DISPOSITIONS, VIRTUES, AND INDIAN ETHICS

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ABSTRACT

According to Arti Dhand, it can be argued that all Indian ethics have been primarily virtue ethics. Many have indeed jumped on the virtue bandwagon, providing prima facie interpretations of Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist canons in virtue terms. Others have expressed firm skepticism, claiming that virtues are not proven to be grounded in the nature of things and that, ultimately, the appeal to virtue might just well be a mere façon de parler. In this paper, we aim to advance the discussion of Indian virtue ethics. Our intent is not to provide a catch-all interpretation of the different Indian schools. Our goal is, more modestly, to offer a theory of virtues in Indian philosophies, as a framework for theorists and interpreters who see these diverse traditions as amenable to systematic virtue analysis. Our theory grounds virtues in the reality of genuine moral dispositions and in a system of beliefs where morality is understood as transformative in nature.

KEYWORDS: virtue ethics, Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, dispositions, causal powers

1. Introduction

Arti Dhand claims that Indian ethics is “reminiscent of the genre of virtue ethics developed in the West” and that “one could argue that all Indian ethics have been primarily virtue ethics” (2002, 358). Since then, a number of scholars have argued that Indian ethics is indeed virtue ethics (see Chakraborty 2006; Van Den Bossche and Mortier 2008; Bilimoria 2014).

Yet others have expressed firm skepticism. J. N. Mohanty reports that “it has often been said that the Indian philosophies did not develop a moral theory” on the ground that an appeal to virtue does not constitute evidence of a theory, since virtues are not proven to be grounded in the nature of things (2017, 66). Roy Perrett and Glenn Pettigrove, echoing a similar skepticism, have recently warned us against overvirtuing Indian ethics. They urge us to consider whether Indian virtue ethics is “one that consists primarily in the advocacy of the virtues” or, instead, one where virtues really “possess a sufficient degree of explanatory primacy for the theory to be considered a virtue ethic” (2015, 55).

In this paper, we argue that the main Indian philosophies go well beyond virtue-advocacy. In all three canons—the Jain, the Buddhist, and the

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Hindu—virtues have a solid ontological foundation and a primary explanatory role; they are dispositions grounded in the nature of things, and their exercise produces merits and moral progress. We understand our task as requiring a degree of intellectual humility. We do not want to claim that all Indian ethics are virtue ethics. Indian ethical writing is not a monolithic corpus where one philosophical current can claim supremacy over others.\(^1\) Hence, our intent is not to affirm the primacy of any ethical framework nor to provide a catch-all interpretation of all of the many different Indian ethical traditions. These traditions might very well be understood on their own terms, rather than as a species of some Western school. So, our goal is, more modestly, to offer a theory of Indian virtues—or moral dispositions—and a general framework for theorists and interpreters who see Indian ethical traditions as systematic and amenable to virtue analysis.

Thus, first, what we are after is not interpretation but explication: a systematization of the reasons that explain the use of the term “virtue.”\(^2\) Second, to meet the skeptics’ demands, we must describe how the ontology of Indian virtues works vis-à-vis the ontology of moral dispositions and how it explains moral agency and moral progress.

Indian ethical traditions are diverse, and each includes different schools holding different philosophical positions. As we will see in Section 3, the internal mechanics of the virtues are deeply intertwined with the metaphysical assumptions underpinning the ontology of dispositions. Since different schools disagree on some aspects of the underlying ontology, we expect that each school will generate a slightly different rendition of the mechanics of the virtues. We believe that each of these renditions must be assessed in appropriate venues. Hence, the scope of this paper is limited and programmatic in nature. It lays out the preliminary foundation for a more in-depth, future assessment of the dispositional nature of

\(^1\) Vivekananda’s Vedāntic ethics is often presented as a clear-cut case of virtue ethics by many (see Ranganathan 2017c, 124; 2018, 60; Davis 2017, 137; Medhananda 2022, 11). But Ranganathan argues that Yoga’s ethics, or Bhakti, cannot be associated with virtue ethics because “whereas Virtue Ethics claims that the good (virtue) causes the right action, Bhakti claims that the right action [which is worship] causes the good outcome” (2017b, 252). Reading the ethics out of the mythology is equally controversial since, as Edeltraud Harzer points out, these sources do not present one moral theory as the “true” one but often employ the fictional device of personifying moral theories onto characters, thereby presenting many at the same time (2017, 321–23; Dhand 2002, 369). The Jain tradition is almost exclusively identified as a form of virtue ethics (see Soni 2017; Ranganathan 2016a, 2016b). Buddhist scholarship is not equally cohesive. Harvey 2000, Keown 2001, Heim 2020, and Hanner 2021 have argued for a virtue reading of Buddhist ethics. Others, such as Davis 2017, 137, Ranganathan 2018, 64, and Chakrabarti 2017, 214, frame some Buddhist ethical traditions, and Nyāya in particular, as Perfectionism Consequentialism. According to William Edelglass, Śāntideva’s ethics cannot be fully equated with (at least Aristotelian) virtue ethics because it incorporates elements of classic Consequentialism (2017, 242). For a case of Buddhist ethics as universalist consequentialism, see Goodman 2009 and Clayton 2006. For a response to Goodman and Clayton, see Fink 2013, Harris 2015, and MacKenzie 2017. Mark Siderits 2003 takes Buddhist ethics to represent a form of aretaic utilitarianism.

\(^2\) On interpretation versus explication, see Ranganathan 2017a, 7.
virtues. What we argue, as a starting point, is that there is a general core that all of them further develop: that morality is transformative in nature and that the ground of morality rests on genuine moral dispositions.

We will proceed in a systematic fashion. In Section 2, we briefly introduce the state of the scholarship on virtues in Indian philosophies and set the boundaries of the problem we intend to address. In Section 3, we begin by examining the notion of virtue in relation to the notion of dispositions. We argue that, across the ethical board, virtues are identified as moral dispositions, good potencies or dispositions for the good. In Section 4, we first connect the commitment to genuine moral dispositions with the broader conception of morality as active, or transformative, in nature. Second, we explicate the notion of active morality in relation to that of the exercise of moral dispositions. Hence, we examine how moral dispositions qua virtues manifest and the proper manner by which their exercise must be curbed to enhance moral progress. We conclude that, contrary to the skeptics, the appeal to virtues is far from being a cosmetic affair or a mere cataloguing. In each tradition, virtues are unified in a system and grounded in the nature of things.

2. On Overvirtuing Indian Virtue Ethics

Despite virtue theorists disagreeing on a number of issues, there are a few minimal claims that virtually everyone endorses. The first is that morality is primarily about someone’s character rather than about someone’s actions; about what kind of person to be rather than what to do (see Anscombe 1958; Annas 1993; Kraut 1989; Zagzebski 2004; Hursthouse 1999). Someone’s character, in turn, is a matter of instantiating (global) moral dispositions, which are dispositions for the good or the bad. The second is that, in virtue ethics, a theory of value is prior to the theory of moral rights: what to do (what is obligatory, permissible, and impermissible) is defined in terms of good and bad. Deontic notions are thus grounded in the aretaic notion of virtues and vices, which are explanatorily prior and (morally) fundamental. Finally, morality cannot be fully captured by appealing to universal, general laws but is rather an activity: one develops and refines one’s moral character and acquires or loses moral dispositions by cultivating oneself. In brief, an ethics is virtue based if and only if it grounds morality in real features of agents and explains moral conduct and moral progress based on the mixture of moral properties that the agent bears and exercises.

Like Dhand, many have jumped on the virtue bandwagon. Dipasikha Chakraborty, for instance, claims that virtues in Hinduism can be best accommodated by a version of Agent-Centered/Agent-Based virtue ethics (2006, 93). Purushottama Bilimoria agrees with Chakraborty and explores the role of character in Aristotelian virtue

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3 For a discussion of the distinction between global versus local dispositions/virtues, see Miller 2003. The distinction will not bear on the discussion ahead.
ethics in connection with that of vyavasāyātmikābuddhih in Yoga-Śramana (2014, 297–300). In the context of Buddhism, Jay Garfield (2017, 2022), Oren Hanner (2021), Charles Fink (2013), and Matthew MacKenzie (2017) argue that virtues are the subject of systematic philosophical reflection and are nonreducible sources of moral actions. Within the Jain tradition, Jayandra Soni explores the vīrya (virtue) as the essential trait of jīva (self), understood as the center of moral responsibility (2017, 155).

Likewise, much has already been said about the nonderivative normative status of virtues vis-à-vis other normative principles. Garfield (2017), Damien Keown (2001), and Maria Heim (2020) emphasize how Buddhist virtues cannot be reduced to a set of moral prescriptions or imperatives and that Buddhist ethics understand the agent’s moral development through the exercise of virtues. Similar remarks are put forward by Soni (2017) and Shyam Ranganathan (2016a, 2016b) in respect to the Jain tradition. The same dissatisfaction with general, prescriptive rules is echoed by Heim in the Dharmaśāstra Dānanibandha (2017), by Braj Sinha (1988) and Bina Gupta (2006) in the context of the Bhagavad Gītā, and by Frank Van Den Bossche and Freddy Mortier (2008) in the Vajjālaggam. The general verdict seems to be that morality is fundamentally a matter of “internal subjective dispositions” (Sinha 1988, 192) that “oblige only under certain circumstances” (Gupta 2006, 381).

Nevertheless, Perrett and Pettigrove are suspicious that all these virtue-related goings-on within Indian ethics might be just a mere façon de parler. According to them, mere advocacy, or cataloguing, is not sufficient for a theory to qualify as a virtue theory. Probably referring to Nand Kishore Devaraja (1962, v–vi) and Eliot Deutsch (1969, 62), Mohanty reports that:

It has often been said that the Indian philosophies did not develop a moral theory. The task of a moral theory, one may continue, is not merely to produce a catalogue of do’s and don’ts, of virtues and vices, rights and duties, but also to (i) unify them in a system, and (ii) ground them either (a) in the nature of things (i.e. in a metaphysics) or (b) in the nature of humankind (i.e. in a philosophical anthropology) or (c) in a supreme moral principle from which they all, in their systematicity, can be derived. Obviously, [they] did not quite do any of these. (2017, 66)

When Perrett and Pettigrove warn us not to overvirtue Indian ethics, we take them as requesting friends of Indian virtues to show how virtues get a systematic foundation and how they explain moral behavior and moral progress—in other terms, to provide evidence of virtues being ontologically and explanatorily substantial. 

Prima facie, to those familiar with the ontology of dispositions, Perrett and Pettigrove’s concern is legitimate. Lorenzo Azzano argues that the truth of dispositional sentences does not immediately commit to the existence of genuine dispositions (2019). And because virtues are dispositions, virtue talking is not prima facie committing to the reality of genuine moral dispositions. Even though theorists of virtues seldom emphasize the connection between virtues and the underlying ontology of dispositions, Azzano and Raimondi argue that the connection between the two is tight (2023).
We start our quest by arguing that the connection is also evident within Indian ethics. To this we now turn.

3. Properties, Dispositions, and Virtues

So far, we have used virtues and moral dispositions interchangeably. The reason is that virtues, despite being referred to as character traits, correspond to certain ontological posits: dispositional properties, or potencies, that bestow their bearers with certain abilities. Dispositional properties are properties for (or directed to) a certain manifestation. Aristotle calls these properties pros-ti, the toward something (Marmodoro 2018). The idea is that a disposition is a property that tells us what something would do in certain circumstances (for example, fragile objects might break if struck). The “doing” of this property is dubbed manifestation, a state of affairs that the property brings about or causally produces (see Mumford and Anjum 2011; Groff 2021; Ingthorsson 2021). The link between the disposition and the manifestation is what underpins and explains the behavior because dispositions “are meant to generate patterns in the behaviour of their bearer, which, albeit not exceptionless, are most often than not detectable” (Azzano and Raimondi 2023, 3–4).

In the Hindu tradition, references to the dispositionality of things abound. The notions of force, capacity, or influence (śaktā) and power or strength (vīrya) are often used to mean potency/tendencies to produce/act (respectively, Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 1.10.22, 3.5.51, 4.24.18, 6.2.19, 6.4.1–2; Gīta 9.40; Śrī Caitanya-caritāmṛta 17.212). Paradigmatically, the notion of “one’s own nature” or “intrinsic nature” (svabhāva) is either cashed out in dispositional terms (see Śrī Caitanya-caritāmṛta 6.199, 8.207) or directly translated as “one’s own natural dispositions” (svabhāvabhāva; see Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 10.63.26).

The notion of virtue, too, is characterized dispositionally. Virtues are, first of all, properties or potencies, that is, gunās, that can be possessed by an individual (guṇin) and that determine their actions through manifestations. In the Vajjālaggaṃ (see Van Den Bossche and Mortier 2008, 98) and in the Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam, among others, the notion of gunās is directly associated with virtues—or “pious” qualities or “modes of goodness” (3.9.23, 11.20.1, 11.19.40, 4 6.199, 8.207).

In this section, we will talk of attributes, quality, and properties interchangeably. We are also aware that each canon works with a preferred ontology of properties, namely as universals (Hinduism), modes (Jainism), and tropes (Buddhism) (see Siderits 2002; Bartley 2015). For the purpose of this paper, unless required, we will ignore the metaphysical details, for they do not impinge on our arguments. We will, however, say more about the influence of these details in Section 5.

Christopher Bartley argues that the Abhidharma notion of svabhāva—particularly as it is discussed in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakosā-bhāṣya—is similarly characterized in dispositional terms as “the capacity to do something . . . the nature of a white atom is to contribute to a white surface and bring about a certain perception . . . it seems that they are not characterized in categorical terms but rather in dispositional ones, that is to say, in terms of their capacity to interact with other dharmas” (2015, 46–47).
In others, such as the Śrī Caitanya-caritāmṛta (24.41) and the Gīta, we find the distinction between the morally loaded use of gunās and the ethically neutral use—as “human qualities,” “attribute,” “property,” or “potency” more in general (see Bodewitz 2019, 368).

Similar semantic volatility affects the Buddhist canon. The Majjhima Nikāya uses gunās for “qualities” and kuśala for “virtues” or “good qualities,” those conducive to happiness (sukha) or awakening (bodhi; see Nānāmoli and Bodhi 2005, 524–25). But the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra uses sīla and kuśalaguṇa interchangeably to indicate both qualities and good qualities (50.4.2).

Similarly, the Visuddhimagga—a formative text of the Theravāda Buddhist tradition—uses sīla, sometimes referring to the general category of qualities, sometimes more specifically to moral dispositions (see also Hanner 2021). In 1.38, for instance, we read the neutral rendition of sīla as dispositions: “but in the world the nature of such and such beings is called their disposition (sīla) of which they say: ‘This one is of happy sīla, this one is of unhappy sīla, this one is of quarrelsome sīla, this one is of dandified sīla.’”6 The Sarvāstivāda school tends to use sīla in its moral connotation (see Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāṣā-śāstra 723c).

In the neutral sense, the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma dispositions or potencies are referred to as śakti or its synonyms: bīja (seed) and sāmarthya (capability; see Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra 621c–622a, 631c–633b; also Siderits 2002, 69). There are seldom any references that connect both sīla and śakti with gunās. This absence is likely due to Buddhist schools being generally nominalist, disagreeing with the Jain and Hindu schools about the reality/fundamentality of properties.8

According to Jain ontology, both substances and qualities are real. Substances (dravya) are that “which is characterized by origin, persistence and decay, without changing its ‘own-nature’” and are the “substratum cause” (Pravacanasāra 2.3–6). Substances possess qualities (guṇa; Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya 5.37) which “are themselves devoid of any qualities” (Tattvārthasūtra 5.41) and “[are] (actually) the distinguishing character of one substance from another” (Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya 5.38).9 As Siddhasena remarks, while the category of substance is associated with “being” and that of gunās with “becoming,” this is a distinction of thought and not of reality (Sanmati-tarka 1.7–9). In reality, gunās are not independent existents but dynamic states, or modes of the substance.

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6 A similar neutral rendition of sīla as disposition is given by Vasubandhu in the Pañcaskandhaka-prakaraṇa. “And what are dispositions (sīla)? They are contact, mental attention, feelings, cognitions, volitions, zest, confidence, memory or mindfulness, meditational concentration, insight, faith, inner shame, dread of blame, the root-of-the-beneficial of lack of greed, the root-of-the-beneficial of lack of hostility, the root-of-the-beneficial of lack of confusion, vigor, tranquility, carefulness, equanimity, attitude of nonharming, attachment, aversion, pride, ignorance” (Anacker 2005, 66).

7 See also Dhammjoti 2009, 380.

8 More on this in a moment.

9 See also Matilal 1981.
Similarly, Kunda Kunda argues that the quality of a substance is the result of the manifestation of the substance’s intrinsic nature, and therefore, the two are not distinct (3.103). The souls (jīva), too, are substances (dravya; Tattvārtha-sūtra 5.3) and so have qualities (guna) and psychic dispositions (vīrya; bhava) that set them apart from matter. In the Samayasāra, bhava are “modification[s] of the (empirical) self according to its nature” and, in turn, that from which “the self is produced” (3.102).

As is well known, Siddhasena’s, as well as Kunda Kunda’s, endorsement of the nonduality of substances and qualities—or Perspectivalism (see Siderits 2002, 55–56)—is in antithesis with the sharp ontological distinction, introduced by the Vaiśesika and the Sāṃkhya school, between dravya and gunās. Perhaps, the Vaiśesika and the Sāṃkhya are the closest to the Aristotelian substance ontology. In the Vaiśesika Sutras (1.1.15), gunās identify substances, account for their difference and, as in the Tattvārtha-sūtra, are described as “inhering in substances, not possessing attributes” (1.1.16). In the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, the qualities are basic constituents of the fabric of the world. The one God is the “Lord of qualities” (6.13.16) and “begins with works (karman) which are connected to the qualities (gunās), and distributes all existences (bhava). In the absence of these qualities, there is disappearance of the work that has been done (This which is regarded as earth, water, fire, air, space)” (5.14.4).10

The Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam takes the “tri-guna,” too, to be “potenc[ies] of activit[ies] (mahat-tattva or sūtram, power to act)” and “cause[s] of manifestation of the universe” (11.09.20). The tri-guna are the gunās of sattva (essence), rajas (energy), and tamas (mass). Only later, they will be identified with psychological traits, existing in different proportions in any individual.11 In this broadly, ethically neutral sense, both virtues and nonvirtues are gunās. The tri-guna too are more often than not described dispositionally in terms of what they are for and their manifestations:

Sattva, rajas, tamas, thus, the qualities (gunās) born of material nature, Bind fast in the body. . . . Of these, sattva (virtue), free from impurity, illuminating and free from disease, binds by attachment to happiness, And by attachment to knowledge. . . . Know that rajas (passion) is characterized by passion. . . . By attachment to action. Know indeed that tamas (sloth, darkness) is born of ignorance. . . . This binds fast, Arjuna, With negligence, indolence, and sleepiness. (Gīta 14.7–9)

10 A similar remark is present in the Chāndogya Upanishad, in which the quality of the good is said to: “[subsist] in the form of the (constituent) cause in all such products as the Regions—earth, fire, sky, heaven. Similarly, the idea of the Regions and other products is always accompanied by the idea of the ‘Good’ (which is their cause)” (2.2.1).

11 See also: “know Goodness (sattva), Activity (rajas), Darkness (tamas) to be the three qualities of the Self, with which the Great One always completely pervades all existences” (Manusmṛiti 12.24). On sattva, rajas, and tamas, see also Bhāgavata-purāṇa 1.8.18, 3.5.46 and Brahmāṇḍa-purāṇa 2.19.173.
They say the fruit of good action is sattvic and without impurity, But the fruit of rajasic action is pain, And the fruit of tamasic action is ignorance. (Gītā 14.16)\textsuperscript{12}

In line with the Jain school, the Hindu tradition understands gunās as genuine ontological posits and (at least some of them) as “efficacies toward something,” “potentialities” (śakti) (Dasapardartha-Sastra I.8), or “potencies for” (Vaiśesika-sutra 6.1.4). Likewise, in Dasapardartha-Sastra, attributes inhere in substances, which in turn “produce their effects in virtue of potentials” (2.1.2). When it comes to potencies or dispositions, the kind of realism shared by the three Indian schools is neatly reflected in their rendition of the notion of dispositional nature, as exemplified in the Sāṃkhya Kārikā and the Pramāṇavārttika:

The effect is existent (satkāryam) (in the cause, prior to its production); for there can be no production and manifestation of that which is non-existent; there can be no connection of the cause with the effect (if the latter be non-existent); (some connection must exist between the cause and the effect, since) the production of everything is not possible from everything else; there can be production of one thing from another, if the two are mutually related as the producer and the producible (and such relation cannot be possible if the effect be non-existent); and the cause and the effect are identical, (so that the one cannot be non-existent, while the other is existent). (Sāṃkhya Kārikā 9)

For fire, which has a distinct potentiality for smoke, has [being] its cause as its nature. If smoke were to come into existence from what is not the cause of smoke, then it would be without a cause. That whose nature something is seen to conform to in the manner of concomitance and exclusion, is its cause. Hence, there is no coming about from what is different. (Pramāṇavārttika, svārtha-anumāna 37–38; in Gillon 2009)

These passages contain crucial elements characterizing dispositions. Let us explain. We have said above that dispositions, or potencies, are causal properties—namely, properties that (regularly) produce their manifestations. The Sāṃkhya Kārikā (14) refers to gunās of this sort as kāranaguna, meaning “quality of the cause” or “causal property” (see also Vaiśesika Sutras 7.1.6). Īśvara Kṛṣṇa explains that the kāranaguna and their manifestations are not connected accidentally because “production” cannot occur between any element whatsoever. It occurs only if something is suitably connected as producer and product. These manifestations are identical because one cannot exist without the other. In contemporary parlance, the reason why a disposition $x$ regularly brings about a manifestation $y$ is because of a relation of metaphysical necessity $R$ (Bird 2007; Mumford 2004). Manifestations are connected internally to the dispositions such that one cannot

\textsuperscript{12} For a comprehensive list of the manifestations of the rajasic and tamasic qualities, see Maitri Upanishad 3.5.5.
exist without the other—“the effect is existent with the cause”—and if the one is exercised “there is voidness of failure to produce the effect” (Vaiśesika Sutras X.II.2).

Similarly, Dharmakīrti argues that smoke, as an effect, depends ontologically on the potency of fire; the cause has a nature to produce the effect, and the “indispensability of effect with respect to cause is due to the former’s arising from the latter” (Gillon 2009, 203). What the discussions in the Sāmkhya Kārikā and in the Pramāṇavārttika have in common is, therefore, the idea that a single potency contributes causally with a single manifestation, or contribution to a causal outcome (see Raimondi 2022; Baltimore 2020).

Despite sharing a similar notion of dispositionality, we cannot expect any Buddhist school to follow Vaiśesika’s claim that powers are properties. First, because, as nominalists, they cannot equate potencies with properties. For a nominalist either (i) there are no properties (understood as universals) or (ii) properties only exist derivatively. Second, because, being anti-essentialists—as Nāgārjuna and Dignāga—they reject the idea that things have an internal or intrinsic essence. By no means have these two tenets prevented Buddhist schools from attributing reality to dispositions (arthakriyāsamartha) and their “causal roles” (arthakriyāyākāritva). Potencies are so important for Buddhist metaphysics that to have potential is to be the mark of the real: “Whatever has causal powers (arthakriyāsamartha), that really exists (paramārthasat) in this context. Anything else is declared to be customarily existent (saṃvṛtisat). These two are particulars and universals” (Pramāṇavārttika 3.3). But these potencies are not things (Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāṣa-śāstra 633a; Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā 509; Sarvadarsana-saṃgraha 14f).

In accordance with a certain brand of contemporary dispositionalism (Groff 2021), potencies are conceptualized as causal activities (causal kāritra). These activities have manifestations (samudācāra) and are distinguished between those that sustain existence (phala-grahaṇa/phalākṣepa) and those that are productive:

The potencies (śakti) are of two kinds, activity (kāritra) and efficacy/capability/capacity (sāmarthya/vṛtti/vyāpāra). It is only the activity of inducing or projecting a dharma’s own fruit (phalākṣepa = phala-pratigrahaṇa/phala-parigrahaṇa) that is called kāritra. This does not exhaust the set of efficacy of a given dharma; it also has efficacies that are not kāritra. . . . [As for] their capability to contribute causally to the arising of a different entity, this is not kāritra, but efficacy. (Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra 631c–632b)

If [a power], with regard to the production of the fruit within a series of a different species, can serve only as a condition assisting its arising—this is an efficacy, not a kāritra. (Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra 409c)

13 The Vibhajyavāda tradition understands the notion of potency as basic, akin to the notion of energy (svalaṅkāna; see Bartley 2015, 56–57).
The exercise of productive activities brings novelty. In contrast to the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśesika ontologies, Buddhists are noninherentist (asatkāryavādins), and so they deny that manifestations (samudācāra) are internal or preexisting in the cause.

In line with some contemporary conceptualizations of dispositions’ manifestations (see Heil 2012), they deny that each potency has its own manifestation. They see it as the coming together (samāgri), or “total cause” (see Siderits 2002, 75), or, again, as the mutual exercise of potencies occurring with conditional necessity: “In our school, we hold that when the necessary conditions obtain, conditioning forces arise not having existed previously. But these conditions are various and at times they assemble together and at other times do not” (Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra 632b–633a).

What, then, are the virtues? Simply speaking, they are qualities for the good. As elements of the jīva, Jain’s virya are powers for right action (anantavirya; see also Ranganathan 2016a, 6) or virtuous dispositions (parināma; Tattvārtha-sūtra 6.3). In the Samaysara, virtues are subha bhava (good dispositions), which are associated with punya (good conduct) and which tend to produce happiness (3.102).

In the Hindu canon, too, the semantic extension for “virtue” varies depending on the texts. In the Manusmṛiti, it is translated as sattva, although occasionally virtues are described as the “result of Goodness (sattva) as the mark of that quality (gunās)” (12.31), suggesting a distinction between properties, on one hand, and virtues as the good nature of a property, on the other. In the Gītā, sattva (see 17.1; inter alia) and dharma (see 14.27; inter alia) are used interchangeably. The most general rendition for virtues is “good qualities,” “potencies for the good,” or “mode[s] of goodness/the good” (sattvam; Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 11.22.13; Gītā 14.5; Vaiśesika-sutra 6.1.4).

The Buddhist virtues of the Visuddhimagga, the Aṅguttara Nikāya (Sutta 3 to 8 of The Book of Tens), and the Dasakanipāta (V3–9) are the sīla, the virtuous behavior is sīlāni, and the virtuous person a sīlāvanta or śīlāvat (see Tikaniṭṭha, Sutta 46, 1.152; see also Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra 2001, 1836). A similar use of sīla can be found in the Mahāyāna tradition where it is used to describe the goodness of virtuous behavior (śīlapāramitā; see Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, śīlapāramitā, 23).

14 This dynamic is what, in the Mahāyāna Yogācāra tradition, is understood as simultaneous causation.
15 This distinction might suggest that it is accidental whether a property has a virtuous nature. But in Hinduism, the connection between these gunās and their (good) manifestation is nonaccidental and part of the nature of the gunās. The necessity of this connection is crucial, and it spills over into the epistemology of morality. For example, in the Chāndogya Upanishad, at the end of Section II.i of the “Meditation of the whole Sāma,” we are told that simply meditating on goodness suffices to know what is the right action to perform: “if anyone knowing [would] thus meditate upon Samā as good, all right duties would readily come to him and accrue to him” (II.i.4). Gupta 2006, 394, and Sinha argue that a connection between gunās and their pros-ti dimension is present in the Gītā too, where gunās are understood as “potentialities”—another term for dispositions—and where the ethical subject is one “enmeshed in the gunā structure” and hence “entangled in a world of possibilities” (1988, 147).
In all three canons, the use of virtues is reminiscent of the Aristotelian virtues as qualities tending toward an outcome, namely an intrinsic good. The Jain virtues constitute the innate nature of the soul, and their goodness consists of their tending toward the production of right faith (samyagdārśana), right knowledge (śamyaĝñāna), and right conduct (śamya-kārita). The possession of these virtues is the virtuous or “righteous” state (dharma; Tattvārthasūtra 9.28) that “which is the consequence of virtuous disposition (parināma)” (6.3).

Similarly in the Buddhist canon, the sīla-vanta is disposed to manifest right speech (samma vaca), right action (samma kammanta), and right livelihood (samma ajiva; Saṃyutta Nikāya 56.11). In the Saṃyutta Nikāya, Buddhist virtues lead to “freedom from remorse,” which in turn leads the sīla-vanta to the Theravāda Buddhist moral ideal of the arahant (Cetana Sutta 11.2; Kimatta Sutta 11.1). Whether or not the state of arahant is achieved, the good of virtues is conceived as “support of beings” in this life and in the afterworld, since “what you do with body, speech, or mind that is yours; taking that you go; that’s your follower, like a shadow, that never leaves. Thus, you should do what is fine” (Saṃyutta Nikāya, Aputtaka Sutta, 3.20).

In the Manusmṛiti, the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, and the Mahābhārata, we read that the good outcome is a natural outcome of the virtues:

If while a man performs an act his disposition is sattvika, or “chiefly penetrated by the quality of Goodness,” he will reap its reward. (12.81)

Through virtuous conduct he obtains long life, through virtuous conduct desirable offspring, through virtuous conduct imperishable wealth. (4.156)

For what then do Rishis and gods and Gandharvas and Rakshasas who are all independent of human conditions, cherish virtue with such affection? Knowing it for certain that God is the giver of fruits in respect of virtue, they practise virtue in this world. This, O Krishna, is the eternal (source of) prosperity. When the fruits of both knowledge and asceticism are seen, virtue and vice cannot be fruitless. (Mahābhārata 3.31.67) Whoever has qualities (gunās, distinctions) is the doer of the deeds that bring recompense; and of such action surely he experiences the consequence. Undergoing all forms, characterized by the three qualities (sattva, raja, tamas), the individual self roams around according to his deeds. (Śvetāśvatara Upanishad 5.13.7)

The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic good is often presented in terms of admired versus admirable qualities (see Vajjālaggam 76). Some are qualities that are admired (such as being powerful or rich) in the sense that people would have them rather than not. The good of these qualities is external, while that of the admirable qualities is internal. While the latter are sometimes conducive to the former, it is never the case that the opposite occurs (see Vajjālaggam 76.689). See more on the superiority of virtues over richness and power in Mahābhārata 5.27.45. A similar distinction, in the Buddhist canon, using admirable qualities for virtues can be found in Itivuttaka 3.48.

For a similar remark, see the Brihad-Aramyaka Upanishad 4.4.5.

As emphasized by Bühler, in the Upaniṣads, dharma confers “specific features on account of specific function that they have to perform” (1886, 25).
And in the *Vajjālaggaṃ*, where the virtuous person is described against the profile of the common person, we are told that the virtuous do good for its own sake:

This is the nature of everybody, namely, to do good in response to something good. But to do good to others even when no good has been done to them by others, well, that is the nature of the virtuous. . . . At the time of world-dissolution, (even) the mountains stir; the oceans transgress their boundary-line; but even at that time, the good do not slacken their determination to stand by their commitment. (4.39)

What is perhaps strikingly common to the traditions is the primary function of virtues. In the Hindu tradition, it is to “suppress inordinate affection and hatred” (*Manusmṛiti* 2.6) and “destroy (the effect of) inauspicious marks” (4.156). The *Vaiśesika Sutras* point out that the function or activity of virtue cannot just be the removal of hindrances (*nivṛitti*), since the destruction of demerits can also be achieved via gifts of the Gods. Hence, they must also promote the good (*pravṛitti*). A virtuous act is an act “which brings about fulfilment as its fruit by the path of the annihilation of obstacles” (1.1.1).

Similarly, when Buddhist virtues are described in functional terms, we are told that:

Its function has a double sense: Action to stop misconduct, then achievement as the quality of blamelessness in virtuous men. So what is called sīla should be understood to have the function (nature) of stopping misconduct. (*Visuddhimagga* 1.20–1.21)

It is on account of the thought with which one makes the vow of undertaking (abhypagama-citta)—serving as the assisting accompaniment (sāparivāra)—that the immorality practiced from beginningless time comes to be relinquished upon the undertaking of the moral practice. This is like the long accumulated darkness in a room being banished on the arrival of a bright lamp. The same applies in the case of a moral practice counteracting an immorality. It is to be understood in the same manner that the path [as the counteragent] counteracts a defilement. (*Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra* 623b)

Likewise, the virtues of the Jain canon work toward stopping, regulating, and even destroying the influx (*āsrava*) of matter that becomes karmas. So, for example:

The practice of these virtues (dharma), and the thought of good that these virtues bring about and of the evil that the opposites of these bring about, lead to stoppage (samvara) of karmic inflow. . . . When wrong-belief (*mithyātva*) is restrained by virtuous thought-activity, due to auspicious disposition, it becomes quiescent and no longer obstructs right faith. (*Tattvārtha-sūtra* 6.3–8.9)

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19 This point is somehow reiterated by Yudhiṣṭhira addressing his wife: “I act virtuously, not from the desire of reaping the fruits of virtue, but of not transgressing the ordinances of the Veda, and be-holding also the conduct of the good and wise!” (*Mahābhārata* 3.31.65).

20 See Chandrakanta’s commentary of 1.1.4.
All three traditions examined admit the reality of genuine dispositions and align with the general idea in virtue ethics that virtues are dispositions that tend toward the good. Nevertheless, what counts as good might vary from one virtue ethical tradition to another. In other terms, it is possible that the same ontology of moral dispositions underwrites different moral ideals.

For some canons, it is difficult to pin down this ideal univocally. The Hindu canon advocates for a variety of merits, in a variety of venues, that are seldom directed toward a unique moral good but, more generally, toward worldly prosperity (see *Mahābhārata* 18.6.293–299; *inter alia*) or toward spiritual well-being—such as in the Sānkhya and the Vedānta traditions. For the Jain canon, given the emphasis on the equality of life, nonviolence and austerity are the primary moral ideals (see *Daśavaikādlika* 1.1). In the Theravāda and the Mahāyāna traditions, the virtues of mindfulness (*Smṛti*) and nonattachment (*Arāga*), which underlie and inform all the other virtues, tend toward the removal of misery (*dukkha*) and hence help in reaching the ultimate goals: enlightenment and purity. Even within the same tradition, similar moral dispositions lead to different moral ideals, as in the case of the ideals of Arahant and Bodhisattva.

In general, the ontology of dispositions is *per se* neutral about which of the things are deemed good. What the ontology requires is just that every disposition disposes its bearer toward a certain good behavior in a nonaccidental way (see Van Buiten 1957, 36). The issue has nonetheless generated considerable discussion. Some, like Bilimoria, argue that Brāhmanical-Hindu, Upanishadic, Smārta, Theravāda, Mahāyāna, and Jain ethics are all similar in that they share a core of the same virtues (2017, 41). It is indeed true the three cardinal virtues—compassion, nonviolence, and self-restraint (see *Brihad-Āranyaka Upanishad* 5.1; *Mahābhārata* 7.55.114)—are also considered equally so for the

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21 The main cataloguing of virtues comes from the *Arthaśāstra*, the *Vāmana*, the Vyāsa's *Mahābhārata*, the *Vana Parva*, the *Vajjālaggaṃ*, Vātsyāyan's *bhāsya*, the *Manusmṛiti*, the *Gīta*, and the *Nyāyāsutras*. These virtues include: noninjury, truth, good will, mercy, patience, purity, charity, forbearance, self-restraint, tranquility, generosity, honesty, kindness, forgiveness, purity of conduct, modesty, and simplicity (see Doniger 1988, 95; Dhand 2002, 358; Matilal 2002, 54; Van Den Bossche and Mortier 2008, 90).

22 These virtues are so crucial for the Buddhist and Jain traditions that reference and illustration of their merit can be found in a variety of venues, from the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* to the *Arīguttara Nikāya* and the *Visuddhimagga* and the *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, among others. The collection of virtues for both traditions is, unsurprisingly, similar. The Pāli canon *The Four Sublime States* emphasizes four main virtues, or “sublime states of mind,” loving-kindness (*mettā*), compassion (*karunā*), sympathetic joy (*muditā*), and equanimity (*upekkhā*; see Thera 1994, 14–23). Likewise, in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*, we find virtues (understood as perfections) such as generosity (*Dānāpāramitā*; 2011, 529–51), wisdom (*Prajñāpāramitā*; 2001, 819–26), vigor, diligence or perseverance (*Viryapāramitā*; 2001, 736–61), and patience (*Kṣāntipāramitā*) (2011, 676–702). In the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (an authoritative book for both of Jainism’s major sub-traditions Digambara and Śvētāmbara), we see the virtues include *sarāga* (characterized by the virtues of tranquility), *praśama* (incessant fear of worldly existence), *saṃvega* (compassion for the worldly beings), *inter alia* (*Tattvārtha-sūtra* 7).
Buddhist (see Thera 1994, 14–23) and the Jain traditions (see Tattvārtha-sūtra), Moreover, according to Bilimoria (2014), Chakraborty (2006), and Leesa Davis (2014), the copresence of moral and intellectual virtues is necessary for moral self-cultivation. Whether this is evidence enough to establish a unique moral ideal operating in all the canons, we do not dare to say. However, as we understand it, there is a prima facie reason to maintain that the similarities of virtues cannot establish similarities of moral ideals. Let us explain.

In traditional virtue ethics, things deemed good are certain ideals from which the person and those around would benefit. So, for example, if we are persuaded of the importance of fairness and equity, we would claim that justice is good and, consequently, that it is good or virtuous to be just. If justice is deemed prior, or conducive to other virtues, then justice is a moral ideal. Thus, the quality of being just corresponds to justice as a virtue. But the question of why justice is good does not pertain to ontology, nor ethical theory in general, but to the theory of value and the metaethics behind it.

Let us take the case of Rāma (the protagonist of Vālmiki’s Rāmāyana) accepting his exile (3.16.48). The kind of obligation he fulfills is toward his father. Rāma’s actions have the effect of Daśaratha remaining in accordance with his dharma. They are an expression of Rāma’s filial piety. The decision is an opportunity for him to display his quality. But we can only deem Rāma good, and his gunās good, if we first explain why filial piety is a good character trait to have. And to do so, we need a story of how gunās are connected with the good. It seems, then, that facts about the similarities of virtues cannot determine similarities of good, rather it is the other way around.

Hence, we maintain that, within Indian Ethics, different traditions have different priorities of virtues and different exemplars of moral ideals. We confess to side with Heather Battaly (2008) in thinking that it is unlovely to try to find a sole winner, a unique concept of moral ideals, or a unique list of virtues. In the context of Indian ethics, it is perhaps even unproductive, for it would damage the diversity of ethical conceptions. Within Indian ethics, the pluralism advocated by Battaly is fully realized.

Finally, we will not touch on the important question of how to situate the good of the Hindu mokṣa, or the Buddhist nibbana, or the Jain śreyas (spiritual bliss), whether higher in degree or on par with the moral good. For the sake of the present discussion, we will not touch upon the subject, as our argument holds independently of considerations regarding these states. We also do not feel compelled to discuss spiritual goods in the context of developing an Indian virtue theory. As Daya Krishna (1991), Perrett (1998), Henk Bodewitz (2019), and Dayanand Bhargava (1968) have argued, moral and spiritual goods, although sometimes

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23 In particular, for a discussion of the similarities between Jain and Buddhist virtues see Weber 1867, 175, 187.

24 In a similar fashion, Medhananda argues that this is a metaethical question, and as such, it falls beyond the scope of normative ethics (2022, 22).

intertwined, must be kept distinct. In light of these considerations, we leave the discussion of supra-moral goods, and how moral dispositions might or might not contribute to achieving the former, for future works.

4. Manifesting the Virtues

In the previous section, we presented a preliminary examination of the dispositional nature of virtues. We argued that all three traditions understand virtues dispositionally, as qualities grounded in the nature of things, disposing their bearer toward the good. But is the possession of such qualities sufficient to dub someone virtuous? For traditional virtue ethics, the answer is in the negative: virtues must also be exercised and exercised skillfully.

Virtues must produce the appropriate manifestations and must be supported by the appropriate moral discernment, as a precondition for moral conduct. In this section, we will first discuss why the mere possession of virtue is not enough. The answer is: because morality is understood as an activity, rather than a rule-following affair. Second, we will examine the virtues’ typical manifestations and then the need for moral discernment. Let us start with the first question.

According to virtue ethics, morality is an active affair which involves thinking, feeling, and doing when and where it is appropriate and not a mere application of rules of conduct. The notion of activity in relation to morality figures prominently in the Jain canon. Dharma is, first and foremost, a “principle of motion,” which pervades Loka (physical world; see Pravacanasāra 2.36; inter alia). As Ranganathan (2017a, 23) and Soni argue, motion is understood as the exercise of dispositions, which constitute activity, “a way to cash out the dispositionality of virtue” (Soni 2017, 160). Right activity is quite literally a function of virtue on this account: “exercising of physical, vocal, and mental dispositions constitute Yog (activity); that leads to the incoming of Karma; the virtuous Yog leads to the acquisition of Punya (merit)” (Tattvārtha-sūtra 6.1–4, italics added).

26 As Daya Krishna points out “Mokṣa then is not dharma, that is, it does not belong to the domain of moral action even though the latter may prepare the ground for the true knowledge of the self to arise and thus, in a sense, to also bring it into being” (1991, 39; see also Perrett 1998, 55–56). Similarly, Bodewitz argues that the notion of suktām and pūṇyam must not be confused with guna on the ground that the first two refer to “merit” and the latter to “virtue”; the former are associated with spiritual goods and have nothing to do with moral goods (2019, 396–401). Dayanand Bhargava argues that the path of the virtues (subhopayoga) and the path toward spiritual bliss (suddhopayoga) must be kept distinct (1968, 5) and that “Jaina ethics does not confuse the science of spirituality (mokṣaśāstra) with science of social righteousness (dharmaśāstra)” (1968, 37).

27 Soni and Garfield have already adumbrated that moral development is a matter of the “dispositionality of virtues” (Soni 2017, 160) or “exercise of virtues” (Garfield 2017, 274).

28 For instance, Gupta argues that in the Gītā there is “value placed on repeated performance according to certain rules. Is repeated performance the key to becoming virtuous? One does not become virtuous by following a rule but by doing virtuous deeds. Virtue is excellence in character, which one can acquire by repeated performance of some action” (2006, 391).
According to the Tattvārtha-sūtra, regular exercise of the virtues results in acquiring merit and stopping (saṃvara) demerit—the inflow (āsrava) of karma (9.1–2). Kunda Kunda, in his discussion of perfect asceticism, stresses that “that is perfect asceticism, when one practices his course ever intent on knowledge preceded by faith and exerting in the practice of (primary) virtues” (Pravacanasāra 3.14).

For Aristotle, too, the praise that comes from being virtuous is indeed grounded in the fact that being virtuous is something we become. We are deemed courageous, for example, when we repeatedly display courage when the situation calls for it. The right display of courage is shaped by all the previous situations that we have decided to confront actively. Prominently, the Buddhist Aṅguttara Nikāya emphasizes quite clearly the Aristotelian idea that we become virtuous “by confronting morally challenging situations more often than not” (Azzano and Raimondi 2023, 13):

It’s through adversity that a person’s endurance may be known, and then only after a long period, not a short period. . . . There is the case where a person, suffering loss of relatives, loss of wealth, or loss through disease, does not reflect. . . . Suffering loss of relatives, loss of wealth, or loss through disease, he sorrows, grieves, & laments, beats his breast, becomes distraught. And then there is the case where a person, suffering loss of relatives, loss of wealth, or loss through disease, reflects, ‘That’s how it is when living together in the world. That’s how it is when gaining a personal identity. When there is living in the world, when there is the gaining of a personal identity.’ . . . Suffering loss of relatives, loss of wealth, or loss through disease, he does not sorrow, grieve, or lament, does not beat his breast or become distraught. (Thana Sutta 4.192.3)

In the Buddhist canon, the exercise of the virtues is what sustains the samskāras, the process of transformation or “mental formation,” where “one becomes what one does” (Keown 1996, 343; Fink 2013, 670). Since samskāras are a gradual achievement (see also King 1964, 51; Garfield 2017, 275), mere possession of virtues is largely insufficient: to be moral is primarily not about what to do but about developing a moral vision (Garfield 2022, 11). As claimed in the Dhammapada: “Think not lightly of good, saying, ‘It will not come to me.’ Drop by drop is the water pot filled. Likewise, the wise man, gathering it little by little, fills himself with good” (9, 122). This gradual achievement is manifest and recognized by others in “discussing . . . dealing . . . living with a person”; yet, it is possible to see the extent to which someone is endowed with the virtues “only after a long period, not a short one” (Aṅguttara Nikāya, Thana Sutta, 4.192).29

29 Similar considerations are emphasized in the Khuddaka Nikaya (Patisalla Sutta 6.2). It is interesting to notice that some Buddhist texts, the Visuddhimagga inter alia, echo the notion of active morality in relation to the virtues. Here the immoral person is often referred to as “the wretch,” often translated as “the corpse” (chava) (see Catukkanipāta, Sutta 53, 2.55–59). As Buddhaghosa points out, the immoral person is dead or inactive due to the absence of virtues. Interestingly, a similar remark is advanced by Vasubandhu in the Pañcaskandhaka-prakaraṇa, where he links the notion of death and life to the possession of dispositions: “What is birth! It is any arising of a stream of motivating dispositions which has not already arisen, as regards any collection of events taking part in an organism. And what is decrepitude? It is an alteration in the stream of those like that” (Anacker 2005, 71).
The theme of morality as an activity is far from being a unique characteristic of the Buddhist and Jain canons. It has a recognized prominent role in all three traditions (see Dhand 2002; Krishna 1991; Garfield 2017; Soni 2017). As per the Pravacanasāra, the Vaiśesika Sutras describe virtues as that from which “the action of the ultimate atoms arises” (4.2.7). At the beginning of creation, motion only arises in the most fundamental elements in conjunction with a soul carrying the consequences of its previous moral conduct. On the other hand, the current conduct of the pious person (sadhus) is shaped by the “constant/incessant (nirantarā) practice” that, “by slow degrees” (Śrī Brahma-saṁhitā 5.59), gradually enhances the virtues and removes impurities:

One should therefore understand what is duty and what is not duty by the regulations of the scriptures. Knowing such rules and regulations, one should act so that he may gradually (śanaiḥ, step by step, again and again) be elevated. (Gīta 16.24, italics added)

[the] inauspicious disturbances can be gradually (śanaiḥ, step by step, again and again) removed by constant remembrance of Me, by congregational hearing and chanting of My holy names, or by following in the footsteps of the great masters of yoga. (Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 11.28.40)

According as to one acts, according to how one conducts himself, so does he become. The doer of good becomes good. . . . One becomes good by virtuous actions. (Brhadāranyaka Upanishad 4.4.5)

Practice is, then, not just a means to progressively harvest the good (śanaiḥ, as “step by step”) but a means to gradually hone it (śanaiḥ as “again and again”) and, by virtue of this process, become good. Unlike other qualities, virtues can be possessed to a higher or a lesser degree, with excellence being the highest. In other terms, dispositions are gradable (Azzano and Raimondi 2023, 13). Practicing is a way of strengthening the virtues, to exemplify them to a higher grade.30

Let us now move to the second question. We have said above that morality is an activity of the virtues, which involves thinking, feeling, and doing when and where it is appropriate. It is indeed a feature of dispositions that they are multitrack (Vetter 2013): they manifest in feeling, thinking, and acting, in the appropriate circumstances in the right way (Timmons 2001, 270). At times, when the circumstances are unfavorable, the dispositions still exist but remain unmanifested, as, for example, the Vaijñālaggaṃ reminds us: “the fire, like the company of good (righteous) people evermore delight (people) [but] virtues spread out and make themselves felt only when they are in the proper

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30The Tattvārtha-sūtra refers to high-grade dispositions as those virtues that become factors-of-action (karaka) for permanent “dislodgement” (apādāna) of inauspicious (aśubha) or destructive (aghāti) karmas.
surrounding” (70.655–65, 678). When, instead, the circumstances are right, virtues manifest.

But what are these three manifestations? Generosity, for example, manifests in donating the right amount, to the right people, in the right circumstances. Likewise, courage disposes its bearer to feel the right amount of fear, against the right people, at the right time. As Aristotle writes: “virtue is concerned with feelings and action, in which excess and deficiency are in error and incur blame, while the intermediate condition is correct and wins praise, which are both proper features of virtue. Virtue, then, is a mean in so far as it aims at what is intermediate” (Aristotle 1998, 44 [1106b]). Because virtues are concerned with feelings, thinking, and doing, they do have three distinct manifestations: an affective, a behavioral, and a cognitive one.

In the Vajjālaggaṃ, the nature of the good person (sujana) is entirely described in multitracking terms: “He does not get angry. When he does, he has no evil thoughts. When he has evil thoughts, he does not express them. When he does express them, he is ashamed” (4.33). Likewise, in Mahābhārata’s twelfth book, Shanti Parva the sage is described as: “one into whom words enter like frightened elephants into a well and never come out. He hears no evil of others. He remembers no evil. When dispraised, he is silent” (quoted in Dhand 2009, 36).

The sujana or supuruṣa (good man) must display a correct emotional, cognitive, and linguistic attitude. Take, for instance, when Kṛṣṇa must come to the aid of Arjuna, hesitant to fight his kin and fatigued before the battle. Arjuna, despite being a great warrior, has lost his resolve: he feels concerned about the implications of his actions and that makes him hesitant and powerless (see Bilimoria 2014, 298–30). But he is not. Arjuna is both (morally) courageous and (intellectually) cautious, thus displaying both moral and intellectual virtues. Arjuna, when the time comes, answers the call and acts with valor in battle. But the emotional manifestation of caution obfuscates that of valor and courage and alerts him to be reflective. And by doing so, Arjuna’s emotional response does justice to his courage. As per the Aristotelian tradition, courage and caution are here intimately tied such that in the Nicomachean Ethics (1998 [1115 a7–1116 a15]) they are rolled into one. Arjuna’s felt concern stems from the intellectual virtue of caution. His concern, of “not being able to see justice in this situation” (Bilimoria 2014, 299), is the concern of a cautious person: “of

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31 See also Vaiśesika Sutras: “But the nonexistence of cause does not follow from the nonexistence of the effect” (1.2.2).
32 As Bilimoria puts it: “what if emotions have other values and [causal] efficiencies (bhāvaka)? . . . Have not his emotions made Arjuna a little more reflective, muddled though he is now, than he might otherwise have been about his proper duties?” (2014, 299).
33 As R. C. Roberts and J. W. Wood put it: “Courage is not recklessness, and the courageous person is typically cautious. Because he is brave, the perceived prospect of harm does not master him, but he does take it intelligently into account. He wants to minimize the potential harm” (2007, 224).
failing to see something important, of misleading someone, of damaging our cognitive powers; or fear of one’s own dispositions that may undermine epistemic performance—laziness, impatience, boredom” (Roberts and Wood 2007, 220). Simply, in this case, the virtue of caution manifests primarily in its emotional track.

The value of an appropriate emotional response is also evident in the Buddhist and Jain traditions. The Jain’s notion of samvega is an aspect of both right belief (samyaktva) and right faith (samyagdarśana). It is not, however, a cognitive one. Rather, samvega is the “perpetual fear of the cycle of existence” (Tattvārtha-sūtra 6.24). But, notably, its display causes the influx of life-karma (see Tattvārtha-sūtra 6.21), and so it has a positive connotation as it is a manifestation of the desire for emancipation. Thus, in the Adisvara-caritra, we find it so described:

Attachment to the principles told by the scriptures is called ‘right-belief’ (saṃyakśrad-dhāna or samyagdarśana), and is produced by intuition or instruction of a Guru. . . . Right-belief is marked by . . . desire for emancipation [and] disgust with existence. . . . It is called desire for emancipation (samvega) when there is disgust with the objects of the senses on the part of one meditating on the results of karma and the worthlessness of saṁsāra. (1.3.14)

A similar role for emotions, this time for the bodhisattva, is emphasized in the Bodhisattvabhūmi. In the morality chapter (Śīla-patala), Asanga includes in the “essence of Bodhisattva’s morality” the “having developed a respect for remaining free of transgressions” (1.10.1). Asanga further explains his remark, stating that:

because a bodhisattva has received the morality from somebody else, he feels a sense of other-oriented embarrassment when he fails in training. Because the bodhisattva has a pure aspiration to be moral, he feels a sense of self-oriented shame when he fails in training. By making corrections after transgressing, and because he has a feeling of admiration that stops failure from happening in the first place, the bodhisattva becomes free from regrets in two ways. Thus, because of correctly receiving [the morality] and because of having a pure aspiration this bodhisattva feels a sense of embarrassment and shame; with a sense of embarrassment and shame he keeps the morality he has received; and by keeping it is free from regret. (1.10.1)

This quality manifests in the affective dimension of shame upon violation of precepts. Yet this shame has an important role: it “keeps the morality” intact, by causing the Bodhisattva to stir away from transgression or to swiftly restore their path if transgressions are committed. As per the case of the Hindu virtues, the virtues of the Bodhisattva are those of “body and speech for the sake of [achieving] enlightenment, following acceptance of the morality discipline. All of that [virtue], in brief, is called “the morality of acquiring virtuous qualities” (2016, 1.10.2.2).

According to Śāntideva’s ethics, too, what cultivates the bodhicitta (or enlightenment of the mind) is the “cultivat[ion] [of] perfections that are
dispositions to act, feel, think” (see Edelglass 2017, 241; see also Harvey 2009). In general, the virtuous person on the path to nonattachment exhibits “self-control over body, speech, and mind” (Aṅguttara Nikāya, Tikanipāṭa, Sutta 52, 1.156; see also Sutta 58, 1.165) and that “for having willed, one acts by body, speech, or mind” (Chakkani-pāṭa, Sutta 63, 3.415). Good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, and good mental conduct are “categorically what should be done” (Aṅguttara Nikāya, Ekamsena Sutta, 2.18). The same is reiterated in the Itivuttaka: “This was said by the Blessed One, said by the Arahant, so I have heard: ‘There are these three kinds of good conduct. Which three? Bodily good conduct, verbal good conduct, mental good conduct. These are the three kinds of good conduct’” (65.3.16).

The path itself “is just this noble eightfold path; that is, right intention, right speech, right action” (Tikanipāṭa 62, 1.180) and, in turn, the virtuous behavior “generate(s) much merit in three ways. What three? By body, speech, and mind” (Tikanipāṭa 46, 1.152).35 The Tamonata Sutta is clear on the value of pursuing all the tracks of the manifestations of virtues:

And how is one the type of person in darkness who is headed for light? He engages in good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, & good mental conduct. Having engaged in good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, & good mental conduct, he—on the break-up of the body, after death—reappears in the good destination, the heavenly world. This is the type of person in darkness who is headed for light. (4.85)

What works for the person in darkness who is heading for the light works for the person of “flawless character” too:

Let a man guard himself against irritability in bodily action. . . . Let a man guard himself against irritability in speech. . . . Let a man guard himself against irritability in thought. . . . The wise are controlled in bodily action, controlled in speech and controlled in thought. (Khuddaka Nikaya, 17, Kodhavagga, 231–34)

Like the wise person of the Khuddaka Nikaya, the person of knowledge of the Pravacanasāra is “controlled in three ways—mentally, verbally, physically” (3.37–38). As Soni remarks, the multitrack manifestations of virtues figure prominently in the Tattvārtha-sūtra (2017, 163). The very notion of Yog (activity) is characterized as “the action of the body (śarīra), the organ of speech (vacana), and the mind (mana) is called yoga (activity)” (6.1).

34 On the dimensions of virtues in connection with cetanā, see again Keown 2001, 218.
35 This achievement is also called purity and results in the possession of pure qualities, or viśud-dhaśīla. “Pure in body, pure in speech, pure in mind, without taints: they call the pure one, accomplished in purity, ‘one who has washed away evil’” (see Tikanipāṭa 120, 1.271–272). Details on how virtuous behavior generates virtuous merits can be found in Tikanipāṭa 163–82, 1.297–299.
Virtuous activity requires, nevertheless, a further element. Virtuous activity (punya) is the cause of merits (Tattvārtha-sūtra 6.3) and of the stoppage of karmic influx (9.1) but only if activity stemming from virtues is controlled or “curbed well” (gupti) (9.2–4). Indeed, according to Aristotle, the good of a thing—virtues included—is not just its having a function but the right performing of this function. Because virtues are possessed by agents, the appropriate performance of the function of the virtues belongs to the sphere of practical rationality (phronesis). A virtuous behavior, then, is the appropriate manifestation of the virtues guided by the intellect (Aristotle 1998, 42 [1106a]).

The emphasis on practical rationality stresses one fundamental issue, common to Aristotle and the three canons: that acting morally requires the (practical) ability to skillfully analyze situations, to understand when to act, and to what proportion. In other words, acting morally is to have the discernment required to control the virtues.

The theme of control over virtues clearly cuts across the ethical board. The virtues of the five vows (vrata) mentioned in the Tattvārtha-sūtra are said to be reinforced by “control of speech (vacanagupti), control of thought (manogupti), regulation of movement (īryāsamiti)” (7.4). Similarly, in the Manusmṛiti, the nature of the ascetic Tridaṇḍin is described as characterized by control over his three faculties:

That man is called a (true) Tridaṇḍin in whose mind these three, the control over his speech (Vāg-daṇḍa), the control over his thoughts ( mano-daṇḍa), and the control over his body (Karma-daṇḍa) are firmly fixed. That man who keeps this threefold control (over himself) with respect to all created beings and wholly subdues desire and wrath, thereby assuredly gains complete success. (12.10)

Jan Gonda points out that the Vedic notion of sukṛtām (well-done) and of buddhi (mental understanding/control/intelligence) is best interpreted as something correctly carried out (1966). Likewise, Gupta argues that “the notion of a golden mean and the discussion of the role of buddhih in the Gītā have Aristotelian overtones” (2006, 390). The Gītā clearly connects the notion of understanding with the notion of virtues and moral practice:

That intellect which understands (buddhih) when to act and when not to act, What is to be done and what is not to be done, And what is to be feared and what is not to be feared, Along with the knowledge of bondage and liberation, Arjuna, is sattvic (virtuous). (30)

The mind, indeed, is unstable, Kṛṣṇa, Turbulent, powerful and obstinate; I think it is as difficult to control as the wind; The Blessed Lord spoke: Without doubt, O Arjuna, The mind is unsteady and difficult to restrain; But by practice, Arjuna, it is restrained. (VI.34–35)

36 See also Srimad-Bhagavatam 7.5.23–24 and Skanda Purana 6.1.126.
Why is control over one’s virtue required? Again, the three traditions seem to offer, from different stances, a univocal answer: because morality cannot be learned in the abstract but requires experience. In the *Mahābhārata*, we are told rather explicitly that:

> There must be some indications for distinguishing virtue from sin. Sometimes that high and unattainable knowledge may be had by the exercise of reason. Many persons say, on the one hand, that the scriptures indicate morality. I do not contradict this. The scriptures, however, do not provide for every case . . . .” (8.69.253–255, italics added)

The truth is certainly difficult to establish in practice! It might be that a truth should not be spoken and a falsehood should be spoken, in which case falsehood would be truth and truth would be falsehood. . . . In determining what is true and what is false, a man becomes wise in the law. . . . Now there will be an explanation of what signs you should look out for. In this case this most profound and complex knowledge is determined through reason. On the other hand, many other people say that law comes from sacred learning. But no, I’m unhappy with that, for it doesn’t account for everything. (8.69.30–54)

Bhishma said, ‘I do not instruct thee in respect of duty, taught by what I have heard from the Vedas alone. What I have told thee is the result of wisdom and experience. This is the honey that the learned have gathered. Kings should gather wisdom from various sources. One cannot accomplish his course through the world with the aid of a morality that is one-sided. (12.142.343)

In the *Sāṃkhya Kārikā*, the point is further elaborated. Here Īśvara Krsna introduces the distinction between two kinds of moral dispositions: *sāmsid-dhikāh* and *vaikrtikāh*. The first class consists of good dispositions that someone is born with (dispositions of nature) and that spring from *Prakti*. The second includes the dispositions that are “incidental or acquired” and are brought about by personal effort (43). Both are required to “ascent to higher plane” (44) since knowledge of *Puruṣa* (transcendental self) cannot be achieved without experience and experience is not possible without the acquired dispositions (52). Control is what allows the growth in virtue that can occur in experience.37 Similar recommendations are reiterated by Kunda Kunda in a passage of his Jain treatise, the *Pravacanasāra*:

> One does not attain liberation (merely) by the (study of) scripture. . . . [O]ne who has faith cannot attain Nirvāṇa, if he is devoid of moral discipline. The man of knowledge, who is controlled in three ways, destroy[s] within a breath the Karma which a man devoid of Knowledge could destroy in hundred thousand crores of lives. (3.37–38)

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37 For an account of acquired dispositions in the ethics of the *Gīta* as second-order desires, from which actions for the sake of the good and for the sake of their fruits stem, see Perrett 1998, 19–24.
Regarding moral discipline, Doshi stresses in his commentary to the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* that:

the emphasis is on the right approach. One should have right thinking, and right conviction, and he should behave in light of that conviction. . . . What is needed is to have the right discernment to make out what is right and what is wrong. The vigour for putting the understanding into practice is bound to follow. The right discernment is thus the basic requirement. (14–15, italics original)

Here, right discernment is important for two reasons. First, it is important because coordinating the manifestation of virtues is a practical affair—that is, it is a function of one’s discernment. Second, it is important because, although some of us are born with good qualities, the majority of us must acquire them via experience. Doing so requires conscious effort and striving to achieve the same (*Tattvārtha-sūtra* 1.3). Kunda Kunda goes further in arguing that all of us require moral discernment. Right perception, right knowledge, and right conduct are what the real self, the “all-knowing master of scripture” (1.10), rests upon (*Samayasara* 1.2). The study of the scriptures (adhigama), or even intuition (nisarga), is sufficient to offer an understanding of the pure self in its path to liberation (*nischaya mōksha marga*). Through the real point of view (nischaya naya) (*Samayasara* 10.277), “the real self realizes oneness (ekatva) with own-nature (svabhāva)” (1.3). However, while it is prescribed not to forget about the real point of view (4.156), it is also prescribed not to forget about the vyahavara naya, the practical-empirical point of view, that through which the self understands itself as distinct from the external world, its qualities, its conduct, belief, and so on (1.7).

From the *nischaya naya* standpoint, we can attain clear comprehension of the virtues (1.13), but it is from the *vyahavara naya* that the ordinary person realizes that their nature, though pure, is contaminated by karma (see also Krause 1929, 3). Hence, *vyahavara naya* is the ground of a form of practical knowledge necessary for the ordinary person, for two important purposes. First, moral discipline is necessary for liberation. Indeed, the path of liberation is understood in terms of a process of purification, the conditions of which include progressing into different levels or states of the virtues (*guṇasthānas*) (2.56; 3.10.112). This progress cannot be achieved solely via “concentration of the mind on the idea of bondage” (9.291). Achieving the “spotless state of the self” is only possible by integrating the practice of moral discipline (9.305–306). This practice, in turn, can be done from the *vyahavara naya* point of view, within which the self understands itself as the one who “produces, shapes, binds, causes to modify, and assimilate karmic matter” and is the “producer of vice

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38 Notice that knowledge of scriptures is (partially) right knowledge, but this knowledge is different depending on the points of views. From the *nischaya naya*, the self is right knowledge, whereas from the *vyahavara naya*, the self has right knowledge (see *Samayasara* 8.276–277). Both, however, are important, as we shall see in a moment.

39 For a chapter-length discussion of all *guṇasthānas*, see Barghava 1968, 205–19.
and virtue” (3.107–108; see also Barghava 1968, 34). Second, as Kunda Kunda remarks, it is necessary to avoid the “undesirable attitude” that a person focused only on scriptures might develop:

If the ultimate nature of the Self is pure and unsullied, if it is identical with the liberated Self or Moksha Jīva, then the ordinary man may argue, why should I unnecessarily worry myself about moksha-mārga, or the path to Salvation, when my soul is already pure and liberated in nature. Both ethics and religion would appear to him superfluous, and prescribing a course of conduct for realising the same would all be vain and useless, because the ideal is already there. This perverse moral attitude is also to be avoided and this could be achieved only by emphasising the vyahavara point. (2.46)

In the Buddhist tradition, this idea of moral discernment is sometimes presented as already contained in the meaning of moral dispositions themselves. Indeed, in the Visuddhimagga, sīla is used to indicate both the set of dispositions and their consistency. As in Tattvārtha-sūtra, here the discernment is required to coordinate the manifestation of virtues:

In what sense it is virtue? It is virtue (sīla) in the sense of composing (sīlana). What is this composing? It is either a coordinating (samādhāna), meaning noninconsistency of bodily action, etc., due to virtuousness; or it is an upholding (upadhāraṇa), meaning a state of basis (ādhāra) owing to its serving as foundation for profitable states. (1.19)

But moral discernment has a much larger role to play in the Buddhist canon. In the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, the Saddharma Puṇḍarīka Sūtra, and the Visuddhimagga, the Buddha is referred to not only as Bhagavat, which is translated as “the one who possesses the good qualities” (Bhaga—that is, guna, quality and vat—that is, possession) but also as “the one who is skillful in analyzing (the dharma)” (Bhaga—that is, to analyze and vat—that is, skills) (see 1.4; see also Nāgarjunā 2001, 109). In part ten of the scripture, the Buddha is called Sāstā (teacher) not only because he possesses the virtues but also because he teaches what should be done (kūsala) and what should not be done (akūsala). In other words, the Buddha qua teacher imparts how to be skillful at employing the virtues (4.10). For the Buddha, Dhamma is for one “who is concentrated [alt. translation=whose mind is centered], not for one who is unconcentrated” (Aṅguttara Nikāya, Aṭṭhakanipāta, 4.229; Saddharma Puṇḍarīka Sūtra 2.8c–9a).

Similarly, in the Bodhicaryāvatāra, Śāntideva puts great emphasis on moral discipline as the capacity to sustain focused attention (samprajanya) for the sake of the transformation of the whole person (see also Edelglass 2009, 390–92). This skillful possession (or right/centered understanding) can be found discussed in a variety of other venues, as standing for the fact that sīlāni cannot be achieved by abstract knowledge, speculation, or blind adherence to moral precepts but requires practical and evaluative skills (see also Kavissara 2016, 440–41; Bodhi 2012, 34; Ñānamoli and Bodhi 2005, 24–25; Nelson 2009, 202).40

40 Regarding the venues, see also the Majjhima Nikāya (see Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta 1.47–55, 2.197) and the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta (see Maggasaccaniddeso).
As per the *Samayasara*, Buddhist moral discernment depends essentially on experience. As Garfield nicely puts it “Buddhist moralists recognize no special category of agent causation that privileges that locus as a center of responsibility [so] moral progress and moral experience, rather than moral responsibility, are foregrounded in moral reflection” (2022, 5). In the *Saddharma Puṇḍarīka Sūtra*, we are told that the Buddha “appear[s] in this world in order to cause sentient beings to enter the path of the wisdom” (2.7a–b), and because he is a moral example, his teachings are made of examples of moral situations that one can face. In other terms, teaching the Dharma with skillful means (*upāya*) means teaching morality as we can find it in experience (2.5c; *inter alia*). These means of teaching are skillful because they have to adjust to the level of experience of the listener. They have to “deeply penetrate the dispositions of sentient beings” (7.26a), which is possible only after having understood the “desire and deep-rooted inclinations of sentient beings. . . . according to their capacities” (2.7b–c; see also 10b–c):

All the buddhas teach the Dharma
That they have attained
Through the immeasurable power of skilful means,
For the sake of sentient beings.
Completely knowing their intentions,
Their various ways of practice,
Their wishes and capacities,

. . .

The Buddha teaches by means of sutras, verses,
Stories of his past deeds, and of past events,
Miraculous tales, explanatory tales,
Allegories, poems, and exegeses.

(2.8a)

The *upāya* of the Buddha himself depends on the experience acquired in his practice of Dharma. In turn, those who follow the path find in experience the virtues required to achieve the status of *bodhisattva mahāsattvas*, “the one who preserves the sutra” (11–14):

Such people as these
Are praised by the buddhas.
They are courageous.
They are persevering.
They are known as those
Who follow the rules of good conduct.

(11.34b)

While understanding the nature of reality is necessary for liberation, it is ultimately insufficient and requires overcoming attachment through moral discipline (see Edelglass and Garfield 2009, 7). The acquisition of an always higher level of virtues comes from the fact that the walk of the path is essentially a walk of moral learning where every moral situation must be assessed individually. The acquisition of kindness, tranquility, nonviolence (14.37b), compassion, honesty (38b), and patience (39a) is but a result of such training. It is the kind of knowledge or state of mind necessary for a virtuous action to be fully virtuous. Peter Harvey (2009) argues that, in the Sammā-ditthi Sutta, the root of wholesome action is based on these virtues as elements that oppose unwholesome conduct. We agree with Harvey, since the virtuous person is indeed the result of eliminating vices, such as greed (lobha), hatred (dosa), and ignorance (moha), inter alia (see also Davis 2014, 316). In this sense, the function of virtues is to interfere with the working of vices, a function which is in line with the underlying Buddhist assumption about human nature. As Gowans emphasizes, vis-à-vis Aristotelian virtue ethics, “for the Buddha, our enlightened nature is deeply flawed, and only extraordinary measures can overcome this. Aristotle’s conception of nature is quite different: the virtue develops our nature but they do not radically transform it” (2004, 163). In this respect, Sutta 68 of Aṅguttara Nikāya is illuminating of the interfering actions of virtues qua dispositions:

[Suppose they ask:] ‘But what, friends, is the reason unarisen hatred does not arise and arisen hatred is abandoned?’ You should answer: ‘The liberation of the mind by loving-kindness. For one who attends carefully to the liberation of the mind by loving-kindness, unarisen hatred does not arise and arisen hatred is abandoned. This friends, is the reason unarisen hatred does not arise and arisen hatred is abandoned.’ (1.201)

On the other hand, actions stemming from such virtues are, at the same time, the evidence of someone having the right acquired perception of reality and hence the right motivation behind her conduct. A good action, for example, is nonetheless wrongful if performed out of ignorance (moha), but it is good if it is well thought or well intentioned (cetanā) (see Keown 2001, 218–21). Thus, those who are guided by good qualities speak at the proper time, act in the proper way, and think the proper thoughts (see Tikanipāta 69.1.203–205).

5. Conclusions

Contrary to the skeptics à la Perrett and Pettigrove (2015), in this paper we have argued that Indian philosophies do achieve the task required for a moral theory. The appeal to virtues is far from being a cosmetic affair or mere cataloguing. In each tradition, virtues are unified in a system and grounded in the
nature of things. In other words, Indian virtues are ontologically and explanatory substantial.

Moreover, our findings tend to support certain interpretations, already mentioned at the end of Section 3, according to which “even though, the different Indian philosophies disagree about such problems [as the] nature of self or the position of a liberated soul, yet as far as the practical side of morality is concerned, they seldom differ” (Bhargava 1968, 72–73). As we understand it, this support is merely circumstantial.

We have claimed in Section 3 that similarities in the ontology of virtues do not license similarities of moral ideals. Different moral ideals entail different sources of normativity for virtues, which in turn are reflected in different virtue theories. All three canons might very well be realists about virtues as moral dispositions, and yet they might differ in what kind of theory of virtue they exemplify; whether oriented toward well-being, that is, eudaimonistic à la Aristotle (see Hursthouse 1999; Annas 1993; Kraut 1989), agent-based or exemplarist in nature (see Zagzebski 2004, 2017; Slote 1995), target-centered (Swanton 2003), Platonic (see Murdoch 1971; Chappell 2014), a mix of these, or something else entirely. Assessing this is a matter of both further explication and further interpretation.

Further explication is required because, as mentioned in Section 1, different schools have different understandings of the nature of potencies or dispositions. And, as Garfield nicely puts it “while we do not generally think of metaphysical insight as an important moral quality in most Western ethical theory, from a Buddhist perspective it is essential to morality” (2022, 129). While, for example, the Vaibhāṣika school understands dispositions as continuing in existence, the Vibhajyavāda (or Sautrāntika) school maintains that dispositions have only momentary existence. In this case, we might expect the metaphysical difference to be a moral difference-maker and the two schools to disagree on whether or not a virtue, when exercised, does or does not act as a sustaining cause for the individual’s moral progress.

Famous anti-essentialist positions, such as the one of Nāgārjuna and Dignāga, run counter to the attribution of essence or intrinsic nature to things and, hence, by extension, to virtues. If virtues lack dispositional essence, or if we cannot think of their manifestation as internal to the virtues (see Section 3), the resulting virtue theory must be constructed as a form of nominalist dispositionalism, where generic essences, instead of individual ones, are predicated of individuals, suitably understood (see Vogt 2022). In this case, we would expect the locus of the exercise of virtues not to be within a single agent but within an assemblage (samāgri) of mutual causes and conditions within which the agent is immersed (pratītya-samutpāda).

Regarding the Hindu canon, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, in its asatkārya-vāda theory of causation, argues that the manifestation of a disposition is best understood as a novel product obtained via generation in combination with other existing dispositions. On the other hand, the Śāmkhya school propounds, in its
satkārya-vāda theory of causation, that manifestations preexist in the dispositions (see again Section 3). This disagreement neatly maps onto the current debates about the disposition-based theories of causation and between what is dubbed the mutual manifestation model and the contributions model (see Baltimore 2020; Raimondi 2022). We might expect the two schools to disagree over the manifestation of virtues being a single affair—where one can instantiate a virtue independently of other virtues—or a plural affair—where virtues must be instantiated in concert, if at all. Overall, we might expect different notions of the exercise of dispositions—and hence of virtues—to affect why and how virtues manifest and how moral progress unfolds and is defined. These differences require close inspection.

What is further required is the interpretation of the sources where moral behavior is described in action. These sources are often collections of stories and parables—like the Buddhist Jataka stories—and mythologies—such as the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, in their many versions. Careful assessment of the moral behavior of the characters might reveal more perspicuous details concerning the flavor of each virtue theory under scrutiny, as well as important information about how the spectrum of virtuousness and viciousness is composed—that is, the many ways for someone to be virtuous (completely virtuous versus continent) or to be vicious (incontinent versus malevolence).

Theorists of dispositions (Mumford and Anjum 2011; Bird 1998) have argued that dispositions can be employed to model the behavior of things as resulting from external interference or additive and subtractive internal composition. Extending their work, Azzano and Raimondi (2023) have shown that this model can be applied to elucidate different types of viciousness and vicious profiles. Hence, we believe that dispositions could, again, play a role in explaining the spectrum of virtuousness and viciousness within which the characters of those stories and mythologies lie. We leave these two important tasks for future work.

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