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Description of Module

Subject name	Philosophy
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Module Name/Title	
Module Id	4.9
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Key words	*Dharma, jñāna, bhakti, karma yoga*

Bhagavad Gītā II: Metaethical Controversies

1. Introduction

As noted in the introductory chapters of this course, normative ethics concerns a practical resolution of questions of the right or the good. Applied ethics concerns a case base resolution of questions about the right or the good. Metaethics in turn concerns the conceptual resolution of the right or the good. These three areas of moral philosophy are closely related, as they converge on the right and the good. In the previous lesson on the *Gītā*, we focused on the normative theories of the text. Here, we will emphasize the metaethical component of the *Bhagavad Gītā*'s account of proper practice: *jñāna* yoga.

In the previous module we examined the dialectic that Krishna initiates in the *Bhagavad Gītā*. Arjuna's despondency and worry about the war he must fight is captured in his own words by teleological concerns – consequentialism and virtue theoretic considerations. In the face of a challenge, a teleological approach results in the paradox of teleology. The paradox is clear in the case of consequential considerations: if I have to choose so as to maximise a positive outcome, I have to decide my course of action independently of the decisions and factors not under my control. However, these decisions and factors contribute to the overall outcome. The*a priori* chances of success are hence low. This leads to depression and inertia. Virtue theoretically, I might be faced with a challenge that I am ill-equipped for as my virtues may be ill suited for the challenge: I may be virtuous, but not virtuous in every respect. This would lead to depression and inertia. Krishna tries to turn the tide by reversing the considerations: if the criterion of ethical choice is procedural and not teleological, then we can simplify the decision structure by ignoring teleological considerations that are discouraging and thereby overcome depression and inertia. Once we start to embrace the struggle, the chances of a good outcome change for the better, because then we are making a difference that we could not have if we were under the grips of the depression brought on by the paradox of teleology.

To this extent, Krishna identifies three ethical theories. Two were discussed extensively in the earlier chapter on the *Gītā*. The first is basic deontology, called *karma yoga*. This states that we should choose to do our duty without appealing to the outcome as a justification. The duties in question are definable by good outcomes, but the outcomes do not constitute the reason for embracing duty. The second, spoken about at length, is *bhakti yoga*. According to this, the right thing to do is to worship the ideal by our actions. This practice results in us improving our skill and practice such that we come to liberate ourselves from fault and instantiate the ideal itself. The third is the *Gītā*'s metaethical theory—conceptual account of the right and the good. This is called "*jñāna* yoga."

2. Usual Suspects

First, some review:

Consequentialism: the *good* (end) justifies the *right* (means).

Virtue Theory: a *good*—virtue or strength—produces *right* action.

These two theories are often associated with each other in the literature. They are together the *teleological* ethical theories. What they have in common is the primacy of the good over the right. The difference is whether the relationship is causal or epistemic. The inverse could be called *procedural*:

Deontology: the *right* is justified independently of the good.

Bhakti Theory: the *right* is productive of the *good*.

A common approach to Indian ethics is to assume that any talk of consequences entails consequentialism. This is a mistake. Deontologists have the ability to define duties in terms of consequences – they merely deny that consequences are the reason for doing one's duty. Moreover, I am unaware of anyone (present company excluded) who appreciates that Bhakti counts as a distinct version of proceduralism, which is similar to deontology as well as different. Bhakti concerns itself with outcomes as the regulative ideal of a practice. However, this version of moral theory denies the teleological claim that outcomes justify or cause right action.

In the case of the *Bhagavad Gītā*, it is not uncommon for the distinction between the four moral theories to be ignored. For instance, Sundeep Sreekumar (2012) paints the *Gītā* as advocating rule consequentialism. He is by no means the first (Theodor 2010).Why? Bhakti seems like consequentialism if we fail to appreciate that it is a *causal* claim about the right bringing about the good, as opposed to a justificatory claim that the right is justified by the good. Consequentialism takes the latter view, and does not claim the former. This is true even of rule-utilitarianism. Rule-consequentialists hold that it is our duty to follow rules that maximise a certain outcome in the long run. This is a justificatory claim, and not a causal one. Hence, as a rule-consequentialist, I might identify happiness as the outcome to maximise and I might then adopt the Millian strategy of never interfering with someone else's happiness, even if by interfering I might on occasion stand to make someone happier. This might, all things considered, maximise happiness in the long run and thereby justify the strategy, but it does not *cause* the happiness.

There are other reasons for confusing Bhakti with consequentialism. One is that Bhakti does not seem like deontology, and if one is only cognisant of two options (deontology or consequentialism), it would seem that Bhakti is a version of consequentialism. There are other confusions also that do not help. The most prominent confusion is the idea that a proceduralist, such as a deontologist, cannot identify as his duty something that is beneficial. This is because in justifying a duty that brings about benefit, one appears to be appealing to goodness or badness of the consequences of performing the duties in one's justification of the duty (Sreekumar 2012, 282). Krishna repeatedly makes a case for duty by appealing to consequences. Sreekumar reasons that Krishna, hence, cannot be defending deontology. However, by parity of reasoning, Kant couldn't be a deontologist. His principle of humanity formulation of the categorical imperative (that we should treat others not merely as a means but also an end), and the kingdom of ends formulation of the categorical imperative (that we should choose rules that connect us as

citizens of a kingdom of such ends) appeals to outcomes in the justification of an action, but does not treat the outcomes as the justification for the action. Rather, his justification is that a maxim that satisfies these outcomes counts as our duty, and should be embraced because it passes such a test.

The mistake here is an error of scope.

Sreekumar's characterisation of deontology is too vague and permissive. Sreekumar is correct in stating that deontology does not appeal to consequences as the justification of an action. However, it is quite another claim to identify deontology as the ethical theory that does not "appeal to consequences in its justificatory portions.". As a deontologist, I might identify duties in terms of their consequences, and further argue that said duties must be embraced on procedural grounds. This would be a case of deontology that does not appeal to consequences as the justification of an action, yet appeals to consequences in the justification. The consequences are the action, so to speak.

The final error in confusing Bhakti with consequentialism is the failure to appreciate that the good of bhakti is nothing but the practical realisation of the means: there is no good apart from the means. This entails that there is no separate good from the practice. However, consequentialism as a form of moral justification requires that the end is distinct from the means so as to function as justification.

As a rejoinder, Sreekumar might note, as he does, that Krishna argues that there are two outcomes of duty well performed: liberation for the self (*mokṣa*) as well as maintenance and welfare of the world (*lokasaṃgraha*). Are these not the consequences to be maximised on the *Gītā* account? For them to be true consequences to be maximised, they would have to be ends that are distinct from the means. It should be possible that the same ends can be maximised by different means. However, the Bhakti story entails that the end is nothing but the means, perfected. We are liberated when we are devoted to the lord of persons, for we thereby instantiate this excellence in personhood when we perfect duty so understood. The world in turn is maintained and protected as an outcome of our own self perfection, as we instantiate the Lord itself. This is no mystery: the world has to continue to exist to a high standard of living in order to accommodate me as someone who has perfected the art of being a person. In perfecting myself as a person, I thereby change the world to accommodate me. So here we see that *mokṣa* (liberation) and *lokasaṃgraha* (maintenance and protection of the world) are nothing but the instantiation of the regulative ideal of the practice of ethical action: the Lord itself.

3. Main Argument

The normative thrust of the *Gītā* is largely to relieve us from having to conceive of practical problems teleologically. There are two versions of teleology: one is Virtue theory – good state causes right action – and the other is Consequentialism – good states justify right action. The problem with a teleological account is that it leads us to give credence to outcomes, which are beyond our control.

Deontology – *karma yoga* – replaces Consequentialism. Bhakti – *bhakti yoga* – replaces Virtue Theory.

Krishna also mentions *jñāna* yoga: the discipline of thoughtfulness or knowledge. The outcome of all three is the maintenance and welfare of the world on his account. However, *jñāna* yoga, in contrast to *karma yoga* and *bhakti yoga*, is depicted as not so much about actions but as being attitudinal. The practitioners of *jñāna* yoga develop the correct attitude towards themselves and several elements that correspond to the regulative ideal invoked by the Bhakti theory.

There are at least two possible ways of accounting for this, relative to the procedural emphasis. One is to treat *jñāna* yoga as an analogue of Buddhist, mindfulness meditation. Both are characterised by detachment.

The other option is that *jñāna* yoga is the metaethics of the *Gītā*'s proceduralism. While Karma yoga and Bhakti yoga are two normative theories that Krishna recommends, *jñāna* yoga is the proper understanding that depicts both activities as the right idea.

The Śrī Vaiṣṇava commentator Yamunacarya, in his summary of the *Gītā* (the *Gītārtha Saṅgraha*), notes that *jñāna* yoga and karma yoga are taught together in the first third of the Gītā (cf Rāmānuja 1991, for translation). Put this way, *jñāna* yoga is the critical appreciation of the framework of moral action, which compliments karma yoga's disinterest in trying to understand action as justified by outcome. Both of these together lead to bhakti yoga. In bhakti yoga we have the stronger renunciation of outcomes, because while in the case of deontology duties can be defined by good outcomes, in the case of bhakti, right actions are defined by the regulative ideal.

Here, Krishna depicts himself as the regulative ideal of moral practice.

Śaṅkara, the famous Advaita Vedānta commentator, treats *jñāna* yoga as the central theme of the *Gītā*. According to him, the main theme of the *Gītā* is that we should renounce the idea of our own agency and focus merely on the right perspective. Śaṅkara goes even further and claims that dharma (ethics) is an evil for those interested in moksa (freedom) as it is based on the idea of our agency (*Gītā Bhāṣya* IV:21).

How do we reconcile these competing accounts? First, we might note that Śaṅkara's account is biased and highly selective: it emphasises some aspects of the *Gītā* and excludes others that are extensively discussed. Yamuna's account is far more objective. It includes all the three yogas that Krishna discusses. What is the difference then? In the case of a biased account of a text, what one is presented with is an *interpretation*. An interpretation relies upon theses that the interpreter believes are true, and the plausibility of the interpretation depends in large measure on how much you agree with the assumptions. The interpretation thus is the depiction of a text in light of the beliefs of the interpreter. Here, Śaṅkara's assumptions are his Advaita Vedānta: his interpretation relies upon the plausibility of this philosophy and if you disagree with it, you will find Śaṅkara's gloss on the text difficult to accept.

An objective reading hones in on arguments of the text that can be valid. Valid arguments are those that we can converge on without having to agree on philosophical questions of truth, since validity is not about the truth of the constituents of an argument, but the plausibility of the

conclusion assuming the truth of the premises. Highlighting what is objective about a text, such as its theses and arguments, does not require that we agree on what is true. No assumptions about which philosophy is right must be accepted. Objects in public space are things that look different from differing perspectives, yet we converge on them. Hence, an objective reading of a text will highlight the features of the text that we are free to disagree with.

Yamuna's reading does not deny that all three disciplines play a role in Krishna's account. It follows the positions in the text that we are free to agree or disagree about.

Śaṅkara has to reject the text's many arguments for karma yoga and bhakti yoga solely in favour of his highly Advaita take on *jñāna* yoga. This is to read the text in light of Advaita philosophy. The difference is between identifying what counts as the possibly valid arguments of the *Gītā* (Yamuna) and insisting only on the putative sound ones (Śaṅkara). As students of philosophy, we need to determine validity before soundness: objectivity before truth. The *Gītā* does not make a case for *jñāna* yoga alone, nor is it the primary yoga in the text.

Therefore, if we accept all three yogas as playing a role in Krishna's theorising, as he lets on, we can focus on *jñāna* yoga as the metaethical contributions of the debate.

3.1. *Gītā*'s Metaethical Theory

3.1.1. Moral Realism

In the fourth chapter of the *Gītā*, where the topic of *jñāna* is discussed, Krishna specifies himself as the moral ideal whose task is to reset the moral compass (IV.7-8). What ensues in this section are the characteristics of the moral ideal, but also its relationship to ordinary practice. What follows in the fifth chapter and beyond seems increasingly esoteric but morally significant. The fifth chapter discusses the issue of *renunciation*, which in the *Gītā* amounts to a criticism of consequentialism and teleology on the whole. The various ascetic metaphors in the *Gītā* are in short ethical criticisms of teleology. One of the implications of this criticism of teleology is the equality of persons understood properly: all of us are equal in moral potential if we renounce identifying morality with virtue (V:18). The sixth chapter ties in the broader practice of Yoga to the argument. The continuity between Bhakti and Yoga as a separate philosophy is seamless, and if we were to study the *Yoga Sūtra*, we would find virtually the same theory as the Bhakti Yoga account in the *Gītā*. Here in chapter six, we learn about the equanimity that arises from the practice of yoga (VI:9). Indeed, as we abandon the paradox of teleology, we ought to expect that ethical practice results in stability. Chapter seven returns to the issue of Bhakti in full, with greater detail given to the ideal (VII:7). Chapter eight brings in reference to *Brahman* (literally 'Development') and ties it with the practice of yoga. Moral realism has many expressions (Brink 1989; Shafer-Landau 2003; Brink 1995; Sayre-McCord Spring 2015 Edition; Copp 1991), but one dominant approach is that moral value is real. Chapter nine introduces the element of Moral Realism: all things that are good and virtuous are subsumed by the regulative ideal (IX: 5). The ideal is accessible to anyone (IX:32).

3.1.2. Good and Evil

Chapter ten contends with the outward instantiation of the virtues of the ideal. It is claimed that the vices too are as though negative manifestations of the ideal (X.4-5). This is an acknowledgement of what we might call the *moral responsibility* principle. This is the opposite of the moral symmetry principle, which claims that two actions are of the same moral worth if they have the same outcome. The moral responsibility principle claims that different outcomes share a moral value if they arise from the same procedural ideal. As outcomes, vices are a consequence of a failure to instantiate the moral ideal –hence the moral ideal is responsible for this. This only shows that the devotion to the ideal is preferable (X.7).

This certainly seems strange: should we not understand the moral ideal only in terms of good outcomes? This is a tacit acceptance of teleology, which talks of priority of the good over the right. If we prioritise the right, we have to accept that bad outcomes might come from devotion. Yet, it is worth it if the regulative ideal not only characterises proper practice, but the benefic results – the realisation of the regulative ideal as a practical reality. Think about the musical case.

One person has resolved to learn how to play the violin, and begins practicing. A second person decides to pick up the violin and make noise. It may be that the two cases are phenomenologically indistinguishable, even as outcomes, which is to say that blind observers would be unable to distinguish the student from the one who is merely making noise. They are not good, certainly bad – perhaps even *musically* evil (out of tune, out of rhythm perhaps). Yet, they are not morally equivalent. In one case, we have someone working on the path to success. On the other, we have a lark. In the case of the student, it is the regulative ideal – *music* – that gives rise to the clinkers as what structures the practice. But the regulative ideal in time also improves the practice by providing standards to aspire towards. According to Bhakti, hence, people cannot be judged on performance alone: it is performance relative to the ideal that grants value to our activities.

Chapter eleven refers to the empirical appreciation of the relation of all things to the regulative ideal. Here we hear of Krishna giving Arjuna special eyes to behold the full outcome of the regulative ideal – his cosmic form.

Chapter twelve focuses on the traits of those who are devoted to the regulative ideal. They are friendly and compassionate, and do not understand moral questions from a selfish perspective (XII.13). Importantly, they renounce teleological markers of action: good (*śubha*) and evil (*aśubha*) (XII.17). Yet, they are devoted to the welfare of all beings (XII.4). The Bhakti theory suggests that these are not inconsistent: if the welfare of all beings is the regulative ideal, then ethical practice is about conformity to this ideal. The outcome is not what justifies the practice; it is rather the perfection of the practice. Krishna does depict himself as dedicated to the welfare of all beings, so here, the devotee is the devotee of Krishna.

3.1.3. Moral Psychology

Chapter thirteen emphasizes the distinction of the individual from their body. Chapter fourteen articulates the tri-*guṇa* theory that is a mainstay of Sāṅkhya and Yoga analyses. Accordingly, aside from persons (*puruṣa*), nature (*prakṛti*) is comprised of three characteristics: *sattva*

(illumination) *rajas* (activity) and *tamas* (recalcitrance). Nature so understood is relativised to moral considerations, and plays an explanatory role that ought to be downstream from regulative choices. Chapter fifteen is an articulation of the success of those who adhere to Bhakti: "Without delusion of perverse notions, victorious over the evil of attachment, ever devoted to the self, turned away from desires and liberated from dualities of pleasure and pain, the undeluded go to that imperishable status" (XV:5).

Chapter sixteen refers an inventory of personalities relative to the moral ideal. Chapter seventeen returns to the issue of the three qualities of nature, but this time as a means of elucidating moral character. Most importantly, it articulates the bhakti theory in terms of *śraddhā* (commitment), often also identified with *faith*: "The commitment of everyone, O Arjuna, is in accordance with his *antaḥ karaṇa* (inside helper, inner voice). Everyone consists in commitment. Whatever the commitment, that the person instantiates" (Ch XVII:3). Here, we see the theory of bhakti universalised in a manner that abstracts from the ideal. Indeed, we are always making ourselves out in terms of our conscience (what we identify as our moral ideal), and this warrants care, as we must choose the ideal we seek to emulate carefully. The three personality types, following the three characteristics of nature, choose differing ideals. Only the illuminated choose deities as their ideals. Those who pursue activity as an ideal worship functionaries in the universe (*yakṣa*-s and *rākṣasas*), while those who idealise recalcitrance worship those that are gone and inanimate things (XVII: 4).

4. Transcending Deontology

In the final chapter, Krishna summarises the idea of renunciation. Throughout the *Gītā*, this has been a metaphor for criticising teleology. The practical reality is that action is obligatory as a part of life, and yet, those who can reject being motivated by outcomes as the priority in ethical theory are true abandoners (XVIII: 11). Unlike those who merely choose the life of the recluse, the true renunciate has gotten rid of teleology. A new paradox ensues. Those who operate under the regulative ideal are increasingly challenged to account for their action in terms of the ideal. This means that it becomes increasingly difficult to understand oneself as deliberating and thereby choosing. In exactly the way that virtuosity moves to a level of spontaneity, so does the ethical life of devotion move away from deliberation to virtuosity. Hence: He who is free from the notion "I am the doer," and whose understanding is not tainted – slays not, though he slays all these men, nor is he bound (XVIII:17). This specific line takes Arjuna as the referent of ethical action, poised for battle. However, it generalises to ordinary cases as well, where agents operate via the propitiation of the ideal. Whether one is an excellent musician or master warrior in battle: "That agent is said to be illuminated (*sattvika*) who is free from attachment, who does not make much of himself, who is endued with steadiness and zeal and is untouched by successes and failure" (XVIII:26).

At this juncture, Krishna introduces a virtue theoretic account of duty. Duty, caste duty specifically, is duty suited to one's nature (XVIII:41). He also recalls the procedural claim: better one's own duty poorly done than another's well done (XVIII: 47). This is at odds with the virtue theoretic account because it is inexplicable how, given virtue or a natural disposition one could fail to do what is appropriate to one's nature. Many see the *Gītā* as defending and articulating a

caste morality, and it is indeed a theme that shows up in the text. Yet, philosophically the two do not cohere.

Krishna's method of reconciling the two is to seek to assign virtue theoretical considerations to the identification of duty, and distinguish this from an account of why we should attend to our duty. Krishna claims that the right thing to do is specified by context transcendent rules that take into account of life capacities and situate us within a reciprocal arrangement of obligations and support (BG III.5-13, 33-35). These are moral principles. He also further argues that good things happen when people stick to their duty (BG II.32). The argument for sticking to our duties is two fold: it includes deontology and bhakti. Yet, an undercurrent of the argument is to move away from thinking in terms of outcomes. Couldn't a strict adherence to moral principles be a kind of teleological fetish? Indeed, this is a worry. Here we find Krishna moving the argument along. Bhakti allows the individual to be subsumed by the moral ideal (XVIII: 55). However, this subsumption leads not only to renouncing outcomes to the ideal, in the final analysis, it should also lead to giving up on moral principles as a sacrifice to the ideal (XVIII:57).

In the Western tradition, going beyond duty in service of an ideal of morality is often called *supererogation*. Here, Krishna appears to be recommending the supererogatory as a means of embracing Bhakti. This leads to excellence in action that surmounts all challenges (XVIII:58). This move however treats deontology and its substance – moral rules and principles – as matters to be sacrificed for the ideal.

Having argued for Deontology and Bhakti theory as the way to understand Dharma through the entire *Gītā*, at BG XVIII.66 Krishna claims that "relinquishing all Dharma, seek Me alone for refuge. I will release you from all faults." This seems like an expression of Virtue Theory, for it claims that some state of goodness or outcome (Krishna, defined as a state that one can take refuge in) results in the right, without fault. Goodness (the refuge provided by Krishna) produces the right; however, this also appears to be a version of Moral Particularism, which rejects the role of ethical principles (dharma as Krishna previously set out) in ethical reasoning. Here when Krishna tells us to abandon all dharmas, he is not rejecting the project of ethics (right actions, and good outcomes – he is still concerned about that) but the idea that we get there by what he spoke of as "dharma" – general principles specific to one's capacities.

Krishna follows this up with the claim that this doctrine should only be adopted by the austere and one who is devoted (BG XVIII.67). Here a connection is being drawn between Bhakti and Virtue. What is it?

Being devoted to a moral ideal as a matter of practice is a principled approach to ethical choosing. This is Bhakti theory, which itself is a version of Generalism. However, the good that follows from devotion is not a deductive consequence of principles (constrained by one's capacity) but is *caused* by one's conformity to the regulative ideal. To give you an analogy, let us say a musician might be concerned about the rules of music while practicing music. However, the outcome is not a deductive outcome of practice, but is rather caused by the individual's conformity to the ideal (music). It might seem in the end that a good musician is not following rules or direction at all. This seems like Particularism applied to music. In this state of high performance, the musician should put aside the rules and take refuge in the outcome: virtuosity.

This is what makes for a good performance. Nevertheless, it comes about via a Generalist program of binding oneself to a regulative ideal.

By analogy, as one continues in the process of Bhakti Ethics, where one's behavior is regulated by one's commitment to an ideal, one starts to instantiate the very rules of morality as a good musician instantiates the rules of music. At this stage, it is rather correct to embrace the virtuous outcome as that which protects right action. However, this is only relevant to the practitioner of a discipline that aspires to the ideal. Therefore, Virtue Theory and Moral Particularism are merely how things look as we perfect ourselves, and not in any sense the right account of how to get there. They are supervenient on the more basic practice of Bhakti.

5. Conclusion

There are ways to read the *Gītā* where we ignore the various theories and the arguments present in them. However, as students of philosophy, what we want to understand is how the various theories and arguments relate to each other. This is hampered in large measure by the attempts to understand the *Gītā* in terms of moral theories that we find exclusively in the Western tradition. Bhakti is certainly not a moral theory that we find easily discussed or defended in the Western tradition. Nor is the idea of *jñāna* yoga: a metaethical discipline that yields the correct appreciation of the moral frame. However, if we take the trouble to look at what the *Gītā* has to say about these issues, we find that it provides its own complex philosophical dialectic– one which takes teleology as its object of criticism and then replaces it with procedure – and finally bhakti as the version of proceduralism that does not rely upon outcomes to define duties. Rather, the outcome is defined by the perfection of our duties, and the perfection of our duty is a matter of devotion to the regulative ideal.

Glossary

Letter	Term	Definition
B	Bhakti Yoga	Theory of ethics, where the right causes the good by way of devotion to the regulative ideal
D	Deontology	Theory of ethics, where the right is not justified by the good outcome.
G	Generalism	The idea that there are generalities about ethics that are truth independently of contexts. These generalities

		are principles.
J	*Jñāna* yoga	The *Gītā*'s metaethical practice.
P	Particularism	In ethics, it is the idea that the right is determined by the good in a context.

Questions

1. Correct Answer	**1**	Any talk of consequences entails consequentialism
	True	
Correct Answer	False	
	feedback	Consequentialism is only the idea that the right is justified by the outcome. One can talk about outcomes, and even define duties by outcomes, without being a consequentialist.

2. Correct Answer	**2**	Bhakti seems like consequentialism if we fail to appreciate that it is a causal claim about the right bringing about the good, as opposed to a justificatory claim that the right is justified by the good.
Correct Answer	True	
	False	
	feedback	

3. Correct Answer	**3**	Śaṅkara, the famous Advaita Vedānta commentator, treats *jñāna* yoga as the central theme of the *Gītā*.
Correct Answer	True	

	False	
	feedback	

4. Correct Answer	**4**	Valid arguments are those that we can converge on without having to agree on philosophical questions of truth
Correct Answer	True	
	False	
	feedback	

5. Correct Answer	**5**	Sound arguments are not the same as valid arguments.
	True	
Correct Answer	False	
	feedback	A sound argument is a valid argument with true premises.

6. Correct Answer	**6**	The *Gītā* affirms the equality of all people.
Correct Answer	True	
	False	
	feedback	So long as we reject identifying people with their character, they are all equal.

7. Correct Answer	**7**	The *Gītā* affirms that vice is a negative manifestation of the moral ideal.
Correct Answer	True	
	False	
	feedback	

8. Correct Answer	**8**	The idea that vice can be the outcome of the moral ideal is

		the moral responsibility principle.
Correct Answer	True	
	False	
	feedback	Indeed, if the moral ideal is to take responsibility, it would seem to have to take responsibility for failure too.

9. Correct Answer	**9**	Consequentilialism is the idea that moral symmetry is all that counts.
Correct Answer	True	
	False	
	feedback	

10. Correct Answer	**10**	Moral Symmetry is the idea that two differing actions have the same moral worth if they have the same outcomes.
Correct Answer	True	
	False	
	Feedback	

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