic writings from the period exhibit traces of the conjectural history – indeed, the ‘Four-Stages Theory’ of societal development which Hont refers to as the endpoint of the Pufendorfian scheme – for which many of the Scottish school were shortly to become famous. We would do well to note, for instance, some striking similarities between Tucker’s historico-commercial analyses and that of William Robertson (1721–93). On closer inspection, it is no coincidence to find that the Presbyterian Robertson had also been schooled, like Butler, by a former student of Leiden, Charles Mackie (1688–1770).

The second answer to the above query obliges us to revisit Smith’s conception of oikeiosis. In a chapter in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* entitled ‘Of licentious systems’, Smith reformulated the ‘self-interest–sociability’ conundrum in terms of the disparity between ‘partiality’–‘impartiality’, which, crucially, was modelled on the philosophical contrast between Mandeville and Butler’s respective taxonomies. Put very briefly, here Smith characterised Mandeville’s ‘licentious system’ as that which fashioned the ‘indulgent and partial spectator’: the individual who only yielded to a higher political authority because their vanity and self-love had been appealed to. Conversely, Smith’s Butler-inspired ‘impartial spectator’—the individual of genuine ‘self-command’, who was capable of looking beyond their narrow self-interest towards the public good—was the figure truly worthy of emulation. It has not escaped notice that Smith’s conception of the ‘impartial spectator’ in this, and in other sections, of *Moral Sentiments* positioned the Scottish philosopher ‘very close to … Butler’s account of conscience’, thereby revealing him at his ‘most Stoic’. Adjacently, it has also long been acknowledged that Smith owned several of Tucker’s tracts in his private library; and while the *Elements of Commerce* is not listed among them, A. M. C. Waterman points out that there is nevertheless good reason to suggest that Smith read the tract given the ‘many traces of Tucker’s Butlerian view of the human condition’ in *Moral Sentiments*, penned merely three years later. This said, it is a distinct possibility that Smith’s treatment of oikeiosis was modelled on the Butlerian and Tuckerian iteration.

To conclude, then, in this paper we have demonstrated an intriguing eighteenth-century ‘re-enactment’ of the Grotius-Hobbes-Pufendorf dynamic, in the guise of the Butler-Mandeville-Tucker configuration. Recognised the ferocity of the compulsions of Mandevillean self-love, in a mirror-image of Pufendorf’s earlier concession to Hobbesian self-preservation, Tucker nevertheless ultimately sided with Butler, just as Pufendorf did Grotius. It is in this vein that Laurence Dickey summarises Tucker’s economic scheme as ‘a modernization of the oikeiosis process and a Christianization of it,’ in which he ‘reinforces in the name of Christian morality and Christian providentialism what Cicero had philosophically sanctioned in his discussion of oikeiosis and Grotius and
While it is undoubtedly correct, then, to draw theoretical parallels between the seventeenth-century jurists and the eighteenth-century Scottish political economists, as Hont did and others continue to do, this paper has shown that there are adjacent narratives, trajectories and lines of inquiry which require our attention. Butler and Tucker are one such example of this; no doubt there are others yet to be exposed.

Notes

3. Hont, “Free Trade and the Economic Limits to National Politics.”
9. Forman-Barzilai, Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy, 8.
11. Forman-Barzilai, Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy, 30.
12. Ibid., 12.
13. For further acknowledgement of Stoic oikeiosis in Smith’s economic and moral thought, see Brown, Adam Smith’s Discourse.
17. A notable exception is Dickey, “Doux-Commerce and Humanitarian Values.” However, Dickey does not sketch the full extent of the relationship between Grotius, Pufendorf and Tucker, and, crucially, makes no mention of Butler.
19. Clark, Josiah Tucker Economist, 25; Schuyler, Josiah Tucker, 7–9; Shelton, Dean Tucker, 14–16.
21. Waterman, Political Economy and Christian Theology, 109–13, esp. 112. For the ‘simultaneous kinship and distance’ between the English and Scottish varieties of Enlightenment in the context of the era’s Christian political economy, see also Young, “Christianity, Commerce and the Canon,” quotation at 395.


24. For a statement of this scepticism in relation to the present author’s work, notwithstanding some profound points of agreement, see Oslington, “Anglican Social Thought and the Shaping of Political Economy in Britain,” 40, n. 4.


37. Cf. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods)*, XV. “… justitia suum cuique distribuit” (“… justice, the virtue which assigns to each his due”).

38. Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace*, I. I. VIII, 142: ‘Tis expletive Justice, Justice properly and strictly taken, which respects the Faculty, or perfect Right …’

39. Ibid., I. I. IV, 138: “[A] moral Quality when perfect, is called by us a Faculty; when imperfect, an Aptitude: The former answers to the Act, and the latter to the Power, when we speak of natural Things.”


41. Ibid., I. I. IV, 138.

42. Ibid., I. I. IX, 147–8.


44. For a study of Grotius’s achievement described in terms of the creation of a universal morality as a ‘distinctive normative force,’ see Darwall, *Honor, History, & Relationship*, Chap 8: “Grotius at the Creation of Modern Moral Philosophy,” 157–88.

45. For the ‘partial levelling of distinction between human and animal,’ see Straumann, *Roman Law in the State of Nature*, 92–3. Contrast, however, with Renée Jeffery, *Hugo Grotius in International Thought*, 31:

   However, what is of central importance in [Grotius’s] somewhat pedantic taxonomy is the idea that although humans are capable of making laws, those that are not in
accordance with the law of nature and, by extension, divine law, are not considered law at all. What this implies is that the structure of Grotius’ legal and moral order was hierarchical: that is, natural law is of a higher status than human volitional law and both are superseded by divine volitional law.

46. Ford, “Preaching Propriety to Princes.” For an arguably more measured interpretation see Waszink, “Lipsius and Grotius”
47. Blom, “Sociability and Hugo Grotius,” 603. For Blom, only Grotius’s conception of justice remains consistent throughout his oeuvre.
49. Recognition of Hobbes’s adoption of Epicurean atomism is appropriate here.
53. Although note Brooke’s observation (Philosophic Pride, Chap. 5) that Hobbes was considered an unusual type of Stoic among some contemporaries.
54. For Hobbes’s denial of the Aristotelian zōn politikon, since ‘agreement’ between animals is ‘natural,’ whereas between humans it is ‘by covenant only, which is artificial,’ see Leviathan, I. XVII, 175–6.
55. Haakonssen presents a useful preamble to Pufendorf’s ideas in the context of the German Lutheranism debate in his Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, 35–7.
60. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and of Nations, II. III. XVI, 139.
61. Ibid. II. III. XV, 136–7.
62. Ibid. II. I. VI, 100: ‘… Man, of all Living Things, is the most able to hurt Man, and, if left to his own furious Passions, the most willing.’
63. Ibid., II. IV. XVI, 177:
   … Society, for which a Man is sent into the World, cannot be well exercise’d and maintain’d, unless every one, as much as in him lies, takes care of his own Preservation … it manifestly appears, that a Man by throwing aside all Care of his own Life … is highly injurious both to Almighty GOD, and to the general Body of Mankind.
66. Hont, Jealousy of Trade, 18–22.
67. Ibid., 38.
68. Ibid., 46; “The Language of Sociability and Commerce,” 172.
71. Pufendorf, Whole Duty of Man, II. V. VI, 189.
72. Ibid., II. I. VII: “Paternal Authority,” 169; II. III. I–VI: “Duty of Parents and Children,” 179–87. Note too that for Pufendorf, parental authority is analogous to God’s preeminent authority over humans in the state of nature, e.g. Ibid, II. I. VIII, 169:

Now it is the chief Prerogative of those who are in the State of Nature, that they are subject and accountable to none but God only; in which respect also, this is call’d a State of Natural Liberty, by which is understood, that a Person so circumstanced without some antecedent human Act to the contrary, is to be accounted absolutely in his own Power and Disposition, and above the Controll of all mortal Authority.


74. See esp. notes 136–140.

75. Quoted in Hont, “Jealousy of Trade,” 39.

76. Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, xii, 7, 148–96.


80. Irwin, The Development of Ethics … II, 486, n. 33; quoting Cicero, De officiis, iii. 23:

And this follows even more from the reason of nature, which is divine and human law. If anyone is willing to obey it (and all will obey it who want to live in accord with nature), he will never act so as to seek what belongs to another and to take for himself what he has taken from another.


82. For Carmichael’s praise of Grotius and Pufendorf, see Moore and Silverthorne, “Gershom Carmichael,” 76–8.

83. E.g. Samuel Jones, “Notes on Grotius: De jure beli et pacis”; “Nota in Grotium de jure beli et pacis.”

84. For the Dutch and especially Witsian influence on Jones, see Whitehouse, “Intellectual and Textual Entrepôts,” esp. 566, 572.

85. Although note Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories, 45, which downplays the Dutch influence on Pufendorf: ‘Although it is right to associate neo-Stoicism with Lipsius’ enduring intellectual legacy to Leiden, yet in none of his numerous autobiographical allusions does Pufendorf refer to this period of his intellectual life as formative.’

86. Jones’s dissenting academy produced some of the most notable eighteenth-century English dissenters, including Samuel Chandler (1693–1766), Jeremiah Jones (c. 1693–1724), Andrew Gifford (1700–84) and Daniel Scott (1694–1759). Not insignificantly, alongside Maddox, who was made Bishop of St. Asaph in 1738, Butler’s closest friend at Tewkesbury Thomas Secker (1693–1768) would also go on to become a prominent Anglican convert: he was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury in 1758.

87. The theoretical overlap between Pufendorf’s notion of imbecillitas and Locke’s discussion of human ‘uneasiness’ as ‘the chief, if not only spur to human industry and action’ (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II. XX–XXI) may have influenced Butler’s developing ideas. Cf. Pross, “Naturalism, Anthropology, and Culture,” 228.

88. Later published as Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God; Clarke, A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion.

89. Price, “Liberty, Poverty and Charity.”

90. Butler, Fifteen Sermons (1729), xvi.

91. Quoted and discussed in Tennant, Conscience, Consciousness and Ethics, 33.

92. Butler, Fifteen Sermons (1726), 39; Fifteen Sermons (1729), 39.

93. Ibid., (1726), 209. The phrase ‘immoderate self-love’ echoes Grotius’s statement in De Indis: ‘As for the [philautiá], which is classified as a vice – in other words, immoderate self-interest – it is an excess of such love.’ Quotation and translation in Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 173.

94. Butler, Fifteen Sermons (1726), 190; Fifteen Sermons (1729), 190.
96. Butler, *Fifteen Sermons* (1729), xxix. Cf. Pufendorf’s claim (*Of the Law of Nature and Nations*, IV. IV. XIII, 376) that property and society arise naturally in process of time ‘according as the Temper or Condition of Men, the Nature of things themselves, and the difference of Place required.’
99. Ibid., (1726), 229–30; (1729), 235–6.
101. See esp. note 45 above.
103. Ibid., 67, editor’s note 18.
104. See, e.g. Butler, *Fifteen Sermons* (1726), 269; *Fifteen Sermons* (1729), 276: ‘[Christianity] does not demand new Affections, but only claims the direction of those you have, those Affections you daily feel […]’. Butler’s emphasis on the importance of Christian piety on a ‘mundane’ level—which he would later describe as a ‘practical thing’ in *The Analogy of Religion*, 278—echoes Archbishop Thomas Tenison’s (1636–1715) ‘latitudinarian’ call for Anglicans to ‘devote themselves to the practical uses of religion’ rather than factious politics.’ See Ingram, *Religion, Reform and Modernity*, 10, n. 37, 115 & n. 6.
107. Ibid., (1726), 156; (1729), 156.

 […] natural jurisprudence or, synonymously … natural law … was applied at the time … to mean a social and political ethics that arranged moral life into three broad sets of duties imposed by a basic law of nature: the duties to God, to ourselves, and to others.

109. *Fifteen Sermons* (1726), 18; *Fifteen Sermons* (1729), 17. It is highly likely that in this respect Butler drew equal inspiration from the later Bishop of Cloyne George Berkeley’s (1685–1753) essay ‘The Bond of Society’ (1713). Berkeley’s work conjoined the pervasive English Newtonianism of the British Isles at the turn of the century with Stoic *oikeiosis* to theorise about the ‘gravitational attraction’ between the natural, moral, material and social worlds. For discussion see Breuninger, *Recovering Bishop Berkeley*, 35–52.
111. Tennant, *Conscience, Consciousness and Ethics*, 50–1.
116. Ibid., II, 310.
120. Butler, *Fifteen Sermons* (1726), 12; *Fifteen Sermons* (1729), 12.


122. Ibid., 5–6.


127. The phrase is Forman-Barzilai’s, *Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy*, chap. 6.

128. “Stint and Bound” is attributable to Butler, *Fifteen Sermons* (1726), 210; *Fifteen Sermons* (1729), 212.


137. See notes 72–4 above.


[I]t followeth, that in such a condition, every man has the right to every thing; even to one another’s body. And therefore, as long as this natural Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man … of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily allow men to live.

Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, II. §. 5: 9:

The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone; and … teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions.


Brute Creatures … are plac’d below our Degree of Being […] because GOD Almighty has not given them a Mind capable of the Knowledge of Right and Law. […] The Dignity of Man … above all other Parts of the animal World, made it requisite that his Actions should be squar’d by some Rule; without which no Order, no Decorum, no Beauty can be conceiv’d. Hence it is his greatest Honour that he has obtain’d an immortal Soul, endu’d with the Light of Understanding, with the Faculties of judging and of choosing Things, and with an admirable Capacity for Arts and Knowledge.

142. The famous phrase is Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) in *Idea for a Universal History with a cosmopolitan aim*, 111:

[By] ‘antagonism’ [I refer to] the *unsociable sociability* of human beings, i.e. their propensity to enter into society, which, however, is combined with a thoroughgoing resistance that constantly threatens to break up this society … it is this resistance that awakens all the powers of the human being … thus happen the first true steps from crudity toward culture … thus all talents … [and] taste is formed.
An excellent summary of the recent literature is Dew, "Epicurean and Stoic Enlightenments."

The present author is particularly indebted to Straumann, *Roman Law in the State of Nature*, 83–102, for enriching this aspect of the essay’s argument.

On these points in general consult Young, "Christianity, Commerce, and the Canon."

Hont, "Jealousy of Trade," 39; Hont, *Politics in Commercial Society*, 19, goes so far as to label Smith a ‘dissenting pupil of Hutcheson.’


Most recently acknowledged in Oslington, “Anglican Social Thought and the Shaping of Political Economy in Britain,” 29.


Phillipson, “Providence and Progress,” esp. 72–3. Tucker was an avid reader and admirer of Robertson. In a footnote to *A Treatise Concerning Civil Government*, I. II, 170, which precipitates discussion about the analogous relationship between native Americans and the presocietal state of nature, he recommends Robertson’s *History of America*, I. IV.

Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, I. III. I, 53; VII. II. III, 363–4. Smith simultaneously praises and lambasts Mandeville as a ‘lively and humorous,’ though ‘coarse and rustic’ writer, whose ‘notions ... [were] in almost every respect erroneous,’ whereas he compliments Butler as a ‘late ingenious and subtle philosopher.’

Ibid., VI. II. IV, 361–71.

This falls under a section and chapter entitled ‘Of the influence and authority of the general rules of morality, and that they are justly regarded as the laws of the Deity.’

Haakonssen and Whatmore, “Commerce and Enlightenment,” 300.

*Mizu*, *Adam Smith’s Library*, 147–8.


Cf. notes 9, 11, 12 above. Interestingly, Forman-Barzilai (*Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy*, chap. 1) does note Butler’s influence on this aspect of Smith’s thought; however, she ignores Tucker entirely and pairs Butler instead with Nicole. Alternatively, for a statement of Smith and Tucker’s equal (or near-equal) significance as ‘historicist’ theorists at the close of early modernity, in which they personify the ‘essentially conservative Whig Enlightenment at its most intellectual adventurous; at the high point of its grasp of history,’ see Pocock, “Political Thought in the English-Speaking Atlantic 1760–1790: (i),” 264, 265, 275, 278; Pocock, “Political Thought in the English-Speaking Atlantic 1760–1790: (ii),” 283, 291, (quotation at) 294, 301, 303.


**Acknowledgements**

For various conversations and discussions leading to the formation of this article over several years, I am grateful to Sophie Bisset, Cesare Cuttica, Kris Grint, Iain McDaniel, Norman Vance, Anthony M. C. Waterman, Richard Whatmore, the late Donald Winch and Brian W. Young. For more recent comments and criticism I sincerely thank Knud Haakonssen. Certain aspects of the paper were delivered at the John W. Kluge Center, Library of Congress, Washington DC in June 2013.

**Disclosure statement**

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Bibliography


Jones, Samuel. “Notes on Grotius: De jure belli et pacis.” Bristol Baptist College, G 95 A.


