**Positionalist And Non-Positionalist Form Of Being**

My task in this paper is to put forth the structure of our world-orientation: the conditions under which the possibility of authentic and inauthentic mode of being arises. The act of taking complete responsibility of an action requires as a pre-requisite, the being of a mode of being where one is not considered to be solely determined by conditions. “There are conditions of being”- this is obvious. I am a human- bound by temporality and this temporality reaches its actualization in death. However, this is not *all* I am. This not-being-death alone creates the space for possibilities of actions. Within this space of possibilities, the being acts with *complete* free will. Complete free will does not imply that our actions are devoid of being determined but that *in spite* of these conditions, our actions stand in an absolute relation to our being. Every action is the manifestation of my being, to the extent that I am a human being. To be a human is to be free. Is there any justification to say that we are free?

The determinist will say that it is possible to point out the exact condition that *made me* who I am. But then, this starts with the assumption that I am made. Can determinism point out exactly the point when Schubert’s compositions, which were utterly valueless to me 5 years ago, began to move me through ambiguity and anxiety- of what in Schubert that it affected me? What conditions the transformation of the mode of being? Determinism can only materially grasp a being; it is completely powerless in face of the experientiality of being.

The study of being is not in the realm of knowledge- one might claim for it to be object of their knowledge- I could definitely sit and contemplate about the act of loving but is this to love? I do not talk of love as a *term* but as a fundamental mode of being in which the other is manifested as oneself. This does not imply that one ceases to be- in lieu of an extra-sensible sacrifice of the self but that the other is naturally appropriated as being the space where Being is revealed. The experience of this revelation is love. There is no distinction of subject and object when it comes to revelation of Being. The experientiality of being is such that it knows of no distinctions between the experiencer and experienced. This has been the illusion of those *studying* love or so-called ‘emotions’- we have considered them to be conceptual to the extent that they ceased to be experiences of beings where the Being is revealed. The scholarly might ask for reasons to believe that such a revelation exists or of there being love as a fundamental mode of being- I would like to invoke that which Wittgenstein had said in his Preface to Tractatus- that ‘This book will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it -- or similar thoughts.’ (Wittgenstein, 2001). This does not imply that I prescribe to Wittgensteinian tradition. I do not believe that there is a requirement to follow any tradition to be an existentialist. Moreover, I would be arguing exactly for non-positionalist world-orientation shortly.

There is no reason for the fundamental moods of Being to be. To ask for an argumentative mode of presentation for fundamental mood is to ask of a dog why it wags its tail when it is overwhelmed with joy. There is no justification why I feel anxious or ambiguous in the face of responsibility and confrontation at the same time of my finitude as a human. However, this finitude is not something which has to be specifically asserted- for to be human is to be in a certain set of conditions and there is no way out but to be in these, in entirety. That there is no justification to be in the fundamental moods does not imply that it digs a hole in the space of responsibility to move into a zone of arbitrariness; it implies exactly the opposite- that you cannot use these fundamental moods as tools for rescuing yourself from owning up to every deed that you perform. Being in a fundamental mood does not imply excusability but commitment to what-is. As there can be no justification for the fundamental moods of Being, there is no *reason* for asserting that we have free will. There is only experiental grounding of the free will- which we engage with and presuppose in every action that encloses meaning. Engagement-with-free will is thus an existential condition and not an objectively provable concept. It is as though one were to attempt to set up an apparatus in the laboratory to demonstrate Nothingness of Heidegger (Heidegger, 1977). Say- do you call a womb ‘empty of a child’? Our womb is child of Heidegger's Nothingness- the amniotic fluid is your locus of birth. The Nothing. Can you define the amniotic fluid of human existence?

The mode of Being refers to the manner in which Being is enclosed within one’s being. Mood of Being refers to a particular instance of the exposition of this mode of being. Previously, disclosure has been recognized as the unconcealing of the beings to which the being-of-concern related. In the intrabeingal realm, the fundamental moods of beings enclose the meaning that these relations of the being to the world disclose during the revelation of Being. Enclosure arises as an existentialist category which deals with the manner in which the being *looks* at the world. The fundamental mode of enclosure of meaning is through the manner of looking which frames the actions of the being in the world- towards the other beings and itself. This does not suggest that the self that is being acted upon is separate of the self that acts (the common illusion of any study which puts as its objective the study of *self* as though it were an object that could be grasped through subjectively grounded instruments).

In being a Christian, atheist, realist, Hindu or an idealist, we appropriate the system of beliefs within our world-orientation which obstructs engagement-with-free-will. Every *ism* is a prison within which you bury your free will. Every belief or system appropriated by the individual constructs a hindrance in engagement-with-free-will. Thus, at some level, while there is no choice but for a belief to be received in the form of appropriation- this very appropriation can become the imprisonment of the free-will (the action of choice becomes the estrangement of free will). Here, it is important to make a distinction between positionalist and non-positionalist world-orientation. Ethics and morality cannot be the starting point for engagement-with-free-will. God would have to die in order to be resurrected as a human-with-free-will. Morality would have to collapse into amorality before an embodied being capable of engaging with Being through its fundamental moods can arise. The belief that there are determined actions arises due to the positionalism of systems in the world-orientation. In a positionalist world-orientation, every act is crammed to fit the puzzle of beliefs that embody the system while in a non-positionalist world-orientation, the beliefs are temporally recognized as being- as a certain posture of wings is for a certain mode of flight for the bird. This is presupposing that belief prescribes a certain world-orientation. However, this does not imply that the non-positionalist way of looking at the world can *choose* any system to justify his actions but that no system can be *chosen* but of the actions flowing naturally from the revelation of Being where the orientation towards conditions of human finitude define the action- resulting in commitment to Being itself. A positionalist sweeps through the street with grease- with great propensity to attach itself to the ground while the non-positionalist flows through the landscape as the water of a river that can assume the form of the banks through and through. By the appropriation of the non-positionalist way of looking at the world, our actions become inexcusable and as meaning is enclosed within the manner of looking, the world is disclosed intelligibly in the moment-to-moment actions of the being.

Every act of suspension of our belief is an instance of appropriation of free will and enclosure of meaning within your being. Since every belief has actional implications, this suspension also puts into question the existential locus of every action we perform. The positionalist way of looking at the world is grounded in the tendency towards illusionary finality and certitude while the non-positionalist way of looking at the world is based on the appropriation of beliefs which, though are beliefs, do not define the being of the individual. It is as if we were all trying to walk back from the side of kaleidoscope which mystified 'reality'- of which we know what it is, in walking through- we lastly reach a tiny hole into the reality. Some continue to look through the keyhole. Others walk out of it into the reality, only to fall over the edge- for- have we forgotten we can fly due to the fact that all we have done through the kalideoscopical experience is to walk? A positionalist, in the face of his own life, feels as though he were becoming a character of his own story and were stuck in it. The scientist in the laboratory becomes the guinea pig of his experiments. In suspension of beliefs, one gradually appropriates one’s being and begins to write it- to live it than to simply lead it.

Beliefs are considered to be of such a nature that they can be *broken-* as though they were a wall we had built up around our being. However, beliefs arise in us as plants on the ground from seeds which had fallen over many seasons- unknown to the one nurturing the ground. Beliefs are diluted under the eyes of free will- such a dilution occurs over time and through subsistent questioning of one’s being which arises in the form of engagement and not destruction. We must remember that anything that can strengthen the plant could uproot it too- we begin to own beliefs as though they were objects of our home and slowly, they begin to have a life of their own\* and build up their castles even though the purpose of their existence had been already eroded. To possess a non-positionalist world-orientation does not mean to not have beliefs but to have them in the commitment to what is. It is as though you loved without being attached to the object of love. It is only in the act of romantically overloading the concept that we rob the experiential counterpart of it.

Under the non-positionalist world-orientation, Being is revealed to be an existentialist game\* where the fundamental moods become the rules for mode of being. The mood of love would be to reveal Being through the relation with the Other, though it would not be confined to the objectual Other anymore (as is the case in positionalist world-orientation).

It is only because non-positionalist world-orientation is, that the fundamental mood of anxiety and love can arise. In the act of suspending one’s beliefs, the fundamental mood arises as the expression of one’s being without any compromise on its authenticity. In the act of deciding to be silent, the speaker does not become dumb but only silent. The non-positionalist world-orientation is preconditioned upon the positionalist. To be a positionalist is to be passive in the sense Sartre mentions\*. Passivity is only a form of activity where one assumes the mood of being offended. Experientiality of your being is the expression of who and what you have appropriated in your being and only through the non-positionalist world-orientation, can such an appropriation even occur. It is time to leave behind the linguistic melodrama contained in the speculation of Being and to let the experientiality of being take over. For Kierkegaard could not have put it better when he said, ‘The highest and most beautiful things in life are not to be heard about, nor to be read about, nor seen but if one will, are to be lived”\*. What is to an action if not that it had or is being done?

Every action can be interpreted to reveal a positionalist as well as non-positionalist world-orientation. For instance, the act of deciding to feed a hungry donkey could arise from the positionalist ground of animal rights or from the non-positionalist fundamental mood of compassion. But does the action of an animal rights activist of feeding the donkey not arise out of compassion? The question is: Is it a *fundamental* mood? Is it bound by conditions of the position one has imprisoned oneself in? It is the game of the snake eating its own tail and believing that it had been victimized by the world. The only way of knowing if an action were positionalist or non-positionalist is through the holistic appropriation of the being of the other in one’s world-orientation. We are pointing to a *manner*, not a contentful state. It is the frame through which one approaches the world and not a list of norms on how to approach the world. In fragmenting the being into several roles and categories of colleague-hood, daughter-hood and a series of other hood’s, we are incapacitated from looking at the individual as a whole. This does not mean the appropriation of the infinite manifestations of the individual (which is humanly impossible), but the grasping of the action through the unity of their manner of looking at Being as a whole, revealed through a series of their other actions. This is to hint that an individual is not a sum of their actions alone in a quantitative manner but the qualitative being of their actions. The metamorphosis of thinking in an individual can occur not in grand gestures but in any ordinary instant. For this reason, it would be to temporally not limit the individual as a sum of his actions but to be completely in engagement with the being of the other, without frame of any belief system.

One could ask if we have ourselves fallen into a linguistic melodrama and used terms like non-positionalist without it being of any association to real life. Is it not that ‘real life’ is appropriated for one through the Proust, for another through Chopin and yet another through Kierkegaard? Secondly, it is only in the attempts to *rationalize* experientiality that the question of linguistic melodramacity might arise for non-positionalist world-orientation. Third, asking for *concrete* examples of non-positionalist world-orientation can be charged with the complaint that it objectifies that which is not capable of being objectified- the world-orientation. As mentioned before, we can pick up any act- conventionally grand or ordinary- and frame it within positionalist or non-positionalist depending on one’s own world-orientation. Henceforth, we will use the term world-orientation for world-orientation.

The victimization of one’s self is the essence of a positional world-orientation. Every belief is an excuse for irresponsibility- your belief that you should care, your belief that a violent person is wrong and shouldn’t be cared about- every belief is a gateway to becoming more and more inauthentic. This is precisely why Socrates stands like a shining star to the world of philosophy: he was the most authentic being in the sense that he was incapable of having positions. Such an incapacity did not arise as a lack but as a fundamental mode of being- thus, it cannot be posited as a quality of the individual. Every belief is the exduction of meaning onto an activity, event, person or place. I exduce the essence onto existential positions.

[Points to be added:

* Difference between belief and positions
* Existence does not precede essence. Essence does not precede existence. The non-duality of essence and existence.
* Impossibility of existentialist ethics
* The possibility of choice (freedom) arises only in affirmation of essence in existentiality of a being: the fruits that a tree bears does not depend upon the type of soil it is sown in, the orange seed bears oranges, not apples. ]