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Francis Bacon
Selected Philosophical Works.
Ed. Rose-Mary Sargent.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company
1999. Pp. xxxviii + 290.
US$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-471-5);
US$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-470-7).

At the beginning of *The Great Instauration*, Francis Bacon speaks despairingly of the state of human learning. Having complained that men, 'while admiring and applauding the false powers of the mind,' are ignoring the true powers by which nature could be understood, Bacon concludes that the only course left is 'to commence a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and all human knowledge raised upon the proper foundations.' *The Great Instauration* presents a six-part plan for this reconstruction: first, Bacon would include a systematic account of 'The Divisions of the Sciences.' The second part, 'The New Organon; or Directions concerning the Interpretation of Nature,' would describe a new method for the study of nature. The third part would contain a compendium of 'The Phenomena of the Universe; of a Natural and Experimental History for the Foundation of Philosophy.' The last three parts would be titled 'The Ladder of the Intellect,' 'The Forerunners; or Anticipations of the New Philosophy,' and 'The New Philosophy; or Active Science.'

The collection of Bacon's writings contained in *Selected Philosophical Works* is representative of the broad nature of his philosophical project. Most of Bacon's work contributed to the first three parts of his reconstruction of learning, and this is reflected in Rose-Mary Sargent's compilation. She has included selections from *The Advancement of Learning* and *The Great Instauration, The New Organon*, and *Preparative*, as well as the complete text of the *New Atlantis*. Most notably, the *Selected Philosophical Works* also contains selections from Bacon's natural histories. Although natural history was an important part of Bacon's project, examples of his work in this area have been less frequently anthologized than his other philosophical writings.

In addition to reflecting Bacon's diverse interests, the *Selected Philosophical Works* also includes examples of the various ways in which he expressed himself. The careful analysis of the *Advancement of Learning* can, for example, be seen side by side with the aphorisms of *The New Organon* and the compendiums of the Bacon's natural histories.

In order to include a broad selection of Bacon's work, Sargent has, unfortunately, had to abridge both the *Advancement of Learning* and *The New Organon*. This was, however, a wise trade off, given the range of material that she was able to include as a result.

Sargent's edition also includes some useful critical apparatus. The general introduction includes a sketch of Bacon's life and career, as well as discussions of some of the main themes in his work. In addition, Sargent presents an interesting overview of Bacon's historical significance from the seven-

teenth century through to contemporary debates in the philosophy of science. Although Sargent's discussions are often quite brief, she supplies extensive references for those who wish to do further reading. These features of the *Selected Philosophical Works*, together with the well-chosen selections from Bacon's writings, make this volume an excellent way to introduce students to Bacon's work.

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Mara Beller
Quantum Dialogue —
The Making of a Revolution.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1999.
Pp. xv + 365.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-226-04181-6.

Mara Beller is a philosopher of science and the book appears under a series titled 'Science and Its Conceptual Foundations'. Beller undertakes to examine why and how the elusive Copenhagen interpretation came to acquire the status it has. The first part of the book traces in seven chapters early major developmental phases of QT, such as matrix theory, Born's probabilistic interpretation, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and Bohr's complementarity framework. The details are authentic but the presentation is already woven around the conclusions (premises?) which Beller further argues for in the second part, over eight chapters.

Beller's central claim is this: The ideas developed initially by Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, Born and others came to be known and accepted as the 'standard interpretation' more due to the success of their 'ad hoc strategies' and 'ingenious and misleading improvisations' aimed at 'the legitimization of their stand' (12), rather than any intrinsic merit of their interpretive ideas. The 'Copenhagen-Göttingen group' as she calls them, proclaimed their interpretation is the only one possible. They 'exaggerated the difficulties of the opposition stand while ignoring their own', and 'trivialized and often deliberately caricatured opposition stand' (277). They presented Bohr as a hero who cannot be wrong and demanded we change our ideas to understand how Bohr is right (275).

'Dialogical creativity' is a term that Beller introduces as she tries to draw the above conclusions by detailing the scientific exchanges that members of both camps had while making their own contributions to quantum theory.

All told, there is nothing convincing in Beller's arguments — historically, philosophically, scientifically, and sociologically — to warrant the charge that the members of the so-called Copenhagen orthodoxy mainly engaged in 'discrediting the opposition stand and caricaturing the opposition's criticisms of their own stand' (10). 'History is written by the winners' she complains, but the 'winner' in this case is quantum theory itself, with its tremendous practical successes. Most physicists merely aligned themselves with the theory. Those who didn't had a tougher call. They had to justify their skepticism toward a successful theory by developing a new theory with the same predictive power sans the felt paradoxes and inconsistencies.

Bohr's claim that his was the only objective interpretation possible is most likely incorrect, but equally, Beller's claim that the content of Bohr's interpretation 'cannot be fully comprehended without taking into account such psycho-physical factors as ambition, professional interest, group dynamics' (144) remains unsubstantiated.

Some examples will indicate the trend of argumentation in the book. In chapter two, Beller shows Born's own testimony that his opposition to the realistic construal of the Schrodinger wave equation preceded his early papers on the statistical interpretation is contradicted by the fact that Born initially embraced Schrodinger's wave formalism over Heisenberg's, treating it realistically. Beller sees in this, evidence for a willingness to manipulate history to preserve the claim of 'inevitability' of their position. Once introduced, the idea of 'manipulation' is invoked to explain why Schrodinger's interpretation of his own wave formalism did not get any attention from other physicists. 'Bohr and Born headed the most prestigious schools of theoretical physics. Young physicists, who streamed into these centers from all over the world, were exposed automatically to the new philosophy. ... most of them simply adopted the official interpretation without deep deliberation' (39). She sees Heisenberg as 'conceding this' in his 1930 book: 'the physicist more often has a kind of faith in the correctness of the new principles than a clear understanding of them.' Actually, Heisenberg is proposing that the acceptance of a successful theory often precedes its full comprehension.

Similarly, she discusses Einstein's warning not to rely on the recollections of the participants (11). But her quoted lines were written by Einstein to espouse the 'logically real' status of concepts in physics. As an example of the orthodoxy's willingness to trivialize the oppositions ideas, Beller cites Heisenberg's assertion that 'Bohm's "strange" arguments for hidden variables is identical to the hope that 2 x 2=5' (196), but does not mention that Einstein too referred to Bohm's efforts 'as too cheap a way out.'

Because Beller thinks that Bohr actually had no interpretation — only a set of inconsistent ideas that he used to browbeat the opponents — her readings of Bohr's individual interpretive ideas are seriously flawed. For example, she repeatedly refers to Bohr's stress on the necessity of experimental arrangements to define quantum mechanical properties as merely an 'operational viewpoint'. But Bohr's perspective here is *relationalism*, not operationalism. QT does not describe the positions and momenta of particles

in terms of their trajectories in free space. Once we specify the experimental arrangements, say a two-slit experiment, the 'position' attribute gets defined as which of the two slits *on the screen* the particle will take. All contradictions are avoided with mechanics of point particles, as Pauli put it, by predicting only probabilities for the possible values of position. Bohr handled this idea of relationalism epistemologically, while it is possible to treat it ontologically (see Gomatam, R., *J. of Consciousness Studies*, 6 [1999] 173-90).

If the architects and supporters of the Copenhagen orthodoxy erred in presenting their interpretation as the only and final one, Beller seems to have erred on the other side, of dismissing the ideas of such a thoughtful physicist as Bohr as having no rigorous interpretive content.

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Radu J. Bogdan
Minding Minds: Evolving A Reflexive Mind by Interpreting Others.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2000. Pp. xiii + 215.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-262-02467-5.

How do humans come to develop the ability to think explicitly about thoughts? Not by language, logic or a privileged access to their own minds, but by means of the capacity to interpret each other. This is the unorthodox answer that Bogdan offers for the origin of reflexive minds. His approach is 'largely theoretical and often speculative' (5), gathering evolutionary, conceptual, and developmental considerations in an effort to contrive a global, integrative framework.

The book has two parts. The first one (chapters one to three) sets the evolutionary background for Bogdan's general thesis that 'almost every major step in the evolution of primate mentation is closely linked to a major step in the evolution of interpretation' (37). He argues that socialization is the principal force behind this evolution. Interaction with conspecifics in a complex social world will endow primates with a set of practical interpretive skills. Yet, while other primate minds remain situated and interactive, only human minds become unsituated and intersubjective: they are capable to abstract from immediate perceptions, and to exchange information with no current utilitarian goals in mind. The transit from Machiavellian minds, whose capacities are fueled by political activities, to Humean minds, that

express and recognize a shared sense of common interest, is explained as the consequence of a unique developmental process in humans.

Bogdan adopts the Vygotskian insight on cognitive development as a progressive internalization of social interaction, adding two new elements: interpretation and mental rehearsal. He constructs an argument in which interpretation designs metamentation as causal knowledge that is mentally rehearsed. As the child recognizes the others as sources of causation and strives to interpret their actions, she generalizes causal categories and manipulates them separately. Development itself is for Bogdan a form of evolution, constrained by the pressures of social life. He shows how a relatively simple process like sentimental bonding extends beyond its initial regulatory functions to allow the emergence of protoconversational exchanges and topical predication.

The second part of the book (chapters four to eight) discloses a structural similarity between interpretative and metamental tasks. Bogdan distinguishes a number of metamental routines, from the simplest implicit metathinking that occurs in daydreaming to the full explicit metathoughts employed in the highest reflective processes, where thoughts are represented qua thoughts, while specified in terms of their contents. The progress towards explicit metathinking is unfolded in a sequence of twelve successive emulations of the categories and schemes of interpretation. Mental rehearsal is the main engine of emulation, since by reenacting interpretational tasks it allows the internalization of its functions. To chart the developmental changes that each emulation brings about Bogdan introduces two characters, Mom and Mim. Mom recognizes intentionality: it 'minds other minds' (105). Mim understands the representational nature of minds and is capable of explicit metathinking: it 'minds its mind'. (Bogdan intends to display graphically the transformation of Mom into Mim in a number of figures, but their quality is so poor that to interpret them actually demands an extra effort, so the reader can perfectly ignore them.)

The first category to appear in the advance from situated minding to unsituated metaminding is metaintentionality, when agents recognize that the mental conditions of their conspecifics are purposely related to a target. This is tracked in emulations 1 to 4, with the capacity to engage in gaze recognition and joint gaze given a prominent role. Metaintentional parameters provide the setting for the development of promentality, tracked in emulations 5 to 7, which involves a recognition of the intramental modulation of the intentional conditions displayed by the partners. Shared attention is the main interpretive category in this stage, and Bogdan's innovation is to locate its roots in sentimental bonding: emotions and feelings are mind-revealing conditions by which the others are recognized as agents that share cognitive states.

We do not find unsituated metaminding until metarepresentationality is achieved through emulations 8 to 10. Kids come to understand the representational nature of mental states, become sensitive to their origins, and see them as a function of further mental states. Those familiar with the

literature on 'Theory of Mind' will identify here the conditions in which children pass the crucial 'false belief' tasks. In contrast with the views that emphasize introspection, Bogdan presents the interpretation of others as previous and more basic for metathinking. Explicit metathoughts appear as counterparts of the propositional attitudes employed in interpretive attributions. Emulation of the format of propositional attitudes, however, is not the end of the story: we must explain how it is possible to metathink on different domains, that is, how an initially partitioned mind can be unified. Bogdan claims that interpretation is not totally developed until adolescence, with the increasing competence to reconstruct other people's attitudes in an interpretive narrative. Emulating this reconstruction will allow us to integrate metathoughts in embedded and iterated sequences. Unification concludes when full explicit metathoughts ultimately appear as an emulation of 'the category of an attitude to a content relationally specified, commonly formatted, and integrated across databases and domains' (169). Bogdan's empirical evidence for his thesis comes in the final chapter, where he reviews data from autism. Autistic difficulties with metamentation would be due to deficiencies in interpretive capacity. As this capacity is constituted by an assembly of elements, autism appears as a plural condition, a product of different possible failures.

This book will interest those who want an informed speculation on the origins of metathinking, not on its nature, which is left relatively unexplored. A trouble is that Bogdan often seems too partial in his characterization of metaminding so as to make it fit his interpretational account. The relevant categories through which the emulations proceed are rather idiosyncratic, sometimes forcing the logic of the process to a predetermined path and making it difficult to contrast his view with related positions. In fact, the reader should not expect detailed examination of alternative theses, which are dismissed all too quickly. In addition, autism offers questionable empirical evidence for Bogdan's thesis, since the criteria to assess interpretive and metamental failures are intermingled. These problems notwithstanding, this essay offers a novel approach whose originality lies in the ingenuity to integrate disparate ingredients in an elaborate scenario.

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Kenneth A. Bryson
Persons and Immortality.
Atlanta, GA: Editions Rodopi 1999.
Pp. xiii + 201.
US$38.00. ISBN 90-420-0485-1.

Bryson's book is a weighty one and the rewards of a thorough reading of it are equalled by the challenges it poses. While it might not always be objective or convincing, it tackles age-old questions with new and intriguing possibilities, forcing the reader to contemplate the adequacy and intellectual competence of his or her own opinions. In essence, Bryson's text represents another attempt to resolve the problems of Cartesian dualism. By re-thinking the concept of the person, and arguing for the interdependent existence of all beings in our galaxy, Bryson seeks to show that science and religion are at one. Furthermore, he uses this suggestion as support for the plausibility of both God's existence and human immortality. Moreover, he insists that this is the only intelligible basis for ethics.

During the first fifty pages of the text, Bryson coherently sketches the history of the main philosophical perceptions of the person, along with criticisms of them, thus setting the stage for his re-construction. In short, Bryson's claim, echoing the thought of continental philosophers such as Levinas, Buber and Mounier (along with the more analytical person theory espoused by Macmurray), is that a person is only such by virtue of that with which he or she is in relation. He states that 'It is not human nature that allows us to forge relationships, but the relations that trace the locus of being human' (51). More originally, though, Bryson claims that this essential relationality of humans is evidence of a 'God craving' (62) in the human psyche.

What renders Bryson's attack on Cartesian mind-body dualism particularly engaging is the fact that it includes an argument for immortality. Dualist theories which postulate an immaterial soul, able to exist independently of the material body, can accommodate immortality without too much difficulty. Bryson, however, argues that the disruption to personal identity, engendered by dualism, is too great for the continued existence of the soul to be the same person at all. He states that 'While no serious objection is presented by the loss of a limb, the critical issue is not the quantitative determination of body parts, but the principle of embodiment' (30). Embodiment is as much a fundamental characteristic of being human as relationality; hence, both these properties must be maintained in the after-life.

By drawing heavily on Heidegger's account of 'Being's unconcealment', Bryson turns the materialist's reduction of mind to matter upside down, proposing the reduction of matter to mind. That is, he argues that the body is the 'intrinsic limitation of mind' (91) through which human activities are carried out in this life. At death, then, being's unconcealment ceases, but that is not to say that being itself is negated. On the contrary, enlisting the help of quantum physics, Bryson suggests that being endures in an alternative

form appropriate to its new environment, just as an electron can be defined as either a wave or a particle, depending on the environment in which it exists. At this point, the reader might begin to doubt the efficacy of Bryson's approach. While Bryson seems to assume that his use of quantum mechanics will bolster his thesis, he is unable to offer satisfactory reasons for believing that the immortality of the person is akin to the categorisation of electrons. Furthermore, dazzled by the complexities of the Big Bang, Bryson makes a Capra-esque leap of faith towards near certainty in the existence of a creator, namely God.

Nevertheless, this allows Bryson to re-write Natural Law theory and to firmly ground his ethics. He claims that, having been made in the likeness of God, humans are beings toward good. In addition, however, it is a necessary characteristic of their finitude that they are also beings toward evil. He states that 'In the proposed model, the person develops moral posture by entering into a systems process of relationships' (131). To perform an evil act is to dis-empower another person, while a good act is one which empowers him or her. In this sense, then, Bryson's natural law is a relational account of 'a dynamic person-making process' (73), which explains the existence of evil in a Hickian manner.

This aspect of Bryson's theory paradoxically contains both its most appealing strength and its most ill-conceived weakness. An ethical system based on the conception of the human person as a being in relation contains a universal and transcultural principle, while it also allows for diverse moral laws in respect of specific circumstances of the relational experience. Nevertheless, Bryson's explanation of immoral action turns into an over zealous attack on what he perceives to be the heinous 'technocratic mentality' (127) of contemporary Western society. While there is indeed a valid point to be made here, regarding the appropriate use of technology, Bryson turns technology into the enemy of the person-making process, failing to give adequate account of the sense in which technology works for the good or the occasions when Nature is destructive. Despite this disappointment, there is much to recommend this text to philosophers and theologians alike; only repeated readings of the text can fully do it justice.

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John D. Caputo and
Michael J. Scanlon, eds.
God, the Gift and Postmodernism.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1999.
US$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-333572-8);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-21328-2).

Merold Westphal, ed.
Postmodern Philosophy and Christian Thought.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1999.
US$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-33592-2);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-21336-3).

Published in the 'Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion', both volumes are conference proceedings with some common contributors and overlapping in topics. Preceded by very fine editors' introductions that lend coherence to the diversity of each volume, both seek to find common ground between postmodern philosophy, between thinking that is relativistic, radically other, and atheistic, and Christian thought that is logocentric, totalizing, and theistic. Or, as John Caputo and Michael Scanlon would have it, reflecting on the featured dialogue between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion 'On the gift', to restore the 'good name of the impossible'. A name lost in the 'mortal opposition' between reason and religion — in modernity's effort to think a foundation for the possible. Yet if postmodernity makes room for the voice of religious imagination — for the impossible — is not postmodern philosophy, asks Merold Westphal, at least in its secular discourses in 'moral combat' with Christianity?

The Westphal volume originates in a conference at Calvin College in 1997, preceded the previous year by an extended seminar on the same topic, and includes thirteen contributions, primarily by philosophers, arranged under three headings: 'placing postmodernism' (W. Jay Wood, Lee Hardy, Brian Ingraffia, Gary Percesepe), 'theological issues' (Garret Green, Walter Lowe, Jean-Luc Marion, George Connell, Steven Bouma-Prediger, John Caputo), and 'ethical and social issues' (Edith Wyschogrod, Norman Wirzba, Andrew Dell'Olio). The stated theme of both the seminar, and conference to which John Caputo, Walter Lowe, Jean-Luc Marion, and Edith Wyschogrod were also invited as contributors, was the possibility and desirability of appropriating secular, postmodern insights in Christian thought and life: the question of a certain kind of recontextualization.

The Caputo and Scanlon volume originates in a conference entitled 'Religion and Postmodernism', at Villanova University in 1997, where philosophers and theologians in dialogue with Jacques Derrida discussed religion at the end of the millennium. Prominent are Jean-Luc Marion's paper 'On the name: how to avoid speaking of negative theology' and Derrida's reply, the extensive discussion between these two 'On the gift', and John Caputo's 'Apostles of the impossible: On God and the gift in Derrida and

Marion' which lend the volume its title. Of the other eight contributions by John Dominic Crossan, Richard Kearney, Françoise Meltzer, Michael Scanlon, Edith Wyschogrod, Derrida's replies to Robert Dodaro, David Tracy, and Merold Westphal are also included.

Postmodernism as a social-cultural phenomenon as well as in its philosophical expressions would indeed seem to have little in common with, if not being outright antagonistic to, Christian thought, theology, and faith. Hence, the question of a Christian 'appropriation' of postmodern philosophy — the thinking of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, and Foucault that radically questions the assumptions of philosophical modernity — is an attempt to discern whether these philosophers are more hospitable to Christian thought than was the hegemony of reason characteristic of modernist philosophical thinking. Thus, Westphal in his 'Introduction' is clear enough: 'the kind of appropriation I have in mind is a challenge to religious traditions and institutions that see nothing but nasty nihilism in these disturbers of peace... ' (2). Remarkably, the contributors to this volume range from those with a deep sympathy for postmodern thought so as to find appropriation almost unnecessary, to those whose antipathy to postmodern thinking, both as philosophers and as Christians, makes any appropriation very unlikely. For the latter, whose contributions appear under the 'placing postmodernity' in the Westphal volume, postmodern texts can be readily assimilated to a 'virtue epistemology' (W. Jay Wood and Gary Percesepe), absorbed in a realist framework (Lee Hardy) or, from a literary perspective of the postmodern novel, offer but a parody of Christian spirituality (Brian Ingraffia).

The two volumes converge on the question of what a postmodern Christian theology would be like: what philosophical themes might be appropriated in theological discourses about God. The major 'postmodern' figures engaged are Derrida and to a lessor extent Heidegger. Under the heading 'theological issues' in the Westphal volume, Garret Green insightfully explores the conceptual similarities between the dialectics of Karl Barth's theology and Derrida's critique of the metaphysics of presence and the transcendental signified; Walter Lowe warns against certain romantic, totalizing, tendencies in postmodern theology which he claims can benefit from Derrida's deconstruction; and Jean-Luc Marion critically reads Derrida's aporetic character of the economy of the 'gift' and in its place provides a phenomenological analysis of 'genuine giving' — the gift that gives itself — in an understanding central to theology. The exchange between Marion and Derrida in the Caputo and Scanlon volume serves to fill out this and Walter Lowe's contribution, especially in Derrida's careful elaboration of the 'gift without giveness'.

Of the possibility of natural theology, George Connell asks whether Heidegger's rejection of natural theology and affirmation of faith as the proper basis of religion owes more to Kierkegaard and Barth than to Nietzsche. Heidegger's prioritization of the question of Being over the question of God nevertheless leaves open possibilities of appropriation for Christian discourses and not just natural theology. Connell's conclusion is echoed by Merold Westphal in his 'Overcoming ontotheology' in the Caputo and

Scanlon volume. However, no such appropriation is possible with regard to the 'homelessness' of postmodern culture, argues Steve Bouma-Prediger, as the constructed character of its meanings and truth, its nomadic sense of self, and its ecological degration, can find its ethics and eschatological hope only in creation as the good gift of a loving God. In contrast, John Caputo's incisive comparison of Heidegger's and Derrida's reading of the St. Augustine's 'Confessions', of faith as struggle and faith as suffering, finds in Derrida's suffering an ethics of compassion exemplary for Christian thought, a thesis that nicely dovetails Robert Dodaro's beautiful comparison of Derrida's reading of Augustine, in 'Circumfession', in the Caputo and Scanlon volume.

The three contributions to the final section, 'ethical and social issues', assume that postmodern philosophy either opens up new possibilities or recovers old sources in undermining a modernist ethical theory. Edith Wyschogrod pits Heidegger's ontological discourse, as the most recent of Greek thinking, against Levinas' ethical discourses stemming from Hebrew sources in a manner that reveals both the tension and inseparability of self and other. Immanuel Levinas also informs Norman Wirzba's analysis of Heidegger's early writings on 'care', which are wanting from the perspective of Wirzba's proposed Christian conception of 'reason-for-the-other', reason before the other as love of neighbor. This whole issue of the embeddedness of reason as reason-for-the-other comes to the fore in Andrew Dell'Olio's seemingly larger effort formulating a postmodern Christian philosophy of other religions. Eschewing exclusivism in a hermeneutics of suspicion and pluralism in a hermeneutics of finitude, he argues for a Christian inclusivism that adheres to divine truth that would not withhold others' claim to revelation and, therefore, would not hold its practices and dogma to be originary.

The 'impossible' of the Caputo and Scanlon volume is the beginning of a possible reciprocity, of a mutual appropriation, between postmodernism and religion. Broader than Christian thought, questions of religion here converge with those traditions that have crossed beyond the metaphysics of presence, and ontotheology. The engaging debate 'On the gift' between Jean-Luc Marion and Jacques Derrida that highlights the second volume is an apology by what Caputo refers to as the 'apostles of the impossible'. The impossible of dream, desire, and faith declared to be outside the limits of experience and reason is of something radically other that pushes beyond the horizons of possibility. The implicit claim is that postmodern discourses, those discourses that are enlightened about the Enlightenment, are hospitable to paradoxes of the impossible not in reason, not intellectually, but in desire and deed. Secular deconstructionists can expect to find here in the deferral of presence, in the 'text', not a denial of God so much as a critique of all idols of presence. For it is idolatry to think that the present can embody the radical other in history — an impossibility.

Derrida and Marion in their discussion of the 'gift' push the limits of phenomenology in different ways. For Derrida there are signifiers without fulfilling intuition and whose 'giveness' is impossible, always yet to be given in an advent of deferred presence, of faith and desire. For Marion there is

saturated giveness, 'donative excess', that precludes, impossibly, any intentional containment, beyond any categorial conditions, and so leaves us in silence, in praise, in song, in prayer. This radicalization of phenomenology, of giveness, is also the topic of Marion's provocative contribution 'In the name: how to avoid speaking of "negative theology"' wherein he interprets the hyperousios of mystical theology, and to which Derrida replies. But negative theology, as Derrida would have it, still clings to a hyperessentialism — an affirmation of God beyond God — and différance is not God. Marion resists this apophantic interpretation of the hyperousios, preferring mystical theology over negative theology in a pragmatic of pure reference, a naming that 'de-nominates'. If Marion attempts to rescue mystical theology from Derrida's charge of hyperessentialism by invoking a 'saturated giveness' that is beyond the limit of presence, Derrida rejoins that the pragmatic is included in his characterization of negative theology as a multiplicity of voices, so that his critique of mystical theology protects the name of God from any attack. As the editors ask in their 'Introduction', is Marion's excess of presence not merely a more refined notion of hyperessentialism in terms of giveness since presence need not be understood conceptually? Or, from the other side, is Derrida's attack on mystical theology really a way of protecting the name of God from attack so that everyone, and not just Christians, can assent? Caputo's sensitive reading of the Derrida-Marion exchange, argues for a more generous interpretation of Derrida's paradox of the gift as a departure for the leap of the gift; nevertheless, what perhaps divides them is the messianic to come versus the Messiah who has been and is yet to come. Michael Scanlon favorably compares Derrida's Messianic religion without religion and the historically instantiated messianisms of religion to theologican Karl Rahner's apriori revelation, of Spirit, and apostiori realization of Spirit in world religions. The undecidability of Augustine's 'God is love' and 'love (of neighbor) is God' underlies both Rahner's appreciation of the ethical commitment of atheism and Derrida's deconstruction of the distinction between atheism and theism.

If there is in both these volumes an unease about 'postmodernity', there is also an appreciation that traditional philosophical discourse, or natural theology, has too long been dominated by ontotheology. As Robert Dodaro argues in his remarkable study of Derrida's Augustinian orthodoxy, 'For what have you that you have not received' (*I Cor.* 4:7), self-discovery through confession deconstructs into a self-doubt that has much in common with Derrida's religion without religion and without religion's God'. Richard Kearney engages Derrida's critique of ontotheological desire as idolatry, or Messianism of positive religion, in an argument juxtaposing Derrida's messianic desire of every other (impossible God) and Immanuel Levinas' eschatological desire, his ethics of alterity, of the absolute other, who first desires us. What concerns Kearney is not Derrida's desire beyond knowing and having however, but Derrida's possible 'desertification' of such desire beyond traditions. In his conversation with Martin Heidegger, Merold Westphal appropriates the latter's critique of ontotheology in service of the praxis of

the believer: theology is not about the what — to justify our philosophical and theological projects — but about the how we speak of God. Not in nominating but in de-nominating God, Westphal echoes Marion's pragmatic of praise.

No such praise is found in Mark Taylor's fascinating 'Betting on Las Vegas' which pushes the limits of deconstruction to where the virtual becomes real and the real virtual. Taking Vegas, in particular the black glass pyramid that is the Luxor hotel, as the cultural expression of Baudrillard's unconstrained simulacrum of the death of God staged as the kingdom of God on earth without foundation or sacrifice — 'nothing' — just image/idol, Taylor's virtual reality has neither reality nor appearance. Idolatry is also Edith Wyschogrod's topic as she explores the 'idols' in Schoenberg's opera 'Moses and Aaron', Aaron's golden calf, smashed, but also Moses' ideality of the written law and invisible God, tablets now rewritten, as both conjuring up the divine and so raising Derrida's question, and Taylor's, of the original (Word) and its images.

David Tracy 'destabilizes' the modern-postmodern distinction arguing that the putative postmodern 'fragment' is our spiritual tradition — theologically as the authentic bearer of infinity and redemption — in a retrieval of Bruno, Cusa, and Pascal. If in reply Derrida argues that there are only modernities and postmodernities, Tracy aligns himself with the poetry of T.S. Eliot, the apophatics of negative theology, and above all with those who like Walter Benjamin and Simone Weil deem fragments to be of suffering and hope thereby countering modern totalities.

The critique of ontotheology reflects, in the postmodern discourses of Foucault and Kristeva, a nostalgia for the incarnate subject of early Christianity. Françoise Meltzer reminds us of the difference between the speculative seeing of Aquinas with the touch of the doubting Thomas, and the 'thinking body', that reaches its apogee in the virgin martyr whose sacrifice is the unity of body and soul in the gift of wholeness, and of love, for which postmodernity yearns. If Taylor's Vegas and Meltzer's virgin martyr are extremes tropes of postmodernity, John Crossan's final contribution to the Caputo and Scanlon volume argues that the search for the historical Jesus is an ethically unique event, and theologically necessary to Christian faith. Contrasting Catholic Christianity with Gnosticism, Crossan's dialectic of faith and history demands that the Gospels stories also historically show, and not merely tell, Jesus as the risen Jesus. But then do enlightened texts also not assert that history demands faith?

The questions both these volumes raise is whether postmodern thought is indeed more hospitable to faith than modern philosophy's reign of reason. Is 'l'invention de autre' wherein everything philosophically interesting begins in the impossible and embraces a wholeness of spirit, philosophy or is it a religious expression, a paradoxical religious repetition, of a distressing secularity that refuses to withdraw from the objectification of reason? Is the deferral of presence a 'messianic' desire that always reaches beyond its historical idols of metaphysics, ontotheology, or of science? Is the impossibil-

ity of 'giveness' of the unnameable and invisible radically other, or of 'every other' an excess beyond intention, a gifting, or an impossibility of faith, of hope, of grace, allowing what we know we cannot do. Is either of these the God with us whose 'self-gifting' is our passion? Does the giveness of faith reside within or outside the question of being; can there be a theology of the de-nominating one that would allow a recontextualization of postmodern thought, an appropriation of postmodern philosophy?

Both volumes bring philosophy back into dialogue with theology. If theologians are guarded about postmodern thinking, something they share to be sure with many philosophers, both they and philosophers will find here an opening for a renewed thinking about matters of faith beyond the pale of reason. That Derrida should find a prominent place in this dialogue is hardly a surprise to those familiar with his more recent writings, and especially the Caputo and Scanlon volume grants the sceptical reader an insightful glance at this thinker of 'religion without religion'. That echoes of Augustine, Kierkegaard, and Levinas are everywhere evident is also unremarkable even as what is, is that the contributions to both these volumes find their space within the context of the history of theology and philosophy. Philosophy often forgets its history, even as postmodern thinking seems burdened by it. Theology reminds us that philosophy is its history enlightened, and some postmodern philosophical discourses do seem unburdened by the unnameable and invisible of God without being. Perhaps, these are mindful of Kierkegaard's 'without religion no generation can endure'. All this is far from the Stoic ideal of self-command.

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Joseph H. Carens
Culture, Citizenship, and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 2000. Pp. xii + 284.
Cdn$116.00: US$40.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-829751-3);
Cdn$39.95: US$14.99
(paper: ISBN 0-19-829768-8).

No liberal democratic state can be entirely neutral with regard to culture. This becomes especially obvious when we consider, for example, the practical imperative that states settle on official languages. Depending upon which languages are chosen, some groups (especially immigrants and linguistic minorities) may be at a considerable disadvantage when participating in politics, or negotiating civil bureaucracies. The choice of an official language, even where it is determined by an overwhelming majority of native speakers, is never culturally neutral in its effects. States further privilege particular cultures through political symbols, public holidays, immigration and naturalization policies, and so on.

This simple — yet often overlooked — observation is the starting point for Carens' illuminating exploration of the interaction between liberal institutions and cultural difference. He shows how careful reflection on the ways that policies and institutions are inflected by (and in turn inflect) culture can help liberals to arrive at greater justice for all members of a political community. As states inescapably privilege certain cultures over others, we cannot achieve justice exclusively through a policy of cultural neutrality. Therefore, Carens proposes a companion conception of justice as evenhandedness. Evenhandedness requires 'a sensitive balancing of competing claims for recognition and support in matters of culture and identity' (12). Rather than abstracting from cultural difference to determine what justice requires in general, an evenhanded approach attends to the cultural and historical contexts of each particular conflict.

Evenhandedness also helps us judge the suitability of particular institutions and policies for particular contexts. A commitment to liberal principles alone does not entail a commitment to any particular set of institutions or policies. Thus, when we examine actual liberal democracies, we find varying institutions and practices that fall within the range of the morally permissible. Liberal theory can help us evaluate whether specific policies or institutions lie within this range, but on its own it cannot establish which are most fitting for a particular community. An evenhanded attention to context is crucial to help us decide among options consistent with liberal values.

Furthermore, Carens argues that, because an evenhanded approach requires examination of actual political cases, it forces the theorist to acknowledge and address the messiness of everyday life. When theorists rely on

abstract cases, they often construct them so as to guarantee or bolster a particular theoretical outcome. To avoid oversimplification, Carens makes a point of examining actual cases and live political issues throughout the book. I cannot do justice here to the impressively wide range of topics he covers. Suffice it to say that he nudges the ongoing debates about culture in the U.S. and Canada onto unfamiliar territory by considering cultural politics in Fiji in his final chapter.

In the last few chapters of the book, Carens addresses (among other issues) the messiness of political membership. He dismisses the conventional understanding of citizenship: that each of us belongs to a single state, which has a uniform concept of citizenship, and which commands our undivided patriotism (161, 166). In its place, he offers an account of the multiplicity of memberships that we experience and observe in actual liberal democracies. He importantly reminds us that one can legally belong to many communities: dual citizenships are increasingly common, and regional memberships often have more salience than state citizenship. Accordingly, one can feel psychological membership in multiple communities at once: an immigrant may be attached to both her homeland and her host country; a Quebecois may be attached to both Quebec and Canada. Furthermore, citizens may differ in the quality of their attachment to a community: some Canadians may be attached to the Charter, others to a conception of dual nations, others to distinct societies, and still others may feel no attachment to Canada at all. Finally, within the life of a single individual, legal, psychological, and political memberships can vary significantly over time; we cannot assume that a patriot today will be a patriot in ten years' time. All of these observations derive from empirical observation, and not from theoretical principles. An evenhanded approach shows that theorists must attend to this multiplicity of memberships.

With this in mind, it is odd that in these same final chapters, Carens calls for 'a sense of common citizenship' (173) and 'a mutuality of understanding, trust, and concern among the citizenry' (194) of Canada. What citizenship is it that Canadian citizens can sense as common, if citizens may have radically different psychological attachments to a community, and to different communities? What would mutuality mean, if they may have radically different understandings of the scope and purpose of that community? Even if it were possible to achieve some kind of convergence of attachment, in which mutuality were founded in part upon citizens' disagreements about the community (as in Charles Taylor's 'deep diversity'), Carens' book reminds us that such a convergence would be fragile and susceptible to change. The aspiration for commonality and mutuality seems futile from an evenhanded perspective.

Moreover, Carens is quick to remind us of the limits which liberal principles place upon our ability to create such commonality. They delegitimate, for example, the use of force or expulsion to create community. Freedom of conscience dictates that liberal states cannot coerce citizens to think and believe in a particular way. Carens even suggests that disaffected and unattached citizens command more sympathy and respect than patriotic

ones (168-9). This means that liberals may have to suffice with a good deal less of a 'sense of common membership' than we might like.

In expressing a persistent desire for mutuality at the same time as he attends to the deep complexity of achieving community, Carens highlights an important tension facing contemporary liberal theory. How are we to create bonds of trust and mutuality in conditions of deep diversity? His work suggests that we cannot achieve a sense of commonality in a neat and permanent way. We must look, therefore, for ways of creating imperfect moments of trust and understanding. We need a new political language to articulate the kinds of commonality which may at once do justice to our desire for mutuality and to our awareness of complexity. Evenhandedness, by discouraging theoretical simplification and encouraging attention to contextual detail, is a significant and useful beginning.

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G.A. Cohen
If You're an Egalitarian,
How Come You're So Rich?
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
2000. Pp. 256.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-674-00218-0.

In *If you're an egalitarian, how come you're so rich?*, Gerry Cohen provides both a summing up of the work that he has been doing over the course of the past quarter-century, and with some signposts indicating the direction which his thought has latterly been taking. In the lectures which make up the book (these were originally Cohen's 1996 Gifford Lectures) Cohen offers an account of the reasons that have moved him to abandon the Marxism which he imbibed literally with his mother's milk (and which he has expounded with remarkable rigour and clarity in such classic works as *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense*). He also indicates the grounds that have led him to reject the egalitarian liberalism of contemporary thinkers such as John Rawls, and provides arguments for the claim that egalitarianism must be as much a *personal* philosophy as a theory of just social *institutions*.

It would be difficult to overpraise this wonderful book. It is profound, humane, witty, erudite, and often deeply personal. Though presented as something of an intellectual memoir, Cohen provides us with more food for

thought than has been available in any book on egalitarian political philosophy in recent memory. I can only hope to provide the briefest sketch of the argument that the reader will discover in its pages.

After an initial section in which Cohen describes his own Communist upbringing, and reflects upon the worrying situatedness of philosophical conviction (would Cohen have expended as much intellectual energy in defending Marxism had he not been brought up the way he was?), Cohen provides a succinct and in my view unassailable critique of Marxism's scientific and 'anti-philosophical' bent. Marxists believe that there is no reason in a capitalist society to produce moral arguments in favour of equality, because capitalism inevitably generates the conditions of its own demise, by producing an immiserated and exploited proletarian class which will inevitably rise up to break its shackles and lay the foundations of an egalitarian society. This inevitabilist thesis is in Cohen's view deeply mistaken, and for this reason Marxism must be rejected. As Cohen notes, the class of the truly immiserated and that of the exploited working class no longer have the same extension. And so irreducibly *moral* argument is required in order to convince those that were on the Marxist view supposed to be the engines of social revolution that they must care for the immiserated, and act so as to alleviate their misery.

Cohen does not believe that Rawlsian liberalism provides the egalitarian moral impulse with a more adequate theoretical articulation. For Rawls, inequalities are justified to the extent that the incentives which higher incomes provide are required to improve the situation of all members of society, including the less well-off. Cohen's critique of Rawls proceeds in two steps: first, he shows that a tension threatens Rawls' conception of a well-ordered society. Indeed, Rawls believes that a well-ordered society is one in which all citizens *affirm* the same view of justice. But Cohen asks, why would anyone who truly affirmed an egalitarian ethos require the motivation which extra income provides in order to generate riches which might then be put to use to improve the situation of the less well-off? It would seem that it is only on pain of contradiction that Rawls can continue to uphold that well-orderedness and inequality are compatible.

Second, Cohen shows that there is a problem with claiming that, by limiting the purview of egalitarian principles to the basic structure of society, we are thereby immunizing individual choices from the reach of these principles. For (depending on which of Rawls' characterizations we follow), either the phrase 'basic structure' only denotes society's main coercive institutions, or more expansively, it refers to all social institutions which have an important impact on what people can reasonably expect out of life. If we choose the former reading, we have immunized individual choice from the reach of principle, but at the price of an implausible narrow conception of the basic structure. But if we choose the latter, we are forced to recognize that some of the institutions within the basic structure (e.g., the family) are *constituted* by individual choices. And so, on this more plausible conception of the basic structure, the restriction of egalitarian norms to the basic

structure does not immunize individual choices as Rawls seems to claim that it does.

The book ends with a chapter in which Cohen canvasses a host of arguments which might be provided to justify well-off individuals in less than just societies not transferring resources to the less well-off. While Cohen rejects most extant arguments to this effect, he holds open the possibility that such arguments might exist, arguments which might for example indicate how rich egalitarians might best be able to advocate and organize in favour of egalitarianism if they are allowed to hold on to some of their extra resources.

As this briefest of sketches makes plain, this is an enormously thought-provoking and rewarding book. Of course, it is in the nature of thought-provoking books that the thoughts that they provoke are not always of the agreeing kind. Let me briefly indicate two questions that lingered in my mind after having read this admirably clear and rigorous book.

First, Cohen must surely realize that one avenue that has historically been open to non-Rawlsian liberal egalitarians who believe that egalitarian norms must in the first instance bear upon the question of institutional design rather than individual choice consists in dropping the Rawlsian requirement of well-orderedness. Many liberals have recognized that one of the reasons that institutions are required to constrain individual choice is that individuals are truly conflicted about social justice. Roughly speaking, they want to want to help, but they often find themselves wanting not to help. Institutions which make it easier for people to act on the basis of what they want to want, rather than on the basis of what they often in all-too-human fashion want, or conversely, which make it more costly for them to act on their non-altruistic motives, are a way out of this predicament, as Madisonian constitutionalists and institutional designers have realized. Thus, by dropping Rawls' requirement of well-orderedness from our picture of the just society, we might be able to resist Cohen's very ambitious claim that only a society in which people *choose* justly can hope to be truly just.

Second, Cohen in the book's final chapter gives excessively short shrift to the coordinating function of the state in an even ideally just society. The lack of institutional specificity and concreteness which sometimes plagues Cohen's argument often makes it seem as if all that egalitarians have to do in order to do their bit to bring the good society closer to realization is to transfer resources to the less well-off. But this is not the case: the poor do not just need money (though they need that as well). They need education, hospitals, decent housing, etc. And for this, teachers must be trained, hospitals built and staffed, decent low-cost housing provided, etc. It would be a miracle if individual altruistic choices spontaneously coordinated so as to provide these goods.

Thus, once one brings a bit more empirical reality into the picture, one realizes that there may be more to the traditional liberal, institution-centered approach to egalitarianism than Cohen is willing to recognize.

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Deane Curtin and **Robert Litke, eds.**
Institutional Violence.
Atlanta, GA: Editions Rodopi 1999.
Pp. xv + 413.
US$110.00 (cloth: ISBN 90-420-0508-4);
US$36.00 (paper: ISBN 90-420-0498-3).

Concerned Philosophers for Peace have issued a comprehensive collection with twenty-seven essays, focusing on institutional violence and covering a broad range of themes, such as buddhist and marxist critiques of violence, women in prison, 'firearm' feminists, and analyses of oppression. The volume's seven sections deal with international issues, cultural violence, environmental concerns, feminist analyses, racism, the military, and end with a hopeful section on how to think nonviolently.

Amy Ihlan's article on firearm feminists is particularly intriguing in a volume that is devoted to an ethic of peace, since she argues that pacifist feminists have to learn important lessons from firearm wielding feminists, who most recently engaged in a counter-demonstration at the Washington, D.C. Million Mom March. This is an encouraging approach given the essentialist tendency in feminist peace theory and in popular discourse that women are naturally more pacifist. Such attitude is displayed in Stephanie Gutmann's book, *The Kinder, Gentler Military: Can America's Gender-Neutral Fighting Force Still Win Wars?*. Gutmann argues that the military ought to remain a male prerogative given that women are prone to argue things out and not to follow orders blindly. Ihlan notes, on the other hand, that '[o]wning a gun and being willing to use it appears necessary for self-protection, ... and for independence from male protectors' (188). The military may serve as a training ground for such purpose. Ihlan suggests that pacifist feminists need to come up with better strategies of empowerment in order to persuade firearm feminists to give up their guns, but does not clarify what an alternative model would propose other than the idea that violence is not a moral choice.

Newton Garver's taxonomy of violence serves as a starting point for the editors as well as several contributors. Garver classifies personal versus institutional violence and covert versus overt forms of violence. Violence in its systemic and covert manifestations presents clear challenges to moral philosophers. As Robert Ginsberg asks, who is to blame when there are no visible culprits but genocide has occurred? Ron Hirschbein puns on Arendt's dictum by pointing us to the evil of banality in the case of a dehumanized public which lacks a sense of outrage in the face of military aggression mediated and celebrated on network television.

Other contributors rely on Iris Marion Young's classic description of the five faces of oppression. Sally Scholz's article sheds light on structural oppression. Robert Litke discusses Young's cultural imperialism in his article on fundamentalist violence, defining a 'ghettoized' retreat into one's own cultural terrain as 'reverse cultural imperialism' (108). The U.S. Moral

Majority exemplifies such 'reverse cultural imperialism,' thus Litke paints it as a lunatic fringe movement which is not taken seriously by politicians. Litke's claim seems odd given that the U.S. Congress passed by wide margin the heterosexist Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1995.

One reason why oppression is so difficult to make sense of is that there tends not to be a particular oppressive group which intentionally oppresses. Scholz claims that systematic oppression works so that those who benefit from it may not realize how they are privileged and how others are marginalized. She points out how structural oppression is at work in the dichotomy of the public and private sphere. Yet Scholz's argument about the arbitrariness of the public/private division could be strengthened if she were to consider citizenship issues. Postcolonial theorists, such as Chandra Mohanty, have criticized Western feminists for failing to realize to what extent immigration regulations are played out in the so-called private sphere against poor immigrant women.

A number of articles focus on moral individual efforts to combat violence, even systemic violence. The papers by Judith Presler and Laura Kaplan use character-based ethical and deontological theories respectively as a way to resist the practice of devaluing others and justifying their exclusion from the human community. Kaplan maintains that 'self-esteem [of the racist] rests on the devaluation of others as a factor that legitimizes institutional violence in the eyes of its perpetrators' (201).

Michael Allen Fox's article on ecofeminism addresses the problem of systematic nature of group-based privilege in order to suggest why dismantling institutional violence is so difficult to achieve and not simply attainable by a rational appeal to moral fortification or 'cultivation of one's garden,' as virtue ethicist Judith Presler argues. Glen Martin's article on Buddhism accommodates both approaches (of systemic analysis and individual moral intervention) by suggesting that 'compassion without critical theory is blind; critical theory without compassion is empty' (377). Martin emphasizes the need of a Habermasian critique of the institutions as structures of domination. Several contributors, however, follow Presler's advocacy for a personalized approach to putatively dismantle repressive institutions rather than proposing collective non-violent strategies. While this book does not follow the majority of textbooks on social ethics which focus on applied ethical issues pertaining to an individual, it could have benefited from a more coherent ideological approach, e.g., by focusing on the interlocking systems of oppression. Nevertheless, this book serves as a useful guide for ethicists who tackle the problem of systemic violence.

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Miranda Fricker and
Jennifer Hornsby, eds.
The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2000.
Pp. xiii + 280.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-62451-7);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-62469-X).

Miranda Fricker and Jennifer Hornsby have a winner. Here, at last, is a book one can confidently recommend to one's colleagues (feminist or otherwise) who wonder about the relevance of feminism to Anglo-American analytic philosophy. A short Introduction and thirteen essays chart the development and summarize the current state of feminist thinking in various branches of philosophy. The volume also advances discussion on a number of specific philosophical questions; sets challenging research agenda; and, in general, demonstrates why feminism *in* philosophy is good for philosophy.

Fricker and Hornsby say, 'we wish neither to advocate an understanding of feminist philosophy as a separate and distinctive branch of philosophy, nor to argue for the ability of feminist philosophy to replace philosophy' (1). Rather their aim is to make clear 'the intellectual value of taking feminism to be a radicalizing energy internal to philosophical inquiry' (4).

Philosophy may be credited with the task of articulating a satisfying understanding of ourselves and our place in the world. That is a tall order and arguably an uncompleteable one, since the satisfactoriness of any such understanding depends in large part on the contingent cultural and intellectual climate in which inquiry is pursued. Trivially, philosophy is an activity carried out by spatio-temporally located human persons whose assumptions, intuitions, interests, and aspirations inflect the questions they ask, the methodologies they deploy, and the theories they construct. Given philosophy's task, philosophers must *by their own lights* pay attention to the effects of their social locatedness. Hence, the questions of what difference gender makes — to conceptions of what it is to know, what it is to be a moral agent, what it is to be the same person over time — are questions that arise *within* philosophy itself. It is an historically explicable (but not essential) fact that it took the increased participation of women in the philosophical enterprise for such queries to be honestly confronted.

To *investigate* the relevance of gender to epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind and language, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy is precisely not to assume *a priori* that gender does make a difference or makes a difference in particular ways. One is, of course, motivated to pursue the inquiry by the suspicion that gender may be relevant. After all, philosophy has largely been the province of men, some of whom thought and wrote some staggeringly stupid things about women (and many other things!). But the proof must be in the pudding. Particular philosophical theories, explanations, and arguments must be evaluated for completeness, validity, consis-

tency, soundness, and so on. Above all, they must be assessed in terms of how well they do as philosophy; that is, the extent to which they contribute to the task of rendering human existence and practices intelligible to actual human beings. Such evaluation and assessment is the project of the essays here.

The richness of the papers resists easy summary. Here is a list of topics and contributors: ancient philosophy (Sabina Lovibond); philosophy of mind (Susan James, Naomi Scheman); philosophy of language (Jennifer Hornsby); metaphysics (Sally Haslanger); epistemology (Rae Langton, Miranda Fricker); philosophy of science (Alison Wylie); political philosophy (Diemut Bubek); ethics (Marilyn Friedman, Alison Jaggar); history of philosophy (Genevieve Lloyd), and feminism and psychoanalysis (Sarah Richmond).

Feminist work in philosophy of mind and language is likely to be less familiar, so I shall limit my (brief) detailed remarks to the contributions by Naomi Scheman and Jennifer Hornsby. Moreover, for better or worse, questions about mind and language are at the heart of Anglo-American analytic philosophy. So failure to make a case for the value of feminist inquiry in these domains would only fuel the concern that feminism has no particular contribution to make to philosophy, at least within the current dominant tradition that the editors appear to endorse.

Scheman's target is physicalism in the philosophy of mind. As she notes, physicalism comes in 'dizzyingly many varieties,' all of which may be characterized by the 'demand for the mental to be composed of, or determined by, the physical ... in some way that attributes to mental phenomena not only continuity with the physical but also the sort of reality that the physical is presumed to have, including independence from our practices of noticing and naming' (52). Scheman holds that psychological (intentional) explanations operate at the level where we engage with other as socially located persons, enjoying partially overlapping vocabularies and conceptions of the world. But unlike many others who hold this view, Scheman rejects the very possibility of any account that identifies mental states, processes or events with physical states, processes, or events, or that, like Kim's, endorse strong supervenience of the mental on the physical. She is happy to endorse global supervenience (of the sort advanced elsewhere by Hornsby and others), but she argues 'beliefs, desires, emotions, and other phenomena of our mental lives are the particulars that they are because they are socially meaningful, and when they figure as those particulars in causal accounts, neither those accounts nor the phenomena that figure in them survive abstraction from social context' (52). The commonsense psychological explanation that figures in our practices of making us intelligible to ourselves and to each other does not require — indeed, cannot support — a psychological ontology 'whose objects' individuation is independent of the social and the normative' (59).

Hornsby is also concerned to emphasize our social embeddedness. In particular, she very nicely brings out the irony implicit in the apparently asocial treatment of language offered by what she calls the 'malestream' (87): 'when modality, say, or relative identity, or reference is the topic, the subject matter is apparently far removed from any social setting, ... [thus] it becomes

very easy to forget that language is part of the fabric of human lives' (88). Human languages are not objects to be studied independently of the embodied minds between which they make communication possible. Drawing on Austin, and neatly disposing of Grice, Hornsby develops an account of '*saying something to someone*' (88), according to which saying something to someone is a particular sort of action — a communicative act. Hornsby shows how this conception constrains semantic theory and any account of what it is for a speaker-hearer to know a theory of meaning for her language. For it brings into simultaneous focus what a sentence means and what a speaker may effect by uttering a particular sentence.

The approaches to philosophy of mind and language explored by Scheman and Hornsby are not unique to feminists. Scheman notes her affinity with the work of Ian Hacking and John Dupre. And Hornsby's claim that knowledge of meaning cannot be attributed to someone who lacks communicative abilities would be thoroughly congenial to Michael Dummett. So, what one learns about feminism's contributions to these fields is not that feminism makes possible ways of thinking that are otherwise not available, but rather that there are independent arguments — at least, initially differently motivated arguments — that lend support to approaches previously but perhaps not fully articulated in the history of analytic philosophy.

In addition, though, when feminists do philosophy of mind and philosophy of language in these ways, they have been apt to see applications that might not occur to a theorist not engaged in the general feminist project of identifying and addressing various forms of oppression. Thus, feminists will interrogate 'commonsense' more closely, asking why a particular psychological explanation succeeds or fails in making some action or practice intelligible. Similarly, when one construes speech as action, one becomes attuned to the deeply problematic things we do with words. (See, for example, Hornsby and Langton's work on hate speech and pornography cited in the notes to their respective papers.)

For such a diverse collection the book is remarkably uniform in quality, clarity, and tone. However, let me enter a few quibbles. The chapter on feminism and psychoanalysis really does seem out of place, some papers are summaries (but very clear ones) of previous work, and liberals will object to much in Jaggar's piece on moral justification and in Bubek's paper on political philosophy. Fricker and Hornsby say that the collection was designed to be accessible to non-specialists. This is true only for non-specialists in feminist theory. Many of the chapters will be difficult for philosophical neophytes.

Taken together this companion makes vivid that feminism in philosophy is continuous with a theme that has motivated philosophers of every stripe in every age: How are we to understand ourselves, others, our world and our place in it? If this makes feminism seem less radical than some would like, so be it. Those who wish for a more radical and disruptive feminist stance in philosophy should recognize that there is a lot of substantive work to be done to address the questions these philosophers pose and to test the methodologi-

cal strategies they recommend. For my money, that makes feminism *in* philosophy very exciting indeed.

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Jennifer A. Herdt
Religion and Faction in Hume's Moral Philosophy.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.
Pp. xv + 300.
US$64.95. ISBN 0-521-55442-X.

To grasp the project of this book it is most helpful to contextualize it, much as Herdt attempts to contextualize Hume's writings on sympathy. This is the third volume in the Cambridge Studies in Religion and Critical Thought (preceded by Van Harvey's book on Feuerbach and Nicholas Wolterstorff's *John Locke and the Ethics of Belief*). As such, part of what motivates Herdt's project is the question of what the study of religion should look like, whether there is a 'niche for a non-relativistic, non-confessional study of religion and of the human sciences more broadly' (217-18). She believes a careful study of Hume's concept of sympathy does, in fact, establish such a niche, although Hume's own practice of discussing religion failed to measure up to what his theory establishes as possible and desirable.

Herdt's proposal is that Hume's view of sympathy is best understood if we read his discussions of sympathy not, first of all, as the outcome of Hume's wrestling with questions of epistemology but rather as the result of his 'preoccupation with securing the conditions of peace and prosperity' (xiii). Viewed in this light, one can recognize a coherence to Hume's work, from the early philosophical treatises to his political and literary essays, to his *The History of England*. Herdt's examination of Hume's concept of sympathy, thus, ranges from Hume's *A Treatise on Human Nature* and his *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Morals* to his essays 'Of tragedy' and 'Of the standard of taste' to Hume's history. Hume's conviction was that the primary threat to peace and prosperity is religious factionalism. His theory of sympathy, Herdt maintains, is an attempt to understand virtue and vice without divisive appeals to God and religion. In short, in Hume's moral theory, natural sympathy replaces divine revelation.

Specifically, Herdt attempts to establish the following eight claims in discussing Hume's role in the 'secularization' of moral philosophy: (1) Hume's

theory is best understood in the context of modern natural law theory; unlike other natural law theories, however, Hume eliminates all veiled and unveiled appeal to a sectarian deity. (2) A major concern of the Treatise is to replace the religious doctrine of Providence, so evident in Hutcheson's moral thought, with a non-theological concept that can maintain the connection between morality and human flourishing without reducing morality to self-interest. (3) Hume's doctrine of sympathy, thus, is the key to understanding Hume's moral thought as well as the secularization of moral theory. (4) Hume recognizes the unreliability of natural sympathy and its tendency to reinforce factionalism, and thus, introduces 'extensive sympathy' as a corrective; in so doing, he provides a normative account of moral judgment. (5) 'Extensive sympathy,' developed most fully in Hume's essays and his History, requires us to enter sympathetically into the outlooks of others, thus overcoming factionalism. (6) A primary theme of Hume's works is that religious enthusiasm undermines the operation of extensive sympathy and distorts moral judgment. (7) Hume believes that ways of life which are 'absurd, contradictory, and unintelligible,' e.g., religious ways of life, cannot be sympathetically understood. (8) Even if Hume is mistaken about the unintelligibility of theistic belief, he nevertheless establishes the conditions for a secular historiography.

Herdt's tracing the discussion of sympathy through the Latitudinarian responses to Hobbes, to Shaftesbury, to Hutcheson and Butler is not novel — Knud Haakonssen and J.B. Schneewind have recently told similar stories, but it is satisfying. It is important to remember that Hume did think highly of Butler's work. But Herdt's claim that one finds in Hume, as in Butler, a normative, rather than merely a causal, account of moral feeling and judgment is far less convincing. One can read Hume's essays on tragedy and the standard of taste as entirely consistent with the more straightforwardly causal account of his Treatise. Possession of the corrective state of 'extensive sympathy' may just be the causally necessary condition for authentic moral feeling. Annette Baier's more modest reading of corrective sympathy is, thus, the more persuasive reading. Readers will also find it worthwhile to consult Stephen Darwall's discussion of Hume in his rich and rewarding *The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought': 1640-1740*. What is signal to establishing the normativity claim is some discussion of obligation, a discussion present in Darwall although wholly absent in Herdt.

Perhaps most interesting and novel in Herdt's book is her discussion of sympathy in Hume's essays on tragedy and the standard of taste. 'On tragedy' establishes, she believes, the need for and the possibility of bringing oneself into a state of extended sympathy without implying any sort of belief voluntarism. 'The standard of taste' illuminates what factors may play into distorting our moral as well as our aesthetic perceptions and points the way towards the criteria for a properly extensive sympathy. *The History of England* illustrates, Herdt suggests, how we are able to extend our sympathy to radically different times and cultures, assuming there is nothing inherently irrational in those cultures. Hume's sympathy, thus, mutates from a

'passion' in the early philosophical treatises to an 'understanding' in Hume's mature literary work, Herdt argues. But if sympathy as mere passion raises the problem of moral obligation, sympathy as 'understanding' raises the equally vexing problem of motivation, a surprisingly unHumean problem, one might add.

Herdt concludes with the charge that in his *Natural History of Religion* (as well as in *The History of England*) Hume failed to achieve a sympathetic understanding of religious believers, failed in extending his sympathy as far as was warranted by his own theory. Many readers may be more inclined than Herdt to think that Hume was justified in regarding theistic belief as incomprehensible.

This is rewarding reading. Those who are more inclined to history than to analysis will appreciate Herdt's contextualization of Hume's work, while at the same time finding troubling her uncritical reliance upon E.C. Mossner's life of Hume. Those more inclined to analysis may be put off by Herdt's rather broad historical strokes. Still, this is a welcome and helpful addition to studies of Hume's moral thought.

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Siu-chi Huang
Essentials of Neo-Confucianism. Eight Major Philosophers of the Song and Ming Periods.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1999.
Pp. xiii + 261.
US$85.00. ISBN 0-313-26449-X.

The term *Neo-Confucianism*, which was coined by the Jesuits in the seventeenth century, denotes a philosophical movement that arose in the eleventh century and continued for roughly eight hundred years to the incursion of Western ideologies in the middle of the nineteenth century. This new school was born in the upheavals of the Song dynasty (960-1279), a time of great political weakness and renewed frontier invasions from the peoples of the steppes, and reached a culmination in the Ming dynasty (1368-1643) when one branch of what is a very complex movement became the most dynamic and intellectually vigorous philosophy of the period. Although we have many specialist works on individual Neo-Confucianists, S. has written the first general study of the main metaphysical, epistemological and ethical issues of the Song-Ming philosophers. The Song-Ming era has, as S. notes (xi), been

called the greatest creative period in the history of Chinese philosophy since the Zhou dynasty (1122?-256 BCE). Her brilliant new survey provides a lucid, compelling and often very moving guide to the thought of these crucial centuries.

S. focuses on eight philosophers, seven from the Song and one from the Ming, a balance that reflects the importance of the Song as the creative crucible from which Neo-Confucianism was born. All eight have long been recognized for their individual contributions to the development of an innovative philosophy relevant to the needs of the time, though each claimed to anchor his own intellectual pursuits in the ancient texts of Confucius, Mencius and Xun Zi.

In her first chapter, S. gives four main historical factors that stimulated these eight philosophers to fashion Neo-Confucianism from hints and often very vague notions in the traditional Confucian classics. The first was a response to the foreign invasions, which made the Chinese realize how important it was to foster national independence and, concomitantly, to free themselves from foreign religious and intellectual influences by a return to the traditional roots of their culture. The second was a reaction against the perceived nihilism of Buddhist metaphysics with its negative attitude toward family life and social responsibility. The third was the influence of religious Daoism, which had enjoyed nearly a thousand years of intermittent favor and played an important role in Neo-Confucianism through its cosmology. The fourth was the revival of Confucianism, which can be traced as far back as the Tang dynasty (618-906), though it was the Song-Ming philosophers who went beyond mere collecting and commenting on ancient texts to a free and creative interpretation of the spiritual and ethical values in traditional Confucian thought. From this four-fold impetus, 'Neo-Confucianism thus arose to bring about a renaissance of the Confucian classics and become the last great orthodoxy of China until recent times' (5).

The following nine chapters then explore the thought of these eight Neo-Confucians: Zhou Dun-yi (1017-1073), Shao Yong (1011-1077), Zhang Zai (1020-1077), Cheng Hao (1032-1085), Cheng Yi (1033-1107), Zhu Xi (1130-1200), Lu Xiang-shan (1139-1193) and Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529). Zhu Xi, as the supreme synthesizer of Neo-Confucianism and the greatest philosopher since Confucius and Mencius, one whose ethical thought has been compared favorably to that of Kant, is given two chapters, while the rest receive one each. S. opens every chapter with a brief biography and summary of the major works before she explores the philosophy using standard western categories. She closes her study with a summary of their subsequent reception in the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and the contemporary significance of Neo-Confucianism.

References are placed helpfully at the end of each chapter, while a large glossary of names and terms in transliterated English with matching Chinese characters and a full bibliography enhance the book's usefulness. It's unfortunate that the glossary has rather sloppily-written Chinese characters rather than printed ones, since it is an indispensable tool for understanding

the terminological subtleties of the eight philosophers. The Neo-Confucians have a tendency to posit verbal distinctions in ontology and then negate them by conflation. For those who know some Chinese, the glossary helps track the terminology and its purported distinctions.

It's impossible to give a detailed explanation of all eight thinkers in short compass, but I would like to sketch their primary contributions and tendencies.

Zhou Dun-yi is the founder of the philosophical school of Neo-Confucianism. He wrote the least of all the Song-Ming philosophers, but exercised enormous influence by adopting the Confucian term *tai-ji*, the Supreme Ultimate — which is infinite, ultimateless and the source of all things in the universe — as the foundation of his cosmology. He affirmed the reality of the phenomenal world against the Buddhists and followed the Confucians in stressing a humanistic outlook centered on the ethical conduct of life. His contemporary Shao Yong is best known as a numerologist who derived a sterile theory of emblems and numbers from the *Book of Changes*. Zhang Zai expounded a metaphysics based on the concept of *qi* or vital force that allowed him to explain the objective universe in terms of constant change and transformation. His realistic naturalism seems to share both idealist and naturalist features. In his ethical thought, Zhang reasserted the traditional cardinal virtue of *ren* or humanity, maintaining that man is by nature ethical, born as a social being and endowed with an innate moral sense. His short essay 'The Western Inscription' (*Xi Ming*) is the single most powerful statement of the ethical life I personally know.

From here Neo-Confucianism splits into two schools that derive from Zhang's nephews, the Cheng brothers Hao and Yi. The former was an ethical idealist who formed a subjectivist approach to moral cultivation based on the belief that the Principle of heaven (*li*) and the mind are one. His thought was worked into a monist idealism by Lu Xiang-shan and reached its culmination in Wang Yang-ming, who anticipated the epistemological idealism of Berkeley. The latter, being more rationally and analytically inclined than his brother, conceived reality in terms of a duality between a corporeal reality ruled by *qi* and a formless incorporeal reality. His thought culminated in Zhu Xi's synthesis of rationalism and empiricism, with its emphasis on knowledge of nature, history and current events as essential conditions for the moral life. Zhu Xi's ethical cognitivism, so like Plato's though derived from Confucian sources, became the dominate way of thinking and living in China.

The Neo-Confucians only indulged in metaphysical speculation as a counter to Buddhist metaphysics and a support for their own ethical thought. For subtlety, depth and sustained gravity, only Greek ethical thought equals it.

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David Ingram
Group Rights:
Reconciling Equality and Difference.
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 2000.
Pp. ix + 323.
US$40.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7006-1006-5);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7006-1007-3).

David Ingram's basic claim is that in the context of social inequalities between individuals belonging to different racial or cultural groups, the principle of equal treatment is best advanced by according special entitlements and recognition to disadvantaged and oppressed groups.

Ingram begins by examining the concepts of rights, equality and social difference, liberal democracy, and culture and race to develop a general account of group rights (Parts I and II). He then considers a wide range of contemporary issues pertaining to group rights, including national self-determination, citizenship and immigration, affirmative action, racial redistricting and group representation, multiculturalism and education, and culture and globalisation. These case studies (mostly North American), with their close attention to historical and legal particularities, is the chief attraction of the work. As well, readers approaching these cases philosophically for the first time will find Ingram's broad and fair survey of the relevant philosophical arguments a very helpful introduction and resource.

Ingram's first challenge is to show how group-specific rights, which have the effect of giving some individuals special entitlements on the basis of their group membership, are consistent with the principle of treating individuals equally. The key here lies in what counts as equal treatment. On the one hand, equal treatment might mean treating individuals the same way, and thus 'impartial law must articulate rights that apply to individuals as individuals, not as members of particular groups' (15). On the other, it might mean 'treating them differently, in a way that respects their individual distinctness' (ibid.). Ingram argues that while in some contexts equal treatment means sameness in treatment (e.g., criminal law), in others it might entail different treatment, as in cases involving the recognition claims of certain socially oppressed and disadvantaged groups (e.g., minority racial and cultural groups).

Racially based group rights (e.g., special group representation, affirmative action, etc.) may appear on first glance to reinforce racial classification, which historically tends to have its source in injustices, and hence is potentially oppressive rather than liberating (Chap. 3). Yet, while race is an 'aggregate group' (i.e., an externally imposed category), it is often also an 'affinal group' in that it is characterised by a sense of affinity among fellow members (56-60). In the case of disadvantaged racial groups, this affinity is centred around the common experience of oppression and systematic discrimination; and racial identity in this case has a certain legitimacy (69-70). The role of group rights, e.g., affirmative action, is to help ensure that members of such socially

oppressed racial groups are accorded equal treatment. Ingram recognises that, ultimately, justice would require that we transform society, so that racial policies like affirmative actions or racial redistricting (for the purpose of democratic representation), are no longer relevant nor required (170, 215-16). But in the interim, such affirmative action policies can play a role in correcting racial inequality and underrepresentation.

With regard to cultural group rights, Ingram expresses some initial discomfort. He worries that 'power relations are built into the very fabric in which culture is woven' (89). All cultures, Ingram thinks, need to indoctrinate their members, particularly children, to their norms and customs. Nonetheless, he accepts that cultures are also empowering, and proposes that a 'culture is legitimate to the extent that it does not discriminate against members of others groups and does not overly hinder its own individual practitioners ... from acquiring capacities to critically revise, reject, and if need be, exit the culture in question' (89). Thus self-determination for most indigenous groups, which are dynamic and complex cultures with ample avenue for dissent and reform, is consistent with a liberal constitutional framework (121).

One recurring challenge for Ingram, and certainly an important one for any individualist defender of group rights, concerns the possible tension between group and individual rights. An acceptable theory of group rights has to be able to walk the fine line between protecting the traditions and practices of a group that make individual lives meaningful, and not restricting the freedom of individuals to question and revise these traditions and practices. One way of achieving this balance, Ingram argues, is to ensure a right of exit (which may not always be possible, he acknowledges), and that traditions themselves are regulated by fair democratic procedures (34). Here one may wonder if we do not need finer distinctions and arguments than what Ingram has offered. The right of exit may not be sufficient to protect individual rights (exit may not constitute a reasonable choice in some cases even where possible), and the 'dialogic democratic' procedures Ingram refers to (34) may not be applicable within certain informal cultural or religious contexts. Nonetheless, Ingram confronts this issue head on, instead of setting it aside as a hard case and an exception to his general theory.

An immediate general reaction to this book might be that its chief appeal is also its main drawback. Given the wide net Ingram has cast, the book lacks a substantive unifying thesis. Other than the general thesis that group rights can help reconcile equality with difference, there is not much else in common between, say, race-based affirmative action and multiculturalism. If both of these invoke group rights, they invoke very different kinds of group rights, with rather different substantive justifications. Race based affirmative action is a transitory policy, and relevant because of nonideal conditions (i.e., racial discrimination), whereas multiculturalism is an ongoing policy aimed at engendering and protecting diversity as an ideal. Ingram himself stresses this difference several times (e.g., 162, 252-4).

Yet this bringing together of race and culture in the context of group rights is also, perhaps, what is most novel about the book. Most recent books on group rights tend to focus on cultural rights exclusively, with little or no discussion on race. One of Ingram's central contributions is to draw attention to the complex relationship between race and culture, especially in the case of African Americans (Chaps. 3 and 4). For instance, can we eliminate racial differences (that have their source in injustices) while preserving their attendant cultural differences (252-4)? In this respect, this well-informed, thoughtful, and humane book is of special interest not just to political philosophers, but to race theorists as well.

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David Johnson
Hume, Holism, and Miracles.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1999.
Pp. 106.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-8014-3663-X.

David Johnson doesn't hedge his conclusion: 'the view that there is in Hume's essay ['On Miracles,' *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Ch. 10, pt. 1] or in what can be reconstructed from it, any argument or reply or objection that is even superficially good, much less, powerful or devastating, is simply a philosophical myth' (4). Having called his shot, he takes the reader through a summary of Hume's own presentation and four reconstructions of Hume's argument, viz., those of J.L. Mackie, J.S. Mill, Antony Flew, and John Howard Sobel, against which Johnson repeatedly poses his basic criticism in ever subtler form. To his credit, Johnson defends Hume's own treatment from some of the usual barbs, and presents as clear a statement of Hume's reasoning as I have seen anywhere, only to be led to the familiar conclusion, that 'Hume's own argument either obviously begs the question, or becomes obscure' (21).

His book is in no way an attempt to survey previous research into Hume's argument. Johnson cites only what is essential in supporting his own argument. Those already familiar with the literature will find this pared down approach refreshing.

Johnson's basic perspective seems to be that alleged laws of nature are frail things, grandiose balloons that will pop at the first disconfirming instance. Thus, a believer in miracles must concede only that the alleged law

of nature, L, 'is exceedingly probable ... relative to the body of inductive evidence which supports L' (23). Neither the believer nor anyone else need concede that L is probable relative to the total body of evidence which includes a report by one reliable witness that L has been violated. Johnson argues that each of the reconstructions of Mackie, Mill, Flew, and Sobel involves an unwarranted explanatory leap from a body of evidence that is good support for an alleged law of nature to the conclusion that that body of evidence overrides a seemingly reliable report to the contrary. Johnson takes this critique far enough to assert, 'Did ever a young Scotsman of the eighteenth century believe in the reality of the Christian miracles, and then not believe, that change was "founded in *Faith*, not on reason", so far as we have been able to ascertain' (57).

There are occasions when I thought Johnson's book could have stood to be a bit longer, as with Johnson's repeated mention of a dilemma which, he opines, may show that the Humean's task is not only unfinished but impossible (33, 38). True enough, there is no onus on Johnson to show that Hume's premises are self-defeating, but a demonstration would certainly be germane to the subject. Johnson, however, leaves the matter completely undeveloped.

Johnson's book leads us to a more incisive analysis of Hume's argument, and shows that those who would disgrace Johnson's opening claim have a more difficult task than they might otherwise have supposed.

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David Johnston, ed.
Equality.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company
2000. Pp. x + 267.
US$37.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-481-2);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-480-4).

The anthologies flying the banner of *Hackett Readings* address issues of philosophical importance such as 'certainty', 'free will', 'God', 'the good life', and 'the idea of race' through a variety of readings selected from classical, modern, and contemporary sources for their 'accessibility, historical significance, and philosophical merits,' according to the publisher's description. The present volume offers a wide-ranging introduction to the concept of equality in a compact anthology, evidently intended for use as a primary or supplemental text in political philosophy, history of political thought, or intellectual history.

'The idea of equality has been with us since the beginnings of moral and political philosophy,' writes editor David Johnston in his introduction, citing Herodotus; but the founders of Western philosophy viewed it skeptically. In the excerpts from Book 8 of the *Republic* that opens the collection, Plato describes the process by which oligarchy may degenerate into democracy, in which pleasure-seeking, fickleness, and disorder prevail. In the selections from the *Politics* that follow, Aristotle distinguishes 'proportional equality' according to merit from 'arithmetic equality' that doles out equal measures to all. Aristotle acknowledges that democracy is 'more stable and freer from fashion' than oligarchy, but he cautions that when disagreements arise between rich and poor, 'the side whose assessed property is greater should prevail.'

Because these views will strike students as bizarre, some indication of their context would be useful. Plato and Aristotle were reacting against the Athenian practice of direct democracy, a more radically egalitarian polity than any devised by modern revolutionaries and one that sent Socrates to his death on trumped-up charges. Some indication of this context would have helped prevent historically uninformed readers from dismissing Plato and Aristotle as benighted elitists.

The large gap following these selections may also feed the myth of the medieval 'Dark Ages'. Selections from the Stoics, from Aquinas and the Scholastic tradition, or from Renaissance Platonism could have carried the discussion of equality from ancient to modern eras. Instead the anthology leaps forward to seventeenth-century England with a 1649 manifesto presented to Parliament by the Levellers. A full-blown concept of legal equality, including the abolition of all hereditary immunities and privileges, is here linked with progressive taxation and legislative reform (not to mention a call 'for the ridding of this kingdom of those vermin and caterpillars, the lawyers'). Selections from Hobbes's *Leviathan* offer a contrasting vision of legal equality as achievable only through subjection to absolute monarchy.

Next are three selections from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when equality came to be a ruling ideal in Western political thought. A generous helping of Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality* is supplemented, oddly, by a few pages of misogyny from *Émile*. Brief excerpts from Burke's apology for property as the lifeblood of society precede a lengthy selection from Tocqueville, who observes that democratic societies 'have a natural taste for freedom' but that 'for equality, their passion is ardent, insatiable, incessant, invincible.' A discussion of socialism and equality from Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme* rounds out these historical selections.

The remaining ten selections, and two-thirds of the book's pages, are devoted to contemporary discussions of equality. R.H. Tawney's history of the concept is sympathetic to democratic socialism, while F.A. Hayek argues for a free market in capital and labor. Rawls's defense of 'Two Principles of Justice' incorporates a strong bias toward substantive equality, but Robert Nozick insists that every attempt to impose a distributive pattern tramples on liberty.

The remaining selections provide glosses and commentaries on the issues that divide Tawney from Hayek and Rawls from Nozick. Economist Amartya Sen identifies several senses of equality: utilitarian, 'welfarist,' Rawlsian, and 'basic capability.' Ronald Dworkin argues that a fair distribution of goods is one that might have arisen from initial equality, public auction of all goods and services, and an insurance system for protection against future misfortune. Michael Walzer's intriguing but elliptical argument for a 'complex equality,' in which 'social meanings call for the autonomy, or the relative autonomy, of distributive spheres,' seeks to explain the moral grounding of both liberal democracies and caste systems. Closing out the collection are brief selections in which Will Kymlicka argues for the right of all national groups to 'maintain themselves as a distinct culture' and Iris Young's critique of the institutional structures by which 'the powerful enact and reproduce their power.'

Young's plea for greater attention to context could also be directed at this collection. It will be difficult for students to make sense of Rousseau's fulminations against gender equality, for example, or Sen's delineation of several varieties of consequentialism, without some knowledge of what they are arguing against. Johnston has provided no explanatory footnotes for Plato's reference to 'these lotus-eaters,' Rousseau's invocation of Grotius and Pufendorf, or Tawney's references to Keynesian economics. Providing neither transliteration nor translation for the Greek words occasionally used by Hobbes represents either inattention or snobbery.

Johnston teaches an interdisciplinary course in Contemporary Civilization at Columbia, and his inclusion of readings outside the conventional philosophical canon is commendable. But his omissions are troubling. There is nothing by Locke or Mill, for example, nor any writings from the founding of the American republic, and issues of equality in international contexts are mentioned only in passing. Furthermore, it is surely no coincidence that the era of the Protestant Reformation and the rise of modern science coincided with the ascendancy of an ideal of equality in the West, yet this collection scarcely mentions the religious or cultural roots of the modern ideal of equality.

Its imperfections notwithstanding, this collection offers a valuable resource for teaching philosophy and political theory in intermediate-level undergraduate courses. Its omissions can easily be remedied, and an instructor can provide the historical context absent here. Too many textbooks and anthologies smother students in copious notes and study aids, on the assumption that they are scarcely literate. The present collection errs in the opposite direction, and students may rise to the challenge.

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Stephen Macedo
Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1999. Pp. xvi + 343.
US$45.00. ISBN 0-674-21311-4.

Liberalism is often characterized by a focus on negative liberty, where the overriding emphasis is on delimiting an appropriate sphere of inviolability around individuals. For many, the unfettered freedom for individuals to work out and pursue their own conception of a good life is the hallmark of liberal theory. Such freedom is the fertile ground upon which diverse forms of life may grow. Cutting somewhat against the grain, Stephen Macedo's excellent new book is about the positive and transformative aspirations of liberalism, or the ways in which the liberal state attempts directly to cultivate certain civic virtues and significantly to shape the character of its citizens. In arguing for a 'tough-minded version of liberalism' (5) or a 'liberalism with spine' (5) or 'judgmental liberalism' (237), Macedo hopes to show how, contrary both to liberal preoccupations with neutrality and to contemporary and uncritical celebrations of diversity, 'profound forms of sameness and convergence should not only be prayed for but planned for without embarrassment' (2).

Macedo concentrates his attention on the central modern institutional vehicle for soulcraft: schools. In doing so, Macedo joins a growing list of political philosophers, including Amy Gutmann, Eamonn Callan, Harry Brighouse, Meira Levinson, and William Galston, who have begun to address questions of basic educational aims and policies in a liberal state. Macedo's book is divided into three parts. Part One is historical, examining the rise of common schools in the United States and the endemic and ongoing tension between common school defenders and those who found such institutions oppressive. Part Two focuses on the tensions between liberal civic education and religious diversity, and in particular on the challenges posed to the liberal state by religious fundamentalism. Part Three emphasizes the civic purposes of schooling by examining a host of more policy-oriented questions about school size, charter and voucher schools, and the place of private and religious schools. Despite his focus on education, however, Macedo does not view schooling as the only vehicle for cultivating civic virtue, and he frequently alludes to a future 'political science of group life' (108) in which he will take up indirect means of soulcraft, through shaping the associational lives of citizens.

The bulk of Macedo's philosophical argument comes in Part Two. Building on a Rawlsian platform of political liberalism, Macedo argues that, because citizens in a liberal society will inevitably disagree about their religious and philosophical ideals, they must attempt to justify the arrangement of basic political institutions to each other using standards of public reason. According to Macedo, public reason has two virtues: accepting fair terms of cooperation, or reciprocity, and a willingness to acknowledge the fact of reasonable

pluralism (171). Macedo claims that the liberal state is fully justified in attempting to foster these civic virtues in its citizens. However, the problem arises that some citizens, especially religious fundamentalists, may reject the standard of public reason, and therefore reject the attendant civic virtues. Macedo asks, 'when public efforts to inculcate basic liberal values interfere with the free exercise of religious beliefs, which values should give way?' (150)

As might be expected, Macedo's answer is a careful articulation and emphatic defense of the importance of common civic values. Like other writers on the subject, he analyzes two well-known U.S. court cases, *Wisconsin v. Yoder* and *Mozert v. Hawkins*. Both cases concern the desire of religious believers of deep conviction to opt out of educational requirements promulgated by the state in the interest of fostering civic virtue. Macedo concludes that there are occasional, prudential grounds for accommodating conscientious dissenters to civic values, but he firmly holds that when fundamentalists refuse to alter their religious justifications in political discourse, disavowing public reason, 'there may be nothing more to say to such people, except to point out that their religious beliefs are, unfortunately, inconsistent with the demands of good citizenship in a religiously pluralistic society' (186). I think Macedo is right to argue that religious believers cannot attempt to remake public policy according to the dictates of their religion. But let us be aware of the heavy psychological demands, and potential cost, of public reason. I was reminded of a Walter Lippman book that appeared in 1926, in which he imagines a dialogue between a fundamentalist and someone we could call a proponent of public reason. To the request to continue an open-minded discussion of whether citizens should rely on faith or reason, Lippman's fundamentalist replies, 'Your request that I be tolerant and amiable is ... a suggestion that I submit the foundation of my life to the destructive effects of your skepticism, your indifference, and your good nature. You ask me to smile and to commit suicide' (*American Inquisitors: A Commentary on Dayton and Chicago* [New York: MacMillan Company 1926], 65-6).

I find the frequent focus, in Macedo's book and elsewhere, on *Yoder* and *Mozert* to be excessive. While the cases are helpful in deciding how to weigh the scope of religious freedom against competing civic demands, they tend to ignore far more important and wider-ranging trends in American society, like the explosive growth of homeschooling and the increasing privatization of education through vouchers and charter schools. Macedo deals briefly with the privatization question in Part Three, but his commonsense conclusion that vouchers and religious schools are acceptable given certain regulations is far more tentative than his ringing defense of transformative liberalism in earlier chapters.

Macedo's book stands alongside Eamonn Callan's *Creating Citizens* (Oxford 1997) for the significance of its contribution to the ongoing debate amongst political theorists about the proper kinds of educational aims and institutions in a culturally diverse liberal state. While Macedo is concerned more centrally with religious diversity than with multiculturalism, belying

his title, his basic argument that liberalism justifiably and necessarily constrains diversity is a welcome salvo in defense of an activist and interventionist liberal state.

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W.J. Mander, ed., *et al.*
Anglo-American Idealism, 1865-1927.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 2000.
Pp. vi + 232.
US$59.95. ISBN 0-313-31152-8.

It is a great difficulty in intellectual scholarship to provide a concise understanding of the writings of particular thinkers at the same time as placing them correctly in their respective historical context. However, W.J. Mander's introduction (1-19) to the anthology, *Anglo-American Idealism (1865-1927)* adequately familiarizes the reader with both the distinctness and similitude of such thinkers as E. Caird (1835-1908), F.H. Bradley (1846-1924), and J.M.E. McTaggart (1866-1925) in Britain and America during this period. Along with his contribution of *Caird's Developmental Absolutism* (51-63) to this volume, previously, one of Mander's other notable contributions to this area is his *An Introduction to Bradley's Metaphysics*. Stated at the outset in the present text, 'The chapters of this volume constitute a reassessment of one important, but until now neglected, school of thought: that of the Anglo-American idealists' (1). Mander's synopsis traces the rise, flourishing, and decline of this original movement whose essential source is said to be *metaphysical*, and was inspired by Kant and Hegel. Particularly, Mander suggests that of the thinkers studied in this text, all 'held some form of monistic Absolutism, but from the very beginnings of the idealistic movement, dissatisfaction was felt with this idea on the part of those who would champion the cause of individual personality' (12). Subsequently, Mander finds that the idealism of the period provided both a response to Darwinism and materialism, as well as endeavoured to 'balance out' the relation between the individual and society in view of the mass industrialization of the Victorian era. But, as Mander points out, the movement was 'struck down' by the onset of the 'new realists', social pessimism, and the anti-German suspicions which accompanied the First World War. Here, I focus on two articles that pertain directly to recent questions surrounding the relation of

skepticism to 'Absolute Idealism', and the need for skepticism to 'curtail' humanity's 'desire to become God' through an attack on metaphysics.

Phillip Ferreira's *Caird on Kant and the Refutation of Skepticism* (64-79) investigates E. Caird's stance with regards to Kant's efforts to refute skepticism through his theory of knowledge. Specifically, as Ferreira writes, Caird held the opinion that Kant 'is ultimately *un*successful in his effort to refute empirical skepticism.' However, Caird also thought that 'Kant allows those who follow to take the requisite step.' While Kant had conceded to the skeptic 'that we have no access to things in themselves', he did acknowledge that 'we can, ... reflect upon the *forms* of experience. ... [And,] it is only through the identification of a priori *forms* of apprehension that the skeptical attack may be deflected' (66). In this way, Caird argues that Kant's stance 'is merely provisional' (67). In so doing, Caird suggests that Kant does not take his own 'transcendental perspective' to its full conclusion, which he feels would unseat the skeptic. Rather, according to Ferreira, Caird argues that Kant 'failed to rigidly deduce his fundamental categories from the transcendental unity of apperception itself and ... has implicitly acknowledged that these categories may ... just be contingent psychological forms of human apprehension' (74). For Caird, the sharp dichotomy between 'sense' and 'understanding' is to be undercut in that neither has reality on its own. Rather, 'when we recognize that the universal principle in thought supplied by the categories can exist only as a principle of organization for the particular — neither universal nor particular — neither form nor content — has any reality in isolation from the other, we are forced to realize that any actual judgment we might make carries with it only *relative* necessity' (75). But, while Caird asserts that we make our experience intelligible in virtue of such 'initial' Kantian categories, he also acknowledges that skepticism participates in the ongoing task of philosophy to seek more comprehensive categories and to 'progressively correct and modify them', in order to overcome the limitations of reason (77). In this endeavour, Caird is definitely 'closer to Hegel than to Kant' (65).

Leslie Armour's *Argument and Emotion in McTaggart's System* (163-181) reconsiders J.M.E. McTaggart's *The Nature of Existence* (1921-1927), in order to address the question: 'how can we know anything unless in some sense we can know it from the inside, unless in some sense we become it, how in short can we know God without becoming God?' (13, 164). The answer to this question lies parallel to the query as to how we know and love other persons, sharing in their perceptions. For McTaggart, pace Armour, 'reality is ultimately composed of timeless, loving spirits ...: persons composed of perceptions' (163). However, according to McTaggart, persons are also very much distinct in that each one of us is at the center of one 'field of experience'. In this sense, Armour writes, where G.E. Moore had attacked idealism for failing to distinguish between the perceiving and the object, McTaggart asserted the distinctness of each perceiver, with a degree of mutual interrelationship. For McTaggart, it is true that we do not know something unless, in some sense, we can know it 'from the inside'. But, 'by sharing in the

perceptions of others, we do, indeed, see things "from the inside." At the same time we do not lose ourselves in the objects' (173). Hence, McTaggart makes the distinction that to a certain extent, while we 'become' the other in coming to know him or her, we do remain ourselves. In the same manner, while 'God enters into our lives, as it were, from the inside ... we do not lose ourselves in God, but to love God and to love one's neighbor are the same thing' (173). According to Armour, it is in this way that McTaggart was able to respond in a positive manner to G.E. Moore's skeptical 'refutation of idealism', as well as offered his own solution to Augustine's age-old problem of the priority of the two loves: namely, love of God versus love of neighbor.

The other contributions in this volume, too numerous to adequately acknowledge here, include J. Allard's 'Bradley's Chain Argument', A. Quinton's 'Green's "Metaphysics of Knowledge" ', A. Simhony's 'Green and Sidgwick on the "Profoundest Problem of Ethics" ', E. Trott's 'Caird, Watson, and the Reconciliation of Opposites', G. Thomas' 'Philosophy and Ideology in Bosanquet's Political Theory', W. Sweet's 'Bosanquet and the Nature of Religious Belief', T.L.S. Sprigge's 'The Absolute Idealism of Royce', R. Walker's 'Joachim on the Nature of Truth', and D. Holdcroft's 'Collingwood: On History'. As such, the scope of this volume constitutes a well-needed comprehensive analysis of some of the important figures and original ideas predominantly associated with the 'Anglo-American Idealism' of the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries.

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Plato
Timaeus.
Trans. Donald J. Zeyl.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. 2000.
Pp. xcv + 94.
US$29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-447-2);
US$10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-446-4).

Donald Zeyl's translation of and lengthy introduction to Plato's *Timaeus* is the latest addition to the very successful series of translations of individual works of Plato published by Hackett. In 1987, Hackett published Zeyl's translation of Plato's *Gorgias* with a much shorter introduction. These translations are included in the monumental *Plato. Complete Works* (1997), edited by John Cooper. That collection, containing the first complete translation by many scholars of the entire Platonic *corpus* into English in one

volume, is rapidly becoming the standard Plato reference work for English readers. Zeyl's translation, now appearing in a separate, inexpensive volume, is very welcome indeed. Though it does not replace the splendid translation and commentary of F.M. Cornford in 1937 titled *Plato's Cosmology*, it certainly provides a useful addition. In fact, for the undergraduate or graduate student, it is to be recommended first.

In the nearly 90-page introduction, Zeyl clearly and fairly sets out the main opposing positions on the central interpretative issues in the dialogue. For example, ever since antiquity scholars have argued over whether Plato's account of the generation of the universe in *Timaeus* is to be taken literally or as a myth. In recent times, scholars have debated extensively the question of the nature of the so-called 'receptacle' or 'nurse' of becoming. Is it meant by Plato to be matter or space or perhaps both? They have also debated the larger question of where this dialogue fits in to a theory about its author's 'development'. Since *Timaeus* appears to affirm in all essentials the metaphysics of the so-called 'middle dialogues' like *Republic, Phaedo*, and *Phaedrus*, quite a lot rests upon whether we take the dialogue to be a late work, or, as has been claimed by some, to be itself a middle period dialogue. The reader of the introduction will find there a concise statement of the pros and cons of the various major interpretations. Wisely, Zeyl provides only the mildest indication of his own position.

It is a little disappointing that Zeyl does not give much attention in his introduction to controversy surrounding psychological issues in the dialogue, especially the composition of soul and its relation to the body. I would have thought that this is one area in which the dialogue is especially interesting to contemporary students. Zeyl also provides almost no assistance for the reader with the limited but fairly complex mathematics in the dialogue. Since Plato famously thought that mathematics was essential for physics, here again would be an opportunity for demonstrating the contemporary interest of the dialogue. In this regard, Cornford is more helpful than Zeyl.

The volume contains a useful analytical table of contents which should orient the reader to the remarkable array of topics discussed in the dialogue. It also contains an extensive bibliography which, however, is almost completely limited to works in English.

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C.D.C. Reeves
Substantial Knowledge.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2000. Pp. xviii + 322.
US$34.95. ISBN 0-87220-515-0.

In *Substantial Knowledge*, Reeves argues for a unified, non-developmental interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics, centered upon the Primacy Dilemma. The Primacy Dilemma arises because Aristotle's first principles, as principles of knowledge, must be universal and yet, as principles of being, they must be particular. But, since nothing can be both universal and particular, it seems that nothing can be an Aristotelian first principle. According to Reeves, 'Aristotle's attempt to solve it [the Primacy Dilemma] is the central project of his entire epistemology and metaphysics' (xiii). Reeves' central purpose is to explain Aristotle's response to the Primacy Dilemma, but he also claims that something like Aristotle's solution to the Primacy Dilemma, is, or should be, of interest and concern to contemporary philosophers, in order to allow for the possibility of defensible metaphysical realism. As Reeves sees it, skepticism (and its twin, philosophical reductionism) takes root in the divorce between ontological and epistemological first principles, a philosophical legacy of Cartesianism and modern philosophy with which contemporary philosophy still wrestles.

Reeves is so convinced of the value of an Aristotelian orientation that he even defends his theory of animal reproduction, and explains how that theory, and Aristotle's other theoretical commitments (e.g., to the eternality of the species) might be compatible with Darwinian evolutionary theory. In other words, Reeves does not think that Aristotle's worldview is necessarily incompatible with either evolutionary theory or modern biology. Consider animal reproduction. Aristotle notoriously thinks that the male animal contributes the form and the female only matter. In normal reproduction, the form of the male animal, including its maleness, is passed on. What about a female offspring, or an offspring that resembles the mother? Aristotle's understands these cases as abnormal, the motions from the male are interfered with or deformed; sometimes in a way that results in a female, sometimes in an offspring (male or female) that resembles a maternal relative. Now, Reeves speculates, if you have enough deformation of this kind, you might just get a new species. But, even though the idea of female animals as the engine of evolution is a wonderfully paradoxical doctrine to attribute to Aristotle, neither his account of inherited characteristics nor females as deformed males really supports it. For the family resemblances are characteristics like eye color or nose shape, and these are not functionally related to environments for Aristotle. And, while female animals are deformed in their inability to concoct residues and in their coolish temperatures, their existence is both necessary and for the best — because it is through animal reproduction that the eternality of species is preserved.

Hence, Aristotle's myth of female deformity serves the fixity of the species not the evolution of new ones.

This is a very ambitious book both philosophically, and as an interpretation of Aristotle. Reeves takes a holistic approach to the texts, asking his readers to consider the entirety of his argument rather than to fixate on individual texts. This is a fair request, but some of Reeves' textual juxtapositions might be misleading, and some of his summaries of doctrine shroud serious interpretative difficulties. For example, Reeves uses a text on aporematic method from *Metaphysics* III (a book devoted to elaborating philosophical puzzles) to explain the method of the *Categories* without comment, which is misleading (107). And when Reeves explains Aristotle's distinction between potentiality and actuality in five stages 'as Aristotle implicitly does', and later says that most of his account is 'uncontroversial and commonsensical', he ignores serious difficulties of interpretation. Indeed, it is safe to say that not much in Reeves' book is either uncontroversial or commonsensical, which means that it is a stimulating and interesting read for specialists in Aristotle, but an unreliable guide for the uninitiated.

Reeves' interpretation of Aristotle's resolution to the Primacy Dilemma has much to recommend it — both philosophically and as an interpretation. His account of Aristotle's theory of science, and his account of what philosophy does in relation to the sciences, is both original and important in its cogent and detailed description. Ultimately, however, the identification of God as both ontologically primary and primary in scientific knowledge, while probably right, is a bit disappointing. The disappointment is not that Aristotle endorses a transcendent first principle, but that the aporematic discussion of primary substance seemed really difficult, and yet intellectually engaging (a fascinating puzzle), just so long as it tried to solve the Primacy Dilemma without transcending nature. But, as Reeves says in his concluding remarks, Aristotle's theory of substance has no solution to the Primacy Dilemma, once we reject Aristotle's God, and his teleological metaphysics. Ironically enough, Reeves' description of Aristotle's complex and intricate response to the Primacy Dilemma turns out to be 'a marvelous but intellectually uninhabitable ruin' (298).

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Philipp W. Rosemann
Understanding Scholastic Thought with Foucault.
New York: St Martin's Press 1999.
Pp. xiv + 263.
US$49.95. ISBN 0-312-21713-7.

This clearly-written book is interesting, opportune and symptomatic. Interesting, in that it offers a pedagogical introduction to main elements of Foucault's preoccupations concerning history and historiography at the time of *Madness and Civilization* and *The Order of Things*, bringing these preoccupations to the study of 'scholastic thought'. At the same time, the book proposes a clotural reading of the historiography of 'scholastic thought' since Chenu's and Van Steenberghen's divergent proposals. This critical reading ends by situating new approaches to the medieval period: those attempting diverse entries into themes and authors, considered marginal until recently. Further reading is enabled by endnotes and an appendix, including the 'library of the Medievalist philosopher' web sites and addresses.

Opportune, at a time when the waning of modernity is announced, the book offers to bring scholastic thought back from oblivion. Reappraising the aims of the catholic institutions set up in the wake of *Aeterni Patris*, it presents scholastic thought not just as a museum piece, but as an active, yet too often repressed, element within modernity itself. This theme is interesting and constitutes a field for investigation.

To achieve this, Rosemann presents, in Chapter 1, Foucault's main options and themes. He prepares the way for a problematic where the triad madness, irrationality and rationality is considered dialectically at work in western thought. The elements gathered in that chapter are used to inscribe the medievalist philosopher into a paradigm shift already taking place within the studies of medieval philosophical production. Each introduction to the following five chapters returns to an aspect of the archeological categories suggested by Foucault. They are put to use in the study of the definition of 'the scholastic tradition' (Chapter 2), scholastic intellectual practices (Chapter 3), the 'Prose of the World' concerning Greek circularity, Christian linearity and their metaphysical foundations (Chapter 4), the application of these conclusions to Aquinas's theoretical construction (Chapter 5) before using it to uncover the 'other' of the Scholastic 'episteme' (Chapter 6). In this structure, Chapter 4, on the prose of the world, is central as it situates conceptually the problematic of scholastic thought. Openness and non-completion are structurally inscribed in the will to systematically conceptualize reality: 'how it is possible to live with the realization that no human theory or practice can ever arrive at a final synthesis or integration of all our differences into a flawless unity?' (17) Ironically, the strategy reverted to in order to illustrate this shows the question at work in an author long considered central: Thomas Aquinas.

The book is symptomatic, since it quickly becomes clear that Rosemann's strategy is reactive. Reaction to Hegelian temptations at systematicity that preoccupied much of the neo-scholastic movements. Reaction also to post-modern dissemination. He offers the medieval attempts at unity as a valid philosophical program to be reckoned with, while avoiding dissemination and babelic situations. In this sense, the newly revisited medieval episteme could answer questions of modernity without resorting to postmodern strategies.

By the end of the book, a question remains: how is this work presenting a 'new Middle Ages'? Since it concludes with a classical reading of Aquinas, one can read it as an offer to the 'historians' afraid of post-structuralist approaches. It could also be read as a reintroduction of the metaphysical element into the postmodern field. Thus this 'methodological' text could be read as an introduction to other texts published by Rosemann, *Omne agens agit sibi simile: A 'Repetition' of Scholastic Metaphysics* and *Omne ens est aliquid: Introduction à la lecture du 'système' philosophique de saint Thomas d'Aquin*.

Furthermore, I wish to destabilise elements central to Rosemann's thesis in Chapter 4, 'the Prose of the World'. The presentation of Christian time as simply linear, in opposition to Greek circularity, needs to be put to question both historically and conceptually. Oscar Culmann's 1964 thesis — which serves as the theoretical foundation of the argument — has since been challenged: there is cyclicity in the Bible already and in Christian practices. I also wonder if the elements considered at stake as centres and margins in the dialectics between Greek *sophia* and Christian *moria* are not themselves elements chosen from a yet uncriticised modern reading of the medieval, heir to XIXth century reconstructions. What is being repressed in the medieval texts and paradigms by the dialectic of a reinscription of Greek *sophia* within Christian foolishness? What is the hallowed void present in Rosemann's presentation of the Medieval ages? The distinction between theology as *sacra doctrina* and philosophy? There is no critical appraisal of Foucault's description of the medieval paradigm in *The Order of Things*: is it immune to deconstruction? These questions are invitations to follow up on Rosemann's lead and critically use Foucault's conceptual tools on the complex constellation of medieval texts and practices. These questions also invite renewed readings of the conditions of production and enuntiative modalities of the texts from which spring 'scholastic thought'.

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Mark Rowlands
The Body in Mind:
Understanding Cognitive Processes.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1999.
Pp. vii + 270.
US$59.95. ISBN 0-521-6527-4.

According to Rowlands, a picture of the mind holds us captive, which prevents us from understanding what minds can do, and how they do what they do. This picture is Cartesian in that it posits internal structures for cognitive processes, and neo-Kantian in that it proposes that 'there are activities of the mind whose function is to structure the world' (ix). Rowlands sets himself the task of unseating this picture and the conception of cognition (perception, memory, thought and language) thus given to us. He calls his position 'environmentalism' and outlines the ramifications of this for the two projects of 'psychotectronics' (i.e., what minds can do) and 'psychosemantics' (i.e., how minds do what they do). The book is divided into two parts, one focused on each of these two projects.

In Part I, the emphasis is on the *action* of the *organism as a whole* (rather than merely its internal mechanisms), through which it exploits or manipulates the environment. Rowlands captures his anti-Cartesian position in terms of two claims, viz. *'The Ontological Claim*: Cognitive processes are not located exclusively inside the skin of cognizing organisms'; and *'The Epistemological Claim*: It is not possible to understand the nature of cognitive processes by focusing exclusively on what is occurring inside the skin of cognizing organisms' (22). Further, he distinguishes environmentalism from positions close to, but still different from it; i.e., philosophical externalism, behaviourism, and Ruth Milikan's theory of mind. It is to the latter that Rowlands feels closest. Yet, he still charges Milikan with adopting an 'essentially internalist' and 'curiously traditional' view of the mechanisms of behaviour production (60). In contrast to this, Rowlands states that ' ... the position to be developed (by him in the book under review) can be stated thus: cognitive processes are fundamentally hybrid in character, made up of three distinct types of things. They are partly constituted by certain sorts of internal process instantiated in the brain, partly by certain forms of behaviour, specifically, behaviour that involves manipulating, or exploiting, certain types of structure in the environment of the cognizer, and partly by these external structures themselves' (61). This means, at least, that the cognizer must have (or have evolved), or will develop in time, the abilities to manipulate the environment so as to release or utilize the information carried in it.

Central to his view on psychotectronics is his *manipulation thesis* or the idea that avoiding 'multiplying effort beyond necessity' is 'a rough expression of a fundamental biological truth' (24). This he, finally, points in the direction of two principles. Firstly, the barking dog or BD principle, captured by the saying that 'if you have a dog, then you do not have to bark yourself' (79). Phrased differently, it is cheaper, evolutionarily speaking or in terms of

resources (energy), to equip you with dog-barking-manipulating-strategies — given your specific evolutionary niche in the environment, and barking dogs in this — than to equip you with the wherewithal to bark yourself. This is basically an expression of the (environmentalist) ontological claim. He couples this with another principle, i.e., NOC or 'the *principle of the non-obvious character of evolved internal mechanisms*' (81), which in its turn, is an expression of the epistemological claim. For the rest of Part I, Rowlands sifts through contrasting theories on perception, memory, thought and language 'to show not only that if we had adopted the most efficient evolutionary strategy towards the accomplishment of cognitive tasks then the ontological and epistemological claims would be true of our cognitive processes, but also that the ontological and epistemological claims are, in fact, true of our cognitive processes' (101).

In Part II of *The Body in Mind*, that part devoted to the question about how minds do what they do, or 'showing how (intentionality) can arise out of non-intentional, or non-semantic, properties and relations' (205), Rowlands considers *Informational theories of representation* and *The teleological theory of representation*, each with its problems (e.g., of intentionality, misrepresentation, indeterminacy, and transparency). He does so because, as he argues, environmentalism requires an account of mental representation. He opts for a teleological theory, suitably enhanced through distinguishing between organismic and algorithmic proper functions. He clarifies these as follows: 'The organismic proper function underwrites attributions of content to an organism, whereas the algorithmic proper function underwrites attributions of content to a mechanism possessed by the organism' (241). The former is to detect, for example, '*eatability*' (involving nutrition and nourishment for the organism + edibility), while the latter detects presence of '*edibility*' (i.e. the mechanism involved detects, say, 'movement'). As Rowlands says, many things are edible but not all eatable and, yet, together these are needed for survival (and to solve some of the problems encountered by a teleological theory of representation). Central to this distinction is Gibson's concept of '*affordance*', i.e., what the environment offers a given creature, 'what it *furnishes* or *provides*, whether this benefits or harms the creature' (237).

The Body in Mind offers many interesting insights and represents a fine use of established empirical work on cognition. It is well worth reading. Moreover, Rowlands certainly succeeds in showing 'how the contents of mind are, in some sense at last, *worldly*: they are environmentally constituted' (ix), but he wants more than strong externalism.

For his environmentalism to be convincing, however, he has to do better than the arguments he gives for the manipulation thesis, and he has to do better than propose 'action' as the central, whole organism, device with which to tap into that which the environment has to offer or can furnish (e.g., the optic array). Phrased differently, even Jean Piaget's model of cognition (Cartesian and also neo-Kantian, in Rowlands' terms), places an active organism inside information-bearing, environmental structures, without wanting to *locate* cognition — or important parts of it — in the environment.

My point is that one needs more argument and better empirical evidence, than Rowlands provides, for how, if at all, an organism *develops* its 'abilities' to 'manipulate' the 'environment' in 'appropriate' 'ways' from birth to death — all the scare quotes indicating what still remain 'names for problems' as far as environmentalism is concerned.

Lastly, why title the work, *The Body in Mind* (apart from wanting to reverse Descartes' internalism), and not *Minding in the World*? The latter would better capture Rowlands' environmentalism.

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Charles E. Scott and **John Sallis, eds.**
Interrogating the Tradition:
Hermeneutics and the History of Philosophy.
Albany: State University of New York Press
2000. Pp. vii + 303.
US$65.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4401-5);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4402-3).

This volume, a commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the Collegium Phaenomenologicum, contains sixteen papers from presentations and conversations at the 1995 meeting. The editors maintain that these papers 'renew our engagement with traditional thought in such a manner as to dispel its aura of stability and self-evidentness and thus to reawaken the wonder and the questioning that animate that thought' (1). The papers, quite diverse for a single volume, are divided into three distinct parts. The range of the essays provides any reader with possibilities for raising important questions.

Part One, 'On Hermeneutical Thought', contains five essays that could be more carefully ordered. Jean Grodin's 'Continental or Hermeneutical Philosophy: The Tragedies of Understanding in the Analytic and Continental Perspectives', is placed fifth, but would have made an excellent lead article. Grodin examines the analytic/continental division in American philosophy and argues that the task of what is called continental philosophy is really best understood as hermeneutics because hermeneutics looks at human beings as questions posed to themselves and addresses the need to bestow 'some measure of meaning on our temporal existence' (81). Moreover, hermeneutics recognizes the importance of historical background for concept formation. Charles E. Scott's 'On Thinking', the third chapter, can be read as building on Grodin's claims. Scott asks what philosophers do when they

think. He outlines two strategies for thinking to avoid treating thought as 'a kind of transcendent reality that gives universality and necessity to contingent influence' (42-3). These strategies are genealogy and reading. Using these strategies can help philosophers recognize that thinking is really a 'living activity' (56). James Risser's 'Philosophical Hermeneutics and the Question of Community' exemplifies living thinking. Risser is concerned with the question of community as it arises in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. He argues that friendship is the condition of the possibility of community and that friendship involves sacrifice. 'For philosophical hermeneutics, the sacrifice in the community of friendship is simply the granting of the word, that is, a granting of the voice of the other who speaks' (32). Two essays complete this section. Ben Vedder examines the work of Dilthey and the tension between metaphysics and hermeneutics in 'The Metaphysical Background of Hermeneutics in Dilthey'. Michael Nass, in 'Receiving the Tradition', makes use of Derrida's 'Plato's Pharmacy' to explore how the tradition both furnishes us with concepts and themes and also gives us the means by which to receive these concepts and themes. The editors use this essay as the lead essay because it stresses the importance of receiving the tradition as a process of questioning. If read as the last of the first group of essays, it provides a helpful bridge into the rest of the book.

Part Two, 'Heidegger and the Greeks', includes seven essays. John Sallis' 'Reception' is an analysis of reception that uses Heidegger and Plato's *Timaeus* in order to restore wonder to the task of philosophy. Günter Figal's essay, 'Refraining from Dialectic', examines Heidegger's reading of the *Sophist* arguing that Heidegger actually philosophized 'in close vicinity to Plato' (96) and is best understood as remaining closer to Plato than Heidegger himself thought. Three essays focus on Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle. In 'Heidegger's Interpretation of Aristotle on the Privative Character of Force and the Twofoldness of Being', Walter Brogan argues that Heidegger confronts Aristotle in order to show how traditional readings of Aristotle have misunderstood the concept of force and 'presupposed an unclarified understanding of being as presence' (128). Tina Chanter's essay, 'Heidegger's Understanding of the Aristotelian Concept of Time', explains the three features found in Aristotle's concept of time: the priority of the future, the irreversibility of time, and time's infinity. She argues that Heidegger disputes the third feature. His task is to 'provide access to a more original understanding of temporality' (148). John Ellis's contribution, 'Heidegger, Aristotle, and Time in *Basic Problems § 19*' also looks at how Heidegger's examination of Aristotle on time points toward a notion of original temporality from which to understand the common everyday conception of time. Françoise Dastur writes on 'Heidegger and Anaximander'. She argues for the importance of an ontology of Dasein for any consideration of ethics. Freedom enables people to affirm or disaffirm being and human finitude. 'Krimskrams' by Robert Bernasconi concludes the second part. He proposes that beginning philosophy with Plato developed in the past two hundred years. At the end of the eighteenth century 'the history of philosophy was reduced to a single

narrative' (193). This narrative excluded mythic and religious expressions of meaning. He believes that understanding this reading of the history of philosophy will better enable us to decide how we are to hand over the tradition of philosophical thought.

Part Three, 'The Question of Nature and German Idealism', contains four essays. The first two essays approach the theme of nature indirectly. Rodolphe Gasché's 'Of Mere Form' argues that Kant's work on art and form are still important. Art can be understood as 'reflections on the necessary requisites for becoming an object' (230). In the process of this analysis he examines the movement from aesthetic judgment to determining judgment. John Russon reads Hegel's dialectic of the Master and Slave in 'Hermeneutical Pressure and the Space of Dialectic' and argues that 'spirit is hermeneutics as this intersubjective interrogation of the tradition by itself' (249). His reading is complicated by his use of the feminine pronoun in ways that are not true to Hegel, and he makes suggestions about women's identity that need further support. The final two essays clearly address the theme of nature. Jason M. Wirth writes on 'Schelling and the Force of Nature'. He contends that the force of nature presents Schelling with a question 'whose final answer does not culminate a line of questioning but which loses itself in the magic circle of thinking' (271). David Farrell Krell's article, 'Contagium', concludes the anthology. He suggests that nature is dire, bringing both beneficence and bane. He argues that contemporary science has lost a reverence for these two sides of nature and so lacks the full possibilities of scientific imagination. This essay again raises the important question that Grodin asks. How is it that philosophy can aid us in bestowing meaning on temporal existence?

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Ian Shapiro and
Casiano Hacker-Cordón, eds.
Democracy's Edges.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1999.
Pp. xiii + 297.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-64356-2);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-64389-9).

Ian Shapiro and
Casiano Hacker-Cordón, eds.
Democracy's Value.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1999.
Pp. xiii + 201.
US$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-64357-0);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-64388-0).

The papers collected in these volumes were originally presented at a conference held at Yale in 1997 and they include contributions from an impressive line-up of philosophers and political scientists. The first of these volumes, *Democracy's Edges*, concentrates for the most part on the boundary problems posed by globalisation, while the second, *Democracy's Value*, contains discussions of the normative basis of democracy and of the relationship between democracy and development. This latter volume opens with a provocative piece from Adam Przeworski which, contrary to recent trends in democratic theory, argues for a 'minimalist' conception of democracy. 'Minimalism' is the Schumpeterian notion of democracy as a process of interest-group competition regulated by the majority rule. On this view the virtue of democratic government is that it ensures the peaceful removal of existing governments. Przeworski challenges those with more elaborate conceptions of democracy to address the fact that democratic regimes are simply not very good at delivering the things which democrats typically want from them, namely, rational decisions, representative governments and/or redistributive policies. Przeworski's scepticism may be salutary, but the point of adopting this 'minimalism' is obscure: the peaceful removal of governments is a good thing but hardly enough to satisfy not only theorists but ordinary citizens, who are not obviously conceptually mistaken in identifying democratic government with values like freedom and equality, however often they are likely to be disappointed in practice. John Roemer continues this deflationary theme, arguing that we should not follow the trend of political liberals and deliberative democrats in regarding democratic institutions as embodying the values of both freedom *and* justice. The Scanlonian arguments of theorists like Joshua Cohen and Brian Barry are insufficient to establish the sort of equality of condition which these same theorists espouse. Roemer argues that this is because politicians habitually present their programmes in universalistic terms and because the economic information which would enable voters to determine which policy is most likely to have redistributive effects is

difficult to weigh and open to reasonable disagreement. This is certainly plausible, but it is no more than someone like Brian Barry himself acknowledges, i.e., that further argument is required to get from impartiality to redistribution.

Chief among those contributors who are concerned to advance a more substantive conception of democracy is Philip Pettit who sets out a case for 'contestatory' democracy based upon his 'republican' theory of freedom. This account of freedom is supposed to overcome the contrast drawn by Berlin between negative and positive freedoms insofar as republican freedom is not simply freedom from interference, but freedom from the possibility of *arbitrary* interference. The significance of this is that it circumvents the apparent conflict between liberty and democracy which follows from a purely negative view of freedom. Pettit argues that, while on the negative view more government must mean less liberty, for a republican more government can help to secure the conditions of individual freedom. Unlike Przeworski, Pettit focuses on the problem of the tyranny of majorities and argues that a theory of democracy must not rely upon the fiction of rule by 'the people' conceived as a homogenous unit, but rather must address the problem of the government of 'the people' considered 'severally', i.e., as made up of distinct groups. He calls for the institution of 'contestatory' institutions through which minorities may subject policies to review, although not to a veto. This is not especially revolutionary but it has the virtue of overcoming the traditional opposition between (majoritarian) democracy and individual liberty, as well as putting some flesh on the fashionable rhetoric of 'contestation'.

This is more than can be said for the contribution of Jeremy Isaac, et al., which is, oddly, located in the other volume, *Democracy's Edges*. Isaac and his colleagues criticise political liberals for an 'apolitical' stance with respect to the claims of non-liberals such as the Christian right. Liberalism should be more 'democratic' and open to 'contestation' they claim, as the versions of public justification advanced by political liberals simply serve to remove illiberal claims from the political agenda. As Courtney Young points out in her comment, however, Isaac et al. simply identify democracy with majority rule and empty it of any normative content.

Iris Young, like Pettit, aims to revisit old arguments about democracy and liberty, in this case addressing herself to the anti-statism of the left. It is not enough to trumpet the virtues of 'civil society' and to neglect the state: we should regard these as complimentary institutions. A just society must ensure that its citizens suffer neither domination nor oppression. The former affects persons' capacities for self-determination, preventing them from participating in decision-making processes which affect their lives, while the latter affects persons' capacities for 'self-development', by restricting opportunities to communicate with others, or to develop skills for self-expression. Young argues that while civil society (which she divides into private, civic, and political aspects) affords people opportunities for self-determination, the redistributive power of the state is still necessary to create the conditions which will enhance citizens' capacities for self-development.

The second volume, *Democracy's Edges*, is, perhaps, of less interest to political theorists. The introduction promises a consideration of the boundary problem that affects democracy, namely the difficulty of providing a democratic justification for the boundaries of a given state, when such a justification would presuppose those very boundaries. However, only Susan Hurley comes close to addressing this question in a speculative piece comparing ways of thinking about democracy to ways of conceiving the operation of neural processes. This tells us a little about the brain, but not much about politics. The bulk of the volume is devoted to arguments about the implications of globalisation, with Dahl adopting a sceptical position, on the grounds that if nation-states are run by elites at present, then international organisations represent an intensification of this tendency. David Held argues for a cosmopolitan international order, while Kymlicka, in a short comment, is more cautious, taking the view that existing states are more likely to be responsive to the wishes of individuals than any international government. The second part, on the 'inner edges' of democracy, contains papers which are not obviously thematically linked at all. Which is not to say that they are uninteresting: Elizabeth Kiss provides a very useful discussion of the politics of recognition which contrasts the Kymlicka/Taylor tendency to regard cultures as valuable in themselves, with what, she argues, is the more individualist tendency of thinkers like Iris Young, to regard them as instrumental to the self-respect of individuals.

Ultimately, while there is much of interest here, one cannot help but wonder if the editors were right to compile two volumes from these proceedings. A number of the prominent contributors provide no more than brief comments on other papers (See Kymlicka, Dunn and Van Parijs) and the mix of normative and empirical pieces is not entirely successful. Interdisciplinarity is a worthy goal, but to be fruitful it must be well focused.

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Robert K. Shope
The Nature of Meaningfulness.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1999.
Pp. xii + 327.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-9286-8);
US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-9287-6).

In ordinary parlance, we ascribe meanings to, or question the meaning of, many different kinds of things, including natural phenomena such as tree rings, the utterances of speakers of a natural language, a person's dreams or slips of the tongue, artworks, and even life itself. Philosophers have generally assumed that there is a measure of equivocation in such talk. In this book, however, Robert Shope defends a unified account of meaningfulness which encompasses all of the preceding examples. He maintains that we should regard meaningfulness as a *genus*, determine in what it *consists*, and treat philosophical accounts of meaning in different domains as offering sufficient conditions for the presence of particular species of this genus. His analysis of meaningfulness draws upon an analysis of representing which is equally inclusive of apparently diverse phenomena. He further argues that his proposed analyses capture what is constitutive of their analysanda.

The book is divided into three sections, with four Appendices which take up nearly one third of the volume. In Section One, Shope outlines and defends a non-naturalistic analysis of what is involved in x's representing y. In a lengthy appendix, he sets out perceived limitations of some influential naturalistic analyses of representing and of meaning. Shope's analysis of representing includes both causal and epistemic elements, and is contrasted with alternative analyses that rely exclusively on one of these components. The underlying intuition, developed in more technical form in Shope's discussion, is that x's representing y is always relative to a range of questions about y that are salient in a context of inquiry: roughly, x represents y just in case 'an answer to a certain question about y is rendered justified by the way that y is involved in the causation of a condition of x' (7). Representing so construed is not mind-dependent, but it is mind-*related*, in that it makes reference to contexts of inquiry in which certain claims are justified, and in which certain factors, selected as 'the cause' of a condition of x, are salient, for inquirers.

In Section Two, Shope examines the notions of 'causal powers' and of 'non-deviant causal chains' that enter into the more developed versions of his analysis of representing. The discussion in this section is of independent interest. He argues against attempts to analyse ascriptions of causal powers in terms of conditionals, offers an account of 'causal selection', and develops a truth-conditional analysis of conditional statements that appeals to the exercise of causal powers.

In Section Three, Shope uses his analysis of representing to develop an analysis of what it is for something to have a meaning, or to enter into the determination of something's meaning. Where x represents y, we may label

the answer to the relevant questions about y that is justified on the basis of a given condition of x the 'answer-content' of x in that condition. Then, relative to a context of inquiry, the meaning of a given natural phenomenon x is that h just in case 'that h' is the answer-content of x, and it is indeed true that h. This analysis extends to conventional linguistic meaning if we focus upon the answer-content of *the use* of a given sentence — that the speaker was expressing a particular propositional attitude — or the contribution that a word makes to the answer-content of the uses of sentences in which it occurs. Conventional meaning, however, does not require that the answer-content of the use of a sentence be true. Shope offers two reasons in support of his claim that this analysis captures what is constitutive of meaningfulness. First, so taking it explains many important facts about meaning, including the possibility of misrepresenting, and, second, it solves a number of 'puzzles' that arise concerning meaning in different domains — for example, how Putnamian stereotypes, or the reference of an expression, can be aspects of linguistic meaning. Shope also applies his analysis of conventional meaning to the notion of 'meaning' itself, offering an account of the answer-content of sentences that ascribe meaning to some phenomenon.

This book will certainly be of interest to anyone who is suspicious of attempts to naturalise such notions as representing, meaning, and cause. In this respect, it is a welcome attempt to spell out in some detail a non-naturalistic account that sees these notions as irreducibly embedded in our interest-driven inquiry practices. There is also considerable critical discussion of the naturalistic views of writers such as Stampe, Cummins, Dretske, and Fodor, although the discussion of the latter three in the Appendix may prove elusive for anyone not already familiar with their views. Some of the material in Section Three also requires very careful reading, in part because the reader must come to terms with the occasionally unwieldy applications of the general schematic analysis of meaningfulness to particular cases.

Shope's general methodological strategy — in itself highly praiseworthy — of measuring the constitutivity of his analyses by their capacity to resolve outstanding puzzles in different areas of philosophy, is not completely convincing, because the 'puzzling' status of these problems is not always obvious. This applies particularly to the proposed resolution of exegetical problems in Freud's work, and of issues concerning the possibility of life's having a meaning in the absence of a deity. One problem in evaluating what Shope has achieved in these domains lies, again, in the difficulty of recognising issues of independent interest when translated into the framework of the author's analysis — a necessary evil, perhaps, but one that can prove frustrating.

A final concern, which Shope acknowledges but sets aside, is that his analysis of the meaningfulness of utterances is not intended to apply to the contentfulness of mental states, nor, indeed, to intentionality in general — to 'aboutness'. Indeed, it *cannot* so apply if the proposed analyses are not to appear circular, since Shope's analysis of representing appeals to an unanalysed notion of the contentful intentional states of inquirers, and his analysis

of conventional meaning to the expression of particular propositional attitudes in the use of language. Those who seek a unified account of linguistic and mental content may be unwilling to trade the anticipated benefits of such an account for a conception of meaningfulness that excludes intentionality but incorporates the disparate phenomena cited in the first sentences of this review.

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Paul Vincent Spade, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to Ockham.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1999.
Pp. xvii + 420.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-58244-X);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-58790-5).

This recent addition to Cambridge's series of 'Companions to Philosophy' joins one on Aquinas as the second to cover a medieval philosopher, and will be followed soon by one on Duns Scotus. It consists of fifteen short articles by some of the best known contemporary scholars of late medieval philosophy plus a useful bio-bibliographical introduction by Spade. The first essay, by the eminent historian William Courtney, summarizes what we know of Ockham's career and his reputation among later generations. There is also a selective but nevertheless very substantial bibliography, a list of citations from Ockham's works, and an index.

Ockham's philosophical and theological works cover a very wide range of those areas in which late medieval scholars operated, and when we add to these the political writings he produced in the last twenty years of his life we are confronted with a very daunting corpus indeed. Virtually all of Ockham's works are now available in recent critical editions, and Marilyn Adams published in 1987 a comprehensive study of Ockham's non-political thought. As this 'Companion' shows, there is much in this body of work that will keep scholars busy for years, and, more importantly, there is much which is philosophically interesting and suggestive for our own times.

Modern philosophers know Ockham best for his work in logic, semantics and ontology, and five of the essays in this volume explain various aspects of his thought in this area. The essays here are, in order of appearance, by Calvin Normore, Claude Panaccio, David Chalmers, Paul Spade and Gyula Klima. Normore in explaining Ockham's supposition theory and modal logic lets us see some of the difficulties that attend Ockham's ideas in both these areas. Panaccio elucidates Ockham's theory of a mental language and Chal-

mers takes up the question of synonymy in that language. Spade and Klima concentrate on Ockham's nominalist reductions of the kinds of entities that are justifiably posited. This section is certainly useful, but it suffers from the absence of any discussion of Ockham's very elaborate reasons for rejecting realist theories of universals and of his own positive views on universals. Since several of the authors remark that this is fundamental to Ockham's philosophical program, the omission is both puzzling and damaging. Also omitted is any treatment of Ockham's very significant views on identity and distinction, another major topic in his day and one that is of increasing importance in our own time among professional philosophers.

The next three articles by Andre Goddu, Eleonore Stump and Elizabeth Karger treat Ockham's philosophy of nature and epistemology. Goddu's interesting piece on Ockham's contributions to Aristotelian physics is a bit marred by his believing that Aristotle, in contrast to Ockham, did not believe in the reality of form and matter. Stump takes up Ockham's rejection of both sensible and intelligible 'species' and gives the reader a very useful comparison of Ockham's views to those of Aquinas on this topic. Karger in treating the doctrine of intuitive cognition corrects recent scholars' belief that for Ockham intuitive cognition, in contrast to abstractive, is infallible. What she fails to address, though, is the utterly bizarre character of Ockham's view on the intuitive cognition of non-existents, where the cognition by itself tends to produce a judgment of non-existence but when accompanied by the object it tends to produce a judgment of existence!

In the area of ethics there are essays by Peter King, Marilyn Adams and A.S. McGrade. The importance of Ockham's emphasis on the will and its freedom comes out clearly here. Adams does a particularly good job of placing Ockham's thought on morality in relation to the approaches of Anselm and Duns Scotus. These articles are followed by an essay by John Kilcullen on Ockham's political writings, which usefully summarizes the dispute over Franciscan poverty that led Ockham to defy the pope and spend the rest of his life arguing against papal pretensions to absolute power.

The final two essays by Alfred Freddoso and Rega Wood deal with Ockham's theology. Wood convincingly argues that Ockham was in no sense a Pelagian, while Freddoso accurately, in my opinion, characterizes what distinguishes Ockham from his scholastic predecessors on the question of how theology relates to philosophy: Ockham essentially gives up on the effort to reconcile the two. An unfortunate omission from this section is any discussion of Ockham's highly original and still influential views on divine foreknowledge and future contingents.

Although this 'Companion' ignores some topics it should have addressed, those of us who read the 'Venerable Inceptor' will certainly profit from having it at our sides to lead us into some of the issues that currently concern our fellow scholars.

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Nigel Warburton
Philosophy: Basic Readings. Third Edition.
New York: Routledge 1999.
Cdn$98.00: US$60.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-14693-3);
Cdn$29.99: US$14.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-14694-1).

Philosophy: Basic Readings is a collection of essays and selections from larger works that cover a wide range of contemporary philosophical issues. As may be expected, most readers who have studied philosophy would have already been exposed to most of the writings that are included. The audience, however, is the students who are taking an introductory course in philosophy. More accurately, the immediate audience is the teachers who are searching for an edited work to include in such a course.

And so the reviewer ought to be primarily concerned with the question: Is this a good book for introducing students to philosophy? The book begins well, with a series of contemporary answers to the basic question: what is philosophy? Warburton includes answers given by Bertrand Russell, A.J. Ayer, Mary Warnock and D.H. Mellor. While these responses would engage with the question and encourage discussion, there are many other important and varied responses to this question that could have made this section of the book more interesting, beginning with the Socratic dialogues and including some of the better-known passages from Wittgenstein's notebooks.

The remaining selections in the book focus on some of the core problems of contemporary philosophy. These problems are organized into general sections: god, politics, mind, art, and so on. As with the first section, these selections could encourage significant engagements with some of the key contemporary debates but could also have been more varied.

There are very few pre-twentieth-century selections, except short selections from earlier philosophers who happen to fit into contemporary debates. Thus Berlin's 'Two Concepts of Liberty' is included, while a selection from Hobbes's *Leviathan* is the only selection in the 'Politics' section from before the twentieth century. In Warburton's defense, even if he did not include extensive selections from pre-twentieth-century philosophers, many of the people that he did include discuss many earlier thinkers. Berlin, for instance, discusses Locke and Rousseau, and could be used to point students in these directions.

The general character of the selections is clearly in favor of analytical philosophy (from Hume to Russell). Beyond short selections from Descartes, Kant, and Pascal, the writings are almost completely Anglo-American. In part, the character of the selections arises from the obvious decision to organize these selections without a concern for the history of philosophy. But another result of these selections is that a wide variety of issues and thinkers are not given a place in the 'basic readings'. Where, for instance, is Nietzsche? or the Existentialists? or the Marxists?

From another direction, however, a concern for the organization of the selections raises important questions concerning how 'the problems of philosophy' ought to be classified. It is interesting to note, for instance, that while Warburton includes a section on 'politics,' he has not included a section on 'ethics'. There is a section labelled 'right and wrong', which contains many of the selections that people would expect to find in the section dealing with 'ethics'. But there is a key philosophical debate that is being obscured here. Warburton assumes that philosophical ethics is primarily about right and wrong, which means that the so-called 'virtue-ethics' of writers such as Aristotle simply do not fit. The section begins, quite expectedly, with Kant's 'Categorical Imperative'.

Another series of issues that the organization of the selections raises is how the different classes of problems can be related. How, for instance, do the selections in 'Politics' relate to those in 'Right and Wrong'? Or those in 'Science' relate to those in 'Art'? These are not obvious issues in the book. Rather, students are encouraged to pass from one set of issues to another, as if from one study component to the next.

But do these criticisms mean that the book is not a good book for an introductory course in philosophy? As with most teachers who decide which books to use as textbooks, there are some selections that I would not use, others that I would have included, and complaints that I would raise in class. I would encourage students to worry about the way that the book classifies problems and the way that various important people and issues are absent or marginal. But I would do that with any introductory text book; in part because these concerns are also an important aspect of philosophy.

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Fred Wilson
The Logic And Methodology of Science in Early Modern Thought.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1999.
Pp. xxiv + 608.
$95.00. ISBN 0-8020-4356-9.

There has been a growing tendency among historians of science to adopt a continuity thesis between Aristotelian and medieval science on the one hand and modern (post-Galilean) science on the other. Wilson's impressive book is a systematic attempt to reverse this tide by showing that there was a real break between the two in the characterisation of both the cognitive end which science aims to achieve *and* the method by which it is best achievable. Put

in a tiny nutshell, Wilson claims that the cognitive goal of the new science is knowledge of general and exceptionless matter-of-fact regularities and the new method by which this goal is best achieved is eliminative induction. Contrast to these the aim and method of Aristotelianism: to achieve rational insight into the metaphysical natures or essences of things by the method of abstraction from particulars. The break was so deep, according to Wilson, that the philosophy of science itself had to be revolutionised in order to make space for the new science. Humean empiricism, we are told, is the product of this revolution and — at the same time — the philosophical foundation of the new science.

All this sounds basically right to me, and Wilson argues thoroughly for it and documents it masterfully, citing and analysing the views of both the defenders of the new science and its detractors. However, there is a residual worry that his argument is set up in a way that renders Carnap's and Hempel's view of science the, almost inevitably, correct philosophical companion of modern science. Even the infamous Hempelian symmetry between explanation and prediction is given a constitutive place in the post-Aristotelian science (64). The book consists of seven interconnected studies. It is somewhat wordy and with quite a number of almost *verbatim* repetitions of the same material. It would have certainly benefited from a better editing. But the studies can be read — and used in courses — independently of each other. One of them, study 5 — "'Rules by Which to Judge of Causes" before Hume' — offers a rather nice summary of the basic argument of the entire book. It also makes a very strong case for the thesis that, despite the fact that some versions of the famous principles of agreement and difference for finding causes had been around before Hume, it was Hume who first articulated them properly and connected them with the method of elimination as well as with the cognitive aim of the new science. There is also a neat discussion of Hume's account of causation in study 4. Wilson distances himself from the naive regularity-theory interpretation of Hume (308), but also points out that, unlike both the Aristotelians and the Cartesians, all necessity that Hume finds in causation is purely psychological: a matter of having a 'law-asserting attitude' (321) towards some regularities but not others. But the central study of the book is the first. There Wilson presents the Aristotelian view of science and knowledge in some detail and outlines the empiricist and rationalist reactions to it. His main point is that both rationalists and empiricists defended the new aim and the new method of the post-Galilean science, but it was the empiricists who really broke with the Aristotelian philosophical framework of substances, natures, essences and necessary connections. And they, Locke and Hume in particular, did this by repudiating the metaphysics of essences and the epistemology of rational intuition, innate ideas and infallible knowledge. Here, however, Wilson should have been clearer in his argument. For if we take the cognitive aim of science to be the discovery of matter-of-fact regularities, the Cartesians did break with the Aristotelians. But if we take the cognitive aim to be the establishment of infallible knowledge, then there is no such break. Which of

the two aims should we prioritise in our analysis of the new science? It seems that Wilson wavers. He does want to put Descartes and the like on the side of the new science, but he also wants to stress that they didn't break with the basic Aristotelian framework (cf. 86 and 111). Another problem might be his interpretation of Locke. He tends to present Locke more as an eliminativist about real essences (108) than as a sceptic about them. He attributes to Locke an ontological version of the basic empiricist 'Principle of Acquaintance' (249 and 335), whereas it seems that he was more after an epistemic version of this principle. However, later on (336), Wilson pictures Locke as an agnostic by noting his argument that we can, after all, form the abstract idea of real essences based on the immediate comprehension of the power of the will to bring about actions. Study 3, on logic, is very impressive. Wilson shows how both the rationalists and the empiricists distinguished the logic of consistency from the logic of truth — the two having been brought together by Aristotle. Here again, however, he seems to waver. For he says that for empiricists logic was simply the logic of consistency (214), but he then goes on to show how they after all tried to articulate a logic of truth — eliminative induction (cf. 255-61 and 340). To his credit, Wilson makes abundantly clear that any account of the new scientific method — eliminative induction — should rest on some substantive assumptions about the world: that there are causes to be found and that there is a limited variety of these causes. Rationalists and empiricists differ in the justification they offer for these assumptions. The former make them a priori true, whereas the latter treat them as empirical hypotheses — to be justified only a posteriori.

The Logic and Methodology of Science in Early Modern Thought is an impressive book that casts new light on many issues in the history of modern philosophy. It is full of rigorous scholarship and detailed examination of both more and less well-known works by many modern thinkers. But it also makes a couple of insightful contributions to still outstanding problems in the philosophy of science, e.g., the nature of laws of nature (231-53).

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