



THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF TRUTH

A Treatise on Anti-Logic



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Preface

“Es gibt keine Tatsachen, nur Interpretationen.” (There are no facts, only interpretations) – Friedrich Nietzsche, Notebooks, Summer 1886 to Fall 1887.

Does truth exist?

To many, the answer to that question would be in the form of a three-letter, monosyllabic word: yes. Yet by saying “yes”, one presupposes that “yes” (which is an affirmation of truth) has any meaning at all, and a meaning that can only exist if truth exists. If one proceeds to then choose “no” as a response so that the circular reasoning can be avoided, they are met with the same problem, because “no” is simply the negation of “yes” and therefore, it presupposes that “yes” exists in some way or another. Unsure of how to respond binarily, one might attempt in responding with a third option beyond “yes” and “no”. However, that would not be possible, as the question of truth is binary in such a way that a third option would dismiss the concept of truth entirely, in which case, truth is

rendered non-existent, and the answer reverts to “no”. From this, it appears that truth is presupposed in all objects of reality as its very existence cannot be questioned, and thus, two ideas become clear:

1. Whether truth exists or not becomes a question of utmost significance, since the answer to it would potentially shift our understanding of reality.
2. The question of whether truth exists or not cannot be answered through a direct response to the question, or else the response becomes paradoxical. Hence, this treatise takes an investigative approach into the very question of “does truth exist?” and will arrive at the conclusion that truth is impossible.

This investigative approach will begin by vivisecting the concepts of “truth” and “impossibility”, then considering their relation. After the concepts are clarified, two paradoxes which follow from the case that “truth is impossible” is valid will be examined and resolved. Subsequently, the proof that “truth is impossible” will begin, and this will be in the form of a proof by cases – where the impossibility of truth is demonstrated in truths existing both empirically and

rationally (which will later be affirmed as the only two types of truth). Since all logic is ultimately just the determination of how true ideas are, and truth will have just been shown to be impossible, this means that logic would also be impossible, so the concept of “anti-logic” will be a substitute for logic and will be analysed. “Anti-logic” will then be developed for pragmatic purposes (such as for an anti-logical system of ethics), and the concept of “anti-logic” will also be applied to theology and the question of whether God exists.

Thus, the following treatise considers the question “does truth exist?” and considers the consequences of truth being impossible.

Chapter 1: The Concept of Truth

Section 1: The Presupposition of Truth in All Concepts and Intuitions

Truth (or at least the concept of the existence of it in the world), as shown in the introduction, appears to be presupposed in all concepts, and also the intuitions by which those concepts are known. However, even if this *appears* to be the case, is it really?

I contend that it is the case because it is self-evident that all concepts and intuitions can be expressed in the form of propositions, or are propositions in-themselves, and deflationists (including Frank Ramsey) have shown that “it is true that...” can be placed in front of all propositions. For example, “Kant was a philosopher” can be changed into “it is true that Kant was a philosopher”.

Some may refute this view by arguing that propositions can be false, and therefore, “it is true that...” cannot be accurately placed in front of those propositions.

However, I suggest that a proposition must already contain their truth, or at least the possibility of their truth, within itself; and anything that does not satisfy

this would not be a proposition at all. For example, “extra-terrestrial life forms exist” should be changed to “it is possible that extra-terrestrial life forms exist”, and “all snow is black” should be changed to “it is false that all snow is black”. With this new definition of a proposition, the deflationist view is still accurate, because even false propositions such as “it is false that all snow is black” can be changed into “it is true that it is false that all snow is black”.

In addition, even what J.L. Austin calls “illocutionary acts” (such as commands) contain their truth or the possibility of their truth within themselves, as all illocutionary acts can be evaluated in the form “it is true/false/possible that an illocutionary act is being performed”.

Following this, some deflationists concluded that truth was a redundant predicate, but that it is still an important one and the Aristotelian *telos* or purpose of formal inquiry.

There are two main areas which I disagree about this deflationist conclusion:

1. Truth cannot be redundant if it is important, and besides, according to our definition of a proposition, the modality of the truth of that proposition should be expressed within the proposition, meaning that even if truth is redundant because it presupposes all propositions, the modality of truth contained within the proposition is most definitely not redundant.
2. Truth is not a predicate. This is because, based on the logic from Kant's critique of Descartes' ontological argument (where Kant argued that existence was not a predicate as it presupposed all things, and so it contradicted the definition of a predicate by not being able to function *particularly* to a concept, but only *universally* to all concepts), the presupposition of truth implies that truth is not a predicate.

However, following the conclusion that truth is not a predicate, three questions can be raised:

1. How does this apply to the liar paradox and self-referential propositions? Self-referential propositions are usually unproblematic (for

instance, one can state, “this sentence has five words” without problems), although they can still lead to paradoxes, and the most famous is the simplified liar paradox: “this proposition is false”. If the proposition is false, then it would be true that it is false, thus making it true, resulting in what appears to be contradictions that continue ad infinitum, with no clear answer as to whether it is true or false. A common resolution to this version of the liar paradox is by stating that “this proposition is false” is neither true nor false, however, this violates the principle of bivalence (which states that every proposition has exactly two possible truth values – true or false). Due to its violation of the principle of bivalence, it is apodictically troublesome in logical circumstances, and so is not the best solution. Another solution would be the one produced by Alfred Tarski, he suggested that each proposition had a temporary definition for truth, in their truth conditions. Because “this proposition is false” does not have these truth conditions (which is usually indicated by all propositions containing a conditional modifier or as a part of a conditional modifier as an antecedent or a consequent). However, I disagree with Tarski’s notion of truth,

because metaphysically speaking, there must exist an essence or form (as elucidated by Plato) as the basis for all ontically existent beings, and if truth only has temporary definitions, then truth is ontically non-existent and is only *functional* rather than *descriptive*, which is impossible if there is no absolute rule determining this function, which in-itself, would be the essence of the ontic being of truth. Either way, truth would be ontically non-existent according to Tarski's definition, and therefore, I have proposed another resolution to the liar paradox. I contend that in self-referential propositions, a particular predicate is contained within them as a constitutive part of their very concept of being self-referential. This predicate is the fact that self-referential propositions should have the truth of the cognitive import expressed from their self-reference judged as if it were a regular proposition, and that the self-reference is self-referential propositions is to be taken literally. Hence, in response to the liar paradox, the proposition is, in fact, false, because it states it is. If it is stated that the proposition is true, then that would be a judgement of the truth value of the

proposition in-itself, and not in the content of the proposition.

2. Does this prove that truth is non-existent and meaningless? No, because truth is still existent as a conceived concept, just not a predicate. Furthermore, the conclusion that truth is not a predicate does not mean that truth is completely redundant, because truth – even when subjectively identified – can be incredibly useful, and even utilised as a means for power, as proven in Foucault's philosophy.
3. Can truth be made a predicate? If truth is not a predicate but is not redundant, then it can be made into a predicate by *particularly* placing it in certain semantic situations whereby the modality of truth is significant and determines a certain outcome.

Now that it has been identified that truth presupposes all propositions and that truth is not a predicate yet is not redundant either, it can be beneficial to make a connexion to Heidegger's notion of *Seinsvergessenheit* - the presupposition of Being from his *Being and Time* (which can be considered very similar to Kant's theory

expressed earlier), and determine whether truth presupposes Being, Being presupposes truth, or something else entirely.

On the one hand, one may argue that truth presupposes Being. This can be done by stating that if truth presupposes all concepts and intuitions, and if Being is a concept, then it logically follows through simple *modus ponens* that truth presupposes Being.

On the other hand, one may also argue that Being presupposes truth. This can be done by stating that if Being is innate in all conceivable concepts (as Heidegger proved), then it is also innate in the concept of truth, and thus, Being presupposes truth.

From this, it can be seen that a paradox inevitably arises, and this can be resolved by recognizing a special quality present in the concepts of truth and Being if they presuppose all concepts and intuitions. This quality is that a concept that presupposes all concepts and intuitions must also presuppose themselves. Although this may lead some to derive that then, concepts of this type are impossible by *reductio ad absurdum*, it is not a contradiction, and it is only deemed to be so by intuition alone (based on

the principle that a concept cannot presuppose themselves). However, if this principle were true, then all forms of deduction would be impossible, because most formal systems of inquiry rely upon axioms, which presuppose themselves (i.e. the condition of their truth and the essence of themselves) yet also presuppose all others.

Hence, the Hegelian dialectic between whether truth presupposes Being or vice versa can be resolved by stating that truth and Being both are in a position similar to axioms, and they are both equally as significant in their presuppositions, yet they do still, in fact, presuppose all concepts and intuitions including themselves. Later in this treatise, it will be considered whether truth and Being are the same object, but for now, it should be assumed that they are arranged like axioms.

This “axiomatic” structuring of how truth presupposes all concepts and intuitions can then be linked to the French psychoanalyst Lacan’s concept of “The Real”. This is because Lacan explained the Real as “what resists symbolization absolutely,” or as Žižek described it, “an object that exists both as the object and as the obstacle in understanding that object at the

same time.” Thus, it can be said that when truth exists as an object and also as the object which presupposes all other objects used in understanding it or ascribing meaning to it (which Lacan thought resulted from a convergence between the Symbolic order and the Imaginary order), truth exists as the Lacanian Real (which doesn’t mean it is empirically existent).

Section 2: The Distinction between Subjective and Objective Truth

Subjective and objective truths can be easily differentiated using the two main linguistic modalities that concern truth, namely – the alethic modality and the epistemic modality. Alethic modal truths concern truths objective in the world, whereas epistemic modal truths concern truths subjective to an individual's mind. Hence, epistemic modal truths are synonymous with the intuitive notion of subjective truths, and alethic modal truths are synonymous with the intuitive notion of objective truths.

Some people criticize the linguistic modalities in-themselves because they note that in language, these are never formally differentiated. For example, in writing alone, the rules of grammar and the semantics of the different words do not change if the statement is alethic or epistemic. The distinctions between these two modalities are usually only evident in speaking, with paralinguistic and suprasegmental cues such as stressing certain syllables. Hence, the alethic/epistemic distinction may be purely intuitive.

The lack of formal distinction has then led some to conclude that there is no distinction at all, and all truth is subjective.

While I would agree with the conclusion, I disagree with the proof used to attain it. This is because the lack of formal distinction does not mean there is no distinction at all, and as referenced earlier, informal distinctions (which are still distinctions) can still be made.

However, I agree with the conclusion that all truth is subjective, because from a Kantian perspective, everything is known insofar as it is perceived from the manifold and categorized in synthetic unity by the mind. Besides, all truths must also begin in a single mind (because the same truth cannot be understood simultaneously in more than a single mind due to the fact that the manifold from which the truth's existence originates must also be the same for the knowledge of the truth to be the same, and since it would be impossible for there to be two identical empirical manifolds, it can only be in the same mind). Therefore, all truths exist in the mind.

Regardless, why have I chosen to use linguistic modalities in highlighting this difference?

Simply, it is because language is the structure from which everything is understood, and thus, it is fundamental. Since I am examining the fundamental matter of truth, examining it through language would be effective, because in applied Kuhnian terms, they would be “methodologically commensurable” through how they are both fundamental.

In the form of a quantificational first-order logic syllogism (expressed so that it matches natural human intuition processes):

$$\begin{aligned} &\forall x \neg \left(\neg (Language(x) \vee Fundamental(x)) \right) \\ &\forall y \neg \left(\neg (Truth(y) \vee Fundamental(y)) \right) \\ &\quad \vdash \forall x \forall y Examines(x, y) \end{aligned}$$

To show that this is correct, this syllogism can be demonstrated in axiomatic form to prove its logical validity:

$$\begin{aligned} &\forall x \neg \left(\neg (P(x) \vee S(x)) \right) \\ &\forall y \neg \left(\neg (Q(y) \vee S(y)) \right) \\ &\quad \vdash \forall x \forall y R(x, y) \end{aligned}$$

The premises can then be simplified (using De Morgan's laws) to:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x \neg(\neg P(x) \wedge \neg S(x)) \\ \forall y \neg(\neg Q(y) \wedge \neg S(y)) \\ \vdash \forall x \forall y R(x, y) \end{aligned}$$

Then, the negations can be distributed in the premises:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x (P(x) \vee S(x)) \\ \forall y (Q(y) \vee S(y)) \\ \vdash \forall x \forall y R(x, y) \end{aligned}$$

Since it is an inclusive disjunction, and since it is semantically implied through language that it is a conditional relationship, it then becomes:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x (P(x) \rightarrow S(x)) \\ \forall y (Q(y) \rightarrow S(y)) \\ \vdash \forall x \forall y R(x, y) \end{aligned}$$

Based on the Kuhnian logic used earlier, another premise can be introduced based on the fact that the subject matter is empirical and that the Kuhnian logic

is empirically adequate (in the van Fraassenian sense) in carrying out its *telos*:

$$\begin{aligned} &\forall x (P(x) \rightarrow S(x)) \\ &\forall y (Q(y) \rightarrow S(y)) \\ &\forall x \forall y ((S(x) \wedge S(y)) \rightarrow (R(x, y))) \\ &\vdash \forall x \forall y R(x, y) \end{aligned}$$

As can now be seen, the conclusion that $\forall x \forall y R(x, y)$ can be easily derived through a *modus ponens* elimination from the third premise.

In non-axiomatic form, it becomes:

$$\begin{aligned} &\forall x (\textit{Language}(x) \rightarrow \textit{Fundamental}(x)) \\ &\forall y (\textit{Truth}(y) \rightarrow \textit{Fundamental}(y)) \\ &\forall x \forall y ((\textit{Fundamental}(x) \wedge \textit{Fundamental}(y)) \\ &\quad \rightarrow (\textit{Examines}(x, y))) \\ &\vdash \forall x \forall y \textit{Examines}(x, y) \end{aligned}$$

Although it is now clear that the argument is logically valid, to show that it is sound, all three premises need to be proven.

The first premise, which states that language is fundamental, is most certainly true, because language

is the essence of meaning, and meaning is a necessary condition for all fundamentality, meaning that language is a constituent of fundamentality, which, analytically, makes language more fundamental than the very concept of fundamentality, meaning it is still fundamental, through the principle of disjunction elimination in logic.

Why is language the essence of meaning? Simply, it is because language is the concept that allows meaning to be possible. This is due to the fact that, by definition, meaning equates to the subjective knowledge of things, and for this knowledge to be possible, there must *a priori* conditions for knowledge, as Kant argued, and these conditions are, as Jung argued, found in things such as archetypes and synchronicities. While these objects of the collective unconscious or the *unus mundus* are signified concepts, they are only known, or have the potential of being known, through signifiers. Signifiers, are thus the expressors of all meaning, as was also acknowledged in Saussure's semiotics. Signifiers, although not always presented in the form of language, are most certainly always understood through language. This is because language is a condition that makes subjective knowledge (i.e. meaning) possible, due to the fact that we cannot

subjectively know anything if not for logic, and the fact that logic would not be possible if not for pre-established grammatical and linguistic structures that dictate the way we think. Therefore, since language is essential to signifiers, and signifiers are essential to the signified, and the signified are essential for meaning; we can conclude from *modus ponens* that language is essential to meaning.

Why is meaning a necessary condition for all fundamentality? It is because without meaning, fundamentality would be inconceivable and meaningless (by definition). Therefore, meaning becomes a necessary condition for all fundamentality.

The second premise, which states that truth is fundamental, is most certainly true because as stated earlier in this treatise, the existence of truth is presupposed in all things, thus making it fundamental to all things.

The third premise, which states that if language and truth are both fundamental, then language can be used to examine truth, is most certainly true because a possible relation between language and truth - denoted in axiomatic form as $R(x, y)$ - is that language can be

used to examine the concept of truth. In the first-order logic proof, as truth and language both share the predicate of being fundamental, a relation between can be made.

One may then contend otherwise, arguing that analogous examination is not a possible relation between language and truth because the predicate of fundamentality itself is the relation.

However, if one were to examine the predicate of fundamentality, then one would be examining the relation between language and truth, and the only way for that to be possible would be if the examination involved the relation and both objects involved in the relation – as a relation would be meaningless if not for the objects involved – thus leading to the logical conclusion that the examination involves language and truth; and since it would be redundant to examine language using truth (as truth is more fundamental than language), the other alternative would be to examine truth using language, which we have done.

Therefore, we can differentiate between the notions of subjective and objective truth, and this can be

supported by the linguistic modalities of alethic and epistemic.

Section 3: The Essences of Truth

To fully understand anything concerning truth, we must grapple with the entirety of its content, which is constituted mostly by its essences. By uncovering the essences of truth, we can uncover a definition of truth. To do this, Husserl's method of eidetic reduction can be utilised to arrive at the essences of truth.

However, there is something inherently paradoxical about this situation. This is because the eidetic reduction of a concept is only possible if it is predicated on a pre-established definition of the concept.

Thus, we can only know of a definition of truth if we know of its essences, but we can only know of the essences of truth if we know of its definition.

Hence, the following biconditional implication can be expressed:

$$\text{DefinitionOf(Truth)} \leftrightarrow \text{EssencesOf(Truth)}$$

To resolve this paradox, we can use the mereological definition of equality:

$EQ_{xy} =_{df} P_{xy} \wedge P_{yx}$

In other words, an equality is defined as when x is part of y and y is also part x.

A part can be defined as “that which can constitute a whole”.

Since it can be argued that the definition of truth is necessary for the constitution of the essences of truth and vice versa, the necessity for the constitution becomes a constitution in-itself. Therefore, the definition of truth constitutes the essences of truth and vice versa, meaning that they can both constitute a whole, implying that they are both parts of each other, and based on the mereological definition of equality, we can conclude that they are the identical.

However, this does not solve our problem, because if they are the same, we cannot perform eidetic reduction without the reasoning becoming circular and hence fallacious.

This means that we can never *deduce* the essences of truth *a priori*, and instead, we can try *inducing* the essences of truth *a posteriori*. This will not be an

optimal solution but is the only possible way. In fact, since we will be considering only the *a posteriori* side to truth in this treatise, inductive methodology would be compatible.

To arrive at the essences of truth through inductive reasoning, we will check whether a proposed definition of truth is satisfactory in valid propositions involving the idea of truth.

The following is a list of these valid propositions:

1. Truth functions universally to all conceivable objects.
2. Truth is presupposed in all conceivable objects.
3. Truth can be subjective or objective.
4. Truth must be known by a subject in order to exist.
5. Truth has connotations of purity and value.
6. Truth is a type of the Lacanian Real.

7. Truth can appear in infinitely possible forms.
8. Truth in its absolute form is the negation of absolute falsity.
9. Truth can be measured as any number equal to or between 0 and 1.

Now, I propose that truth is defined as “that which cannot be defined”.

By “define”, I refer to the ascribing of meaning (or signifiers) to something.

I have proposed this definition of truth because perchance, the impossibility of a logical *a priori* derivation of a definition is itself the definition. In this case, the definition is the absence of a definition. Hence, truth is “that which cannot be defined” because there is an impossibility in the *a priori* understanding of it, meaning it is of a quality that transcends the transcendent into a realm that rests on a blurred line between fiction and reality. In other words, it is a transcendental object.

This will seem more coherent when one considers the fact that truth is metaphysically fundamental and has its existence presupposed in all things, meaning that if we attempt to understand the concept through something less fundamental than it, such as linguistic definition, it is already presupposed as being understood, meaning that any attempts at a definition would only be *symbolic* and a twisted version of what is factual, making them absent of utility when one needs to examine the matter of truth accurately.

Additionally, in the first section of this chapter, I stated that I would consider whether truth and Being were the same object. In fact, I contend that they are the same, based on the mereological definition of equality referenced earlier.

Why is this the case?

It is because if truth presupposes Being, truth is a constitutive element of Being, thus making it a part of Being, and vice versa, so that truth and Being are part of each other, making them identical.

Besides, if our definition of truth is supported by the fact that truth is fundamental, and Being is also

fundamental, the same logical chain of reasoning can be used to arrive at the same conclusion.

However, one may argue that if truth and Being are the same, then Being can be defined as “that which cannot be defined”. One may propose that since some things with Being can, in fact, be defined, that this results in a contradiction.

Regardless, that argument relies upon the generally accepted definition of Being, which can be rendered false with the proof that truth equates to Being. I will term this generally accepted definition of Being as “existence”.

Hence, one can conclude upon the nihilistic idea that nothing *exists* as a result of the confliction of *existence* and the definition of Being.

To further affirm the definition of truth/Being, the definition will be checked against each of the 9 propositions:

1. The definition is coherent with the first proposition because truth/Being is fundamental to all things, meaning that it functions universally

to all things through means of that fundamentality.

2. The definition is coherent with the second proposition because the definition of truth/Being is supported by this proposition (as said earlier).
3. The definition is coherent with the third proposition because there can be “that which cannot be defined on a subjective level” and also “that which cannot be defined on an objective level”.
4. The definition is coherent with the fourth proposition because as Berkeley argued, God is always a subject in the perception of things, and as Leibniz argued, “monads” are always subjects in the perception of things, meaning that God or “monads” must always be able to know of truth as subjects to truth.
5. The definition is coherent with the sixth proposition because “that which cannot be defined” is of the utmost purity, in the fact that there is not a definition or linguistic structure to distort that purity and make it something new,

and the fact that it has this very unique and rare quality allows it to be of value.

6. The definition is coherent with the seventh proposition because truth/Being cannot be defined, yet it defines itself through that absence of definition, and is itself the absence of definition, meaning that it is both the object (the absence of definition) and the obstacle in understanding that object (its definition as the absence of definition) at the same time, making it the Lacanian Real. Besides, if truth/Being is “that which cannot be defined”, then it will definitely be “that which cannot be symbolized”, because symbolization requires definition. Hence, one can consider truth/Being to be a type of the Lacanian Real.

7. The definition is coherent with the eighth proposition because “that which cannot be defined” must also be “that which cannot be conceived”, be conceiving or perceiving something is a necessary condition for defining something, and since there are possibly infinite things that we do not conceive of, truth/Being can appear in infinitely many forms.

8. The definition is coherent with the ninth proposition because the “that which cannot be defined” has the possibility of being negated. In fact, once negated, it becomes “that which can be defined”, rendering all absolute falsities as all things that can be defined. The existence of every definable thing as an absolute falsity may be a possible aftermath to the “impossibility of truth”, which will be explored later in this treatise.

9. The definition is coherent with the tenth proposition because the “defined” in “that which cannot be defined” can have a level of certainty - corresponding to a value equal to or between 0 and 1 (a significant view in fuzzy logic that has proven to be of immense pragmatic success in the development of innovative technologies such as artificial intelligence). In other words, some things can be defined with more certainty than others.

To summarise this section, truth and Being are identical, according to the mereological definition of equality, and the essences which constitute the definition of truth/Being as “that which cannot be

defined” is satisfactory. In addition, if “that which cannot be defined” is the definition of truth/Being, this means that, in reference to the Preface of this treatise, all truths are humanly determined, because a truth would have to be known in order to be possible.

Section 4: The Essences of Knowledge

Truth/Being is the most fundamental concept *metaphysically* speaking, if everything in the world is considered an object, but if the world is considered the relations of objects to an individual perceiving subject, then knowledge would be the most fundamental. After all, nothing would be truthful or have Being if a subject did not know of it.

On the other hand, one may then contend that knowledge is predicated on the existence of subjects and objects, meaning that subjects and objects would be more fundamental. However, the problem with this attempted refutation of the argument is that it is still a metaphysical approach, as it detaches itself from the perspective of the subject.

Then, one may proceed to state that perhaps human consciousness or unconscious/subconscious qualities (such as desire or bias - found mainly in the Freudian id and superego) are more fundamental than human knowledge, because they do not necessarily require knowledge to function, and sometimes even dictate knowledge.

The problem with this statement is that human consciousness or unconscious/subconscious *a priori* qualities are themselves types of knowledge. This is because “conscious, unconscious and subconscious” appear to be synonymous with Kant’s “*a posteriori*, *a priori*, and *synthetic a priori*” – which are kinds of knowledge. Thus, while truth/Being is the most *metaphysically* fundamental, knowledge is the most *psychologically* fundamental.

As an analogy, one can conceptualize reality as an arrow – where the most metaphysically fundamental is the archer shooting the arrow, and the most psychologically fundamental would be the arrowhead, which would make the whole shooting process redundant if it were not there.

Now that we have established the significance of knowledge from the fact that it is the most psychologically fundamental object, it becomes important that we understand the essences of knowledge.

In the last section, we uncovered that the definition of a concept and the essences (in the pure phenomenological sense) of that concept are one and

the same, and so the only logical way to arrive at the essences/definition of a concept would be through inductive reasoning – where the methodology we adopted would be through the verification of the definition in relation to valid propositions.

To derive this set of valid propositions, let us first examine notable theories of knowledge and find common themes/ideas among them to be inductively assumed as qualities or predicates of knowledge. To propose a definition, our method will revolve around these common themes unlike the direct derivation from paradox in the previous section, because these epistemological theories must be evaluated from the perspective of the subject (as knowledge is psychologically fundamental), rather than as material objects – which was a method seen in the previous section. To understand knowledge as a subject, we can collect the common themes – which will provide the *subjective* yet universally consensual aspects of the human interpretation of knowledge, which can then be aggregated to propose a definition and a set of valid propositions:

- Plato thought that knowledge was JTB or justified true belief.

- Keith Lehrer and Thomas Paxson, in response to the Gettier counterexamples used to weaken Plato's theory, proposed that knowledge was undefeated justified true belief – meaning that a JTB or justified true belief counts as knowledge if and only if the knower did not know of any other truths that would defeat the present justification for their belief.
- Peirce pragmatically defined knowledge as the ideal belief that a subject would be led to through sufficient empirical investigation in the material world.
- Avicenna thought that knowledge was the merging of education/experience with the syllogistic analysis of that experience in the mind to create beliefs. This is very similar to Kant's theory of knowledge, except Kant believed that the rational understanding of experience was not limited to just syllogistic analysis, but *a priori* evaluations in general.
- Locke defined knowledge as “the perception of the connexion of and agreement, or disagreement

and repugnancy of any of our ideas” in Book IV of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Another empiricist, Hume, similarly stated that “[knowledge is] the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas.” This means that knowledge is the relation between beliefs, and since a belief can have a relation to itself, it implies that Locke and Hume believe knowledge to be beliefs and also, principally, the relation between those beliefs.

- Rationalists in general believe that knowledge is a result of rational *a priori* thought and intellectual exploration, which lead to the formation of beliefs.

From this list of notable theories of knowledge, one can see that there are two recurring themes throughout all of them: belief in the truth of information and the existence of a subject.

The following is a set of valid propositions concerning knowledge:

1. Knowledge functions universally to all conceivable subjects.

2. Knowledge is presupposed in all conceivable subjects.
3. Knowledge can be subjective or objective.
4. Knowledge must be believed to be truthful by the subject.
5. Knowledge must contain information.
6. Knowledge has connotations of experience and rationality.
7. Consciousness, subconsciousness, and unconsciousness are themselves types of knowledge.
8. Knowledge exists in relation to time.
9. The existence of knowledge implies the existence of a subject.
10. Knowledge is a relation between a set of objects and a subject.

As an assimilation of the common themes, I propose that knowledge is defined as “a subject’s belief in the truth of a conceivable piece of information.”

If the definition of truth/Being is substituted into the definition of knowledge, the definition of knowledge then becomes “a subject’s belief in their inability to define a conceivable piece of information.”

An example of knowledge would be knowledge of a musical piece. If a subject has knowledge of this musical piece, then it means they believe they cannot define the musical piece. Why can they not define it if they can hear it clearly and know what a musical piece is? Simply, because the more they perceive the musical piece, the more they realise how the music has subtleties and intricate yet sometimes unintended details that collectively, would be too complex for definition (which is inherently reductionist, because it removes some content that cannot be communicated through symbols of any sort – i.e. essences or the Will – vis-à-vis the replacement of those essences with signifiers of them that lack the full expressive capability and are entrapped within pre-established structures of the understanding).

My definition of knowledge also leads to the conclusion that if you believe that you can define something, then it is not knowledge, and neither is definition in-itself. This supports a key idea in structural linguistics or structuralism – where the context something is placed in with regard to syntax and semantics is more significant in the understanding of it than just plain definition.

The definition can also be interpreted as the “a subject’s subjective truth”, which may lead some to logically conclude that all knowledge is subjective or is only possible when existing in relation to a subject.

To validify the definition of knowledge, the following proves it checks against all the 10 valid propositions:

1. The definition is coherent with the first proposition because a subject can never believe they can define everything, as there are infinitely many possible things to define.
2. The definition is coherent with the second proposition because its coherence with the first proposition implies that if knowledge is present in all conceivable subjects, then a necessary part

of a subject would be knowledge, and thus, knowledge would be presupposed in any conceivable subject.

3. The definition is coherent with the third proposition because while it is analytically true that knowledge can be subjective, objectivity is simply knowledge that is intersubjective to such an extent that it is of near or total universal consensus, making it pragmatic to accept the knowledge as objective.
4. The definition is coherent with the fourth proposition because it is a logical tautology, due to the fact that the proposition itself is simply the reiteration of a part of the definition.
5. The definition is coherent with the fifth proposition because it is also a logical tautology, due to the fact that the proposition itself is also the reiteration of a part of the definition.
6. The definition is coherent with the sixth proposition because “belief” connotes to both experience (in the sense that belief or continued belief is a result of experience) and rationality (in

the sense that belief is continued as a result of rationality), and since the definition of knowledge contains belief, knowledge itself must also have those connotations through the transitive property.

7. The definition is coherent with the seventh proposition because a belief can be unconscious, subconscious, or conscious, and since knowledge is constitutive of belief, and unconsciousness, subconsciousness and consciousness are, analytically, types of belief, the transitive property can also be used to conclude that they are types of knowledge.
8. The definition is coherent with the eighth proposition because belief can be altered, changed, or removed in relation to time, and from the same logic as the previous proof of coherence, the transitive property can be used to deduce the fact that knowledge would also exist in relation to time.
9. The definition is coherent with the ninth proposition because a necessary condition for the definition of knowledge to be possible is the

existence of the subject, meaning that the existence of knowledge implies the existence of the subject.

10. The definition is coherent with the tenth proposition because the “information” referred to in the definition is the set of objects, and the “belief” is the relation between the information and the subject, meaning that knowledge is a relation between a set of objects and a subject.

In summary, the essences which constitute the definition of knowledge as “a subject’s belief in the truth of a conceivable piece of information” is satisfactory.

Section 5: The Relation between Truth and Knowledge

Now that the definitions/essences of truth and knowledge have been uncovered, we can analyse the relation between the two concepts.

The following are some connexions between truth and knowledge:

1. As stated in the previous section, one of the similarities between truth and knowledge is that they are both fundamental to reality – except truth/Being is metaphysically fundamental (if reality – or the Hegelian absolute – was interpreted as a set of objects) and knowledge is psychologically fundamental (if reality – or the Hegelian absolute – was interpreted as subject-object relations).
2. Additionally, the definition of knowledge as “a subject’s belief in the truth of a conceivable piece of information” contains truth within it, meaning that the existence of knowledge directly implies the existence of truth.

3. Furthermore, we must have *knowledge* of a definition of truth in order for the definition to be possible.

While the above three paragraphs may appear as relations between truth and knowledge, they are not, in fact, relations. This is due to the fact that by “relation”, I denote a single transcendental relation that can be ascertained synthetically through an *a priori* judgement.

Thus, since the three paragraphs reveal commonalities, shared predicates, and links (such as the predicate of fundamentality) *a priori* between truth and knowledge, they can be synthesized together to arrive at a relation between truth and knowledge.

The first paragraph shows that there is a shared predicate between truth and knowledge – the predicate of fundamentality. In quantificational first-order logic, a syllogism of this would be as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 &\forall x (Truth(x) \rightarrow Fundamental(x)) \\
 &\forall y (Knowledge(y) \rightarrow Fundamental(y)) \\
 &\vdash \forall x \forall y ((Truth(x) \wedge Knowledge(y)) \\
 &\quad \rightarrow Fundamental(x, y))
 \end{aligned}$$

The second paragraph shows that truth constitutes a part of knowledge. In first-order logic, where ‘P’ denotes a parthood relation, this is written as:

$$\forall x \forall y ((\textit{Truth}(x) \wedge \textit{Knowledge}(y)) \rightarrow P(x, y))$$

The third paragraph shows that knowledge constitutes a part of truth. In first-order logic, where ‘P’ denotes a parthood relation, this is written as:

$$\forall x \forall y ((\textit{Truth}(x) \wedge \textit{Knowledge}(y)) \rightarrow P(y, x))$$

From the three first-order logic propositions derived, we can synthesize them together:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x \forall y & ((\textit{Truth}(x) \wedge \textit{Knowledge}(y)) \\ & \rightarrow \textit{Fundamental}(x, y)) \\ & \wedge ((\textit{Truth}(x) \wedge \textit{Knowledge}(y)) \\ & \rightarrow P(x, y)) \\ & \wedge ((\textit{Truth}(x) \wedge \textit{Knowledge}(y)) \\ & \rightarrow P(y, x)) \end{aligned}$$

By removing the repeated “ $(\textit{Truth}(x) \wedge \textit{Knowledge}(y))$ ”, we can simplify it to:

$$\forall x \forall y (Fundamental(x, y) \wedge P(x, y) \wedge P(y, x))$$

The latter section of the proposition – $P(x, y) \wedge P(y, x)$ – may lead some to conclude based on the mereological definition of equality that truth and knowledge are identical.

However, the problem with the derivation of this conclusion lies in how the parthood relations were established in the first place. Truth/Being constitutes part of knowledge because it constitutes all things as a result of its metaphysical fundamentality, and knowledge constitutes part of truth/Being because it constitutes all things as a result of its psychological fundamentality.

Metaphysical fundamentality and psychological fundamentality operate under different axioms and principles, very much like the general relativity/quantum physics dichotomy. This means that in order to accurately validate the fact that truth/Being is the same as knowledge, we must first prove that metaphysical fundamentality and psychological fundamentality are the same.

To do this, I've decided to change the question from "are metaphysical fundamentality and psychological fundamentality the same?" to two questions: "is metaphysical fundamentality innately psychological?" and "is psychological fundamentality innately metaphysical?".

By showing that the answer to both questions is "yes", we can establish a mereological equality between metaphysical fundamentality and psychological fundamentality, showing that they are the same, which then would logically imply (based on the previous argument), that the relation between truth/Being and knowledge is an equality relation.

Is metaphysical fundamentality innately psychological?

Yes, and this is because metaphysical fundamentality is innately psychological because a metaphysical view of the world would be viewing the world as a set of objects, yet these objects themselves must first be *known* in order to exist or have any value in existence, and since you can only *know* if you are a single unified subject, it means that one can never detach oneself

from the subject, because the subject is necessary for the object.

Besides, the objects are themselves only defined through their relations to other objects. For example, in music, harmony is defined less by the essences of the notes themselves, but by the relations those notes have to other notes. In fact, the essences of the notes are themselves the relations the notes have to other notes, because 12-tone equal temperament – the musical note system widely used today – defines notes as equally divided twelfths of an octave. This means that notes are essentially divisions that can only exist in relation to other divisions/notes which collectively constitute the whole of an octave.

If the above example is utilised in a proof by analogy, it can be reasonably concluded that objects of reality can only exist when related to other objects and subjects which then collectively constitute the whole of reality.

This is a view that is supported by modern paradigms of science. As Bertrand Russell explained in *The Problems of Philosophy*, “Physical science, more or less unconsciously, has drifted into the view that all

natural phenomena ought to be reduced to motions. Light and heat and sound are all due to wave-motions, which travel from the body emitting them to the person who sees light or feels heat or hears sound. That which has the wave-motion is either aether or ‘gross matter’, but in either case is what the philosopher would call matter.” Motions are only possible as a relation between a subject and object, meaning that if one were to define an object, one must define it through the relation that object bears to the subject, which then presupposes the existence of the subject, and thus makes the subject fundamental to it, and fundamentality in this case analytically can only refer to a psychological fundamentality.

Is psychological fundamentality innately metaphysical?

Yes, and this is because a subject must exist in reality and cannot be transcendent above it, or else the pure intuitions of space-time would be non-existent, and the human understanding of all things would fall apart. This would mean that humans would be much like the lemurs in William S. Burroughs’ short story *The Ghost Lemurs of Madagascar* – which are endowed with a completely different method of thought and understanding of space and time that is impenetrable to

the human mind. If a subject exists in reality, then it can be viewed as an object of reality – which reverts to the metaphysical view that reality is nothing but a set of objects, implying that psychological fundamentality has metaphysical grounds and is therefore innately metaphysically fundamental.

Now that it has been shown that metaphysical fundamentality is innately psychological and that psychological fundamentality is innately metaphysical, it means that they are both parts of each other, allowing for the mereological definition of equality to be used to establish the fact that metaphysical fundamentality equates to psychological fundamentality.

As stated earlier, this implies that truth/Being and knowledge are the same, meaning that truth equates to Being which equates to knowledge. Additionally, a relation between truth, Being and knowledge was also considered by Aquinas in his *Summa Theologica*, where he stated, “Knowledge can be concerned only with being, for nothing can be known, save what is true, and all that is, is true.”

There will inevitably be paradoxes that arise as a result of this. For example, if the definition of knowledge

refers to truth as a constituent of the definition, it means that truth would be a proper part of knowledge, which would contradict the idea that they are identical. However, these paradoxes and contradictions do not damage the overall validity of my argument, because they are to be best interpreted as Kantian “antinomies of pure reason” (which will be discoursed on in later chapters) that reveal flaws or falsities in the human systems of logical reasoning, rather than falsities in the world.

Thus, succinctly, the relation between truth/Being and knowledge is their identity.

Chapter 2: The Concept of Impossibility

Section 1: The Essences of Impossibility

In the previous chapter we learned that truth is identical to Being, which was identical to knowledge, and because of the transitive property, it means that all three are the same. After analyzing the concept of truth in depth, we have a sufficient understanding of it for use in this treatise that seeks to prove the impossibility of truth. As we have completed our investigation into the nature of truth, the next rational thing to do would be to investigate into the second main component of the treatise – impossibility – which is what will be done in this chapter.

In this section, we will consider the essences of impossibility, and as was uncovered in earlier sections, the essences of a concept are equivalent to the concept's definition, and these essences cannot be known through deductive reasoning, but only through inductive reasoning – which we have done by listing valid propositions regarding the concept and confirming that the definition satisfies each of those propositions.

Before we inductively conclude upon the essences or the definition for truth, we should first establish the significance of impossibility.

Analytically, it can be said that since impossibility is central to the topic of this discourse, it is significant.

However, in general contexts, one could contend that impossibility is still significant as a result of the fact that impossibility is the negation of possibility – which is integral to everything that exists, because existence is conditioned by the initial possibility of existence. According to a public domain translation of Lao Tzu's *Tao Te Ching*, “being and non-being produce each other”. In other words, a concept only has meaning if its antonym exists. This means that if possibility is fundamental to all things, then so is its antonym – impossibility.

Already, we have the intuitive notion that impossibility can be defined as “the absence of possibility”.

However, this is a problematic definition for two reasons:

1. Firstly, because possibility can never be *absent*. A possible event is one that may exist. Hence, if

an event is conceivable (and an event must, by definition, be conceivable, in order for it to be entrapped in something like language), then it has the possibility of existing empirically.

Despite this, one may propose that an exception be made for events that violate the laws of logic. For example, although one can conceive of a statement being simultaneously true and false, it does not have a possibility of existence because it violates the very laws of logic that determine the empirical world. However, one can argue that these laws of logic are themselves not set in stone, adapting to ever-changing human thought. For example, the modern, non-classical branch of logic known as dialethic logic affirms the fact that a statement can be true and false at the same time. In Foucault's *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, he revealed that every historical period has a characteristic *episteme* - unconscious assumptions about metaphysics and epistemology which determined aspects of that historical period ranging from social standards to the direction of academic research to the arts. Because of this, even the logically impossible would still be possible, meaning that any conceivable thing is possible,

so “impossibility” defined as “the absence of possibility” would be a flawed and problematic definition.

2. Secondly, “the absence of possibility” is what Hegel would call an *indeterminate negation* of possibility. This is because there is an infinite set of objects (regardless of its human conceivability – because what *exists* is irrelevant to what a human *believes it exists as*) that are negations of possibility. If the definition of impossibility is just a negation of another concept, then there are infinitely possible things it could be, thus it is indeterminate. For example, simply negating the idea of a saxophone does not contain any new information in-itself, because the negation of a saxophone could designate absolutely anything other than a saxophone: sushi, Napoleon, wolves, rectangles, the Cuban Missile Crisis, *et cetera*. As a result of this, if the very definition of impossibility is a negation, then the definition would be pointless and therefore problematic.

Due to the fact that it would be of minimal utility to define impossibility as “the absence of possibility”, a new definition should be used.

To affirm the new definition that will be proposed, we will check its viability in the following valid propositions concerning the concept of impossibility:

1. Impossibility can be a quality of anything.
2. Impossibility can be subjective or objective.
3. All unconceivable things are impossible.
4. Impossibility is fundamental to the unconceivable.
5. Impossibility can exist empirically only under specific conditions.
6. Impossibility is knowable when empirical.
7. Impossibility can appear in infinitely possible forms.
8. Impossibility in its absolute form is the negation of absolute necessity.

9. Impossibility can be measured as any number equal to or between 0 and 1.
10. Impossibility has connotations of irrationality and extreme difficulty.

As a new definition, I contend that impossibility should be redefined as “a subject’s belief in the possibility of an event.” This seemingly contradictory definition is, in fact, not so contradictory.

This is because the human mind is never *inclined* to believe in the mere *possibility* of an event. Subjective biases and pre-existing subjective ideas existing *a priori*, as well as Foucauldian power relations such as social normalities and social ideologies existing *a posteriori*, by definition, constantly tug at a person’s opinions in different directions until the feeling of absoluteness in an individual idea or in a coherence with society is established, meaning that one never considers the *possibility* of an event (which is a binary condition between “yes” and “no”), but only the *likelihood* of an event (which is a condition with infinitely possible values in between “yes” or “no”, or in other words, an infinitude of binary oppositions that resolve themselves at an infinitely increasing rate, and

thus never really ends, and the feeling of its end or absoluteness is only a *feeling* due to the fact that it exists within the constructs of human subjectivity, and the feeling arises when the majority of these subjective qualities and power relations align and supplement one another with cohesion and similarity). These binary oppositions can also be seen as the scaled-down Hegelian dialectics of the subjective interpretation of ideas that are already in dialectical cycles on a larger social scale carrying themselves out in a subjective self-consciousness. Hence, even the infinitude of dialectics in the mind which create the feeling of an absoluteness in *possibility* (the main dialectic between the “yes” or “50%<” and the “no” or “>50%” which all the “infinitude of *likelihood* dialectics” contribute to) is never really permanent, implying that we never believe in the possibility of something, but only the temporary cohesion in the majority of the subjective *a priori* qualities with Foucauldian power relations. Therefore, we always are inclined to believe in the constantly changing likelihood of a thing, and never its possibility, or rather, anything at all with finitary value or what can be termed “true absoluteness”. From this, we can derive our definition of impossibility by first arguing that when a person reaches a stage where they believe in the *possibility* of an event, the infinitude of

dialectics transcends the limited capabilities of the human mind and so it can be assumed logically that the number of increasing dialectics “transcends that which cannot be transcended”, appearing as the Hegelian “Absolute Idea” to the human, but in reality, it is still increasing, just outside the reaches of human understanding. Due to this, we can argue that there are typically at least two “absolutes” when one considers the possibility of an event – the feeling of absoluteness and the absoluteness that originates in the transcendence of human knowledge. Now, why does this second absoluteness equate to impossibility? Simply, because the two absolutes must be distinct, or else it would be assumed that a subjective interpretation of something (the feeling) equates to the reality as it is (the noumena or the second absoluteness). Because they must be distinct and they are evaluations of the possibility of an event (which is a binary opposition between “yes” or “no”, as elucidated earlier), these two “absolutes” must be identical to and correspond with one of the two evaluations from “yes” or “no”, or “possible” and “impossible”. The second absoluteness must be identical to impossibility because the second absoluteness can be considered more absolute than the first as there are no more “absolutes” that replace it

and deem it redundant, unlike the first absoluteness. Similar to this, the falsification of something (i.e. impossibility) is also more absolute than the verification of something (i.e. possibility). This is because, as Popper showed, a verification is a conclusion from a smaller set of information than a falsification, which is derived as a correction of the flaws from the verification with a larger set of information. Besides, this fits in well also to Kuhn's theory of paradigms and Foucault's theory of epistemes, because old beliefs are typically abandoned and falsified by new beliefs as a result of new knowledge or new ideals. Therefore, the second absoluteness can be considered a more absolute, more real evaluation of possibility than the first absoluteness, meaning that impossibility is identical to the second absoluteness and can be defined as the most real evaluation of the possibility of an event, and since an evaluation must, analytically, end with a belief, and all beliefs require subjects as a necessary condition for their existence, the definition of impossibility as "a subject's belief in the possibility of an event" can be derived.

Now, to validate our definition of impossibility, we will check its coherence with each of the 10 propositions listed:

1. The definition is coherent with the first proposition because a subject can believe in the possibility of anything, meaning that anything can be impossible.
2. The definition is coherent with the second proposition because it, by definition, can be subjective, and as shown in our evaluation of the essences of knowledge, objectivity is simply something that is intersubjective to such an extent that it is of near or total universal consensus, so if the concept of impossibility is subjective, then it can also be objective.
3. The definition is coherent with the third proposition because a subject must believe in the possibility of all unconceivable things, or else they will believe that only conceivable things exist, meaning they would think that only *subjectively* conceivable things exist due to their position as a subject, meaning they would think themselves to be omniscient, and therefore

omnipotent, which is beyond human limits and thus a falsity. If a subject believes in the possibility of all unconceivable things, then it means that all unconceivable things are impossible, at least from a human standpoint.

4. The definition is coherent with the fourth proposition because if all unconceivable things have the predicate of being impossible, then it no longer is a predicate, but just something fundamental to all unconceivable things.
5. The definition is coherent with the fifth proposition because the “specific conditions” would be the requirement for each of the dialectics in the infinitude of dialectics to collectively constitute the second absoluteness (i.e. impossibility), and it can exist empirically, because beliefs themselves exist in relation to time, or rather, the spatiotemporal intuitions which Kant thought allowed for all human knowledge.
6. The definition is coherent with the sixth proposition because knowledge, as defined earlier, is “a subject’s belief in the truth of a

conceivable piece of information”, and when something is empirical, it analytically must also be conceivable, and since all beliefs must be assumed as truthful in order to be beliefs, impossibility must be knowable when empirical.

7. The definition is coherent with the seventh proposition because there is an infinite amount of unconceivable information, and since we proved earlier that all unconceivable information is impossible at least as a human, it follows that impossibility can appear in infinitely possible forms.
8. The definition is coherent with the eighth proposition because “absolute necessity” is only a subjective *feeling* that we showed earlier was only a “feeling of absoluteness in the possibility of an event”, and since it has been established that when considering the possibility of something, there is a main dialectic between the two absolutes – possibility and impossibility, the two must be opposites.
9. The definition is coherent with the ninth proposition because impossibility is the belief in

possibility, and since possibility can be a value from 0 to 1, or 0% to 100%, it is logical to conclude that a belief in that would retain this essential quality.

10. The definition is coherent with the tenth proposition because the definition of impossibility appears paradoxical or contradictory, thus having the connotation of irrationality, and it has the connotation of extreme difficulty because there is an infinite set of unconceivable objects that are all impossible, and “describing the unconceivable”, like the concept of impossibility does, self-evidently has that connotation.

To end this section, it can be stated that impossibility can be defined as “a subject’s belief in the possibility of an event”, and although this definition has appeared very contradictory at first, it has been proven that it is not through the evaluation that all conceptions of the possibility of an event are really infinitudes of Hegelian dialectics that occur in the mind at an infinitely increasing rate, and these dialectics are made up of all the different factors that generate a subjective idea of the possibility of something, such as subjective

bias or Foucauldian power relations. Additionally, these dialectics then collectively constitute one main dialectic – one between the two sensations of “absoluteness” that a subject has when considering the possibility of something, with the first absoluteness being a *feeling* of absoluteness arising through verification, and the second absoluteness being a point where the number of dialectics increase past human understanding, and thus arising from a falsification of the first absoluteness, being identical to the concept of impossibility.

Section 2: The Relation between Impossibility and Truth

Now that we have examined the essences of impossibility and truth, we can consider their relation.

Note that as stated earlier, I define a relation as “a single transcendental relation that can be ascertained synthetically through an *a priori* judgement.” This means that the relation between these two concepts cannot be determined arbitrarily like being a quality shared by the two concepts, because it would make the relation itself redundant, as all things share qualities, such as the quality of being part of “Substance” (in Spinozist terms).

All truths are humanly determined, because truths would not have any meaning if not determined (or interpreted under the framework of subjective *a priori* ideas) by humans.

Hence, in order for any arguments regarding how truth is impossible to function correctly, I must first examine the proposition “truth is impossible”, because it appears that the “is” may be a potential relation

between truth and impossibility, as it *linguistically* relates the two concepts.

One may think *prima facie* that the “is” means that impossibility and truth are identical. However, “is” isn’t necessarily an identity predicate. For example, when one says that “Goethe is German”, it obviously does not mean that the concept of Goethe is identical to the concept of being German, because, evidently, not all Germans are Goethe. There are many such examples that point towards the fact that “is” isn’t always an identity predicate interchangeable with “=”: the cat is white, 2 is a prime number, Socrates is a mortal, *et cetera*.

The function that the “is” serves in all these contexts where it is not a relation of identity can be considered a predicate relation other than the identity predicate – where there is an object that has some predicate or belongs to some set. In “the cat is white”, the “is” makes it evident that the cat belongs to the set of white objects or has the predicate of being white.

Therefore, we can deduce the fact that the purpose of the word “is” is to elucidate any predicate relation that the user of the word wishes to express. This means that

when one says that “truth is impossible”, they do not mean “truth = impossibility”. Instead, in the first-order logic form “ $P(x,y)$ ” where “ P ” denotes a predicate and “ (x,y) ” denotes the two arguments in the 2-ary predicate relation, one can express the predicate relation between truth and impossibility as “ $P(\text{truth}, \text{impossibility})$ ”.

I propose that all predicate relations are parthood relations. Why is this the case?

Simply, when one uses a predicate in relation to an object, they are essentially *describing* that object using that predicate, because a predicate can only exist when it constitutes a relation between objects that constitute a fact, and as Wittgenstein said in Proposition 1.13 of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, “The facts in logical space are the world,” meaning that predicates constitute facts that describe the world, and in order for constitution of any sort to be possible, all objects related in that constitution must be known or at least described, and since the predicate is the only thing relating the objects within the fact, it must also be the only thing describing the objects within that fact. When one describes an object, one describes a *part* of that object, because even though the description of the

object as a whole would not be a *proper part* of that object, it is still a part of that object. Hence, if predicates describe parthood relations between objects, and if predicates are, analytically, nothing aside from the purpose they serve in logical contexts, then predicates are themselves nothing but their purpose in describing parthood relations, and since all things must be known in order to exist or at least have any real value, and a necessary condition for knowledge is information, which relies upon the descriptive capabilities of a means such as language to be possible, the description as an act-in-itself becomes redundant as a result of its abundance, and thus, a predicate relation becomes nothing more than a parthood relation. Besides, if one thinks of predicates as sets, then the idea of predicates as parthood relations becomes even more apparent. Additionally, even identity predicates would still be parthood relations because identity (or identicality) relies upon the mereological definition of equality, which is to do with parts and parthood relations.

As a result of this, it means that when one says, “truth is impossible”, it means that truth is a part (or member) of the collective set of impossible things.

Regardless, this still does not mean that truth and impossibility are not identical, but to show that they are, in fact, not identical, we must prove that the set of all impossible things is not a part (or subset) of the set of all truthful things.

This can be done through a proof by counterexample. Since there exist infinite unconceivable things that are all impossible, it means there must also be infinite true unconceivable things that are all impossible, and likewise, infinite false unconceivable things that are all impossible. Any one of these infinite false unconceivable things can be used in a proof by counterexample to, by *reductio ad absurdum*, show that a contradiction inevitably arises between how the impossible, unconceivable object is false and how the premise states that all impossible objects must be true, hence allowing for the negation of the premise, showing that truth is not identical to impossibility.

This relation between truth and impossibility is also *the* relation between the two, because a parthood relation must be transcendental and single (by definition), and while we have not ascertained the relation through a synthetic *a priori* judgement, the definition of a relation only states that it *can* be

ascertained through such means, implying that it does not necessarily have to be so.

In addition to this, there is something that should be noted about parthood relations in general – the constituents of that relation cannot be antonymic. For example, to quote Shakespeare, “feather of lead, bright smoke, cold fire, sick health!”

While this can allow for effective use of oxymorons in literature, when dealing with affairs of logic such as this treatise, they would only be explicit contradictions. This means that one cannot consider truth to be the antonym of impossibility after reading the justifications of the predicate relation that “truth is impossible”, which are to follow.

Thus, to conclude this section, the relation between truth and impossibility is a parthood relation, where impossibility is a part (or a predicate) of truth. The reasons for why this relation is the case will be considered in some of the forthcoming chapters of this treatise.

Chapter 3: The First Antinomy Concerning the Impossibility of Truth

Section 1: The Exposition of this Antinomy

Before we proceed with the reasons for why truth is impossible, we must first resolve two antinomies that arise if the conclusion that “truth is impossible” is validated. If the conclusion that “truth is impossible” is thought of as an antecedent in a conditional expression, then these antinomies can be seen as the necessary consequents of that antecedent.

This first antinomy concerns the very state of the proposition “truth is impossible”. If truth is impossible, then what happens to the truth of the proposition which asserts that “truth is impossible”?

Similarly:

If Descartes could doubt everything except the doubting itself, then can he doubt the *proposition* that he can doubt everything except the doubting itself?

If the only thing Socrates knows is “knowing that he knows nothing”, then wouldn’t the act of knowing nothing itself be knowing something, meaning that he does know something, contradicting the premise that he “knows nothing”?

If Derrida thought that there was no absolute truth in the world and only subjective interpretation, then would his own theory itself become subjective and therefore be of just the same value as any other theory that came before it, making it validate its own redundancy?

The above are all antinomies, which are considered by W.V. Quine to be paradoxical situations where perfectly logical reasoning results in a contradiction, but where there is no apparent fallacy in the argument. Quine thought that there were two other types of paradoxes: veridical paradoxes – where the entire argument is logical, yet the conclusion is counterintuitive, and falsidical paradoxes – where there are false claims or fallacies committed in the argument.

Quine also believed that antinomies could not be resolved or else they would be veridical paradoxes. However, in this chapter, we will still attempt to resolve these antinomies because they are still in fact “unresolvable” in Quine’s and the general idea of resolution as a single resolution. If we present two possible resolutions and make the two resolutions form a dialectic, then we can resolve the dialectic, which

would in turn “resolve” the antinomy, whilst allowing it to retain its position as an antinomy.

Kant also thought that antinomies could not be resolved, and that it was because of the limits of human logic, but by “human logic”, he refers to the strictly human method of apodictic deduction, but if we use the natural dialectical processes of material reality, we can almost transcend our position as a human becoming *Übermensch*-like beings, and potentially reason from pure reason alone. Hence, our method is still valid.

If we return to the main antinomy that will be considered in this chapter (i.e. whether the proposition which states that “truth is impossible” is truthful or not), we can link Quine’s definition of an antinomy to it, allowing for us to deduce the fact that the conclusion that “truth is impossible” is a direct result of logical reasoning.

This is apparent in how logical principles (such as the mereological definition of equality) and first-order logic arguments have been explicitly used extensively in this treatise and will be used even more later on. In fact, the act of writing would itself be considered by

Derrida to be *logocentric*, and the act of signifying the *logos* through language would already be rooted in some unconscious idea of how signifiers should operate logically.

From this, we can say that this antinomy may also be phrased as “is the logic used to derive the proposition (truth is impossible) true?” instead of “is the proposition (truth is impossible) true?”, because the proposition is only a direct product of the logic used to derive it, meaning that if the proposition is invalid, we can use a sort of *modus tollens* to conclude that the logic which produced it is invalid.

However, before we provide possible solutions to this antinomy, we must first confirm whether it is, in fact, an antinomy. To do this, we must prove that it is a paradox, and that it is neither falsidical nor veridical, leaving its only option as being antinomic.

A paradox is defined by the Oxford Dictionary of English as “a seemingly absurd or contradictory statement or proposition which when investigated may prove to be well founded or true.” In this case, our “seemingly absurd or contradictory statement or proposition” would be “the proposition which states

that truth is impossible is true/not true”. Although it may appear that our paradox is two distinct paradoxes that begin when you assume the proposition to be either “true” or “false”, Kant argued in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that they are just the thesis and antithesis of the same paradox:

Thesis: If the proposition “truth is impossible” is assumed to be true, then it would contradict the idea that truth is impossible through the fact that it is itself a counterexample.

Antithesis: If the proposition “truth is impossible” is assumed to be false, then it would mean that the proposition implies its own falsity, much like the liar’s paradox referenced earlier in this treatise. Besides, we have already established in the Preface to this book that by saying “false” or “no”, then the dichotomy between truth and falsity is presupposed, meaning that truth would still exist and thus be possible, leading to the same problems that arise when one assumes “truth is impossible” to be true.

As we have shown that our proposition is indeed a paradox, we now need to prove that it is not falsidical and veridical to affirm the fact that it is an antinomy.

In order for it to be a falsidical paradox, then the thesis or the antithesis (or both) must be fallacious.

However, this is not the case, which is evident in the following quantificational first-order logic arguments for both the thesis and antithesis:

Thesis:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \forall x (Truth(x) \rightarrow \neg(x)) \\
 & \forall x (\neg(x) \rightarrow \neg(Truth(x) \rightarrow \neg(x))) \\
 & \forall x (\neg(x) \rightarrow \neg Truth(x) \rightarrow \neg\neg(x)) \\
 & \quad \forall x (\neg Truth(x) \rightarrow (x)) \\
 & \forall x (Truth(x) \rightarrow \neg(x) \rightarrow \neg Truth(x) \rightarrow (x)) \\
 & \forall x ((Truth(x) \rightarrow \neg Truth(x)) \wedge (\neg(x) \rightarrow (x))) \\
 & \quad \vdash \perp
 \end{aligned}$$

Antithesis:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \forall x (Truth(x) \rightarrow \neg(x)) \\
 & \forall x (\neg(Truth(x) \rightarrow \neg(x))) \\
 & \quad \forall x (\neg Truth(x) \rightarrow (x)) \\
 & \forall x (Truth(x) \rightarrow \neg(x) \rightarrow \neg Truth(x) \rightarrow (x)) \\
 & \forall x ((Truth(x) \rightarrow \neg Truth(x)) \wedge (\neg(x) \rightarrow (x))) \\
 & \quad \vdash \perp
 \end{aligned}$$

To fully show that our paradox is an antinomy, it must be proven that it is not a veridical paradox.

Veridical paradoxes have conclusions that are counterintuitive. This means that we can never really prove that our antinomy is not counterintuitive, because counterintuition analytically follows from intuition in general, and as intuition is particular to a single subject, it implies that anything can be a veridical paradox if the subject deems it to be such. This means that the categorization of paradoxes as veridical is itself illogical because logic must detach itself from subjectivity – which, as said earlier, originates in the subjective experience of things, and hence, synthetic judgements (which are not the analytic judgements that logic finds itself in the territory of). Hence, the category of veridical paradoxes in general can be omitted due to its incompatibility with logical processes, meaning that if our proposition is a paradox and is not falsidical, then it is an antinomy.

It is now evident that “is the logic used to derive the proposition (truth is impossible) true?” or “is the proposition (truth is impossible) true?” is an antinomy,

where potential solutions will then be suggested in the next section.

Section 2: The Solutions to this Antinomy

Now that we have completed our exposition of the antinomy of “is the proposition (truth is impossible) true?” and proved that it is an antinomy, we can provide solutions to it.

As stated earlier, there must be two solutions provided, and they will then be arranged into the form of a dialectic, so that the antinomy can exist whilst being resolvable at the same time.

These two solutions must have a part that is the negation of the corresponding part from the opposing solution, in order for the solutions to be presented as a thesis and antithesis in the dialectic.

In order to derive our first solution, we should consider the antinomy itself, and the fundamental axioms that it accepts.

It is an analytic truth of logic that in all propositions, the constituents of that proposition must all be assumed to exist. These constituents are both the objects of the proposition, the relations between those

objects, the possibility of those objects, and the possibility of those relations.

For example, in the proposition “the dog is green,” it is assumed that the dog exists, and that green exists, and also that there exists a relation between the dog and the green, and every existing thing must have a possibility of existence, meaning that the proposition also asserts that there exists a possibility for all of those existing objects and relations.

In our present proposition “the proposition (truth is impossible) is true,” it assumes that:

Axiom 1: There exists the possibility of the proposition

$$\Leftrightarrow \exists x (Proposition(x) \wedge PossibilityOf(x))$$

Axiom 2: There exists the possibility of truth

$$\Leftrightarrow \exists y (Truth(y) \wedge PossibilityOf(y))$$

Axiom 3: There exists the proposition (truth is impossible)

$$\Leftrightarrow \exists x (Proposition(x))$$

Axiom 4: There exists truth

$$\Leftrightarrow \exists y (Truth(y))$$

Axiom 5: There exists the possibility of a relation between the proposition and truth

$$\Leftrightarrow \exists x \exists y ((Proposition(x) \wedge Truth(y)) \rightarrow (PossibilityOf(R) \wedge R(x, y)))$$

Axiom 6: There exists a relation between the proposition and truth

$$\Leftrightarrow \exists x \exists y ((Proposition(x) \wedge Truth(y)) \rightarrow R(x, y))$$

Axioms 1 and 2 concern themselves with possibility alone, and thus, we cannot ascertain any absolute information from them (which is the aim of this section).

Axioms 5 and 6 concern themselves with relations, but everything has a relation simply by being a part of reality, as Spinoza contended in his *Ethics*. Hence, the idea of relation would itself be redundant in logical circumstances.

However, unlike the previously considered axioms, Axioms 3 and 4 can be used to conclude that since there exists both the proposition and truth, there is an

obvious contradiction, because if truth is impossible yet there exists truth, then either truth cannot exist, or it cannot be impossible.

For convenience in highlighting this contradiction, Axiom 3 can be changed from “ $\exists x (Proposition(x))$ ” to “ $\exists x (Truth(x) \rightarrow \neg Possible(x))$ ”, as it simply substitutes “Proposition” to the actual content of the proposition.

Additionally, we can also change Axiom 4 from “ $\exists y (Truth(y))$ ” to “ $\exists y (Truth(y) \rightarrow Possible(y))$ ”.

Now, in the form of a quantificational first-order logic syllogism:

$$\begin{aligned} \exists x (Truth(x) \rightarrow \neg Possible(x)) \\ \exists y (Truth(y) \rightarrow Possible(y)) \\ \vdash \perp \end{aligned}$$

From this, we can introduce this step analytically from the two premises:

$$\exists x \exists y (Truth(x) \wedge Truth(y))$$

Following this, we can derive the fact that the variables “x” and “y” are equivalent, because the domains for them apply to all objects that satisfy the antecedent (which is the same), implying that if they are determined only by the antecedent, then they are equivalent, because the antecedent conditions are the same:

$$\exists x \exists y (x = y)$$

Through *modus ponens* or conditional elimination from the first premise, we can then establish this step:

$$\exists x (\neg Possible(x))$$

Similarly, with *modus ponens* or conditional elimination from the second premise, we can establish this step:

$$\exists y (Possible(y))$$

This step can then be changed based on “ $\exists x \exists y (x = y)$ ” to:

$$\exists x (Possible(x))$$

Now, the following contradiction becomes apparent:

$$\begin{aligned} &\exists x (\neg Possible(x)) \\ &\exists x (Possible(x)) \\ &\vdash \perp \end{aligned}$$

However, this is hardly a resolution to the antinomy because it only provides a reason for why the antinomy exists in the first place.

Regardless, now that we know the cause of the problem, we can resolve it logically. The problem itself can then be considered a result of the Law of the Excluded Middle (which states that “for every proposition, either it or its negation is true”). As can be evident in how all contradictions (including the contradiction we elucidated between “ $\exists x (\neg Possible(x))$ ” and “ $\exists x (Possible(x))$ ”) arise when a proposition and its negation are true simultaneously. If we were to go against this Law using dialethism (which makes it possible for the proposition to be both true and false at the same time), then it might resolve the antinomy.

However, if “truth is impossible” is true and false at the same time, then it would still be true, so if

conjunction elimination is utilised for either the “true” conjunct or the “false” conjunct, then the antinomy arises again.

Hence, this means that we must transcend the barriers of “truth” and “falsity” entirely, so the statement would be neither true nor false, and be something else entirely.

However, this “something else” must also have a negated form, in order for the dialectic between the thesis and antithesis to be established. This “something else” must also not be referred to as just a “something else”, because if it cannot be defined, then it satisfies the definition of truth, leading to the paradox once more.

I propose that since this “something else” transcends the human understanding entirely, it would be noumenal. As negative noumena can still be comprehended, then it does not absolutely transcend the human understanding, and therefore, is still confined within the dichotomy between truth and falsity. Positive noumena, on the other hand, do not even have a conceivable possibility. Hence, one can suggest that a satisfactory state or condition for the

proposition “truth is impossible” to be in is as a positive noumenon.

One may then refute this idea in two ways:

1. If positive noumena are inconceivable, then they cannot be applied to something that is conceivable (such as the proposition).
2. For the dialectic to exist, there must be an antithesis to the positive noumenal state, and thus, a negation of it, but its negation is the negative noumenal state, which, as shown previously, cannot function in this context.

In response to these refutations:

1. In fact, the inconceivable can be applied to the conceivable. Analogously, we can compare this to how in mathematics, complex numbers are expressed in the form “ $a + bi$ ”, where the “ a ” part is a real number, and the “ bi ” part is an imaginary number. Besides, the inconceivable aspect of this is only the *condition* that the proposition is in and is not a part of the *innate content* of the proposition, implying that there is

no contradiction that happens between the conceivable and the inconceivable in this context.

2. The dialectic does not necessarily have to be composed of a proposition and its negation. As stated earlier in this section, only a *part* of one proposition needs to be the negation of a part from the opposing proposition. Besides, all things are already the indeterminate negations of each other, but in this section, we are aiming to find an explicit negation between one part and another. I propose that this negation is to do with fundamentality (i.e. its state as a positive noumenon is fundamental to reality, or its state as a positive noumenon is not fundamental to reality). This negation, although arbitrary, is, by definition, enough for a dialectic to be established, hence, a satisfactory resolution can then be made from the dialectic. In addition, it does not matter whether the resolution is “true” or “false”, because the subject matter concerns itself with the positive noumenal state or condition, meaning that it transcends the measures of truth and falsity entirely, and instead, we can only accept the resolution that

will be derived from the dialectic as also having a positive noumenal state.

To conclude, the two possible solutions to the antinomy are:

1. The proposition (truth is impossible) exists in a positive noumenal state that is fundamental to reality.
2. The proposition (truth is impossible) exists in a positive noumenal state that is not fundamental to reality.

Section 3: A Resolution to the Dialectic of these Solutions

In the previous section, we established the thesis and antithesis of our dialectic concerning the antinomy.

As stated earlier, the dialectic is composed of two propositions where there is an explicit contradiction apparent. In this case, it would be the contradiction between “fundamentality” and “non-fundamentality”.

To present our dialectic in a table:

<p>Thesis - The proposition (truth is impossible) exists in a positive noumenal state that is fundamental to reality.</p>	<p>Antithesis - The proposition (truth is impossible) exists in a positive noumenal state that is not fundamental to reality.</p>
<p>It is evident that the proposition must be of a positive noumenal state, because only positive noumena can transcend the human understanding, and the human</p>	<p>It is evident that the proposition must be of a positive noumenal state, because only positive noumena can transcend the human understanding, and the human</p>

<p>understanding is founded on the fundamental idea of truth/falsity, which is why it must transcend the truth/falsity distinction entirely in order to be of a state that is neither true nor false, and positive noumena are the only objects capable of such. The proposition must have its state as a positive noumenon that is fundamental to reality because truth is fundamental to reality, so the negation of something fundamental to reality would significantly change that fundamental concept, making it equally as fundamental.</p>	<p>understanding is founded on the fundamental idea of truth/falsity, which is why it must transcend the truth/falsity distinction entirely in order to be of a state that is neither true nor false, and positive noumena are the only objects capable of such. The proposition must have its state as a positive noumenon that is not fundamental to reality because truth is fundamental to reality, so negating the concept of truth would negate all the constitutive predicates of that concept, including the predicate of being fundamental.</p>
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To resolve this dialectic, we can synthesize the thesis and antithesis together. With “fundamental” and “not

fundamental” as the two extreme boundaries which we will operate within, we can conclude that the synthesis that results from this dialectic is the idea that the proposition (truth is impossible) is of a positive noumenal state, which is, in turn, of a “half-fundamentality” or “partial fundamentality”. However, if it is only partly fundamental, then it would not be fundamental at all, since fundamentality deals with the absolute essences of objects, and if it is only fundamental to a part of the object as a whole, then it will not constitute the absolute essence of that object, but only the object that exists as a part of that object. Therefore, in denying its “half-fundamentality”, we deny that it is fundamental, and also deny that it is non-fundamental (because non-fundamentality is the other half).

As a result of this, we can contend that the positive noumenal state is neither fundamental nor not fundamental. Besides, the very idea of fundamentality exists within the human understanding and is determined by whether its concept is negated or not, thus reverting to the truth/falsity distinction, becoming incompatible with positive noumena.

If it is neither fundamental nor not fundamental, then what is it?

As a matter of fact, we do not know, or rather, we are unable to know, because positive noumena are beyond the human mind, so any attempt at ascribing humanly determined qualities to it would make our idea of the positive noumenon lose its identity as a positive noumenon. However, one may then argue that when we placed the positive noumenon in a certain context (i.e. as a substitute for truth and falsity) we ascribed a quality to it, thus making it lose its identity as a positive noumenon. Contrary to this, one may refute this view by contending that by using the idea of a positive noumenon for explanatory purposes (like what we are doing here), the positive noumenon becomes similar to an indeterminate in mathematics, where the *actual* essence of the concept (the indeterminate or the positive noumenon) becomes irrelevant, and instead, the manner by which it acts as a signifier of meaning within a specified context becomes its only *relevant* essence, so you could argue that this theory of the proposition being in a positive noumenal state is an *empirically adequate* theory, and that the theory itself is neither true nor false, and only in a positive noumenal state.

In summation of this chapter, there arises an antinomy when you consider a question about the proposition or conclusion that we will ascertain by the end of this treatise: is the proposition (truth is impossible) true? There are two possible solutions to this antinomy (the proposition is in a positive noumenal state that is fundamental to reality or not fundamental to reality), which when formed into a dialectic, can lead to the ultimate solution that the proposition (truth is impossible) is neither true nor false, and can only be identified as being in a positive noumenal state, and any attempts at ascribing qualities to this state would make the state lose its identity as a positive noumenon.

Chapter 4: The Second Antinomy Concerning the Impossibility of Truth

Section 1: The Exposition of this Antinomy

Now that we have analysed and resolved the first antinomy of truth by means of a dialectic, we can proceed to the second antinomy that arises when considering the proposition “truth is impossible”.

Unlike the previous antinomy, which concerned itself with the *state* of the proposition (truth is impossible), this antinomy is centred around the logical implications of the proposition: If truth is impossible, then that would be falsifying the empirical existence of truth, but falsity can only exist in relation to truth, so does that mean the existence of truth is implied through the impossibility of truth?

This antinomy can be related to the question that was considered in the beginning of the treatise – does truth exist? If you recall, the question cannot be directly answered, because the possible responses can only be “it is true that truth exists”, “it is not true that truth exists”, “it is both true and false that truth exists”, or “it is neither true nor false that truth exists”.

All of the four possible responses assume that truth exists in some way or another, because simply by

describing it through language, it must exist in the understanding, and Kant thought that the understanding originated in experience, and thus, the rationally existent must always be empirically existent, or at least based off of experience. Truth cannot be “based off” of anything, because as shown earlier, truth is identical to Being and knowledge, and since truth/Being is the most metaphysically fundamental concept, and knowledge is the most psychologically fundamental concept, collectively as a single concept, it is the most fundamental concept in all respects, meaning that it cannot be “based off” anything, because everything is already “based off” it. Therefore, by responding to the question in any of the possible ways, one already assumes the empirical existence of truth.

Although our method that will be used in the derivation of the conclusion that “truth is impossible” is indirect and investigative, the very essence of the conclusion remains the same as saying “it is not true that truth exists”, which is one of the four possible responses, meaning that it is still assumes that truth exists.

As done in the previous section, we must prove that this is, in fact, an antinomy. To do so, we must first show that it is a paradox, and then prove that it is not falsidical (but we do not need to validate the fact that it is not veridical, because in the analysis of the first antinomy, it was revealed that veridical paradoxes are themselves a category subjectively defined, and therefore of no utility in purely logical, *a priori* contexts).

To substantiate the fact that it is a paradox, we must demonstrate how a contradiction arises in both the thesis and antithesis of our proposed paradox:

Thesis: If truth is impossible, then that would be falsifying the empirical existence of truth. Falsity can only exist in relation to truth because it would have no meaning if truth did not exist, implying that if falsity exists, then truth must also exist. If truth exists, then truth cannot be impossible, because existence implies the possibility of existence. This means that there is a direct contradiction between the idea of impossibility and the negation of that idea.

Antithesis: If truth is impossible then that would not be falsifying the empirical existence of truth. If the

empirical existence of truth is not falsified, then it means truth empirically exists, implying that there is a possibility of that existence, meaning that truth is possible, contradicting the idea that truth is impossible.

In order to show that our paradox is not falsidical, we can express our thesis and antithesis in quantificational first-order logic, showing that the arguments are logical and not fallacious:

Thesis:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \forall x (Truth(x) \rightarrow Impossible(x)) \\
 & \quad \forall x (Impossible(x) \rightarrow \neg(x)) \\
 & \quad \quad \forall x (\neg(x) \rightarrow x) \\
 & \forall x ((\neg(x) \rightarrow x) \wedge (Truth(x) \rightarrow \neg(x))) \\
 & \quad \forall x ((\neg(x) \rightarrow x) \wedge (x \rightarrow \neg(x))) \\
 & \quad \quad \vdash \perp
 \end{aligned}$$

Antithesis:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \forall x (Truth(x) \rightarrow Impossible(x)) \\
 & \quad \forall x (Impossible(x) \rightarrow \neg\neg(x)) \\
 & \quad \quad \forall x (\neg\neg(x) \rightarrow x) \\
 & \quad \quad \forall x (x \rightarrow Possible(x)) \\
 & \forall x (Impossible(x) \rightarrow Possible(x)) \\
 & \quad \quad \vdash \perp
 \end{aligned}$$

From these quantificational first-order logic arguments, it is evident that contradictions arise from perfectly logical reasoning, affirming the fact that it is an antinomy, which is then further supported by how it is a paradox, and an antinomy is the only type it can be.

Thus, in the next section of this chapter concerning the second antinomy of truth, we will consider how to formulate two solutions to the question “if truth is impossible, then would that falsify the empirical existence of truth?”, where responding to it with “yes” or “no” would both lead to inevitable contradictions, and in order to maintain the question’s identity as an antinomy, we will then have to arrange the two solutions in a dialectic to then synthesise an ultimate solution.

This thesis-antithesis-synthesis model of the dialectic is, in fact, not just Fichtean, but also still Hegelian (even though it is commonly held that the Hegelian dialectic either cannot be schematized in a linear way or can be more accurately interpreted as abstraction-negation-concretion). This is because the concretion is only possible through the unity of the abstract with its negation in the process of sublation, as the abstract

analytically cannot, in-itself, become the concrete, so, something external to it must be necessary, and an object external to another would be a negation of it, hence proving the thesis-antithesis-synthesis interpretation as directly deriving from abstraction-negation-concretion. Additionally, everything must have its opposite, because the definition of a thing is the affirmation of the negation of its negation, so all theses must have their antitheses.

Section 2: The Solutions to this Antinomy

In order to provide two valid solutions to our antinomy, the two solutions must, as stated earlier, have at least a single part that is the negation of the corresponding part from the opposing solution so that a dialectic can be established.

This antinomy is the question “if truth is impossible, then would that falsify the empirical existence of truth?”. To solve the antinomy would be to answer this question, although as shown in the exposition of this antinomy, we cannot answer this question through any of the four responses (“yes”, “no”, both “yes” and “no”, or neither “yes” nor “no”).

From this, it may appear as though this antinomy is truly unresolvable, as it can be proposed that the “four responses” are the only possible ways to respond to a binary question (the form in which our antinomy presents itself), yet they have been proven to be unusable.

Regardless, we should consider exactly what boundaries constrain and determine the idea of having “an impossibility of resolution”. Potentially, we can

refer back to how we considered truth/Being/knowledge to be the most fundamental, conceivable object to reality (in both metaphysical and psychological aspects). If truth/Being/knowledge is fundamental to all things, then it is also fundamental to the idea of an impossibility of resolution. However, since truth/Being/knowledge is fundamental to all things, making a claim about this *particular* idea would be redundant. Instead, we should look towards how this idea is expressed: language.

Therefore, the antinomy only has an impossibility of resolution when limited by language, implying that the only way to resolve this antinomy would be to transcend language itself.

On the other hand, in this treatise, we have already extensively concerned ourselves with matters that are beyond language (e.g. positive noumena), and one could even argue that since truth is itself presupposed in language (so that syntactical structures – involving negation and therefore truth – can exist), it transcends language. This is only possible because “being limited in language” equates to “being limited in the structures of language” (as language is part of the structure it is built upon, and its structure is part of its totality, so the

mereological definition of equality can be used to suggest that they are the same), meaning that anything limited in language would have to be consistent with the structure of language. This means that we can still resolve the antinomy if not limited by language, and this can be done through “anti-language” (expanding upon the expressive capabilities of language by no longer being coherent and logical with its structure, almost like expressing ideas through “anti-reason”). An example of this “anti-language” would be Noam Chomsky’s sentence “colourless green ideas sleep furiously”, where it must be consistent with the grammatical structure of language in order for it to exist but is not coherent with the structure of language as a whole, because that structure includes the laws of logic, which the sentence violates (by synthesising together contradictory terms such as “colourless” and “green”).

Following this, one may then propose that to resolve this antinomy, we contend that by deeming truth to be impossible, we establish it as being in a positive noumenal state, as positive noumena transcend language, its structure and logic, thus implying that we can only reference it through “anti-language”, fulfilling the condition for resolving the antinomy.

On the contrary, one can state that we established earlier in the first antinomy that to be in a positive noumenal state is to transcend the concepts of truth and falsity entirely, therefore being “neither true nor false”, which is problematic as it is one of the four responses.

From this, we can say that in the first antinomy, we resolved it using *language*, meaning that the idea of positive noumena must be coherent with the *logical* idea of “neither true nor false”. In this analysis however, we must transcend logic and language entirely through *anti-language*, implying that we should solve the antinomy by doing the negation of the logical (in this case, the logical would be one of the four responses).

One may then refute this method by contending that by negating logic towards a logical end (i.e. the development of a logical theory), the negation of logic would still be logic. To respond to this refutation, it can be argued that our negation of logic is not towards a logical end, because this entire philosophy seeks to be of a positive noumenal state, thus transcending all logic. Besides, paradoxes like the one stated in the

refutation can be considered inevitable, as “anti-logic” can never be compatible with logic, and as paradoxes themselves are only possible through logic, there would be no way to respond to them in an *anti-logical* way, as they themselves exist within the paradigm of logic, so by adopting a method of anti-language, these paradoxes cease to exist, because they only exist within a logic framework. On the contrary, one may content that simply by arguing against the refutation, we leave behind the paradigm of anti-logic for the paradigm of logic. However, this criticism is itself a *logical* interpretation of the anti-logic/anti-language, making it one of the aforementioned paradoxes. Therefore, parts of this treatise intended to be anti-logical may still *appear* as logical, due to how the human mind is rooted in logic and cannot easily interpret things without it. Additionally, the fusing of logic with anti-logic is itself anti-logical, meaning that it should be accepted as part of the anti-logic. Hence, the difference between that which is illogical and that which is anti-logical is in how the logical is part of the anti-logical (because it is the determinate negation of logic) whereas the logical cannot be part of the illogical (because it is the indeterminate negation of logic).

Now that we have validated our method, we can resolve the antinomy using anti-language.

To do this, I propose we negate the *logical* solution to the question of the antinomy: resolving it using one of the four responses.

If we negate it, it becomes: not resolving it using one of the four responses.

We can then understand this proposition in two ways:

1. To not resolve the antinomy at all.
2. To not resolve the antinomy using only one of the four responses.

These two ways can then be understood as the two solutions to this second antinomy (which are the thesis and antithesis to the dialectical solution to the antinomy).

However, a problem arises with regard to the second solution, because it is an indeterminate negation (i.e. it does not specify any number of the four responses in general). To rectify this, we must choose a number of

the four responses which would be the most anti-logical – which can be defined as the number of the four responses which allows for the most paradoxes to occur, as the paradoxes are only present if anti-logic is present, meaning that the more anti-logic there is, then the more paradoxes there are. In order for there to be a possibility for the most paradoxes, then the domain in which these paradoxes can occur in must be maximized. In this case, the domain is a number of the four responses, and since the maximal number would be four, the most anti-logical formulation of the second solution would be “to resolve the antinomy using all of the solutions simultaneously”.

In order to make it more apparent that the two solutions are thesis and antithesis, we must show that they are, at least in part, the negation of the other.

The first solution can be changed from “to not resolve the antinomy at all” to “to resolve the antinomy using none of the four responses”. This is because if the antinomy is not resolved, then by definition, it implies that it was not resolved using any of the four responses, so it would be resolved using none of the responses since that would be, analytically, the contrapositive of the earlier proposition.

There is now a clear contradiction between the two solutions – in how all is the negation of none, and one solution resolves the antinomy using all of the four responses (at the same time) while the other resolves it using none of the four responses.

Hence, to conclude, the two solutions to the antinomy “if truth is impossible, then would that falsify the empirical existence of truth?” are:

1. It falsifies, does not falsify, concurrently falsifies and does not falsify, and neither falsifies nor does not falsify – all at the same time. In other words, all of the four responses to that question (yes and not no, no and not yes, both yes and no, neither yes nor no) are all valid.
2. It neither falsifies, nor does not falsify, nor concurrently falsifies and does not falsify, nor neither falsifies nor does not falsify – all at the same time. In other words, none of the four responses to that question (yes and not no, no and not yes, both yes and no, neither yes nor no) are valid, implying that an answer to the question must be of a positive noumenal state, and one in

an anti-logical interpretation, unlike the logical interpretation of the positive noumenal state from the analysis of the first antinomy.

In the next section of this chapter, these two solutions to the antinomy will be synthesised together in a dialectic to provide a definitive solution. One may then state against this by contending that the dialectic is innately logical, so it would be incompatible with the anti-logical subject matter. However, this is simply the *logical* interpretation of things, and not the anti-logical (whose true essence is unknowable). Besides, the dialectic is simply a process natural to reality, and so we can neither assume that it is logical, illogical nor anti-logical, so our approach still holds.

Section 3: A Resolution to the Dialectic of these Solutions

In the previous section, we showed that the thesis and anti-thesis to our dialectical resolution to the antinomy of “if truth is impossible, then would that falsify the empirical existence of truth?” are:

1. All of the four responses to that question (yes and not no, no and not yes, both yes and no, neither yes nor no) are all valid.
2. None of the four responses to that question (yes and not no, no and not yes, both yes and no, neither yes nor no) are valid, implying that an answer to the question must be of a positive noumenal state, and one in an anti-logical interpretation, unlike the logical interpretation of the positive noumenal state from the analysis of the first antinomy.

To present our dialectic in a table:

Thesis - The proposition (truth is impossible) falsifies, does not falsify,	Antithesis - The proposition (truth is impossible) neither
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<p>both falsifies and does not falsify, and neither falsifies nor does not falsify, all simultaneously.</p>	<p>falsifies, nor does not falsify, nor falsifies and does not falsify, nor neither falsifies nor does not falsify, all simultaneously.</p>
<p>It is evident that all the logical solutions to the antinomy cannot be used, and hence, the antinomy can only be resolved through the negation of logic – anti-logic. For the most anti-logical solution, we must resolve it using a number of the four responses which would be the most anti-logical – which can be defined as the number of the four responses which allows for the most paradoxes to occur, as the paradoxes are only present if anti-logic is present, meaning that the more anti-logic</p>	<p>It is evident that all the logical solutions to the antinomy cannot be used, and hence, the antinomy can only be resolved through the negation – anti-logic. For the most anti-logical solution, we must not use any of the logical solutions, meaning that the anti-logical solution would use none of the four responses to the question.</p>

<p>there is, then the more paradoxes there are. In order for there to be a possibility for the most paradoxes, then the domain in which these paradoxes can occur in must be maximized. In this case, the domain is a number of the four responses, and since the maximal number would be four, the most anti-logical formulation of the second solution would be “to resolve the antinomy using all of the solutions simultaneously”.</p>	
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To resolve the two solutions to our antinomy, the most anti-logical method should be adopted, as the solutions are themselves anti-logical, so resolving it anti-logically would be of optimal compatibility.

Analogously deriving from the solutions themselves, this method can take two forms: not resolving the solutions in the first place (as the idea of resolution

itself exists within a logical structure) or allowing the resolution itself to be the simultaneous coexistence of both solutions. The second form of the method would not resolve the antinomy, because it simply accepts the situation as it is, meaning that it would be part of the first form of the method, leading one to conclude that our resolution to the dialectic of these solutions is (in a paradoxical sense that only exists within the framework of logic) to not resolve the antinomy at all.

Chapter 5: The Impossibility of Humanly Determined Empirical Truths

Section 1: The Inconstancy of Information in the Empirical World

In all the earlier chapters, we have analysed the concepts of truth and impossibility, and resolved two antinomies that would arise from the conclusion that “truth is impossible”. These earlier chapters have laid the groundwork for us to continue our investigation into whether truth empirically exists, and this chapter will consider the possibility of truths rooted in the empirical world and which interact with humans, beginning with this section on why the inconstancy of information in the empirical world implies the impossibility of truth.

In order to show that the inconstancy of information in the empirical world implies the impossibility of truth, we must first show that there is, in fact, an inconstancy of information in the empirical world.

By “inconstancy of information in the empirical world”, I refer to how information never stays the same in the empirical world, and what is held to be truthful, or acceptable, or beautiful always changes. However, this does not mean that the information itself (e.g. truth, acceptability, or beauty) is lost over time, as

is validated by the quantum no-hiding theorem in physics. This means that what one believes to be the truth (or that which cannot be defined) would still not be definable over time, and only the form in which that truth appears to the subject can shift.

There must necessarily exist an *inconstancy* of information in the empirical world, because if we assume a *constancy* of information in the empirical world, it means that everything in the empirical world would be constant and unchanging (because by applying a universal idea, either all information is constant or all information is inconstant, and there cannot be information that is sometimes constant or sometimes inconstant, because that would itself be inconstant). If everything in the empirical world is constant and unchanging, that means nothing would change, which implies that causality would be impossible. If causality were impossible, then there would be nothing which caused the existence of information in the first place, meaning that the information would be paradoxically subsistent, and thus, constant information would be impossible based on general logic, meaning that all information must be the negation of constancy – inconstancy.

One may then refute this idea by arguing that it uses logic, which goes against the idea of an anti-logical system proposed in the resolution to the second antinomy. However, this refutation is flawed for two reasons:

1. It itself uses logic, meaning that it would simply be a logical interpretation of the anti-logic/anti-language, meaning that the refutation arises necessarily as a paradox caused by an attempt to analyse anti-logic using logic, as mentioned earlier.
2. As shown in the analysis of the second antinomy, logic is itself a part of anti-logic, implying that the use of logic would, in a way, be anti-logical, but identifying this as a paradox would itself be confined to the paradigm of logic without considering the relation between logic and anti-logic.

There are many other ideas in support of my notion that information in the empirical world is not constant.

For example, the Foucauldian concept of *epistemes* mentioned earlier in this treatise can be used to suggest that periods of time throughout history (e.g. the

Renaissance) have different underlying structures for thought, so if the way we think will constantly change over time, the thoughts and ideas (i.e. information) which we determine will also constantly change over time, thus being inconstant. This Foucauldian concept is also very similar to the Kuhnian idea of paradigms, which suggest that in areas of intellectual study, a revolution in that area would trigger a ripple effect and influence the entire field of research. Kuhn thought that these paradigms were constantly changing, and that no paradigm was “better” or more “truthful” than the others, so if all information is confined within a paradigm, then all information is inconstant. The Hindu belief in a “Yuga Cycle” also supports the view that as time periods change, so do the fundamental ways of looking at the world.

All three of these concepts are concerned with time, which Kant thought created the quality of being empirical, further validating the idea that information in the empirical world is inconstant. However, one may contend against this by stating that Kant proved that time does not exist outside of the human subject, and even Bergson’s “durée” or “duration” is subjective, so the very premise of arguing towards an objective end using a subjective means is flawed. In

response to this, it can be said that the nature of time and its relation to the human subject is irrelevant, because the only thing that is significant here is whether time dictates the empirical quality of objects, which it does.

This idea is then further supported by the Hegelian notion of *Geist* or Spirit. The understanding of World Spirit or *Weltgeist* is ultimately the understanding that the consciousness of the subject is driven by the world of objects around it, such as *Zeitgeists* which dictate the behaviour of conscious subjects throughout different time periods in history, and concrete universals such as the *Volksgeists* or “National Spirits” which will dialectically diminish in significance over time. If our very ideas and consciousnesses (information) are determined mostly by constantly changing external forces, then how can we expect there to be a constancy of information in the empirical world?

Durkheim’s “collective consciousness” and Jung’s “collective unconscious” both substantiate this idea, as they also suggest that the information, we have are derived from constantly changing sources, meaning that the information itself changes constantly.

Moreover, an analytic evaluation can be made that the empirical world must have inconstant information, or else it would not be empirical. This is because space and time (the means of understanding the empirical world) themselves change. If time does not pass (i.e. does not change), then one will have transcended time (since time is defined through its passing), meaning that one would leave the realm of empirical representations. Hence, precisely because space and time change, the empirical world and its information (at least as it is presented to us) must change.

Besides, we only know of the empirical world when there is a human subject perceiving the world. This means that if the empirical world does not change, then the human subject does not change. However, the human subject is reliant upon society as a whole to constitute its very condition (as referenced earlier), meaning that if the human subject does not change, then neither does the society which influences it. This is obviously not the case, because perhaps human death (which is inevitable for all members of society) is the perfect example of change - it impacts everyone close to it and it is a direct transfer to the unknowable, suprasensible world. Because it is certain that death

happens frequently, yet the constancy of information in the empirical world contradicts this idea, making it true that the information in the empirical world is inconstant.

In addition, the Buddhist belief in *Anicca* or “impermanence” states that nothing lasts forever and that everything changes, meaning that information is never constant in the empirical world.

The Roman historian Sallust once said, “Everything rises but to fall, and increases but to decay.” This is similar to the scientific idea that entropy increases over time and that order becomes disorder, meaning that everything always evanesces and fades from existence, which is an example of change, and thus, inconstancy.

Now, why does the inconstancy of information in the empirical world imply that truth is impossible?

Simply, if truth exists solely through information (which it does, because it was shown earlier that truth is identical to knowledge, so in a paradoxical manner which only exists when one seeks to theorize about anti-logic using logic, truth can be defined as “a subject’s belief in the truth of a conceivable piece of

information”, which is a definition that relies upon the fact that truth can only exist when applied to a piece of information), then empirical truths (which are the focus of this chapter) are inconstant.

However, this goes against the definition of truth as “that which cannot be defined”, because “that which cannot be defined” is not “that which cannot be defined yet”, but “that which can never be defined” as truth must transcend the human faculty of reason in order to be the fundamental basis for it, so if truth changes, then its definition must also change, meaning that the original definition must be negated, implying that “truth can be defined”, which would contradict the very nature of the definition.

By contradicting the very nature of the definition, it means that our definition of truth is either flawed (which we have shown to be not the case in the first chapter) or truth does not exist at all.

By “not existing”, I refer to the empirical impossibility of truth, as our reasoning is concerned solely with objects of the empirical world, meaning that truth is impossible.

Therefore, if there is an inconstancy of information in the empirical world, then empirical truths cannot exist and would be impossible.

Section 2: The Relativistic Determination of Truth

In the previous section, we analysed how an inconstancy of information in the empirical world implied the impossibility of truth, and in this section, the implication that truth is impossible will be derived from how truth is relativistically determined.

Hence, in first-order logic form, the following must be proven:

$$\begin{aligned} & \forall x (Truth(x) \rightarrow Relativistic(x)) \\ \vdash & \forall x (Relativistic(x) \rightarrow Impossible(x)) \end{aligned}$$

From this expression, we know that we must show that all truth is relativistically determined, and how that means truth is impossible. This can be done by showing that truth is, in fact, also the negation of relativity – absoluteness. Hence, if we can show that truth is simultaneously relativistically and absolutely determined, it will become clear that truth does not exist at all, because it would be an explicit contradiction, as truth would have to be organized according to logic, since truth itself forms the basis for logic, so logic must rely upon truth to be possible, and

truth in this sense would be truth in the logical interpretation.

And so, to show that the relativistic determination of truth implies the impossibility of truth, we must prove the constitutive parts of this syllogism:

$$\begin{aligned} & \forall x (Truth(x) \rightarrow Relativistic(x)) \\ & \forall x (Truth(x) \rightarrow \neg Relativistic(x)) \\ \vdash & \forall x ((Relativistic(x) \wedge \neg Relativistic(x)) \\ & \rightarrow Impossible(x)) \end{aligned}$$

In order to substantiate the first premise, we must first show that there exists relativism in our view of the world, and then prove that all truths must be relativistic determinations.

Relativism actualizes itself in three forms: through the individual, through the group, and through language.

Relativism through the individual concerns how the subject which experiences and interprets the world does so in a relativistic way unique to their own selves. We can never prove that everyone understands the world in the same way, yet we can prove that everyone understands it differently. If we assume that everyone

experiences the world in the same way, this implies that the experiences themselves must be the same, but experiences are dependent on the subject's presence (as experience is, analytically, a subject-object relation), meaning that the subject's presence must be absolutely the same, so there would only be a single subject existing in the world. This cannot be the case, because if there is only a single subject, then the subject itself becomes the object, as it means there is only one way of interpreting the world, which is the definition for objectivity, making the subject-object relation arbitrary, directly contradicting the argument's presupposition that such a relation exists, resulting in a negation of the idea that everyone understands the world in the same way:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \exists x \forall y \forall z ((\text{Everyone}(z) \wedge \text{World}(y) \wedge \text{Subject}(x)) \\
 & \quad \rightarrow (\text{Understands}(z, y) \wedge x = z)) \\
 & \vdash \exists x \forall y \forall z ((\text{Everyone}(z) \wedge \text{World}(y) \\
 & \quad \wedge \text{Subject}(x)) \\
 & \quad \rightarrow \neg(\text{Understands}(z, y) \wedge x = z)) \\
 & \exists x \forall y \forall z ((\text{Everyone}(z) \wedge \text{World}(y) \wedge \text{Subject}(x)) \\
 & \quad \rightarrow (\neg \text{Understands}(z, y) \vee x \neq z))
 \end{aligned}$$

Hence, not everyone understands the world in a single unified way, and the "everyone" does not equate to an

individual subject. As a result of this, we can conclude that everyone understands the world in a unique way.

Furthermore, one could argue that because the world we live in now has become nothing more than endless simulacra, symbols, and signs (which the postmodernists like Baudrillard and Deleuze had analysed in great detail), and these objects are, by definition, to be interpreted in subjective ways, so the human experience has ended, and we are nothing more but machines which attempt to understand the world around us in differing ways.

However, one may argue against this. As Lacan stated in his 1954-1955 Seminar, “The machine is the structure detached from the activity of the subject. The symbolic world is the world of the machine.” Thus, if the machine is “detached from the activity of the subject”, it would appear that the machine becomes objective and no longer subject.

Contrary to this, simply by arguing against the notion that everything is simply relativistic interpretation, one is relativistically interpreting, meaning that the argument is still valid, and everything that is known is

only known by a single subject, making all facts individual interpretations.

This means that all knowledge is subjective (or only exists in relation to a subject, and is relativistically determined), and since it was shown earlier in this treatise that knowledge equates to truth, it directly leads to the conclusion that all truths are relativistic determinations.

Relativism through the group concerns how the groups which individual subjects find themselves in are themselves relativistically determined. This can be validated by how, in the previous section of this chapter, we considered how there is an inconstancy of information in the empirical world, and this inconstancy exists in relation to the changing time periods of history which groups and societies contribute to the development of, as well as the social structures which these groups and institutions construct.

Notions like the Hegelian Geist, Foucauldian epistemes, Kuhnian paradigms, and Hindu yuga cycles (which were all evaluated in the first section of this chapter) are all interpreted and accepted by different

groups, which then contribute to the individuals which are a part of the group and their understanding of the world.

Hence, a relativism through the group would also simultaneously be how a relativism through the group influences the relativism through the individual.

For example, a religious community would be one of these groups, and if an individual is a member of a religious, it is very likely that some of their decisions would, in a large part, be dictated by the religion they believe in and the customs of the community (e.g. if a member of a Christian community were in an ethical dilemma, it is highly probable that they would make sure to act in such a way where they abide by the Ten Commandments).

Society as a collective whole is itself one of these groups, because different societies have different cultures and standards for ethicality and etiquette (which continue being used even when an individual leaves their society for a new one because the individual would already be accustomed to it), meaning that a person's understanding of the world is also determined relativistically by the groups they are a

part of, and since these groups concern themselves with the ethics and aesthetics of human life, they are significant to the fundamental groundwork from which an individual's interpretation of events and experiences is possible.

Because all knowledge has its foundations in the individual, which finds its own foundations in the relativistic determination of groups, and knowledge equates to truth, it means that truth has the modality of relativistic determination, implying that truth (or rather, *all* truth in this sense) is relativistically determined.

Relativism through language concerns how the languages we use also dictate the way we understand the world. Whether our understanding is *determined* or only *influenced* by language is irrelevant to our notion of relativism, because for language to *relativistically determine* our understanding simply means for different languages to interact with the ways different people think.

This relativism through language (best described in Wittgenstein's statement "The limits of my language

mean the limits of my world”) necessarily exists, and there are numerous reasons in support of this.

For example, Brown and Lenneberg carried out an experiment involving English speakers and Zuni speakers, to see if colours which have names within their language could be more easily recalled and differentiated between one another than colours which don't have specific names. After their study, they concluded that there was, in fact, a correlation between the two, and that colours which were named and understood through their languages were more noticeable than those which weren't, which is empirical evidence for the idea of relativism through language.

Moreover, because language is, by definition, a form of communication, and communication is the transfer or elucidation of information, it means that there is no rule prohibiting the fact that one can use language to communicate facts to oneself.

Language can help in ordering information and making links between different objects from the disorganized array of information in the Kantian manifold. When one experiences the world, one cannot experience it to

the most complete degree without the establishment of symbols and signs (i.e. the *telos* of language) to relate objects together. This is because without identifying similarities between objects, everything would seem unique, and thus, the very concept of uniqueness would become redundant, meaning that in a paradoxical way which cannot be possible within the confines of the empirical realm, every object would become neither unique nor not unique. Hence, we must be able to relate objects to one another in order to cognize the world, and this is only possible through language and signs (which themselves understood through language, making them part of language) as a sign or linguistic expression would make one understand an object in a certain way, and is the comparison or the reflection of one object into another (i.e. signifier and signified), which is the definition of a relation.

Due to the fact that much of our knowledge and understanding of the world around is rooted in and influenced by language, our knowledge is relativistically determined by our languages, and because truth is identical to knowledge, truth is relativistically determined.

Besides, it was mentioned in our analysis of the distinction between subjective and objective truth that all truth is subjective (at least with regard to the linguistic modalities), meaning that all truth is relativistically determined.

To validate the second premise, we need to show that truth is not relative, and is instead absolute.

This can be done by considering the following:

If truth is “that which cannot be defined”, then *relativistically determined* truth would be things which can sometimes be defined and sometimes cannot be defined. However, the “cannot” denotes an impossibility, and impossibility either *is* or *is not*, so if definition is sometimes possible and sometimes impossible, then that would deny the presupposed dichotomy between possibility and impossibility entirely, contradicting the very premise, meaning that truth must be absolute.

In this section, it was shown that truth is simultaneously relativistically determined and absolute, yet it is self-evident that this cannot be the case, because one is the negation of the other.

Therefore, from these two premises which concern whether truth is relativistically determined, we can logically derive the conclusion that contradictions arise analytically from the concept of truth, meaning that the concept of truth must not be possible (at least within the structure of the empirical realm).

Section 3: The Idealistic Conception of the World

The final reason for why empirical humanly determined truths are impossible lies in how the world can be idealistically conceptualized.

Idealism in the postmodern age is no longer just a simple ontological problem between some greater metaphysical reality and its lesser representational form, but rather, also concerns how our notion of the greater metaphysical reality is itself part of the world of phantasmagoric representations we are trapped in.

If everything we know is confined to representations and distortions of the truth, then either the truth never existed in the first place (but we would have been led to believe that it does as a part of the representation itself) or the truth no longer exists (because we would no longer be able to know of it if we are confined within representation).

This can be represented as a syllogism:

$$\forall x (\textit{Representation}(x))$$

$$\forall x (\textit{Representation}(x) \rightarrow \neg \textit{Truth}(x))$$

$$\vdash \forall x (\neg Truth(x))$$

Therefore, if we can prove the premises to be true, then it would validate our idea that empirical truths do not exist and allow for the argument to be sound.

Everything is representation, and this is evident in many different ways.

First of all, when Foucault wrote about panopticons in societies, he revealed the important truth that we constantly live as if we are being watched, even if the watcher does not exist. This means that nothing is “authentic”, and the drive towards a supposed authenticity would do nothing but bring you closer to representation. This is evident in how realist artists want to depict the world as authentically as possible, but in doing so, have only created representation. They want to be free of romanticization and the ideologies which make us perceive the world in a certain way, but they do not realise that believing in an authentic world would also be a romanticization and yet another ideology. This can also be explained by Aquinas in Article 9, Question 1, Part 1 of the *Summa Theologica*,

where he writes, "...it is natural to man to be pleased with representations."

René Girard's theory of mimetic desire seems to also extend this Foucauldian idea, arguing that we do not know what we really desire, so we desire what others desire.

However, in a panopticon, there must still be a creator or a manager of that panopticon, and in mimetic desire, there must still be an original desirer from which the mimesis begins, so shouldn't there still be an authentically existing reality?

As Deleuze and Baudrillard have stated, even the idea of a panopticon is outdated, and in the postmodern age, even the creator of the panopticon or the original desirer is influenced and driven in certain ways by their own creation, so no one really has control over their own selves.

In *Simulacra and Simulation*, Baudrillard writes, "*End of the panoptic system*. The eye of the TV is no longer the source of an absolute gaze, and the ideal of control is no longer that of transparency. This still presupposes an objective space (that of the Renaissance) and the

omnipotence of the despotic gaze. It is still, if not a system of confinement, at least a system of mapping. More subtly, but always externally, playing on the opposition of seeing and being seen, even if the panoptic focal point may be blind.”

Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage theory shows that the ideas and actions of every human being exist within a complex framework of constantly shifting socio-political, historical, and material relations, so an action is never dependent on the actor of that action alone. Actor-network theory in anthropology develops this idea and emphasizes that human relations are constituted as much by humans as by non-humans.

Hence, everything we know, feel, and believe is purely representational and an imitation of an imitation (that we believe to be reality, but is not really there at all). Embodying this idea well is Guy Debord’s *Society of the Spectacle*, where he states, “Everything that was directly lived has receded into a representation.”

However, it can be said that these representations can become truths in-themselves, as evident in Baudrillard’s concept of hyperreality, where a simulacrum of reality becomes equally as real as the

reality itself; or Nick Land's hyperstitions, which "by their very existence as ideas function causally to bring about their own reality."

This means that even though everything is a representation, these representations can eventually become truths, so empirical truths would still be possible.

Nevertheless, this objection is flawed because it does not follow that all representations are on a path to becoming hyperreal or are hyperstitions. In fact, there must exist non-hyperreal simulacra or non-hyperstitious fictions. This is evident in how if all representations are hyperstitions and are to become hyperreal, then the concept of falsity or illusion assumed to exist originally in both concepts would disappear and negate itself, as everything would become truthful, and truth cannot, through its totality alone, result in falsity. Hence, by *reductio ad absurdum*, it can be concluded that not all representations are set to become hyperreal or exist as hyperstitions.

In addition, the relativistic determination of truth analysed earlier in this treatise also seems to prove the

notion that the world is idealistically conceptualized. This is because the relativism (through the individual, group, and language) conceals and replaces an objective truth or reality, hence resulting in idealism, as the relativism is only possible in relation to a mind subjectively knowing the world.

Moreover, even without concerning the idea of postmodernity, it can be shown that the world is idealistically conceptualized.

Everything known for certain must not be external to the human understanding, and for a human to understand or cognize something, there must be *a* human. A singular human's understanding of something cannot constitute an objectivity (which was established earlier in this treatise as simply intersubjectivity with near or total agreement) of multiple beings, and even if the human were to understand what is believed to be an objective truth, it would still be *their* understanding of the objectivity, which would transform the objectivity into subjectivity. Due to the fact that the objective truth can only be known subjectively, this means that objectivity cannot exist, as it is confined to a single subject.

Contrary to this, one might suggest that the objectivity can be understood in the exact same way by all knowers of the objectivity.

However, this can be disproved by contending that the “way” information is understood also involves the quantity of information that is understood, and this also includes a single piece of information, because that piece of information must also stand in relation to other pieces of information and be addressed to the subject through signifiers familiar to them (such as words or symbols). Two different humans can never know the same quantity of information, as this would mean they have experienced exactly the same events in their lives, and had exactly the same thoughts about everything, which would ultimately mean the two humans are identical and thus not different. Hence, objectivity is only possible subjectively, which negates the concept of objectivity entirely.

Hence, if everything is subjective, then subjective truths cannot exist prior to representation, as representations make their objects subjective through the very way in which the objects are represented (such as in art), and this is only possible with representations, because it is the very definition of

representation (i.e. the act of representation – which distorts its object and hence denies its objective form). Objective truths, as shown earlier, are in-themselves subjective truths, so both types of truths cannot exist as a result.

Besides, all our empirical knowledge begins with perception, and perception is itself a kind of representation, as perception allows for a world one conceives to be outside one's mind to be brought into the mind, and hence is the transformation of objectivity into subjectivity, otherwise known as representation.

All of the above validate the first premise, so we can now proceed to the second premise, which suggests that if everything is representation, then nothing is truth.

This is valid because representations are, analytically, imitations and copies of truth, meaning that they negate truth. The object of all representation is truth, so an inauthentic version of truth cannot, at the same time, be the authentic truth itself.

However, it can also be argued that representations logically imply the existence of truth. Reinhold, developing Aristotelianism, thought that all representations were “hylomorphic compounds”, or unities of matter and form. Form, although known *a posteriori*, is by itself *a priori*, and can be considered the essence of the representation, and thus, truth.

Furthermore, if all representations represent truths, this will presuppose the existence of truth. This can be used as a possible refutation of both the first premise (because everything cannot be representation if there must also exist truth to allow for the representations to be possible, and a representation must begin with the object – truth – even if it were to become hyperreal) and also the second premise (because if the definition of representation implies the existence of truth, then it cannot imply the negation of truth).

On the other hand, it can be said that this is incorrect.

Firstly, if form is considered to be the *essence* of representation, will have transcended the truth/falsity dichotomy entirely, as the dichotomy is limited to human reason, whereas essence is beyond human reason and is transcendental. If form is beyond truth

and falsity, then form cannot be true by the rule of conjunction elimination.

Secondly, even though all representations represent truths, or have truth as their object, this does not imply that truth exists. While it can be said that for all representations, their object must have existed at some point in time, this does not mean the object must still exist. For example, if I were to paint an apple which I perceive, the painting would be a representation of the apple, yet if the apple is destroyed immediately after the painting is completed, the representation would exist, yet the object of that representation would no longer exist. The reasoning behind this section makes it such that the aim is not to ascertain whether truth has ever existed in the past, but that it does not exist in the present age of postmodernity.

Hence, with both premises substantiated, the entire syllogism is sound. In conclusion, the way the postmodern world can be idealistically conceptualized as purely a multiplicity of representations directly justifies the notion that empirical truths do not exist.

Section 4: The Impossibility of All Empirical Truth

From the above three sections, it can be concluded that all empirical truths are non-existent and impossible.

The arguments address the question from different angles: one regarding how truth must be constant, yet at the same time can only exist in a world of inconstant information, one regarding how truth is always determined relativistically, constrained by subjective structures such as language and one regarding how truth negates its own concept in a world of representations and subjectivity.

If truth is “that which cannot be defined” and is impossible empirically, this means that all truth *can* be defined empirically. This is valid because a definition is the expression of a concept using other concepts and linking them all in a rhizomatic structure. The empirical realm connects every constituent of it to every other using the pure intuitions and the 12 common pure concepts of the understanding from which the phenomenological observer understands all objects of experience. Hence, every empirical object can be defined, and this can be done through the

linking of each object to their context within a larger empirical manifold, or by identifying abstract qualities of it such as colour.

Hence, after proving the idea that it is inconceivable for truths to exist in the empirical realm, we can proceed to justifying the idea of the impossibility of rational truths, which will then allow for a concrete proof that truth (as “that which cannot be defined”) can never exist.

Chapter 6: The Impossibility of Humanly Determined Rational Truths

Section 1: The Impossibility of Rational Truth in the Synthesis of the Rational with the Empirical

In this chapter, we will consider three types of rational truths: ones synthesized with empirical truths, ones which are purely rational and ones which are art.

This section will consider the synthesis of the rational with the empirical, which is the kind of reason employed by the *a posteriori* sciences.

In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that empirical truths cannot exist, and so, by the transitive property, this means that anything which has an impossible constituent must itself be impossible. Hence, in a synthesis of the rational with the empirical, such as applying an *a priori* theory in an *a posteriori* context, the synthesis would also be impossible because empirical truth is impossible, and for a true synthesis of two parts, both parts must also be true.

However, one may refute this view by arguing that in the synthesis of the rational with the empirical, the very nature of the synthesis allows for the transformation of the falsity of the empirical into truth. This is because the rational becomes dominant over the

empirical, like how an even number multiplied by an odd number will always give another even number.

Why is the rational dominant over the empirical?

Simply, it is the metaphysical structure from which the empirical manifold is made possible.

Nevertheless, this argument is incorrect because the rational is not dominant over the empirical, in fact, it is the opposite.

All rational thought must be constrained by the empirical manifold. If a subject thinks about reason, the subject must think about it subjectively and within the limits of the subject. The subject is limited by the pure intuitions of space and time, and their relativistic determinations. These intuitions, as Kant demonstrated in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, are the basis for the human experience of the world, and therefore, if the rational can only be actualized in the mind of an empirically determined subject, then reason must have an empirical groundwork.

Contrary to this, one might argue that the actualization of the rational must, analytically, make the rational

limited by the empirical, and there must also be a “rational-in-itself”, prior to the actualization, which would be free from the empirical groundwork for all reason.

Nevertheless, this “rational-in-itself” cannot exist because reason is socially constructed.

This is done through the underlying grammatical structures behind language. For instance, English grammar allows for the use of “if...then...” sentences, which unconsciously instils an idea in users of English: that linear causality exists. However, as Hume showed, causality does not exist, because what *is* does not imply what *ought to be*, and causation is ultimately a mind’s subjective link of two concepts with one another.

In addition, reason has accepted logical principles which affirm the validity of some ideas and negate others through the identification of them as committing a fallacy. Yet these principles and fallacies themselves change over time (for instance, in the split between Boolean and many-valued logics), and the people who determine these principles and fallacies are themselves only subjectively extracting the implicit rules of life

and attempting to express them explicitly, which is inherently flawed because by changing the implicit into the explicit, an *eidos* of the implicit would be lost, demonstrating how reason is simply a forever incomplete and imperfect model of reality. The incompleteness of logical systems was also shown in Gödel's incompleteness theorem, proving that all logical systems must have unprovable yet true propositions.

The development of reason can also be considered an evolutionary one, beginning through strong need rather than for its own sake. Reason is needed to allow for societies to be maintained and groups of self-conscious beings or Others to be ordered, as Hegel proved in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Besides, humans originally did not have the capacity for reason, which is substantiated by a Darwinian conception of human evolution, and it only became a faculty of the mind after more complex and abstract ideas (instead of simple descriptions of the external world) needed to be expressed and linked to other ideas. These ideas came about as common universals became abstracted from the empirical world (such as the textures of materials), and humans became more conscious of the world around them, constructing concepts such as emotion to

make sense of relations between objects. Hence, if reason is pragmatically determined by humans and their societal systems, it cannot have an essence free from the empirical.

Moreover, since reason is a social construct, it is only the paintbrush which adds colour to a colourless world, yet the colourless world must have existed prior to the paintbrush, so the empirical precedes the rational. This even applies to morality, as Shakespeare writes in Act 2 of *Hamlet*, “There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.”

Hence, to conclude this section, it can be said that rational truth is not possible in a synthesis of the rational with the empirical.

Section 2: The Impossibility of Rational Truth in the Purely Rational

Now that we have considered the impossibility of rational truth when the rational is synthesized with the empirical, we can proceed to an analysis of the impossibility of rational truth in the purely rational, or in other words, why the purely rational can never have any truth.

This may appear counterintuitive, as rationality is closely intertwined with the idea of truth, and all systems of logic can ultimately be reducibly defined as the question of whether something is true or false, so to suggest that truth cannot exist within these systems would mean that reason negates itself (by definition).

This self-negation of reason can be demonstrated in multiple ways.

The first is how there does not exist and will never exist a unified system of reasoning. As mentioned in the earlier section, the fundamental axioms of logic are themselves subject to change and can never be established with certainty. Scientific ideas and methods also change, as Kuhn and Feyerabend showed

in their works, meaning that there can never be an undoubtably true idea, or infallible claim in the sphere of reason.

The second concerns how a purely rational system is impossible, and hence, must affirm its own falsity. This is because something purely rational would also have to be purely abstract if it were to be detached from the world of experience (or the concretion of ideas) entirely. However, the purely abstract is impossible, because a purely abstract concept would be unrepresentable and thus, impossible to understand, because understanding can only originate from a knowledge of representations, and it was proved earlier that knowledge is equivalent to truth.

To symbolize this is first-order logic:

$$\forall x (PurelyRational(x)) \leftrightarrow \neg(Empirical(x))$$

$$\forall x (Empirical(x)) \rightarrow (Concrete(x))$$

$$\forall x (Concrete(x)) \rightarrow \neg(PurelyAbstract(x))$$

$$\vdash \forall x (PurelyRational(x)) \rightarrow (Abstract(x))$$

$$\forall x (Abstract(x)) \leftrightarrow \neg(Concrete(x))$$

$$\forall x (Knowable(x)) \leftrightarrow (Representable(x))$$

$$\forall x (Representable(x)) \leftrightarrow (Concrete(x))$$

$$\vdash \forall x (PurelyRational(x)) \rightarrow \neg(Knowable(x))$$

$$\forall x (Knowable(x)) = (Truth(x))$$

$$\vdash \forall x (PurelyRational(x)) \rightarrow \neg(Truth(x))$$

Besides, truth/knowledge was defined earlier in this treatise as “that which cannot be defined”, so truth must be related to a human subject or a “definer”, meaning that something purely abstract cannot be of a positive noumenal state, and instead, must be part of a relation with a human subject in order to have truth.

This view is also supported by Marx’s final *Thesis on Feuerbach* – a call for praxis or concretion, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.” While reason’s way of interpreting the world has the empirical as its object, ultimately, the interpretation itself can still be purely rational. However, this interpretation would still have to be done by a human subject as that is part of the definition of an interpretation – a passive human understanding of an active object in the world, and so, in fact, the essence and groundwork of interpretation would be limited to the material, physical world, meaning that a purely rational system is impossible.

Additionally, in the previous section, it was shown that reason cannot exist independently of an empirical groundwork, meaning that the purely rational is impossible.

Furthermore, the simple fact that we are currently negating the truth of reason using reason means that reason must be able to negate itself, substantiating the idea even more.

Thus, with the idea of a purely rational system inevitably ending in its own negation, it can be deduced that *a priori* truth cannot exist in these systems.

Section 3: The Impossibility of Rational Truth in Art

If the rational is understood as the negation of the empirical, then we must consider the concept of art, as it is not purely empirical because of how works of art can abstract ideas from the empirical realm (such as absurdity) and then actualize these in new forms. Hence, we can now evaluate whether rational truth is possible in art.

Kant understands art as “purposiveness without purpose”. In other words, it is something that is illusory yet presents itself as real – a representation which ignores its own representation, an empty signifier referring to anything but itself. Thus, art reflects the inner contradictions of life, and how through contradiction and disorder, beauty emerges.

As Fernando Pessoa writes in *The Book of Disquiet*, “Why is art beautiful? Because it’s useless. Why is life ugly? Because it’s all ends and purposes and intentions.”

Thus, the uniqueness of art lies in its absence of utility, contrary to life, where objects are only defined through

their utility. Art is the antithesis to life, it is the world of disorder, which somehow, through the recognition of its own disorder, is also at the same time, a world of order. We like art not because it simulates the real, but precisely because it is a simulation, or a detachment from the real.

Therefore, rational truth cannot exist in art because art is itself irrational and is comprised of illusions and not realities.

However, with the emergence of postmodernity, the irrational essence of art has gradually transformed into one of rationality. As Baudrillard analysed in *Simulacra and Simulation*, the line between fiction and reality can be blurred. With the use value becoming a form of sign value in the postmodern age, art also no longer is useless. For the modernist Walter Benjamin in *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*, the uniqueness of art also decays in value, and this is especially relevant today when considering the context of mass culture, mass media and mass consumerism, with all of these helping to constitute a universal groupthink that eliminates individuality and hence, the authenticity of artistry.

Hence, as a result of the transition into postmodernity, art has shifted from an irrational and disordered representation of a rational and ordered world into a rational and ordered representation of an irrational and disordered world.

An excessive love of “irrational art” in earlier centuries has arguably led to the shaping of the new postmodern world in its image. When an object is loved, there is need for its repetition, so that the love can be repeated, which will be beneficial to the *conatus* of the being wanting to repeat it, in Spinozist terms. Therefore, the repetition and actualization of irrational art in the postmodern world follows directly from the love of irrational art. The postmodern world, as referenced earlier, is now devoid of objectivity and truth, and where inconstancy is the only constant. This is why the rational world has become an irrational world.

Art has become rational through this process, because in the past, art has only sought to represent all objects but itself (except for art manifested in music, which Schopenhauer thought was the “Will” itself), and this is because only rational objects have the possibility of being transformed into irrational ones through representation. Yet in the postmodern world, the

respective states of art and the world as irrational and rational have reversed, meaning that “postmodern art” can no longer represent the world, but only represent itself, becoming what Lacan would term a “master signifier”, or a signifier which signifies itself and is the root for an entire chain of signification.

For example, in abstract expressionism (a mainstream branch of postmodern art), art seeks not to represent the objects of the external world to a high degree of accuracy, but to represent itself and its own ideas (which have no actualized physical matter).

Thus, art is rational insofar as it does not refer to the empirical manifold, or the world of perceivable objects.

From this, it may seem as if rational truth can exist in art, yet this is false for two reasons.

Firstly, if art is the only rational concept in postmodernity, then it would be *purely* rational, and the impossibility of rational truth in the purely rational has already been established.

Secondly, art can never be art-in-itself because art can only be known through empirical means and is only actualized in these means, meaning that art, even in postmodernity, remains as the confrontation between the rational and the irrational, the dialectic of truth and falsity. “True” art would be detached from the human experience and unknowable forever. This means that art (when knowable to humans, which is a condition for the definition of truth as “that which cannot be defined”) is neither true nor false, as it is the liminality between the two forces of the world (the knowability of the rational and the unknowability of the irrational).

Therefore, in either of these cases, art cannot have any rational truth.

Section 4: The Impossibility of All Rational Truth

In the previous three sections, we have identified three rational systems (the rational synthesized with the empirical, the purely rational and art) and showed that rational truth is not possible in all of them.

This means that all truth (empirical truth and rational truth) is impossible. We have already examined the implications of the proposition “truth is impossible” in the two antinomies of this treatise, but those analyses were only concerned with the *a priori* implications immediately knowable by definition.

Following this, the *a posteriori* implications of the proposition “truth is impossible” will be ascertained. This will begin with a thorough vivisection of the concept of “anti-logic”, which had emerged in the solution to the second antinomy.

Chapter 7: Anti-Logic

Section 1: The Infinite Scope of Anti-Logic

Fundamentally, anti-logic is the absolute negation of logic. This means that anti-logic cannot be understood through a logical means, and so in a seemingly paradoxical manner, one can only understand anti-logic by using an anti-logical system.

Anti-logic is very much like the Tao. In the first chapter of the *Tao Te Ching*, Lao Tzu writes “道可道也，非恒道也”，which translates to “The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao.” To have anti-logic “told” would be to have anti-logic expressed logically, thus denying the essence of anti-logic itself.

Earlier in this treatise, it was demonstrated that logic results in its own self-negation, and limits to reason like those were also shown in Kant’s antinomies of pure reason. The death of logic brings forth the birth of anti-logic as its replacement – the impossibility of truth reveals that logic is no longer the most accurate way of understanding the world, and that a system grounded on this impossibility would be more ideal. Hence, anti-logic can only be described through anti-language, which is language that permits innate contradictions and inconsistencies, or language modified in such a way that it no longer has a logical structure. Anti-

language is indistinguishable from language on a surface level, as they would utilise the same basic graphemes, it is only their theoretical bases which differentiate anti-language from a structured language.

In this chapter, there will still be logical evaluations of anti-logic, and this is because logic is itself a part of anti-logic, as it would be anti-logical to assume this to be the case (this then implies that anti-logic is not simply the antithesis to logic, but the dialectical sublation of logic to illogic to itself). Hence, the illogical (the indeterminate negation of logic) would also be a constituent of the anti-logical (the determinate negation of logic). This implies that an anti-logical system of philosophy cannot be refuted, because a refutation would have to be logical in order to be considered a successful refutation, yet this fails because logic is itself a form of anti-logic and using logic to refute the validity of its determinately negated opposite would be circular reasoning, which would reveal the fallaciousness in non-fallacious logic. Fallaciousness in non-fallacious logic would be contradictory, and so, anti-logical.

However, even if there existed a complete system of anti-language, the human mind would still be unable to

grasp the full content of anti-logic, as the mind itself has a structure in its process of transforming perceived information into the subject's knowledge, so something without structure such as anti-language can never be understood fully by it.

Nevertheless, a full understanding of anti-logic is not needed for our general definition of anti-logic as the determinate negation of logic, or for the ascertaining of its scope and limits (because the scope of something can always be identified without interacting with it).

Anti-logic is not simply a way of interpreting the world – it is the world itself in a totalized unity. This is because *logic* is just a way of interpreting the world, and if *anti-logic* is its determinate opposite, then anti-logic cannot be this.

Miguel Unamuno once said, “Everything vital is, not only irrational, but anti-rational, and everything rational is anti-vital.” The world must be vital because it contains within it everything that is vital or has the possibility of being vital, meaning that the world is anti-rational, which ends the dichotomy between the rational and irrational forces proposed earlier by introducing the anti-rational, which must also include

the rational and the irrational, if reason is synonymous to logic.

If anti-logic is the totality of everything, then it becomes even more evident that it can never be fully known.

Additionally, if anti-logic is everything, then its scope is infinite, because everything, as a collective whole, is infinite. This is also substantiated by the fact that logic has a limited scope, so anti-logic (negating logic) would have an unlimited scope. Hence, anti-logic can be applied to anything, and anything that can be conceived is contained within it.

The infinity of the scope of anti-logic is not what Hegel would call a “spurious infinity”, or a finitude that successively creates new limits to its finitude, thus not being a “true infinity” at all. This is because anti-logic, if containing the totality of the universe, would mean that anti-logic contains within it the dialectical movements of the Absolute Spirit, so it would be cyclical and a “true infinity”.

Thus, it can be concluded that anti-logic’s scope is infinite and contains everything that has the possibility

of being contained. Therefore, anti-logic is not a system, it transcends systems by being the commonality that all systems share and the unifying order behind not just the *a posteriori* realm, but also the *a priori* and the transcendental.

In the next section, we will consider what anti-logic is generally comprised of, even if a high degree of specificity in these can never be attained by virtue of the definition of anti-logic itself.

Section 2: The Principles of Anti-Logic

There is no complete set of principles of logic, which means that for anti-logic, this set is possible.

It may seem that the principles of anti-logic would be the inversions of logic, yet anti-logic is a complete system and logic is an incomplete one, and so, it is better to think of the principles of *logic* as being the inversions of the principles of *anti-logic*, and not vice versa, because an incomplete system is always part of the larger completeness of all incomplete objects – the anti-logical.

While the principles of logic are always subject to paradigmatic shifts, the principles abstracted from these principles are not since they are the measure of the changes themselves. One of the most significant of these higher-order principles is the principle that there exists such thing as a principle in the first place. This principle would be the basis for all other principles of logic as it is the principle that allows not for the validity, nor for the certainty, but simply for the conceivable existence of a principle.

Hence, to negate this principle would be anti-logical, and so, in anti-logic, there is no such thing as a principle and principles do not exist.

Yet the idea that “principles do not exist in anti-logic” exists in a positive noumenal state (following the reasoning from the analysis of the first antinomy). Hence, it is fundamental to everything, and “everything” as a totalized unity is the system of anti-logic itself, meaning that “principles do not exist in anti-logic” is itself a principle of anti-logic, because what is fundamental to a system must, by definition, be a principle of that system.

The contradiction between the meaning expressed by this principle and the condition of the principle itself then allows for the deduction of another principle: contradiction and negation are fundamental to anti-logic. This is because contradiction is fundamental to the fundamental principle of anti-logic.

Objects of the world can be endlessly negated, as is evident in how x can become $\neg x$, and then $\neg\neg x$, and then $\neg\neg\neg x$, allowing for a repeated negation of a concept. If negation can occur in infinitely different ways, and negation is fundamental to anti-logic, then

the idea that the scope of anti-logic is infinite presents itself as the third principle.

If the scope of anti-logic is infinite, this means that there are either infinitely many systems of anti-logic, or a single system that is this infinity itself. In the first section of this chapter, it was demonstrated that the former is not the case, because anti-logic is not a “spurious infinity”, so the latter must be the case, becoming the fourth principle.

Due to the fact that a logical derivation of the fourth principle resulted directly from the third principle, the third from the second and the second from the first, this means that logical analysis is possible in anti-logic, which becomes the fifth principle.

Additionally, the fifth principle was derived self-referentially from the system of anti-logic itself, meaning that all self-referential propositions are possible in anti-logic, including ones which fail in regular logic, such as “this statement is false”.

No other significant principles can be derived from the existing sixth, as the principles which were derived previously were done through pure analytic

consequence. However, the idea that no other principles can be established itself becomes a principle.

This principle is a contradictory one, and so, we can derive the second principle again, and then the third, and the fourth and so on, meaning that there are six principles of anti-logic, yet they cycle through each other in a linear, spurious infinity of derivation. These principles can also be symbolised in first-order logic:

1. Principles do not exist in anti-logic.

$$\exists x \neg(\textit{Principle}(x))$$

2. Contradiction is fundamental to anti-logic.

$$\forall x \exists y (\textit{Contradiction}(x) \wedge \neg \textit{Logic}(y)) \\ \rightarrow \textit{FundamentalTo}(x, y)$$

3. Anti-logic has an infinite scope.

$$\exists y (\neg \textit{Logic} = y) \rightarrow (y = \infty)$$

4. There exists only a single system of anti-logic.

$$\exists! y (y = \neg \textit{Logic})$$

5. Logical analysis is part of anti-logic.

$$\forall x \exists y ((x = \textit{Logic}) \wedge (y = \neg \textit{Logic})) \rightarrow (x \in y)$$

6. Self-reference is possible in anti-logic.

$$\exists x \exists y ((x \in y) \wedge (y = \neg Logic)) \rightarrow \\ (\text{RefersTo}(x,x))$$

Hence, in anti-logic, anything is possible, and this means that even truth can exist in the system of anti-logic. However, the concept of truth then negates itself instantly in the presence of all the other ideas which contradict it, and since every idea in anti-logic will have to contradict with another, this means that the ultimate *telos* of anti-logic is absolute nothingness – with every possible idea eliminated by its opposite.

Thus, anti-logic is a system of decay, and although there are infinite possibilities as to what is possible in anti-logic, this infinity only has a single path into 0.

One may argue against this idea, suggesting that contradictory ideas do not have to negate the other, as Hegel proposed. However, this refutation is wrong because Hegel also proposed that all ideas will eventually be actualized in the concretion of the Absolute, and in the concrete space of the *a posteriori*, concrete ideas cannot remain contradictory (e.g. a dog cannot be fully black and fully white at the same time).

To conclude this section, it can be said that there are six principles of anti-logic which can loop in an infinite cycle of analytic derivation from the preceding principle, and that the ultimate end of anti-logic is absolute nothingness.

Section 3: The Haecceity of Anti-Logic

The haecceity of a concept would be its “this-ness”, or what differentiates it from others in the mind of a knowing subject.

Anti-logic, as has been analysed in the previous two sections, has several distinguishing features – such as an infinite scope, negation instead of affirmation as the basis for reason (or rather, anti-reason) and the inclusion of all its negations in its own system.

However, the haecceity of anti-logic cannot be simply defined through some knowable or expressible quality such as the aforementioned ones, because haecceity must be what Lacan calls the Real in reference to a concept. This means that it is the gap between the content of the denotation and that of the denotatum, as only this is what constitutes the essence of the concept and separates it from others in the noumenal space along with the phenomenal.

Even if the haecceity of anti-logic cannot be knowable, knowability is itself limited by logic and the construct of the human mind, so an anti-logical understanding of the haecceity of anti-logic can still be possible, as anti-logic negates these limits.

First, the question of whether anti-logic even has a haecceity should be considered. Haecceity is typically used to describe objects known *a posteriori*, let alone abstract ones or one that consist of the totality of all things.

Nevertheless, this would only be a logical criticism, thus incommensurable with the system of anti-logic as a whole. Besides, if anti-logical is a non-spurious infinity which can contain all that is conceivable and inconceivable, then anti-logic can also, in its own system, have a haecceity. Additionally, haecceity is less about the perceived objects, but is fundamentally a psychological question, dealing with the perceiving subject and how they associate different objects with others, as the this-ness of an object is largely to do with the individual's past experiences. For instance, an object of cultural significance to the individual will have a different haecceity to the haecceity of the object in the eyes of an individual who does not associate the same cultural significance with it.

Hence, anti-logic must have a haecceity, and to ascertain this haecceity, one must use an anti-logical system.

This system was generalized into the six principles in the previous section, and so, if a proposed haecceity of anti-logic meets these principles (except for the first principle, as it is self-referential) in a miniaturized form, then that would be the haecceity of anti-logic.

Anti-logic can only have one haecceity (that is empirically identifiable), so it would be difficult to find this through pure trial and error, yet this difficulty can be reduced significantly when one considers the sixth principle – that which permits self-reference, and even though it is only the *possibility* of self-reference, possibility becomes actuality when one needs to find a concretely identifiable haecceity of anti-logic, because in the pure, abstract anti-logical system, there can be infinitely different haecceities of anti-logic, and this infinity would be dialectical, and be anti-logic itself, which does not allow for much significant cognitive import.

I contend that the haecceity of anti-logic (when concrete) is the lack of a haecceity.

This meets the second principle which suggests that contradiction or negation are fundamental to anti-logic,

because the haecceity of anti-logic in this case would also be the negation of a haecceity, which is the explicit contradiction from the simultaneous existence and non-existence of anti-logic's concrete haecceity.

It fulfils the condition of the third principle because explicit contradictions (i.e. "a" and "not a" at the same time) will always negate one and the other infinitely, reflecting the infinite scope of anti-logic through the infinite contradiction.

The fourth principle is also satisfied, because the haecceity of a concept must refer to only that singular concept and no others, meaning that it uses the axiom that anti-logic is a single system by simply being a haecceity, regardless of whether it is also, at the same time, the non-existence of a haecceity.

Furthermore, the fifth principle is met because in the contradiction between the existence and non-existence of a haecceity, one side of the dichotomy is the logical constituent, and another is the anti-logical one, as it is logical to suggest that anti-logic does not have a haecceity, as shown earlier in this section. This instance hence reflects the fact that logical analysis is a part of anti-logic.

Lastly, the sixth principle is met because the haecceity of anti-logical is self-referential by referring to the very existence of a haecceity of anti-logic.

Therefore, this section can be concluded by contending that the haecceity of anti-logic is its lack thereof. In the following two chapters, we will applying the system of anti-logic and the idea that truth is impossible to more empirical matters, such as an anti-logical sociology, as well as an anti-logical theology.

Chapter 8: A Pragmatic Critique

Section 1: A Substitute for Truth in a World of Irrationality

For any system of logic, truth is its fundamental object, and its *telos* is the determination of how true ideas are. For anti-logic, any aspect of logic must be determinately negated, meaning that anti-logic does not even have a fundamental object that it revolves about. Yet this absence of an object serves the same functional role as an object, meaning that this absence of truth becomes a substitute for it in a world where truth (and hence all reason, as reason is grounded on the possibility of truth) is impossible.

However, one may argue against this notion by suggesting that it is anti-logical to assume that truth exists in the system of anti-logic and is the fundamental object of that system, meaning that this is the case. Nevertheless, the opposite of this is equally as valid, and this results in contradiction. The second principle of anti-logic states that contradiction is fundamental to anti-logic, meaning that this contradiction is precisely the fundamental object of anti-logic, and the object is neither absolutely truth nor the absence of truth, but both at the same time, neither at the same time, and both individually, all at the same

time; and this mirrors our refutation of an antinomy concerning the impossibility of truth earlier in this treatise.

This object, following conclusions from earlier sections of this treatise, must then be of a positive noumenal state, yet objects which exist in such state must transcend the human understanding entirely, meaning that this substitute for truth in the postmodern world of irrationality has no relation to the world at all.

Yet this absence of a relation to the world is itself, indirectly, a relation, as it is a determinately negative relation of the world to the object of anti-logic (where the determinate negation – or a negation through anti-logic – is a predicate of the idea of relation).

Hence, the object of anti-logic (which is equivalent to the contradictions which arise from the object being truth and the absence of truth at the same time) is still related to the world, and thus, in a world no longer bounded by logic, exists as a substitute for truth.

Truth as the absence of truth (and the absence of truth as truth) is this substitute, and since it functions in the same way truth functioned in a pre-postmodern world -

where truth had a possibility of existing, it can be termed *functional truth*.

In the pre-postmodern world of rationality and order, truth had one role – as the *telos* of all logical inquiry.

Therefore, in the postmodern world, the role of functional truth is in serving as the *telos* of all anti-logical inquiry.

This means that, in the past, where all matters needed to be examined logically for ideal effects, in a world which lacks truth, this should be inverted.

Anti-logical inquiry through functional truth is exemplified by Camus in *The Stranger*, where the character Meursault embraces the Absurd, which can be understood as a finite concretion of the abstract infinity of anti-logic.

Meursault writes “It seemed to me as if the sky split open from one end to the other to rain down fire.” The juxtaposition of the words “rain” (which is usually associated with water) and “fire” (the opposite to water) reveals that nature is contradictory and paradoxical, and hence, that contradiction and paradox

are natural, suggesting that anti-logic (which is founded on unresolvable contradictions) is natural as well. “Sky” generally has connotations of order and peace (thus can be interpreted as symbolizing logic or reason, which have the same connotations), and therefore, the splitting of the “sky” marks the end of logic and the beginning of anti-logic as the concept of truth collapses. The phrase “it seemed to me” reveals that the description is wholly subjective, and everything written in *The Stranger* is subjective yet understood as objectively true, which links to our idea from earlier which contends that all subjective truths are objective ones and vice versa. Additionally, “it seemed to me” can also reveal how the information is only defined through its utility to Meursault (from the “to me”), showing that the information (which details a finite manifestation of anti-logic) can be used or serve a particular function. This function is thus the function of functional truth, which allows for the acceptance and repetition of the totalizing disorder in the postmodern world.

In an earlier section, it was established that the *telos* of anti-logic is absolute nothingness, and since we have also established that functional truth is the *telos* of anti-logic, this means that functional truth is equivalent

to absolute nothingness. This means that absolute nothingness exists in a positive noumenal state, and thus, in a postmodern world, order will never be fully gone, because a completely disordered system can only exist outside the humanly knowable world.

Thus, the substitute for truth in a world of irrationality is functional truth, which leads one to anti-logic in a practical sense. In the next section, we will consider the possibility of an anti-logical system of ethics, as all practical action in the past had the possibility of evaluation through ethics.

Section 2: An Anti-Logical System of Ethics

In the past, there have been numerous different systems of ethics (or structured methods to judge human action), including ones focused mainly on the *a priori* conditions of actions (such as deontology or virtue ethics) and ones focused mainly on the *a posteriori* conditions of the actions (such as situational ethics or utilitarianism). Despite these differences, all ethical systems (or normative ethics) share one common feature – the desire to establish themselves as logical and rational. For anti-logic however, the contrary is true.

To ascertain the qualities of an anti-logical system of ethics, we must first consider whether such a system is even possible.

On the one hand, it can be argued that an anti-logical system of ethics is impossible because it had been stated earlier in this treatise that there is only a single system of anti-logic.

However, this objection is flawed because it is anti-logical to assume that anti-logic (as the infinity of both the conceivable and inconceivable objects of the world dying away into an absolute nothingness through

infinite series of negation) can have its totality condensed into practical thought for a new system of ethics, meaning that this is the case.

Additionally, it can also be argued that all ethical systems in the past were themselves anti-logical and not logical. This is due to the fact that, as stated earlier in this section, all past ethical systems have their principles deduced either *a priori* or *a posteriori*, and never entirely both at the same time, as an essential quality of both concepts is their self-sustenance and separation from the opposing concept. However, the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* determine each other dialectically (i.e. the *a priori* is constructed through abstractions from the *a posteriori*, and the *a posteriori* through the concretion of the abstract *a priori*), and if all ethical systems can never have both the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* completely at the same time, this means they cannot have a single one completely either, if both determine and provide the structure for the other, thus resulting in normative ethics self-negating and sustaining that self-negation, which is anti-logical. Besides, it has already been established that anti-logic includes the totality of all things, thus also including the ethical systems of the past.

This proposed system of ethics (which has its architecture as the totality of anti-logic itself) will thus not be too inherently different from pre-existing systems of ethics. Nevertheless, anti-logic is, at the same time, the absolute negation of logic, meaning that it is also the opposite of all pre-existing systems.

All normative ethics of the past have involved the teaching of certain values or moral ideas, which means that for the anti-logical system, none of such will be taught. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel discovered that real morality lies within what he terms the “ethical order”, which are the unspoken and inexpressible customs that govern human action throughout world history (hence, a universalization of the ideas of social contract theory). He also thought that “philosophy should not be edifying”, so as such, anti-logical ethics as a philosophy will not compel its believers to follow moral rules, as morality becomes only representational when expressed through a medium like language, and pure morality would exist as the Lacanian Real – the remainder from the symbolization of morality that is the “ethical order”.

However, anti-logical ethics will still try to allow for ethicality in the world, because even though that is also

what logical ethical systems seek to do, each system has a different definition of what ethicality is, so cannot be determinately negated as a monolithic entity (unlike how anti-logical ethics is, in fact, monolithic).

Moreover, all logical ethical systems all have a universalized method of allowing for the construction of moral judgements (even situational ethics, as it prescribes universal notions to varying and contingent situations). Thus, for the anti-logical system of ethics, no universalized method exists.

Synthesising two of the earlier principles derived regarding anti-logical ethics, it can be said that our anti-logical system of ethics allows its users to forget the system entirely, as it is an empty system which paradoxically no longer becomes empty by referring to itself as empty; and wants ethics to be unspoken and forgotten, not preached, or methodically approached.

Ideally, over time, with the concept of morality forgotten by most through anti-logical ethics, all ethical sins will also disappear, which constitutes one of the central aims of logical ethics – the elimination of evil and suffering. This means that anti-logical ethics

has its *telos* commensurable with that of logical ethics, substantiating the fact that it is useful.

An embodiment of this system of anti-logical ethics lies in the Chinese writer Lu Xun's short story "The Incident", which communicates the idea that rationality and logic is never the way to proceed with morality, and the narrator's voice (who is portrayed as an educated intellectual) acknowledges how a rickshaw driver (who is portrayed as uneducated and impulsive) acted illogically, yet also fully morally. This was possible through how the rickshaw driver was driven completely by his impulses (contrary to what Kant would conceive as moral) and ended up acting ethically (in the sense that an action aligns with the purposes of traditional ethics, such as maintaining social order – which the rickshaw driver achieved by being a Good Samaritan) by acting for no particular reason, for no particular intention and for no particular end or gain.

Another example is from the 29th quatrain in the Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam (a work of Persian poetry), which reflects how life is best lived when one does not consider one's actions with too much depth,

and instead, lived in a minimalistic and passive manner:

“Into this Universe, and *why* not knowing,
Nor *whence*, like Water willy-nilly flowing:
 And out of it, as Wind along the Waste,
I know not *whither*, willy-nilly blowing.”

Hence, anti-logical ethics is comparable to art (prior to postmodernity) – an irrational force which does not have explicit rules yet allows for the expression of the deepest natures of human existence. Nevertheless, anti-logical ethics is also insignificant to human action and acknowledges its own insignificance, and through this, becomes the groundwork for all human action in all epochs of history (regardless of whether it is known at the time), because anti-logical ethics describes the implicit movements of unknowable moral ideas and contexts.

In the following section, we will consider how societies function (both through an anti-logical sociological evaluation of how societies functioned in the past, and through constructing a utopian image of how they should function using some of the anti-

logical ideas that we have established earlier in this treatise).

Section 3: Societies and Anti-Logic

A society, at the most fundamental level, is simply an assemblage of individuals. However, in a society, individuals no longer become purely individuals - after their existences have become thoroughly interlinked with other individuals and dependent upon larger institutions (like churches) which regulate society. Individuals of a society become pure constituents of the society, rather than individuals in-themselves, and so, it can be argued that in postmodernity, it is impossible to find an individual that is pure and devoid of contamination from social ideas and the systems which maintain those ideas.

This means that it is impossible to completely follow an anti-logical ethics in postmodernity, as anti-logical ethics is concerned with an individual (in its pure form), whereas in society, the subjective will eventually always shift into the intersubjective over time, and then the intersubjective will be deemed objective, thus establishing a system of logic in place of its anti-logical origins. Hence, evil and suffering will never be fully eliminated, and the project of all normative ethics is forever incompletable; and this means that ethics should not be something a society should concern itself with, and evil and suffering are

integral to the human condition (as suggested by the Irenaean theodicy, or through a Taoist interpretation of the good/evil dichotomy as mirroring yin and yang – with both being equally necessary as the other).

However, anti-logic can still be utilized for sociological analysis because previous sociological systems may have all existed within the continuous loop of paradigm shifts due to the fact that they assume that reason can be applied to the irrational natures of humans, when instead, only an irrational approach (through anti-logic) can be used to analyse societies effectively. For anti-logic, there are no paradigms, as anti-logic is a single system which is the unity of all things.

To begin, we must consider the question of why humans are innately irrational. Some might contend that humans must be innately rational in order to have the capacity for creating and using reason and logic. However, when one considers the fact that emotions (which are irrational) have the ability to easily trigger biases and fallacies in reason, whereas reason cannot easily change the state of emotions, implying that the irrational force of human existence is dominant over the rational, and thus, must be due to the fact that

either humans are naturally inclined towards irrationality because it is rooted in our natures, or because rationality was our nature originally but in an entropy-like fashion, it has shifted into irrationality, making irrationality the new natural inclination of humans.

If humans are naturally inclined towards irrationality, then it means that societies are also naturally inclined towards irrationality, as they are constituted by humans. However, it is also evident that societies are not completely irrational, as there are institutions which exist to maintain order in societies, such as judiciaries. Institutions which seek to preserve reason thus emerge through the smaller (yet still empirically existent) force of rationality in humans. This means that every type of institution has been disliked and possibly even revolted against throughout the course of human history (for example, governments) because the force of irrationality is more dominant in humans, and institutions are rational instruments used in attempts to eliminate the irrational individualities of humans.

An anti-logical approach to sociology can also be used in the analysis of culture. While social institutions utilise the rational force of human nature in the

sustenance of order, culture must operate with something differently – as a social institution can never last forever, yet culture (although subject to change over time) will always last, since it often allows for a material representation of abstract notions like nationality and ethnicity (which must exist because humans must be geographically-dispersed over the world, and categorization using abstract notions like these are necessary for more effective identification).

With regard to the concept of time, it can be argued that social institutions can only be analysed in a synchronic way (using Saussurean terminology) because they denote particular concepts of a particular time. However, culture must be analysed in a diachronic way because “culture” is not a single concept and must describe the constant change in-itself over the total expanse of time, as culture is constituted by ideas which are themselves subject to change (e.g. language).

If culture is always subject to change (or rather, is the change in-itself), then culture is driven neither by the rational force or by the irrational (individually). I contend that this means that culture is always, at the same time, rational and irrational at the same time.

Culture must be regulated by social institutions because only governmental institutions like judiciaries have the power to distinguish between that which is unlawful and that which is cultural, meaning that social institutions decide (though indirectly) whether ideas count as new culture. For example, as of 2023 in Iran, the only officially recognized religions are Islam, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Judaism; so other religions are not encouraged as part of Iranian culture (such as the Bahá'í Faith, which was founded in Iran, but now only approximately 300 thousand of the 86.5 million residents of Iran are its followers). This means that culture is always provided with the rational force which aims towards order. However, culture is also largely dependent on the citizens themselves, as something, by definition, can only be deemed culturally significant if it is popular or has a large following. The cultural idea must also have originated in a single individual's mind, thus providing it with more of the irrational, individualistic force. Hence, culture must be both rational and irrational. This may then explain why culture is appealing to people, because humans are not constituted by the rational force alone (so social institutions alone can never appeal fully), or by the irrational force (so societies exist to eliminate the possibility of complete

individuality, and people who live in isolation from societies must have, at least indirectly, been exposed to a society), meaning that the most appealing societal system to people would have to be a synthesis of both the rational and the irrational forces to match the structure of human nature itself.

However, all of this concerns how societies functioned in the past and the present, yet using anti-logical ideas, a utopian society can also be theorized.

An anti-logical utopia would, following from the principles of anti-logic, be a system which allows for a maximised quantity of unresolvable contradictions, yet at the same time, be optimal for human survival.

These unresolvable contradictions can all stem from the dichotomy of the rational force and the irrational force, and since it actualizes the nature of humans themselves, it will be optimal for human survival. These contradictions can be maximised through a maximised repetition of the simultaneous existence of the rational force and the irrational force in the same system – in other words, a maximised repetition of culture and its ideas.

Culture can be repeated through the repeated transference and communication of cultural ideas, meaning that in an anti-logical utopia, the primary purpose of the government or any governing body should be to ensure that the citizens are most involved with national culture rather than anything else – for example, focused on the arts rather than the sciences.

In Foucauldian terms, this means that the central power relation in an anti-logical utopia is the relation between the citizens and culture, and thus, the main source of authority in an anti-logical society is not the governing body, but the culture itself.

This is also consistent with Aristotle's notion that the role of governments is to encourage morality and instill virtues in its citizens, ultimately leading to the good life; and this is because culture is greatly interlinked with implicit social customs and etiquette, and thus publicizes the unknowable moral rules of anti-logic, paving the way for the good life.

However, governments should not force this to be the case through legislation, since a key component of culture would be the free artistic expression it involves, which is not possible through coercion.

Instead, the government should find alternative, non-coercive methods to allow its citizens to establish the nation itself and the national culture as synonymous, possibly through mass media or other forms of promotion.

This can appeal to citizens who hold all kinds of political views: leftists will approve of the sense of community created through the universal development of national culture and the equality of all before culture, rightists will approve of the acknowledgement of traditional cultural practices, and anyone who holds a view in between or outside the main binary of the political spectrum will still agree to some extent with either side.

Hence, a utopian anti-logical society (defined as the aggregate of individuals in a nation) would be one that is politically neutral and has the development of culture as its main *telos*, instead of economic development or geographical development.

Nevertheless, such a utopia can never be actualized, at least not under the international capitalist drive for developing the economy as the primary focus of governments worldwide, as the success of a country is

usually measured through economic indicators like GNI, and governments will self-evidently want their countries to be seen as successful and well-developed as possible.

Now that we have considered the practical implications of the impossibility of truth through a pragmatic critique, we will proceed to ascertaining the theological implications in the next chapter.

Chapter 9: The Theological Implications

Section 1: The Relation between Truth and Sublime Objects of the Transcendental

In the opening to this treatise, it was revealed that the existence of truth is assumed and presupposed in all humanly knowable aspects of reality. It has already been considered that with the non-existence of truth affirmed, reality can no longer be understood in the most optimal way through the logic of human knowledge, but rather, through the anti-logic of infinity. However, what I term “sublime objects of the transcendental” are a collection of objects which must be outside human knowledge entirely, so in this section, we will consider how the impossibility of truth relates to these objects.

A “sublime object of the transcendental” has two main defining qualities – sublimity and transcendence.

In the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant distinguishes between two types of sublimity (the mathematical and the dynamic). The mathematical sublime is that which overwhelms a human subject with pure magnitude and extremity (for instance, the incomprehensible formlessness of anti-logic), yet the dynamic sublime is the sublimity of nature, and the oscillation between fear and awe (such as the sheer power of a waterfall).

Transcendence can be defined as the quality of being beyond human knowledge, yet at the same time, is also a precondition for human knowledge and even the material world as a whole. This means that, with regard to sublimity, all transcendental objects must be both mathematically and dynamically sublime (because by being a precondition for human knowledge, its magnitude overwhelms the human mind to such an extent that it cannot even be cognized – thus mathematically sublime – and is the very force behind nature and determines change in objects – thus dynamically sublime).

One example of a sublime object of the transcendental is the system of anti-logic, as it drives human action and thought, yet cannot ever be fully comprehended or used, and is sublime because it is infinite, thus containing nature as a whole and having an overwhelmingly large magnitude. Another example is a God conceived as the *summum bonum*. This is because such God would be omnipotent, and omnipotence would, by definition, be both mathematically and dynamically sublime, and God is also considered the Creator and is transcendent, therefore transcendental.

On one hand, it can be argued that the relation between truth and sublime objects of the transcendental has purely one direction (i.e. the sublime objects of the transcendental allow for the human belief in knowing that truth is presupposed in all objects of reality, and only the sublime objects can influence the human understanding of truth, yet not vice versa).

On the other hand, the previous claim is invalid because truth (or knowledge/Being) is itself the totality of all sublime objects of the transcendental as a whole. This is evident in how by the *logical* principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (thus commensurable with an analysis of truth from both within and outside the limits of the concept at the same time), two concepts must be identical if they share all the same constituents. For truth/knowledge/Being and sublime objects of the transcendental, this is valid because both are the foundations of empirical reality (which also implies that both are sublime and transcendental), and there can only be a single foundation for material reality, as a “secondary” foundation would still be functionally the same as the earlier foundation, and for our present case, the foundations are logically

unknowable, so can only be evaluated consequentially or functionally, allowing for them to be equated.

This means that truth, knowledge and Being are not really equivalent to each other (although our earlier *logical* analysis in this treatise may have demonstrated this to be the case), and with an anti-logical system in mind, it can be said that all three concepts are distinct, and simply different sublime objects of the transcendental. Additionally, Deleuze's concept of "difference-in-itself" can be applied to this to argue that the original essence of reality must concern difference and not identity, and if the sublime objects of the transcendental (or foundations for reality) are all different and mutually exclusive, then this notion is satisfied.

Hence, if truth and God are both sublime objects of the transcendental and entirely separate, then it implies that nothing about God is truthful and nothing about truth is divine.

This seems to suggest that it is not true that God does not exist, yet this would, in itself, be a proposition concerning God, thus being subject to the same condition of non-truth, resulting in a paradox of the

same structure as our first antinomy regarding the impossibility of truth. Thus, “God exists” also exists in a positive noumenal state, and any other proposition about God will be the same.

However, since anti-logic is the infinite expanse of all conceivable and inconceivable objects, it also contains all positive noumena within it. Therefore, an anti-logical method can be used to ascertain a new theological system of ideas, and this will be considered in the following two sections.

Section 2: The Exposition of the Concept of God

The definition of God varies from one belief system to another, and in fact, “God” may not even be a single monolithic entity but instead, have itself constituted by a multitude of deities (such as with Hinduism).

Hence, in this section, “God” will be understood as the generalization of all these variations into a single substance. This generalization is possible because all conceptions of God all have one feature in common – their functional role as a Jungian mother archetype to society (or a concept that does not even need to exist in reality yet provides care and a sense of security, while remaining mysterious at the same time).

Differing conceptions of God express God in differing ways, and the distinct predicates ascribed to God by distinct belief systems all contradict each other (for example, the question of whether God is omnipotent or not).

However, one of our principles of anti-logic suggests that contradiction is fundamental to the system; and this means that after a worldview limited by logic is

abandoned, it will be understood that God is the unity of all such differing beliefs.

Therefore, all critiques of a specific God or non-universal quality of all Gods (such as omnipotence paradoxes) can be refuted, and instead, it can be contended that God (as the generalization of all conceived Gods) exists in all possible states at the same time (in this case, omnipotent and not omnipotent).

This unity of opposites is what allows for God to be unknowable, as human logic restricts the total understanding of contradiction – which would be what constitutes God. Besides, no human is able to know of all possible beliefs held about God (as we have demonstrated earlier in this treatise that information is always inconstant in the empirical world), meaning that God will forever be in this relation to the human mind.

Furthermore, this means that everything about God is unknowable, so any criticism of God would essentially be a criticism done blindfolded and invalidly.

Nevertheless, some may argue against the above statement because it can be said that “the impossibility of human knowledge of God” is itself a quality of God, thus being knowable. However, following the method in our resolution to the first antinomy concerning the impossibility of truth, it can be concluded that “human knowledge of God is impossible” exists in a positive noumenal state, so no sound judgements can be derived from it.

Two more qualities of God can be ascertained from our previous analysis of sublime objects of the transcendental: God is an example of such object (as our conception of God must be a conception of God as the *summum bonum* if our God is fully unknowable, thus embodying an ideal anti-logical ethics), and therefore, God must also not have another sublime object of the transcendental as a quality.

This means that, within the scope of human logic, God cannot be knowledge, cannot have any part of it true and also cannot have Being. However, from an anti-logical perspective, all such propositions will exist in a positive noumenal state (as shown in the preceding section).

Belief in this God of infinite contradiction can also be understood as a belief in a religious pluralism or inclusivism. Pluralism or inclusivism can be substantiated using Hegelian dialectics, contending that real spiritual meaning cannot only be attained in one religion or worldview, but must be the dialectical sublation and unity of all religions and worldviews, with each providing a different piece to the human understanding of reality.

By only believing in a single system of faith, the believer has the risk of becoming dogmatic in their faith, whereas a simultaneous belief in multiple systems allows the believer to be in a perpetual state of questioning (as there will always be inevitable contradictions – though possibly implicit - between faiths even if the ultimate *telos* of all the faiths are the same, or else the faiths would be perfectly identical), and this prevents dogma and, allowing for both a rational and irrational evaluation of the different beliefs.

The contradictions between different faiths would, based on the principles of anti-logic established, be fundamental to anti-logic, and since anti-logic contains God within itself, this pluralism will allow for a direct

link to God, instead of an indirect link characterized by a single system of beliefs free of contradiction with another system.

Now that some of the defining predicates of the anti-logical God have been examined, a proof of the necessity of God will follow in the next section.

Section 3: The Necessity of God

In the past, philosophers and theologians have made proving the existence of God as their ultimate task.

However, the existence or non-existence of any concept in reality can never be proven soundly (as a perfectly logical proof of it will have to be completely *a priori*, thus lacking a connection to the empirical actuality of reality, and an *a posteriori* proof can, analytically, only be inductive). Besides, it was already demonstrated in the earlier section that, through a human sphere of reasoning, it appears God and other sublime objects of the transcendental cannot have Being.

Anti-logic negates logic, meaning that proving the existence of God is not the purpose of an anti-logical theology, but rather, an anti-logical theology will aim to show that God is necessary. An attempted proof of the necessity of God is far more significant and fuller of cognitive import than an attempted proof of the existence of God, as ascertaining the idea that a concept exists does not alter our understanding of the concept itself, whereas ascertaining the idea that a concept is necessary does (because it allows for a

thorough knowledge of the relation the concept has to others and establishes its importance).

Moreover, the concepts of existence and necessity do not comprise an inherent conditional relation. This is because not all necessary ideas are existent ones (as a counterexample is Žižek's notion that Santa Claus does not exist and no one truly believes in Santa's existence, yet the belief functions as an ideological mechanism that allows for the preservation of social customs), and because not all existent ideas are necessary ones (as it is possible for something to exist yet serve no significant purpose).

Hence, by "necessity", I refer to the quality of an object which allows for it to be an essential constituent of another. Therefore, necessity always denotes a binary relation (i.e. x is necessary to y), and in the case of God, I contend that the other part of the necessity relation is the human experience as a whole.

This means that God, albeit possibly non-existent in-itself, is necessary to everything that a human can experience.

The conclusion that God is necessary to human experience can be ascertained when one considers the role of God as a sublime object of the transcendental.

Sublime objects of the transcendental must, by definition, be fundamental to reality. However, this does not mean that a specific object is fundamental in-itself (in this case, God), because the object could possibly only be fundamental due to its existence as a sublime object of the transcendental, and not vice versa.

While other sublime objects of the transcendental (like truth or anti-logic) may involve a process of self-negation and contradiction, God is the only concept which can have no significant qualities of it understood through the human mind as a result of how it is completely constituted by contradictions; and anti-logic does not fulfil this condition because anti-logic, being the totality of all things, must also be all sublime objects of the transcendental as a whole, therefore not a single sublime object of the transcendental and thus not a singular concept. This means that God is fundamental in-itself, as it is the original absolute totality of innate contradictions, thus allowing for the

possibility of contradiction in the humanly knowable reality by being transcendental.

Therefore, God is the precondition for all contradiction and perceived falsity in the human experience, thus also being the precondition for subjectivity (as we have shown earlier in this treatise that all “rational” ideas are inherently subjective). Analytically, subjectivity allows for individual meaning and morality, which means that God allows for morality, thus explaining a quotation often attributed to Dostoevsky from *The Brothers Karamazov*: “If there is no God, then everything is permitted.”

All human experience must be subjective (as everything that a human experiences must be experienced through their individual selves), showing that God must be necessary for the human experience entirely.

This necessity of a pluralistic God to the human experience is commonly implicit and rarely acknowledged, yet it is possible for the necessity to become apparent. One such example of this is the governmental system of theocracies, where a society and its politics is centred around the concept of God

(like Vatican City). Another example is how religious holidays such as Christmas often leave lasting effects on culture globally (in this case, Christmas becomes a vital theme in internationally popular music and film, therefore affecting anyone who is a part of society, though indirectly), therefore establishing cultures (which are, by definition, fundamental to an individual's sense of identity and their unique human experiences) throughout time as pluralistic and celebrating different religions or systems of faith.

Thus, it can be argued that God is necessary for all human experience, and in some cases, also the societal structures which influence and govern experience.

Conclusion

To conclude this treatise, truth is impossible. This then implies that logic (which is the determination of how true an idea is) is also a self-negating system, so one should opt for anti-logic instead (which is devoid of limits and is a more comprehensive model of reality). This system of anti-logic can then be developed and applied to fields ranging from sociology to theology.

The argument outlined in this treatise can never be refuted. This is evident in how a valid refutation is one that is logical, yet using logical reasoning to refute the argument (which leads to the conclusion that logic is a poor system) would be circular reasoning, therefore revealing a self-contradiction in logic. If one attempts to refute the argument in a way that is not logical, then one would simply be affirming the argument itself.

Therefore, it can be said this treatise is the most complete and ideal method of understanding the world.