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THE ETHICS OF DOPING: BETWEEN PATERNALISM AND DUTY

Abstract

The most plausible line of anti-doping argumentation starts with the fact that performance enhancing substances are harmful and put at considerable risk the health and the life of those who indulge in the overwhelming promises these substances hold. From a liberal point of view, however, this is not a strong reason neither to morally reject doping altogether, nor to put a blanket ban on it; on the contrary, allowing adult, competent and informed athletes to have access to performance enhancement drugs is often showcased as a liberty-related *right of noninterference*. In this article I will first discuss doping from the liberal point of view, especially in the light of the *harm principle* as it was introduced by Mill and elaborated by his successors, most notably by Joel Feinberg. Then I will examine whether – and to what degree – one’s decision to receive performance enhancement drugs would mean to use humanity in one’s own person only as a means, which would be self-defeating in the light of Kantian ethics. From this I will move one step backwards to what I consider as the core question concerning the ethics of doping, the one that is logically prior to any other in my view, and concerns the consistency of the thesis that doping may be compatible with sport. I will argue that there is an inherent logical antinomy between doing sport and using performance enhancement drugs, one that presents any argumentation in favor of doping as essentially self-contradictory.

Keywords: ethics, doping, liberty, right of noninterference, paternalism, normative utilitarianism, duty, categorical imperative, harm principle

Introduction

Although doping is usually and by most taken as an issue easy to deal with, one that can be expediently addressed by means of convenient, simplistic, intuitive aphorisms of the kind: “doping is wrong,” “doping is harmful,” “doping goes against the spirit of sport,” or “doping is – and should remain – illegal,” when it comes to the moral – and consequently, the legal – support of claims as such, the situation seems to be not that convenient any more. As a matter of fact, the issue becomes particularly tricky and unexpectedly demanding the very moment one asks, “why then is doping wrong, and why should it be illegal?” As it is often the case with judgements that draw on moral intuition, since their only strength is that they “appeal, implicitly or explicitly, to our feelings and sentiments, and to moral consensus,” (Shaw, 1980: 127) they maintain a veneer of validity only as long as they remain unchallenged; the moment they are put under thorough examination, however, intuitive judgements need to seek justification in proper, sound moral arguments, unless one endorses the view that “we do not, or even cannot, deliberate and calculate in deciding what we ought to do;” (Hampshire, 1949: 470) such a view, however, portrays ethical debates as altogether redundant, which also makes any debate on the strengths and the merits of moral intuition a waste of time.¹

So, why is doping morally wrong? The most common group of arguments against doping draws upon the fact that doping is illegal. But as I already implied above, this is only an *improper reversal*, a typical *affirming the consequent* fallacy, at least the way I see it. Doping is illegal indeed, but only because it is wrong, that is, *morally wrong*, and not vice versa; anything that is prohibited by law is so only due to the fact that the moral community once decided that it should be banned as morally impermissible, a *malum*, either a *malum in se* or a *malum prohibitum*; but I will return to this discussion later on.

One more usual answer to the riddle – entirely dependent upon the view I previously mentioned – is: “Doping is morally wrong because it is cheating, and cheating is wrong.” This view is as inconsistent as the previous one, as far as I am concerned: doping is cheating indeed, but only due to the fact that doping is illegal, and this in turn is only because doping is considered to be a *malum*; if the legal status of doping weren’t what it is, and all athletes were equally permitted to

1 For a discussion on the limitations of moral intuition see, among others: Paul Slovic and Daniel Västfjäll (2010) Affect, Moral Intuition, and Risk. *Psychological Inquiry*, vol. 21, no. 4, 387-398; for an advocacy of its merits see: John Kekes (1986) Moral Intuition. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 1, 83-93.

enhance their performance by means of receiving chemical substances, doping wouldn't be cheating, therefore it wouldn't also be considered as morally wrong.

Another weak argument against doping, as far as I am concerned, is the one that maintains that using performance-enhancing drugs goes against the "spirit of sport" (Melzer, Elbe and Brand, 2010: 70). The way I see it, the spirit of sport has always consisted in exceeding one's physical and mental limits through various means of enhancement; top level athletes already since the classical era have been receiving personalized expert services that include personified nutrition, tailored medical treatment, dedicated psychological support, advanced training techniques, and others as such. Behind any top-level athlete there is usually a huge team of experts that supports him; they too perform and compete no less than the athletes they support, albeit in the background. Adding a couple of biochemists to the team – and one more field to the competition – would not compromise the spirit of sport, leastways no more than any other form of excessive support that is currently provided to athletes. If anything, doping wouldn't maximize injustice in sport; as you read this piece, somewhere in the world some runner or thrower is training alone after a hard day's work, with no expert support of any kind, well aware of the fact that his competition enjoys immense support by his community, state, or sponsors. Living and training in Cote d' Ivoire, for example, is not exactly the definition of equal opportunities in sport, when one has to compete with athletes who live and train in the United States. One would be justified even to assume that performance enhancement substances could provide a remedy and make up for the injustice: administering performance enhancement drugs is by all means much more affordable than establishing and supporting any dedicated team of experts may be.

What is it, then, that makes doping wrong, that is, a morally unjustifiable option? But of course, what else apart from the prima facie undeniable fact that doping puts into extreme danger one's health, and even one's life (Breitsameter, 2017: 288). This is the only necessary and sufficient condition why doping is almost unanimously considered to be morally wrong, and it's a quite strong one – to some the strongest possible. The argument goes as follows:

- A. If *f* or *f*ing exposes one's health or life to extreme risk, *f* or *f*ing is morally wrong.
- B. Doping exposes the athletes' health and life to extreme risk.
- C. Therefore, doping is morally wrong.

Is this the end of the road, then? I think not. Leaving aside that the argument appears to be a weak one, since the major premise (A) can hardly be accepted as true (humans engage in numerous activities that, despite the fact that they are as – or even more – dangerous, are nevertheless thought of as perfectly acceptable), the argument's minor premise (B) also appears to be inherently problematic.

Paternalism, soft and strong: The liberal perspective

For one, the possibility that some performance-enhancement substances may prove to be *not* (or, *not as*) harmful to some, cannot be excluded from the outset; on the basis of this one would be justified to argue that doping should be banned *only to the degree it indeed puts at risk one's health*. In this case, of course, it is not doping that is being banned, but putting one's health at risk instead. Such a view would necessarily lead to the conclusion that "If a drug does not expose an athlete to excessive risk, we should allow it" (Savulescu, Foddy and Clayton, 2004: 670), which is nevertheless quite far from the one the initial argument intends to reach. This would *a fortiori* apply in cases that a drug is proven to expose an athlete to *minimum risk*, let's say no higher than the risks of super-intensive training programs, or at *no risk at all*.

But even if, for the sake of the discussion, we accepted it as an undeniable fact that all performance-enhancement drugs are equally harmful to everybody, and this to the highest degree, we would still have to explain why it should be morally wrong that one's health or life is put to danger, in the case one is willing to put one's own health and life in danger according to one's own free will. People do this all of the time, actually, and one doesn't need to be an athlete to endanger one's health or life; *a fortiori*, people often do this for reasons much less meritorious than those usually invoked by the athletes who opt to use performance enhancement substances (assuming that they do so just on purpose of exceeding their limits): a lot of people smoke, some use drugs, many are in the habit of consuming large quantities of alcohol, and all these are normally taken as morally permissible to the extent that no harm is inflicted upon others, and the consequences are limited to the person concerned. In other words, unlike what applies in the case of doping, decisions that lead to actions and lifestyles that indeed endanger one's own health or life usually seem to be conceived as *mala prohibita*, and not *mala in se*:² you are free to drink as much alcohol as you

2 For the distinction between *malum in se* and *malum prohibitum* see: Arthur D. Greenfield (1921) *Malum Prohibitum*. *American Bar Association Journal*, vol. 7, no. 9, 493-495; also:

wish, unless you intend to drive your car shortly after, or perform a civil duty of yours, let's say, fly a plane or give a public lecture, because doing so might be harmful to others; you are free to smoke, but not in the presence of others or in public places, because this would affect other people's wellbeing or health. After all, isn't this the cornerstone as well as the heyday of liberalism? According to Mill (2003: 94-95):

“...the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise.”

In any case and regardless of the circumstances any moral agent should be acknowledged and granted the freedom to do as one wishes with one's self, as long as one's choices and actions are deliberate on the one hand, and do not inflict any harm on others, or affect in any negative way whatsoever the interests or the wellbeing of any other person, or the community. This view is the backbone of Mill's (2003: 165) attitude towards (the possibility of) self-inflicted harm:

“... no one but the person himself can judge of the sufficiency of the motive which may prompt him to incur the risk: in this case, therefore [...] he ought, I conceive, to be only warned of the danger; not forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it.”

Why shouldn't the same apply also in the case of athletic competition? If being administered performance enhancement substances in order to exceed one's physical limits is what one wills, and provided that this doesn't have any negative, harmful or detrimental effects whatsoever on anybody else apart from the person who will receive the drugs, one should be granted the freedom to proceed as one wishes, that is, to be allowed to use performance enhancement

Richard L. Gray (1995) Eliminating the (Absurd) Distinction Between Malum In Se and Malum Prohibitum Crimes. *Washington University Law Review Quarterly*, vol. 73, no. 3, 1369-1398; and Susan Dimock (2016) The Malum prohibitum – Malum in se Distinction and the Wrongfulness Constraint on Criminalization. *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review*, vol. 55, no. 1, 9-31.

drugs, despite the fact that this might compromise one's health or life, *a fortiori* when "there is not a certainty, but only a danger of mischief." (Mill, 2003: 165) By and large, from a liberal perspective each person should be acknowledged a private, individual sphere, a realm of one's own self, with which no one should be entitled, justified or allowed to interfere, since what is included in this realm is of no concern to anybody other than the agent on the one hand, while at the same time the content of this private sphere is of paramount significance and absolutely essential for its proprietor.³ In the light of the above, any hard version of paternalism⁴ as the one that is currently being endorsed in the case of doping, is in need of overwhelmingly strong reasons, of robust and convincing moral justification that would explain why the privacy principle should be bypassed, and moral agents should be forced to abide by certain rules and regulations concerning the way they ought to treat their own health, body, and future. The fact that one puts one's own self at risk seems to be a weak reason when it comes to smoking, free diving, paragliding, and the like; why should doping be treated differently? In light of this, putting a ban on performance enhancing substances based on the risk undertaken by the athletes seems to be in need of further strong argumentation.

Mill regarded any intervention in strictly individual affairs, even if committed for the sake of the actor's welfare, as a violation of one's liberty. His legacy, the *harm principle*,⁵ suggests that there should be a limit on intruding within the sphere of individual liberties, one that could be crossed only in cases when interfering would reduce "harm to persons other than the actor (the one prohibited from acting) and there is probably no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost to other values." (Feinberg, 1988: xix) In other words, the harm principle does not allow forceful prevention of physical harm and moral or social offense, if the effects of the physical harm or moral or social offence are limited to the actor himself. A soft version of paternalism⁶ is as far as

3 For a documented account of the right to privacy and the related right "to be let alone," see: Samuel D. Warren, and Louis D. Brandeis (1890) The Right to Privacy. *Harvard Law Review*, vol. 4, no. 5, 193-220, especially 195ff.

4 See: Richard J. Arneson (2005) Joel Feinberg and the Justification of Hard Paternalism. *Legal Theory*, vol. 11, no. 3, 259-284.

5 See: Richard A. Epstein (1995) The Harm Principle – And How it Grew. *The University of Toronto Law Journal*, vol. 45, no. 4, 369-417, especially 372ff; also: Nils Holtug (2002) The Harm Principle. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, vol. 5, no. 4, 357-389; as well as: Piers Norris Turner (2014) Harm" and Mill's Harm Principle. *Ethics*, vol. 124, no. 2, 299-326.

6 According to Feinberg's definition soft paternalism maintains that "the state has the right to prevent self-regarding harmful conduct (so far it looks 'paternalistic') when but only when that conduct is substantially nonvoluntary, or when temporary intervention is necessary to establish

Mill (2003: 165) would go:

“If either a public officer or anyone else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river [...] unless he is a child, or delirious, or in some state of excitement or absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflecting faculty...”

In any other case, however:

“Considerations to aid his judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may be offered to him, even obtruded on him, by others: but he himself is the final judge. All errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good.” (Mill, 2003: 148-149)

In the light of the above, the decision to receive performance-enhancing drugs according to one’s own free will – provided, of course, that the one who decides to do so is a competent, fully informed, adult agent – should rest with the person concerned; if not, one would be faced with *hard paternalism* that, apart from being despicable to Mill, is also in need of further justification.

Humanity as end in itself: The Kantian perspective

Such a justification could probably be sought in Kant’s doctrines on the freedom of the will. As I mentioned above, to Mill “liberty consists in doing what one desires;” nevertheless, what one desires cannot be inferred with safety from one’s actions – not always, at least. In the bridge example, let’s say, Mill’s *presumes* that the person who is about to cross the unsafe bridge “*does not desire* to fall into the river.” Mill’s hypothesis is a *prima facie* plausible one – in Mill’s view plausible enough to serve as a justification for the soft version of paternalism he seems to be suggesting.⁷ But still, judging one’s inner motives based on empirical evidence leaves one with nothing better than just a *probable hypothesis*, one among many other possible explanations of an agent’s actions: there is always the possibility that the person in Mill’s example *may indeed desired to fall into the river* so as to

whether it is voluntary or not.” Joel Feinberg (1986) *Harm to Self: The Moral Limits of Criminal Law*. New York: Oxford University Press, 12.

⁷ On Mill’s *soft paternalism* see: Eunseong Oh (2016) Mill on Paternalism. *Journal of Political Inquiry*, vol. 9, no. 2, 41-49.

kill himself, let's say, or to attract the bystanders' interest – there are numerous other plausible assumptions one could come up with. This, of course, leaves Mill's desire-based discussion of *liberty of action* defenseless against allegations of unsoundness, arbitrariness and contingency. Kant's account of the freedom of the will, on the other hand, seems to be immune to allegations as such, and this because Kant aptly chose to move the discussion to a logically prior stage, that is, from what an agent *actually desires*, to what the agent *could rationally desire* or, in Kant's words, to whether what one desires "were to become through [the agent's] will an universal law of nature" (Kant, 2002: 4:436). The question about what an agent would be rationally justified to will, of course, applies *a fortiori* to the issue of pharmaceutical performance enhancement.

To start with, and against what liberals are never weary to assume, from the Kantian viewpoint any decision to undertake actions that would inflict harm on one's own self could never be taken as the actual manifestation of an agent's free will, even more so because the agent would decide this on purpose of achieving a goal that lies outside the agent's will, as it is in the case of doping. In other words, even if one indeed *desired* to risk one's own health or life in order to enhance one's performance by means of doping, one still wouldn't be morally justified *to will* it, not as a rational moral agent, that is. The presence of *desire* or *inclination* is morally irrelevant; it is *duty* instead that determines whether an action is of any moral worth, and duty, in turn, is determined only by reason: "the will is a faculty of choosing only that which reason, independently of inclination, recognizes as practically necessary, i.e., as good" (Kant, 2002: 4:412); and again: "I understand by a perfect duty that which permits no exception to the advantage of inclination" (Kant, 2002: 4:421). This is because, in Kant's view, inclination⁸ allows only for hypothetical imperatives of the type "if you want *x*, then you should do *f*," and imperatives of this kind leave moral worth prey to individual taste and desire.

"Through this relation, whether it rests now on inclination or on representations of reason, only hypothetical imperatives are possible: 'I ought to do something because I will something else.' By contrast, the moral, hence categorical, imperative says: 'I ought to act thus-and-so even if I did not will anything else.' E.g., the former one says: 'I ought not to lie,

8 For inclination and duty as determining factors of morality see: Herbert James Paton (1984) *The Categorical Imperative*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, especially 49ff; also: Stuart M. Brown, Jr. and H. J. Paton (1949) "The Categorical Imperative," *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 58, no. 6, 599-611.

if I want to retain my honorable reputation'; but the latter says: 'I ought not to lie, even if I did not incur the least disgrace'. The last must therefore abstract from every object to the extent that it has no influence on the will, hence practical reason (will) does not merely administer some other interest, but merely proves its own commanding authority as supreme legislation." (Kant, 2002: 4:441)

As to the way one would be morally justified to use one's self or others, Kant claims that a categorical imperative could maintain only that moral agents ought to act so, as to use humanity never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end, regardless of whether their actions are aimed at others, or at their own person.⁹ Unlike hypothetical imperatives, categorical ones allow for no exceptions or alternatives, and there can be no latitude in their implementation. This means that irrespective of whether it is in one's interest to do as the categorical imperative commands, or regardless of whether one is inclined to abide by it, one should always act in accordance to the maxims that derive from it. That is, no matter if one desires it or not, a rational moral agent should always use humanity as an end, whether in one's face or in the face of anybody else; the opposite would be logically self-defeating. In Kant's moral universe all moral agents, that is, each one of us, is a lawgiver, or in Kant's poetic aphorism, a *legislative member in the realm of ends*.¹⁰ The upshot is that rational moral agents are entitled to decide about the ends that they will set out to pursue, and this makes them ultimate ends, ends in themselves. It follows that using humanity only as a means, and not at the same time as an end, can only be taken as an oxymoron: humanity, that is by definition the ultimate end, would be used only as a means, which would be self-defeating, since it would be to assume that something *is*, and at the same time it *is not*; that rational moral humanity is – and at the same time is not – the ultimate end. To this, however, a rational agent cannot consent. The bottom line is on the one hand that no rational moral agent *could will* to use one's self only as a means to an end and still claim to be rational, and on the other that whenever one uses oneself only as a means to an end and not at the same time as an end in itself, one does so not as a rational agent, but in some other capacity of his, be it animal instinct, or passion, or

9 The formula of *humanity as end in itself*: "Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means." Also, "[...] the rational being, as an end in accordance with its nature, hence as an end in itself, must serve for every maxim as a limiting condition of all merely relative and arbitrary ends." See: Kant, 4:429 and 4:436 respectively.

10 The formula of the *realm of ends*: "Act in accordance with maxims of a universally legislative member for a merely possible realm of ends." See: Kant, 4:439.

inclination, or anything else of the kind – but morality.

Now, harming or killing one's self is the definition of using humanity in one's self only as a means to an end, and not at the same time as end in itself, since it would be self-defeating to assume that any agent would will to harm or kill one's self just for the sake of harming or killing one's self; such a decision would be conceivable only as aiming at a purpose that is *external* to the agent, to wit as a means to achieve an end that the agent considers to be superior to one's own existence, and would be out of one's reach if one didn't decide to put one's self at risk: such an end might be to protect one's own freedom or the freedom of one's people, to defend one's honor, etc., and also to break a world record, or to win the gold medal in the Olympics. None of these, however, would render one's decision to act in such a way immune to allegations of being inconsistent and self-defeating.

As far as I am concerned, taking one's chances and risking one's own health and life by using drugs in order to enhance one's performance, is the epitome of using "humanity in one's own person only as a means to an end, and not at the same time as an end in itself" (Kant, 2002: 4:429). Such a maxim, however, could never be an option to any rational moral agent, since it would only constitute an overwhelming logical contradiction, since it goes against a principle that "is not gotten from experience," but "arises from pure reason:"

"This principle of humanity and of every rational nature in general as end in itself (which is the supreme limiting condition of the freedom of the actions of every human being) is not gotten from experience [...] in it humanity is represented not as an end of human beings (subjectively), i.e., as an object that one actually from oneself makes into an end, but as an objective end which, whatever ends we may have, is to constitute as a law the supreme limiting condition of all subjective ends, hence must arise from pure reason." (Kant, 2002: 4:430-4:431)

The ground for attributing such a special status to human beings is, of course, rationality; this in Kant's view means that persons, that is, rational moral beings, unlike "all objects of inclination [that] have only a conditioned worth," and "all beings without reason, [that have] only a relative worth as means, and are called things" (Kant, 2002: 4:428), should be counted as the limiting condition of every possible end:

"rational beings, by contrast, [that] are called persons, because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves, i.e., as something that may

not be used merely as means, hence to that extent limits all arbitrary choice (and is an object of respect).” (Kant, 2002: 4:428)

In this respect, using humanity only as a means to any arbitrary, relative end is not just morally unjustifiable, nor wrong; it is *morally incomprehensible*. Therefore, to the extent that doping is indeed using humanity *in one’s self* only as a means – in the light of Kantian ethics it is – doping is morally incomprehensible. Kant is adamant in his view: one “cannot dispose of the human being in [one’s] own person, so as to maim, corrupt, or kill [one].” (Kant, 2002: 4:429) Whoever indulges in enhancing one’s performance by means of potentially harmful practices, through their actions makes a statement that is entirely contrary to reason, and therefore can have no validity as a moral claim. The upshot is that, being overwhelmingly inconsistent for the reasons I outlined above, the maxim that underlies one’s decision to pharmaceutically enhance one’s athletic performance could never be acknowledged the status of a universal law of nature.

Even though not for the same reasons, nor having followed the same thread of reasoning, consequentialists too – normative utilitarians in particular – would probably also endorse Kant’s claim as far as allowing doping in sport is concerned. This is because granting one the liberty to do as one wishes with one’s health and life when it comes to athletic competition, is very much likely to become *the thin edge of the wedge* for introducing extortion, manipulation, and deceit in sport. The anticipated benefits would be much less and less significant if compared to the possible harms, therefore, even from a utilitarian point of view, allowing for pharmaceutical performance enhancement in sport could be equally objectionable, since it wouldn’t foreshadow the best possible balance of benefit and harm.

Doping and sport: A possible *contradictio in terminis*?

It is true that ever since the classical era top level athletes have been receiving the best support that has been available in their time and their community could afford; the purpose has always been the same: to assist them in excelling in athletic competition so as to bestow honor and glory upon their community, state or nation, and become an inspiration to others. Between *supporting* and *enhancing*, however, there is a thin, almost indiscernible, line of demarcation. It is one thing to give an athlete access to the best training, diet, living conditions, recovery techniques, etc., possible, so as the athlete is aided in unfolding one’s potential, talent and skills; it is totally different, however, when one’s

performance is *dependent upon* the contribution of various sciences, and behind one's achievements there is the effort and skill of several experts. In the first case, it is the athlete who excels in competition; in the second, the competition seems to be also among various teams of scientists and experts. That said, there is a huge distance between *aiding* the athlete to reach outstanding levels of performance, and *making* one the athlete one is, the same that appears to exist between boosting the athlete's organism and functions, and introducing in one's body substances that normally shouldn't be there, or are increased to unnatural levels.

It is exactly in that sense that performance enhancement drugs alter the very essence of the competition, by turning it to a mainly scientific one, while it was intended to be primarily athletic. By and large, doping is not about enhancing one's performance and moving it to even higher levels; it is about introducing a new, totally alien to the essence of sport, field of *ever broader competition*. This is where a possible *contradictio in terminis* could be sought: on purpose of enhancing one's athletic performance, one ends up making one's athletic performance *irrelevant*. Doping makes exceeding one's physical and mental limitations seem to be no longer the key *desideratum*, nor the most significant one. This is the reason why, in my view, introducing doping in sport is a self-defeating prospect: doping unavoidably shifts the focus from athletic competition to pure science in a way that sport becomes almost irrelevant. If I am right in this, there is no possible world in which the idea of doping and the idea of sport would co-exist in relation to each other, since in such a world something, that is, sport, would exist, and at the same time would not.

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ETIKA DOPINGA: IZMEĐU PATERNALIZMA I DUŽNOSTI

Sažetak

Najuvjerljivija linija anti-doping argumentacije počinje činjenicom da su stvari za poboljšanje performansi štetne i da predstavljaju značajan rizik za zdravlje i život onih koji se upuštaju u prevladavajuća obećanja koja ove stvari sadrže. S liberalnog stajališta, međutim, to nije jak razlog niti da moralno odbacimo doping u potpunosti, niti da ga zabranimo; naprotiv, omogućavanje odraslim, kompetentnim i informiranim sportašima pristup lijekovima za poboljšanje performansi često se smatra oglednim primjerom prava povezanim sa slobodom nemiješanja. U ovom ću članku najprije raspraviti o doping u liberalnog stajališta, posebno u svjetlu načela štete jer ga je Mill uveo i razradio njegov nasljednik, ponajviše Joel Feinberg. Zatim ću ispitati hoće li - i u kojoj mjeri - nečija odluka o primanju lijekova za poboljšanje performansi značiti korištenje ljudskosti u vlastitoj osobi samo kao sredstvo, koje bi bilo samopobijajuće u svjetlu kantovske etike. Od ovoga ću napraviti korak unatrag do onoga što smatram temeljnim pitanjem etike dopinga, onim koje je po mom mišljenju logično prije bilo kojeg drugog, a tiče se dosljednosti teze da doping može biti kompatibilan sa sportom. Ustvrdit ću da postoji inherentna logička antinomija između bavljenja sportom i korištenja lijekova za poboljšanje performansi, koja predstavlja bilo kakvu argumentaciju u korist dopinga kao suštinski samo-kontradiktorne.,

Ključne riječi: etika, doping, sloboda, pravo ne miješanja, paternalizam, normativni utilitarizam, dužnost, kategorički imperativ, načelo štete