

Ambivalence, Emotional Perceptions, and the Concern with Objectivity

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Abstract: Emotional perceptions are objectivist (objectivity-directed or cognitive) and conscious, both attributes suggesting they cannot be ambivalent. Yet perceptions, including emotional perceptions of value, allow for strictly objectivist ambivalence in which a person unitarily perceives the object in mutually undermining ways. Emotional perceptions became an explicandum of emotion for philosophers who are sensitive to the unique conscious character of emotion, impressed by the objectivist character of perceptions, and believe that the perceptual account solves a worry about the possibility of a conflict between an emotion and a judgement. Back into the 1980s Greenspan has argued that emotional ambivalence is possible, her reasons implying that objectivist accounts of emotion are inconsistent with ambivalence. Tappolet has more recently replied that perceptual accounts allow for emotional ambivalence since the opposed values seen in ambivalence are good or bad in different senses. The present paper identifies strict objectivist ambivalence between judgements and between emotional perceptions by contrasting them with such ambivalence of separate values such as evoked by Tappolet.

Keywords: cognitivism, internal conflict, judgements, non-cognitivism, perception, perceptual account of emotion, value.

1. Introduction

Let us say that a person, *S*, is ambivalent if she maintains two opposed attitudes towards *A* (*A* can be a person, a thing, an action and so forth).¹ Ambivalence, also referred to as ‘internal conflict,’ ‘mixed feelings,’ etc., is an ordinary and frequent phenomenon, and yet it has a bad reputation in philosophical quarters. It seems as if definitions such as the above depict the notion of ambivalence as incoherent. Ambivalence appears even more problematic, however, when it is about truth or value, for here the attitudes appear to be accepting opposed objective states of affairs – and what would that mean? This worry informs for example various accounts of ethics: the possibility that a person *ambivalently* judges her *A*-ing

¹ The poles must be opposed in a sense that implies that in holding any of them, *S* holds it as opposed to the other pole. We shall come back to this. The definition above is partial, and in particular ambivalence can (complementarily) be seen as a single tension-fraught attitude. See Razinsky 2016.

bad and good, or that she ambivalently judges her action bad and judges that it is not bad, is hardly ever permitted.²

In an influential paper, Greenspan (1980) has argued that emotional ambivalence is possible and rational. Her main strategy is to distinguish emotions from judgements: in holding an emotion, we take it to be appropriate, somewhat similarly to how a judgement is taken as true and as justified. Yet, Greenspan says, appropriateness has a very different logic from that of truth and justification and in particular it does not follow from the fact that an emotion is appropriate that the opposed emotion is inappropriate. This could never be the case – her contrast with judgements makes clear – were emotions the kind of attitudes that are concerned with how their object is. When a person is happy that her friend has won a competition, for example, her happiness is appropriate, but this is not a way to say that the emotion is justified in taking the friend's winning to be such and such, e.g., good. Emotions do not take things to be such and such, on Greenspan's account, and hence emotional ambivalence does not face the problems of accepting two contradictory truths.

What, then, if emotions are about objectivity? In asking this question, Tappolet's main concern is with perceptual accounts of emotion (2005). Does it follow from the phenomenon of emotional ambivalence that emotions cannot constitute perceptions? In perceptual accounts, to have an emotion is to perceive a value – for example, to fear or be enthusiastic as regards a journey would be to 'see' that the journey is dangerous or that it is attractive.³ Let us name such accounts, as well as those that analyse emotions in terms of judgements, *objectivist*: emotions are here understood as objectivity-directed or cognitive.⁴ Accordingly, objectivist accounts appear to make ambivalence impossible. Even if a person can somehow judge or perceive both ways, it appears that her attitudes must be unrelated for her as in cases of inadvertent self-contradiction, and, thus, that she must not be ambivalent between her attitudes. One way or the other, an objectivist account of emotion, and in particular a perceptual account, would appear to bar out emotional ambivalence. For as 'perceptions,' the opposed emotions involved in ambivalence would be explicated in terms of the person 'seeing' contradictory things. Tappolet takes the possibility of the perception of contradictory things as itself self-contradictory, but argues that

² Such ambivalence is permitted by Carr (2009), Foot (1983), Kristjánsson (2010), Nussbaum (1985), Rorty, (2010), Smilansky (2007), Stocker (1990, Ch. 4), Wong (2006), and Zimmerman (1993).

³ Perceptual accounts of emotion are proposed by Johnston 2001, de Sousa 2002, Döring 2003, and Prinz 2004. Wedgwood (2001, Part II) proposes an objectivist account of emotions. Nussbaum (1990) understands value perception as bound up and partly constitutive of emotions.

⁴ I prefer the term 'objectivist' because the term 'cognitive' has been connoted with modelling value judgements on factual judgements.

In taking judgements to be objectivist I make a discursive or logical point, rather than supposing some extra-discursive realm of objectivity or truth.

this is not how emotional ambivalence should be interpreted on the perceptual account. Rather, she explains, the opposed values seen in ambivalence are good or bad in different senses.

Tappolet's solution echoes the account for ambivalence of value judgement that is given by the few studies that recognize ambivalence of value judgement and think of the opposed judgements in objectivist terms.⁵ Thus, Zimmerman (1993) makes a 'plea for ambivalence' in virtue of the separate scales constituted by different values, while Foot (1983, section II) allows for ambivalence between opposed judgements since they apply alien values. Similar accounts are proposed by Nussbaum, Stocker (Chs. 6 and 8) and more recently Carr and Kristjánsson.⁶

This paper follows Greenspan and Tappolet in acknowledging emotional ambivalence. I do not accept a completely objectivist account of emotion and one reason for this is presented in section 5. However, I agree that emotions can have perceptual and judgemental dimensions, and in particular this paper establishes that ambivalence between emotional perceptions is possible. Furthermore, perceptual accounts enable us to understand important forms and aspects of emotional ambivalence. This is not, however, because, as Tappolet claims, ambivalence between objectivist attitudes does not have to be understood in a way that would make it impossible or irrational. Rather, objectivity-aiming does not imply the impossibility and irrationality of ambivalence between objectivist attitudes, while *ambivalence can be objectivist* in a strict sense. By this I mean that ambivalence can be such that (i) each of the opposed attitudes that constitute its poles is objectivist, but moreover that (ii) the opposed attitudes are opposed as regards the objectivity concerned.⁷ At the same time, though, (iii) objectivist accounts of emotions will fail if they are seen as exhaustive.

2. There Is Such a Thing as Objectivist Ambivalence: A Dissimilarity Argument

Although objectivist ambivalence seems paradoxical, such ambivalence, I shall argue, does exist. Supposing that one acknowledges ambivalence in general, it remains to show that some admissible cases of ambivalence are different from other such cases, and that they are different precisely in being objectivist. I will distinguish ambivalence from certain other phenomena, and describe the examples of both forms of ambivalence in a way that reveals their ambivalent character, but a detailed demonstration of ambivalence as such goes beyond the

⁵ So far as judgements are not conceived as objectivist, one can argue, as Williams (1973) has done that ambivalence between value judgements is possible since they are similar to desires rather than to beliefs.

⁶ Rorty (2010) proposes a view of evaluative ambivalence that does not rely on judging the object by different values.

⁷ Consider also Döring's definition of 'rational conflicts' as 'conflicts in content about how the world actually is' (Döring 2009, 241).

scope of this paper. My primary aim will be to establish objectivist ambivalence. In doing this, I shall appeal to the difference between such ambivalence and *ambivalence of separate values*, where ambivalence of separate values requires that while (i) each of the opposed attitudes that comprise the ambivalence's poles is objectivist, (ii) the attitudes at the poles are not opposed as regards the objectivity concerned.

Regardless of whether emotions are objectivist, value judgements allow both objectivist ambivalence and ambivalence of separate values. In a central form of objectivist ambivalence of value judgement, the person affirms and yet denies a single value in regard to the object of ambivalence. Thus a person can be ascribed with such ambivalence by saying that she judges (at the same time) both that A is *v* and that A is not-*v*. We should be cautious, however. The same pattern can be used to attribute ambivalence of separate values (where '*v*' takes different senses in the two poles of the ambivalence) as well as non-ambivalent judgements and non-ambivalent combinations of value judgements.⁸

Suppose Sarah ambivalently judges a certain paper as interesting and yet also judges the paper uninteresting. Before turning to the objectivist character of her ambivalence, we may stipulate that Sarah's case is one of ambivalence if and only if (i) she actually holds both judgements and (ii) each of them is held by Sarah as opposed to the other one.

The first condition requires that Sarah judges the paper interesting and judges it uninteresting, rather than merely maintains certain reasons for and against the paper's interest. That is, it is not the case that Sarah judges only that something stands for both judgements. Nor are we concerned here with what may be called first-person confusion, in which Sarah 'does not know what to think.' To ascribe such confusions, we would not so much say that Sarah holds both judgements but that she would hold a judgement that the paper is interesting were this judgement not defeated and vice versa. Finally, condition (i) implies that we are not concerned with cases in which the formulation of two judgements in fact describes one actual judgement that is harmonious with the grounds for a rejected opposed judgement. For instance, Sarah may judge that a paper is interesting in a way that accepts that it is only of moderate interest. Thus her judgement may be that the paper is quite interesting due to the author's new presentation of the theme, even though the claims themselves are not original.

⁸ Objectivist ambivalence can also refer to different values, i.e., the agent may entertain objectivist ambivalence by judging that A is *v* but also that A is *w*. What is required is that the predication of *v* undermines the predication of *w*. Another pattern for attributing non-ambivalent composite judgements, non-objectivist ambivalence, but also and importantly, some objectivist ambivalence, is "the person judges that A is *v* and yet not-*v*."

The second condition adds that ambivalence involves opposition in a sense that requires that the opposition is moored in the person's own point of view. The second condition entails, first, that the attitudes are opposed. This sub-condition fails, for example, when a person judges in a non-ambivalent way that the paper is interesting generally speaking, but is not professionally interesting. Such may be the case, for instance, if she is glad she read the paper and may recommend it to certain people, but does not intend to discuss it in her own writing and does not feel that it extends her understanding in her areas of special concern. Condition (ii) also excludes opposition from a *merely* external point of view, namely such that does not imply that the attitudes are opposed from the person's own point of view. This is not to say that (ii) requires that the opposition must be conscious or available to consciousness (in Freudian terms perhaps) and again (ii) allows that the agent is unable to assert that she has opposed attitudes, or reflect on it, or have explicit knowledge of it (though sometimes ambivalence is conscious and, in particular, is experienced in a stroke of momentary consciousness,⁹ and sometimes it is explicitly acknowledged, reflected on and asserted). The point is rather that the opposition between the attitudes is part of the intentional character of the ambivalence: one is ambivalent *between* these two attitudes. In holding one of the attitudes, one holds it as opposed to the other. And in ascribing ambivalence to a person, this interlinkage is part of what we take to be expressed in her thoughts, feelings, behaviour, further attitudes or whatever. By contrast, Sarah's attitudes are opposed from a merely external point of view, when she judges an anonymous paper she reads for a journal uninteresting, but also takes the same paper to be interesting – since the author is someone she admires – when she accidentally comes across the title without realizing that she has read the paper. In this case, Sarah's opposed judgements do not constitute ambivalence on her part.

While there are various ways for conditions (i) and (ii) to fail to fit a case, sometimes we do *ambivalently* judge that A is *v* and that A is not *v*. In the typical case, such ambivalence would be objectivist. It may as such be compared with a case in which Sarah ambivalently judges a paper as important and as tedious. Ambivalence thus described is often of the sort that comes, so to speak, after the opposed judgements. Sarah, we may assume, is settled both about the importance of the paper and its tediousness. As she sees it, neither of her conflicting judgements undermines the truth of the other: importance is one thing (so far as the case goes) and boredom another. Yet as is not unusual with such judgements, in holding them both Sarah is ambivalent towards the paper. She may, for example, hold that it is good that she has read the paper, yet have to force herself to give it a further thought, or she may be devoting a discussion essay to it, constantly yawning while she is working on it, or perhaps she is

⁹ See Razinsky 2016, Ch. 5.

looking for some 'victim' to replace her in reviewing it. However, while Sarah is ambivalent about the paper, she is not ambivalent as to its importance.

Yet in other cases, it is precisely the application of the value (or values) to the object that stands at the heart of Sarah's ambivalence. For example, she judges the paper as interesting – it has a fresh approach, etc. – and yet this judgement is undermined by a contrary one. For overall, the paper is vague (so Sarah thinks), and it is not clear what, if anything, it is about: it is not really interesting. Now, in the cases that interest us, Sarah is ambivalent, i.e., her judgement that the paper is interesting has not been destroyed by being undermined. Instead, each of her opposed attitudes is constituted as part of the particular objectivist ambivalence. Sarah sees, for example, that a vague paper makes one reflect on what the paper's claims would mean concretely and is perhaps particularly interesting for this reason. But this again does not settle things for her and we may go on suggesting how Sarah's opposed judgements further (i) undermine and shape one another and (ii) by the same token, contend on how interest should be understood in judging the interest in that paper.¹⁰ It is not that Sarah must be involved in any actual internal monologue;¹¹ however, such a possible monologue elucidates Sarah's ambivalence between two more or less incompatible objectivist attitudes. Her monologue brings forth the aspect of the opposition, according to which each judgement raises the question whether the other is right. In a typical case, this takes the form of each judgement raising the question whether the value of being interesting should be taken as it is taken in making the opposed judgement true. The way Sarah behaves and her further attitudes and thought participate in expressing the fact that *she entertains both judgements as opposed in an objectivist way*. Perhaps her mind strays every other minute and each time she tries to return to the paper. Perhaps she does not come back to it for months, but will not remove the hard copy from her desk; or she may be busy with the question raised therein, but avoid considering the paper directly, and so forth.

Though Sarah is ambivalent, her case cannot be interpreted as similar to the above case of ambivalently taking a paper to be important and yet boring. In order to be thus interpreted, Sarah's judgement that the paper is interesting

¹⁰ While (i) is crucial for objectivist ambivalence, I suggest that it is central to the logic of value that typical cases of objectivist ambivalence also obey (ii). In so far as only the first element is present, the opposed poles (separately) accept contradictory things. The second element reveals, however, that the notion of contradiction is not completely appropriate for the discussion of value judgements. When a value applies to some object, this does not exclude, but rather stands in tension with, that value not applying to the object. For a positive explication of objectivist ambivalence and its implications for the logic of value, see Razinsky 2016, Ch. 8.

¹¹ And such a monologue by itself would not necessarily express full-blown ambivalence rather than uncertainty. I show in Razinsky 2016, Ch. 8 that objectivist ambivalence and states of deliberation in which a person is uncertain which position is right are not reducible to each other.

would have to be taken as affirming another value than that denied in her opposed judgement. Tappolet presupposes this must be possible. She writes:

[I]t could well be the case that being happy that p is appropriate just if p is good in a way. But this would be perfectly compatible with the claim that unhappiness about the same p is also appropriate: something good in some way can also be bad in some other respect. (232)

We have, however, seen that it is not the case that Sarah ambivalently takes a paper to be interesting-in-one-respect and yet uninteresting-in-a-second-respect. Although we can say that the two poles of Sarah's ambivalence inflect the value of interest differently, it is impossible to identify any particular emphasis they make that would contribute to splitting the value into two. On the contrary, any emphasis as to how being interesting should be understood that is implied in one pole of Sarah's ambivalence is relevant for the opposed judgement as well, which may question the legitimacy of the emphasis made by the other judgement, and also partly admit it.

3. Objectivist Ambivalence: Implications for the Logic of Belief and the Logic of Value

The argument from dissimilarity has let us identify two different forms of ambivalence between objectivist attitudes. While ambivalence is by definition such that each of the attitudes is held as opposed to the other – connecting the person to the object in a way challenged by the other pole – when the ambivalence consists in applying two separate values to the object, the attitudes do not challenge each other in regard to their objectivist application of the values. Objectivist ambivalence, by contrast, is such ambivalence in which the judgements are opposed as claims to objectivity. The general structure of objectivist ambivalence consists in two objectivist attitudes that undermine each other. Each of them ought to be understood as a part of their concrete relation of mutual undermining.

We have identified both objectivist ambivalence and ambivalence of separate values within the range of ordinary forms of intentionality. This suggests, moreover, that ambivalence, including objectivist ambivalence, is basically rational. To briefly support this claim, let me propose that basic rationality characterizes engagements – mental attitudes, behaviour, feelings, thoughts, etc. – as connected to other engagements of the person (and open to reconnection), such that an engagement makes sense in terms of its mental interlinkages. The above explication can be seen as a reconstruction of Davidson's analysis of rationality, yet Davidson assumes that the interlinked attitudes must be harmonious or, as he calls it, 'consistent,' to lend sense to each other (e.g., Davidson 2004a, 2004b). This assumption is, however, unjustified unless ambivalent interlinkages are by definition ruled out. In particular, if they are not disallowed by definition, objectivist ambivalence as exhibited through

the dissimilarity argument is no exception to basic rationality, but is rather a mode of basically rational interlinkage between (objectivist) attitudes.¹² Furthermore, the examples in this paper indicate that objectivist ambivalence can be highly rational, and especially that to the extent that we can say of some judgements and perceptions that they are right, ambivalent judgement and perception is sometimes as right a way to judge or perceive the object as is possible.

In claiming that objectivist accounts of emotion allow for ambivalence, Tappolet rejects Greenspan's explanation of the possibility of emotional ambivalence in terms of a crucial difference between the objectivist (basic and high) rationality of judgements and the rationality of emotions. As regards the rationality of judgements, however, Greenspan and Tappolet both share (i) the received view that objectivist attitudes (given that the agent is basically rational in holding them both together) entail their conjunction; and that, accordingly, when one finds opposed values to hold for some object, one's opposed attitudes entail the perception or belief of a contradiction. Greenspan also shares with Tappolet and many others (ii) a second presupposition, according to which for value judgements (and perceptions) to be objectivist it is required that their logic is the same as that of factual truth and belief. These two assumptions invite philosophers to re-interpret cases of objectivist ambivalence either as non-ambivalent,¹³ or as irrational, or more rarely as non-objectivist ambivalence. However, given that the dissimilarity argument shows that objectivist ambivalence *is* possible (and implicitly that it is basically rational), the two assumptions must be ill-conceived. If they are, it may be less surprising that objectivist ambivalence can also be highly rational and epistemically successful.

The first assumption has to do with the way that objectivist attitudes are supposed to be related (if they are to aim at objectivity). The thought is that they are related by forming together an attitude affirming the conjunction of their contents. However, in identifying objectivist ambivalence, we see in fact that objectivist attitudes can be related, instead, by mutual undermining, such that for one attitude to be held is for the other to be doubted and vice versa. Thus, against the first assumption, objectivist ambivalence calls for rethinking the objectivist logic of belief, value judgement and perception.¹⁴

¹² I analyse basic rationality and defend the view that the opposing poles of ambivalence are connected in a basically rational manner in Razinsky 2016. Ch. 7 considers the rational character of the interlinkage between the poles of objectivist ambivalence.

¹³ Examples are innumerable, but see for instance Kant's interpretation of ambivalence in terms of grounds for opposed judgements (1999, 17-1), Mill's interpretation in terms of judgements of different values that constitute grounds for a harmonic value judgement (1968, 298), and Davidson's explication of the opposed value judgements in weakness of the will as judgements that such-and-such evidence supports each of the opposed conclusions (1980, 21-42).

¹⁴ The basically rational relation of mutual undermining allows also for ambivalence of factual belief, as well as self-deception. See Razinsky 2016, Ch. 7.

In addition to the implications for objectivist rationality, when objectivist ambivalence has to do with the character of a value, it also challenges the second assumption, which concerns the logic of the objectivity believed, judged and perceived. Although the logic of objectivity is usually supposed to involve a clear notion of contradiction, such a notion is suitable only in so far as the character of the relevant concepts – value concepts included – is *presupposed* by the objectivist attitude, i.e., in so far as the judgement (or perception) applies a pregiven concept without contributing to its character. This requirement has an important role in regard to the logic of factual belief, but it is highly misleading as a guide to the relations of evaluative attitudes and value concepts. Thus, for Sarah to judge the paper she reads interesting, is, by the same token, to judge what it would be for it to be interesting. In such cases, we find ourselves with opposed judgements such that the judged propositions may not be satisfactorily described either as contradictory or as mutually consistent.

When the opposing evaluative attitudes are undermining each other in a way that has to do with how the value concept ought to be understood in the relevant context, the two judgements (and similarly for perceptions) often also form together a unitary judgement in which the person ambivalently holds that a tension-fraught value, 'v and not v,' applies to the object. Once (i) and (ii) are not taken for granted, there is no need to deny that people often meaningfully judge (or perceive) an object in this way; and if they do so, why won't epistemic success be also as open to such judgements as to wholehearted ones? In any case, we do not take them as always wrong, except when theoretically insisting on assumptions (i) and (ii). Other than that, a piece of art for example may well *invite* us to ambivalently evaluate it as beautiful yet ugly, such that the application of beauty is questioned by the conflicting attitude and vice versa; and ambivalently regarding a particular policy or social approach as progressive-and-yet (in the same sense in which it must be progressive) non-progressive may appear as fair as possible to the character of the policy or approach.

4. Objectivist Ambivalence in Perception and Emotion

Tappolet's account of emotional ambivalence does not allow for what I have tried to show are phenomena of objectivist ambivalence. Yet similarly to ambivalence of value judgement, emotional ambivalence is also in some cases objectivist, while in some other cases it comprises ambivalence of separate values.¹⁵ The possibility of objectivist emotional ambivalence does not tell against an objectivist account of emotion. If anything, it lends support to the view that emotions are objectivity-directed: Not only is such ambivalence possible only for objectivist emotions, but objectivist ambivalence presents the objectivist character of emotions as central to them.

¹⁵ For further possibilities for emotional ambivalence, see Razinsky 2016, Ch. 3.

The existence of objectivist ambivalence also has direct bearing on the investigation of the perceptual character emotions might have, as certain aspects of perceptual accounts of emotion require or strongly propose it. Two central points in De Sousa's account in 'Emotional Truth' may be of special interest in this regard. Firstly, De Sousa emphasizes that emotions access objectivity directly rather than by accepting the truth of propositions. It follows that instances of objectivist ambivalence may not be assimilated to the harmonious consideration of the truth of two competing propositions. Any case of objectivist opposition must involve actual objectivist ambivalence. As De Sousa writes, "[D]espite the fact that standards of contrariety for emotions are, as we have seen, obscure, it is principally emotions themselves, and not propositions, which are weighed against one another in the quest for reflective equilibrium" (259).

Secondly, De Sousa compares a true emotion with an analogue rather than digital representation, contrasting emotional evaluative perception with the instantiation of pre-given determinate pairs of signifier and signified. Now, as it stands, De Sousa's comparison excludes ambivalence, as no clocks – not even analogue ones – show two times at once. At the same time, the interpretation of emotions as analogue captures the fact that objectivity that is not completely independent of attitudes (260) may disagree with the logic of ideal facts.

In a related account, Salmela writes in that "persistent and warranted emotional ambivalence is possible for an individual belonging to two or more communities of sensibility whose feeling rules contradict each other" (Salmela 2006, note 27). This note in fact regards emotional ambivalence, or at least the ambivalence it considers, as ambivalence of separate values. However, the main text (400–1, 403) suggests that communal standards are open to correction in which its values are re-appreciated, which would make ambivalence potentially objectivist.

It would be useful to reproduce the argument from dissimilarity in regard to perceptual emotions. In fact, although we cannot dwell on it here, ambivalence of perception, and in particular objectivist ambivalence, pertains also to less evaluative and emotional contexts. For example, one can be ambivalent between seeing someone as 'less than 30 years old' and as 'much older.' This is to be contrasted with seeing a Gestalt-shift picture both as an old woman and as a young woman (or as a duck and as a rabbit). Unlike the alternating perception of Gestalt shifts perceptual ambivalence as to someone's age can be held in one stroke of consciousness. There is however another and more crucial difference to note: Seeing the picture in two ways does not constitute ambivalence as to how the picture is. The fact that the combination of shapes and colours depicts a duck or an old woman is not opposed to the fact that the picture depicts a rabbit or a young woman, and perceiving there a duck would not as a rule challenge for

the perceiver her opposed perception.¹⁶ A person may, however, be ambivalent as to what she sees. This would be the case, for example, if everything about the other person – the eyes and hair, the posture and muscles – tells her he is rather young, and yet some strain is also there for her to see, impairing the young impression. She being ambivalent, this is also undermined: after all, the strain is not always present and the young looks are then beyond reproof, and even when a tint of strain is visible, you might well be merely seeing a fatigued young man...¹⁷

Peter Goldie supports perceptual accounts of emotion with the claim that they are especially suitable to accommodate conflicts between emotions and judgements (2007, 935). The visual ambivalence encountered above might help to make clear how different objectivist ambivalence between emotional perceptions is from the view underlying Goldie's claim. Goldie takes the emotion in such conflicts – for example being insulted by someone's behaviour although you judge that in truth there was nothing insulting about it – to be similar to a visual illusion. The emotion can on this view be maintained together with the judgement to the contrary, just as one can have the impression of a broken spoon in a cup of water while believing that the spoon is not broken (Goldie 2002, 74ff.). But are 'emotional conflicts' really accommodated – rather than explained away – by this analogy? The whole point of the analogy is that the person who experiences the illusion does not at all believe the appearance, and does not at all *see*, in the ordinary and objectivist sense of the word, a broken spoon. In other words, such cases are taken to be devoid any real conflictuality.¹⁸ Moreover, Goldie interprets the visual illusion analogy as consisting in the emotion and the judgement having contents of different types (Goldie 2002, 61ff.), thus adding another dimension to the absence of conflict, while according to others, such as Döring (2009), the analogy consists in holding an unbelieved-perception that not-P (a non-objectivist attitude similar in this respect to imagination) and a judgement that P. One way or the other, no room is left for ambivalence.¹⁹ In

¹⁶ Nor is subjectively seeing in the combination the figure of an old woman opposed as a rule to seeing there a young woman. Ambivalence however can be conscious also when it is not objectivity-directed. I also note that although Gestalt shift does not imply ambivalence, there are phenomena of Gestalt shift that demonstrate also perceptual ambivalence.

¹⁷ The example suggests an objectivist ambivalence that consists in the appreciation of evidence. In other cases perceptual ambivalence about age would involve ambivalence about what 'rather young' ought to mean in the relevant context.

¹⁸ As I see it, although disbelieved visual illusions can lose their epistemic character completely, such perceptions often preserve some epistemic character that undermines the disbelief, forming at least a touch of ambivalence. This does not make illusion an adequate model for any kind of ambivalence, since in as much as the perception is non-epistemic there is no conflict.

¹⁹ It should be added that Döring, like others who use the analogy with visual illusion, analyse emotions as generally objectivist. Döring also holds that emotional perceptions and judgements have different kinds of content. She is aware of the problem of the lack of

their discussions Goldie and Döring move between a famous example by Hume, a version of which would be a case of height fear being maintained despite judging that one is completely safe, and such cases as being disgusted by something judged not disgusting. It might be that in some cases, such as height fear, emotions to which an emotional perception that P would otherwise be central do not have an objectivist dimension (either because the emotional value perception has the character of an unbelieved perception, or because the emotion does not include an emotional perception). This would mean that the emotion and the 'opposed' judgement stand in harmony, or else that the ambivalence they form is not objectivist. In fact, at least some 'Humean' cases would be better described as marginal cases of objectivist ambivalence, but this is only to say that the emotion has not completely lost its objectivist dimension. In many other cases, emotions and judgements form objectivist ambivalence. These cases are easy to handle once the analysis of objectivist ambivalence of emotional perception is added to that of objectivist ambivalence of value judgement.

Moving, thus, to consider ambivalence between emotional perceptions of value, here our examples should be of emotional ambivalence, in which (i) the emotions are elucidated by describing them as (partially) comprising perceptions of value towards the object of the ambivalence; and (ii) the ambivalence constitutes in an interesting way ambivalence of value perceptions. The phrase 'in an interesting way' is added so that (ii) would not apply to any ambivalence whose poles are emotions that perceive value. What we look for, rather, is ambivalence that constitutes a perceptual conflict.

Consider, first, a case of objectivist ambivalence between emotional perceptions: Sarah may ambivalently both dislike John and like him, seeing him ambivalently as unkind and as kind. Perhaps she hardly knows John and her ambivalence consists in ambivalent perception of his eyes and face both as unkind and ugly and as kind and even beautiful. Or we may imagine another form for her ambivalence: In this version Sarah is impressed by the way John listens to people. She likes him, seeing that he cares, listening to others with full attention, but then, ambivalently, the same readiness to listen is seen by Sarah as objectifying and aloof, making her dislike John. Is it kindness that one may perceive in the way John listens, or rather the contrary? Sarah ambivalently answers both ways: her perceptions tell against each other.

Now compare Sarah's objectivist emotional ambivalence towards John with such emotional ambivalence of separate values as she may feel towards Jack. Sarah likes Jack, seeing kindness in him, but, at the same time, she dislikes him, perceiving that he is egocentric. It may be the case that these judgements do not undermine one another for Sarah. As she may express it, some people just

opposition between an unbelieved perception and a judgement, but attempts to solve it. Salmela (2006) (referring to an earlier work) also criticizes this aspect of Döring's solution.

are both kind and egocentric. Yet even if kindness and egocentrism can comfortably both be true of Jack, Sarah's perception of the one value in Jack stands in conflict with her perception in him of the other value.

We may thus conclude that objectivist ambivalence of perceptions, value perceptions, and emotions all do exist, and that they are clearly dissimilar from ambivalence of separate values.

We can conclude this part of the discussion by considering a way that the character of objectivist ambivalence ought to change perceptual accounts of emotion. Mark Johnston argues that we affectively perceive in things fully determinate sensuous values, and that such affective perception constitutes a central aspect of our life. As affects can 'disclose an enormous variety of demanding goods,' practical ambivalence may be expected, though Johnston's point is that evaluative beliefs serve to limit it (Johnston 2001, 213-4). In any case, forms of objectivist ambivalence show more than that some ambivalence is possible, namely they show that the affects can conflict as to whether a certain good applies.²⁰ Indeed, such conflicts typically involve ambivalence about the character the value should take. Johnston discusses the example of a person who sees the sweetness of his kissing partner. Now, there are occasions in which one ambivalently both sees sweetness and also sees it lacking in one's partner. Moreover, one would then be ambivalent not as to whether one's partner's conduct testifies to sweetness, but rather whether this conduct should count as sweet. This, however, entails that the values sensed cannot be understood as fully determinate. Here Johnston might reply that the kissing partner is seen as sweet-in-a-particular-way, but not in another. Such a reply would however simply ignore the dissimilarity of ambivalence regarding sweetness from ambivalence of separate values. I shall not elaborate this point further, but let me emphasize what is at stake: it is not only that the value applied and denied in such objectivist ambivalence is not univocally determinate, but it may further be argued that sensed values are never determinate since they could be involved in such ambivalence.

5. Ambivalence of Separate Values and Objectivist Attitudes

Let us again abstract from perceptual ambivalence to objectivist ambivalence. We have seen that the phenomenon of ambivalence of separate values cannot serve to explain how an objectivist account of emotions is compatible with the phenomenon of ambivalence. Even though some ambivalence is of separate values, Tappolet's solution must be rejected, for a clearly dissimilar phenomenon of objectivist ambivalence must also be acknowledged. The existence of

²⁰ Johnston's account of possible conflicts between an evaluative belief and an affect seems to vacillate between two interpretations. On the one hand, such conflicts are explicated in terms of opposed desires, and, on the other, they are understood as objectivist conflicts of a judgemental (rather than perceptual) sort, which are based on evidential confusion.

ambivalence of separate values is thus a side issue in relation to the fact that the logic of objectivist attitudes allows for ambivalence that is concerned with the application of a single value to its object. However, the argument from dissimilarity has shown that ambivalence of separate values is part of our lives. And here a surprising difficulty arises, namely that a purely objectivist account of the attitude in question makes such ambivalence impossible. Let me explain.

How does Tappolet describe her solution? She considers two kinds of emotional ambivalence (or two kinds of attribution of emotional ambivalence). In the one case the emotions are described in terms of different value predicates, while in the other case the same predicate is applied in one emotional perception and denied in the opposed emotional perception. As regards the first pattern she asks, "Does this pattern of ambivalent emotions make for a contradiction?" and answers, "It does not, for your emotions key you in to two compatible aspects of what you are about to do: its danger and its attractiveness" (230-1). To this, in a passage already quoted, she then adds the second pattern, according to which "something good in some way can also be bad in some other respect" (232). The problem is, however, that once the oppositions are explained in these two ways, it is not clear why such pairs of emotions form ambivalence. The first pattern may perhaps be transformed into the second pattern: to be attractive makes the journey good and to be frightening makes it bad or not good. How are we, however, to understand this second pattern? It might be that the ambivalence is in fact objectivist: Although to some extent the journey is seen as good in one respect and as bad in another, it is also part of the first perception that the attractiveness constitutes goodness in the relevant context and that the absence of fearfulness does not, while the opposite is true of the opposed perception. In such a case the person views the journey as good and as bad, and any of these poles undermines the other. Objectivist ambivalence can take this form, but we know that ambivalence of separate values is possible, so we cannot generally explicate the second pattern in this way.

We are hence brought back to square one: we learn that ambivalently seeing the object both as good and as bad is seeing it as good in one respect, e.g., as attractive, and as bad in another, e.g., dangerous. But under this explication, where is the ambivalence? We merely see two compatible values in the same object, and this is surely not enough to make us ambivalent.²¹ We are not

²¹ More specifically this argument concerns ambivalence of consistent separate value concepts, but the notion of ambivalence of separate values can also refer to alien value concepts. I suggest that values are alien when one value is incomprehensible if considered from a perspective that endorses the other value (the same values may be alien in certain contexts and not in others). *Mutatis mutandis*, cases of completely alien values limit the objectivist account in the same way as cases of consistent separate values. However, it is fundamental to values that they tend to lose their alien relations when the thinking of them together becomes relevant, and especially when a person is ambivalent towards something in applying to it two values.

ambivalent when we see that John is kind and intelligent, and we do not have to be ambivalent when we see that he is kind and not very intelligent. Ambivalence is not involved in seeing that the journey one has taken has been both difficult and dangerous, and it can be absent from one's seeing both that the journey was too difficult and that it provided inspiring sights.

However, seeing a journey as difficult yet inspiring, or a person as kind and yet not intelligent, may indeed comprise ambivalence, and in particular emotional ambivalence. Moreover, sometimes the ambivalence described in such terms will not be objectivist and the opposed attitudes will not be opposed as to where the objectivity lies. However, if such ambivalence is not objectivity-oriented, it must be oriented elsewhere, and this strongly suggests that perceptions, judgements, and emotions are not exhausted by their objectivist character. Thus, it is easy to think of cases of looking back ambivalently at the journey, being happy and yet unhappy that we took it, even if the ambivalence is not objectivist and we are not ambivalent as to whether the journey was difficult, or inspiring, or of any more fundamental value. In ambivalently seeing the journey both as inspiring and as too difficult, we are ambivalent between opposed ways of living with it. Our actual course expresses this ambivalence: recommendations given but with a certain reserve, joy at looking at the photos taken, shrinking from the idea of repeating the journey yet showing some envy at those who are setting out to go there, etc.

Thus, the phenomenon of ambivalence of separate values leads us away from objectivist accounts of emotions to the non-objectivist dimensions of objectivist attitudes. If ambivalence between emotions does not have to be objectivist, then the poles are opposed from another perspective than that of having opposing claims to objectivity. They, thus, must have non-objectivist aspects, even if, like the poles of ambivalence of separate values, they also comprise objectivist attitudes. Moreover, the non-objectivist dimension of the poles of emotional ambivalence of separate values is carried over to perceptual emotions in general, as there is hardly anything about ambivalence that would suggest that objectivist attitudes acquire a non-objectivist dimension under ambivalence while being purely objectivist when they are not part of ambivalence.

Finally, let us note that nothing prevents us from applying the argument from ambivalence of separate values to value judgements as well. Ambivalence of separate values between judging John kind and judging him egocentric strongly suggests that the judgement that John is kind is opposed to the judgement that he is egocentric in the sense that these judgements involve the ambivalent agent with John in opposed ways. For instance, the agent likes John in an abstract way, but responds reluctantly when John approaches him. He will never speak ill of John, but will in some cases warn people about him – for which, however, he may feel regret. And here again, if such ambivalence constitutes opposition that centres on a non-objectivist dimension of the person's two

judgements, then we have to admit such a dimension for value judgements generally. Not only does a purely objectivist account leave us unable to account for an ambivalence which is not objectivist, but, furthermore, value judgements and perceptions must involve a dimension that is more like that of emotions and desires.

6. Conclusion

Objectivist attitudes, such as beliefs, judgements, and perceptions, appear to exclude the possibility of ambivalence; hence, the existence of emotional ambivalence appears to threaten the perceptual account of emotion. Tappolet has argued that this threat is overstated since the emotions that stand in conflict may perceive separate values. An argument from dissimilarity, however, demonstrates the existence of an ordinary phenomenon of objectivist ambivalence both between judgements and between emotional perceptions. In such cases, a person both applies and denies the same value to the same object, being ambivalent as to where the objectivity lies. Rather than frustrating objectivist accounts of judgement and emotion, objectivist ambivalence supports and characterizes them. At the same time, the fact that it is also possible to maintain ambivalence of separate values shows that such accounts cannot be exhaustive.²²

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