6

Moving in a World You Cannot See

From Imaginative Perception to Creative Moral Imagination

Yanni Ratajczyk

In this chapter, I discuss a particular mode of moral imagination. Last decennia, philosophers have identified several ways in which imagination fulfills certain roles in moral reasoning. This ranges from imagination as a crucial part of our moral perception, as a tool to test possible scenarios or revise dominant moral understandings, or as what makes empathy possible.[1] This chapter focuses on one specific role, namely imagination's function in the personal re-envisioning of moral situations, and on the way this function was conceptualized by Iris Murdoch's, Cora Diamond's, and Martha Nussbaum's notion of *moral imagination as imaginative perception*.[2] These authors investigated how imagination gives rise to an attentive vision that we need in order to grasp the particularity of other persons and moral situations.

After a discussion of their ideas, I address the examples and images they use to explain this mode of moral imagination. I argue that these images are dubious: while they should illustrate imaginative perception, they can be read as examples of *moral creativity*, a practice that is driven by imagination but crucially consists of concrete (patterns of) action in response to moral situations. Creativity, I will argue, fulfills its own moral role that cannot be reduced to imaginative perception. Such moral perception, however imaginative it may be, may not lead us to moral actions. Very often, there is a gap between what we see and what we do on a moral level: encountering someone in need does not tell us how to help this person. Seeing a fight happening between two other friends does not reveal how to solve it.

I conclude by emphasizing the value of Murdoch's, Nussbaum's, and Diamond's contributions to moral philosophy: directing one's attentive vision to

a person or situation is indeed a morally important effort. The fact that creativity fulfills another moral role than imaginative perception does not mean that the latter cannot be valuable for the creative process. On the contrary, it might offer a fertile starting point for moral action.

Imaginative Perception

Let's start with an example. It is the summer of 2021. A group of friends booked a cabin at the seaside. On the first evening, the after-dinner discussion hits Covid-19: it turns out that Sam and Robert rejected vaccination. The discussion flares up: there is a lot of disbelief, accusations are being made, and the evening ends abruptly. The next morning, the group finds a table full of breakfast with one friend at the head who speaks up: "Let's settle this, if we are all willing to do the good thing, we can continue our weekend as if yesterday did not happen."

There is something morally wrong or at least morally insufficient about this "solution." The chances are high it would be regarded simplistic and empty by the others. It presupposes that all of them would immediately identify the one good thing to do, as if it would be the logical outcome of a formula that they just should be willing to follow. However, this is highly improbable. This situation is not a mathematical puzzle but an intricate case about friendship, mutual trust, and responsibility that requires more effort than "having a good will."

Murdoch would look suspiciously at this story as well. She warned against the image of morality as shopping solutions: "I objectively estimate the features of the goods, and I choose" (2001a, 8). Murdoch, evenly known as a novelist and a philosopher, opposed analytical and existential philosophies of her time, which she accused of concentrating too much on overt, will-driven action as the crux of morality but thereby neglecting inner moral contemplation. According to Murdoch, this type of moral psychology degrades morality to publicly observable acts or at least to instrumental thought directed at action, as a "matter of thinking clearly and the proceeding to outward dealings with other men" (Ibid.: 8). It posits our mental world as "inevitably parasitic upon the outer world" (Ibid.: 5).

In contrast, Murdoch thinks morality essentially centers around the contemplative activity of outward-reaching *attention* to the world surrounding us. Murdoch borrowed the concept of attention (and its utmost moral relevance) from Simone Weil, who explained attention as a fundamental inner orientation toward others (and ultimately to God).[3] Weil describes attention as an unselfing

attitude where "(t)he soul empties itself of all its own contents in order to receive into itself the being it is looking at, just as he is, in all his truth." (1992, 115). It is in this spirit Murdoch defines it as a central moral task "to come to see the world as it is" (2001c, 89).[4] A task we can fulfill, in her words, by shifting away from the "fat relentless ego" (2001b, 51) and redirecting our attention toward the reality and individuality of others. Instead of looking at the other from an ego-centered perspective, with its self-absorbed phantasies, and prejudices, we must pay selfless attention to the individuality of the other *as* the other. Murdoch's famous example of such shifting attention shows a mother-in-law who revises her vision of her daughter-in-law:

> A mother, whom I shall call M, feels hostility to her daughter-in-law, whom I shall call D. M finds D quite a good-hearted girl but while not exactly common yet certainly unpolished and lacking in dignity and refinement. D is inclined to be pert and familiar, insufficiently ceremonious, brusque, sometimes positively rude, always tiresome juvenile. M does not like D's accent, or the way D dresses. M feels that her son has married beneath him.

However, Murdoch remarks how M "is an intelligent and well-intentioned person, capable of self-criticism, capable of giving careful and just *attention* to an object which confronts her." Therefore, M later confronts herself with her inadequate vision:

> "I am old-fashioned, and conventional. I may be prejudiced and narrow-minded, I may be snobbish. I am certainly jealous. Let me look again." Here I assume that M observes D or at least reflects deliberately about D, until gradually her vision of D alters. (. . .) D is discovered to be not vulgar but refreshingly simple, not undignified but spontaneous, not noisy but gay, not tiresomely juvenile but delightfully youthful, and so on. (2001a, 17–18)

Murdoch argues that M's changing vision of D reveals an important *moral activity*: "she has been *doing* something, something which we approve of, something which is somehow worth doing in itself. M has been morally active in the interim" (Ibid.: 19). Murdoch grasps this activity, her careful attention, in terms of perception. What M displays is a different way of seeing: a seeing that goes beyond one's preconceptions and short-sightedness (D is not vulgar, but simple, she is not tiresomely juvenile but delightfully youthful, she is more than she seems to be; more than a daughter-in-law married to her son, etc.).

According to Murdoch, imagination is crucial to changing one's vision. It makes visible what was not before and so grounds moral will and choice: "I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of 'see' which implies that clear

vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort" (Ibid.: 36). Imagination is the vehicle by which attention turns egocentric or limited perspectives into clearer vision. In *The Darkness of Practical Reason*, where Murdoch wrote more extensively on the nature of imagination, which she characterized as "a type of reflection on people, events, etc., which builds detail, adds colour, conjures up possibilities in ways which go beyond what could be said to be strictly factual" (48).[5,6]

Murdoch's particular way of conceptualizing moral imagination, as a capacity to look beyond what is directly and easy-for-us observable, is elaborated by Martha Nussbaum in her 1985 article on the comparison between artistic and moral imagination. Nussbaum defends how moral imagination surpasses the dry facts and entails more than just acquiring more factual *details* about the situation but gives rise to rich, colorful, and sensitive images and descriptions of others which makes us understand them and their particularity better. She uses an example of Henry James' *The Golden Bowl*, where father and daughter Adam and Maggie Verver find themselves in a new phase of their relationship as Maggie is planning to leave the parental house for her husband. Adam, Nussbaum recounts, could only approve of his daughter leaving him by seeing her as an autonomous grown woman instead of something fragile and precious he should protect. After having an image of her as "a slight sim draped 'antique' of Vatican or Capitoline hills," he envisions her as "a creature consciously floating and shining in a warm summer sea" (James 1966, 476 cited in Nussbaum 519). Imagining his daughter in this way, Nussbaum explains, "is, precisely, to know her, to know their situation, not to miss anything in it—to be, in short, 'a person on whom nothing is lost.'" Moral knowledge—in the sense of a realization of the particularity of a situation and other persons—Nussbaum says, "is not simply intellectual grasp of propositions; it is not even simply intellectual grasp of particular facts; it is perception. It is seeing a complex concrete reality in a highly lucid and richly responsive way; it is taking in what is there, with imagination and feeling" (521).[7]

Cora Diamond commented on Nussbaum's article, and discussed a dialogue of Plato's *Crito*, where Socrates tries to convince Crito he should not escape from prison but must await his punishment. Diamond emphasized he does not achieve this by presenting Crito a sound argument by applying moral principles to the facts of the case.[8] Instead, he convinces Crito that an escape would be wrong by personifying the laws of Athens as parents and teachers whom he would betray:

> Then the laws will say: "Consider, Socrates, if we are speaking truly that in your present attempt you are going to do us an injury. For, having brought you

> into the world, and nurtured and educated you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good which we had to give, we further proclaim to any Athenian by the liberty which we allow him, that if he does not like us when he has become of age and has seen the ways of the city, and made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him. (. . .) But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the state, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong; first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the authors of his education; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands; and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are unjust; and we do not rudely impose them, but give him the alternative of obeying or convincing us;—that is what we offer, and he does neither. (Plato 1931, 51d-e)

Just as Adam can only accept Maggie's leaving because he sees her in a novel way, Socrates helps Crito see why she should not escape. These examples show, in Diamond's words, how "(t)he possibilities are not lying about on the surface of things. Seeing the possibilities in things is a matter of a kind of transforming perception of them" (313).

Murdoch, Nussbaum, and Diamond all describe, though with their own accents, moral imagination as imaginative perception. This imaginative perception transforms our limited (egocentric, theoretic, fact-based, . . .) perspective into a fuller vision by which we see things in novel ways and discover what is morally at stake.[9] This applies to the example of the summer cabin as well. One could "objectively" describe what happened there: two adults revealed they rejected a Covid-19 vaccine. But of course, this description misses at least one important moral question involved. This situation concerns more than the question of who is "right" and who is "wrong." One crucial moral question is, instead, "How do we, being a group of friends, relate to this situation?" If this concerns a group of good friends (or persons with a fair amount of moral sensitivity), we might expect that they will direct their attention to the situation's different layers and personalities involved. Their imaginative perception will be used to morally frame the multi-interpretable situation in a particular way. What did exactly happen between Robert, Sam, and the rest of them? Is this a matter of "lying"? "Loss of trust"?, "Unawareness"?, "Ignorance"? It is the imagination that enables the friends to frame the situation in such ways; these frames do not "come" with the situation, as if they only need to be read off.[10]

However, more is needed here than framing the situation in a particular way. It is necessary to look at the realities of Robert and Sam themselves. When attention is focused on Robert and Sam, it needs to look beyond Robert and Sam as those who have displayed wrongdoing toward the others. The details of them as separate individuals who live and act in a certain way need to be envisioned. Let's assume that Sam is concerned with the "shorter than usual" testing time of the vaccines and thinks a rejection is the best way to protect one's family. Sam may have a family member with fragile health, whom he thinks he needs to protect from experimental medication. Or he may have a disease or physical disability that makes him evaluate certain things as risky. His situation might be totally different from Robert, who may be concerned with the amount of medication taken by the average adult, swears by "alternative" medicine, and finds support in questionable opinions circulating on social media. Note that there can be a thin line between imaginative perception and perspective-taking or empathy but that the first might entail more than the latter. The attentive vision of Sam and Robert might require more than that. As especially Nussbaum and Diamond showed with their examples, the friends might learn moral lessons by picturing Robert and Sam in very particular ways: Sam as a scaredy-cat or as a caring father; Robert as a hothead, or someone attracted to new, exciting dynamics. The details of this imaginative picturing do matter in their grasp of the situation.

Imaginative Perception and Moral Action

Murdoch is right when she said that it is not "silent and dark within" (2001a, 13): something happens when you use your imagination to envision the case of your friend that rejected vaccination. However, even if we (rightfully) regard imaginative perception as a mental moral activity, it possesses a passive dimension that we can hardly explain away. Things morally change (improve or get worse) because we eventually *make* them change; we "act." "Action" amounts to performed intentional, agential behavior, and must be distinguished from "activity"; yoghurt shows the activity of bacteria, but no action. Imaginative perception is not by itself already action and it is not always the case that, after employing our imaginative perception, we know what to do. Take Murdoch's example. M's new vision of her daughter-in-law may lead to an awkward period where she does not exactly know how to behave. Even if we assume (as Murdoch does) that her outward behavior toward her daughter-in-law was not

inappropriate or unrespectful, M might still wonder if (or which) change of attitude must follow from her change of perspective.[11] It looks like using your imaginative perception and acting accordingly it can be two different things: specific acts might not follow directly from moral perceptions. Nevertheless, Murdoch, Nussbaum, and Diamond do not seem to make this distinction and surprisingly illustrate their reflections on imaginative perception with examples that show (patterns of) moral *action*. Before Murdoch focuses on the case of M and D, she tells how she "was at first tempted to take a case of *ritual* for instance a religious ritual wherein the inner consent appears to be the real act" (2001a, 16). In another essay (2001b, 53–4), she clarifies that she was thinking of prayer to explain the inward moral activity. For her, the transcendent focus of attention (God) that is central to prayer compares to an ethical focus of attention to the good.

Nussbaum further discusses Maggie Verver's character and shows how, throughout the novel, she develops an imaginative perception comparable to the imaginative activity of an improvising actress:

> if Maggie sees herself as an actress improvising her role, we must remember, too, that the actress or musician who improvises well is not free to do anything at all. She must at every moment—far more than one who goes by an external script—be responsively alive and committed to the other artists, to the evolving narrative, to the laws and constraints of the genre and its history. She must, far more than one who works from a score, be actively responsible and responsive, a person who will not let the others down. (1985, 524–5)

Diamond, inspired by this example of Nussbaum, highlights the importance of *adventure* in moral life by quoting the mountaineer George Malloy:

> The sense of adventure, expressed there, is closely linked to the sense of life, to a sense of life as lived in a world of wonderful possibilities, but possibilities to be found only by creative response. The possibilities are not lying about on the surface of things. Seeing the possibilities in things is a matter of a kind of transforming perception of them. The possibilities yield themselves only as it were under pressure. There you are, let us say, at the end of a long day's climb, with your earlier "confident enjoyment" shattered by the finally impossible unyielding obstacle, knowing your spirit unwilling at last to tackle the alarming perpendicular wall. Mallory described how in such circumstances one's active sense of possibilities may flow back, not as it were first with a seeing, then a doing; it is rather a moving directly into an intensity of effort of mind and body which is an intensity of awareness, the expressive response in the face of great danger and difficulty. This response is, for Mallory, analogous to the dancer's

> response to music, involving also all of mind and body; it is analogous as well to the appreciative response to great art. Like a work of art, "(a) great mountain is always greater than we know: it has mysteries, surprises, hidden purposes; it holds always something in store for us." (Diamond 313; Mallory, quoted in Robertson 1969, 138–9, 219, 142)

The preceding examples are spelled out to illustrate the importance of imaginative perception for morality by comparing it to essential attentive, imaginative phases in other matters. But it sounds odd to talk about praying, dramatic or musical improvising, dancing, and mountain climbing in this context, as they all crucially involve patterns of action. An improvising actress does not *see* her role being played; she just does her acting. The same holds for dancing: maybe the dancer will visualize some moves before or even during his performance, but it is the body movement itself that we qualify as "dancing." And the same goes for mountaineering: even though a lot of preparation is involved (including trying to visualize the unique challenges of the surface and climate), mountaineering is essentially about conquering the heights. It is obvious that inward attention to a transcendent object is central to prayer but even so, prayer has an important overt aspect. Proper praying postures are essential in many religions (e.g., Catholics that kneel at specific times in church and Muslims that pray five times a day in different poses). Prayer and other religious rituals (e.g., baptism, marriage, burial, etc.) consist of patterns of action that are considered equally important to the mental attention involved. They may facilitate and sustain that attention but cannot be reduced to it.

The examples of Murdoch, Nussbaum, and Diamond are dubious in this sense. It is not unproblematic to illustrate the moral use of imaginative perception with examples that heavily rely on action performance. It is not that the authors ignore the importance of moral action, it is rather that they seem to think the action flows directly from imaginative perception, as Murdoch suggests that "one who perceives what is real will also act rightly. If the magnetic field is right our movements within it will tend to be right" (1966, 50). However, most people will recognize a gap that regularly exists between the perception of a moral problem (however imaginative that perception may be) and a proper response to that problem. The friends in the cabin might have attentively envisioned the situation, but that does not tell them what to do with the rest of the weekend, how they must interact, or how they should reorganize their planning for the coming weeks. I suggest that those actions, just as the actions of the improvising actress or mountaineer, are to be understood as part of a moral practice that relies on but cannot be reduced to imaginative perception: moral creativity.

Moral Creativity

In aesthetics, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science, creativity is a growing research topic.[12] Two interesting observations of the field that are relevant here are that, first, imagination is an enabling condition of creativity (see Audi 2018; Carruthers 2002; Gaut 2003, 2010, 2014; Stokes 2014, 2016) and that, second, creativity requires action (Gaut 2014; 2018, Mulgan). Most philosophers and psychologists maintain that something is considered creative when it brings novelty and possesses value. One argument that can be traced back to Kant holds that imagination is the cognitive capacity especially suited for these new and valuable realizations since it is not limited by truth or fixed concepts and ideas. Kant stated how "in an aesthetic respect (. . .), the imagination is free to provide, beyond that concord with the concept, unsought extensive undeveloped material for the understanding" ([] 2001, 194).[13] Imagination is in that sense more "free" than other cognitive capacities and fulfills, in Stokes' words, the necessary "cognitive manipulation role that enables creativity" (2014, 162–3).

Although imagination's playfulness seems crucial in the creation of novel ideas, some authors have emphasized how creative thoughts and ideas eventually require realization in one way or another. Gaut explained how "being creative" is a success-term: "one must have actually done something creative in order to qualify and not merely have the ability to do something. In this it is like traits such as kindness, niceness, reliability and so on" (2014, 188–99). I think this observation must not be underestimated; creativity requires a certain amount of exercise or realization. On the question of whether creativity can take place in the mind alone, Audi (2018, 36) suggests that "(t)he answer is clearly yes: Shakespeare would have been no less creative if he had 'written' all his works mentally and never penned or communicated them." However, I think this is an incorrect conception of creativity. We (still) value the creativity of Shakespeare and Cervantes exactly because they enriched our culture with *written* and *performed* books and plays. And even more, the creative process does not consist in the mere application of novel ideas to reality but seems to unfold during its realization. Consider painting. It is doubtful that Kandinsky, whose paintings are generally judged as highly creative, did have a total mental picture of his monumental *Composition VII* before painting. On the contrary, the eventual canvas was the result of over thirty preceding drawings, watercolors, and oil studies (Dabrowski 1995, 40): an essential part of the creative process lies in the creative practice itself. That does not mean overt practice is the only locus

of creativity; creativity often starts from and builds on highly imaginative ideas. But these ideas further develop and extend during practice. The protagonist-painter of Murakami's novel *Killing Commendatore* describes this as follows:

> This time I began with a rough draft. I stood up, grabbed a stick of charcoal, and stood before the canvas. On the blank space I created the spot where the man's face would go. With no plan, without thinking, I drew in a single vertical line. A single line, the focal point from which everything else would emerge. (. . .) What was important was believing in myself. Believing in the power of the lines, in the power of the space the lines divided. I wasn't speaking, but letting the lines and spaces speak. Once the lines and spaces began conversing, then color would finally start to speak. And the flat would gradually transform into the three-dimensional. (2018, 626–8)

In art, we easily recognize that creativity at least partly unfolds in practice. Artistic creativity involves patterns of action that are not entirely reducible to the imaginative envisioning of new ideas. It partly moves "in a world it cannot see" (Murdoch 2001a, 19).[14] Still, this does not only apply to art but even so to moral situations where we try to envision people and situations as good as we can. But then, there can be this feeling of a void ("What should I do now?") that Murdoch too easily discards as existentialist *Angst*. This is the point where creativity comes into play.

Back to the summer cabin. Having used the imaginative perception to frame the situation and to picture the persons involved, the friends will need to get beyond this phase and *do* something. That is the moment where they start to be morally creative, which would be possible on many levels. Creativity might be in place to continue the conversation in another way. They could go for a walk, as this might change the harsh dynamic of the evening before. And as so many people did in countless ways during the pandemic, they will use moral creativity to adapt their activities and schedules to the changed situation. For example, they will meet differently in the future (e.g., outdoors, replacing bar nights and bungalow weekends with outdoor activities and online conversations). But their creativity might show in even smaller acts and gestures, for example, in the way they address each other concerning this sensitive topic (the tone they use, the length and intensity of the conversations, etc.) Nussbaum gave the example of a hug between Maggie and Adam; the way it is performed—"that it is hard and long, expressive of deep passion on his side, yielding acceptance of that love on hers (. . .)"—is crucial in transforming their father-daughter bond (1985, 523). The same applies to the gestures and acts of the friends; the way they talk, ask questions, or

do activities matter. And this is not primarily a matter of imaginative perception but of moral creativity, which consists of highly imaginative responses and actions.

Recognizing this difference between imaginative perception and moral creativity does not speak against the insights of Murdoch, Nussbaum, and Diamond. They offered an important contribution to moral philosophy by conceptualizing the highly morally relevant inner activity of imaginative perception. Their examples, on their turn, seem to point at the importance of practicing creativity in moral situations. However, these two different points are not mutually exclusive. Attentive moral vision made possible by imaginative perception can possibly influence creative actions. The ways in which Robert and Sam and their decisions are perceived by their friends can impact the way the group will reorganize the rest of the weekend, their future plans, and the tonality of their conversations. Moral creativity, just as aesthetic creativity, does not take place in a vacuum: it gets nurtured by our contemplations, perceptions, and surroundings. In this way, moral creativity connects our inner and outer world via inventive moral action.

References

Audi, R. (2018), "Attributing Creativity," in B. Gaut and M. Kieran (eds.), *Creativity and Philosophy*, 25–41, London and New York: Routledge.

Biss, M. (2014), "Moral Imagination, Perception and Judgment," *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 52 (1): 1–21.

Boden, M. A. (1990), *The Creative Mind: Myths andMechanisms*, London: Weidenfield and Nicholson.

Carruthers, P. (2002), "Human Creativity: Its Cognitive Basis, Its Evolution, and Its Connections with Childhood Pretence," *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 53 (2): 225–49.

Currie, G. (1995), "Visual Imagery as the Simulation of Vision," *Mind and Language*, 10 (1–2): 25–44.

Diamond, C. (1991), *The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind*, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Gaut, B. (2003), "Creativity and Imagination," in B. Gaut and P. Livingston (eds.), *The Creation of Art: New Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics*, 148–173, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gaut, B. (2010), "The Philosophy of Creativity," *Philosophy Compass*, 5 (12): 1034–46.

Gaut, B. (2014), "Mixed Motivations: Creativity as a Virtue," *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement*, 75: 183–202.

Gaut, B. (2018), "The Value of Creativity," in B. Gaut and M. Kieran (eds.), *Creativity and Philosophy*, 127–44, London and New York: Routledge.
Gaut, B. and M. Kieran, eds. (2018), *Creativity and Philosophy*, New York: Routledge.
Husserl, E. (2005), *Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898–1925)*, trans. J. Brough, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
James, H. ([1904] 1966), *The Golden Bowl*, New York: Penguin.
Johnson, M. (1993), *Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Kind, A. and P. Kung, eds. (2016), *Knowledge Through Imagination*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mulgan, T. (2018), "Moral Imaginativeness, Moral Creativity and Possible Futures," in B. Gaut and M. Kieran (eds.), *Creativity and Philosophy*, 350–68, New York: Routledge.
Murakami, H. (2018), *Killing Commendatore*, trans. P. Gabriel and T. Goossen, New York: Knopf.
Murdoch, I. (1966, July 27), "The Darkness of Practical Reason," *Encounter*: 46–50.
Murdoch, I. ([1970] 2001a), "The Idea of Perfection," in I. Murdoch (ed.), *The Sovereignty of Good*, 1–44, New York: Routledge.
Murdoch, I. ([1970] 2001b), "On 'God' and 'Good'," in I. Murdoch (ed.), *The Sovereignty of Good*, New York: Routledge.
Murdoch, I. ([1970] 2001c), "The Sovereignty of Good of Other Concepts," in I. Murdoch (ed.), *The Sovereignty of Good*, New York: Routledge.
Murdoch, I. (1992), *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals*, London: Random House.
Nanay, B. (2010), "Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery," *Philosophical Studies*, 150 (2): 239–54.
Nussbaum, M. (1985), "Finely Aware and Richly Responsible: Moral Attention and the Moral Task of Literature," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 82 (10): 516–29.
Paul, E. S. and S. B. Kaufman (2014), *The Philosophy of Creativity: New Essays*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Plato, C. (1931), *The Dialogues of Plato Vol II*, ed. and trans. B. Jowett, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Robertson, D. (1969), *George Mallory*, London: Faber.
Sartre, J. P. ([1940] 2015), *The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination*, trans. J. Webber, London: Routledge.
Stokes, D. (2011), "Minimally Creative Thought," *Metaphilosophy*, 42 (5): 658–81.
Stokes, D. (2014), "The Role of Imagination in Creativity," in E. S. Paul and S. B. Kaufman (eds.), *The Philosophy of Creativity*, 157–84, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stokes, D. (2016), "Imagination and Creativity," in A. Kind (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination*, 247–61, New York: Routledge.
Weil, S. ([1947] 2002), *Gravity and Grace*, trans. E. Crawford and M. von der Ruhr, London and New York: Routledge Classics.
Weil, S. ([1950] 1992), *Waiting for God*, trans. E. Crawford, New York: Harper Perennial.

AQ: Please provide volume for reference Murdoch, 1966.