

Non-Standard Neutral Free Logic, Empty Names and Negative Existentials

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ABSTRACT – The aim of this paper is to evaluate the correctness of a semantic analysis of existential sentences containing proper names as its grammatical subject that make use either of a negative or a neutral free logic as their semantic framework. I will try to show that a specific version of neutral free logic has important advantages over its standard negative free logic rival. In the first section of the paper I will set the task of the analysis in more explicit terms. Secondly, I will outline on the basis of a clash of semantic intuitions what in my opinion the essence of the stubborn philosophical problem of the analysis of singular existential sentences is. In the third section, I will give a short overview of current popular solution-strategies to our problem. Fourthly, I will briefly present the semantics of standard negative free logic and unrestricted neutral free logic. In the fifth section, I will present two motivations for a solution to our initial problem based on a negative or neutral free logic. The last section will contain a discussion and evaluation of objections that have been cited against negative and neutral free logic. The upshot of this discussion will be a defence of a certain non-standard neutral free logic.

1. Proper Names and Negative Existential Sentences

Proper names can be used in natural languages in a great variety of sentential contexts. They can, for example, be used in positive and negative singular existential sentences. A positive singular existential sentence has the grammatical form ‘*n* exists’; a negative the form ‘*n* does not exist’, if we conceive of ‘*n*’ as a schematic letter for singular terms. There are other singular terms than proper names that can be inserted for ‘*n*’ in these forms in a meaningful way, but we will concentrate our attention on singular existential claims that only contain proper names.

The use of proper names in these existential contexts poses a serious and delicate problem for any conception concerning the semantics of proper names. Competent speakers of English have the shared intuition that there are true and false negative and positive singular existential sentences that only contain proper names. They also accept that a large number

of these sentences are contingently true or false. Famous examples of negative existential sentences that contain proper names and are intuitively conceived of as true are:

(E1) Vulcan does not exist.

(E2) Pegasus does not exist.

(E3) Sherlock Holmes does not exist.

These intuitions about the truth-values of positive and negative singular existential sentence pose a problem, because it seems to be extremely difficult to account for these intuitions on the basis of standard assumptions about the semantics of proper names and existential sentences.

2. Four inconsistent assumptions concerning negative existential sentences

In my opinion, the best way to formulate this problem makes use of four different intuitive assumptions, which are highly plausible if they are considered in isolation, but are insofar incompatible as they cannot be jointly true. Explicitly we can formulate these four jointly inconsistent assumptions in the following way:

(The Truth-Value-Thesis)

Some sentences of the grammatical form 'n does not exist' that contain a proper name are true.

(The Logical-Form-Thesis)

Every sentence of the grammatical form 'n does not exist' that contains a proper name is a sentence of the logical form ' $\neg E!a$ '.

(The Truth-Condition-Thesis)

Every sentences of the logical form ' $\neg E!a$ ' is true iff 'E!' designates the set E^* and 'a' designates the object a^* and a^* is not an element of E^* .

(The Connection-Thesis)

Every instance of the schema ' $(\exists x('n' \text{ designates } x) \rightarrow n \text{ exists})$ '¹ is true.

¹ We can alternatively use the following schema (+) for the same purpose: ' $('n' \text{ designates } n \rightarrow n \text{ exists})$ '.

The Truth-Value-Thesis is a direct consequence of the mentioned intuitions of competent speakers concerning the truth-values of positive and negative existential sentences that contain proper names. The Logical-Form-Thesis assigns to negative existential sentences that contain a proper name not only the simplest plausible logical form, but also a logical form that is most near to the grammatical surface structure of such existential sentences. The Truth-Condition-Thesis outlines the standard account for truth-conditions of negated singular predications on the basis of classical predicate logic. The Connection-Thesis draws attention to a very plausible and intuitive necessary connection between semantic reference and existence. Our philosophical problem now consists in the following: Each of these four theses seems to be plausible in its own right; nevertheless they cannot be accepted jointly, because of their inconsistency. Their inconsistency can be shown as follows. Let us assume that the sentence 'Vulcan does not exist' is true. According to the Logical-Form-Thesis this sentence is a sentence of the logical form ' $\neg E!a$ '. The Truth-Condition-Thesis has the consequence that if a sentence of this form is true, then the individual constant 'a' designates something. But now the Connection-Thesis says that if the individual constant 'a' designates something, then a exists. 'a exists' says the same as 'Vulcan exists' and so it is the case that Vulcan exists. But if our assumption is correct that 'Vulcan does not exist' is true, then Vulcan does not exist. Therefore, our initial assumption leads on the basis of the application of the Logical-Form-Thesis, the Truth-Condition-Thesis, the Connection-Thesis and the truth of the instances of the following plausible truth-theoretic schema:

(TS \rightarrow) If x is true (and x expresses the proposition that p), then p,

to a contradiction. A solution to this problem either requires an explanation why this inconsistency is only apparent and can be explained away *or* the rejection and substitution of at least of one of the four listed assumptions. In my opinion, the instances of (TS \rightarrow) should not be added to the claims that are at disposition, because they are no essential component of the outlined problem.²

² They become superfluous if we reformulate the Connection-Thesis in the following cumbersome way: For every n: $(\exists x('n' \text{ designates } x) \rightarrow 'n \text{ does not exist}' \text{ is not true})$.

3. Five solution strategies to our problem concerning negative existential sentences

Philosophers have proposed a variety of different solution strategies to our problem. In this section I will outline five of these strategies. In my opinion these strategies cover the most recent and most plausible accounts to solve our problem.

According to *strategy A* the falsity of *the Truth-Value-Thesis* is the main source of our problem. There are at least two different versions of this strategy. The first version of strategy A locates the error why we falsely believe that *the Truth-Value-Thesis* is true in an erroneous intuitive conception concerning the semantics of sentences like (E1)-(E3).³ The second version holds that we erroneously believe that *the Truth-Value-Thesis* is true because we conflate the literal content of a sentence like (E1)-(E3) with the content that such a sentence may pragmatically convey.⁴ There seem to be at least three different ways to defend the first version of strategy A. According to the first and most radical variant sentences like (E1)-(E3) are meaningless; the second variant holds that they are literally neither true nor false; and the third that these sentences are literally false. The second version of strategy A can, in my opinion, only be defended in two ways, these ways correspond to the second and third mentioned way of defense of the first version of strategy A. (A solution based on the claim that sentences like (E1)-(E3) are neither true nor false also requires the rejection of *the Logical-Form* or *the Truth-Condition-Thesis* or both.)

Strategy B regards *the Logical-Form-Thesis* as the main source of the mentioned incompatibility. There is a large number of different accounts of this variety. Let me just mention two prominent versions of this kind: Frege's solution and the Russell-Quine solution. According to Frege, sentences like (E1) are meaningless and do not express a proposition, because the expression 'exists' stands for a second-level-concept that can only be applied to first-level-concepts, but not to objects and proper names like 'Vulcan' that purport to designate objects can according to Frege only be combined with expressions that stand for first-order

³ We may, for example, think that 'Sherlock Holmes' designates an abstract object and that 'exists' expresses a property with a non-empty anti-extension (= the complement of the extension of the property), while in fact 'Sherlock Holmes' is an empty name and 'exists' expresses a property with a necessarily empty anti-extension. A solution to our problem based on this estimation is defended in: Reimer (2001, 498-501).

⁴ This strategy is defended in detail in the following papers: Adams and Stecker (1994); Adams, Fuller and Stecker (1997); Adams and Dietrich (2004) and Adams and Fuller (2007). They hold the view that sentences like (E1) are literally neither true nor false, but pragmatically convey true descriptive singular negative existential propositions. In opposition to Williamson (2002) Williamson now defends the view that negative existential sentences like (E1) are literally (necessarily) false, but that they convey pragmatically restricted existential generalizations that are true (source: personal conversation).

concepts or relations.⁵ Russell and Quine have claimed that the correct logical form of sentences like (E1)-(E3) is represented by certain rather complex quantificational formulas. Namely, quantifications of the following logical form: $\neg\exists x(Fx \wedge \forall y(Fy \rightarrow x=y))$.⁶ Such an analysis is committed to some version of the so-called description theory of proper names. *Strategy C* holds that the rejection of *the Truth-Condition-Thesis* is the key to a solution to our problem. This solution is defended in two different versions by two current prominent philosophers. According to Sainsbury, a sentence like (E1) has the proposed logical form, but the truth-conditions of such a sentence are provided by a certain bivalent negative free logic.⁷ On this basis atomic sentences that contain at least one empty individual constant are conceived of as false. According to Salmon, on the other hand, we have to distinguish two kinds of sentential negation, namely so-called *choice* and *exclusion negation*. If we interpret the expression of negation contained in sentences of the form 'a does not exist' as an expression of exclusion negation and, on this basis, assign it the logical form ' $\neg_e E!a$ '⁸, we can explain the truth of such a sentence and solve our problem.⁹

Strategy D identifies *the Connection-Thesis* as the main source of our problem. This strategy can be called *Meinongian* solution to our problem.¹⁰ Meinongians typically reject the claim that a sentence like (E1) is equivalent with a sentence like the following:

(E1*) There is no Vulcan.

More precisely there are two different versions of Meinongianism, both versions claim that the predicate 'exist' expresses a first-order discriminating property.¹¹ Only the second version also holds the view that the primary universal and the primary particular quantifier have no existential import and quantify over both existent and non-existent objects. It is, therefore, possible to define a secondary particular quantifier with existential import on the basis of the primary particular quantifier and the existence predicate or a restriction of the do-

⁵ On the basis of Frege's solution it is therefore also necessary to reject the Truth-Value-Thesis. C.f.: Frege (1892b, 73-76).

⁶ C.f.: Russell (1918-19) and Quine (1948). Alternative solutions based on the second version of strategy B are defended in Kripke (1973); Evans (1984, 369-372); Fitch (1993, 469) and Katz (1994, 23-24).

⁷ C.f.: Sainsbury (2005, 69-75; 86-97, 202-209). A similar view also based on the second version of strategy B is defended in Braun (1993, 460-465) and Braun (2005, 598-600).

⁸ The exclusion negation maps to a sentence B – that result from the application of the exclusion negation sign to a sentence A – the truth-value TRUE if sentence A either has the value FALSE or the value NEITHER TRUE NOR FALSE. And it maps the truth-value FALSE to B if A has the value TRUE.

⁹ C.f.: Salmon (1998, 280-281, 309).

¹⁰ Different versions of this solution are defended in: Parsons (1980); Zalta (1983); Priest (2005).

¹¹ A non-discriminating property is a property with a necessarily empty anti-extension.

main to existent things. Against this background, some Meinongians hold the view that sentences of the form ‘Some F’s are G’s’ have no existential import while sentences of the form ‘There are F’s that are G’s’ have existential import.¹² Therefore, according to the first version of the Meinongian solution *the Connection-Thesis* is plainly false. According to the second version, it is ambiguous and has a false and a trivially true reading, because of two possible interpretations of the particular quantifier that *the Connection-Thesis* contains.¹³ This leads to a solution to our problem, because only on the basis of the rejected reading of *the Connection-Thesis* the mentioned incompatibility obtains.

The last solution strategy I want to mention here is a *strategy E*. This strategy does not solve the problem by rejecting any of the mentioned four assumptions, it rather claims that the whole problem is based on an equivocation concerning the natural language expression ‘exist’ and can be dissolved by drawing a distinction. *Strategy E* says that ‘exist’ is an ambiguous expression. According to it there is a logical notion of existence relative to which *the Truth-Value-Thesis* is false and there is an ontological notion of existence relative to which *the Connection-Thesis* is false.¹⁴

It is not the aim of this paper to show which of these strategies are implausible or hopeless and which in fact work in a specific version. My aim is a bit more moderate. Firstly, I aim to present three different kinds of reasons that favour a solution-strategy that makes us of negative or neutral free logic and strategy C over any other mentioned solution if they are accepted. Secondly, I want to demonstrate that a certain non-standard version of neutral free logic is against common wisdom more plausible than familiar versions of a negative free logic. But before I will do this, I will outline the versions of negative and neutral free logic I aim to consider.

4. Negative and Neutral Free Logic

The semantics of classical predicate has two features that a free logic may question and reject. Firstly, it is committed to the thesis that necessarily, the domain of discourse is a non-empty set; secondly, to the claim that necessarily, interpretations are functions and there-

¹² C.f.: Priest (2008, 295).

¹³ If we make use of schema (+) to formulate our problem, then this schema has false instances according to the Meinongian solution.

¹⁴ In Williamson (2002, 244-245) a solution is at least suggested. Williamson claims that ‘a exists’ in the logical sense means the same as ‘ $\exists x(a=x)$ ’ and in the ontological sense it means the same as ‘a is concrete’. A similar line of defence is outlined in Salmon (1998, 293) and Soames (2002, 89-95).

fore assign to every individual constant an object of the domain of discourse.¹⁵ We can distinguish on this basis two versions of a free logic. A *universally free logic* is a logic that rejects the first claim and therefore allows the possibility of an empty domain of discourse. A consequence of this possibility is that an interpretation must be possible that assigns to no objects to the used individual constants. We have to treat the interpretation function on this basis as a partial function. A *non-universally free logic* treats the interpretation function as a partial function, but rejects the possibility of an empty domain of discourse. Concerning logical truths, the acceptance of both mentioned claims and the acceptance of standard semantics of classical predicate logic has the consequence that the following formulas of predicate logic come out as logical truths:

(E4) $\exists x(Fx \vee \neg Fx)$

(E5) $\exists x(x=a)$

If we transform the interpretation-function into a partial function, only (E4) comes out as a logical truth. In my opinion, it is implausible to treat (E4) and (E5) as logical truths, but I will come back to this later in more detail.

A further distinction that one can draw concerning free logic concerns the kind of semantics that one chooses to provide truth-conditions for the formulas of the logical language. We can distinguish a *dual* from a *non-dual* free logic. A dual free logic makes use of two different domains of discourse: a so-called outer domain and an inner domain. The inner domain might possibly be empty the outer domain not. Every object that is an element of the inner domain is also an element of the outer domain, but not the other way round. The quantifiers only range over the inner domain. The objects assigned to the individual constants can be elements of both domains. A non-dual free logic makes just as classical predicate logic only use of one domain of discourse, but with the yet mentioned differences concerning classical predicate logic. In this paper I will only consider kinds of free logic that make use of a non-dual semantics. I aim to defend a solution to our initial problem that that tries to account for the meaningfulness of empty proper names and this can only be done on the basis of a non-dual free logic.

¹⁵ If we only make use of one domain of discourse, a rejection of the first claim has the rejection of the second claim as consequence, but not the other way round.

The third and most important dimension of distinction concerns the logical type of a free logic and related more specific differences concerning the semantics of such a free logic. Commonly, three different *semantic* types of free logic are distinguished: positive, negative and neutral free logics. If we focus on the *logical* type of such logic, we can distinguish bivalent, from three-valued and supervaluationist versions of free logic. Neutral free logics are typically three-value logics. The dual-standard version of positive free logic is a bivalent logic as the standard version of negative free logic. More recently also supervaluationist versions of free logic have been developed. The difference between positive, negative and neutral free logics mainly concerns their different modifications of the truth-conditions of classical predicate logic for atomic sentences. A positive free logic makes it possible that there are atomic sentences that are true that contain non-denoting individual constants. According to negative free logic, every atomic sentence that contains at least one non-denoting individual constant is false. Concerning negative free logic we have to distinguish two different variants, namely unrestricted and restricted variants. According to an unrestricted negative free logic every formula that contains at least one non-denoting individual constant is neither true nor false. There are several different possible versions of a restricted neutral free logic, but it is not easy to provide a rationale for such a restriction.

The two most prominent and widely discussed versions of negative and neutral free logic might be called standard negative free logic and unrestricted neutral free logic. Both of these logical languages are universally free. I will now outline the semantics of this two logics, because they will constitute the background for our discussion of standard objections against a negative or neutral free logic.

Standard negative free logic is a bivalent first-order predicate logic with identity. It shares many features with classical first-order predicate logic with identity. The main differences concern (a) the possibility of an empty domain of discourse, (b) the interpretation-function that is conceived of as partial function¹⁶ and (c) the semantics of atomic sentences.

Contrary to classical predicate logic standard negative free logic assigns the following truth- and falsity-conditions to standard atomic sentences and to atomic sentences that contain the logical predicate of identity:

¹⁶ An interpretation I of an individual constant α is designated iff I assigns to α an object of the domain of discourse.

A.1. Atomic Sentences

$V(Pt_1...t_n) = T$ iff $I(t_1), \dots, I(t_n)$ are designated and $\langle t_1, \dots, t_n \rangle \in I(P)$

$V(Pt_1...t_n) = F$ iff it is not the case that $(I(t_1), \dots, I(t_n)$ are designated and $\langle t_1, \dots, t_n \rangle \in I(P))$

A.2. Identity Sentences

$V(s=t) = W$ iff $I(s)$ and $I(t)$ are designated and $I(s) = I(t)$.

$V(s=t) = F$ iff $I(s)$ and $I(t)$ are designated and $I(s) \neq I(t)$ or $(I(s)$ is not designated or $I(t)$ is not designated or both are not).

There are no differences between concerning the truth- and falsity conditions of (a) connectives sentences and (b) quantificational sentences between classical predicate logic and standard negative free logic. I assume familiarity with these conditions provided by classical predicate logic.

It is a further feature of standard negative free logic that it conceives of 'exist' like 'is identical with' as a logical predicate and therefore assigns to this predicate a fixed interpretation.

There are three possible (equivalent) ways to introduce an existence predicate against this background:

A.5. Existential Sentences

a) $V(E!t) = T$ iff $I(t)$ is designated.

$V(E!t) = F$ iff $I(t)$ is not designated.

b) $E!t =df t=t$

c) $E!t =df \exists x(x=t)$

This completes our introduction of the semantics of standard negative free logic. Concerning logical truths it has to be noticed that it is a desired feature of such a logical system that most logical truths apart from (E4) and (E5) that are logical truths relative to classical predicate logic with identity are also logical truths relative to standard negative free logic.

In opposition to standard negative free logic unrestricted neutral free logic provides a more extensive modification of the semantics of classical predicate logic. These further modifications are the consequence of the acceptance of a third truth-value NEITHER-TRUE-NOR-FALSE. We have to add conditions that concern this third value to every kind of sentence. In case of (a) atomic sentences, (b) identity sentences and (c) connective sentences this leads to the following rather minor changes:

B.1. Atomic Sentences

$V(Pt_1...t_n) = T$ iff $I(t_1), \dots, I(t_n)$ are designated and $\langle t_1, \dots, t_n \rangle \in I(P)$

$V(Pt_1...t_n) = F$ iff $I(t_1), \dots, I(t_n)$ are designated and $\langle t_1, \dots, t_n \rangle \notin I(P)$

$V(Pt_1...t_n) = N$ iff $I(t_1), \dots, I(t_n)$ are not designated

B.2. Identity Sentences

$V(s=t) = W$ iff $I(s)$ and $I(t)$ are designated and $I(s) = I(t)$.

$V(s=t) = F$ iff $I(s)$ and $I(t)$ are designated and $I(s) \neq I(t)$

$V(s=t) = N$ iff $I(s)$ is not designated or $I(t)$ is not designated or both are not.

B.3. Connective Sentences

$V(\neg A) = T$ iff $V(A) = F$

$V(\neg A) = F$ iff $V(A) = T$

$V(\neg A) = N$ iff $V(A) = N$

$V(A \wedge B) = T$ iff $V(A) = T$ and $V(B) = T$

$V(A \wedge B) = F$ iff $V(A) = F$ or $V(B) = F$ or both

$V(A \wedge B) = N$ iff $V(A) = N$ or $V(B) = N$ or both

The treatment of quantificational sentences requires more radical adaption on the basis of the acceptance of a third truth-value. This leads to the following valuation-conditions:

B.4. Quantificational Sentences

$V(\exists x A) = T$ iff there is at least one $d \in D$, $V_{(t,d)}(A(t/x)) = T$

$V(\exists x A) = F$ iff for every $d \in D$, $V_{(t,d)}(A(t/x)) = F$

$V(\exists x A) = N$ iff there is at least one $d \in D$, $V_{(t,d)}(A(t/x)) = N$

$V(\forall x A) = T$ iff for every $d \in D$, $V_{(t,d)}(A(t/x)) = T$

$V(\forall x A) = F$ iff there is at least one $d \in D$, $V_{(t,d)}(A(t/x)) = F$ and there is no $d \in D$, $V_{(t,d)}(A(t/x)) = N$

$V(\forall x A) = N$ iff there is at least one $d \in D$, $V_{(t,d)}(A(t/x)) = N$

As in case of standard negative free logic there are three possible (equivalent) ways to introduce an existence predicate into the logical language of unrestricted neutral free logic:

B.5. Existential Sentences

a) $V(E!t) = T$ iff $I(t)$ is designated.

$V(E!t) = N$ iff $I(t)$ is not designated.

b) $E!t \text{ =df } t=t$

c) $E!t \text{ =df } \exists x(x=t)$

Before I will discuss objections against these two outlined versions of free logic, let me illustrate why a solution based on either of these logics has several advantages over other kinds of solution that are based on different logical frameworks.

5. Four Motivations for a Solution based on Negative or Neutral Free Logic

5.1. Logical Purity

A first of two motivations I am to present here for a solution to our problem based on negative or neutral free logic concerns *logical purity*. It is a difficult *metaphysical* question whether it is possible that nothing exists. It is also an important *semantic* question whether there are and can be meaningful proper names that do not designate. Both of these questions are not a logical concern and should not be decided by logical restrictions or the formulation of logical laws. So a logic that is neutral in this respect and can cope with either answer to both questions is preferable to a logic that already presupposes an answer to these questions on the basis of logical restrictions. Universally free versions of negative and neutral free logic satisfy this requirement and are therefore logically austere in this respect. This is a major advantage of such a framework over a framework that makes use of classical logic. According to classical logic the following formulas are logical laws:

(E4) $\exists x(Fx \vee \neg Fx)$

(E5) $\exists x(x=a)$

(E6) $\exists y \exists x(x=y)$

(E7) $\exists x(x=x)$

The fact that these sentences are logically true already presupposes an answer to both mentioned questions which have nothing to do with the concerns of logic. But these sentences are not logical laws on the basis of a universally negative or neutral free logic. It is an evident virtue of a universally free logic that it does not assign the status of logical laws to sentences, which should not be conceived as *logical* laws. Logical purity favours a solution based on

negative or neutral free logic over a logical framework that conceives of sentences like (E4) – (E7) as logical laws.

5.2. The Intelligibility of Empty Proper Names

The second motivation for a solution based on negative or neutral free logic concerns the intelligibility of empty proper names. Intuitively, we can distinguish three different sorts of name-like expressions. *Prototypical proper names*, these are expressions that denote an object purely on the basis of a conventional assignment of an expression to an object, *descriptive proper names*, these are expressions that grammatically are indistinguishable from proper names, but semantically function as abbreviations of definite descriptions and are introduced by specific acts of stipulation; and finally *empty proper names*, these are expressions that can be used in a singular term position, they neither denote an object on the basis of a conventional assignment nor do they function like definite descriptions, they do not denote objects at all.

We must distinguish two questions concerning these categories: (a) Are there any possible expressions of some actual or possible language that fall under these three categories? (b) Are there any expressions of any actual natural language that fall under these three categories? There are philosophers who answer both kinds of question negatively concerning the category of empty names. For these philosophers either every name has to be a prototypical name or every name has to be a descriptive name or every name has to be either a prototypical or descriptive name. Are there any good reasons for such kinds of restrictions? I do not think so. Firstly, because we can use different versions of free logic to account for the meaningfulness of empty proper names. Secondly, there are facts concerning the use of proper names in natural language that suggest that the category of an empty proper name should not be questioned with levity.

Negative and neutral free logic assign truth-conditions to formulas that contain individual constants that do not designate. If we make use of such a free logic to solve our initial problem we assume that individual constants are the formal counterparts of proper names, therefore we can provide a formal semantics for natural languages sentences that contain empty proper names and justify their meaningfulness on this basis. But we can also give an account of the understanding of a proper name that is either prototypical or empty on the basis of a framework that makes use either of negative or specific restricted versions of neu-

tral free logic. This account holds that our actual understanding of a genuine or empty proper name is constituted by our implicit inclination to accepted instances of the following schema:

(NS) $\forall x(n' \text{ refers to } x \text{ iff } x=n)$.

On the basis of both kinds of logical framework instances of (NS) that concern *designating* and *non-designating* individual constant come out as true. Therefore, we can account for the understanding of both kinds of names on this basis.

The mentioned versions of free logic provide a framework that can account for the truth-conditions of sentences that contain empty names and that also has to offer a conception of the understanding of such kinds of names and this framework therefore provides a justification for the meaningfulness of empty proper names. So a positive answer to question (a) concerning the category of empty proper names seems to be justified.

Can we also make the case for a positive answer to question (b) concerning the category of empty proper names? In principle, there seem to be different candidates concerning expressions of natural languages that might be conceived of as empty names. The two most plausible cases are, in my opinion, (i) proper names that are currently used on the basis of the unrecognized false belief that they designate something, but which in fact do not have a referent and (ii) and proper names that have been used for a certain time in the past on the basis of the unrecognized false belief that they designate something, but which in fact did not have a referent.

We may also consider names of objects that existed in the past and so-called fictional names as candidates for empty proper names. But in case of these two kinds of names a decision concerning their semantic status also depends on rather difficult metaphysical issues. In the first case we would have to take a stance concerning the debate about presentism and eternalism and commit one to the view of presentism. In the second case we would have to decide the issue whether there are fictional characters and whether there are names that can be used to refer to these characters. The discussion of these two difficult topics is beyond the scope of this paper, so we should concentrate our attention on the other mentioned kinds of candidates for empty proper names. It is obviously impossible to discuss examples

of kind (i) that concern our own present use of proper names.¹⁷ Examples of category (i) that concern the use of names of other current users seem to be in any case more controversial than a certain class of examples of category (ii).

This category concerns names that were used in the past by a large part of the human population with the unrecognized false belief that they do designate something, but which are used by nearly nobody or at least a very small number of people currently on the basis of such a false belief. The proper names 'Zeus' and 'Vulcan' seem to be examples of this kind.

'Zeus' was used and introduced as proper name for the highest of the Greek gods and the majority of the Greek people during ancient times used this name on the basis of the unrecognized false belief that it refers to something. Nowadays, nearly nobody believes in the existence of Zeus.

In case of 'Vulcan' things are a bit different, because the expression 'Vulcan' was introduced on the basis of the *hypothesis* that there might a planet that explains the perturbations in the orbit of Mercury. So when the expression was introduced the person who introduced it was not quite sure whether the object he aims to pick out does exist, but he nevertheless believed in the existence of this object.

Is it possible to explain the meaningfulness of names like 'Zeus' or 'Vulcan' without treating them as descriptive names? I think so. Let us focus for this purpose a bit more narrowly on the nature of acts of baptism, which are a specific kind of speech acts. An act of baptism is a prototypical way to introduce a proper name into discourse. By an act of baptism I mean an act of attaching a name to an object. It can most explicitly be performed by using a naming-verb with performative force. Such utterances may have the form 'I (hereby) name x *N*' or 'Let us name x *N*'. We can substitute for '*N*' the name we want to attach and for '*x*' an expression that aims to pick out a specific object, to which we want to attach the name. On this basis we can distinguish *ostensive* from *descriptive* acts of baptism. If we substitute '*x*' with some sort of definite description and use this description in an attributive way, we can perform on this basis a *descriptive* act of baptism. If we substitute '*x*' with a singular term that requires a directing intention to fix the reference of this term, we can perform on this basis an *ostensive* act of baptism.

We can distinguish success-conditions and felicity-conditions in case of the performance of a speech act. Success-conditions describe the conditions that have to be satisfied that a cer-

¹⁷ An atheist might claim that several people use the name 'God' with the false belief that it refers to something.

tain act is successful performed. Felicity-conditions describe conditions that have to be satisfied by a perfect or prototypical example of such a speech act. The satisfaction of felicity conditions can therefore be more demanding than the satisfaction of success-conditions.

Which role can an act of baptism play concerning the class of names we are interested in? To be able to answer this question we have to decide whether the existence of the object that should be baptized and the belief in the existence of such an object are conditions that have to be satisfied by a successful performance of an act of baptism.

It is the essential purpose of an act of baptism to establish a stipulative link between an expression and an object, which might be described by the relational expression 'is a name of'. This thesis can be justified in the following way: An act of baptism, as we conceived it here, is an act of naming and acts of naming aim to attach a specific name to a specific object. Therefore, it is the essence of a successful act of naming to establish the desired link between a name and an object. We can describe the stipulative element of an act of baptism in the following way: If P names x N , P declares x to be the name-bearer of 'N'. If someone declares x to be the name-bearer of 'N', x is the name-bearer of 'N'. That is, there are specific kinds of relations such that a declaration that an object stands in this relation to another object, is sufficient for the obtaining of this relation between these two objects.

It seems to be quite plausible to claim that such a stipulated link can only be established if both relata exist (or if someone conceives of existence as a discriminating property if the expressions that are used to establish the link refer to something). Therefore, the successful performance of an act of baptism seems to presuppose the existence of the object that should be named (or a successful reference to the object that should be named). Therefore, this condition is a precondition of the successful performance of an act of baptism.

What is the status of the belief-condition? Is it a necessary requirement for a successful act of baptism that the baptizer believes in the existence of the baptized object? If someone aims to stipulate a link between two objects, he has to believe in the existence of these objects for this purpose or he has to believe at least that the terms he uses to establish the link refer to something. On this basis we can restate our question: Is it necessary to have an intention to provide a link between two objects by a stipulation to achieve the desired link or is it only necessary to purport such an intention by the performance of a certain utterance? I think we should not assume that there are unintentional acts of naming an object. If a bap-

tizer does not have the intention to name something by a certain utterance, he cannot succeed in his task.

So the belief in the existence of the baptized object seems to be also a precondition of a successful performance of an act of baptism; the desired link cannot be established by someone who does not believe in the existence of the baptized object.

Against this background we can provide the following possible explanation of the introduction of the names 'Vulcan' and 'Zeus'. It is possible that both names have been introduced by an (at first) unrecognized unsuccessful descriptive act of baptism, which had a successful act of initiation of a name using practice as its consequence. That is, certain unsuccessful acts of baptism that are not immediately recognized as such can have the same perlocutionary effects as successful acts of baptism, namely the initiation of a name-using practice. These acts have been unsuccessful, because contrary to the belief of the person that introduced the name the description he used to pick out an object did not satisfy an object.

If we accept such kind of introduction of an intelligible name, we can now even strengthen our case for a view that makes use of intelligible empty names to explain certain phenomena of our uses of names in natural language. If we accept the view that there are not immediately recognized unsuccessful acts of baptism and that there are expressions that can be used in a meaningful way as a consequence of the performance of such an act, then we can show that no alternative view can make the case for the meaningfulness of such names in a plausible way.

Let us have for this purpose a look at possible scenario of an unsuccessful attempt to baptize a concrete object, namely a planet. If I aim to baptise a planet by using the sentence 'I hereby name the planet that causes the perturbations in the orbit of Mercury *Vulcan*' and there is no (concrete) planet that satisfies this description my attempt of baptizing something was clearly unsuccessful. It would be ad hoc and implausible to say that even if there is no concrete object that satisfies the used description there is always a merely possible object or some sort of object that satisfies such a description.¹⁸

Such a move is question-begging, because the expression 'the planet that causes the perturbations in the orbit of Mercury' seems to have the same satisfaction conditions as 'the concrete planet that causes the perturbations in the orbit of Mercury' and the second descrip-

¹⁸ Someone who holds the view that apart from the property of existence merely possible objects do not exemplify properties like concrete or abstract objects, does not have the resources to account for the success of an act of baptism in any case.

tion cannot be satisfied by a merely possible object. And even if someone does not accept this equivalence, he has to accept that someone that aims to name a certain planet has the intention to name a planet in space and time, and such an attempt fails if there isn't a concrete planet that satisfies the used description. Additionally, one may use the second description to perform an act of the desired kind and we cannot explain on this basis how such an act can be successful without the existence of a certain concrete planet.

What are the options for a defender of the view that every meaningful proper name has to name some sort of object if he grants that there are not immediately recognized unsuccessful acts of baptism? I think, there are no really plausible options to account for the meaningfulness of a name whose use is initiated by such an act.

Firstly, he might claim that an unsuccessful act of baptism concerning a concrete object is always implicitly accompanied by a successful act of baptism concerning a merely possible or abstract object. But such an account is implausible, because in such cases a speaker does not have any communicative intentions to name an abstract or merely possible object, because he thinks that the concrete object he aims to name exists. But the performance of a further indirect speech act requires such additional communicative intentions. Therefore, this reaction is implausible and ad-hoc.

Secondly, he may claim that the use of some other kind of expression than a name is established by such an unsuccessful act of baptism. But even if we would grant that there are descriptive stipulations and that descriptive names are semantically not genuine names, this option is implausible, because the *indirect* establishment of the meaning of such an expression again remains a mystery. The problem seems to be a universal one for any desired *indirect* establishment of a meaningful expression on the basis of the given setting.

Name-using practices that are established by unrecognized unsuccessful acts of baptism seem to offer the best examples of intelligible empty proper names in natural language. A framework based on some sort of free logic seems provide the best and most simple explanation of the meaningfulness of expressions that have the described features.

Let me summarize our findings: There are two motivations that favour an analysis of singular existential sentence based on a negative or neutral free logic based over other alternative solutions to our initial problem. Firstly, it seems to provide the desired and adequate logical neutrality concerning certain metaphysical and semantic issues; secondly, it seems to be the

only considered solution that can account for the fact that there are meaningful empty proper names in natural languages.

6. Problems of a Solution based on Negative or Neutral Free Logic

The mentioned four motivations seem to provide good reasons to adopt a solution to our initial problem based on some sort of a negative or neutral free logic. But standard negative free logic and unrestricted neutral free logic are logical systems that make incompatible assumptions and both systems can be modified in different plausible ways. So there still remains the task of deciding which of different possible logical frameworks fits our purposes in the best way. I will try to decide this issue by discussing several problems and objections that have been put forward against standard negative free logic and unrestricted negative free logic. The discussion of these objections will show that the specific version of a restricted negative free logic is the most adequate framework to defend a solution of our initial problem based on the rejection of the Truth-Condition-Thesis.

6.1. The objection from equivalent predicates with different polarity

Firstly, I will discuss three objections against standard negative free logic. The first objection can be called the *objection from equivalent predicates with different polarity*. It is a common feature of natural language that we can express the same propositions by means of different sorts of expressions. In some cases we can express the very same proposition either by using a simple predicate F or by using the negation of a simple predicate G. 'Peter is an adult' intuitively expresses the same proposition as 'Peter is not a minor' and 'Peter is different from Michael' expresses the same proposition as 'Peter is not identical with Michael'. These facts seem to be undeniable if 'Peter' and 'Michael' are used to refer to the very same object relative to the considered pairs of sentences. But it also seems to be plausible that the two mentioned pairs of sentences have in some sense the same content if 'Peter' and 'Michael' do not designate any object relative to their uses in this sentences. But this intuition is problematic for a defender of standard negative free logic.

According to the standard procedure of assigning logical forms to our example sentence, 'Peter is an adult' gets the logical form 'Fa', 'Peter is not a minor' gets ' \neg Ga', 'Peter is different from Michael' gets 'Rab' and 'Peter is not identical with Michael' gets ' \neg Sab'. If we now

assume that the constants 'a' and 'b' do not designate objects, then we have to assign to 'Fa', 'Ga', 'Rab' and 'Sab' the truth-value FALSE according to the treatment of atomic sentence with non-designating of standard negative free logic. As a consequence of this, we have to assign to '¬Ga' and '¬Sab' the truth-value TRUE. Therefore, the mentioned pairs of sentence are pairs of sentence with different truth-values. This result leads to a problem if we combine it with further plausible principles.

Intuitively the sentence 'Peter is an adult' expresses the same proposition as 'Peter is not a minor' if they are used relative to the same context of utterance, in this sense they have the same context-relative truth-conditions. These two sentences also get the same truth-value if they are assessed relative to the same parameters of the context of evaluation. Therefore, they also have the same assessment-relative truth-conditions. But if two sentences have the same context- and the same assessment-relative truth-conditions, then they also have the same truth-values relative to the same context of use and context of evaluation. But this result is incompatible with the proposed assignment of truth-values according to standard negative free logic. According to this assignment the relevant sentences have different truth-values relative to every context of use and every context of assessment, if 'Peter' and 'Michael' do not designate.

How can a defender of standard negative free logic react to this problem? A defender of standard negative free logic has either the option to detect a further parameter that accounts for the difference in truth-conditions between these two sentences or the option to reject the view that the mentioned sentences have the same context- and assessment-relative truth-conditions. I cannot see any meaningful relativization of truth-conditions that could account for the proposed difference. So the second option seems to be the only remains option. This option is also proposed by Sainsbury. It forces a rejection of our intuitive assessment of the semantic relations between the constituents of our presented pairs of example-sentence. Someone who proposes such a rejection has therefore the burden of proof to explain the proposed difference in truth-conditions between a sentence like 'Peter is an adult' and 'Peter is not a minor'.

Such an explanation is not an easy task if one keeps in mind the following facts: The open sentences 'x is an adult' and 'x is not a minor' have the same satisfaction conditions and the only further semantic constituent of both sentences is the very same non-designating individual constant.

The first fact requires an acceptance of the truth of the following generalisations:

(P1) $\forall x(x \text{ is an adult} \leftrightarrow \neg(x \text{ is a minor}))$

(P2) $\forall x\forall y(x \text{ is distinct from } y \leftrightarrow \neg(x \text{ is identical with } y))$

The truth of these claims seems to be compatible with the fundamental assumptions of standard negative free logic, but the proposed rejection of our objection also has a counter-intuitive consequence concerning (P1) and (P2). These two true generalisations have false instances on the basis of this rejection and it seems to be counterintuitive that a true generalisation has false instances. But there is an explanation, I think, that can at least show why this consequence is not as bad as it seems. If we think of generalisation in substitutional terms, then it is impossible to accept that a true generalisation has false instances. But negative free logic seems to teach us that we should not conceive of generalisations in substitutional terms, we should rather understand it in objectual terms. The objects of the domain of discourse and the interpretations of the predicates account for the truth-values of a generalisation, but not the instances of a generalisation. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether a true generalisation has false instances or not. I think this reply takes some pressure from the treatment of (P1) and (P2) by a defender of standard negative free logic.

But how can a defender of standard negative free logic *explain* the proposed difference concerning the given example-sentences on such a basis? All he can do seems to be the following: to insist that atomic sentence that contain at least one non-designating individual constant are false by default and the treatment of more logically complex sentences that have atomic sentences as their constituents depends on this default setting. This apparent inability leads us to two further objections that are more narrowly concerned with this default setting by a standard negative free logic.

6.2. The objection from arbitrariness

The first of these two further objections is *the objection from arbitrariness*. According to standard negative free logic the truth-value of an atomic sentence that contains at least one non-designating individual constant is false per default. But this means that the truth-value of certain sentences arbitrarily depends on our choice of atomic predicates. There is no clear non-arbitrary criterion which predicates should be conceived as atomic and which not.

It has to be noticed that we cannot identify atomic predicates with primitive predicates. We may conceive 'is a minor' as a primitive predicate and define the predicate 'is an adult' on its basis. But we may also proceed the other way round. There is no plausible criterion for this choice. It is up to us and a matter of stipulation. But independently from our choice which of the mentioned predicates is primitive, we would represent 'is an adult' and 'is a minor' by different predicate symbols and therefore a sentence that contains one of these predicates and an individual constant as further constituent has to be conceived as an atomic sentence. So the determination of atomic sentences is completely independent from our choice of primitive predicates.

What counts as an atomic predicate seems to be pure and arbitrary morphological and syntactic matter. From this point of view 'is mortal' and 'is immortal' would both be conceived as atomic predicates. Although from a semantic point of view this seems to be implausible, because it is clear that the prefix 'im-' is an explicit device of negation. On the other hand neither 'is an adult' nor 'is a minor' clearly involve a semantic marker of negation, nevertheless 'is an adult' is semantically equivalent with 'is not a minor' and 'is not an adult' with 'is a minor'. This shows that there is no clear systematic criterion of what we should conceive as an atomic predicate. Our choice seems to be a rather arbitrary matter. But it is implausible to hold that the truth-values of sentences like 'Peter is mortal', 'Peter is immortal', 'Peter is an adult' and 'Peter is a minor' depends on such arbitrary facts of the morphology and syntax of a natural language, if 'Peter' does not designate anything.

Neither this problem nor the mentioned problem concerning equivalent predicates with different polarity is a problem for a defender on a neutral free logic as long as he makes use of choice negation. On this basis every atomic sentence that contains at least one individual constant without a denotation and its negation receive the truth-value NEITHER-TRUE-NOR-FALSE and so we have no troublesome and counterintuitive difference in truth-value between a sentence like 'Peter is not a minor' and 'Peter is an adult' if we formalize these sentences in the standard way and if 'Peter' does not designate anything.

6.3. The objection from unsystematic truth-conditions

The third, last and in my opinion most important objection against standard negative free logic concerns the proposed modification of the classical falsity-conditions of atomic sentences. Standard negative free logic changes the falsity-conditions of atomic sentences ac-

According to classical logic in such a way that an atomic sentence like 'Fa' not only then gets the truth-value FALSE, if the referent of 'a' is not an element of the extension of 'F', but also if 'a' does not designate anything. Standard negative logic therefore weakens the classical falsity-conditions of atomic sentences by adding a further condition by means of a disjunction. But such a move seems to lack any systematic motivation and seems to be only an ad hoc manoeuvre to close truth-value gaps. A defender of standard negative free logic has the burden of proof to justify his move of closing truth-value gaps. I don't know any good systematic reasons for this move. The driving force seems to be the instrumental reason to be able to combine the postulation of a partial interpretation function with a bivalent logic.

A defender of a negative free logic on the other hand does have a systematic motivation why we should not alter the classical truth- and falsity-conditions of atomic sentences and why we should instead of modifying these conditions accept truth-value gaps and a further condition that specifies under which conditions an atomic sentence is NEITHER-TRUE-NOR-FALSE.

It is a widely accepted phenomenon of natural language that certain expressions trigger relative to certain contexts of use so-called semantic presuppositions. These presuppositions are preconditions that have to be satisfied that a sentence that triggers such a presupposition can receive a classical truth-value. Negative free logic aims to account for the presuppositions that are triggered by proper names represented as individual constants. The majority of atomic sentences have the semantic presupposition that the singular terms they contain designate something. If this presupposition is not satisfied, such a sentence cannot receive one of the classical truth-values and therefore receives the value NEITHER-TRUE-NOR-FALSE. This conception is implicitly also accepted by a defender of classic logic, because according to him the following conditional holds: If an atomic sentence is either true or false, then the individual constants that such a sentence contains designate something. It should be noticed that only in case of atomic sentences that do not contain a logic predicate the condition holds without exception that if this sentence contains at least one non-designating constant, then the sentence is neither true nor false. Such a condition also does not necessarily hold in case connective sentences, because a connective may have a specific semantics that does not project the presuppositions of the embedded atomic sentences to resulting complex sentence. The upshot of this is the following: It is a systematic advantage of a neutral free logic if it aims to capture the phenomenon of semantic presuppositions in natural language,

but a neutral free logic has to be adapted insofar that it makes the correct predictions concerning embedded atomic sentences and their presuppositions. This observation immediately leads us to the first of three objections we want to discuss in connection with neutral free logic.

6.4. The objection from overgeneralization

This first objection is directed against the commitment of unrestricted neutral free logic to a principle that is often called *Frege's principle*. One can find different versions of Frege's principle in the literature as the rationale behind the construction of a neutral free logic. We can distinguish at least the following three versions:

(FP1) Every sentence that contains at least one individual constant without a designation is neither true nor false.

(FP2) Every embedding of a referring expression which, in the embedding, has no referent yields a sentence that is neither true nor false (or has no truth-value). (Sainsbury (2005, 67))

(FP3) The truth-value of every sentence is a function of the extension (or referents) of its constituents. (Lehmann (1994, 307))

Unrestricted neutral free logic clearly can be described as a logic that either satisfies (FP1) or is constructed on the basis of (FP1) as its guiding-principle if it comes to the assignment of truth-value gaps (or the value NEITHER-TRUE-NOR-FALSE) to sentences of any kind. The second mentioned principle can be understood as a variation of (FP1) if one reads 'embedding' in a very loose sense such that every occurrence of a referring expression in a sentence is an embedded occurrence. Alternatively one could understand 'embedding' in a more narrow sense such that every occurrence of a referring expression in a logically complex sentence is an embedding. On the basis of this reading (FP2) is not identical with (FP1), but only implied by (FP1).

The relation between (FP1) and (FP3) depends on what we exactly conceive as the extension of certain expressions. (FP3) has the consequence: if there is an expression with no extension as component of a sentence *S*, then *S* receives no truth-value: no input, no output. According to a strictly Fregean understanding the extension or reference of monadic predicate would be a function from objects into truth-values and the extension of quantifier would be

a second-order function from first-order functions into truth-values. Lehmann conceives of quantifiers in a Fregean way. This has the consequence that every quantificational sentence receives a classical truth-value, because every open sentence that is the constituent of such a quantificational sentence denotes a certain function. On the basis of this reading (FP3) and (FP1) are different principles and (FP3) is not satisfied by our unrestricted neutral free logic. If we would use (FP3) as a construction principle for a neutral free logic, this would lead to different truth-conditions for quantificational sentences.

Sainsbury makes use of the mentioned narrow reading of (FP2) and aims to demonstrate its incorrectness by providing a counter-example. He points out the following:

Yet it seems hard to exclude the possibility of an operator, say 'Neg', which can attach to any intelligible sentence *S* to form a truth just on condition that *S* is not true [...]. Even if *S* is without truth value, 'Neg *S*' is true [...]¹⁹

It is absolutely correct what Sainsbury points out. There are also alternative ways to understand the other standard connectives. One could, for example, conceive of a disjunction as true if at least one of the disjuncts is true. There are lots of different ways to construct a neutral free logic and a large number of these possibilities is backed up by *prima facie* plausible principles. But the question is what Sainsbury's observation shows. It does not show that we cannot use (FP1) or (FP2) to construct a logic on the basis of these principles. It depends on the purpose of such a logic, whether the use of one of the mentioned Fregean principles is justified. If the purpose of our logic is to provide a formal semantics for a natural language or a specific subpart of natural language, then Sainsbury has to show more than to point out the possibility of the introduction of a certain operator whose semantics is incompatible with (FP1)-(FP2). He has to show that in natural language we have got a device of negation that has the described feature such that its application transforms a sentence that is neither true nor false into a true one.

The expression 'It is neither true nor false that *p*' seems to have the desired feature, but it cannot be regarded as device of *negation* in English. We could argue that 'It is not true that *p*' and 'It is not the case that *p*' are not equivalent with 'It is false that *p*' and that these expressions are the counterparts of different monadic-connectives of a formal language. Expressions of the form 'It is F that' are often conceived of as natural-language-counterparts of

¹⁹

certain monadic connectives. But this is a misconception. Expressions of the form 'It is F that p' are in the most cases semantically equivalent with expressions of the form 'That p is F', because these two expressions have the same semantic constituents, namely the expression 'that p' that designates propositional contents and the predicate 'is F'. The pronoun 'it' that an expression of the form 'It is F that p' contains does not have a semantic function, it is a purely syntactic placeholder for the logical subject 'that p'. On this basis it becomes apparent that the devices for negation in natural language are quite different from the devices in predicate logic. We have the predicate modifier 'not' and suffixes like 'non-', 'un-', 'im-' and 'in-' to express negation in natural language. But it is not at all clear whether these expressions have a semantic impact on expressions that is equivalent with the semantic function of 'Neg' according to Sainsbury. So I think, as long as Sainsbury cannot provide clear evidence that there is a device of negation that corresponds to 'Neg' his objection does not show what it aims to show. Namely, that an unrestricted neutral free logic does not provide an adequate description of a certain part of our discourse that makes use of non-designating names.

I have argued that the systematic motivation for favouring the valuation-conditions for atomic sentences that are provided by unrestricted neutral free logic over those of standard negative free logic is the desire to cover the phenomenon of semantic presuppositions triggered by proper names. It is a widely accepted phenomenon that presuppositions that are triggered by a component of sentence S are also triggered by the same component if S is negated. That is, presuppositions seem to survive the operation of negation. If this is a general truth concerning the semantics of natural language, we have good reasons to deny that the negation-operator proposed by Sainsbury should be used by a formal representation of natural language semantics.

6.5. The objection from singular existential sentences

Let us now focus on a more promising objection against (FP1) and (FP3) provided by Sainsbury. Sainsbury claims that intuitively an existential claim like 'Vulcan exists' is false and its negation 'Vulcan does not exist' is true, if 'Vulcan' does not designate an object. Someone who thinks that either the principle (FP1) or the principle (FP3) should be satisfied by a predicate logic that represents the formal semantics of natural language or a certain part of natu-

ral language, cannot account for this data if he treats existential sentences as atomic sentences.

A defender of (FP1) does not even have the resources to account for the intuitive truth-values of the mentioned sentence-pair if he rejects the claim that ‘Vulcan exists’ be regarded as an atomic sentence. He would also undermine by such a move one of the given motivations for an analysis of existential sentences based on a negative or neutral free logic. But not only that, a defender of (FP1) would complicate the matters unnecessarily. Such a solution would not only require the rejection of the Logical-Form-Thesis and the Truth-Condition-Thesis, but also the Truth-Value-Thesis, because on its basis no sentence that contains a non-designating term that is represented as an individual constant can have a classical truth-value. So the acceptance of (FP1) has an implausibly high price and we should not use it as a principle that guides our construction of negative free logic for the required purposes.

The prospects of a neutral free logic that makes use of (FP3) as its semantic principle of construction to solve the proposed problem seem to be on the first sight a bit better. As we have already noticed, a defender of (FP3) is committed to replace the valuation-conditions of quantificational sentences by the following conditions:

C.5. Quantificational Sentences

$V(\exists xA) = T$ iff there is at least one $d \in D$, $V_{(t,d)}(A(t/x)) = T$

$V(\exists xA) = F$ iff there is no $d \in D$, $V_{(t,d)}(A(t/x)) = T$

$V(\forall xA) = T$ iff for every $d \in D$, $V_{(t,d)}(A(t/x)) = T$

$V(\forall xA) = F$ iff there is a $d \in D$, $V_{(t,d)}(A(t/x)) \neq T$

He is committed to this replacement, because he interprets quantifiers as second-order functions from first-order functions into truth-values. On this basis every quantificational sentence has to receive a classical truth-value, because there is always an input for a function designated by a quantifier.

Such a modification seems to licence now also a rejection of the analysis of the existence predicate on the basis of unrestricted neutral free logic and therefore the proposal of a more adequate analysis of singular existential claims. A defender (FP3) may now claim, as Lehmann does, that an existential claim like ‘Vulcan exists’ has the logical form ‘ $\exists x(x=t)$ ’ and that

a negative existential claim like ‘Vulcan does not exist’ has the logical form ‘ $\neg\exists x(x=t)$ ’. Against this background he can account for the intuitive truth-values of singular existential claims.

This seems to be a viable option on the first sight, but let me show why I think it is not possible to provide an adequate solution to our initial problem on the basis of an acceptance of (FP3). Someone who holds this view must not only additionally to the Truth-Condition-Thesis reject the Logical-Form-Thesis, but he also has to reject the thesis that a sentence of the logical form ‘ $\exists x(x=t)$ ’ is logically equivalent with a sentence of the form ‘ $E!t$ ’. According to the given semantics the following holds: If ‘ t ’ does not designate anything, then ‘ $\exists x(x=t)$ ’ is false and ‘ $\neg\exists x(x=t)$ ’ is true, while ‘ $E!t$ ’ and ‘ $\neg E!t$ ’ are both neither true nor false. This observation has an important consequence. We cannot provide an adequate definition of a first-order non-discriminating existence predicate by means of the following claim ‘ $\forall x(E!x \text{ =df } \exists y(y=x))$ ’. But we also cannot stipulate the desired meaning and extension of such a predicate by conceiving it as logical predicate with a fixed interpretation, because (FP3) does not allow such a move. Therefore, there seems to be no adequate way to conceive of the existence predicate as an expression of a first-order non-discriminating predicate. So we are again confronted with a version of a neutral free logic that undermines one of our given motivations for a solution based on a framework of free logic. If such a version of free logic wants to use ‘ $\exists x(x=t)$ ’ as the logical representation of singular existential sentences that contain proper names, it is committed to conceive of existence as a second-order property, because of its inability to interpret such a sentence as an ascription of a first-order property. But we have already pointed out in section 5.4. why such a second-order view on existence seems to face insurmountable problems. Therefore, I think, it is a good choice to reject (FP3) as well and don’t use it as a construction principle of a neutral free logic that should be used for a solution to our initial problem.

But there is also a further problem that a solution based on (FP3) has to face. If a sentence of the form ‘ $\neg\exists x(x=t)$ ’ contains the non-designating term ‘ t ’, then according to the semantics of quantificational sentences proposed by (FP3) such a sentence is true. But the remarkable fact is that it is true, although the open sentence ‘ $\neg(x=t)$ ’ has no true instances. Every instances of this sentence is neither true nor false. This is a counterintuitive result. A similar consequence holds in case of ‘ $\exists x(x=t)$ ’ under the given assumptions. Such a sentence is false, although it has no false instances. Every instances of the open sentence ‘ $x=t$ ’ is neither true

nor false. Such a result is licenced by (FP3) and the view that quantifiers are second-order functions. But it is not only counterintuitive, it also forces a rejection of Tarski's classical notion of satisfaction. According to Tarski an object o satisfies an open sentence ' $x=t$ ' iff $o=t$ and o does not satisfy ' $x=t$ ' iff $\neg(o=t)$. But both conditions do not hold, if we conceive of ' t ' as a constant that does not denote. Therefore, we cannot use Tarski's notion of satisfaction to outline the truth-conditions of quantificational sentences. Insofar as Tarski's notion of satisfaction is itself a technical notion this is not a major problem of this view. But it is a challenge for such a view why we should accept that quantificational sentence can be true, if they have no true instances or false, if they have no false instances. The postulation of (FP3) by itself does not provide a plausible answer to this question.

We have rejected (FP1) and (FP3), because both principles are incompatible with the outlined task of providing a solution to our initial problem only on the basis of the rejection of the Truth-Condition-Thesis. We have already proposed a different way to construct a neutral free logic, namely on the basis of phenomena of semantic presupposition concerning proper names. We have seen that such an approach can provide a plausible justification for the truth-conditions of atomic-sentences based on a neutral free logic.

Can we also provide a correct analysis of singular existential sentences that only contain proper names on this basis? I think so, although it may appear on the first sight that this is not possible. If we conceive of existential sentences like 'Vulcan exists' and 'Vulcan does not exist' as atomic sentences, then these sentences provide an exception, because they do not trigger existential presuppositions like other atomic sentences. It would be pointless, if a sentence of the form 'Vulcan exists' would trigger the presupposition that 'Vulcan exists', because the presupposed content would be identical with the content of the sentences that has such a presupposition, but on this basis it could also not be a precondition for the truth of such a sentence and it is clearly not a precondition for the falsity of such a sentence. Existential sentences seem to provide a counterexample to the claim that every atomic sentence that contains a proper name represented as an individual constants triggers certain existential presuppositions.

If we want to avoid the falsification of this claim we seem to be forced to reject the thesis that singular existential sentence are in fact atomic sentences. This is a possible reaction, but it is not the only possible rejection. If it would be the only reaction, it would have to face

similar problems than the two mention systems of neutral logic based on (FP1) and (FP3) have to face.

A further possibility is provided by exploiting the distinction between logical and non-logical predicates. It is a feature of a non-logical predicate that we can assign different extensions to such a predicate relative to different interpretations. A logical predicate on the other hand has a fixed interpretation and therefore also a fixed extension relative to a given domain of discourse. There are good reasons to conceive the existence predicate beside the identity predicate as a logical predicate on the basis of any framework of free logic. It is one of the distinctive claims of a free logic that the existence predicate plays an important role in validating certain arguments. We can for example in case of a free logic only derive from 'Fa' the sentence ' $\exists xFx$ ' if we also assume that a exists.

Existential sentences do have on this basis a distinctive logical role and if we conceive existential sentences as atomic sentences, then we should treat existence as a logical predicate. But if we conceive the existence predicate as a logical predicate, such a predicate has to receive because of its fixed interpretation a separate semantic treatment than other atomic predicates. This separation allows us to assign specific truth-conditions to such sentences that account for the specific logical role of the contained predicate and that distinguishes these *logical* atomic sentences from other atomic sentences.

If we want to do justice to the specific logical role of existential sentences and the mentioned features concerning presuppositions in natural language, we are forced to alter the truth-conditions of existential sentences. And in this case the specific logical role of existence sentences explains why they do not trigger presuppositions that normal atomic sentences trigger and why it is also necessary to treat such a sentence in a different way than other atomic sentences.

We are guided by the following principle: Only in case of atomic sentences that contain non-logical predicates it is guaranteed that they trigger existential presupposition in the described way. On this basis existential sentences provide no counterexample to our proposed truth-conditions for atomic sentences. We have to add the following further conditions to our logic, if we want to capture the specific semantic features of existential sentences on the basis of the outlined conception:

D.5. Existential Sentences

$V(E!t) = T$ iff $I(t)$ is designated.

$V(E!t) = F$ iff $I(t)$ is not designated.

So our first minor modification of unrestricted neutral free logic concerns an adaption of the truth-conditions of existential sentences that is licenced by their intuitive logical role that distinguishes such sentences from other sentences of the same grammatical form. But this minor revision is not sufficient to provide a plausible framework for a semantic analysis of singular existential sentences.

Our logical language contains two different *logical* predicates, the existence and the identity predicate. There are important intuitive dependences between the semantics of these predicates. A sentence of the form 'Vulcan exists' should receive the same truth-value as a sentence of the form 'Something is identical with Vulcan' relative to every interpretation and relative to every possible world. We are committed to the view that the first sentence has the logical form ' $E!t$ ' and the second most plausibly has the logical form ' $\exists x(x=t)$ '. But we cannot account for this equivalence in truth-values on the basis of our minor modification of unrestricted neutral free logic, because according to this semantics a sentence of the form ' $\exists x(x=t)$ ' is neither true nor false, if ' t ' does not designate anything. Further adaptations of the semantics of our neutral free logic are required to cope with this intuitively plausible data.

There seem to be at least two possible ways to adapt our logic for this purpose, if the given truth-conditions of singular existential sentences remain untouched. The first option makes adaptations of the semantics of the existential quantifier; the second changes the semantics of the identity predicate.

If we chose option one, then the adaption provided by Lehmann seems to be the best way to reach the desired equivalences. On the basis of our rejection of (FP3) this move does not face a crucial problem that Lehmann had to face because of his commitment to (FP3). But there still remains the further mentioned problem concerning the rejection of a Tarskian notion of satisfaction to account for the semantics of open sentences. Maybe we can justify this rejection. The Tarskian notion of satisfaction has some intuitive appeal, but it is a technical notion and it might be substituted by another technical notion of satisfaction if this leads to more adequate and plausible results. So we might swallow that some quantificational sentences can be false, although they have no false instance, but only instances that are neither true nor false as long as the truth-conditions provided on such a basis for quantificational sentences are correct and acceptable.

But there is another new problem that such a strategy has to face on the basis of our commitment to the view that a neutral free logic should capture existential presuppositions triggered by proper names. Someone may have the intuition that ‘Some planet is larger than Vulcan’ is plainly false if Vulcan does not exist. But on this basis he would have to accept as well that ‘No planet is larger than Vulcan’ is true relative to the same conditions, because this sentence is logically the negation of the former sentence. But such a consequence is unacceptable because we are intuitively inclined to hold that if ‘No planet is larger than Vulcan’ is true, then also ‘Vulcan is the largest planet’ is true. But such a transfer in truth-values is unacceptable if ‘Vulcan’ does not designate. On the other hand it seems to be perfectly acceptable to claim ‘No planet is larger than Vulcan because Vulcan does not exist’. But not only that we are inclined to hold such a sentence as true if Vulcan in fact does not exist. It is also the case that a sentence of the form ‘p because q’ can only be true if both ‘p’ and ‘q’ are true.

How should we react to this conflicting data? The viability of our first option of adaption depends on the fact whether proper names trigger existential presuppositions if they are used in simple quantificational sentences or not. If they do not, then it would be easily to modify the mentioned rule of inclination in the following way: Only if we are inclined to accept that Vulcan exists and that no planet is larger than Vulcan, then Vulcan is the largest planet. So this should not be a big problem. The other data is quite more puzzling. But it seems to be no specific problem that concerns quantificational sentences that contain proper names. It seems to be a more general problem, because even in case of a use of the name ‘Vulcan’ in the negation of an atomic sentence, we can formulate similar intuitively true because-claims like ‘Vulcan is not a planet, because Vulcan does not exist’.

There are several possible ways to account for the communicative role of these puzzling because-claims. (a) One could postulate different kinds of negation, (b) one could postulate that ‘because’-constructions can block specific presuppositions, or (c) that our example sentences represent only a *sloppy* way to express a presupposition-based denial. It seems to be quite difficult to motivate (a) and (b) in a plausible way. Option (c) seems to be a more moderate and promising solution. Explicit and more adequate ways of presupposition-based denial concerning our example sentence make either use of either of the following constructions:

(E23) No planet **can** be larger than Vulcan, because Vulcan does not exist.

(E24) **Neither** some planet is larger than Vulcan **nor** is no planet larger than Vulcan, because Vulcan does not exist.

Both of these sentences are clear meaningful examples of presupposition-based denial. This shows an important parallel between simple quantificational sentences like ‘Some planet is larger than Vulcan’ and ‘Vulcan is a planet’. In both cases we can construe plausible and explicit presupposition-based denials and in both cases there are also *sloppy* ways to express such a sort of denial. Therefore, we should accept that proper names trigger the same existential presuppositions in simple quantificational sentence which they trigger in atomic sentences that contain only non-logical predicates.

Against this background, the proposed option of a modification of existential quantifiers to cope with the mentioned data is not viable for an account that aims to capture certain presupposition-phenomena of natural language by the construction of a neutral free logic. So whether we can justify a non-standard notion of satisfaction in case of open sentences or not, we have now good reasons not to follow the adaptations of the valuation-conditions of quantifiers proposed by Lehmann.

The only remaining option to capture the intuitive equivalence between sentences of the form ‘ $E!t$ ’ and ‘ $\exists x(x=t)$ ’ is the option that modifies the semantics of the identity predicate in a way that we can account for the equivalence.

It is an interesting fact that in case of identity sentences we do not have the same clear and shared intuitions concerning the truth-values of these sentences as in case of existential sentences. Let us have a look at the following examples for this purpose:

(E25) Vulcan = Vulcan.

(E26) Vulcan = Zeus.

(E27) Vulcan = Neptune.

If we assume that ‘Vulcan’ and ‘Zeus’ do not designate anything and that ‘Neptune’ designates the planet Neptune, what are the intuitive truth-values of sentences like (E25)? There is no clear answer to this question. There are people who think that any claim that states self-identity should be true. Others think that (25) is false, because Vulcan does not exist, and there are people who think that (E25) is neither true nor false, because ‘Vulcan’ does

not designate anything. But there are also people that have no clear intuitions at all concerning the truth-value of (E25).

The situation is rather similar in case of (E26) and (E27). The most significant difference between these examples and (E25) is that there is agreement that these sentences cannot be true on the given interpretations of the terms. But there are again people who think that these claims are false; others that think that they are neither true nor false; and there also people that have no idea which truth-value they should assign to (E26) and (E27).

The reason for this messy situation seems to be a certain sort of confusion about the semantic status of identity sentences and the nature of the identity relation. How can we resolve this confusion? In my opinion we have all the clues for this purpose in our hands. Firstly, we have clear intuitions about the truth-values of existential sentences that contain proper names. Secondly, we have found a semantic representation of these claims that fit with this data. Thirdly, we have clear intuitions about the equivalence in truth-values between existential sentences of the form 'E!t' and existential generalisations ' $\exists x(x=t)$ ' that contain the identity predicate. Fourthly, the identity predicate is a logical predicate and therefore we are free to assign specific valuation-conditions to identity sentences without altering on this basis the valuation-conditions of atomic sentences that contain non-logical predicates. Fifthly, there is an intimate connection between the logical role of the existence predicate and the logical role of the identity predicate; therefore a certain assimilation of their semantics is welcome. Sixthly, we often use equivalence claims like the following to explain the meaning of identity claims: Mark Twain is identical with Samuel Clemens if(f) there is one object that is both Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens.²⁰

On the basis of this six plausible assumptions and on the basis of the diagnosed lack of clear intuitions concerning the truth-values of identity sentences it should be allowed to make certain reasonable *stipulations* concerning the valuation-conditions of identity sentences that allow the most simple and best unified acceptance of the mentioned intuitively accepted claims.

This immediately leads to the view that identity sentences like existential sentences can only have classical truth-values and that identity sentences like existential sentence do not trigger existential presuppositions. The most plausible way to put forward such a view makes use of the following valuation-conditions for identity sentence:

²⁰ C.f.: Perry (2001, 118).

D.2. Identity Sentences²¹

$V(s=t) = W$ iff there is an x such that $x=l(s)$ and $x=l(t)$.

$V(s=t) = F$ iff it is not the case that there is an x such that $x=l(s)$ and $x=l(t)$.

Against this background we can account for the intuitive equivalence in truth-value between sentences of the logical form ' $E!t$ ' and ' $\exists x(x=t)$ '. We can do this without undermining our systematic motivation of capturing the phenomenon of semantic existential presuppositions triggered by proper names for the construction of a neutral free logic.

This alteration of the valuation-conditions of identity sentences is rather moderate and it also seems to have a good motivation. So I propose to make use of the mentioned two modifications of unrestricted neutral free logic as a semantic framework for the analysis of existential sentences in natural languages. Let us call this kind of logic *non-standard (presuppositional) neutral free logic*.

6.6. The objection from non-projective embedding

There remains at least a further problem concerning the justification of such a kind of neutral free logic on the basis of their systematic motivation. Unrestricted neutral free logic makes use of the *Weak Kleene* connectives and such valuations-conditions for connective sentences predict that the existential presupposition of a sentence S projects in case of any embedding of S into a complex sentence build on the basis of the given standard two-place-connectives. But this seems to be an unwelcome result. We reached the conclusion that existential sentences like 'Vulcan exists' do not trigger existential presuppositions in opposition to normal atomic sentences like 'Vulcan is a planet'. But if we embed this two sentences into the following sentence,

(E28) If Vulcan exists, then Vulcan is a planet,

²¹ Alternatively one could claim that identity sentences of the form ' $a=b$ ' are *true*, if ' a ' and ' b ' designate the same thing, *false* if only one of this expressions designates something and *neither true nor false*, if they both designate nothing. Such a modification also leads to the desired results, but it seems to be more difficult to justify such extravagant valuation-conditions.

the second sentence intuitively does not project its existential presupposition to the whole sentence. In this sense the connective ‘If..., then...’ seems to block a projection of a presupposition of a component of (E28) to (E28) itself.

The intuitive semantics of disjunctions provide a further motivation to change the given valuation-conditions of connectives. For the truth of a disjunction it is sufficient that only one of the conjuncts is true. So if we have the sentence ‘Vulcan is a planet or Neptune is a planet’ this sentence is true, because ‘Neptune is a planet’ is true and although ‘Vulcan is a planet’ is neither true nor false. And even if both were true it is questionable whether they project the existential presuppositions in this case to the disjunction.

To cope with such and similar data it seems to be necessary to modify the valuation-conditions of connective sentences that are provided by unrestricted neutral free logic. Such an account is for example offered in Peters (1979):

D.3. Connective Sentences

$$V(\neg A) = T \text{ iff } V(A) = F$$

$$V(\neg A) = F \text{ iff } V(A) = T$$

$$V(\neg A) = N \text{ iff } V(A) = N$$

$$V(A \wedge B) = T \text{ iff } V(A) = T \text{ and } V(B) = T$$

$$V(A \wedge B) = F \text{ iff } (V(A) = F \text{ and } V(B) = T) \text{ or } (V(A) = T \text{ and } V(B) = F) \text{ or } (V(A) = F \text{ and } V(B) = F) \text{ or } (V(A) = F \text{ and } V(B) = F)$$

$$V(A \wedge B) = N \text{ iff } V(A) = N \text{ or } V(B) = N \text{ or both}$$

$$V(A \vee B) = T \text{ iff } (V(A) = T \text{ and } V(B) = T) \text{ or } (V(A) = T \text{ and } V(B) = F) \text{ or } (V(A) = F \text{ and } V(B) = T)$$

$$V(A \vee B) = F \text{ iff } V(A) = F \text{ and } V(B) = F$$

$$V(A \vee B) = N \text{ iff } V(A) = N \text{ or } V(B) = N \text{ or both}$$

$$V(A \rightarrow B) = T \text{ iff } (V(A) = T \text{ and } V(B) = T) \text{ or } (V(A) = F \text{ and } V(B) = T) \text{ or } (V(A) = F \text{ and } V(B) = F)$$

$$V(A \rightarrow B) = F \text{ iff } V(A) = T \text{ and } V(B) = F$$

$$V(A \rightarrow B) = N \text{ iff } V(A) = N \text{ or } V(B) = N \text{ or both}$$

$$V(A \leftrightarrow B) = T \text{ iff } (V(A) = T \text{ and } V(B) = T) \text{ or } (V(A) = F \text{ and } V(B) = F)$$

$$V(A \leftrightarrow B) = F \text{ iff } (V(A) = T \text{ and } V(B) = F) \text{ or } (V(A) = F \text{ and } V(B) = T)$$

$$V(A \leftrightarrow B) = N \text{ iff } V(A) = N \text{ or } V(B) = N \text{ or both}$$

So if we assume that we can adapt the valuation-conditions of connective sentences in such a way that they capture the data in case of the mentioned projection-problems, we seem to

have a logical framework that might function as basis for future extensions to a more complex logical language that captures modal and other more elaborated facets of our discourse concerning negative and positive existential claim that contain proper names in an adequate and plausible way.

6.7. The objection from logical laws

Let me discuss and try to reject one last and more fundamental objection that has been presented against three value logics in general to substantiate this impression about the usefulness of our neutral free logic a bit further.

This objection can be called *the objection from logical laws*. It is a significant property of unrestricted neutral logic that there are no sentences that are in the following classical sense logical truths according to this logic:

(CL) A sentence x is a (strong) **logical truth** iff for every interpretation I it is such that the semantic value of x relative to I is identical with the truth-value TRUE.

But there is a certain *ersatz*-notion of logical truth to compensate this shortcoming:

(WL) A sentence x is a **weak logical truth** iff there is no interpretation I such that the semantic value of x relative to I is identical with the truth-value FALSE.

So if we want to capture the vast number of *acceptable* logical laws according to classical logic we have to make use of this weaker notion of logical truth for such a purpose. But this adaption has the following counterintuitive consequence: At least some sentences that are weakly logically true are not true, because they are neither true nor false. Should we bother about this counterintuitive consequence? I do not think so. Firstly, our two defended modifications of unrestricted neutral free logic at least extend the class of logical truths to a certain degree. Secondly and more importantly, the notion of a logical truth is a technical notion whose main purpose is to explain the notion of validity and valid inference. As long as our used notion of a weak logical truth fixes the extension of validity and valid inference correctly, it is of no importance whether every so-called logical truth is in fact true or not. Our *non-standard presuppositional neutral free logic* alters the extension of classically valid arguments only in so far as they concern the implausible presuppositions of classical predicate

logic that a universally free logic aims to avoid. In this sense the mentioned last objection does not really undermine our project of providing a plausible semantic framework for the analysis of existential sentences that contains proper names as their grammatical subject. In my opinion, the presented and sketched logical framework has all the desired features that a plausible solution to our initial problem that is solely based on the rejection of the Truth-Condition-Thesis should have.²²

²² ... thank you for the music ...

7. Bibliography

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