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Direct Reference, Meaning, and Thought

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The distinction between the meaning of a sentence and what is said (the proposition expressed) by an utterance of the sentence is commonly recognized to be necessary when one deals with indexical sentences; but there is also a third term—the *cognitive* content of the utterance—whose irreducibility to either the proposition expressed or the meaning of the sentence (or a mixture of both) has not been properly appreciated. Thus, Fregeans do not feel compelled to distinguish between the proposition expressed by an utterance and the cognitive content of the latter, while direct-reference theorists such as Kaplan and Perry, who make this distinction, have been prone to equate cognitive content with linguistic meaning.

In this paper, I will start with the theory of direct reference; I will show that it is justified by two straightforward intuitions, and that it does not conflict with Frege's claim that the thought expressed by an utterance containing a referential expression must involve a mode of presentation of the reference. This claim can be made consistent with the theory of direct reference by a distinction between what is said and the cognitive content of the utterance (the "thought")—a distinction which a Fregean has no reason to insist on rejecting, since it is always possible to interpret it in a Fregean way. Having thus laid the groundwork, I will examine the relation between sentence meaning and cognitive content. My conclusion will be that the latter cannot be reduced to the former, contrary to what Kaplan and Perry have suggested.

1. *DIRECT REFERENCE: THE INTUITIVE BASIS*

According to the theory of direct reference championed by David Kaplan (henceforth to be called the DR-view), some singular terms

are “purely” or “directly” referential in the sense that their semantic value—the contribution they make to the propositional content of the utterance in which they occur—is constituted by nothing other than their reference. That is not to say that these terms have no meaning, or that their meaning is constituted by their reference. A distinction must be made between (i) directly referential terms, which contribute to the proposition expressed merely by picking out a certain object, and (ii) what Mill calls “nonconnotative” terms, that is, terms which have no meaning besides their reference and “do not imply any attribute” as belonging to the latter. (i) and (ii) would come to the same thing if there were no difference between the linguistic meaning of an utterance and its propositional content. But such a difference exists: there is a difference, for example, between the meaning of the sentence “I am French” and what is said by an utterance of this sentence (the proposition expressed). Owing to this difference, one may grant that the singular term “I” has a meaning and “implies” a certain attribute as belonging to its reference, while insisting that this term is directly referential and contributes to the proposition expressed merely by specifying a certain individual.

Suppose that a singular term *t* has a meaning by virtue of which it presents its reference in a certain way. To say that *t* is directly referential is to say that the mode of presentation of the reference of *t* is not part of the proposition expressed by the utterance *S(t)* in which *t* occurs, whereas the reference of *t* is part of the proposition expressed. Behind this double claim, there are two intuitions. The first intuition concerns the truth-conditions of the utterance. The mode of presentation of the reference is said not to be part of the proposition expressed because the reference’s satisfying the mode of presentation is not part of the truth-conditions of what is said. Thus, by virtue of its linguistic meaning, the pronoun “I” presents its reference as having the property of being the speaker; yet the reference’s having this property is no part of the truth-conditions of an utterance in which “I” occurs. When Paul says “I am French”, what he says is true if and only if Paul is French. The property of being the speaker is not a constituent of the proposition expressed: it is used only to help the hearer identify the reference, which *is* a constituent of the proposition expressed. As Kaplan puts it, the mode of presentation of the reference, in such a case, “should not be considered part of the content of what is said but should rather be thought of as [a] contextual factor . . . which help[s] us interpret the . . . utterance as having a certain content” (Kaplan 1978:228).

But what does it mean to say that the proposition expressed involves the reference itself? The intuition here concerns what counts as understanding the utterance. In some cases, a hearer does not understand what is said if she cannot *identify* the reference. To identify the reference, in the relevant sense, one must go beyond the descriptive content of the referring expression and equate the reference with a certain object about which one has independent information. (This process is what Evans calls “*re-identification*”.)¹ Thus you do not understand what is said when I utter “He is a spy” if you do not go beyond the (meagre) indication provided by the word “he” and identify a certain person, e.g. someone you are currently perceiving, as the person to whom I am referring; likewise, you do not understand what is said by an utterance of “I am French” if you know only that “I” refers to the speaker, without knowing *who* the speaker is. Directly referential terms such as “he” or “I” prompt the hearer to go beyond the meaning of the sentence and find an object in the world matching the descriptive content of the referring expression. What is said cannot be grasped unless that object is identified: this gives a sense—the only reasonable sense—in which the proposition expressed may be said to involve the object itself. By contrast, the reference of an attributively used definite description need not be identified for the utterance to be understood. Even if I have no idea who the Mayor of Paris is, I understand what is said by “The Mayor of Paris must be a busy man”. The proposition expressed is general and does not involve the reference, but only a certain concept or mode of presentation, which figures prominently in the truth-conditions of the utterance.

To sum up, the DR-view holds that the content of a referring expression may be either its reference or the mode of presentation of the reference. (“Content” is Kaplan’s word for a term’s contribution to the proposition expressed—the proposition itself being the content of the utterance as a whole; the content of an expression is distinguished from its “character”, i.e. its linguistic meaning.) If the content of an expression is constituted by its reference, that is, if the expression is directly referential, the mode of presentation of the reference is external to the proposition expressed and constitutes only the character of that expression. If the content is the mode of presentation, as in the Mayor of Paris example, then it is the reference that is external, in the sense that it is only part of the “world”: in this case, it is possible for the utterance to make sense, and to be understood, even if the reference does not exist or cannot be identified. These two possibilities are displayed in Table 1.

	DIRECTLY REFERENTIAL EXPRESSIONS	NON-DIRECTLY REFERENTIAL EXPRESSIONS
Character (utterance)	Mode of presentation	
Content	Reference	Mode of presentation
(world)		Reference

Table 1

2. SINGULAR PROPOSITIONS AND THOUGHT

There is a well-known objection to the DR-view. We may call it the Fregean argument:

The proposition expressed by an utterance is the object (the content) of our cognitive attitudes towards the utterance. It is what we understand, what we grasp; it is what we believe or disbelieve when we sincerely assent to or dissent from the utterance. Now, our cognitive attitudes are clearly sensitive to the mode of presentation of the reference. I may assent to “Cicero is bald” and dissent from “Tully is bald,” even though Cicero is Tully; this is because the reference, although identical in the two cases, is presented in two different ways. Likewise, I may believe “this man is a spy” and “that man is not a spy” of the same man, if I do not know that the same man is being indicated twice. This shows that the proposition expressed, *qua* object of the attitudes, involves a mode of presentation of the reference and not just the reference itself. It follows that the DR-view must be rejected. The DR-view holds that the mode of presentation of the reference, which constitutes the character of directly referential terms, does not belong to their content, which is constituted by their reference alone; the proposition expressed, according to this view, is a “singular proposition”, consisting of the object referred to and the property predicated of it². But, if really the proposition expressed by sentences in which a proper name, a pronoun or a demonstrative expression occurs were a singular proposition in this sense, then in cases such as those I have just mentioned one and the same singular proposition would be assented to and dissented from at the same time: someone who believes “Cicero is bald” while disbelieving “Tully is bald” would be entertaining contradictory beliefs. Now, there is a sense in which the person is not entertaining contradictory beliefs in such a situation, provided he or she does not know that Cicero is Tully. This sense cannot be accounted for in the framework provided by the DR-view.

There is much that is true in this argument, but the truths it contains seem to me perfectly consistent with the DR-view. The Fregean argument constitutes a decisive objection to the DR-view only if one makes an assumption which, precisely for that reason, a defender of the DR-view would be foolish to make. According to the Fregean argument, the proposition expressed cannot be a singular proposition, since (i) the proposition expressed is the object of the attitudes, i.e. what we believe or disbelieve, and (ii) the attitudes are sensitive not only to what is being referred to but also to the way the reference is presented. The second premiss, (ii), can hardly be denied. It establishes that the complete content of the attitudes must include a mode of presentation of the reference. It follows that the complete content of the attitudes cannot be a singular proposition. But who has ever denied this? It would be folly to do so. The only rational position, for someone who holds that the proposition expressed by an utterance containing a directly referential term is a singular proposition, is to reject (i), the equation of the proposition expressed with the proper object (the complete content) of the attitudes. In other words, the DR-theorist must hold that *the proposition expressed is not the complete content of our attitudes*: the proposition expressed, which is singular, is apprehended *under a mode of presentation*, and it is this—the proposition under a certain mode of presentation, or, perhaps, the mode of presentation itself—which constitutes the object of the attitudes. Thus, the same (singular) proposition is expressed by “Cicero is bald” and “Tully is bald”, but this proposition may be apprehended under different modes of presentation. This explains why one may both assent to and dissent from this proposition without irrationality: it is assented to under one mode of presentation and dissented from under another mode of presentation. The Fregean argument, therefore, does not refute the DR-view; it only shows that the DR-view implies a distinction between the proposition expressed and the (complete) object of the attitudes.

The distinction between the proposition expressed and the object/content of the attitudes is made by all defenders of the DR-view. The only exception I know of is Nathan Salmon, who claims that “singular propositions are the contents of thoughts and beliefs” (Salmon 1986:6), but this exception is only apparent: even Salmon concedes that singular propositions are assented to or dissented from only under a mode of presentation (Salmon 1986:111). In any event, Perry and Kaplan admit that a singular proposition cannot be the complete content of the attitudes. As Kaplan emphasizes, to believe that my pants are on fire is not the same thing as to believe that this person’s pants are on fire, even if this person, whose image

I see reflected in the window, turns out to be myself (Kaplan 1989:533). Now, for Kaplan, “My pants are on fire” expresses the same singular proposition as “His pants are on fire”, provided the same person (myself) is being referred to. Kaplan’s solution is to say that this proposition may be apprehended under different modes of presentation, different “characters”:

A given content may be presented under various characters and . . . consequently we may hold a propositional attitude toward a given content under one character but not under another. (For example, on March 27 of this year, having lost track of the date, I may continue to hope to be finished by March 26, without hoping to be finished by yesterday.) (Kaplan 1989:532)

Clearly, this amounts to conceding that the complete content of our attitudes involves a mode of presentation and not just a singular proposition. There is no disagreement between the Fregean and the DR-theorist on this score. The difference between them lies elsewhere: contrary to the Fregean, the DR-theorist makes a distinction between the proposition expressed and the complete object of the attitudes (henceforth to be called the “thought”). It is because of this distinction that the DR-view is not threatened by the Fregean argument.

3. THE NARROW CONTENT OF THOUGHT

The Fregean holds that an utterance $S(t)$ expresses a thought which involves a certain mode of presentation of the reference of t . As I have just said, there is no disagreement between the Fregean and the DR-theorist on this score. The direct-reference theorist accepts this characterization of the *thought* expressed by the utterance. He simply distinguishes the thought from the proposition expressed, which he takes to be singular (if t is a directly referential expression, e.g. a proper name or a demonstrative). In that way, the DR-theorist is able to account for the double intuition mentioned at the beginning of this paper without denying the cognitive significance of the mode of presentation of the reference.

Is the distinction between propositional content and thought acceptable to the Fregean? I think it is. Nothing prevents the Fregean from considering that the “proposition” which the direct-reference theorist distinguishes from the thought is merely an aspect of the thought. The Fregean might argue as follows:

Different thoughts may well have the same truth-conditions; in other words, truth-conditions determine *equivalence classes of thoughts*. Those equivalence classes of thoughts are what the DR-theorist calls “pro-

positions''. To say that an utterance *u* expresses the singular proposition *P* is to say that *u* expresses a thought that belongs to a certain class, namely the class of thoughts that are true if and only if *P*. On this account, the propositional content of an utterance is nothing other than the truth-conditional content of the thought expressed by that utterance.

In this way, the distinction between propositional content and thought is trivialized and made acceptable to the Fregean. To be sure, some DR-theorists would reject the argument above; they would deny that the propositional content of an utterance is "nothing other than" the truth-conditional content of the thought (in the intended sense of a conceptual identity between the notions "proposition expressed" and "truth-conditional content of the thought expressed"). But there is a minimal basis of agreement between the DR-theorist and a Fregean who accepts the intuitions underlying the DR-view. Both sides would agree that, if A is both the utterer of "My pants are on fire" and the person indicated in "His pants are on fire", then (i) "My pants are on fire" and "His pants are on fire" express different thoughts, (ii) both utterances, as well as the thoughts expressed by them, are true if and only if A's pants are on fire³, and (iii) one understands what is said (the proposition expressed) by one of these utterances if and only if one identifies A as the person *x* such that the utterance is true iff *x*'s pants are on fire. This is sufficient to justify the use of the singular proposition **<A, ξ's pants being on fire>** to represent both what is said and the truth-conditional content of the thoughts expressed by these two utterances. The propositional content of an utterance and the truth-conditional content of the thought expressed by that utterance can therefore be equated, as in Figure 1, even if it remains an open question whether or not the DR-theorist's notion of "what is said" or "proposition expressed" can be reduced to that of truth-conditional content of the thought.




Fig. 1

The Fregean and the DR-theorist also agree that the thought cannot be reduced to its truth-conditional content. "My pants are on fire" and "His pants are on fire" express different thoughts that have the same truth-conditional content. This unique content

is apprehended under two different modes of presentation. The thought therefore consists of a certain truth-conditional content under a certain mode of presentation. Note that, in the same way as a given content can be apprehended under different modes of presentation, it seems that different contents can be apprehended under the same mode of presentation. It can hardly be denied that there is something common to our thoughts when we both think something that we might express by uttering “My pants are on fire”. This common element cannot be the truth-conditional content of the thought, since our thoughts have different truth-conditional contents (my thought is true if and only if *my* pants are on fire, yours is true if and only if *your* pants are on fire). What is common can only be the mode of presentation, or the type of mode of presentation, under which these different contents are apprehended.

As John Perry has insisted, it is the mode of presentation, not the truth-conditional content of the thought, that is tied to behaviour and, more generally, accounts for the functional properties of the thought. When two different persons think “My pants are on fire”, they behave in the same way—e.g. by taking off their pants and shouting “Help!”, or by uttering “My pants are on fire!”—even though the truth-conditional content of their thoughts is different. This is because the mode of presentation is the same. On the other hand, the thoughts expressed by “My pants are on fire” and “His pants are on fire” have different behavioural consequences even though they have the same truth-conditional content in Kaplan’s example.⁴

The distinction between the mode of presentation, or *narrow* content, and the truth-conditional content of the thought parallels the distinction between the linguistic meaning of an utterance and the proposition it expresses. There is much in common between these two distinctions. Sentence meaning (“character”), in Kaplan’s two-tier theory, is a function from context to propositional content: the meaning of the sentence “My pants are on fire” determines that, when Paul utters it at time *t*, his utterance expresses the proposition that Paul’s pants are on fire at *t*. In the same way, the narrow content of thought has been described as a function from context to truth-conditional content (see e.g. Fodor 1987:47-8): the narrow content of the thought “My pants are on fire” determines that, when Paul entertains that narrow content at *t*, the thought he has on that occasion is true if and only if Paul’s pants are on fire at *t*.⁵ And just as the proposition that Paul’s pants are on fire can be expressed in different contexts by uttering different, non-synonymous sentences, it is possible to think that Paul’s pants are on fire by entertaining different narrow contents in different con-

texts. What we seem to have is a general distinction between two modes of individuation—“wide” and “narrow” individuation—applicable to both meaning and thought (McGinn 1982; Block 1986: 618-621)⁶. Indeed, many people refer to the linguistic meaning of an utterance as the “narrow meaning” of that utterance, in contrast to its propositional content.

Given the close parallelism between the two distinctions—meaning/proposition for utterances, and narrow content/truth-conditional content for thoughts—it is natural and tempting to equate meaning and narrow content, in the same way as we equated the proposition expressed and the truth-conditional content of the thought. On this simplified picture (Fig. 2), the narrow content of the thought expressed by an utterance is the meaning of the uttered sentence: the meaning of the sentence is what is “in the head” and accounts for the cognitive (and behavioural) significance of the utterance. By thus “entertaining” a certain meaning in a certain context, one apprehends a proposition—the truth-conditional content of the thought—in the same way as, by uttering a certain sentence in a certain context, one expresses a proposition.

<u>Utterance</u>		<u>Thought</u>
Linguistic meaning	=	narrow content
<i>vs</i>		<i>vs</i>
Proposition expressed	=	truth-conditional content

Fig. 2

The simplified view illustrated by Figure 2 is very widespread; one finds it, in particular, in the pioneering works of direct-reference theorists such as Kaplan and Perry, who use “character,” “sense” and “role” interchangeably to mean the meaning of the sentence or the narrow content of the thought expressed by the utterance. Equating narrow content with linguistic meaning enables Perry and Kaplan to account for the observation that our attitudes are sensitive to the mode of presentation of the reference. As we have seen, the meaning of a directly referential term such as “I”, which is the contribution made by that term to the meaning of the whole sentence, is a certain mode of presentation of its reference. To say that the narrow content of the thought is the meaning of the sentence therefore entails that the narrow content of the thought involves a mode of presentation of the reference. Hence, the observation which the Fregean argument presents as an objection to the DR-view can be straightforwardly accounted for within the latter, given the equation of narrow content with linguistic meaning (character).

Despite its boldness and initial appeal, I think the simplified

picture is seriously mistaken⁷. Narrow contents *cannot* be equated with linguistic meanings, or so I shall argue. In what follows, I will try to make this point by showing that there are crucial differences between the mode of presentation of the reference that constitutes the meaning of a directly referential term and the mode of presentation of the reference which the Fregean argument shows to be a constituent of (the narrow content of) the thought.

4. TWO TYPES OF MODES OF PRESENTATION: LINGUISTIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL

As I have just said, Kaplan and Perry use a single label (“character” for Kaplan, “role” or “sense” for Perry) to cover two quite different things. They start by defining the character/role of a word like “I” as follows: it is a rule which, given a context, determines the reference (the semantic value, the content) of that term in that context. Thus the character/role of “I” is the rule that “I” refers to the speaker, i.e. to the person who utters this token of “I”. By virtue of this linguistic rule, the reference of “I” is presented as being the speaker. The character/role of a word like “I” can therefore be described as a certain mode of presentation of the reference. Since this mode of presentation is determined by linguistic rules, I will call it the *linguistic* mode of presentation of the reference. It has the following properties:

(a) It is conventionally determined by the rules of the language. The way the reference of “I” is presented (viz., as being the speaker) is determined by the linguistic rule that “I” refers to the speaker. Kaplan (1989:505): “The character of an expression is set by linguistic conventions and, in turn, determines the content of the expression in every context. Because character is what is set by linguistic conventions, it is natural to think of it as meaning in the sense of what is known by the competent language user.”

(b) As a consequence of (a), the linguistic mode of presentation is constant and does not vary from context to context, contrary to the reference. Perry (1977:479): “When we understand a word like “today”, what we seem to know is a rule taking us from an occasion of utterance to a certain day. “Today” takes us to the very day of utterance, “yesterday” to the day before the day of utterance, “I” to the speaker, and so forth. I shall call this the *role* of a demonstrative. (. . .) The object a demonstrative takes us to in a given context, I shall call its value in that context or on that occasion of use. Clearly, we must grant “today” a role, the same on both occasions

of use. And we must, as clearly, give it different values on the two occasions.”

(c) In the case of indexical or “token-reflexive” words such as “I”, the reference of a token of the expression is presented as bearing a certain relation to this token: the reference of “I” is presented as being the utterer of this token, the reference of “you” as being the person to whom this token is addressed, the reference of “now” as being the time at which this token is uttered, and so on (see Reichenbach 1947, §50).

Now, as we have seen, Perry and Kaplan recognize that the singular proposition which they take to be the content of an utterance containing a directly referential term cannot be the complete object of the attitudes, since the latter are sensitive to the mode of presentation of the reference. The object of the attitudes is not the content, they say, but the content “under the character” imposed by the meaning of the sentence. The character thus plays an important role in the individuation of the attitudes. I may believe that Cicero is bald without believing that Tully is bald, even though “Cicero is bald” and “Tully is bald” express the same singular proposition; this is possible because the same proposition may be expressed under different characters. But there is a confusion here: the “character” (or “role”) which is crucially involved in the individuation of the attitudes is very different from the character which has the properties (a), (b) and (c) mentioned above. In what follows, I shall argue that the mode of presentation of the reference which is involved in the (narrow) individuation of the attitudes is a *psychological* mode of presentation—or mode of identification—of the reference, *distinct from* what I have just called the linguistic mode of presentation. Distinguishing between these two types of mode of presentation amounts to rejecting the claim that narrow content can be equated with character in the original sense, that is, with linguistic meaning.

Consider, again, Kaplan’s example. Suppose that, looking at the window and seeing there the reflected image of a man whose pants are on fire, I say: “His pants are on fire”. Unbeknownst to me, this man happens to be myself. Corresponding to my utterance, there is a certain belief which I entertain—the belief that this man’s pants are on fire. If I am mean and selfish, I may just laugh at the situation, instead of doing something to help the poor man. When I realize that I am the man whose image I see in the window, I exclaim: “*My* pants are on fire!”. Corresponding to this utterance, there is another belief—the belief that *my* pants are on fire. That this belief is different from the first one is shown by the fact that

it results in a different sort of behaviour—I immediately start doing something to stop the fire. In such a case, according to Perry and Kaplan, the same (singular) proposition is apprehended under different modes of presentation. This proposition involves a certain person—the person whose pants are on fire, namely, myself—who is thought of under different modes of presentation, a first-person mode of presentation in one case and a third-person mode of presentation in the other. The mode of presentation of the reference is not reflected in the proposition expressed, that is, in the content of the utterance (the same in both cases), but it plays a crucial role in the explanation and prediction of behaviour and therefore in the individuation of the belief expressed by the utterance.

Neither Kaplan nor Perry seems to realize that the mode of presentation that is involved here is very different from the linguistic mode of presentation. They use “character”, “role” or “sense” indiscriminately for both. But this will not do. We cannot, contrary to what they believe, equate the first-person mode of presentation of myself that occurs in my belief that my pants are on fire with the linguistic mode of presentation associated with the first person in English. The linguistic mode of presentation associated with “I” (or more generally with the first person) is something like “the person who utters T”, where “T” names the token of “I” that is being uttered. Now, I might possibly believe that the pants of the person who utters T are on fire, without realizing that I am the person who utters T, and therefore without behaving as I do when I realize that *my* pants are on fire. (A situation in which I do not realize that the person uttering a token is in fact me is not a very common situation, of course, but I take it not to be impossible.⁸) This shows that the psychological mode of presentation that occurs in my belief that my pants are on fire—i.e., the way I think of myself when I think that my pants are on fire—differs from the linguistic mode of presentation associated with the word “I”. I think of myself as *myself*, not as the utterer of such and such a token. Yet, if we turn from the thought expressed by the utterance to its linguistic meaning, we have no reason to deny that the reference of “I” is presented as being the speaker, by virtue of the linguistic rule that a token of “I” refers to the person who utters this token. All this raises no problem if we accept that the mode of presentation of the reference in the thought (psychological mode of presentation) is different in principle from the mode of presentation of the reference at the level of linguistic meaning (linguistic mode of presentation).

If we focus on the *psychological* modes of presentation associated with indexical expressions, we see that they have none of the three properties listed above as properties of linguistic modes of presenta-

tion. In particular, they do not have the third property, that of "token-reflexivity". A mode of presentation is token-reflexive when the reference is presented as bearing a certain relation R to the current token of the expressions whose reference it is. Now, in the case of "I" or other indexical expressions, it is intuitively clear that the psychological mode of presentation is not token-reflexive in this sense. There certainly are objects which I identify only indirectly, by their relations to something else, but it is paradoxical to claim that I identify *myself* (or the present time, or the present place) in that indirect way, as whatever bears a certain relation to an independently identified object. Even Russell, who went so far as to claim that we know material objects only by description, maintained that he was directly acquainted at least with *himself*. In general, there is something ludicrous in the suggestion that we think of the objects of our indexical thought as "whatever bears such and such relation to the present token", for it implies that we think of these objects only "by description", instead of being directly acquainted with them; a very paradoxical consequence, since the objects of our indexical thoughts are precisely the objects with which it seems that we are "directly acquainted", if there is anything like direct acquaintance.

The claim that psychological modes of presentation are token-reflexive would entail not only that the objects of our indexical thoughts are identified indirectly, by description, but also that they are identified in an objective (rather than a subjective) manner. As many philosophers have insisted after Castañeda (1966, 1967), we think of ourselves under an essentially subjective or *first-person* perspective: for any objective (i.e. third-person) description of myself as the F, it is possible for me not to realize that I am the F. In the same way, for any objective description of the present time (or of the present place) as the F, I might not realize that the present time (now) is the F, or that the present place (here) is the F. Given this fact, the psychological modes of presentation associated with indexical expressions such as "I", "now" or "here" *cannot* be token-reflexive, for token-reflexive modes of presentation appeal to *objective* relations between the token of the word and the reference of the token.

The psychological modes of presentation associated with indexical expressions can no more have the second property of linguistic modes of presentation than they can have the third property, that of token-reflexivity. As we have seen, the linguistic mode of presentation associated with an indexical expression does not vary from context to context, contrary to the reference of the expression; since it is set by conventions and belongs to the linguistic meaning of

the expression, the linguistic mode of presentation of the reference is constant from one occurrence of the expression to the next. What about psychological modes of presentation? Are they also constant from context to context? My answer is that they are not, and cannot be, given (i) their subjectivity, and (ii) their role in psychological explanations.

Let us start with a simple observation concerning the word ‘I’. That linguistic modes of presentation are constant entails in particular that the linguistic mode of presentation conventionally associated with the word ‘I’ is the same for the speaker and the hearer, as it is for any user of English. The constant meaning of ‘I’ is simply the rule that ‘I’ refers to the speaker; by virtue of this constant meaning, the reference of a token of ‘I’ is always presented as being the speaker. But the psychological mode of presentation of the reference, that is, the way the reference of ‘I’ is thought of, is not constant like the linguistic mode of presentation. When I utter ‘I am tired’, I think of *myself* as being tired; the psychological mode of presentation in this case is a first-person mode of presentation, as I pointed out earlier. But when *you* hear me say ‘I am tired’, you do not think of the reference under a first-person mode of presentation. Rather, you think: ‘*He* is tired’. The linguistic mode of presentation (‘the speaker’) is the same for speaker and hearer, but the psychological mode of presentation, that is, the mode of presentation of the reference that occurs in the thought associated with the utterance, is different for the thought expressed by the speaker and for the thought the hearer forms upon understanding the utterance. This form of nonconstancy goes along with the *subjectivity* of psychological modes of presentation.

To be sure, it would be possible to maintain that the psychological mode of presentation associated with ‘I’ is constant, merely by defining the psychological mode of presentation associated with an expression as *the mode of presentation of the reference in the thought of the speaker*, or alternatively as *the mode of presentation of the reference in the thought of the hearer who understands the utterance* (Evans 1982). Certainly, I think of myself under the same first-person mode of presentation when I say ‘I’ as you do when *you* say ‘I’: in this sense, the psychological mode of presentation associated with ‘I’ can be said to be constant. But the linguistic mode of presentation associated with ‘I’ has a stronger, unrelativized form of constancy. Two people, A and B, associate the same linguistic mode of presentation with the word ‘I’, no matter which one utters it. From A’s point of view, the reference of a token of ‘I’ is linguistically presented as being the speaker even if it is B who utters this token. On the

other hand, A does not think of the reference of a token of “I” as being *himself* if it is B who utters this token.

In any event, it cannot be maintained that psychological modes of presentation are constant even in the weaker, relativized sense. The linguistic meaning of the expression “this ship”, and therefore the linguistic mode of presentation of the reference, is constant from occurrence to occurrence: the reference is always presented as being a ship salient in the context of utterance. But the psychological mode of presentation is not constant. In fact, it cannot be. Consider the utterance “This ship <pointing to a ship through one window> is a steamer but this ship <pointing to a ship through another window> is not a steamer” and suppose that, unbeknownst to the speaker, the same, very long ship is being demonstrated twice.⁹ The speaker is not irrational even though she says of the same ship both that it is and that it is not a steamer. She is not irrational because she does not realize that there is only one ship; and she does not realize this because she thinks of the ship under two different (psychological) modes of presentation. In other words, we have to posit two different (psychological) modes of presentation of the reference, one corresponding to each token of the expression “this ship”, in order to make sense of the utterance. But there is only *one* linguistic mode of presentation, the same for both tokens of this expression. This provides us with a powerful argument to support the distinction between linguistic and psychological modes of presentation—an argument that can be formulated in quite general terms.

Psychological modes of presentation are needed to make sense of our attitudes—e.g. to make sense of the fact that we believe “Cicero is bald” while disbelieving “Tully is bald”. In order to play this role, psychological modes of presentation must obey what Schiffer (1978:180) calls “Frege’s Constraint”:

Necessarily, if *m* is a mode of presentation under which a minimally rational person *x* believes a thing *y* to be *F*, then it is not the case that *x* believes *y* not to be *F* under *m*. In other words, if *x* believes *y* to be *F* and also believes *y* not to be *F*, then there are distinct modes of presentation *m* and *m'* such that *x* believes *y* to be *F* under *m* and disbelieves *y* to be *F* under *m'*. Let us call this *Frege’s Constraint*: it is a constraint which any candidate must satisfy if it is to qualify as a mode of presentation. (. . .) In effect, Frege’s Constraint provides the motivation for the introduction of modes of presentation.

Frege’s Constraint provides the motivation for the introduction of *psychological* modes of presentation. But linguistic modes of presentation do not have to satisfy Frege’s Constraint. In the ship example,

there is only one linguistic mode of presentation: both tokens of “this ship” have the same linguistic meaning, by virtue of which they present their reference as a ship salient in the context of their utterance. However, Frege’s Constraint dictates that there be two different psychological modes of presentation involved in this example. Since the speaker is not irrational yet believes of a certain ship both that it is and that it is not a steamer, there must be two different (psychological) modes of presentation of this ship, m and m' , such that the speaker believes the ship to be a steamer under m and believes it not to be a steamer under m' . It follows that there is a difference between linguistic and psychological modes of presentation.¹⁰ Linguistic modes of presentation are constant from occurrence to occurrence, and do not satisfy Frege’s Constraint; psychological modes of presentation satisfy Frege’s Constraint, and are not constant from occurrence to occurrence.

What about the first property of linguistic modes of presentation, namely conventionality? Are psychological modes of presentation conventionally associated with linguistic expressions? A negative answer to this question follows immediately from what I have just said. If psychological modes of presentation are not constant from context to context, that is, if the same linguistic expression is sometimes associated with a certain psychological mode of presentation of the reference and sometimes with another, then psychological modes of presentation are not conventionally associated with linguistic expressions; for if they were, they would be constantly associated with those expressions. Thus it seems that psychological modes of presentation have none of the three characteristic properties of linguistic modes of presentation.

5. TYPES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL MODES OF PRESENTATION

In this section, I want to consider a possible defense of what I called the “simplified picture”, that is, of the view which equates the semantic and the psychological (both narrowly construed). The defense I have in mind is based on the distinction between psychological modes of presentation and types of psychological modes of presentation.

I said earlier that “I think of myself under the same first-person mode of presentation when I say ‘I’ as you do when you say ‘I’ ” (§4). What I meant when I said that was only that the same *type* of (psychological) mode of presentation was involved in both cases. In the same way, it seems that there is something common to all our thoughts involving “here”, even if that common constituent is not a complete psychological mode of presentation, subject to

Frege's Constraint, but merely a type of psychological mode of presentation. Given this distinction between psychological modes of presentation and their types, it is not sufficient to invoke the nonconstancy of psychological modes of presentation to dismiss the claim that they are conventionally associated with referring expressions. For the conventionality thesis might be understood as applying primarily to *types* of modes of presentation. On this weak interpretation of the conventionality thesis, psychological modes of presentation are "conventional" in the sense that they fall under types that are conventionally associated with linguistic expressions. Thus interpreted, the conventionality thesis does not entail the constancy of psychological modes of presentation (which Frege's Constraint rules out), but only the constancy of types of psychological modes of presentation.¹¹

What are we to think of the conventionality thesis, on this weak interpretation? The problem with this thesis is that it comports badly with the distinction between linguistic and psychological modes of presentation. If we accept both that thesis and that distinction, it seems that we are bound to have two sets of conventions: those which determine linguistic modes of presentation, and those associating referring expressions with types of psychological modes of presentation. For example, there would be two conventions governing the use of "I": the convention that "I" refers to the speaker, and the convention that "I" expresses the concept *Ego* (i.e. the concept, or type of psychological mode of presentation, that is common to my thoughts about myself and to your thoughts about yourself). Or, in the case of "here", there would be two conventions, the convention that "here" is used to talk about the place where one is, and the convention that "here" expresses what McGinn calls the "concept of spatial vicinity". Now, if this is not multiplying conventions beyond necessity, what is? Certainly, it would be more attractive to have only *one* set of conventions. Since linguistic modes of presentation are by definition conventional (insofar as they are linguistic, i.e. set by linguistic conventions), I see only two ways of achieving that aim, that is, to ways of having only one set of conventions involved:

- (1) We may accept the thesis that types of psychological modes of presentation are conventionally associated with linguistic expressions, and drop the distinction between types of psychological modes of presentation and linguistic modes of presentation. On this view, referring expressions are conventionally associated with types of psychological modes of presentation, and the linguistic meaning of a referring expression con-

sists in this association: there is no linguistic mode of presentation over and above the type of psychological mode of presentation with which a referring expression is conventionally associated. The type of psychological mode of presentation *is* the linguistic mode of presentation, on this view.¹² Thus, instead of taking the linguistic convention governing the use of ‘I’ to be the rule that ‘I’ refers to the speaker, one would take it to be the rule that ‘I’ is used to express the sui-generis concept *Ego*. In this framework, there is only one type of convention, the convention that pairs linguistic expressions with types of psychological modes of presentation.

(2) Alternatively, we may continue to distinguish types of psychological modes of presentation from linguistic modes of presentation, but say that the former are not conventional, contrary to the latter. On this view, there is only one set of conventions, those associating linguistic expressions with linguistic modes of presentation (which are *distinct from* types of psychological modes of presentation).

The second solution consists in maintaining a sharp distinction between the linguistic and the psychological, and rejecting the claim that types of psychological modes of presentation are conventionally associated with linguistic expressions. The first solution consists in maintaining that claim, and rejecting the sharp distinction between the linguistic and the psychological. Insofar as it attenuates the distinction between the linguistic and the psychological, the first solution is obviously in line with the “simplified picture”, which equates sentence meaning and narrow content. As against this picture, I argued in section 4 that psychological modes of presentation are neither constant nor (therefore) conventional, contrary to linguistic modes of presentation. But the simplified picture can be reinstated, in a weaker version, if one accepts the first solution above: if one cannot straightforwardly equate linguistic and psychological modes of presentation, because of the arguments presented in §4, nothing prevents one from equating linguistic modes of presentation and types of psychological modes of presentation, once it is admitted that the latter are constantly and conventionally associated with linguistic expressions. The essentials of the simplified picture are thereby preserved.

The view I have just sketched is not to be dismissed on *a priori* grounds. It is a serious theoretical possibility, which deserves to be considered. But I am far from sure that it can be worked out in a satisfactory way. How, for example, will it be extended so as to

account for the mode of presentation of the reference of “you”? Is there a communication-independent concept of *Alter-ego* that the word “you” could be said conventionally to express, in the same way as “I” expresses the communication-independent concept of *Ego*? In general, the problem with the first solution is that it forces us to abandon the classical view of the meaning of indexical expressions and leaves us with only the promise of a new theory. According to the classical, token-reflexive view, the meaning of an indexical like “I”, “you” or “here” is constituted by a reference rule governing the use of that indexical—the rule that “I” refers to the speaker, “you” to the addressee, “here” to the place of utterance, and so on. This rule determines the linguistic mode of presentation associated with a token of the expression—for example, the rule that “I” refers to the speaker determines that a token *t* of “I” presents its reference as being the utterer of *t*. No one has ever fully stated the alternative meaning theory for indexicals, with its alternative conventions. It is not even clear whether or not, in the alternative theory, the senses of indexicals could be displayed by reference rules, as they are in the classical theory.

Contrary to the first one, the second solution enables one to preserve the classical semantic theory for indexicals. For this reason, I think the second solution is preferable if it can be made to work. I also believe that it *can* be made to work. Let me briefly indicate how.

6. MEANING AND THOUGHT

The second solution consists in rejecting the conventionality thesis and saying that psychological modes of presentation are not conventional, not even in the weak sense: types of psychological modes of presentation are not *conventionally* associated with referring expressions, and the only conventions there are associate the latter with linguistic modes of presentation, which are *not* identical to types of psychological modes of presentation. As far as “I” is concerned, the only relevant convention is the convention that “I” refers to the speaker; this convention determines the linguistic mode of presentation associated with “I” (“the person who utters this token”), and the linguistic mode of presentation, in turn, *nonconventionally* determines the (type of) psychological mode of presentation, i.e. the way the reference is thought of.¹³

The problem, with this view, consists in making sense of the claim that types of psychological modes of presentation (ψ -types, for short) are nonconventionally determined by linguistic modes of presentation. Something has to be said about how this is done. Peacocke, who believes that the only convention governing “I” is

the rule that ‘I’ refers to the speaker, suggests the following mechanism. The concept *Ego* is expressed by a use of ‘I’ because normally the speaker who uses ‘I’ fully realizes that *he* (= *Ego*) is the speaker and intends to refer to *himself* (= *Ego*) by saying ‘I’. Since it is mutually manifest that the speaker fully realizes that he is the speaker and intends to refer to himself by saying ‘I’, an utterance in the first person is naturally and correctly taken as ‘an expression of the first-person way of thinking’ (Peacocke 1983:138). There is no more than that to the association between ‘I’ and the concept *Ego*.

This solution raises two serious problems. If ψ -types are not conventionally associated with linguistic expressions, how are we to account for the intuition that they are ‘directly expressed’ by indexical expressions, as McGinn says (McGinn 1983:66)? There seems to be a very intimate relationship between an indexical expression and the (subjective) ψ -type associated with that expression. This seems hardly consistent with the view under discussion. According to this view, the utterance ‘I am French’ means that *the speaker* is French, and expresses the first-person thought that *Ego* is French merely because (it is mutually manifest that) the speaker thinks ‘the speaker = *Ego*’. The association between the first person and the concept *Ego* is only *common* or *normal*, on this view: it depends on the speaker’s realizing that he or she is the speaker. To be sure, the speaker normally realizes that he or she is the speaker, but it is possible for him or her not to realize this, as we saw earlier (§4). Thus, far from capturing the intimate relationship between the first person and the concept *Ego*, the view under discussion makes the tie between the expression and the associated ψ -type particularly loose and shaky.

The second problem is closely related to the first. The speaker might know not only that she is the speaker, but also that she is Paul’s sister, hence that the speaker = Paul’s sister; and the fact that she knows all this might be mutually manifest. Nevertheless, no one would conclude that her utterance ‘I am French’ expresses the thought ‘Paul’s sister is French’. In other words, even if it is mutually manifest that (for some ϕ) the speaker knows ‘the speaker = ϕ ’, it does not necessarily follow that the speaker’s utterance of ‘I am French’ expresses the thought that ϕ is French. Why, then, does this inference pattern work when the relevant ϕ is the concept *Ego*?

Both problems can be solved, I believe, by appealing to the notion of immunity to error through misidentification, understood in the way Evans proposes (Evans 1982).¹⁴ Criticizing Wittgenstein, who implicitly restricted this notion to self-ascriptions of mental prop-

erties, Evans has shown that it also applies to self-ascriptions of *physical* properties. Beliefs such as “My legs are crossed”, when they are acquired in the normal, kinesthetic way (“from the inside”, as one might say), are immune to error through misidentification, in the following sense: the information that someone’s legs are crossed (i.e. the information that the predicate ξ ’s legs are crossed is instantiated) is not given independently of, and cannot be dissociated from, the information that *I* am the person whose legs are crossed; hence it does not make sense to ask “Someone’s legs are crossed, but is it I whose legs are crossed?” As Evans says, “there just does not appear to be a gap between the subject’s having information (or appearing to have information), in the appropriate way, that the property of being *F* is instantiated, and his having information (or appearing to have information) that *he* is *F*” (Evans 1982:221).

To be sure, the same belief will not have the property of immunity to error through misidentification if it is *not* formed in the normal way. If, when anaesthetized, I see my legs in a mirror, and discover that they are crossed, I gain the belief that my legs are crossed, but this belief may be erroneous through misidentification: I may have misidentified the person whose legs are crossed (I may have been right in forming the belief that someone’s legs were crossed, but wrong in equating that person with myself). In that case, there is a gap between the information that the predicate is instantiated and the information that it is I who instantiate the predicate. In the other case (when the belief is formed in the normal way, “from the inside”), there is no such gap. If it turns out that I was mistaken in believing that *my* legs were crossed, I have no longer any reason to believe that *anyone*’s legs are crossed. As Evans (1982: 221) puts it,

We cannot think of the kinaesthetic and proprioceptive system as gaining *knowledge* of truths about the condition of a body which leaves the question of the identity of the body open. If the subject does not know that *he* has his legs bent (say) on this basis . . . , then he does not know *anything* on this basis. (To judge that *someone* has his legs bent would be a wild shot in the dark.)

The same thing can obviously be said of the belief that I am the person uttering the words now being uttered. When it is acquired in the normal way, this belief is immune to error through misidentification. The information that someone is uttering this token is not given independently of (and cannot be dissociated from) the information that *I* am uttering this token. Hence, the concept of “utterer of this token” (i.e., the linguistic mode of presentation of the reference of “I”) cannot be dissociated from that of *Ego* (i.e., from

the corresponding ψ -type), in a normal situation. This is so from the point of view of the speaker, of course; but it is mutually manifest that this is so, hence it is mutually manifest that an utterance in the first person expresses a thought involving the concept *Ego*.

What I have just said can be generalized to the various ψ -types associated with indexical expressions. In the same way as the belief that I (*Ego*) am uttering these words is immune to error through misidentification when it is acquired in the normal way, the belief that this token is being uttered now (*Hic*), or here (*Nunc*), is also immune to error through misidentification when it is acquired in the normal way; there is no gap between the information that this token is uttered and the information that it is uttered here and now. (If it turned out that I were wrong in forming the latter belief, I would have no reason to retain the former.) This shows that in a normal situation the concepts, or ψ -types, *Hic* and *Nunc* are indissociable from the linguistic modes of presentation “place at which this token is uttered” and “time at which this token is uttered”, in the same way as the concept *Ego* is indissociable from the linguistic mode of presentation “utterer of this token”.

Let us now consider how the two problems I mentioned are solved by appealing to the property of immunity to error through misidentification. The intuition that types of psychological modes of presentation are directly expressed by indexical expressions is easily accounted for: this intuition comes from the fact that, in a normal situation, there is no gap between the concept that constitutes the linguistic mode of presentation (e.g. that of utterer of this token) and the ψ -type (*Ego*). On the one hand, the linguistic mode of presentation is conventionally associated with the expression; on the other hand, there is no gap between the ψ -type and the linguistic mode of presentation. It follows that the association between the expression and the ψ -type is as direct as possible—as direct as it would be if it were conventional, even though it is *not* conventional.

It is no less easy to explain why “I am French”, uttered by Paul’s sister, expresses the thought that she herself (= *Ego*) is French and *not* the thought that Paul’s sister is French, even though it is mutually manifest that she believes both “the speaker = *Ego*” and “the speaker = Paul’s sister”. The explanation is straightforward: there is a special relationship, from the point of view of the speaker, between the concept “utterer of this token” and the concept *Ego*, when the speaker has acquired the belief that she is the speaker in the normal way; but there is no such relationship between the concept “utterer of this token” and the concept “Paul’s sister”, in whatever way one gains the belief that Paul’s sister is the speaker.

In other words, it is not sufficient, for a concept ϕ to be expressed by an expression conventionally referring to the G, that the speaker be mutually known to believe that ϕ is the G; there must be an especially intimate relationship between the concept of being ϕ and that of being the G. This specially intimate relationship is what Evans describes when he says that there is no gap between the information that something is the G and the information that ϕ is the G, when the latter information is acquired in the normal way. Such a relationship exists in the case of *Ego* and “the speaker”, but it is missing in the case of “the speaker” and “Paul’s sister”.

7. CONCLUSION

It is important to realize that the wide/narrow distinction applies to both utterances and thoughts. To realize this is to realize that there are *indexical* thoughts, in the same way as there are indexical sentences. In both cases, there is a difference between the content the sentence or the thought has independent of context, and the content it has by virtue of its occurrence in a particular context. Obvious though it may now seem, this analogy between utterance and thoughts has not always been recognized.¹⁵ It has too often been suggested that indexicality characterizes natural language sentences *qua* communicative devices, as opposed to thoughts. Thoughts were traditionally taken to be much more like so-called eternal sentences than like the ordinary, heavily context-dependent sentences of natural language.

My purpose in this paper was not to argue in favor of the analogy between thoughts and indexical sentences. Rather, taking this analogy for granted, I have tried to show that it should not be pressed too far. If I am right, we must resist the temptation to *equate* the narrow content of an indexical thought and the linguistic meaning (the “character”) of the sentence used to express that thought. When the sentence includes an expression that we would classify as directly referential, for example a pronoun such as “I” or “you”, or a demonstrative such as “this ship”, both the linguistic meaning of the sentence and the narrow content of the thought involve a mode of presentation of the reference. But this cannot be used to support the equation of linguistic meaning and narrow content, for I have argued that the linguistic mode of presentation that is part of the meaning of the sentence is crucially different from the psychological mode of presentation that is part of the narrow content of the thought expressed by this sentence. Once it is realized that a distinction must be made between the two sorts of modes of presentation, hence between sentence meaning and narrow con-

tent, the difficult problem of their relationship arises. This is a deep and fascinating issue, which I could only touch upon in the last part of the paper. Whether they agree or disagree with the solution I have sketched, I hope my readers will be convinced that the matter is worthy of serious consideration.*

NOTES

¹Evans 1982:126-7. Note that the second intuition, the one about understanding, is much more congenial to Evans's than to Kaplan's position.

²Or, perhaps, a mode of presentation of that property. I leave this complication aside.

³Note that, in order to accept (ii), a Fregean has to admit that the way the reference of e.g. the pronoun "my" (or "his") is thought of is bound to be nondescriptive, for a descriptive mode of presentation would contribute something to the truth-condition of the thought. Neo-Fregeans who, like Evans, insist that Fregean senses need not be descriptive, do so precisely because they accept the intuitions of the direct-reference theorist.

⁴As many people pointed out (e.g. Evans 1982:203, McCulloch 1989:210-5), it would be a mistake to claim that *only* "narrow" contents—i.e. what I have just called "modes of presentation" as opposed to the truth-conditional contents of thoughts—can be used in psychological explanations of behaviour. Psychological explanations of (object-involving) actions typically mention "wide", truth-conditional contents. This is so in particular when there is no divergence between what is done and the subject's representation of what is done. The retreat to narrow contents in psychological explanations is made necessary when there are such divergences, i.e. when what the agent tries to do is not what she does.

⁵Many philosophers dislike the notion of narrow content because narrow content is context-independent and this feature seems to entail a Cartesian, individualistic picture of the mental. Elsewhere I have argued that the notion of narrow content is actually consistent with anti-individualism but I cannot discuss this here. See my "Externalism and Narrow Content" (forthcoming).

⁶In both cases, the wide/narrow distinction can be made salient by contrasting two types of report. In reporting speech as well as in reporting thought, one can use *oratio recta* or *oratio obliqua*. In *oratio obliqua*, what is reported is the (wide) content of speech or the (wide) content of thought; in *oratio recta*, what is reported is the way that content is presented (i.e. the meaning of the uttered sentence in a case of reported speech, or the narrow content of thought in a case of reported thought).

⁷I am not the first to criticize the simplified picture. My predecessors include Evans (1982: 300-3), Wettstein (1986), Taschek (1987), and Castañeda (1989:133-6).

⁸Peacocke describes such a situation: "An utterance can occur and I be its producer without my knowing that I am its producer. I and my twin brother may be in the same room, and both of us may try to utter the same sentence. If the vocal cords of one of the two of us are inoperative—we do not know which—and the normal forms of feedback which would tell one of us that he and not the other had produced the utterance have been severed, then neither of us will know whether he issued the utterance; but one of us did" (Peacocke 1983:134). This type of situation was originally imagined by Nozick (1981:72).

⁹I borrow this example from Perry (1977:483) through Evans (1982:84). Wettstein (1986:195-6) uses the same type of example to show that cognitive significance cannot be accounted for in terms of linguistic meaning. See also LePore & Loewer 1986:602.

¹⁰This example, and the conclusions based on it, could be dismissed on the grounds that the expression "this ship" is, in Kaplan's terms, a "true demonstrative" rather than a "pure indexical" (Kaplan 1989:490-1). According to Kaplan, pure indexicals like "I", "here", "now", and so forth, are semantically complete in a sense in which demonstratives like "he" or "this ship" are not. Their conventional meaning fully determines a "character", that is, a function from context to reference, whereas in the case of true demonstratives a character is attached not to the expression in isolation, but to the expression *in conjunction with a demonstration*. Now if, following Kaplan, we take the demonstrative-cum-demonstration, rather than the demonstrative in isolation, to be the relevant semantic unit, we can no longer

analyze the ship example by saying that the psychological mode of presentation varies from occurrence to occurrence, for in that example we do not have two occurrences of the *same* demonstrative-*cum*-demonstration. The demonstrative (i.e. the linguistic expression) is the same, but the demonstration (the pointing) has changed. (See Wettstein 1986:196 fn.)

I think that Kaplan's distinction between true demonstratives and pure indexicals, and his original suggestions concerning the semantics of true demonstratives, raise a number of difficulties; however, I need not address this issue here, because examples involving true demonstratives in Kaplan's sense are not essential to my argument. Consider the following example, which involves a pure indexical. A friend and I, visiting a foreign city, stop by a restaurant in the morning and my friend says: "It would be nice to have dinner here". I agree. Later on, we stop by the same place, and my friend says again: "It would be nice to have dinner here." But I don't recognize the place and I disagree.—Again, we have two utterances of the same sentence ("It would be nice to have dinner here") which express the same proposition under the same character. Since what is involved is "here", a pure indexical by Kaplan's standards, it is not possible to argue that the character has changed even though the sentence is the same. Yet the cognitive significance of one utterance is different from that of the other, as witnessed by the fact that I assent to one while dissenting from the other.

As Christopher Peacocke pointed out to me, there is a problem with this example: it involves judgements made at different times, and this might be thought sufficient to account for the case without having to posit two different psychological modes of presentation. I am not convinced that the time difference is relevant here; even if it is, however, this feature of the example can be abstracted from, for it is not necessary for two tokens of a pure indexical to be associated with different psychological modes of presentation that they be uttered in different contexts; the only thing that is necessary is that they be *believed* to have been uttered in different contexts. Thus we have only to imagine a situation in which it is wrongly believed that two tokens of a pure indexical are uttered in different contexts and refer to different objects; in such a situation the two tokens will be associated with different psychological modes of presentation. (I agree that such a situation is hard to imagine, but the reasons why it is are irrelevant to the issue under discussion.)

¹¹An argument for the constancy of types of psychological mode of presentation can be found in McGinn 1983:64-6.

¹²Insofar as it is identical to the type of psychological mode of presentation, the linguistic mode of presentation would not possess the property of token-reflexivity; but it would retain the two other properties—constancy and conventionality.

¹³This is, roughly, the view held by Evans (1982:313-5) and Peacocke (1983:137-9).

¹⁴Evans's views on this topic are unrelated to his view (similar to Peacocke's or to mine) concerning the nonconventional relation between an expression and the way the reference of that expression is thought of.

¹⁵Its recognition was pressed upon philosophers by Castañeda's insistence on the irreducible subjectivity of first-person thoughts as well as by Putnam's "twin-earth" thought-experiments.

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