ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF THE ASSERTORIC SYLLOGISM

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Abstract. Although the theory of the assertoric syllogism was Aristotle’s great invention, one which dominated logical theory for the succeeding two millennia, accounts of the syllogism evolved and changed over that time. Indeed, in the twentieth century, doctrines were attributed to Aristotle which lost sight of what Aristotle intended. One of these mistaken doctrines was the very form of the syllogism: that a syllogism consists of three propositions containing three terms arranged in four figures. Yet another was that a syllogism is a conditional proposition deduced from a set of axioms. There is even unclarity about what the basis of syllogistic validity consists in. Returning to Aristotle’s text, and reading it in the light of commentary from late antiquity and the middle ages, we find a coherent and precise theory which shows all these claims to be based on a misunderstanding and misreading.

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1. What is a Syllogism?

Aristotle’s theory of the assertoric, or categorical, syllogism dominated much of logical theory for the succeeding two millennia. But as logical theory developed, its connection with Aristotle became more tenuous, and doctrines and intentions were attributed to him which are not true to what he actually wrote. Looking at the text of the Analytics, we find a much more coherent theory than some more recent accounts would suggest.1

Robin Smith (2017, §3.2) rightly observes that the prevailing view of the syllogism in modern logic is of three subject-predicate propositions, namely, two premises and a conclusion, whether or not the conclusion follows from the premises. Such a view is found in, e.g., Quine (1962, p. 73). Łukasiewicz (1951, p. 2) claimed that a syllogism is really a single conditional proposition with a conjunctive antecedent, and similarly, either logically true or not. Corcoran (1974, p. 92) argued that for Aristotle a syllogism is “a deductive argument (premises, conclusion, plus a chain of reasoning).” In contrast to these rather different modern views, John Buridan, writing in the fourteenth century, declared:2

“It seems to me that Aristotle takes a syllogism not to be composed of premises and conclusion, but composed only of premises from which a conclusion can be inferred; so he postulated one power of a syllogism [to be] that from the same syllogism many things can be concluded.” (Buridan, 2015, III i 4, p. 123)

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1At least Stebbing (1930, p. 81)—apparently the source of the account of the syllogism in Lemmon (1965)—admitted that her account departed from Aristotle’s.

2In fact, as Hubien (1975, p. 274) observed, Buridan recognized that his own account of the syllogism was different from Aristotle’s.
He referred, in particular, to Aristotle’s remark at the start of the second book of the *Prior Analytics* (II 1), where he says:

“Some syllogisms . . . give more than one conclusion.” (53a4-6)

Aristotle’s own description of the syllogism is at the start of the first book (I 1):

“A syllogism is an argument (*λόγος*) in which, certain things being posited, something other than what was laid down results by necessity because these things are so.” (24b19-20)

But Striker’s translation here of *λόγος* is contentious and prejudicial. Other translations render it as ‘discourse’ (Tredennick in Aristotle, 1938) or ‘form of words’ (Jenkinson in Aristotle, 1928) and (Smith in Aristotle, 1989). In his translation of the *Prior Analytics* (Aristotle, 1962), Boethius rendered it in Latin as ‘*oratio*’, a genus covering anything from a word to a paragraph, or even a whole speech. Moreover, in his commentary on Aristotle’s *Topics*, Boethius made further distinctions, drawn apparently from Cicero’s *Topics*:

“An argument is a reason (*ratio*) producing belief regarding a matter [that is] in doubt. Argument and argumentation are not the same, however, for the sense (*vis sententiae*) and the reason enclosed in discourse (*oratio*) when something [that was] uncertain is demonstrated is called the argument; but the expression (*elocutio*) of the argument is called the argumentation. So the argument is the strength (*virtus*), mental content (*mens*), and sense of argumentation; argumentation, on the other hand, is the unfolding of the argument by means of discourse (*oratio*).” (*De Topicis Differentiis*: Boethius, 1978, p. 30)

He repeats the last clause in Book II, and continues:

“There are two kinds of argumentation; one is called syllogism, the other induction. Syllogism is discourse in which, when certain things have been laid down and agreed to, something other than the things agreed to must result by means of the things agreed to.” (Boethius, 1978, p. 43)

As one can see, Boethius’ definition of the syllogism repeats (with the addition of ‘agreed to’) Aristotle’s description in the *Prior Analytics*, which itself repeated his earlier account in the *Topics* (100a25-27).

Smiley (1973, p. 138) invoked the “Frege point” to argue that Corcoran’s interpretation will not work. For in different arguments (that is, argumentations as chains of reasoning), one and the same proposition may have a different force, as assumption or assertion or question, but the same syllogism is in play. Smith, in the ‘Introduction’ to his edition of the *Prior Analytics* (Aristotle, 1989, pp. xv-xvi) argued that what Aristotle says at 24b19-20, repeating the same formula from the *Topics*, is not so much a description of the syllogism as he will come to develop it in the *Prior Analytics* but of deduction or valid argument in general. For Aristotle later tries to show that every deduction can be reduced to a succession of syllogisms. The most we can say is that a syllogism for Aristotle must, as Buridan realised,

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3Translations from *Prior Analytics* I are those by Gisela Striker in Aristotle (2009) unless otherwise stated. Those from *Prior Analytics* II are by Hugh Tredennick in Aristotle (1938).
include a set of premises from which one or more conclusions can be shown to follow validly. This is the interpretation given by Al-Farabi:

“A syllogism is, at a minimum, composed of two premises sharing one common part.”

So what Aristotle is ultimately interested in is which pairs of assertoric, subject-predicate propositions are productive, that is, yield conclusions of the same sort. That is compatible with his including in that quest an examination of the argumentation by which those conclusions are produced, with investigating which triples, quadruples of propositions, and so on, are productive, and conversely, with discovering what premises will substantiate a given conclusion.

This explains how, if one does include the conclusion, the resulting “syllogism” is by definition valid, since the conclusion “results by necessity” from the premises. A demonstrative syllogism is then a productive set of premises each of which is in fact true, while a dialectical syllogism is such a set not necessarily satisfying this restriction. In the simplest case, a syllogism is a pair of premises from which a syllogistic conclusion can be inferred. More generally, a simple or compound syllogism is a set of two or more premises yielding a distinct syllogistic conclusion pairwise, that is, by taking the premises in pairs to yield intermediate conclusions which can be paired with further members of the set.

But Corcoran was right to emphasize the deductive character of syllogistic reasoning. Recognising that, first, a (simple) syllogism consists simply of a pair of premises, secondly, that the premises constitute a syllogism just when a suitable conclusion can be deduced from them (as assumptions) avoids the unnecessary dispute we find in, e.g., Łukasiewicz (1963, ¶4) and (1951, ¶8) and Kneale and Kneale (1962, pp. 80-1) as to whether a syllogism is a conditional proposition or an inference. It is neither. But of course, if the premises do constitute a syllogism, then there is an associated valid inference and it can be expressed in a conditional with a conjunctive antecedent. So a syllogism, or at least the associated inference, is, by its very definition, valid, contrary to the modern view cited above from (Quine, 1962, p. 74).

Nonetheless, this still leaves important questions open. One of them concerns existential import. I’ve argued elsewhere (Read, 2015) that there is a coherent account of syllogistic propositions which satisfies all the relationships in the traditional square of opposition and at the same time allows the inclusion of empty and universal terms; moreover, that this was Aristotle’s intention. On this interpretation, affirmative propositions are false if their subject is empty; the corresponding negative propositions are accordingly true on that same condition. Existence goes with quality, not with quantity. This interpretation becomes more plausible when particular negative propositions are expressed, following Aristotle’s own form of words, as ‘Not all $S$ are $P$’, or better, ‘$P$ does not belong to all $S$’ (equivalently, ‘$P$ does not belong to some $S$’), rather than ‘Some $S$ is not $P$’.

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5See Topics 100b25-31.
6See also Duerlinger (1968, pp. 488-90) and Thom (1981, §2).
7See also Smiley (1973, p. 139).
2. Sylogistic Validity

Once we are clear about what constitutes a syllogism and the truth-conditions of syllogistic propositions, we can start to consider the basis of validity in Aristotle’s theory. The core theory of the assertoric syllogism is contained in Prior Analytics I 4-6. The syllogisms there all consist in two subject-predicate premises containing three terms, two extremes (or “outer” terms) and one middle term shared between the premises. The premise containing the predicate of the conclusion is called the major premise (and that term, the major term), that containing the subject of the conclusion the minor premise (and that term, the minor term). Prior Analytics I 4 describes the first figure, in which the middle term is subject of one premise and predicate of the other. Let us write ‘PxS’ to represent ‘P belongs to x S’, where ‘x’ is α: ‘every’, e: ‘no’, i: ‘some’ or o: ‘not every’, that is:\n
\[\text{PaS: } P \text{ belongs to every } S, \quad \text{PeS: } P \text{ belongs to no } S, \quad \text{PiS: } P \text{ belongs to some } S, \quad \text{PoS: } P \text{ does not belong to every } S\]

Then the form of the first figure is:\n
\[AxB \quad ByC\]

Syllogisms of the first figure are perfect because the middle term, B, links the premises immediately and evidently:

“Whenever, then, three terms are related to one another in such a way that the last is in the middle as a whole and the middle either is or is not in the first as in a whole, it is necessary for there to be a perfect syllogism with respect to the extremes … It is also clear that all the syllogisms in this figure are perfect, for they all reach their conclusion through the initial assumptions.” (25b32, 26b29-30)

We say that pairs are productive when a syllogistic conclusion follows.

Aristotle identifies four syllogisms in the first figure: the pairs aa, ea, ai and ei. If we include the strongest conclusion each yields, we obtain the four traditional forms. Known by their traditional names, they are:\n
\[8\]


10The names of the moods in the medieval mnemonic are (see, e.g., Peter of Spain, 2014, p. 191):

Barbara Celarent Darii Ferio Baralipont
Celantes Dabitis Fapesmo Frisesomorum;
Cesare Camestres Festino Baroco; Darapti
Felapton Diaenis Datisi Bocardo Ferison.

The semicolons separate the three figures. The first three vowels in each name give the quantity and quality of the premises (major, then minor) and conclusion. There is much more information packed into the mnemonic, which we will come to later.
These four moods are “evident” in virtue of what is traditionally called the dictum de omni et nullo:

“For one thing to be in another as in a whole is the same as for the other to be predicated of all of the first. We speak of ‘being predicated of all’ when nothing can be found of the subject of which the other will not be said, and the same account holds for ‘of none’.”

(24b28-31)

For example, he shows how the pairs ai and eo are productive and derives the strongest conclusions from them:

‘For let A belong to every B and B to some C. Now if ‘being predicated of all’ is what was said at the beginning, it is necessary for A to belong to some C. And if A belongs to no B and B belongs to some C, it is necessary for A not to belong to some C. For it was also defined what we mean by ‘of none’.” (26a24-26)

Thus the perfect syllogisms are, we might say, analytically valid, valid in virtue of the meaning of the logical terms in them, namely, ‘all’, ‘no’, ‘some’ and ‘not’. They are self-evident, and do not need any further or more elaborate demonstration that they are productive. Once recognised, they will become themselves rules of inference whereby the validity of further syllogisms (in the second and third figures) is demonstrated.

2.1. Invalidity in the First Figure. There are 16 possible combinations of syllogistic premises in each figure (restricting ourselves just to particular and universal premises). Aristotle has established that four of these combinations yield a valid conclusion in the first figure, namely, aa, ea, ai and ei. In fact, he observes, each of the four types of proposition, a, e, i and o, can be established by a first-figure syllogism. He proceeds to show that each of the other 12 combinations does not yield a valid conclusion, and so is not a (valid, first-figure) syllogism.¹¹

His method is the method of counterexamples;¹² he specifies substituends for A, B and C in each pair of premises such that, first, the premises are true as well as AaC, then substituends making the premises true as well as AeC. Since the premises are thus consistent with AaC, that means that AoC cannot follow from the premises, and since they are consistent with AcC, neither can AiC follow. Consequently, neither can AeC follow (or its subaltern AoC would follow), nor can AaC follow (or its subaltern AiC would too).

Thus, Aristotle takes syllogistic validity to be formal. In fact, he does more than this. Many authors have been puzzled to determine what is the actual basis of syllogistic validity. It might appear that all validity is based on the perfect

¹¹However, Aristotle’s claim in I 4 will be qualified in I 7: see §3 below.
¹²Corcoran (1974, p. 105) calls Aristotle’s method that of “contrasting instances”.
syllogisms to which all others are reduced (as we will see below). But the basis of the validity of the perfect syllogisms is not their perfection: that explains their self-evidence, as described at 26b29, but not their validity. Rather their validity consists in the lack of any counterexample. Thus Aristotle adopts what Etchemendy (1990) calls an interpretational account of validity, as found in Bolzano and Tarski, as opposed to a representational one.

Let’s look at a couple of counterexamples to first-figure invalidity. First, consider the pair $ae$, that is, $AaB$, $BeC$:

- For $A$, $B$, $C$ take the triple ‘animal’, ‘human’, ‘horse’: ‘Every human is an animal’, ‘No horse is a human’ and ‘Every horse is an animal’ are all true
- Now for $A$, $B$, $C$ take the triple ‘animal’, ‘human’, ‘stone’: this time, ‘Every human is an animal’, ‘No stone is a human’ and ‘No stone is an animal’ are all true (26a8-9)

Thus both $AaC$ and $AeC$ are consistent with $AaB$ and $BeC$. So, by the argument above, no syllogistic conclusion follows in the first figure from the pair $ae$. Note that Aristotle does not suppose that no horse is white, say, but takes substituends for $A$, $B$ and $C$ such that the premises are (actually) true and the conclusion false. For example, take the pair of premises ‘Every white thing is coloured, No horse is white’. To show that it does not follow that not every horse is coloured, one might postulate a possible world in which no horse is white, but all are, say, black. Then the premises are made true, but every horse is still coloured. That is representational semantics, taking the basis of validity to be the impossibility of the premises being true and the conclusion false. In constrast, what Aristotle does is reduce the intuitive or representational account of invalidity, of the failure of the premises to necessitate the conclusion, to the interpretational account, the existence of a counter-instance. Moreover, he does this not only for the assertoric syllogisms in Prior Analytics I 4-6, but also for the modal syllogisms in I 9-22. Note, however, that when he writes, e.g.,

“Nothing prevents one from choosing an $A$ such that $C$ may belong to all of it,” (30b30)

he is not claiming that the conclusion might be false, as in representational semantics, but that the conclusion is false, that is, that its contradictory, ‘$C$ possibly does not belong to every $A$’, is true. For this is the contradictory of ‘$C$ necessarily belongs to every $A$’. So once again, what Aristotle does is to provide a substitution-instance where the premises and the contradictory of the putative conclusion are in fact true.

Now take any pair of particular premises, that is, $ii$, $io$, $oi$, $oo$. A similar pair of substitutions will show that no syllogistic conclusion follows:

- For $A$, $B$, $C$ take the triple ‘animal’, ‘white’, ‘horse’: some white things are animals and some aren’t; some horses are white and some aren’t; but every horse is an animal
- Now for $A$, $B$, $C$ take the triple ‘animal’, ‘white’, ‘stone’: some white things are animals and some aren’t; some stones are white and some aren’t; but no stone is an animal (26b25)

Again, $AaC$ and $AeC$ are consistent with the premises, so nothing follows in the first figure from two particular premises.

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13Corcoran (1974, p. 103) calls this “one-world semantics".
Aristotle proceeds systematically through the remaining seven pairs of premises, producing substituends for \( A, B, C \) to show that none of these pairs yields any \( i \) or \( o \) conclusion, and hence no \( a \) or \( e \) conclusion can follow.

2.2. Validity in the Second, or Middle Figure. The form of the second figure is: \( MxN \)
\( MyX \)
that is, the middle term is predicate in both premises. Aristotle identifies four more (valid) syllogisms in the second figure. Again showing the strongest conclusion that can be drawn, we have:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( McN )</th>
<th>( MaN )</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cesare</td>
<td>( MaX )</td>
<td>( MeX )</td>
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<td></td>
<td>( NeX )</td>
<td>( NeX )</td>
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<tr>
<td>Camestres</td>
<td>( McN )</td>
<td>( MaN )</td>
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<td>( MiX )</td>
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<td>( NoX )</td>
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<tr>
<td>Festino</td>
<td>( MiX )</td>
<td>( MoX )</td>
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<td>( NoX )</td>
<td>( NoX )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, he describes these syllogisms all as imperfect, that is, as not self-evident. Referring to Cesare and Camestres, he says:

“It is evident, then, that a syllogism comes about when the terms are so related, but not a perfect syllogism, for the necessity is brought to perfection not only from the initial assumptions, but from others as well.” (27a16-19)

Aristotle employs three methods to establish (or to perfect—see Corcoran, 1974, p. 109) the imperfect syllogisms. The main method he calls “ostensive”, and contrasts with “hypothetical”. Although Corcoran (1974, p. 89) was right to call Aristotle’s methods of proof “natural deduction” methods, that is, using rules to derive a conclusion from certain premises, he mischaracterizes the essential feature of such systems. It is not just that in such systems “rules predominate” over axioms (though they do). They also predominate in sequent calculus systems, but those are not natural deduction systems. What characterizes natural deduction is that one proceeds from assumptions to conclusion. \(^{14}\) Accordingly, in ostensive proof, Aristotle assumes the premises of the putative syllogism, then uses simple or accidental conversion to infer the premises of a first-figure syllogism, draws the first-figure conclusion, and then, if necessary, uses further conversions to obtain a second-figure conclusion. \(^{15}\) Setting the proof out in the manner of Fitch (1952) follows Aristotle’s

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\(^{14}\)See, e.g., Jaśkowski (1934, p. 5) and Gentzen (1969, p. 75).

\(^{15}\)The medieval mnemonic uses certain consonants, following the vowels, to record the moves needed to demonstrate the imperfect moods:

- the initial letter (A,B,C,D) records which perfect mood will be used
- ‘s’ following a vowel marks simple conversion
- ‘p’ following a vowel marks accidental, or partial, conversion (i.e., \textit{per accidens})
- ‘m’ tells us to invert the order of the premises
- ‘c’ following a vowel marks a proof using \textit{reductio per impossibile} on that premise.

See Peter of Spain (2014, IV 13). William of Sherwood (1966, p. 67) gives a slightly different, and perhaps muddled account of the mnemonic.
text almost to the letter. For example, here is his proof of Cesare, by reduction to Celarent:\footnote{See also Corcoran (1974, p. 111) and Barnes (1997, p. 70). We could also represent the proof in tree form—see (von Plato, 2016):}

\[
\begin{array}{c}
MeN \quad \text{Premise} \\
MaX \quad \text{Premise} \\
NeM \quad \text{Simple conversion} \\
MaX \quad \text{Repetition} \\
NeX \quad \text{Celarent}
\end{array}
\]

He writes:

“For let \( M \) be predicated of no \( N \) and of all \( X \). Now since the privative premiss converts, \( N \) will belong to no \( M \); but it was assumed that \( M \) belongs to all \( X \), so that \( N \) will belong to no \( X \)—this was proved before.” (27a6-9)

The Fitch-style derivation and Aristotle’s reasoning match closely: Aristotle’s reasoning could be a description of the derivation, and the derivation formalizes the reasoning exactly.

2.3. Reduction per impossibile. The ostensive method also reduces the validity of Camestres and Festino to the first figure (to Celarent and Ferio respectively). But, Aristotle observes, it cannot be used to show the validity of Baroco. For only the major premise converts, and then only to a particular, and we have seen that nothing follows in the first figure from two particulars. So he uses a different method, that of reduction per impossibile, which he describes as a special case of hypothetical proof. This is a further feature of so-called “natural deduction”: that assumptions may be discharged in the course of a deduction. Such discharged assumptions are (temporary) hypotheses, made solely “for the sake of proof”, or “for the purpose of reasoning” (Corcoran, 1974, p. 70).

As with ostensive proof, Aristotle starts by assuming the premises of the syllogism whose validity needs to be demonstrated. But then he makes a further assumption, taking as hypothesis the contradictory of the putative conclusion. For example, to demonstrate Baroco:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
MaN \quad \text{Premise} \\
MoX \quad \text{Premise} \\
NaX \quad \text{Hyp} \\
MaN \quad \text{Reiteration} \\
NaX \quad \text{Repetition} \\
MaX \quad \text{Barbara} \\
MoX \quad \text{Reiteration} \\
NaX \quad \text{per impossibile}
\end{array}
\]

He writes:

But the representation of the proof given in the text in Fitch style seems better to accord with Aristotle’s reasoning, as we will see.
“Again, if \( M \) belongs to all \( N \) but does not belong to some \( X \), it is necessary for \( N \) not to belong to some \( X \). For if it belongs to all \( X \) and \( M \) is predicated of every \( N \), it is necessary for \( M \) to belong to every \( X \). But it was assumed that it did not belong to some. And if \( M \) belongs to every \( N \) but not to every \( X \), there will be a syllogism to the effect that \( N \) does not belong to all \( X \); the proof is the same.” (27a36-b2)

Contrary to what Łukasiewicz (1951, §18) says (endorsed by Bochenski, 1962, pp. 77-8), this is a valid deduction of the conclusion \( \neg \exists X \), by deducing \( MaX \) by Barbara, contradicting the minor premise \( MoX \), as Corcoran (1994, p. 12) notes. Aristotle’s method of reduction \textit{per impossibile} is indeed a so-called “natural deduction” method of proof by deduction from assumptions, both categorical (the premises) and hypothetical (for the sake of argument).

The passage suggests that although Aristotle distinguishes ‘\( N \) does not belong to some \( X \)’ from ‘\( N \) does not belong to every \( X \)’, he rightly thinks they are equivalent and play the same role in proof. We might say that ‘some’ “scopes out”, that is, takes wide scope over ‘not’.

Aristotle only appeals to \textit{reductio per impossibile} twice, once in figure II, as above, and once in figure III. But he mentions several times, after an ostensive proof, that the syllogisms in question could also have been proved by a reduction \textit{per impossibile}.\footnote{He discusses it at length in \textit{Prior Analytics} II 11-13.} In his examples, he never embeds such a reduction in itself, or uses it as the main proof, but only as a hypothetical subordinate proof, as noted by Corcoran (1974, p. 116). Again, a reduction \textit{per impossibile} always concludes with that step. So he seems not to conceive of it as a general method of proof, but only restricted to the establishment of syllogistic conclusions. Note that the subproof in such a reduction need only conclude in contraries (though often, as above, they are in fact contradictories). But the assumption for the reduction must, of course, be the contradictory of the ultimate conclusion to be proved.

Note that talk of reduction \textit{per impossibile} is a bit of a misnomer, as noted by Smith in Aristotle (1997, pp. 119-20). The subproof shows that the contradictory of the desired conclusion entails a falsehood, that is, the contradictory (or perhaps the contrary) of one of the premises, which are assumed to be true. What is impossible is that both hold together. So Aristotle’s rule is strictly weaker than \textit{reductio ad absurdum}, equivalent rather to \textit{modus tollendo tollens}: from a deduction of \( Q \) from \( P \) and the contradictory (or contrary) of \( Q \) we can infer the contradictory of \( P \). \textit{Reductio ad absurdum} involves a structural contraction, so is invalid in contraction-free logics, whereas \textit{modus tollendo tollens} does not, and so is valid in them.\footnote{See, e.g., Routley (1982, ch.3 §9).}

2.4. \textit{Invalidity in the Second Figure}. Invalidity by counterinstance proceeds in the second figure as for the first, by giving triples of substituends for \( M, N, X \). The only point of novelty arises with the pair \textit{co}, that is \( MeN, MoX \):

“Terms for not belonging: black, snow, animal. For belonging to all one cannot find terms if \( M \) belongs to some of the \( X \), but not to others. For if \( N \) belongs to all \( X \) and \( M \) to no \( N \), then \( M \) will belong to no \( X \); but it was assumed that it did belong to some. It is not possible, then, to find terms in this way, and one must
prove the point from indeterminacy. For since it is true that $M$
does not belong to some $X$ even if it belongs to none, and there
was no syllogism when it belonged to none, it is evident that there
will not be one in this case either.” (27b15-23)

Thus to show that $NiX$, and consequently $NaX$, does not follow from $MeN$ and
$MoX$ we note that ‘No snow is black’, ‘Not every animal is black’ and ‘No animal
is snow’ are all true. But to show that $NoX$, and so also $NeX$, does not follow
from the same pair, $MeN$ and $MoX$, Aristotle appeals to the fact that that he has
already shown that $NoX$ does not even follow from the stronger premises $MeN$
and $MeX$, by citing the triple ‘line’, ‘animal’, ‘human’ (27a21): ‘No animal is a
line’, ‘No human is a line’ and ‘Every human is an animal’ are all true.

2.5. Validity in the Third, or Last Figure. The form of the last figure is:\textsuperscript{19}

\begin{align*}
P_xS \\
R yS
\end{align*}

that is, the middle term is subject in both premises. Aristotle identifies a further
six valid syllogisms in the third figure:

\begin{center}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Darapti</th>
<th>Felapton</th>
<th>Datisi</th>
<th>Disamis</th>
<th>Bocardo</th>
<th>Ferison</th>
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<tr>
<td>$P aS$</td>
<td>$P eS$</td>
<td>$P aS$</td>
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Once again, all these syllogisms are imperfect, requiring establishment by some
form of reduction.

Aristotle reduces five of the third-figure moods to the first figure by the familiar
ostensive method. For example, Disamis is proved as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>$P iS$</th>
<th>$R aS$</th>
<th>$S iP$</th>
<th>$R aS$</th>
<th>$S iP$</th>
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<th>$P iR$</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Premise</td>
<td>Premise</td>
<td>Simple conversion</td>
<td>Repetition</td>
<td>Repetition</td>
<td>Darii</td>
<td>Simple conversion</td>
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\end{center}

Aristotle writes:

“For since the affirmative (sic) premise converts, $S$ will belong to
some $P$, so that since $R$ belongs to all $S$ and $S$ to some $P$, $R$ will
belong to some $P$ and hence $P$ will belong to some $R$.” (28b8-11)

\textsuperscript{19}We will consider in §3.1 whether Aristotle has overlooked a fourth figure.
However, ostension fails in the case of Bocardo as in that of Baroco, and requires proof by reduction *per impossibile* (see Corcoran, 1974, p. 111):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PoS</th>
<th>Premise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RaS</td>
<td>Premise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PaR</td>
<td>Hyp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RaS</td>
<td>Reiteration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PaS</td>
<td>Barbara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoS</td>
<td>Reiteration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoR</td>
<td><em>per impossibile</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Aristotle says:

“For if *R* belongs to all *S* but *P* does not belong to some *S*, it is necessary for *P* not to belong to some *R*. For if it belongs to all *R* and *R* belongs to all *S*, then *P* will also belong to all *S*; but it did not belong to all.” (28b17-20)

2.6. **Exposition, or Ecthesis.** Aristotle introduces yet a third method of proof for three of the third-figure moods, that of *echthesis*. Note that all the third-figure conclusions are particular, simply requiring, given premises regarding *P*, *R* and *S*, exhibition of an *R* which is or isn’t *P*:

“The demonstration [of Darapti] can also be carried out through the impossible or by setting out [echthesis]. For if both terms belong to all *S*, and one chooses one of the *S*s, say *N*, then both *P* and *R* will belong to it, so that *P* will belong to some *R*.” (28a24-6)

Ross (1949, p. 311), commenting on this passage and following Einarson (1936, pp. 161-2), notes that Aristotle uses the term ‘*echthesis*’ in two senses, both for the general procedure of choosing the terms of a syllogism in order to formalize the argument, and in order to pick out “a particular instance of the class denoted by the middle term.” Both uses seem to derive from their application in geometry. Einarson (1936, p. 156) shows in detail how the way the terms are set out in the basic mood Barbara matches the manner of reasoning about propositions found, e.g., in the *Sectio Canonis* (Barbera, 1991, pp. 118-21). Such analogy pervades Aristotle’s formulation of syllogistic reasoning. But it is the second sense of ‘*echthesis*’ which underlies Aristotle’s third method of proof, sketched in the proof of Darapti just cited.

Proclus (1970, p. 159) (see Friedlein, 1873, p. 203) famously enumerated the six parts to a Euclidean demonstration: “enunciation, exposition [*echthesis*], specification, construction, proof, and conclusion.” This is illustrated by Bos (1993, pp. 142, 156) for the case of Euclid’s proof of Pythagoras’ Theorem. It opens with the enunciation, or statement (*protasis*) of the theorem: “In right-angled triangles the square on the side subtending the right angle is equal to the squares on the sides containing the right angle,” and then proceeds directly to the exposition: “Let *ABC* be a right-angled triangle having the angle *BAC* right.” That is, the exposition [*echthesis*], or “setting out”, takes an arbitrary case (here, of a right-angled triangle) and gives it a designation, ‘*ABC*’, named from its vertices. Euclid proceeds to show that the sum of the squares on the opposite sides satisfies Pythagoras’ result, and so it follows generally, since *ABC* was an arbitrary right-angled triangle, that every such triangle has the Pythagorean property.
Aristotle’s use of *ecthesis* can be seen in a mathematically simpler example, but one that is logically more subtle, in Euclid’s very first Proposition (Heath, 1908, p. 262): “On a given finite straight line to construct an equilateral triangle.” Euclid starts with the *ecthesis*: “Let \(AB\) be the given finite straight line” (or better—cf. Heath (1920, p. 162)—"let \(AB\) be a given finite straight line"). Euclid then constructs an equilateral triangle on \(AB\), thus showing that there is such a triangle.

Aristotle’s sketch of a proof of Darapti follows this model. Suppose \(P\) and \(R\) both belong to \(S\). Then, given an \(S\), call it \(n\), it follows that some \(R\) is \(P\)—this is the *protasis* or enunciation, i.e., what is to be proved. For if \(n\) is both \(P\) and \(S\), something (namely, \(n\)) is both \(P\) and \(R\) (since every \(S\) is \(R\)), so some \(R\) is \(P\). But what is the basis of that final step?

The medievals described this step, from ‘\(n\) is \(P\)’ and ‘\(n\) is \(S\)’ to ‘Some \(S\) is \(P\)’ as the “expository syllogism”. But the epithet is misleading. Its basis is not syllogistic. Rather, they said, its basis is a principle found in Aristotle’s *Sophistical Refutations* 6, at 168b32: “Things that are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another.”

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20 Buridan (2001, §5.1.8, pp. 313, 315) writes: “Every affirmative syllogism holds by virtue of the principle ‘what-ever things are said to be numerically identical with one and the same thing, are also said to be identical between themselves . . . [N]egative syllogisms . . . are valid by virtue of that other principle, namely: ‘whatever things are so related that one of them is said to be identical and the other is said to be not identical with one and numerically the same thing, they necessarily have to be said not to be identical with each other’.”
21...
```

The first of these is similar to the first of Euclid’s Common Notions (Heath, 1908, p. 222): “Things which are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another.” But for these principles to be valid, it is crucial that the subjects are identical in reference, that is, that the premises are singular propositions.

It has been claimed that Aristotle does not include singular propositions in his syllogistic theory, indeed, that it only includes universal and particular propositions. I have argued against this claim elsewhere. In *De Interpretatione* 7, he describes four classes of proposition, universal, particular, indefinite and singular. Indefinite propositions are indeterminately universal or particular (as noted in footnote 8 above), sometimes best interpreted as universal (e.g., ‘Men are animals’), sometimes as particular (e.g., ‘Men are white’). Singular propositions could be taken *sui generis*, thus forming a hexagon of opposition with the others; or as universal, as Aristotle seems to do at *Prior Analytics* II 27 (70a27), for example:

---

20 See also *Physics* 185b15-16, and Hamesse (1974, p. 140): “Quaecumque uni et eadem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem.”
21 *Dico ergo quod omnes syllogismi affirmativi tenent per hoc principium ‘Quaecumque dicuntur eadem uni et eodem in numero, illa sibi invicem dicuntur eadem’ . . . Nunc de syllogismis negativis dicendum est. Qui tenent per illud principium ‘Quaecumque sic se habent quod uni et eadem in numero unum eorum dicuntur idem et alterum non idem, necesse est inter se illa dici non idem’. (Buridan, 2009, pp. 17, 19)
22 E.g., Ross (1923, p. 30).
23 See Read (2015, pp. 536-7).
24 See, e.g., Czeżowski (1955).
Pittacus is good, Pittacus is a wise man, so (some) wise men are good. The argument is (he says) in the third figure, and so by Darapti, with the singular premises interpreted as universal, and the indefinite conclusion as particular. The premises must be universal, since they are of the same kind, and as Aristotle says at *Prior Analytics* I 24, nothing follows from two particular propositions.

There are, therefore, two distinctive moves in an ecthetic proof, distinct from, but supporting, syllogistic inference (just as conversion and *reductio per impossibile* are not themselves syllogistic inferences but support, that is, validate, syllogistic argument): *ecthesis* itself, that is, taking an arbitrary instance; and the principle of Expository Syllogism. But as Aristotle points out in *Sophistical Refutations* 6, the latter requires strict identity. Partial identity will not suffice:

“It is, however, not always true [that things that are the same as one and the same thing are also the same as one another], e.g., suppose that *A* and *B* are ‘the same’ as *C* *per accidens* [i.e., partially]—for both ‘snow’ and ‘swan’ are the same as something ‘white’.”

(168b34)

For snow and swan are certainly not the same as one another. The principle requires that *A* and *B* be wholly or strictly identical, and for that, the premises must be singular propositions.

But at the same time, the instances must be syllogistic propositions, so that we can apply syllogistic reasoning to them. In the proof of Darapti, knowing there is an *S*, given that *PaS* is true, we take a particular *S* which is *P* and call it *n*. We apply Barbara to this instance, *San*, introduced by *ecthesis*, which with the other premise, *RaS*, yields *Ran*. Thus we know that *n* is both *P* and *R*, and so we infer that something is both *P* and *R*. The conclusion here, both in its form, and in its assumptions, is free of reference to *n*, and so the term *n* is arbitrary and the inference is valid, as in Existential Instantiation.25

To emphasize the need to treat ‘*n*’ as arbitrary and so ensure that it cannot belong to the conclusion, let us indent the subproof involving it, not based on a hypothesis, but on *ecthesis*, and labelled with the arbitrary name, in this case, ‘*n*’.26

Then the proof runs:

\[
\begin{array}{l}
PaS \\
RaS \\
\text{Premise} \\
\text{Premise} \\
San \\
Pan \\
RaS \\
\text{Ecthesis} \\
\text{Reiteration} \\
San \\
Ran \\
\text{Barbara} \\
Pan \\
\text{Repetition} \\
Ran \\
\text{Repetition} \\
\text{Expository Syllogism}
\end{array}
\]


26This follows Fitch’s practice in Fitch (1952, ch. 5, see especially p. 131). We can liken ‘*n*’ to an arbitrary name, as Lemmon (1965, pp. 106-7) does. See also the comments by Smith (1982, p. 126).
In the case of Disamis, with premises $\Pi S$ and $RaS$, we again need to take one of the $S$s which is $P$—call it $n$: 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$PiS$</th>
<th>Premise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$RaS$</td>
<td>Premise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Pn$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$San$</td>
<td>Ecthesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$RaS$</td>
<td>Reiteration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$San$</td>
<td>Repetition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Ran$</td>
<td>Repetition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Pan$</td>
<td>Repetition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$PnR$</td>
<td>Expository Syllogism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That is, given $PiS$, we take one of the $S$s which is $P$, call it $n$, show that $R$ also belongs to $n$, thence concluding that some $R$ is $P$. Aristotle notes this method for proving Disamis at 28b15, but without giving any details.

In fact, ecthesis and Expository Syllogism form a pair, giving the meaning of $AiB$: $AiB \iff Aan, Ban$ (where $n$ is fresh, that is, arbitrary, and treating the RHS conjunctively).\(^{27}\) From $AiB$ we can infer $Aan$ and $Ban$ by ecthesis, and from $Aan$ and $Ban$ we can infer $AiB$ by Expository Syllogism.

Aristotle also suggests using ecthesis to prove Bocardo:

“If $R$ belongs to all $S$ but $P$ does not belong to some $S$, it is necessary for $P$ not to belong to some $R$ … (This can also be proved without reduction to the impossible if one chooses one of the $S$s to which $P$ does not belong.)” (28b17-21)

The negative version of the rule for ecthesis will permit the inference of $Aen$ and $Ban$ from $AoB$. However, one might worry about the validity of this rule, since by the interpretation in Read (2015), the major premise, $AoB$, lacks existential import, and so is true if there is no $B$. In the case of Bocardo, however, we do know that the term is non-empty, for the second premise, $RaS$, is true only if there are $S$s. Hence we can safely take one of the $S$s which is not $P$.

Conversely, we can extend Expository Syllogism to its negative version, as in the quotation above from Buridan: $AoB \iff Aen, Ban$, provided there is a $B$ ($n$ fresh). That is, not only does ecthesis allow us to take some arbitrary $n$ that is $B$ and not $A$, but conversely, if there is such an $n$ which is $B$ and not $A$, then $A$ and $B$ are distinct. The proof of Bocardo then runs:

\(^{27}\)It was not until the twelfth century that a conjunctive proposition was even recognised as such. Martin (2012, pp. 295-8) notes that Boethius denies that conjunctive constructions produce single propositions (rather than a complex of propositions), and cites Abelard’s recognition of the conjunctive proposition (propositio copulativa) as “a fundamental turning point in the history of logic”.

As Aristotle says, we choose an $S$, namely $n$, which is not $P$. Then $R$ must belong to $n$, since it belongs to every $S$, and so $P$ cannot belong to every $R$.

However, we do not have the same guarantee of the non-emptiness of the term set out in the case of Baroco:

\[
\begin{align*}
MaN \\
MoX \\
\hline
NoX
\end{align*}
\]

What can we do? Smith (1982, p. 117) notes that Aristotle himself does not mention *ecthesis* in connection with assertoric Baroco, despite appealing to it in the case of modal Baroco (*Prior Analytics* I 8, 30a4-14). In fact, the argument by *ecthesis* can be made to work, but we need to deal with the case where $X$ is empty separately, and perhaps this is why Aristotle does not suggest *ecthesis* here. For if $X$ is empty, $NoX$ is true for the same reason that $MoX$ is; while if $X$ is not empty, we can take an $X$, call it $c$, which is not $M$: $MaN$ and $Mec$ yield $Nec$ by Camestres, and $Xac$ and $Nec$ yield the conclusion $NoX$ by Expository Syllogism.

Thom (1981, ch. X) observes that it is possible to demonstrate all the valid syllogisms by the expository method of *ecthesis*, including the perfect moods of the first figure. *Ecthesis* is a distinctly different method from reduction by ostension or *per impossibile*. In those methods, validity of one syllogistic mood is reduced to that of another, which itself needs to be grounded—either by further reduction, or by the *dictum de omni et nullo*, or by *ecthesis*. *Ecthesis* is not a reduction, but constitutes a categorical proof.

Moreover, in *Prior Analytics* I 2, Aristotle uses *ecthesis* to prove the conversion of E-propositions: That is,
“Now if \( A \) belongs to none of the \( B \)s, then neither will \( B \) belong to any of the \( A \)s. For if it does belong to some, for example, to \( C \), it will not be true that \( A \) belongs to none of the \( B \)s, since \( C \) is one of the \( B \)s.” (25a15-17)

Supposing that some \( A \) is \( B \), take an \( A \) which is \( B \), call it \( c \), then we know both that \( c \) is \( A \) and that \( c \) is \( B \), so some \( B \) is \( A \), contradicting the assumption that no \( B \) is \( A \). Aristotle then uses E-conversion to establish the accidental conversion of A-propositions and the simple conversion of I-propositions—which is in fact a corollary of the proof, lying at its heart.

### 2.7. The Final Reduction

Finally, Aristotle adds a further twist to the ostensive method, reducing Darii and Ferio to Celarent, via the second figure:

“But one can also reduce all syllogisms to the universal ones in the first figure . . . [The particular moods in the first figure] are perfected through themselves, but one can also prove them through the second figure by reduction to the impossible. For example, if \( A \) belongs to every \( B \) and \( B \) to some \( C \), then \( A \) belongs to some \( C \).
If it belongs to none, but to every \( B \), \( B \) will belong to no \( C \); this we know from the second figure.” (29b1, 8-12)

Thus Darii is reduced to Camestres (and so finally to Celarent), and similarly, Ferio is reduced to Cesare (and thence to Celarent too):

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\text{Premise} & \text{Premise} & \text{Premise} \\
\hline
\text{AaB} & \text{B} & \text{C} \\
\text{B} & \text{C} & \text{A} \\
\text{AeC} & \text{Hyp} & \text{AeB} \\
\text{AaB} & \text{Reiteration} & \text{AaC} \\
\text{AeC} & \text{Repetition} & \text{B} & \text{C} \\
\text{BeC} & \text{Camestres} & \text{A} & \text{C} \\
\text{BiC} & \text{Reiteration} & \text{BiC} \\
\text{AiC} & \text{per impossibile} & \text{AoC} \\
\end{array}
\]

As Aristotle writes:

“The demonstration will be similar in the case of the privative syllogism [i.e., Ferio]. For if \( A \) belongs to no \( B \) and \( B \) to some \( C \), then \( A \) will not belong to some \( C \). For if it belongs to every \( C \) but to no \( B \), then \( B \) will belong to no \( C \)—this was the middle figure [i.e. Cesare].” (29b12-14)

Hence all valid syllogisms can be reduced to the universal perfect syllogisms, Barbara and Celarent, themselves shown to be valid by the *dictum de omni et nullo*.

### 3. The Adequacy of Aristotle’s Theory

Thus in *Prior Analytics* I 4-6, Aristotle has shown the validity of 14 (simple) syllogisms. One might, nonetheless, wonder whether this list is complete. In fact, it is not, as Aristotle himself recognises in I 7. Of course, we’ve already seen that each syllogism can have more than one conclusion. For example, Barbara, inferring \( AaC \) from \( AaB \) and \( BaC \), also warrants Barbari and Baralipont.
Barbari follows from Barbara by subalternation, and Baralipton by accidental conversion. Neither of these introduces a new syllogism, that is, a new pair of premises yielding a valid conclusion, since the premises of both are \textit{aa} in the first figure. Indeed, provided the conclusions of the 14 syllogisms already identified are the strongest possible direct conclusions (as in fact they are), drawing further consequences by conversion and subalternation adds no new syllogisms. However, Baralipton alerts us to the possibility of an indirect conclusion. Aristotle has shown by exhibition of counter-instances that no other pairs of premises yield a valid direct conclusion in any of the three figures. But we should now ask what further indirect conclusions can be inferred, and indeed, whether further premise pairs, not yielding a valid direct conclusion, perhaps yield an indirect conclusion.

It’s easy to show that in the second and third figures, indirect conclusions introduce no new syllogisms. For suppose \( MxN \) \( \frac{MyX}{XzN} \) draws an indirect conclusion in Figure II. First, interchange the premises: \( MxN \) \( \frac{MyX}{XzN} \). Now reletter, interchanging ‘\( X \)’ and ‘\( N \)’: \( MxX \) \( \frac{MyN}{NzX} \). This draws a direct conclusion in the second figure. So either \( yxz \) is a valid second-figure mood, and so already counted, or \( yxz \) is invalid in the second figure, by a counterinstance already noted, and so the same will be true for \( xyz \). The same argument shows that there are no new syllogisms by drawing indirect conclusions in the third figure.

However, by this reasoning, two pairs of syllogistic premises in the second and third figures normally listed as distinct are arguably the same syllogism. Recall that Aristotle characterizes the second figure as predicating the middle term in both premises (26b34-37). But Cesare and Camestres differ only in the order of the premises and of the terms in the conclusion, so they each show equivalently that premises in which the same term is said to belong universally to one subject and to be excluded universally from the other are productive. They denote the same syllogism.\(^{28}\) Similarly, he characterizes the third figure as that where the middle term is subject of both premises (28a10-12). But Disamis and Datisi differ only in the order of the premises and of the terms in the conclusion. So they each show that premises in which one predicate is said to belong universally to a subject and another to belong partially to it are productive, and so denote the same syllogism.

Nonetheless, there are two new syllogisms to be obtained by drawing indirect conclusions in the first figure, \textit{viz}:

\begin{align*}
AaB & \quad AaB \\
BaC & \quad BaC \\
AiC & \quad CiA
\end{align*}

Note that *ae* and *ie* are new first-figure syllogisms, not included among the perfect moods. Aristotle recognises the validity of these syllogisms in I 7:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AaB</th>
<th>Premise</th>
<th>AiB</th>
<th>Premise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BeC</td>
<td>Premise</td>
<td>BeC</td>
<td>Premise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CeB</td>
<td>Simple conversion</td>
<td>CeB</td>
<td>Simple conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiA</td>
<td>Conversion per accidens</td>
<td>BiA</td>
<td>Simple conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoA</td>
<td>Ferio</td>
<td>CoA</td>
<td>Ferio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“It is also clear for all the figures that in those cases where no syllogism comes about, if both terms are positive or privative, nothing necessary comes about at all; but if one term is positive, the other privative and the privative is taken as universal, then a syllogism always comes about of the minor extreme in relation to the major. For example, if *A* belongs to all or some *B* and *B* to no *C*. For if the premisses are converted, it is necessary for *C* not to belong to some *A*. Similarly for the other figures; for a syllogism always comes about through conversion.” (29a19-26)

3.1. The Fourth Figure. Many writers since Aristotle, arguably starting with Galen (see Rescher, 1965) claimed that there were in fact four figures in the syllogism. The reason was two-fold: they took a syllogism to consist of two premises *together with* a conclusion; and they took the order of the premises to matter. Hence what Aristotle took to be an indirect conclusion in the first figure was traditionally counted as a direct conclusion in the fourth figure. For example:

Baralipton: $PaM \quad$ becomes Bramantip: $MaP$

and Frisesomorum: $PiM \quad$ becomes Fresison: $MeP$

This doesn’t yield any further valid syllogisms, but conceptualizes the syllogism differently. As Aristotle remarked (I 23):

“Now if it necessary to assume something that is common in relation to both [extremes], and this is possible in three ways (for either one predicates *A* of *C* and *C* of *B*, or *C* of both, or both of *C*), and those form the three figures we have mentioned, it is evident that every syllogism will necessarily come about in one of those figures.”

(41a13-18)

Buridan (2015, III i 2) agreed:

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29See, e.g., Hubien (1975, p. 279).

“But it should be noted that the fourth figure differs from the first only in the transposition of the premises, and that transposition does not permit inferring another conclusion or prevent that inference, but affects whether the conclusion inferred is direct only when in the first figure and indirect in the fourth and vice versa . . . From this it is clear that once the first figure has been explained it will be superfluous to explain the fourth; so Aristotle does not mention it.”

3.2. The Total Number of Assertoric Syllogisms. Thus the total number of two-premise assertoric syllogisms according to Aristotle is 16. Some, e.g., Al-Farabi focussed exclusively on those listed in Prior Analytics I 4-6:

“The [types of] categorical syllogisms are fourteen in number . . . This completes the entire collection of categorical syllogisms.” (Rescher, 1963, pp. 60, 73)

But this omits ae and ie in the first figure, which, we have seen, Aristotle specifically mentions in Prior Analytics I 7.31

Theophrastus is said to have added the five indirect moods to the first figure that we find in the medieval mnemonic: Baralipton, Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum, making a total of 19.32 But this includes Baralipton, Celantes and Dabitis, which just draw new conclusions from aa, ea and ai in Figure I, already included. This slip was observed by Buridan:

“In the first figure in addition to the four moods concluding directly . . . Aristotle describes only two other moods that . . . conclude indirectly, namely, Fapesmo and Frisesomorum . . . Nor did he list Baralipton, Celantes and Dabitis in addition to Barbara, Celarent and Darii, since according to the definition they do not differ from them.” (Buridan, 2015, III i 4, pp. 123-4)

Galen and Porphyry are reported to have split Darapti into two moods, Darapti and Daraptis, hence giving a total of 20.33 But again, Daraptis is not new, being derivable from Darapti by simple conversion, showing that the premises aa in figure III “have more than one conclusion”.

More recently, the 19 Theophrastian moods listed in the medieval mnemonic (with the indirect moods translated to Figure IV) were augmented by the weakened or “subalternate” moods Barbari and Celaront (in Figure I), Cesaro and Camestrop (in Figure II) and Camenop (in Figure IV)—the full 24 usually listed as 6 valid moods in each of four figures.34 But again, these just draw further conclusions from syllogistic pairs already recognised.

Buridan includes O-propositions of non-normal form (where the predicate precedes the negation, e.g., ‘Some S some P is not’) in order to permit conversion of

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31Barnes (1975, p. 65) also omits the two novel imperfect first-figure moods.
34See, e.g., Kneale and Kneale (1962, pp. 74-5) and Bochenski (1951, 9 C) and (1962, pp. 71-2).
O-propositions (see Read, 2016, p. 460), and so lists 8 syllogisms in the first two figures and 9 in the third figure, 25 in all.\footnote{Buridan (2015, III i 4, conclusion 8).} He also distinguishes syllogisms with the same premises in different order. But this changes the rules, adding non-normal conclusions.

In Appendix 2 to Barnes et al. (1991),\footnote{See also Barnes et al. (1991, p. 136 footnote 157).} the total reaches 35, adding Camestres, Faresmo, Cesare, Cesaros and Firesmo (in Figure II) and Daraptis, Fapemo, Datisis, Disami and Frisemo (in Figure III). But these are just reletterings of known syllogisms, as shown above.

What Aristotle didn’t do in I 7, and needs to be done, is to show that no further indirect conclusions can be drawn from pairs of premises which yield no direct conclusion. There are none in the second and third figures, since indirect conclusions reduce to direct conclusions by interchanging the premises, as we have seen. To show that there are no further indirect conclusions in the first figure from the remaining 11 combinations of premises is straightforward.

Recall the earlier claim that Aristotle’s account of validity was interpretational. We can invoke the so-called “squeezing argument” of Kreisel (1967), employed recently by Andrade-Lotero and Dutilh Novaes (2012), to make the point. First, note that Aristotle’s method of reduction is sound, that is, whenever there is a reduction to a perfect syllogism in the first figure there is no countermodel: the premises intuitively necessitate the conclusion. Moreover, it is complete: we have just noted that if there is no reduction then there is a counter-instance. Finally, any counter-instance is intuitively a countermodel. Hence there is no counter-instance if and only if there is no countermodel and the premises necessitate the conclusion. Aristotle reduces the intuitive notion of necessitation to the absence of a counter-instance.

Nonetheless, as we have seen, Aristotle overstated the number of distinct syllogisms by distinguishing Cesare from Camestres, and Disamis from Datisi. Accordingly, there are just 14 distinct Aristotelian assertoric syllogisms, 6 in the first figure (4 direct and 2 indirect), 3 in the second, or middle figure, and 5 in the third and last.

4. Conclusion

My aim in this paper has been to correct misreadings of Aristotle, or at least, misleading accounts of what Aristotle did (e.g., Smith, 2017), and describe accurately the remarkable account of deduction which Aristotle constructed in the first few chapters of his Prior Analytics. Syllogistic propositions can be particular or universal. Aristotle treats singular propositions as universal, and so-called indefinite (or indeterminate) propositions are taken by him as indeterminately universal or particular. Existential commitment goes with quality, not quantity, thus satisfying all the demands of the Square of Opposition: O-propositions can be expressed either as ‘\(P\) does not belong to every \(S\)’ or as ‘\(P\) does not belong to some \(S\)’, and are true if there is no \(S\) (when the corresponding \(A\)-proposition is accordingly false). Aristotelian syllogisms are, at their simplest, pairs of syllogistic premises yielding a valid conclusion. There are just three Aristotelian syllogistic figures, turning on
whether the middle term is subject of one premise and predicate of the other, predicate of both, or subject of both. Such pairs of premises constitute syllogisms just when they yield a syllogistic conclusion, that is, when there is no counterinstance among syllogistic propositions. There are, in total, just 14 pairs of such premises which yield a syllogistic conclusion, that is, there are 14 syllogistic pairs. Their validity can be established either by invoking the meaning of the logical expressions given by the *dictum de omni et nullo*, or by one of Aristotle’s methods: by ostensive or hypothetical proof or by *ecthesis*. But they are not made valid by that reduction and proof, which serves rather to demonstrate their validity. The basis of their validity is the lack of any counterexample, that is, the absence of any terms that can be substituted in the schema that will make the premises true and any putative conclusion false.

References


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