Genre and Metaphors of Embodiment

Voice, View, Setting and Event

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Abstract

This thesis is concerned with the ways in which meaning is generically mediated in the novel. In particular it addresses the productive diversity of meanings generated by critical interpretation and asks how, given this diversity, comprehension and consensus might be possible. I argue that the construction of subject, object, space and time is achieved in the novel through different manifestations of four key metaphors: voice, view, setting and event. These metaphors supply meanings that rely on a common experience of embodiment. Embodiment supplies the basis for an intersubjectively established consensus which identifies subjects and objects in terms that correspond to the semiotic, syntagmatic and semantic uses of metaphor.

I begin by surveying and reviewing certain constructionist accounts of language and meaning in order to establish the importance of metaphor in conveying meaning in rhetorical, rather than linguistic, terms. I then discuss two examples of continental philosophy on speech: Derrida on voice and Foucault on discourse. I demonstrate how meaning is rhetorically constructed according to the use to which metaphors are put—whether they denote formal, semantic, or functional aspects of meaning—through an explication of Foucault’s theory, reserving Derrida’s grammatology for my analysis of the stabilisation of meaning in the theory of certain narratologists (Gérard Genette and Marie-Laure Ryan). Voice and view are key terms in literary theory, and I examine refinements to these metaphors in Genette and Ryan. The insistence of these narratologists on restricting the rhetorical dimension of meaning undermines the value of the literary work, prompting me to argue for a relaxing of such constraints. I read Peter Carey’s True History of the Kelly Gang for its uses of voice and point of view, many of which expose the limitations of the narratological approach.

This is a theoretical thesis, which engages a wide range of perspectives—constructionist, deconstructionist, sociological and structuralist—together with their various accounts of language, metaphor, speech and meaning. In terms of sociological
approaches to genre and discourse, I employ the chronotope as a critical tool, examining it in the context of the theme of the country house to demonstrate the role of two of my key metaphors, setting and event, which are important for the construction of space and time in abstract terms. Focusing on novels by Jane Austen, Virginia Woolf, and Kazuo Ishiguro, in which the country house defines the space and the temporality through which thematic and “material” elements are mediated, I reveal how the chronotope supplies an overarching coherence that unites thought and event in narrative.

My readings of these novels describe a theory that is concerned with the rhetorical capacities of genre rather than with taxonomic constructions of form. To this end I argue that the metaphorical dimensions of narrative—voice, view, setting and event—be loosely drawn, according to the acknowledged mutability of genre. I also emphasise the constructive effect of metaphor whilst according it a rhetorical versatility consistent with the mutability and instability of genre as a semiotic tool, concluding that consensus is achieved in our readings of novels through the form’s reliance on these four key metaphors of embodiment. These metaphors have ordinary, everyday, widespread usage beyond narrative theory; in appreciating their rhetorical value, it must be noted nonetheless that any confusion that ensues is productive, for it results in the diversities of meaning and form celebrated in the literary work.
Declaration

This is to certify that:
(i) the thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD except where indicated in the Preface,
(ii) due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used,
(iii) the thesis is fewer than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies and appendices.

Signed

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Acknowledgments

Researching and writing a doctoral thesis is a long and arduous task and I am very much indebted, for their support and encouragement, to the many individuals who, in vernacular sixteenth-century English (as William Tyndale would have it), I might have once called—without any suggestion of impropriety or promiscuity—my lovers. The term seems apt to me here because it imparts a fuller sense of the gratitude that I feel for those who have given me guidance and support. First and foremost, because she helped me cross the line—and did so with erudition, kindness and warmth—I want to thank and acknowledge the benefit of experience and the encouragement given to me by my supervisor, Professor Deirdre Coleman. Professor John Frow, who supervised the thesis in its earlier stages, generously reviewed it in its final iterations—and I am very grateful for the time and effort he gave to ensuring that I produced a work that was scholarly, well reasoned and well researched in its theoretical framework. I am further indebted to Professor Frow for permitting me to use in this thesis the material on the work of Mark Johnson, Hans Wolf, and Kenneth Gergen, which I had prepared as his research assistant. Along with Professor Frow, my associate supervisor Dr. Clara Tuite was instrumental in my undertaking the doctoral degree at The University of Melbourne. Her encouragement, advice and support then and throughout has been a key factor in my achievement. Professor Ken Gelder and Dr. Marion J. Campbell, as members of my Advisory Committee, also furnished me with valuable insights and feedback about my work, and I want to thank them also.

A significant portion of Chapter 4 of this thesis was published as an article in a special edition of The Journal for the Association for the Study of Australian Literature (JASAL) in 2010. I want to thank Dr. Russell Smith, of the ANU College of the Arts and Social Sciences, for the attention he gave to helping me transform my essay into a published article and for the improvements to the thesis that resulted from this. This chapter was in many ways the basis for the argument that I subsequently developed concerning the role of metaphor in narrative, and his assistance in helping me to find my own voice cannot be underestimated in this respect. And, although Shakespeare plays only a minor part in this thesis, the difficulties I encountered in terms of interpretation and the relevance of genre, led me to consider the role of genre more thoroughly. To this end I am grateful to the School of Culture and Communication for supplying, through the Amy Gaye Cowper Tennent Memorial Scholarship, the funding to travel to Stratford for research during an earlier course of study and subsequently to attend a number of
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Introduction. Genre and Metaphor

In April 2006, I travelled to the United Kingdom, spending the duration of my sixteen-day trip at Stratford-upon-Avon where I researched the ownership and title of the Hathaway family holdings at Shottery. Of particular interest to me was a document of 1610 granting freehold to Anne Shakespeare’s brother, Bartholomew Hathaway. This document revealed that the Hathaway family farm (generally referred to as Hewlands) was known by various parts as Hewlyn, Hewlyns Close, Palmers Close, Hewlands Close and Hewlands. While at Stratford, I also located documents dating further back, which showed that the property had been known by these names for some time within the family’s history, and well before Anne Hathaway’s birth. It was the prefix “Hew” that held my attention. I had formed an impression about Shakespeare’s sonnet 20, widely taken to address a young, feminised male. The idea I had was that—rather than the expression of sexual interest or indebtedness to a young patron, as the scholarship insisted—the poem described familial bonds. My thoughts on reading this sonnet were that the opening term of address, “Master Mistress,” applied, not to a young man, but to an infant—and, subsequently, that the sexual references were related to potency, conception and the rhetorically emphasised realisation of the poet’s desire in the birth of male and female twins; at the same time this rhetoric elaborated the resemblance of the child/children to their mother.

The rhetorical trope in question was hendiadys—two into one. And I proposed that Shakespeare had not only identified this figure in his twin infants, Hamnet and Judith, but also in the duplication that he noted of the parents’ sexes, which were, quite naturally, male and female. I thought that the poem specifically addressed the boy Hamnet, since all reference to the feminine nature of this double-figured person was quickly diverted to elaborating the femininity of the mother and the fairs and faults of women in general—the infant Judith was largely neglected, in other words. Further, I found the sonnet to be playful in tone—not mournful or aggressive as generally suggested—and that, rather than depicting admiration for a young man who is sexually unavailable to the poet, the poem displayed a father’s pride at having produced a male heir. I thought that it josted, humorously, with the notion that, at the time of Hamnet’s birth, he was next in line (that is, after his uncle Bartholomew) to inherit Hewlands. Of course, other heirs would precede him, as Shakespeare well knew. Hamnet’s early death
did not deprive him of that property as it was unlikely that he would ever have succeeded
to it given that Bartholomew’s as yet unborn children would have the prior claim. But it
struck me, that in making this point, this was a sonnet that celebrated a moment—
however transitory and impossible its claims might have been. And it seemed to me that,
more than four hundred years later, we could not see it in these terms because the
accretion of knowledge and event obscured the nature of this poem and the quality of
the poet’s experience. We knew too much of what came after to read the sonnet as the
evocation of an instant in time and the expression of feelings that attended it.

The problem with my reading was one of scholarship. I had read widely and was
well aware of the new historicist’s approach, but I wanted to achieve something that even
this methodology could not confidently suggest in the face of so much critical opinion to
the contrary. The broad practice of Shakespearean scholars was to laud Shakespeare’s
uniqueness, his versatility and his defiance of generic conventions in the plays, but to
insist upon the relevance of genre in the Sonnets. I was suggesting an interpretation that
was inconsistent with the conventions of the Petrarchan sonnet upon which
Shakespeare’s Sonnets were believed to be based. By this reasoning, since familial love is
not a Petrarchan theme, it must be excluded from any analysis of the poems. And yet,
there was, in the poetry of Shakespeare’s contemporary Ben Jonson, an example of
something very close to the sonnet form put to just such use. In an anthology of 1616,
Jonson published two twelve-line poems on the deaths of a daughter (“On My First
Daughter”) and a son (“On My First Son”). These poems are identified as epigrams
rather than sonnets, and this identification of form, made by the poet himself, enables
the critic to resolve their personal nature, which would otherwise breach the conventions
of the epigram, in that the form is generally light in tone and thus not typically associated
with grief and loss (see Ferguson, Salter and Stallworthy *The Norton Anthology of Poetry*
323-24).¹ The critic is able to overcome any inconsistency here because the intention of
the poet is obvious in these poems: metaphor and allusion are largely absent because the
poems recount, in straightforward terms, the story of the poet’s loss together with
Jonson’s and his wife’s grief and consolation. Had Jonson chosen the sonnet form
instead, the clarity of his intention would have remained—the form itself would not have
obscured so direct an expression of meaning.

Genre clearly has a considerable stake in interpretation. Jonson’s choice of form elides the controversy that might have ensued had he chosen to present these meditations on loss in a form that typically conveys the speaker’s sexual interest in the poem’s subject. Nonetheless, as the subject matter of his epigrams reveals, generic conventions are not fixed. And, as this introduction will show, literary genres are not clean-cut, distinct units of writing whose attributes might be identified and guaranteed simply by naming; genres are mutable, ill-defined and changeable—their metaphorical borders (their “internal” and “external” features) are constantly changing. On this view, it might well be asked, if genres are so precarious, what point can there be in studying literary genre theory? The point, I would argue, is that genre theory is not the taxonomy I set out briefly above—though it relies upon taxonomic observation as a critical tool when weighing the different critical interpretations it might make—but a poetics that remarks upon identifiable attributes of literary creation, and which endeavours to interpret texts by reading through the complex and mutable relations that genre mediates. Genre theory provides a means of identifying and understanding the broad parameters by which meaning is organised—and organised to the point where diverse possibilities for interpretation become apparent.2

My research into the Hathaway family holdings was made in order to determine the potential relevance of the word “hew” in line 7 of sonnet 20: “A man in hew, all Hews in his controwling” (original emphasis and spelling). The capitalised Hews suggested a proper name and my research at Stratford enabled me to demonstrate that it was possible to read this phrase as a pun relating to Hamnet Shakespeare and the Hathaway family in doting on its heir. Nonetheless, the text’s generic status confounds my reading. This line, given in any other form, might be read as I have suggested; but the Petrarchan sonnet form excludes a meaning that suggests filial rather than amatory love. I cannot demonstrate how this poem might be read as an expression of paternal pride while its form shapes critical opinion by insisting that sexual desire constitutes the speaker’s position. In other words, I cannot achieve consensus.

This question of consensus—of how consensus is achieved—is central to this thesis. But I want to stress that consensus is always contingent—it adapts to changes in

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2 John Frow notes that “[g]eneric structure both enables and restricts meaning, and is a basic condition for meaning to take place.” John Frow, Genre, The New Critical Idiom (London: Routledge, 2006) 10.
knowledge and circumstance. Before the literary text is written, and before the conventions of form are acknowledged, understood, acted upon, or responded to, the writer has considerable—possibly endless—scope in terms of subject matter and meaning. Yet a critic, a reader, and even the author of the work itself, cannot always know what comes first: the sense of something in need of expression, or the decision to create meaning within a particular set of artistic expectations. This means that the shaping of the work is potentially a haphazard affair. Practise and experience may result in habits of composition that will sometimes intrude upon the idea in its early stages. A writer might introduce elements that go beyond the chosen genre, or she might come to the task with little attention to form so that form develops chaotically and organically, with artistic choices then being brought to bear on the work so as to render it recognisable and acceptable to a reader. Genre supplies these choices because it helps shape readers’ expectations. And this is important to the writer because genre’s relevance is also aesthetic. It is not simply a tool for the mediation of meaning but constitutes a range of artistic choices.

These artistic choices are inextricably tied to choices of relevance and meaning. Writers and artists organise their creative output along the same lines by which their everyday efforts at communication are organised. Elaborating, integrating, opposing, condensing, and repositioning these fundamental elements of communication introduces the subtleties of style and composition that we come to expect from art—this is how art makes meaningful that which is mundanely apparent. I make this point here because, in this thesis, I argue that genre is a rhetorical relation; and by this I mean that it results in choices about how to portray subjects, objects, events and the relations between these—and in particular, whether to construe the conceptualisations pertaining to these as external form, internal content, or as the relation existing between form and content, as well as between objects and events. E.D. Hirsch (Validity in Interpretation 1967) and Alastair Fowler (Kinds of Literature 1982) describe this relation in different terms, but terms which nonetheless hinge upon the persuasive effect of establishing relations between texts and genres: genre supplies a broad set of conventions with which to approach the tasks of communication and interpretation. These conventions—though

they are characterised as rules—correspond, as Adena Rosmarin (*The Power of Genre* 1985) observes, to a particular rhetorical figure, that of metaphor.5 Literary genres, I argue, are collections of metaphors that, when taken literally, determine the subject matter and manner of expression, but they are also formed according to the ways in which the metaphors oscillate in terms of any given meaning—whether meaning is designed to function, signify or convey semantic content.

The question of genre’s relevance to critical interpretation thus centres on the mediation of meaning. Specifically, in terms of this thesis, it relates to questions of how genre affects the mediation of meaning in the novel. And if we are to grasp the significance of verisimilitude in the novel beyond the realist mode, then the question must be further refined. How, we might ask, are the meanings that sustain the construction of subjects and objects (in basic relations of verisimilitude) established? I argue in this thesis that this is achieved through our shared conceptions of four key metaphors—voice, view, setting and event—whose rhetorical values are nonetheless contingent and that this contingency enables the refinement of meaning in three broad terms, as: syntagmatic (relating to function and/or systematic relations), semiotic (of form), and semantic (of content). In developing my argument, I rely on the work of Mark Johnson whose *The Body in the Mind* (1987)6 builds on the insights that he and George Lakoff presented in their seminal work, *Metaphors We Live By* (1980),7 in which they established the importance of metaphor in the elaboration of abstract thought as it is based on material objects and the relations between these. Our capacity to see, hear, feel, taste and to move through the world supplies us with experiences that are translatable in abstract terms: thoughts become mobilised, meaning is evoked through metaphoric language that uses everyday terms and objects to convey what would otherwise be an indescribable abstract relation. If I say that I am going to table my thoughts, if I propose to re-jig genre theory by reorganising the interrelations between the theories and their proponents, I am relying on metaphors founded on physical objects and relations to convey my meaning. But even should I attempt to use less

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7 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)
colloquial expressions—even should I adopt a kind of empirical speech that strives to
describe only what is actually apparent, without recourse to any colourful descriptive
language, I cannot help but rely on metaphors in some form. Here the social theorist
Kenneth Gergen’s insights on the nature of empirical description (Toward Transformation
in Social Knowledge 1982)—on the inherent and inescapable strategy of forming and
expressing value judgments in any descriptive process—will be used to support my
argument, as will the work of Jacques Derrida, and of Mark Johnson and his followers.9
These theorists supply arguments that enable me to demonstrate the conceptual
movement that metaphors perform—the blurring of boundaries and the slide from one
meaning into another through relations of contiguity.

The importance of metaphors relating to bodily experience can be seen in a
branch of genre theory known broadly as rhetorical genre theory, which might include
critics (though they do not necessarily identify with the term specifically) like: Adena
Rosmarin, who emphasises the rhetorical relation of metaphor at work in identifying a
text with a particular genre; Franco Moretti (Signs taken For Wonders 1983),10 who argues
that genres have rhetorical import and represent certain possibilities within a
heterogeneous collection of possible “world views”; Mikhail Bakhtin, who identifies the
social impressions of voice and language as these are brought to significance in speech
and the role of generic space and time in discourse; John Frow (Genre 2006), Tony
Bennett (Outside Literature 1990),11 Michel Foucault (The Archaeology of Knowledge 1972)12
and any theorist who acknowledges the shaping of social forces through the mediation of

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8 Kenneth J. Gergen, Toward Transformation in Social Knowledge, Springer Series in Social
9 The texts by Derrida to which I refer are: Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl’s
Retreat of Metaphor,” Enclitic 2.2 (1978); Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
10 Franco Moretti, Signs Taken for Wonders: Essays in the Sociology of Literary Forms, trans. Susan
Fischer, David Forgacs and David Miller (London: Verso, 1983).
12 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Routledge,
1972).
meaning that genre enables; Jacques Derrida, as the self-styled (self-aware) grammatologist who brought to the world’s attention the constructive effect of rhetoric across all disciplines (even philosophy) and who remarks specifically upon the delimiting scope of genre as another example of the reification of concepts; and, less esteemed critically, perhaps, but no less important, the field of creative writing, where the constructive power of the utterance is celebrated and sought—a field in which the demonstration of those compositional skills inherent to the genre of the novel (the genre that is the subject of scrutiny in this thesis) are openly valued for their constructive potential.

Beginning with the latter, the importance of genre in composition becomes apparent when we regard the work of Amy Devitt, Mary Jo Reiff, and Anis Bawarshi in their 2004 publication, *Scenes of Writing: Strategies for Composing with Genres*. This textbook on composition uses the term “scenes” to describe spatiotemporal factors relevant to discourse. Devitt, Reiff and Bawarshi define rhetorical genre theory as follows: “That theory reveals genres not simply as types of texts but as forms of rhetorical action that are intimately related to forms of social organization and action. Understood in this way, genres are kinds of texts that help writers gain access to and participate in the scenes in which they are used” (Devitt, Reiff and Bawarshi *Scenes of Writing* xvii). *Scenes of Writing* is set out as a workbook and takes a somewhat simplistic approach to genre theory; however, by specifying the importance of scene and situation to genre, it usefully elaborates and integrates, in practical terms, the principles outlined by critics such as John Frow in terms of the importance of speech situation in defining genre. This is apparent, for example, when Devitt, Reiff and Bawarshi write that a “scene is the overall setting, a place where communication happens among groups of people with some shared objectives,” and that a “situation is the rhetorical interaction happening within a scene.” Genre, interestingly, is defined as “a common way of responding rhetorically to a situation” (Devitt, Reiff and Bawarshi *Scenes of Writing* 7, emphasis original). Thus, a scene is a setting in which certain speech situations are likely; these situations entail different styles and elements of communication, defined as rhetorical effect or expectation, with

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14 As Frow notes, “genre […] supposes that questions of meaning and truth are always questions of form and of the situation of utterance.” John Frow, *Genre* 12.
genre being the response to the situation.

Devitt, Reiff, and Bawarshi’s definition performs a curious inversion of Bakhtin’s theory of speech genre, which identifies the importance of the utterance and the responsive understanding of the other that is built into speech—the utterance forming part of a chain in a continuous and dialogised flow of communication between speakers (see Bakhtin Speech Genres [1952-53] 62-63, 68-69, 71, 84, 94).15 Bakhtin uses the term speech genre to describe the generic quality of the utterance rather than the response or the scene and situation—though these are relevant determining elements and are usually rhetorically present in the utterance itself, often as part of the dialogical structure of the utterance in terms of the way it incorporates an awareness of others (in which “other” might conceivably include the speaker’s environment). My thesis extends Bakhtin’s focus on genre as a determinant of speech styles by analysing the role and relevance of space and time in relation to these. Devitt, Reiff and Bawarshi, significantly, characterise the spatiotemporal aspects as scene, setting and situation. But their definition of genre as response is somewhat problematic since genre might be used to define the entire interaction as much as it might usefully describe the response to the situation. This problem arises because genre slides across a range of possible meanings—its versatility makes it both useful and difficult to use as a term: hence the tendency amongst some theorists to delineate kinds of genre (types of genre, and genres of genre), identifying the diversity of possible generic relations in categories such as mode and subgenre (Fowler) or extrinsic and intrinsic genres (Hirsch).

These different ways of seeing genre are determined by the critical stance taken. Stating its pedagogical objectives as enabling students to recognise scenes as determinative of speech genres, Devitt, Reiff and Bawarshi’s workbook demonstrates the extent to which these ways of identifying genre are integrated and mutually dependent. What Scenes of Writing shows is the importance of point of view in theorising genre:

In this book, we distinguish between academic, workplace, and public scenes in order to help you identify different types of scenes. Actually, these categories may not be clearly distinct. Quite often, scenes overlap. For instance, the trial scene is both a public scene and a workplace scene:

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a public scene for observers, defendants, plaintiffs, and jurors and a workplace scene for judges, lawyers, court reporters, and bailiffs. Similarly, you likely inhabit multiple academic, workplace, and public scenes, often simultaneously. (Devitt, Reiff and Bawarshi Scenes of Writing 10)

The same generic elements that make up a scene are, in other words, repeated in terms of a specific social context that might take place within a certain place, but this time viewed from the frame of situation—as an event, that is, rather than as a space in which certain events take place. Importantly, Devitt, Reiff and Bawarshi are identifying a generic quality simply through their use of the term situation. The examples they give suggest that situations repeat themselves in terms of place and event—with place and event being, themselves, generically conceived—and that situations possess recognisable features in terms of the expected participants and how those participants will behave. Thus, they have identified, by their own terms, what Bakhtin termed the chronotope—a generically recognisable fusion of space and time, which anticipates certain kinds of events and how the world will be depicted.

The role taken up by the participants identified by Devitt, Reiff and Bawarshi in generic terms as judges, jurors, academics, etc., further refines the rhetorical use of genre as applicable to every aspect of a given situation. The specificity of a situation is therefore extricable from the concept of situation. This is because the term itself is generic: “Our English word ‘situation’ is really already a chronotope that has had its temporal and spatial components separated into two distinct usages: on the one hand it means a place or location, as in the expression, ‘the house was in a good situation.’ On the other hand, it refers to a particular time, a combination of circumstances at a given moment, as in the expression ‘the current situation.’”16 Thus point of view might be characterised as the rhetorical situation through which a given event is interpreted; but event might also be characterised as the generic determinant of the subjects and objects entailed within it—it might characterise or determine the viewer as much as the viewer (or point of view) delimits it. This interrelation of dimensionality encompasses how

16 Holquist continues: “But notice that situation, even in its spatially delimited usage, is not merely in a location of its own, in so far as its site, in order to be located at all, must be situated with reference to other factors.” Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World (London: Routledge, 2002) 152.
viewers position themselves in relation to the event in metaphorical terms—a matter of what or who is seeing and being seen (aspects of relation, content, or form) and whether and how these are given or viewed. The complexity of the situation will determine a range of identifiable positions, and in each case these different metaphorical perspectives might be taken up, and in being taken up they will determine the parameters of the event.

By defining the interaction as rhetorical, Devitt, Reiff and Bawarshi are identifying Bakhtin’s dialogic relation in different terms—terms that nonetheless signal the responsiveness of the action to the circumstances of the event (Bakhtin *The Dialogic Imagination* 1981).¹⁷ This suggests that rhetoric, as a determinative relation of genre, is not merely a tool of persuasion but forms part of a semiotic system that identifies repeatable elements of discourse and organises the otherwise diverse ways in which we might shape our responses to others. Rhetoric defines the dialogical relation itself, shaping it into recognisable forms that perform both generalised and particularised responsiveness to the addressee and to the situation of address. Here I want to emphasise the central argument that sustains my research on the poetics of the novel. Genre supplies a semiotic system that operates metalinguistically; its “rules” are constituted by rhetorical relations; its units are not words but the established generalised elements that comprise a genre and which Frow terms “knowledges” (Frow *Genre* 7). Instead of “knowledges,” however, I will—for the most part—call these coherent sets of meanings by another term—a term that still acknowledges the coherence of a generalised meaning and function. The term I mean is metaphor. And I use it because, as this thesis will show, metaphors are the repeatable and transferable units that constitute any speech genre, just as words are the repeatable transferable units of language employed to constitute a text. Metaphors account for the shifts that might take place in characterising a situation. The metaphoric values that contribute to the construction of a given scene have a certain versatility that enables the oscillations we might observe between generically construed points of view where each view alters the generic landscape to take stock of the “situation” in new terms. Moving from seeing to being seen within a scene supplies this kind of versatility whereby the metaphors of sight (as view) move through a literal and functional value to a semiotic value: view becomes the object that signifies a gestured meaning—that meaning being everything “contained” within the view in deontic and

epistemic terms. View thus oscillates from a literal function to a signifying role, and on to a metaphoric meaning.

The reasoning supplied by Devitt, Reiff and Bawarshi is just as relevant to this explanation of genre and rhetoric as those that might be found in more detailed and critically elaborate texts like Frow’s introduction to genre theory, *Genre* (2006), aimed at the student of literary theory. But whether the explanation is elaborated in compositional terms, or as a survview of theory, what is apparent in relation to contemporary genre theory is its importance in understanding how meaning is established and communicated. Hirsch, Fowler, Frow, Derrida, Rosmarin and any theorist writing today, acknowledge, by the attention they give to the subject, the rhetorical effect of genre in terms of mediating meaning. Although the material relations that underpin the metaphorical terms are not always elaborated, these critics are consistent in their understanding of meaning as formed through a complex interaction of responses to situations that usually (but not always) include a spoken expression of what is meant. Rhetoric, for Devitt, Reiff, and Bawarshi, describes a system of interaction, typically identified in terms of speech but also possible in a gestural sense, whereby the rhetorical form adopted signifies not only how the semantic content of the utterance or action is to be interpreted, but how the speaker and addressee ought to respond, since genres “carry with them certain expectations” and one’s “expectations of a genre are based on your participation in scenes that repeat themselves and your prior experiences with reading, writing, and using genres” (Devitt, Reiff, and Bawarshi *Scenes of Writing* 23). In other words, the sets of knowledges identified by Frow in his critical explication of genre theory, and the discursive formations that arise and become recognisable because of their repeatable elements, constitute our expectations in that they organise and delimit the possibilities in terms of what is meant. Genre shapes our responses so that we might be more readily understood.

I mention the possibility of gestural communication, but I want to emphasise the importance of our physical being in another sense. Our bodily experience in relation to the formation of meaning is significant—so significant that, as Lakoff and Johnson have shown, it is incorporated in the system of rhetorically ordered meanings that we generate in speech through the use of structural metaphors. Mark Johnson has taken this further to suggest that embodiment defines the way we relate otherwise abstract concepts. Everything gets filtered through schemata of embodiment—of being in the world, and of relating to the world through our bodies. Our condition as beings with senses that
enable our ease of movement in and through space and time structures the way we think and speak about everything. What this amounts to is language, or more accurately utterances, that construct the sense of a body moving in space. In the same way, “individual and social becoming shape each other”—the embodiment of abstractions imposes material imperatives upon social concepts, forces, and discourses that in turn shape the way we negotiate these abstractions as relations that determine our interactions with one another (Morson “Bakhtin” 1083, emphasis original). This constant interplay of abstract meaning and real response creates the world in which we live in a relational sense—and these conceptual relations in turn affect the way we organise our material relations in and with the world.

How we express our understanding of this interplay of being and relating is determined by our sensory capacities as embodied beings. If genre organises our responses to situations, then those responses are fundamentally determined by our physical capacity to interact with the world as sentient beings. In this study of the novel, I locate these basic organising features of genre in the metaphoric use of the concepts of voice, view, setting and event. I choose these terms for their prevalence in narrative theory as well as more broadly, and for their potential for describing the experience of being in the world: voice and view, because these relate to a subject who in seeing and speaking becomes capable of articulating an interior perception and who in being seen and heard is constructed as a object; and setting and event, because setting constructs the sense of space in static terms, whereas event activates both the setting and the subjects and objects that see and are seen within it in temporal terms. The importance of these four metaphors for organising and shaping meaning as it is articulated through the utterance as a product of speech (whether this takes form in writing, speech, or any other media that enable the expression of meaning through its supplementation of language) will be explored in relation to the work of a number of theorists (specifically, Hirsch, Foucault, Derrida and Bakhtin) and in respect to certain specific novels, namely, works by Jane Austen, Kazuo Ishiguro, Peter Carey and Virginia Woolf. These works have been chosen for the uses they make of the metaphors relevant to the generic mediation of meaning—Carey for voice and view, and the others for their identifiable use of a shared conception of a generic setting and event in the chronotope of the country house.

**Methodological and Theoretical Approach**

What then do I mean by embodiment in this thesis? Specifically, what does “metaphors of embodiment” mean? The use of the term embodiment introduces the question of materialism and whether this thesis takes a monist or dualist position. The short answer is that it engages both, but without considering the validity of either in philosophical terms. Rather, because this thesis is concerned with the formation of meaning in the novel—and with certain types of meanings (meanings that rely upon metaphors of embodiment)—its attention is focused upon the ways in which these theoretical positions impact upon the formation of meaning. This may seem like a narrow perspective, for I am proposing to stay firmly within the bounds of speech as Derrida defines it, rather than address language as a semantic system. That is, I include writing as speech; and since this is the form in which the novel is given, the thesis is rightly limited to questions of literary formation rather than issues of semiotics and semiology.19

Although my argument might have relevance beyond the limits of its study of the poetics of novel in terms of its effectiveness in mediating meaning, this is not the task I have set myself.

Thus, by embodiment, I mean those linguistic signs that refer to bodily capacities in a metaphoric sense, without going beyond those signs as they function within the literary text to create certain effects. I do not mean, for example, the bodily capacities of sight and sound as these are materially given or perceived, or any settings and events other than in an abstract form as supplied through description or inference. Rather, I mean the metaphors that derive their value from our understanding of what it is to hear and to produce sound and to see and to be seen without questioning or seeking to determine how it is that we are able to achieve coherence in this way beyond the issues pertaining to the literary work. Hence, when I say that one metaphoric meaning slides into another, I am not presuming any logically sustainable material process, but refer instead to a process that relies upon category mistakes in order to move from one meaningful distinction to another with no other foundation for the connection being

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19 Roland Barthes second order semiology, however, might have proved a friendly ally to my argument that linguistic meaning steps through various levels of abstractions which, according to Barthes, depend upon emptying the linguistic sign of its content in order that it might be taken as the form by which the second order meaning is given. Roland Barthes, “Myth Today,” trans. Annette Lavers, *Mythologies* (London: Paladin Grafton Books, 1989).
made than the action defined by metaphor of finding likenesses between unlike things. This slippage, enabled by the occlusion of the category mistake at its heart by the mesmerising effect of similarity, describes the process whereby the dualist paradigm is made meaningful: mind and body are seen to be in relation to one another—form has content and each relates to each and this relation is itself functional in that it produces certain useful effects, and these effects constitute our common beliefs about the material world (even those that are contested or contestable). For example, vision is (generally construed as) the form by which I receive the visual data (content) that I in turn construe in reified terms as the view: thus, the content that reaches my visual apparatus is transformed into form. It achieves this semantically and not factually, for although vision is a bodily capacity and viewed landscapes may well have a material existence, I can only use the concept in language; and, further, I can only use the concept in metaphoric terms by displacing the actual act of viewing with the description of such. I might just as easily consider it appropriate to say that my capacity for sight enables me to penetrate abstractions themselves or to “see” into the “workings” of material things. It is easier to observe the metaphoricity inherent in such reasoning, yet metaphoric meaning underpins even empirical speech. In this I rely on both the deconstructionist Jacques Derrida and the constructionist Kenneth Gergen, whose positions in this respect are discussed in Chapter 2.

What I am addressing, then, is a paradox. But I am not striving to resolve this ambiguity on philosophical terms. Rather I seek to explain its impact and relevance to the formation of meaning in the novel form. That it is possible to move conceptually from form to content and then to function without there being any material validity to such shifts, is the basis on which meaning is made. It is fundamentally how we think—and I address this briefly in Chapter 3 when I discuss the metaphoric nature of space and time as concepts that enable movements and connections that are not otherwise materially available to the thinker. Beyond these abstractions, the material world offers only its materiality—as something that can be abstracted, and abstracted in the first instance by the principle that enables the conceptualisation of things as being either separate or connected in material terms: this is the concept of contiguity, which I identify as a metonymic relation and as the first order of metaphoric construction. Thus, I am not engaging that discourse on embodiment that addresses affective responses to signs since, although this might be useful and relevant to a new perspective on Bakhtin’s theory of addressivity and dialogic utterance, affective responses relate to a materiality
beyond the scope of my research question. It is enough for me to identify what is
commonly perceived to be the relation between the material and its abstractions, and
how this constitutes a system of belief that—though it may be rife with contradictions
and paradoxes—is nonetheless effective as a strategic resource for making meaning. It is
for this reason that I rely on the work of Mark Johnson and George Lakoff—though
basing my explication on Johnson’s rather than Lakoff’s work in the field of what is now
being termed new materialism—because these theorists have produced what might be
considered an exemplary account of the importance of metaphor in the process of
making meaning. Their work on metaphor—though not without exception—has been
widely countenanced and I accept its basic premise of the relevance of metaphor in this
respect, not least because it supports the Derridean position that I take as the
methodology underpinning this thesis as it goes about answering the question of how
meaning is made in the novel form.

My methodology means that the other critics and theorists I use, or to which I
refer, are understood—often implicitly rather than explicitly—to be caught within the
same paradigm, that which I define out of the opposition between dualist and monist
positions, and which first occurred to me when trying to reconcile Johnson’s argument in
The Body in the Mind (1987). This is the thesis on categories of meaning, which I define as
semantic, semiotic and syntagmatic. I do not claim to have invented these distinctions.
Rather I am remarking upon distinctions that are evident in all linguistic forms
identifying complex structures of thought—these include the writings Judith Butler,
Michel Foucault, E. D. Hirsch, and even Derrida, among others. And it includes my own
writing in this thesis.

To illustrate what I mean by categories of meaning, let me refer you to Chapter 1
of Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, entitled ‘Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire’; these three
terms are separated by forward strokes, rather than commas, suggesting that they might
in some way stand for the same thing—even though they are distinct concepts in their
own right. The thing they stand for, I want to argue, is the unnamed—and unnamable—
concept around which the form of sex, the content of gender, and the function of desire
circulate. What they achieve as concepts is the sense of a unity that constitutes itself in
terms of form, content and functionality. This unity is generic and abstract, rather than
specific and embodied. The terms “sex,” “gender,” and “desire” represent different

rhetorical dimensions of an unsubstantiated implicit metaphor—a metaphor that is deliberately unconcretised so that it might retain its status as an abstraction applicable to specific beings. In other words, the triad points to a condition pertaining to people in general. This is apparent in Butler’s use and explication of these terms. Sex is a category, for example (18) and gender is in limited respects given a semantic value (7), although Butler effectively argues that it shifts from the semantic to the semiotic dimension (32). Specifically, Butler writes: “It would make no sense […] to define gender as the cultural interpretation of sex, if sex itself is a gendered category. Gender ought not to be conceived merely as the cultural inscription of meaning on a pregiven sex […]” (7); and, she writes, “Gender can denote a unity of experience, of sex, gender, and desire only when sex can be understood in some sense to necessitate gender—where gender is a psychic and or/cultural designation of the self—and desire—where desire is heterosexual and therefore differentiates itself through an oppositional relation to that other gender it desires” (22).

What this analysis reveals is Butler’s awareness of the subtle distinctions that are to be found in our use of these concepts. These are distinctions that she herself cannot escape—although she can trouble them by identifying the inherent instability of any metaphoric meaning. Thus, it is possible to draw notions of sex in terms that apply a semiotic or syntagmatic value, and even to concretise desire by giving it form. Each of these metaphors might turn through the various rhetorical dimensions that characterise our conceptions of form as body, content as meaning (and mind), and relation as function. That terms such as these are often stuck in one dimension of meaning is essentially what Butler’s analysis reveals. The significance of this realisation—of Butler’s problematising of these terms—is made apparent if we ask ourselves: How might our comprehension of this meaning-making convention enable, in this discursive context, the reconfiguration of meaning and redistributions of power? The answer is that power relations can be reconfigured by allowing metaphors like sex, gender, and desire to move through all possible dimensions of meaning—thereby bringing into view the mutability of these defining concepts and allowing for the possibility of their redefinition within a state of rhetorical flux.

It is this shifting between the different rhetorical stances that a metaphor might (be given to) take that accounts for the extensive yet submerged category mistakes that enable the formation of meaning through linguistically determined abstractions. Thus, although language as a semantic system is central, my interest and focus is on those
conceptual practices that enable the complex formations that make up the meanings conveyed in literary forms like the novel. That I am able to demonstrate this conceptual practice in the work of theorists such as Butler, Foucault and Hirsch, points to the relevance of that undeveloped aspect of Bakhtin’s essay on speech genres: complex interpolations that depend upon submerged category mistakes which are formulated according to the rhetorical stance of a metaphoric value might be identified as a feature of what Bakhtin terms secondary speech genres. These genres include scientific discourse and literary forms like the novel and, I argue, they arise wherever abstractions of space and time achieve a metaphoric, rather than literal, value. (See my argument below.)

Let me emphasise again that I am not engaging a philosophical discourse concerning the validity of either dualism or new materialism. Mind/body dualism is invoked in this thesis because I argue that it has a fundamental role to play in the composition of the abstract concepts that are the basis of our linguistic compositions—and speech as writing is the medium of the novel form. In this respect I follow Johnson in so far as I agree that our conception of bodily form and interiority—together with our attempts to establish and comprehend relations between these and between these formulations and the formulated world—are crucial elements in the formation of linguistic meaning. Of course, Johnson owes a huge debt to Kant and to others in terms of his schema of embodiment.21 However, I do not engage these discourses because I am concerned not with how the world is, but how we compose it in speech—because this forms the basis for the novel’s compositions.

Although other theorists address the question of embodiment, Johnson’s account most clearly supplies the formulations that enable me to establish the rhetorical dimensions of form, content, relation (semiotic, semantic, and syntagmatic) as based on spatiotemporal abstractions originating in the distinctions of body/mind/world, which have underpinned Western philosophy since at least Descartes. It ought to be clear that

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this is what I mean when I designate Lakoff and Johnson as grammatologists. I see their project of establishing the complexities of our metaphorical linguistic abstractions to be consistent with Derrida’s observations on the metaphoricity of speech. Thus, I do not assert that the elements of conceptualising speech based on the schema of embodiment necessarily correspond to conceptual practices beyond linguistic semantics. If meaning making is to be understood in these broader terms, then my thesis would necessarily embrace a much wider discourse and seek to resolve questions that have occupied phenomenologists and, more recently, cognitive scientists, neuropsychologists and other theorists, critics, and philosophers influenced by the turn to affect, as Ruth Leys describes it.22 If I follow any philosophical position, it is Derrida’s, for I seek to deconstruct the terms employed in the mediation of meaning by identifying how we orient our metaphoric constructions according to the schema of embodiment as an example of the first-order abstraction of space and time. If I add anything new by this thesis, it is to argue that the first-order of abstraction is the abstractions of space and time, since these abstractions allow the conceptualisation of that relation known as contiguity, and contiguity enables the concept of causation. Beyond spatiotemporal contiguity is another level of abstraction; this is where the first abstraction of space and time is given a metaphorical meaning: hence, sameness is a metaphor for continuity and/or identical situatedness in space and time and thus, as a metaphor, it has the paradoxical meaning of objects or parts of objects being identical despite their spatiotemporal difference. Sameness, in other words, presents objects as metaphorically coincidental in space and time whilst of course occupying different spatiotemporal coordinates in literal terms—thus the metaphorical coincidence is translated into the concept similarity whilst the literal difference enables the conceptual action of comparison.

Not surprisingly, the oppositions of monism and dualism might be construed as productive of the rhetorical paradigm I note at work in the formation of meaning: monism insists by its opposition that it is the abstraction of that aspect of our embodied experience that we “know” as mind that results in the distinction itself between body and mind; dualism, apparently guilty of reifying the effects of this abstraction, nonetheless is the dominant position and it is so, I would argue, precisely because it has this capacity to proliferate and reify metaphorical meanings. The opposition between monism and dualism

is important because it enables the extension of the dualism model of body and mind to a tripartite of form, content, and relation. The recognition of this third category is normally overlooked in explicit terms, but nonetheless implicated in dualist reasoning. Monism’s focus on embodiment, free of the necessity to establish relations in absence of the transcendentalising effect of the dualist position, exposes this third category to view. This third category (of relation or function) reveals itself as a necessary means by which the body and the mind cohere—how it is possible to reconnect what has been separated through abstraction. Hence Johnson proves pivotal to my explication of the three categories I identify as the rhetorical dimensions of semantic, semiotic, and syntagmatic meaning, because his work might be situated within monism and theories of embodiment, but nonetheless gives account of the constructive effect of dualism in language. Johnson’s materialist approach locates dualism in the realm of abstraction. I would argue that theories of embodied consciousness likewise fall within the realm of abstraction. What interests me about Johnson’s theory is its self-conscious embodiment of the transcendental: Johnson’s approach demonstrates the entrenchment of the dualist position in language and for this reason he cannot elide it entirely but must find a reason for it. For Johnson, mind/body dualism is necessary for meaning where meaning is based upon metaphors of embodiment. His theory largely overlooks the structuralist category that I identify as syntagmatic, for the most part because it engages in the syntagmatic itself: Johnson’s theory is an attempt to bring dualism into a relation of relevance and subordination to the cognitive sciences.

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23 This is evident when Iris van der Tuin writes: “The intimate relationship between two so-called opposites shows that the transcendental and humanist tendencies, which are fought by new materialist cultural theorists, are fundamentally reductive; after all, negation implies a relation, which is precisely what is undone by transcendental humanist thought that depends on dualism.” Iris van der Tuin, “The Transversality of New Materialism,” Women: A Cultural Review 21.2 (2010): 157. Van der Tuin’s position here illustrates the relevance of this third category, even when it is said to be obsolete or undone—and demonstrates how the identification of this category underpins the monist position which is seemingly anti-structuralist in its poststructuralism.

24 See the later work of Lakoff and Johnson where the dualist conception of the person is contrasted with a monistic conception of reason as wholly cognitive and embodied reason: George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999) 552-56.
That Johnson elides the category of relation is not surprising. Monism has no such need for this category—or for categorical distinctions at all, apparently—but instead posits a kind of self-emanating creative force originating in the monistic matter of cognitive science.\footnote{Van der Tuin, identifying with new materialism, writes of two theorists of the monist position: “In their subsequent work, DeLanda and Braidotti continued constituting new materialism by posing dual oppositions as their main target. In addition to this, they worked on similar dualisms,” with DeLanda targeting “the distinction between natural and artificial, but also that between the living and the inert,” and Braidotti who “does not conceptualise matter as opposed to signification, but designed an ‘approach that starts with asserting the primacy of life as production, or zoe as generative power’. Reworking and eventually breaking through dualism appears to be key to new materialism. Dualism comes to the fore as the structuring principle of the transcendental and humanist tradition that they want to shift in their work.” Iris van der Tuin, “The Transversality of New Materialism,” Women: A Cultural Review 21.2 (2010): 156. See also page 158, ibid.} As such it offers little scope for linguistic proliferations of the kind identified by Derrida, and which represent the basic mode by which meaning is made. There is, therefore, more than a tension between Johnson and Derrida—despite my having identified the grammatical aspect in Lakoff and Johnson’s work—since Johnson’s theory strives to locate metaphysics within the abstracted functionality of the interior material world (the mind/cognitive processes)—a world whose materiality is made accessible to the theorist by science. In contrast, I argue—following John Frow—that meaning—an abstraction—is mediated by another abstraction—that which we know as genre. As Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner express it, form identifies the meaningful patterns in any given content (5). In this respect therefore this thesis takes a dualist stance because it acknowledges that dualism is the productive element at work in the linguistic system through which meaning is established in the literary work. But monism, it must be acknowledged, is the source of this realisation, because it brings to the fore the arbitrary nature of abstraction where abstraction takes the form of establishing conceptual formations based on a process that begins in terms of separating or connecting space and time.

Genre theory, thus, clearly subscribes to the dualist position—at least insofar as it recognises the relevance and usefulness of categories. But rhetorical genre theory witnesses the constructive effect of its machinations and in this it glances toward, and perhaps relies upon, the monist position and its insights. Thus, Johnson’s work in The
Body in the Mind has relevance to this thesis without necessarily transferring its philosophical position, for it is possible for genre theory to embrace the paradox of these opposing systems of belief. In short, this thesis acknowledges its own position to be like that which Derrida outlines of phenomenology in Speech and Phenomena—caught within the linguistic system it contemplates and thus subject to the same contradictions and paradoxes.26 This acknowledgement has consequences for how far this thesis goes in it postulations, for I do not pretend to determine questions of cognition and embodiment beyond that implicated in speech. This is not a cop out, but an ethical choice that seeks to avoid the kinds of conflations that many arguments perform when they begin with metaphors and end on substantialising assertions. Further, the two philosophical positions of dualism and monism have weighty intellectual demands that cannot be resolved in a thesis on the poetics of the novel. While I would note that monism dismisses the metaphysics of dualism as a corporeal induced virtuality, and certainly theorists like Hans Wolf, following Johnson, express distaste for the virtuality of metaphor, I have no such aspirations.27 Rather, I accept that what is addressed here is that which takes place in speech. I do not engage in the debate about whether we ought to be monists or dualists if we are to understand the true nature of things; instead, I look at how these systems of thought have relevance for the mediation of meaning in speech as writing and specifically in the novel.

Charles Sanders Peirce offers perhaps the most provoking and earliest considerations of what is now at issue within the field cognitive science:

A psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain (nihil animale me alienum puto) and then, when I find I cannot express myself, he says, “You see your faculty of language was localized in that lobe.” No doubt it was; and so, if he had filched my inkstand, I should not have been able to continue my discussion until I had got another. Yea, the very thoughts would not come to me. So my faculty of discussion is equally localized in my inkstand. It is localization in a sense in which a thing may be in two places


27 Wolf does his best to try to get out of the linguistic system in which he is so irretrievably stuck by endeavouring to highlight his use of metaphor by capitalising metaphoric terms to the point where the upper case stupendously dominates the text.
at once. On the theory that the distinction between psychical and physical
phenomena is the distinction between final and efficient causation, it is
plain enough that the inkstand and the brain-lobe have the same general
relation to the functions of the mind. I suppose that if I were to ask a
modern psychologist whether he holds that the mind “resides” in the
brain, he would pronounce that to be a crude expression; and yet he
holds that the protoplasmal content of a brain-cell feels, I suppose: there
is every evidence that it does so. This feeling, however, is consciousness.
Consciousness, per se, is nothing else: and consciousness, he maintains, is
Mind. So that he really does hold that Mind resides in, or is a property of,
the brain-matter. The early students of electricity, who assumed that an
electrical current resides in the metallic circuit, had infinitely more reason
for their mistaken opinion. Yes, without exaggeration, infinitely more; for
the ratio of something to nothing is infinite. (Hartshorne Collected Papers of
Peirce 7.3.366)

As Peter Skagestad argues, Peirce uses the inkstand to demonstrate a position that
questions or highlights the “ludicrousness of supposing the mind to be localized in the
brain, or anywhere else” on the basis that what Peirce is referring to in terms of
localisation is virtual rather than literal localisation (553). Just so, rather than the
inkstand, Johnson’s argument might be put in Peircean terms by saying that we
demonstrate a belief in mental embodiment by the image of the body with a mind that
we hold in our minds. Thus, we situate the mind within the body in the way that Peirce
jokingly localises the capacity for complex expression in the inkstand and the brain at the
same time. Hence, I am not disputing Peirce because it is one thing to examine a
practical belief like that he demonstrates and which Johnson argues for, and another
thing entirely to argue for the validity of that belief in literal terms—to insist that it refers
to a literal localisation rather than a virtual one, for example. Indeed, as Skagestad’s
elaboration on Peirce’s conception of “virtual” demonstrates (553), Peirce deployed the
virtual in the same way that I use metaphor: if the virtual is something that has the
efficiency of the literal, then the virtual might stand for the literal on the same terms that
metaphoricity functions in Derrida’s thesis of differance—as that condition which both

28 Peter Skagestad, “Peirce’s Inkstand as an External Embodiment of Mind,” Transactions of the
Charles S. Peirce Society 35.3 (1999).
indicates the absence of that for which the metaphoric term stands and whose own presence elides that absence by the very gesture of standing in place of that which is absent. Indeed, our experience of virtuality may well be a consequence of the proliferation of metaphors in speech: we are used to constructing alternative planes of experience on which to comprehend abstractions, and hence it is not surprising that these partially developed conceptions achieve coherence from time to time—either through deliberate elaboration or through the consistency of metaphors pertaining to certain discourses. To quote Skagestad on Peirce: “Peirce never denied the existence of consciousness, and he did not deny that we may have introspective knowledge of our conscious mental states, but he simply did not regard cognition as consisting of such conscious states.” To do so, no doubt, would be akin to taking the virtual for the materiality it constructs in metaphoric terms. Skagestad continues: “Cognition consists in the manipulation of signs which may be externally embodied; as each sign is what it is by virtue of its possible later interpretations—i.e. virtually—so the mind itself is virtual” (554). Peirce’s position on cognition thus bears some resemblance to Derrida’s on grammatology. One might say that cognition is grammatological in Peircean terms, except that to do so would be anachronistic. Regardless of whether a case might be made for correspondences in the philosophical positions of Peirce and Derrida, my approach in this thesis is made on the basis that the beliefs that enable the standing in of the virtual and the metaphorical underpin the organisation of speech in the formation of complex meanings like those evinced by the novel form. No doubt this thesis has wider application, but I will limit my analysis to the matter of literary genre in this instance.

Because I argue that language (langue) is an abstraction and my thesis takes a critical stance that examines how speech utilises metaphor in the composition of its abstractions (of which language is an example)—that is, because I am concerned with how metaphorical meaning turns through the different manifestations I have identified with respect to certain theorists and in regard to the four key metaphors of voice, view, setting, and event—I am less concerned with semiotics as a discipline than I am interested in how structuralist and poststructuralist accounts of literary speech forms address the compositional questions I pose in these thesis: how is the discrete meaning that is given to terms such voice, view, setting, or event, elaborated and virtually reified in the literary work? The answer is that this is possible in speech forms like the novel because the conventions of meaning making, as these might be addressed through genre theory, enable the shift between categories of expression that focus on different aspects
of our everyday conception of being in the world. It is this shifting through content, form, and relation in rhetorical terms that enables the rounded conception of a virtual (fictive) object. If I say to you now that my cat is on the bed; that she is dozing and expelling strange half-mews and sighs that sound like an old man’s muttering; that I am amused and beguiled by this habit of hers and it bothers me not a whit that I have anthropomorphised so much that I have attributed an internal state to her externalised expressions—simply by referring to this cat as ‘she’ and thereby giving her a female form, and by imputing interiority through my characterisation of her old man’s ways. Thus the cat form becomes an anthropomorphised female form and, related in its likeness to the human form, acquires human habits, which are characteristically construed as originating in that abstraction of human interiority we call character. By this means I have given you a virtual entity that I liken to my living cat and indeed I might even assert that this virtuality—this metaphoric construction—is my cat, meaning that it stands in for my cat, which you cannot encounter in her material form merely by reading this thesis. But in saying this, I am merely adopting a certain style of expression—I am not proving or seeking to establish that the description I give of my cat bears upon my phenomenal experience of my cat. I leave that task to others, since it is not crucial to this exploration of the novel’s poetics and is far too weighty a task for me to involve myself with here.

When Fauconnier and Turner write of “essential formal structures,” or of the “systematic manipulation of forms” (Fauconnier and Turner 3 my emphasis), and of “shared meaning […] having a shared structure” (4), they are somewhat transparently, but

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29 For Henry James, character, self and identity is depicted as narrative sameness over time, ostensibly through habit which is the mode by which continuity is established. Habit suggests “a felt objective recurrence” rather than a “fixed subjective self” that is “nonetheless feels central because it becomes the point of reference” (178); habit stands against disruptions to continuity (and in this respect it bears close relation to Paul Ricoeur’s conception of character; see: Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992] 148). Recollection and repetition are the two modes of habit by which the self is reiterated. James’s essay argues for the continuation of consciousness after death based on a conception of selfhood along these lines. See Renee Tursi, “Henry James’s Self-Reiterating Habit In “Is There a Life after Death?”,” The Henry James Review 23.2 (2002).

30 See, for example, Horst Ruthrof, Semantics and the Body: Meaning from Frege to the Postmodern (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
probably unconsciously, giving effect to what I term the rhetorical transformations of meaning—these are ways of ordering a meaning according to whether that meaning is to be understood in formal, semantic, or structural/functional terms. Fauconnier and Turner begin their book by emphasising the importance of form in identifying meaning; and when they do so, they would seem to be attributing structure a formal quality. In this they are identifying with the dualist position—by seeing meaning as content and form as structure, thus limiting the fundamental elements to two by subsuming structure within form.

I argue in this thesis that the distinction ought to be threefold. There are in fact three ways in which meaning might be accented. I have named these the semiotic, semantic and syntagmatic dimensions of meaning and I argue that the making of such distinctions is a rhetorical choice along the lines identified by John Frow when he writes of genre being involved in the mediation of meaning. Frow’s position is consistent with Fauconnier and Turner when they note that form “picks out the regularities that run throughout meanings” (5). My contribution to this position is to observe that genre does more than identify formal consistencies; it orders those consistencies in terms of the three rhetorical positions available to metaphoric construction; these are the three elements identifiable when the dualist position is opposed to the new materialism of theorists like Mark Johnson. Johnson—together with George Lakoff in their earlier work, *Metaphors We Live By*—reveals the significance of the dualist position of opposing form to content, of remarking outer as distinctly different from inner. But although form and content will prove to be meanings rather than facts under new materialism, what this opposition between monists and dualists identifies is just what it makes obvious has been left out of both philosophical positions. What is omitted is the importance of the relationship between any two oppositions: the relevance of structure as a relation (rather than reified form) and of function underpins the dualist paradigm and is necessarily compensated for under monism through the principle of creative emanation outlined in respect to van der Tuine. If in Fauconnier and Turner’s work we can see, when they

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31 Bearing on the work of a different theorist, Ruth Leys describes the new materialism in terms of a “turn to affect”; the submergence of structure as functional relationships supplying systems whose opposition initiates the emergence of structure itself is most apparent when Leys describes the work of Brian Massumi: “The ‘meaning’ and ‘intensity’ (or affect) systems are said by Massumi to resonate or interfere with one another in various ways, but to the system of intensity
write of “the height of meaning as carried by the intersections and juxtapositions of form” (4, my emphasis), how the shift from the semantic to the semiotic dimension of meaning is made by virtue of the syntagmatic functionality of intersection and juxtaposition, and again note how semantic meaning becomes semiotic by virtue of the syntagmatic in the “manipulation of meaning through systematic analysis of form” (4, my emphasis), then it is owing to the transparency of their terminology rather than any deliberate intention being made apparent in their argument; for Fauconnier and Turner mount a different argument to that which I set out here in this thesis. Their intention is to understand how we think. Mine is to understand how we mean—and in doing so to limit my study to speech and to speech in a specific context, which is the literary work we know as the novel form.

Although at this point it may not be clear, it will soon be apparent that this thesis takes a Derridean approach to poetics of the novel. But my thesis is also Bakhtinian. And in this respect I attempt to bring into relations of relevance two theorists who might be said to stand at opposite poles: Derrida, who seeks to make us aware of the ways in which we concretise concepts based on metaphoric relations rather than any phenomenal ontology, and Bakhtin, who is concerned with the way writing and speech create the very real experience of being—how texts bring the experience of being to life. Bakhtin, not surprisingly, relies extensively on metaphors—metaphors that he acknowledges in a sense and yet he also wants us to understand them as functioning in a literal way. This is perhaps a faint gesture toward acknowledging the process of reification to which Derrida alerts us, but Bakhtin is intent on celebrating this. Can we say that Derrida opposes such celebration? I think not. Rather, his project is to unsettle the process of hypostatisation by making us aware of it; and because awareness enables us to make ethical choices about how we construct the world, and this is something in which Bakhtin is also intensely interested, it is possible to locate some correspondence between the two—however loosely formulated.

In terms of a critical perspective on the novel itself, this thesis begins by

belong all the attributes so prized by today’s self-professed Deleuzean affect theorists—the attributes of the nonsemantic, the nonlinear, the autonomous, the vital, the singular, the new, the anomalous, the indeterminate, the unpredictable, and the disruption of fixed or ‘conventional’ meanings. For Massumi, the system of intensity is the ‘system of the inexplicable: emergence, into and against regeneration (the reproduction of a structure).[…]’.” Ruth Leys, “The Turn to Affect: A Critique,” Critical Inquiry 37.3 (2011): 352-53.
positioning itself against narrative theories that proceed on the basis that there is some structure to the text other than that apparent in the placement of words, page layout, and the given order of one page following another. This is not to say that narrative theory, which relies on such a system, does not offer useful insights or supply practical “frameworks” through which to read a text critically. But I mean to show that methodologies of structure, although they work up to a point and are useful as far as they go, will inevitably reach a condition of logical entropy precisely because they are metaphorical constructions—they are not literal or material relations. Having said this, “literal” is itself a problematic term because it is in some sense a certain kind of metaphor—one that is perhaps equal to, or at another remove from, the relation between a signifier and its signified concept. Nonetheless, the term conveys something close to what I mean, which is that meaning in a literal sense strives, as much as possible, to correspond to the materiality of the world in every sense. To admit to using a metaphor is to acknowledge that some aspect of the meaning being attributed to the phenomenal world is abstract. Both constitute positions taken in regard to the speaker’s relation to the world. The “literal” is also rhetorical, therefore: it presents certain assumptions about how meaning is to be established. This is what I mean to highlight when I say that structure is itself a metaphor—just like voice, or view. Structure may or may not be literal, but regardless, there is no structure to the text (other than that outlined above as the features of the text when viewed in its material form as a book); structure instead metaphorically defines the observable rhetorical relations that enable the formation of broader forms of meaning than those we associate with the semantic value of a sentence—in other words, structure identifies the formation of generic relations and sets of meanings across discourses.

Structure also suggests a material object that we might metaphorically enter and comprehend in sensorial terms. It enables the concretisation of an abstraction that would otherwise be too abstruse and too overwhelmingly complex to comprehend as a whole. We cannot “take in” a novel all at once. It must be savoured over several hours. But we can identify ways in which it enables us to engage with it as something we enter into, and in entering into the novel we like to imagine that there is some stability there—that it has at the very least some skeletal structure to it. It is equally conceivable, however, as tastes in metaphors change, that we might one day talk of entering the novel as though it were a dense amorphous shape and, eschewing all structural terminology, speak in terms of sensation (“here it feels warm, hard, cold, thick, watery, thin, thick, or airy”). Some
novels already invite such probing. But whether I think about the novel as a mass or as a built environment, I think about it in terms of how my senses will perceive it, and I cannot do otherwise. As Johnson argues in *The Body in the Mind* (1987), in making these metaphorical translations we invariably rely on our bodied relation to the material object supplying the metaphor in each instance: “Our reality is shaped by the patterns of our bodily movement, the contours of our spatial and temporal orientation, and the forms of our interaction with objects” (M. Johnson *Body in the Mind* xix). Physical objects, including our own bodies, thus supply the schema by which we organise meaning. Metaphors based on our bodily experiences are used to translate complex thoughts, and their relation to other abstract ideas, into a set of material relations that roughly corresponds to what is meant in the abstract sense.

This, as I have proposed, is achieved in the novel according to four staple ways of thinking about our bodily relations with the world. Voice, view, setting and event are each associated with a complex range of grammatical and rhetorical conventions that sustain the inference of subjective presence that underpins every utterance: voice, because it suggests a speaking presence; view, because it is characterised as the perceptual scope of a seeing subject (including the interior perspective of abstract thought); setting, because, as a viewable space outside the subject who sees, it supplies something other than the subject (including other people, as objects); and event, because it represents the abstract conception of time as change—activating, through movement, what would otherwise be the static entities of subject (person) and object (place). These four metaphors work to create the speaking and seeing subject and the spatiotemporal world—they supply the two key ingredients of any structural metaphor: subject and object. Further, given that bodily and structural metaphors invariably operate either as an embodied action or as a space/object that invites certain actions, it would seem that as well as providing a means by which abstract thought might be expressed, metaphors founded on the schema of embodiment supply the basis on which verisimilitude is established, and the basis upon which any novel—even one that is anti-realist—establishes the mimetic effect of a speaking subject and a metaphorical world or arena in which conceptual or “real” events take place.

By taking a Derridean approach I mean to show that subject, object, space and time exist only as the constructed trace of their presence in the novel as text through the interchange and relation of the four key metaphors outlined above. It is for this reason that, when discussing the relevance of voice and view to the formation of meaning in the
novel, I rely on Derrida rather than Bakhtin, whose writing on social voices might otherwise seem more relevant, to elaborate the diversities apparent in the use of these metaphors. It is because Derrida enables an appreciation of the ways in which metaphoric voice sustains linguistic meaning in speech that my reading answers Bakhtin’s call for a metalinguistic approach to voice and the utterance specifically (Bakhtin’s position in this respect can be found in his theoretical writing on speech genres in *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* [1929] and “The Problem of Speech Genres” [1952-53]).

The metaphors of voice, view, setting and event supplement the absent-presence of the subjectivities and spatiotemporalities of the text. These metaphors both construct and depend upon the implied presence of the subject as that entity expressive of subjectivity, and the world as object, in order to be meaningful. Meaning here relies upon an inferred metaphorical structure that reproduces material relations whereby the “products” of these metaphors are taken literally and the reader-critic presumes that the space, time and characters of the text have been moved around by the author in the act of creation, in the same way that material objects are moveable. There is, however, no movement of person, objects, time, or even thought—at least, not in the manner imputed in the act of making meaning. The sense of movement is only the effect of the supplemented meanings introduced through the metaphors of voice, view, setting and event. The inferred spatiotemporal structure of the text, and its division into subject and object-world, is a rhetorical effect of the text. These mediations are generic because they supply the expected outcome of verisimilitude, which underpins the bodily and structural


33 Pam Morris notes that “[s]ubjectivity [for Volosinov/Bakhtin] is produced on the ‘borderline’ where inner experience and social world meet”: Morris, ed., *The Bakhtin Reader* 12. Thus Volosinov/Bakhtin’s conception of subjectivity is consistent with the intersubjective element (which I will subsequently note) in Bakhtin’s later work on the chronotope in that it defines subjectivity existing in the interaction of the inner and outer experiences that underpin our shared meanings.
metaphors utilised in conveying abstract concepts.  

**Narrative and Metaphors of Embodiment**

Despite the use of four key narrative terms—voice, view, setting, and event—I do not employ narrative theory as a theoretical framework for this thesis. Rather, I take a different approach to those narrative theories that entail an exploration of narrative in linguistic and grammatical terms, identifying instead the role of metaphor in the formation of larger units of meaning like the (speech) genres of narrative and novel. I raise narrative theory here because I argue in this thesis that its approach limits critical interpretation by, for example, diminishing the value of other speech genres relevant to the novel as a form. This is because contemporary theories of the novel, though these acknowledge the relevance of genre more broadly, direct (and in some sense restrict) their analysis according to narrative. The unquestioned supremacy of narrative as the mode by which the novel, as a speech act, is given suggests that the novel is, generically, nothing more than an extended narrative. But, given that the novel comprises a diversity of speech genres, and narrative is itself a speech genre, it would seem reductive to define the novel according to these terms alone. Narrative theorists would appear to proceed on the basis that literary works supply narrative in its originary or, possibly even, its purest form. But Bakhtin argues that styles and forms of everyday speech are transformed when employed in the novel: “primary genres are altered […] [t]hey lose their immediate relation to actual reality and to the real utterances of others” (Bakhtin *Speech Genres* 62). It would seem therefore that narrative as a speech genre of ordinary daily usage—in practice, at least—has been overlooked or relegated to the position of being derivative of narrative in a literary context. I argue, however, that narrative, like any primary speech genre, is transformed through its use in the novel and that this transformation is bound up in the construal of voice, view, setting, and event. The eventfulness of the situations specified in relation to each speech genre becomes causally related and meaningfully

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34 The metaphor of structure is nonetheless useful, and it is a metaphor enriched with a wide range of representational modes from which it might be inferred that, when thought is organised visually in systematic terms, it is well reasoned, stable, reliable and valid. Like Derrida, I cannot avoid using the metaphors about which I write. And, because it works persuasively in my favour to do so, I will supply a metaphoric structure to this text through the more obvious rhetorical features of repetition, rephrasing, and emphasis, as well as by the visually pragmatic practices of using page numbers, headings and chapters.
relevant to every other event that is portrayed through the consistency of narrative’s metaphoric constructions. This is not a quality associated with narrative in ordinary discourse simply because narrative in this context may only paraphrase and cite other speech genres, or else determine the speech style of a given primary speech genre, whereas, in the novel, narrative incorporates and integrates these by mediating space and time.

Admittedly, narrative’s relevance to the formal aspects of the novel is addressed in theory: narrative is important to the novel because it performs a unifying function by integrating the different spatiotemporalities of the text, the different enunciative timeframes and situations, and the different constructions of these by according them the quality of mutually relevant eventfulness. What remains to be established is how this integration of event (which includes the eventfulness of speech and how it is characterised in various speech genres) is achieved through narrative to produce the genre we recognise as the novel. Bakhtin comes close to this in elaborating his theory of genre as it is developed in his essays on the chronotope and speech genres, in which he argues that novels are composed of a variety of speech genres and that chronotopes, as temporally definable places and spatially determined times, are the unifying elements of any narrative (see Bakhtin’s essay “Forms of Time and the Chronotope” [1937-38] in Dialogic Imagination at 84-258).

This emphasises the importance of correctly identifying the metaphoric constructions relevant to narrative. The four terms I use might easily be contested. It might well be said that voice, view, setting, and event are the primary metaphoric constructions that enable the construction of subjects and objects moving in space and time. Yet, it might equally be argued that subject, object, space and time are the metaphors from which metaphoric constructions of voice, view, setting, and event derive. Each term bears some correlation to its corresponding other, and yet their meanings do not equate but overlap. Nonetheless, subjects and objects—and space and time as these are represented through mood and tense—are definitive units of grammar rather than of genre. Given my statement that I will not be pursuing a linguistically

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35 Tzvetan Todorov, for example, argues that “narrative requires the unfolding of an action, change, difference” and defines these as occurring through the representation of narrative elements according to principles of “succession” or “transformation.” Tzvetan Todorov, Genres in Discourse, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 28, 30.
determined methodology, I might prefer the first set of terms on this basis alone. Yet, taking genre as the semiotic system determinative of the novel as a form, the metaphors of voice and view (though narratologists and other narrative theorists pursue these on different terms) allow, in particular, consideration of the different generic aspects of the novel as a composite form comprising a range of speech genres, where these different speech genres (though they may share the same subjects and objects of the narrative as this extends across the novel) construe voice and view in different terms. Subjects and objects, in other words, sometimes shift in their status so that the object of perception may in another instance become a perceiver and the subject of the enunciation. These shifts take place through the metaphoric constructions of voice and view resulting in another construal of these terms that enables the diversity of meaning and conceptual layering productive of different situations. A shift between subject and object, or vice versa, for example, takes place whenever shifts between dialogue and description occur and the object of description becomes the subject of the enunciation.

These four metaphors are therefore just as important for the formation of the subjects and objects that constitute the functional units of any narrative—which are narrators, characters, and the worlds they inhabit—as these functional units are necessary for the construal of voice, view, setting and event. This is because these semantic units prevail in some form in all speech acts—not simply in narrative. They underpin the rules of language and are integral to speech (in written and oral form) as modes of making and conveying meaning. Their integration in speech is such that they are more often implicated rather than openly given. This is important, I argue, because the ways in which they are given determine the kind of speech; the question of how subject, object, time and place are construed in relation to the text as an utterance determines the genre of the speech that is produced. I outline the role of these four metaphors in the chapters that follow. However, their role might be succinctly described as relating to

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36 Gérard Genette identifies tense, mood and voice as determinations of narrative, and we might presume that he means these to stand in as units of narrative by being terms that delineate the ways in which language is organised to construe the meanings that correspond to tense, mood, and voice. His use of grammatical terms is significant, and this will be discussed in Chapter 3. Gérard Genette, *Narrative Discourse Revisited*, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).

37 This will be addressed in Chapter 4, where I discuss the use of these metaphors in the speech genre of the recipe, par exemple.
integrated conceptions of embodiment and of being in the world in terms of where the subject, object and eventfulness are situated in relation to the utterance—whether subjects are construed within or outside the text, for example.

As mentioned earlier, Bakhtin argues that simple (primary) speech genres are transformed when they enter a complex (secondary) speech genre like the novel. This is a more detailed expression, perhaps, of the sociological approach prevailing in genre theory today, that ordinary everyday speech is the source of literary genres and that these literary genres result from alterations to ordinary speech practices. The question remains as to how ordinary speech is transformed. What gets repeated in order that we might recognise the attributes of one in the other? And what, in general rather than specific terms, might we say is the difference between ordinary speech and the literary text? This last question looms as a potentially impossible task, since it summons up the spectre of what is art and literature, which invites questions of aesthetic practice and value—neither of which is the intended domain of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify a basic difference in terms of representation without addressing these broader issues.

Of course, every speech act is an act of representation. The difference in terms of ordinary speech and literary or artistic representation is, I want to argue, in the representation of space and time. Ordinary speech retains the framing narrative of contemporary space and time. Literary and artistic works strive, for the most part, to occlude or sidestep any narrative of contemporariness. They achieve this through transformations of subject and object whereby the subject of the enunciation (the speaker) is represented as being other than the actual speaker (author) of the text as an entire utterance. Similarly, the objects relevant to the contemporariness of the author as speaker and addressee as reader are, for the most part, ignored and replaced with objects relevant to the represented speaker and his/her addressee. It is because subjects and objects are represented through the metaphoric constructions of voice and view, which are themselves further enhanced by the refinements of setting and event (as metaphors that more clearly delimit space and time in objective terms), that meaning reveals its empirical instability to be its creative virtue. The metaphoric nature of meaning is especially relevant here because: firstly, metaphor enhances and transforms the literal and, secondly, the literal bestows a veridical quality to those constructions to which it lends itself.
We can see how this might be achieved if we consider certain aspects of ordinary speech—the example, which I borrow from Candace Volger, relates to the use of the simple present tense:

There are two standard uses of the English simple present: to mark something habitual (“John walks to school,” meaning not that he’s walking there now, nor even that he walked to school this day or that, but rather that when he goes to school, he usually walks); or to narrate dreams and fabulous tales that have a definite chronology (“The rabbit looks this way and that, and then he walks over to me and I fall”). A series of events becomes strangely vivid when told by stringing together simple present phrases. The idiom gives one the impression that each bit of the story is spinning itself out somewhere, over and over again, after the narrative has moved on; the storyteller's present tense in this way sometimes retains something of the standard English use of the simple present to mark the routine or the habitual. (Volger “Sex and Talk” 342-43)\(^3\)

The simple present, as Volger explains, marks something as habitual and repeated, and for this reason it enables the narrating of fabulous events in a way that becomes “strangely vivid” yet commonplace. This versatility stems from the implied iterative sense imparted through the simple present in describing the habitual. The habitual, though iterative and therefore detailed, is eminently translatable to the generic because it identifies what is generally repeated rather than specifically evident in each instance. Thus the generic nature of the simple present renders it useful in recounting the fabulous because it imparts a sense of literal activity to a fictive event through its association with the habitual, creating the impression that certain aspects of the narrative are self-evident and empirically so—thus what are merely (generically) possible circumstances become actual within the narrative of the fabulous.

The same action—of moving through the iterative to the generic and on to the specific (as a reiteration on fictive terms)—enables the transformation of other literalities into fiction. Indeed, we might readily appreciate how this process is responsible for the formation of chronotopes. Meaning necessarily shifts between these two poles, of the

literal and the metaphoric—the latter already introduced in speech as the means by which signification moves beyond its denotative function to achieve a specific meaning. What I mean by this can be demonstrated using the example supplied by Volger. The apparently empirical statement, “John walks to school,” depends upon the imputation of motive (that John’s walking is done with the intention of his arriving at school) and the reconfiguration of that intention as an action (walking). This enables the linking of events: walking and arriving at a destination, whereby the acts of walking and the arrival are related to one another in meaningful terms through the attribution of intention or motive. Thus walking to school becomes a metaphor for the internal state of desiring to move from home to school. This will be addressed in greater detail in Chapters 1 and 2, when I discuss the work of the social theorist Kenneth Gergen. For now it enables me to demonstrate that my use of the term metaphor goes beyond what is understood as literary metaphor. Metaphor entails finding likeness in unlike things. John’s walking (or, more accurately, the bodily movements that are observable and equated with walking) is likened to the intention that is read into his actions (that he reach a certain destination) whereby his walking is revealed to have a purpose. Further, the likening of the phrase, “John walks to school,” with the habitual behaviour that has been observed of John when he walks on certain occasions, produces the sense that the speech accurately depicts the action. Hence, the utterance becomes equated with the material act that it describes and this lends it a veridical quality that occludes the hypothesising that has taken place in the statement regarding John’s motivation for moving/walking. But the walking that “takes place” in speech, as an explanation or description, is not the same as the walking that is observed in action; it is metaphorically that action because it can be likened to it, and this needs to be so if we are to make any sense of such a statement.

Thus meaning necessarily shifts between the two poles of literal and metaphoric meaning. But it also slyly partakes of each at one and the same time so that associated meanings might enable the entanglement of motive and action in narrative. Without this potential to slide between metaphoric and literal values, empirical speech could not sustain anything meaningful beyond signification; yet even if we allow the empiricist some latitude in equating habitual actions with “prevailing” motivations (and thereby enable a statement in narrative terms rather than as an expression of data), such speech would surely collapse into generalisation without any further conflation of internal motive and external action. The specificities observable in respect to the imputed motive and the act need to be integrated such that the internal content (thought) and external
form (embodied action) are related to one another as cause and effect. I generalise a specific act by imputing “known” motives; and I reiterate that generalisation in specific terms by observing certain details. This rhetorical action describes the effect achieved by the chronotope, which imparts “motive” thematically, thereby linking the actions and thoughts of characters, whether or not these are explicitly given as related or relevant.

Mark Johnson’s *The Body in the Mind* addresses the integrated relation of the mind that is in the body and the body-schema that organises thinking (and which might be said to metaphorically exist *within* the mind). But this schema, once employed in a propositional context, might be inverted or complexly structured such that the mind is given to exist independently, with the body functioning externally (or at least metaphorically conceived as functioning) as an object. The schema of embodiment therefore provides the terms on which speech constructs the *subject as that which experiences objects*, with the interrelations between each constituting eventfulness—and with subject and object being interchangeable with conceptions of body and mind and form and content. Language and meaning are thus integrated in a manner not unlike those Russian babushka or matryoshka dolls, in which smaller dolls are successively nested within a larger precedent, and whose unpacking results in the breaking of each layered unity. What I mean by this analogy is that in order to “look” at language and understand how it works, we must construe it in material terms—terms whereby the phenomenal world recedes and metaphoric constructions become “real” in order to mean. Thus we speak of signs, whose meaning value oscillates from the abstraction the term is meant to convey to the physical representation of a sign. We need to see or otherwise sense the sign within the mind’s eye or in phenomenal terms in order to grasp its significance, its function. This construal may seem like an unadulterated abstraction—it might take the form of a word or a mathematical formula—but we are nonetheless construing our intellectual capacities in material terms: the concept is represented to our thought as a discrete unity that might take the form of a written word or the thing which the word is said to signify, but this seeing or sensing is a metaphoric construction—one that we may well make in awareness of its intangibility, which we nonetheless cannot avoid, for we cannot think without internalising our physical experience and translating this to abstract thought.

The literal in fiction relies upon generic values that are sufficiently repeatable as to be taken for fact: the sea is green (or else it is blue or even grey, for example). And these generalised facts supply the “empirical” data from which metaphoric meaning
construes, through speech, new subjects and objects in specific terms: that sea is snot-green. My thesis thus turns on appreciation of the metaphoric nature of meaning, as conveyed in speech, and how degrees of metaphoricity enable the likening of otherwise dissimilar things. But I also want to argue that this quality operates in broader terms. The iterative generality that Volger’s example reveals of simple tense is also to be found in different forms of speech, which are reiterated in the work of fiction in terms that enable the construal of spatiotemporalities that differ from the space and time coterminous with the actual speaker of the utterance as a whole. Speech genres are thus important in understanding how generic elements of speech are utilised in literary works, which reinvest these speech genres with “new” and fictive speaking subjects, as distinct from the speaker who authors them. Bakhtin’s theory of the chronotope, by supplying a generically recognisable construal of space and time, supplements the spatiotemporality of the generic forms of speech by supplying recognisable settings and events that enable the refinement of subject and object in terms that fill out the detail necessary for a convincing reiteration of a material act or internal condition.

Chronotopes are the mental architecture and landscape of place—they define the material world in intersubjective terms through meanings that have developed over time. These include the generic abstractions we constitute by the naming of countries like Italy, France, Fiji, Tahiti, Laos, etc., also towns and cities (Paris, Rome, and London, for example), and recognisable zones such as airports, train stations, homes, interior quarters, and external regions of every variety—beaches, forests, deserts, verdant pastures, town squares, parking lots, highways, roads, and country lanes. Each functions as a recognisable concept formulated through the discursive interchange of experiences surrounding their material counterparts; and each results from the recounting and intimating of qualities that are both directly and indirectly perceived, in speech that is mediated and unmediated, accurate and fanciful, literal and metaphorical. These concepts, articulated over time, constitute the settings through which we imaginatively move in past and future tense; they are formed out of every present moment, from which we glean the experience of being in a certain place and against which we measure the relatable experience of others. Chronotopes are therefore diverse and ubiquitous. Their diversity arises because they are shaped according to their function in the discursive context. Sometimes this will mean satisfying several meanings at once. The “floating world” referred to in the title of Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel, *An Artist of the Floating World* (1986), for example, implicates numerous floating worlds: that of the Edo period
and the world of the pleasure district to which the term refers; but the term “floating world” also conceivably refers to scenes within the novel demarcated by place—whether this be the pleasure quarter, the domicile, the artist’s mountain retreat—and also in temporal terms, in the way that the past might be represented as either remote or immediate, personal or impersonal, and in historical rather than nostalgic terms.

Chronotopes thus operate within and in relation to other chronotopes: bridges link worlds, roads supply a similar passage—a passage that becomes drawn out so that the beginning and the end seem of less significance than the journey taken along it; houses are situated in rural or urban spaces, and these structures have chronotopic elements such as thresholds and stairways, kitchens and outhouses. Furthermore, within these places, the individuals who move through them shape and order space and time according to their status and role. Chronotopes also determine the affective tempo and spatialisation of thought by establishing a character’s emotional and psychological response to events in terms that are sympathetic to, or consonant with, the symbolic value of the event. The mental reconstruction that a character implicitly or explicitly makes of the world is determined by his/her perception of time and space. This involves perceptions of how they, as individuals, fit within this world. Ultimately, the chronotopic configuration of subject, object, space and time results from the integration of character consciousness with the spatiotemporal qualities of the chronotope. The individual’s experience of being in the world, where the world is both a spatial object and temporal event, is conveyed in the metaphorical and literal terms of status and position as these are expressed in subjective and objective terms by the character and other characters/narrator(s) respectively.

Thus the chronotope of the threshold might be read as supplying a sense of pensive containment when the point of view is looking toward the dwelling, or expansive, noisy life, when facing out. However, it is just as possible to invert these relations and see the chaotic vibrancy of a disordered home give way to the peace of an open and empty street. Both representations are recognisable as “intrinsic” to the threshold since they each imply that there are differences in terms of space and time operating on the other side.39 But it is not enough to define the chronotope of the

39 Lisa Eckstrom demonstrates the usefulness of the chronotope (and in this instance, the chronotope of the threshold) as a critical tool in identifying an important development in the moral content of Henry James’s early work, revealing how a critical insight, once overlooked,
threshold as the abutment of different spatiotemporal realities; certain expectations must be fulfilled—and though these expectations are neither fixed nor exhaustible, our expectations about context must nonetheless be satisfied in order for the chronotope of the threshold to be brought to life and for the world it represents to be created. The steps leading up to a house, or the razor-wire fence of a compound, will serve to meet expectations of context. But so might any other scenario of abutment. What is needed is the subjectivity—the point of view itself: “Like the utterance, chronotope is not a term that can be invoked ‘in general.’ It must be a chronotope of someone for someone about someone. It is ineluctably tied to someone who is in a situation. […] Chronotope, like situation, always combines spatial and temporal factors with an evaluation of their significance as judged from a particular point of view” (Holquist Dialogism 151-52). The world needs to be perceived and the perceiver needs an object to encounter. The form supplied by the chronotope requires some correlative content. The body in the mind is thus a body in the mind-as-the-correlate-of-the-material-world: not just a Russian doll within a doll, but a doll within a perceived or imagined world, within a doll within the world as it is phenomenally experienced.

Meaning thus depends upon the correspondence of relatable terms to schema of embodiment. The body in the mind prevails whenever meaning is manifested. Then our awareness of the phenomenal body recedes so that it might be construed in propositional terms. Thus we have the phenomenal body supplying (what Mark Johnson calls) the non-propositional schema of embodiment, which enable the (propositional) meanings that are constituted accordingly, whereby the mind constructs an image of itself as a mind within a body within a world. These correspondences, I argue, are achieved, not “emerges with real clarity when the chronotope of the threshold becomes the object of our considered attention” (Eckstrom 100). Also note Suzanne Rosenthal Shumway, who observes that “feminine literary theory can appropriate Bakhtin’s work to produce a powerful analytic tool with which to examine novelistic texts, because both theoretical systems valorize heterogeneity and diversity”: (Rosenthal Shumway). Rosenthal Shumway observes: “it is in the intersection of chronotopes, in the contradiction and opposition that arises between competing chronotopes, in the relationships that emerge between various chronotopes, that the workings of different ideologies are revealed in the novel.” Indeed, she goes so far as to argue that “each chronotope represents a different ideological view” Suzanne Rosenthal Shumway “The Chronotope of the Asylum” 157.

linguistically but rhetorically, for language must be rhetorically defined in order to mean. I will explain this subsequently, in relation to Derrida’s revelation of the metaphoric nature of speech. For the moment, however, it will be sufficient to note that metaphoric conceptions of voice and view are employed in the construction of experiencing subjects, and the objects they experience, in speech. As metaphors, these terms easily slide from a subjective to an objective position. The shift in meaning that eventuates precipitates the conceptual movement, enabling the construction of a setting as a place in which the subject might be found: for in perceiving, the subject has an object to perceive—since perceiving is, rhetorically at least, the act that construes both the subject and the object.

The same relation can be construed using the metaphor of voice, where voice is both the event of speaking (relating to subject) and the aural event (object) that is heard. With subject and object thus constructed in speech, it becomes possible to give host to some exchange between the two—and this exchange produces the eventfulness that narrative relates. The objects that perceiving initiates constitute everything that is not the subject and will therefore include other individuals (according to the locus of perception), but also places, which I designate under the term “setting” because setting implies a static environment—or rather, an environment absent of any considerations of time in a motile sense, though it might invoke time as a stable configuration of place. The chronotope, because it supplies a short-hand indicator of space and time relevant to the construction of situations of speech, thus enables the layering of the novel’s enunciative levels by shifting through chronotopically defined places and events. Speech genres supply a means by which certain chronotopes become relevant because they carry certain expectations about the speech situation in which they will likely arise, as Devitt, Reiff, and Bawarshi explain in *Scenes of Writing*. Thus, speech genres originate in the basic modes of semantic construction; and their use may result, as Bakhtin observes, in the composition of simple or complex forms.

The complex speech genre of the novel supplies a basis on which to comprehend the metalinguistic system of genre. As the meeting place of diverse compositional modes, the novel is also the harbinger of semiotic paradoxes of the kind I elaborate in my reading of Peter Carey’s *True History of the Kelly Gang* (2000). Yet these semiotic paradoxes are constructive rather than destabilising, for they urge us to consider the contingencies of consensus and to question the fixing of theoretical terms. It is because of the fluctuating uses to which we put these four key metaphors in ordinary speech, that any fixing of their value in theory will impose definitions that potentially fall short of creative
practice. That said, I demonstrate the importance of consensus to critical interpretation by showing how our shared meanings and uses for setting and event in a specific context (the country house) produce similarities that have the potential to divulge deeper meanings in terms of the cultural and historical circumstances mediating these texts.

A further word on the structure of this thesis is needed in terms of its literature review and explication of theory. Since this thesis deals so much with theory—and with theories across a diverse grouping of discourses—its organisation optimises the significance of the theory on which I base my reading of the novel as a form. This means that the first half of the thesis (Chapters 1, 2 and 3) does not address the novel form specifically but deals with issues of genre and meaning. Chapter 1 might be characterised as something close to the conventional literature review. I continue this review in Chapters 2 and 3, but I also begin to evolve my own theoretical framework in Chapter 2 and go on to elaborate and demonstrate the relevance of my argument as to the generic mediation of meaning in Chapter 3, where I identify similarities between the theories of genre and discursive formation in Hirsch and Foucault. I then elaborate aspects of my theory through a reading of the novels. In the first instance, in Chapter 4, this involves taking a critical stance that opposes early narratology (as well as some recent theorising from that school) on the demarcations of voice and view in the novel. In the second instance, in Chapter 5, I demonstrate the effectiveness of my theory in critical interpretation by reading setting and event as metaphors that translate across demarcations of corporeality and metaphysical interiority to effect the construction of conceptual/thematic and “material” objects in the novel.

The novels I have chosen for analysis represent different examples of the productive confusion necessarily engaged by a study of genre. Peter Carey’s *True History of the Kelly Gang* supplies an excellent example of voice as a metaphoric construction, as I demonstrate in Chapter 4. Kazuo Ishiguro’s rhetorical use of ambiguity, together with the first-person mode of narration, necessitates alternatives to focalisation such as chronotopic disjunctions to convey significant thematic and psychologically relevant elements.41 I discuss three of Ishiguro’s novels in Chapter 5, together with Woolf’s *To the Lighthouse* (1927) and Austen’s *Mansfield Park* (1814), in demonstration of the repeatable

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41 This diversity refers to the type of narrator, typically termed “unreliable”; see Wayne C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) 158.
yet distinct meanings that might be conveyed through the chronotope of the country house.

Finally, I conclude my thesis by returning to postulations of narrative as the integration of imputed motives, organised thematically and unified in spatiotemporal terms via strategies like the chronotope and the unities of subject and object—in the form of characters and narrators, together with place and thematic tempo—established through the metaphors of voice, view, setting and event.
Chapter 1. Theoretical Perspectives: Genre

This thesis is concerned with the novel, and specifically with how the novel is recognisable as a certain kind of meaning—the kind of meaning known to literary theorists as genre. To say that genre is a kind of meaning is to infer that it shapes linguistic meaning in the broad sense that I have given thus far, for genre can indeed be said to both enhance and constrain meaning in these terms (Frow *Genre* 10). Thus a statement in a novel, although it will have the same linguistic value that it possesses in ordinary usage, will have the additional meaning described by the term “fiction”; and this additional meaning value will both limit and direct the inferences that follow from the utterance. Situation—as an integral relation of space and time—is important because such enhancements will include presumptions founded on conventions not ordinarily required for everyday speech and writing where the utterance is unmediated, and the speakers are phenomenally known or knowable. These conventions will position the utterance as deriving from a character in the novel, or the narrator, rather than the author of the work overall. Such distinctions are primarily spatiotemporal: although the coherence of the novel’s statements will be critically attributable to the writer, these are mediated through different “persons”—they come to us via the fictive speakers of the novel.

The four key metaphors identified in the title to this thesis are the kinds of meaning that are mediated in the novel to create this effect, which is the sense of a space and time that is other than the conditions in which the novel was written. Mediation of these terms occurs in a variety of genres, but it is in particular the novel which achieves this effect through the elaboration and transformation of ordinary styles of speech. Indeed, the construction of fictive eventfulness is possible because all meaning is metaphoric when added to the world through speech; for speech represents a likeness to the phenomenal aspect without being the same as that aspect: meaning is not material, in other words, but a conceptual aspect correlating to the phenomenal. This realisation underpins post-Saussurean semiologie and post-Peircean semiotics, but in this thesis I

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am concerned, not with language per se, but with the meaning effects generated in the novel, which I argue ought to be addressed in terms of genre theory rather than in terms of semiotics or linguistics.43 Further, the additions and constraints to meaning that I describe above, although they influence linguistic composition, occur outside the semiotic system of language, introduced into speech through rhetorical orderings that shape linguistic meaning according to repeatable forms and projected contexts.

Given that “every piece of speaking may embed another piece of speaking” and a “secondary speech situation [may be] thus embedded in the primary speech situation, and in principle this embedding could go on forever” (Frow Genre 41), an understanding of how the novel organises its embedded speech situations within its own social infrastructure is of considerable importance in understanding how the effect of verisimilitude (as this relates to embodiment) is achieved. This is so, even when realism is not the novel’s overarching strategy. Bakhtin identifies this effect as polyphony—the interplay of voices in embedded speech or styles of speech recognisable in relation to a speaker, through double voicing and through terms such as heteroglossia, dialogised speech, responsive understanding, and addressivity.

Bakhtin’s theory of dialogised speech and heteroglossia in the novel can be found across a range of texts—most notably “Discourse in the Novel” (1935)44 and Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (1929, revised 1963)45—with his notion of addressivity and “responsive understanding” important elements in the argument raised in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (1929) (referred to hereafter as the Volosinov text). The Volosinov text emphasises the social nature of the utterance. This social aspect of speech is also relevant to Bakhtin’s argument in a much later essay, “The Problem of Speech Genres” (1952-53). I want to focus on this later essay whilst utilising the Volosinov text to elaborate key

their referent (phenomenological or material) as “iconic representation,” but how they perform within the dimension of speech: Anderson, “Peirce on Metaphor,” 56. Hence, Peirce’s notion of iconicity is not especially relevant to this thesis.


44 In: Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination 259-442.

aspects of Bakhtin’s theory by exploring the relevance of space and time to his theory of speech genres. The essay on speech genres, because it comes relatively late in Bakhtin’s work, implicates (rather than develops) the earlier concepts of heteroglossia, polyphony, and dialogised speech. In doing so, the essay places greater emphasis on the interactive nature of the relationship between speaker and addressee. By focusing on what Bakhtin terms the addressivity of speech and the responsive understanding of the addressee, the essay on speech genres implicates space and time in determinations of genre by emphasising the relevance of speech situation and situations of address.

Before elaborating these important texts, however, I want to trace the development of genre theory in so far as it sustains Bakhtin’s sociological emphasis on the key discursive elements of speech, utterance, and speech situation. These discursive elements will ultimately be shown to underpin the construction of space and time in the literary work, since levels of enunciation are determined according to situation as a spatiotemporal construct. This is important to my argument, which relies upon the common usage of the four key metaphors I have identified in the construction of subject and object. Voice and view are necessarily situated in spatiotemporal terms, enabling the conceptual and ontological movements that metaphorically take place in narrative, where a character’s point of view, for example, determines not only what is literally seen and hence “objectively” visible, but also entails representations of subjectivity—often through qualitative features of voice.

A Review of the Literature on Genre

I mentioned in the Introduction that genre is often understood in terms of taxonomy rather than of poetics. The sociological approach to genre focuses on the discursive relations that lead to the formation of texts in recognisable relations of lineage; but with the emphasis on the conditions of formation, taxonomy becomes a tool of this rhetorical poetics, and genres themselves—because they prove to be unstable categories—perform in a manner akin to metaphor. That is, they represent a concretisation of a series of abstractions whereby texts are likened to one another in an attempt to trace their relations of lineage. But unlike a family tree, discursive relations are potently promiscuous, and the degrees of separation are not logically sustainable but constantly called into question. Instability and mutability characterise these concretisations. The intangibility of genre as a category or form has resulted in diversities, complexities, paradoxes and contradictions in genre theory.
David Duff writes in *Modern Genre Theory* (2000)\(^{46}\) that “[t]he origins of the modern debate on genre lie […] in the European Romantic movement, especially the tradition of radical aesthetic speculation […]. It was here […] that the Aristotelian doctrine of the division of genres […] was first called seriously into question, and the concept itself came under scrutiny for the first time” (Duff *Modern Genre Theory* 3).\(^{47}\) This radical aesthetic tradition constituted attempts to either justify or debunk the taxonomic tradition of dividing genre into genres. Genre, in other words, has been taken to refer to a poetics of aesthetics (a theory of artistic formation) and a history of aesthetic forms (the recognisable formations that are reproducible in artistic texts). Yet both theorists who posit a poetics, and critics who identify lineages, cannot help but fall back upon taxonomy whenever literary forms are discussed in Aristotelian terms. In “Poetics,” Aristotle himself engages in empirical observation designed at ranking the identified aesthetic forms in terms of their object and mode. Even his theory of kind, which is determined according to the character of the poet conveyed through representational aspects of the text, strives to order these kinds in terms of a value judgment (that a “poet of serious character” is nobler and produces more “exalted poetry” than a poet whose “poetry imitates baser actions” [Farrell “Classical Genre” 384]).\(^{48}\)

Genre did not begin with Aristotle or even with Plato before him. What began with the ancients was a discourse on genre. This discourse, as Duff and others have remarked, has been fraught with mistakes and misconceptions—mostly centring on the original taxonomic divisions of poetry. The errors have involved a range of category mistakes made by highly esteemed thinkers. As Duff explains, the familiar tripartite division [of epic, lyric and drama] is normally traced back to Aristotle, but Gérard Genette has conclusively demonstrated […] that the attribution, though ubiquitous, is erroneous, and that the ‘seductive triad’ is really a conflation of two separate genre theories: that of Plato (which distinguished between three different modes of literary representation: narrative, dramatic and mixed) and that of Aristotle (which differentiates literary types according to mode and object of


representation, but reduces to two the number of modal categories).

(Duff Modern Genre Theory 3)

Aristotle, by emphasising the narrative approach of epic, by highlighting the dramatic media of tragedy (its noble object in the representation of an action), and by associating these poetic forms with their dominant representational modes (when he asks, for example, “which is better, epic or tragic representation?”), began the process whereby the manner of expression, the media employed, and the thematic and compositional elements associated with particular kinds of texts variously serve as the defining attributes of genre (Aristotle “Poetics” 116).49

Alastair Fowler, author of Kinds of Literature (1982), might be said to address the confusion produced by this approach by making the taxonomic hierarchy both practically and theoretically relevant. Insisting upon distinctions such as mode and subgenre, Fowler bases his theory on a long-established division of “internal” attributes and “external” form. Mode, as Fowler uses the term, is descriptive and relates to “tone”—as in the rhetorical effect of the tropes, subject matter, and the effect of the compositional elements of plot.50 Thus a text might be of the genre of the novel but expressed in the comic mode (Fowler Kinds 106). This way of organising genre establishes a relation between lesser modes and subgenres that, as Frow explains (in terms that apply more broadly to taxonomic practice), might be described as “something like that between genus and species, a metonymic relation of the part to the whole”51 (Frow Genre 65, 64). In Fowler’s terms, therefore, mode rests upon an implied hierarchy in which “external” form is superior to “internal” content, since the “internal” qualities of the text are paradoxically identified as characteristic, but not definitive, of certain kinds of literature.


50 Fowler’s usage of the term is opposed to the mode of expression (dramatic performance, poetic metre, for example) used by others more broadly.

51 Metonymy as it is defined here is not as I mean to use it in this thesis. Insofar as I use the term, synecdoche would be more appropriate here, since metonymy for me describes a relation of association or contiguity rather than part for whole. Some rhetoreticians, however, see synecdoche as a form of metonymy, which implies that a part has a contiguous relation to the whole. I do not use contiguity in that sense in this thesis.
Yet the distinction between external and internal elements of a text is itself a metaphorical construction—one that is based on embodiment and initiated by a visual perception of the literary object. What we see in a literal sense determines the accrual of those abstractions that we locate in and of the text: a poem looks like a poem, but what exactly makes it appear to be a poem, and how can this impression be conveyed in meaningful terms? Somehow, we manage to identify these features—we know a novel when we see one on a bookshelf, we recognise poetry and essays according to their visual demarcations, just as you would have known that this was a thesis when you first laid eyes on it. Thus form, when it can be described, takes up the first position in this chain of associations. Content, because it derives from a level of abstraction that is so far removed from visual perception as to be perceivable only in an abstract sense—as a meaning, rather than as a form—is presumed to be a different kind of textual element altogether. And yet both form and content are conceptual objects emanating from the acts of seeing and then reading the text. These visual impressions, however, are subsequently defined according to the meanings generated by the text. The consequence for genre theory is that, where theory accedes to taxonomy, the visible attributes of a text determine its classification in the first instance—although these qualities are often expressed in abstract terms—with the deeper abstractions designated as internal (often in a way that is metaphorically sensual in so far as “tone” and “flavour” are imputed to the concepts of theme and style, for example). This sets up the basic hierarchy implicitly followed by critics like Fowler. We categorise what is empirically observable as the primary determinant, starting with what we see and moving from there to what we think and feel in response to what we metaphorically see once we enter (read) the text.

This Linnean taxonomic approach to genre makes a lot of sense from a practical point of view, but it introduces and relies upon erroneous assumptions about generic values. Critics and theorists who privilege form by describing a generic hierarchy based on it as opposed to theme, for example, are thinking in terms of values that regard meaning or content to be uniquely dependent upon the semiotic system or formal rubric through which it is expressed. Yet one cannot speak without meaning—even through gibberish; similarly, one cannot produce form without theme or content, even when the latter are illogical, scattered, disjointed and hard to define. The relation between the two—between form and content, semiotics and semantics—has long been understood as integral. Thus, any abstraction that seeks to establish hierarchies along these lines is
making a value judgement by taking up a particular point of view—one that announces a preference for semiotics over semantics.

As Fowler defines it, mode is a set of distinctive represented and representational qualities that do not stand for form—although a mode might be derived from a literary kind with formal qualities (Fowler *Kinds* 107). What is apparent in this line of reasoning is that it is possible to speak of texts in terms of their manner of representation, media, semantic content, rhetorical effect, and that each of these definable aspects is loosely recognisable when they take certain forms, which are further refined according to their tone, with tone being mobile across media and varieties of form. The comic mode, for example, determines semantic content, and those representational aspects that enable the presentation of these, but it does not restrict or define media; gothic similarly determines content, rhetorical effects and those representational elements necessary for creating effects such as fear, and it can range across different types of texts—from novel to poem, within a play or cinematically. Yet it is worth noting that formal features also have a rhetorical effect akin to that which Fowler attributes to mode (compare the experiences of reading a text or viewing a film, for example), and modal attributes can be highly significant in terms of genre classifications (one need only enter a bookstore to see the effect of mode as a category). Narrative, for example, might be said to be modal rather than formal, and yet it is a highly significant mode of speech in that it encompasses a broad range of different “kinds” of texts: novels, certain types of poetry, cinematic works, essay, and ordinary everyday conversation.

Thus, by emphasising mode as being of less significance than form in determining genre, and by distinguishing mode from kind (genre as form), Fowler’s approach is intrinsically taxonomic. His method is to define the ways in which genres—or kinds, as he prefers it—take shape, and in doing so, he might be said to attempt both poetics and taxonomy. Yet despite his insistence that genre entails communication and interpretation (Fowler *Kinds* 37-38), Fowler’s taxonomic approach contradicts his explicit statements about genre theory: “It follows that genre theory, too, is properly concerned, in the main, with interpretation. It deals with principles of reconstruction and interpretation and (to some extent) evaluation of meaning. It does not deal much with

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52 This is a common approach, as Joseph Farrell notes when he remarks: “Even Aristotle, […] who is surely the most advanced of ancient genre theorists, goes only so far in decoupling the idea of genre from that of form”. Farrell, “Classical Genre in Theory and Practice” 386.
classification” (Fowler *Kinds* 38).53 “Much,” in this instance is an understatement, for Fowler goes on to establish categories, each of which represent ways of classifying texts according to the critical stance that might be taken in relation to: (1) the distinctive representational aspect, such as narrative, dramatic, discursive; (2) external structure—chapters, stanzas, etc.; (3) metrical structure; (4) size and scale; (5) subject, values, mood or emotional colouration, a characteristic occasion, attitude; (6) visual style or setting; (7) character—as in type of person represented; (8) structural aspects relating to the depiction of action (entanglement, unity, multiplicity of episodes, continuity, discontinuity, embedding); (9) style, as in rhetorical organisation; (10) and the task of the reader—the role played by the audience, for which Fowler gives the example of detective fiction (Fowler *Kinds* 60-68). None of these work independently to form a kind, but each functions as part of a matrix that delimits aesthetic forms along the lines of those that are given in historical terms. This is a theory based on observation. And empiricism is the methodology of taxonomy.

Many of these categories seem to merge, are rather vague (despite Fowler’s attempts to pin them down) and not all appear to be essential (he is clearly writing from his field which encompasses Renaissance literature): does metre, for example, matter for the genre of the novel? We might say that it matters by being absent, but not always. In terms of Fowler’s point that genre theory is about communication and interpretation, his system does enable critics/readers to direct their attention to those elements that are likely to matter in a representational sense, and which will have a role to play in conveying meaning. Understanding the uses of various conventions will help the reader to make sense of the work overall. If you know the mood, tone, subject, rhetorical import, quality of the characters etc., you have moved some way toward understanding the text. And in knowing the general quality of the text along these lines, you have a means for narrowing the potentially broad scope of what is meant in specific instances.

Having set out a rather long list of distinguishable features, Fowler’s efforts to identify the ways in which transformation might take place utilises a similarly taxonomic

53 The influence of Hirsch’s work, *Validity in Interpretation*, can be found in such statements, if not in Fowler’s actual theory. Hirsch, as my analysis will show, supplies a theory that is in large part consistent with Michel Foucault’s theory of discourse as it is contained in his *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. 
approach—this time we have a taxonomy of variations. What is interesting about Fowler’s approach in this respect is its unacknowledged basis in rhetoric. Each of the transformative processes he outlines can be said in some measure to repeat rhetorical strategies. The figures of metaphor (finding likeness), metonymy (association and contiguity), syllepsis (where two meanings, literal and figurative for example, are employed at once), metalespsis (leaping across the logical boundaries of those relations that are established), litotes (understatement, negating the negation, and condensing), hyperbole (exaggeration and enlargement), etc., can be found at work in the taxonomic system of the poetics he devises of inclusion, opposition, integration, expansion, concision, and invention. Fowler’s historiographic (syntagmatic) approach is therefore organised around a rhetorical system in terms of the relations that enable the historical formations he observes. His theory and taxonomy of genre enable him to explain the proliferation of genres that has taken place since the discourse began; breaking genre down into its various parts reveals how those features might be transferred to other forms: new genres adopt some, but not all, of the qualities of their antecedents.

This is consistent with how genre theory has taken shape throughout the twentieth century. Yury Tynyanov, for example, described the evolutionary nature of genre. His argument acknowledges that genre is not a constant, immobile system, but one that adapts and changes over time through the inclusion of ordinary discursive relations in literary texts and the incorporation or inversion of other forms (Tynyanov

54 These Fowler identifies as: topical invention—often involving “a turning from an interest in form to interest in [subject] matter” (which may also entail introducing a new topic to an otherwise unrelated form); combination—integrating two forms; aggregation—composite works that are linked by framing rather than being integrated; change of scale; change of function—for example, using epic listing to comic effect (Ulysses); counterstatement—as with rhetorical inversion (inverted praise like that of Shakespeare’s Dark Lady sonnets, which reverse the Petrarchan rhetoric of praise), burlesque and parody might also be included here, and antinovels also; inclusion—the incorporation of other literary forms through embedding, sometimes of syntax (as in style, or as heteroglossia), but also through framing; and generic mixture—here Fowler seems to mean a fairly pervasive form of genre blending that introduces “impurities” to the original form. As David Duff observes, “many changes clearly involve a number of simultaneous transformations, and some—‘inclusionism’ and ‘generic mixture’, for example—overlap so considerably that the distinction between them may seem questionable.” David Duff, Modern Genre Theory 232-249, 232.
Genre for Tynyanov is therefore a product of the responsiveness of these discursive relations. What Tynyanov terms genre-consciousness (an awareness of a new form), arises as a result of confrontation with a traditional genre: the new supplants the old without being a development of the old; rather, the division arises out of distinctions between the genre and the developing text, such that a cycle of opposition and convention evolves whereby conventionalised genres are replaced by those literary texts that develop in opposition to the constructive principles of the conventional genre; these in turn produce genres that become automatised (and conventional) in relation to which new texts arise to oppose their constructive principles, enabling the emergence of new genres, and so on.

Although his argument is that the modalities of everyday discourse are transformed into genres through their inclusion in literature, Tynyanov, in contrast with the sociological approach of Bakhtin and his school, celebrates the author’s individuality in the establishment of these new forms. Bakhtin’s most important contribution in this respect is to emphasise the social nature of the utterance. The utterance is the element of discourse most relevant here because it is the utterance, and not the sentence, that is dialogically responsive to the discursive framework from which it emerges. A dialogic utterance anticipates the presence of other voices, which are in turn equally capable of being responsive to it. This relation is an important element in Bakhtin’s theory of speech genre. Bakhtin, like Tynyanov, sees ordinary discursive relations to be relevant in the formation of literary texts; but he does not develop a theory of how ordinary utterances of everyday life become the speech genres we collectively term “literature.” What he does develop is a theory of the novel more specifically as a complex speech genre comprising the speech genres of everyday discourse as well as other artistic forms of speech developed from these ordinary forms.

Whereas Bakhtin regards the utterance as the event whereby speech realises its social function—and this social function, it ought to be noted, is enabled by the shared use of certain generic styles of relating—Tynyanov places emphasis on form rather than the relation enabled through formal expression; this can be seen in the title of his essay, “The Literary Fact.” The literary fact, as Tynyanov describes it, is the end result of a process whereby ordinary discursive relations are canonised; this process entails their

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introduction into texts; that is, the literary fact describes the consequence of these
discursive formations of ordinary life moving out of everyday experience into a literary
context where their usage becomes conventionalised to the extent that they form a
generic feature of literary texts. What Tynyanov invokes here is similar to what Bakhtin
calls speech genres: everyday forms such as the journal, the letter, the note etc.—but also
daily forms of discourse.\(^{56}\) In this respect, Tynyanov’s theory of formation would seem
to operate as a precursor to what is subsequently termed intergeneric or metageneric
relations—relations between genres that are very much like the relations established
between texts through intertextuality. Metageneric texts might reference other genres and
“refer from one genre to another” (Frow \textit{Genre} 8); rather than explicitly note it,
Tynyanov’s literary fact implicates this referential quality.

Bakhtin, in a work published in collaboration with/under the name of P.N.
Medvedev (\textit{The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship} 1928),\(^{57}\) defines the Formalist
approach of critics like Tynyanov as viewing the work of art to be formally entire and
self-contained (immanent), as though it were cut off from thought and social discourse in
terms of its formation and meaning.\(^{58}\) In contrast, Bakhtin’s theories of the novel (and
the role of dialogical relations in both the formation of the work and the relations
between its internal elements) emphasise the text as a unit of social relation/discourse,
which arises out of/in response to/is shot through with the discursive relations and
formations that develop in consequence. Although this is a generalisation, Formalists
(Medvedev/Bakhtin suggest) insist that the shape of the text operates like an
impenetrable boundary insofar as the text is viewed as containing everything it needs in

\(^{56}\) As Bakhtin writes, “[t]he vast majority of literary genres are secondary, complex genres
composed of various transformed primary genres (the rejoinder in dialogue, everyday stories,
letters, diaries, minutes, and so forth).” Bakhtin \textit{Speech Genres} 98.
College Series (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978)
\(^{58}\) The production of the work is generally agreed to have been the result of a collaborative
project between Bakhtin and Medvedev, with some dispute as to the level of Medvedev’s
contribution: some critics take the work to be largely Bakhtin’s with Medvedev’s contribution
(despite his designation as author in the original publication) being minimal. Others resist such
readings of this text and another disputed text by Volosinov (\textit{Marxism and the Philosophy of
Language} 1929) as wholly the work of Bakhtin. For discussion of this, see Pam Morris’s
“Introduction” in \textit{The Bakhtin Reader}. 
order to be what it is (Medvedev *Formal Method* 159-160). Whether this aptly describes Tynyanov’s approach is debatable. For Tynanov, change and evolution are the products of juxtaposition—of putting genres together in the sense that they confront one another. This anthropomorphic approach to genre should not be allowed to occlude the significance of Tynyanov’s contribution, for in this sense he anticipates the discursively dialogic relation between texts that Bakhtin will subsequently describe in his essay on speech genres. Tynyanov calls this a constructive principle, and to that end focuses on the formal changes enabled rather than the semantic revelations produced by the new context. This discursive juxtaposition of textual apparatus repeats the cycle of unity and distinction that characterises the formation of new genres by placing generic material within a new context, thereby presenting an opportunity for comparison and reaction leading to a new genre, for which parody provides an excellent example (Duff *Modern Genre Theory* 8). Out of this process of situating them constructively in different circumstances, ordinary discursive relations develop into what we identify as literary genres.

Adopting a corresponding position, Tzvetan Todorov argues that “there is not an abyss between literature and what is not literature,” rather “literary genres originate, quite simply, in human discourse” (Todorov “The Origin of Genres” 208). Hans Robert Jauss effectively makes the same point when he observes that “[l]iterary forms and genres are […] neither subjective creations of the author, nor merely retrospective ordering-concepts, but rather [they are] primarily social phenomena, which means that they depend on functions in the lived world” (Jauss “Theory of Genres and Medieval Literature” 135). Arguing that ordinary speech acts of everyday usage are transformed into literary texts (and become literary genres) by a process inherent to the rhetorical attitude of the speech act and inscribed in the mode of the utterance (the manner of expression by which the text is instanced), Todorov uses a series of examples designed to demonstrate how, for example, “fantastic” speech (a mix of incredulity and intimated

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59 Note the role of the schema of embodiment in the concepts expressed here, where concepts are identified as objects with borders: even notions such as immanence and transcendence rely upon conceptions of inner and outer.


belief) underpins fantastic literature (Todorov “The Origin of Genres” 206). We use the same rhetorical attitude as that of fantasy whenever we recount coincidences and dreams that seem to be of portent, while at the same time indicating that we are not quite so foolish as to believe the meaning of the experience as we recount it. The coincidence of this rhetorical flavour is a consequence of our everyday speech practices being the underlying source of, or inspiration for, fantastic literature.

Todorov’s point about the way in which everyday speech underpins literary genres is apparent in the complexity of generic forms like the novel, of which he states: “The difficulty of the study of the ‘origin of the novel’ […] arises only from the infinite embedding of speech acts with others” (Todorov “The Origin of Genres” 207). In making his case for the novel, Todorov begins by attempting to define genre. He starts by questioning its relevance, citing Maurice Blanchot’s assertion that literature (the book) advances while genre recedes. Yet, as he shows, genre has relevance to both Blanchot’s argument and his writings, which include the genres of diary, prophetic speech, narrative, novel, and lyric. This brings Todorov to the conclusion that what Blanchot really identifies is a transformation of form and of our reading of that form: “Thus ‘genre’ as such has not disappeared; the genres-of-the-past have simply been replaced by others. We no longer speak of poetry and prose, of documentary and fiction, but of novel and narrative, of narrative mode and discursive mode, of dialogue and journal” (Todorov “The Origin of Genres” 195-96). In other words, Blanchot has merely replaced one set of terms with another, but Todorov concedes that Blanchot also recognises that genres change through a process whereby their conventions are transgressed, and that the transgression itself enables, in a sense, the recognition (and possibly the realisation) of the violated generic form: “One has to think that every time, in these exceptional works where a limit is reached, the exception alone is what reveals to us that ‘law’ of which it also constitutes the unexpected and necessary deviation” (Todorov “The Origin of Genres,” quoting Blanchot, 196). Following this line, Todorov asserts (like Tynyanov and Fowler also) that genres are formed in relation to other genres: “A new genre is always the transformation of an earlier one, or of several: by inversion, by displacement, by combination” (Todorov “The Origin of Genres” 197).

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In answering the questions, *what is genre*, and *where do literary genres come from?* Todorov turns to Bakhtin’s theory of speech genres (Todorov “The Origin of Genres” 198). Todorov is careful to avoid confusion between *speech act* (as it is studied by linguists) and *speech act* as Bakhtin means it. He emphasises a dialogic approach by situating the speech act within the enunciative framework whereby it is an utterance made in response to another: speech is always continuous and arising out of earlier discourses—even if interrupted by pauses, and whether or not it is thought, uttered, written, begun and then broken off elsewhere in different times and places. Making the distinction between talking about a genre and locating evidence of the genre in a text, Todorov notes that, as with the embedded speech of everyday discourse, discourse about genre is also layered: the metadiscursive discourse of genre theory has embedded within it the discourse that takes place within the genre in question—we refer to it and speak of it in much the same way that we might report another’s speech. That is, we set up an external framework around the embedded speech of the other so that we might interrogate it, utilise it, etc.

Importantly, Todorov stipulates three ways in which genres might be identified: semantic and syntagmatic—that is, according to meaning and structure—and a third, manner of expression (which includes medium). The third category might be brought under the heading of semiotics, if we concede that manner of expression is determined by the sign system adopted. This makes three categories: semantic, syntagmatic and semiotic. Genres might be discerned according to their theme (semantic content), structure (their syntagmatic element), or according to how they are instanced (the semiotic system employed and the medium necessary for this). Although Todorov avoids the hierarchical distinctions of other theorists here, he seems to be thinking of literature in a narrow sense when he talks about the verbal aspect. Having taken this route, he makes an assertion about genre that enables us to characterise it broadly and identify it both historically and in universalised terms according to the speech act that is being used: “Genres,” he tells us, “are the meeting place between general poetics and event-based literary history; as such, they constitute a privileged object that may well deserve to be the principal figure in literary studies” (Todorov “The Origin of Genres” 201).

**Sociological approaches to the question of genre**

As stipulated, Bakhtin is a theorist whose work is central to this thesis; as well as those identified thus far, a range of critics have adopted approaches that correlate with the sociological view that bases its theory of genre on discursive practices. It is worthwhile
noting these insofar as they support Bakhtin’s own approach to genre. Franco Moretti, for example, argues that rhetorical conventions exist in order to satisfy social requirements: “rhetorical argument starts from presuppositions as well as from feelings, emotions, evaluations [...] ‘opinions’” (Moretti, citing Giulio Preti, Signs 3). Rhetoric therefore has a social, emotive character: “the aim is not to ascertain an intersubjective truth but to enlist support for a particular system of values.” This social role means that rhetoric’s effectiveness lies in its commonplace nature; it reproduces recognisable responses and might be said to convey a particular “world view” if we acknowledge that that world view will be predicated upon ideas, beliefs and opinions—standing for a way of interpreting the world—and thus forming part of a heterogeneous system of world views. On this view, rhetoric defines the dialogical relation itself in generic terms by shaping speech into recognisable patterns or forms of response: it is a semiotic system comprising repeatable styles of discourse that may be organised in diverse ways to represent our response (our personal opinion or our “world view”) to others.

Moretti emphasises the sociological nature of literary forms. With the social sciences privileging an analysis of long-term historical structures, genre theory offers, for him, a rhetorical historiography—a means whereby masterworks can be seen to break with the past and produce historical stability (convention-innovation). Here Moretti takes on the well-worn task of merging poetics with taxonomy: rhetorical tropes become historically relevant and generically recognisable—they enter the texts of an age to express a range of responses which, although Moretti warns against generalising the rhetorically identifiable “feeling” of an age, might be taken as representative of their historical context. At the same time, however, they retain their heterogenic quality, since rhetoric is itself generic in that it can be applied to a range of contexts and meanings, and literary texts use diverse rhetorical figures rather than a singular remark to express complex responses. For Moretti, mutuality or complementarity of form and feeling produce rhetorical genres that are suitable to certain historiographic discourses. (An example of such might be detective fiction for focus on the elimination of the malignant forces at work in society.) Moretti, further, unsettles the notion of originality as the breaking of convention. Instead (and consistent with Blanchot), he suggests that the originality of the text enables the demarcation of conventions, which might not otherwise be apparent without the introduction of those alternatives provided by originality (Moretti Signs 12-15).
For Tony Bennett, genres function to organise a framework of expectations in specific social and cultural contexts where reading is located. This, once again, introduces the discursive nature of genre by pitching it as a point of reference whereby textualised discourses are mediated according to broadly comprehensible boundaries, definable in social and cultural terms. Bennett’s emphasis is on the reception of the text—or relations between readers and texts—and in this way he situates genre within a discursive framework. Genres, for Bennett, are “sets of social relations which, in structuring the sphere of reading practices, serve also to condition writing practices” (Bennett *Outside Literature* 105). Literature thereby becomes a “field of social relations” capable of interacting with other fields in which social relations are organised, rather than merely functioning to represent such relations. They interact and are on the same level: “Viewed in this light, novels are to be investigated with regard to their functioning as parts of an extended, but none the less historically specific, cultural technology of self-formation” (Bennett *Outside Literature* 109). Citing John Frow’s point that meanings are not in texts, Bennett argues that texts enable the mediation of meaning by determining and organising the conceptual material for discursive focus. Genres organise these discursive relations by directing our expectations.

Frederic Jameson can be situated within a field of theorists who, like Bennett, view generic relations as both formative of social relations and formed by these: “Jameson sets out […] to define the terms on which a properly ‘dialectical’ version of [genre] criticism might be based: that is, one which would interpret literary genres in light of the historical conditions that sustain them, while simultaneously reflecting on the historicity of the act of interpretation itself” (Duff *Modern Genre Theory* 167). Jameson takes this approach when he identifies two practices in contemporary genre criticism: semantic and syntactic or structural. Jameson’s dialectical approach to these two systems is

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63 Where Formalists emphasise the text as the expression of its author, theory after Bakhtin addresses the role of, and reception by, the reader. His attention to dialogised speech, which acknowledges the presence and interests of the other—the individuals in specific or general terms to whom speech is addressed—together with his explication of the inherent addressivity of the utterance as a social phenomenon, might arguably be the earliest expression of theory emphasising reception.

64 “Rather […] the text is […] a system of relations continuously and variably interrelated with other systems of different orders”: Bennett citing Frow. Tony Bennett, *Outside Literature* (London: Routledge, 1990) 113.
aimed at revealing the political import of these strategies: the political unconscious is the meaning that is brought to bear via the interpretative practice.\textsuperscript{65} Examining the work of two prominent genre theorists, Northrop Frye and Vladimir Propp, Jameson concludes that Frye’s semantic approach is undergirded with nostalgia for the deep past. Whereas Frye’s approach represents an attempt to reconcile contemporary life with the mythical human experience, Propp’s structuralism produces an analysis that emphasises economic forces (see Jameson “Magical Narratives” 168-192).\textsuperscript{66}

Todorov’s triad of semantic, syntagmatic and semiotic approaches to genre can therefore be found operating in many instances. It even underpins the classifications of theory and theorists that have been made by critics such as Jameson (above) and David Duff (whose \textit{Modern Genre Theory} supplies a useful archive) and results, I argue, from the basic schema of embodiment identified by Mark Johnson (\textit{The Body in the Mind})—whereby meaning is initiated through metaphors relating to body, mind and their integral relatedness. This reveals the transformative effect of genre as a rhetorical tool beyond literary formations. Further, as much as it is productive, the connections formed through oscillation in kinds of meaning (form, content, relation) are capable of making strange bedfellows of theory resulting in contradictions like that evinced by Fowler when he claims that genre is not (so much) about classification, when classification underpins his poetics of communication and interpretation. All the same, Fowler’s point is important. On the same theme of communication and interpretation, Fowler’s predecessor, E.D. Hirsch, identifies a double-sidedness to speech in that “[s]peech is not simply the expression of meaning but also the interpretation of meaning, each pole existing through and for the other, and each completely pointless without the other” (Hirsch \textit{Validity} 68). This would seem to correlate to the relations of addressivity and responsive understanding that Bakhtin locates in speech as a social situation. Hirsch argues that

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{The Political Unconscious} accordingly turns on the dynamics of the act of interpretation and presupposes, as its organizational fiction, that we never really confront a text immediately, in all its freshness as a thing-in-itself. Rather, texts come before us as the always-already-read; we apprehend them through sedimented layers of previous interpretations, or—if the text is brand-new—through the sedimented reading habits and categories developed by those inherited interpretive traditions.” Frederic Jameson, \textit{The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981) 9.

genre has this sense (i.e., as a mediation of meaning between senders and receivers) and stands “between langue and parole”—between language and speech. Yet in his explication of this point, he comes very close to reproducing what Bakhtin criticises in linguistics:

Still current in linguistics are such fictions as the “listener” and “understander” (partners of the “speaker”), the “unified speech flow,” and so on. These fictions produce a completely distorted idea of the complex and multifaceted process of active speech communication. Courses in general linguistics (even serious ones like Saussure’s) frequently present graphic-schematic depictions of the two partners in speech communication—the speaker and the listener (who perceives the speech)—and provide diagrams of the active speech processes of the speaker and the corresponding passive processes of the listener’s perception and understanding of the speech. [...] The fact is that when the listener perceives and understands the meaning (the language meaning) of speech, he simultaneously takes an active, responsive attitude toward it. He either agrees or disagrees with it (completely or partially), augments it, applies it, prepares for its execution, and so on. (Bakhtin, Speech Genres 68)67

Speech genres

Earlier, I noted that the dialogic relation is rhetorical, and implied that this quality underpins the diversity of rhetorical values that I have observed in the meaning-making process. The dialogic relation, the addressivity of speech, and its role in communication, mean that meaning must respond, not simply to the meanings intended by the speaker, but to the possible meanings understood by the addressee. Thus, in shaping speech in

67 Bakhtin’s criticism continues: “Sooner or later what is actively heard and actively understood will find its response in the subsequent speech or behaviour of the listener. [...] What is represented by the diagram is only an abstract aspect of the real total act of actively responsive understanding, the sort of understanding that evokes a response, and one that the speaker anticipates. [...] As a result, the schema distorts the actual picture of speech communication, removing precisely its most essential aspects. The active role of the other in the process of speech communication is thus reduced to a minimum.” Bakhtin, Speech Genres 68-70. The same schematic aspects can be found in contemporary texts like John Lyons, Semantics: John Lyons, Semantics: Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 36.
terms that acknowledge and strive to achieve concurrence with the meanings available to another, the diversity of rhetorically determined meaning must be anticipated and constrained. Genre, for Bakhtin, describes the delimiting of these diverse possibilities in speech. Speech, for Bakhtin, is about agreement: “The utterance is a social phenomenon” (Volosinov Marxism and the Philosophy of Language 82). Language and meaning are the products of social agreements made in the constant interchange of subjective expression through the utterance—the means by which it enters the social sphere: “The understanding of any sign, whether inner or outer, occurs inextricably tied in with the situation in which the sign is implemented. This situation, even in the case of introspection, exists as an aggregate of facts from external experience, the latter commentating upon and illuminating a particular inner sign. It is always a social situation” (Volosinov Marxism and the Philosophy of Language 37). Speech situation in its social context is therefore a key determinant of meaning:

Indeed, from whichever aspect we consider it, expression-utterance is determined by the actual conditions of the given utterance—above all, by its immediate social situation.

Utterance, as we know, is constructed between two socially organized persons, and in the absence of a real addressee is presupposed in the person, so to speak, of a normal representative of the social group to which the speaker belongs. (Volosinov Marxism and the Philosophy of Language 85)

Thus, when Volosinov/Bakhtin writes of the importance of “the actual conditions of the given utterance” he means to include speakers and their addressees. That is, any study of speech that omits the significance of the utterance as a unit of communication operating in relation to speakers and addressees, misses the point of its social nature. In describing it as a “social phenomenon” Volosinov/Bakhtin is restating the lost significance of speech (occurring as he sees it in linguistics and semiotics [Bakhtin Speech Genres 70]) as the product of a speaker directed to another. Situations of address may be oriented according to imagined scenarios, but the utterance still derives from a speaker, even though the speaking situation might be performed as though it belonged to another, and the speaker, even when addressing herself, speaks (as if) to another.

Genre theory gives account of the mediations to meaning conveyed through rhetorical stylisations of speech—which includes the construal of different enunciative
levels. Bakhtin identifies simple (primary) speech genres as the unmediated speech of ordinary usage—these include conversations, letters, commands, etc. (Bakhtin *Speech Genres* 62-63, 98). Clearly, in so far as Bakhtin employs this term, “mediation” does not refer to the medium employed, since speech and writing are not determinative here. Bakhtin’s use of this term relates to the enunciative qualities of speech, but he does not define these precisely. I argue that his thesis on speech genres implicates mediation in terms of the spatiotemporal relations established between speaker and addressee. These relations are dependent upon the rhetorical function of genre as the semiotic system over and above language, which organises the relations between the speaker and addressee in terms of to whom the speech is attributed. Speech genres, for Bakhtin, enable speakers and their counterparts to comprehend the chains of mediation through which the speech is given to mean. In the case of reported speech or citation, grammar and other conventions will indicate that some aspects of the utterance ought to be attributed to another speaker speaking in a different time and place. The immediate speaker frames this (embedded) speech (belonging to another person, space and time) in terms that retain a sense of the space and time in which the utterance is immediately given. A relation is established between the cited and the immediate speech that positions the cited speaker as preceding the other in time. But in the case of the novel, phenomenally perceived space and time recede and the spatiotemporal givens of the represented speakers take precedence. This is most evident in dialogue where linguistic markers indicate the convention that cedes the authority of the phenomenally “present” speaker to the constructed presence of other speakers.

“Any true understanding is dialogic in nature,” Volosinov/Bakhtin writes, and thus “responsive understanding” opposes “the false notion of passive understanding, the kind of understanding of a word that excludes active response in advance and on principle” (Volosinov *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* 102, 40-41, 73):

Orientation of the word toward the addressee has an extremely high significance. In point of fact, *word is a two-sided act*. It is determined equally by *whose* word it is and *for whom* it is meant. As word, it is precisely *the product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addressee and addressee*. Each and every word expresses the ‘one’ in relation to the ‘other.’ I give myself verbal shape from another’s point of view, ultimately, from the point of view of the community to which I belong. A
word is a bridge thrown between myself and another. If one end of the
bridge depends on me, then the other depends on my addressee. A word
is territory shared by both addressee and addressee, by the speaker and his
interlocutor. (Volosinov Marxism and the Philosophy of Language 85)

The dialogic nature of speech can be found in the presence of different rhetorical stances
within a text indicative of different speaking positions and corresponding points of view.
This is often given as a play of different voices, but it is also apparent in the different
forms of speech employed—what Bakhtin calls speech genres—as well as syntactic
elements that more clearly convey the sense of an addressee. Speech situation is a
significant determinant of speech genre simply because it points to those conditions of
the utterance that are potentially indicative of kind. But situation also enables the
specificity of a speaker (in specific or generic terms) as the owner of a voice. Dialogism
describes a situation in which a speech anticipates, contemplates, invokes, or addresses,
another. Todorov, in a work that surveys Bakhtin’s conception of the role of genre in
discourse, identifies dialogised voice with a term Bakhtin employs in an early work on the
novels of Dostoevsky (see Todorov Genres in Discourse [1978] x).68 The term is polyphony:

A plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony
of fully valid voices is in fact the chief characteristic of Dostoevsky's novels. What unfolds
in his works is not a multitude of characters and fates in a single objective
world, illuminated by a single authorial consciousness, rather a plurality of
consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with its own world, combine but are not
merged in the unity of the event. (Bakhtin Dostoevsky’s Poetics 6 emphasis
original)

The characters of Dostoevsky’s novels are the subjects of their own discourses and, in
speaking for themselves, characters are not subordinated to the objectifying perspective
of an authorial voice; rather, the novel “sounds, as it were, alongside the author’s word” to

68 The text in question was first pushed in 1929 as Problems of Dostoevsky’s Art. A revised version
of this book was published in English under the title Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. See Caryl
Emerson, “Editor’s Preface,” Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. Trans. Caryl Emerson. Theory and
xxix. Full citation for the Todorov text mentioned here is: Tzvetan Todorov, Genres in Discourse,
convey a diversity of characters’ points of view and interests, their own perceptions of themselves rather than another’s, and their own world view (7).

On the face of it, Bakhtin’s remarks here would seem to suggest that the author is potentially competing with these voices and speaking through the text in non-polyphonic novels by dominating the speech in all its forms—whether this speech is given as narrative or dialogue. But this notion of the polyphonic novel, sounding through the double-voiced speech of the author and the text, is more clearly defined in a later work in a way that suggests this quality to be characteristic of the novel as a form. Bakhtin appears to have realised that Dostoevsky’s poetics are the poetics of the novel per se. In “The Problem of Speech Genres,” Bakhtin describes the novel as both this interplay of social voices through dialogised speech (represented in diverse speech genres, including dialogue and various modes of address) and the unified utterance of its author:

The vast majority of literary genres are secondary, complex genres composed of various transformed primary genres (the rejoinder in dialogue, everyday stories, letter, diaries, minutes, and so forth). As a rule, these secondary genres of complex cultural communication play out various forms of primary speech communication. Here also is the source of all literary/conventional characters of authors, narrators, and addressees. But the most complex and ultra-composite work of a secondary genre as a whole (viewed as a whole) is the single integrated real utterance that has a real author and real addressee whom this author perceives and imagines. (Bakhtin Speech Genres 98-99)

As a whole utterance, the author is the subject of the enunciation—the speaker of the text. But as an artistic work, the novel is a melange of utterances given by other speakers. Bakhtin says little more than this on the subject. However, I want to argue that these speakers are given within the whole utterance of the author, who conceals their own speech situation in order to enable the authority that Bakhtin accords to the characters of Dostoevsky’s novels. This is possible because the author’s voice is operating on a different enunciative level to the speech of the novel’s narrators and characters. As the utterance of its author, the novel is a communication between novelist and readers—one that utilises a range of constructed speaking positions and different social voices and speech forms. But, as an artistic form, the novel is a polyphonic interplay of diverse
speakers addressing one another directly or indirectly, explicitly or through the implicated response of their comprehension of events. The borders of the utterance, which are—Bakhtin tells us—determined by a change of speakers (Bakhtin SG 71), are modified in the secondary speech genre by the introduction of internal divisions that stand for discrete utterances made by different speakers (75). These different speakers are sometimes presented as embedded within the speech of another—a narrator or a fictive author—and in doing so, these speakers supply the contexts of the various speech situations so that the addressee of the whole utterance (the reader) might construe the correlative features of these embedded statements.

Diversity in the spatiotemporally defined situations from which subjects speak is therefore one of the ways in which the novel might be represented as polyphonic—or at the very least, as double-voiced. This entails the demarcation of enunciative levels through the construal of different spaces and times—typically implicated as different worlds. The author of a novel speaks from the world she shares with potential readers in general terms. Although there are likely to be differences in diachronic and synchronic terms, any differences in this respect between author and reader will nonetheless be part of a causal continuum in terms of shared space and time.

As Bakhtin writes: “An essential (constitutive) marker of the utterance is its quality of being directed to someone, its addressivity” (Bakhtin Speech Genres 95). This is why Bakhtin stresses the importance of attending to the dialogic overtones in determining the style of the utterance, since “[b]oth composition and, particularly the style of the utterance depend upon those to whom the utterance is addressed” (Bakhtin Speech Genres 95):

This addressee can be an immediate participant-interlocutor in an everyday dialogue, a differentiated collective of specialists in some particular area of cultural communication, a more or less differentiated public, ethnic group, contemporaries, like-minded people, opponents and enemies, a subordinate, a superior, someone who is lower, higher, familiar, foreign, and so forth.
And it can also be an indefinite, unconcretized other […]. (Bakhtin Speech Genres 95)

For Bakhtin, addressivity—itself determined by the social and speech situations relevant to the conditions of communication—determines genre (95). Thus, the situation of
address determines the speech genre and its internal dialogical elements. Social and cultural conditions—relations of hierarchy and position relative to the circumstances of the dialogue in question—“influence [...] the construction and style of the utterance” (SG 96). Speakers subsume the speech of others by embedding their speech or stylisations of that speech in their own utterances; but the correlative effect of these embedded stylisations is that these utterances have their own enunciative function, which might be at odds with the enunciative function of the embedding speech. Intertextuality thus construes the semantic authority of the statement—that which commands the rhetorical aspect and enunciative function—in overlapping and ambiguous terms. In other words, the author of any meaning is not necessarily the speaker.

Thus, speech abounds with diverse possibilities in terms of authoring meaning. The subject of the enunciation authorises her speech but does not have absolute control of its meaning. Meaning, instead, is a shared value that constantly under negotiation. Speech functions as the means by which this is acknowledged. It is polyphonic when it enables different voices to be “heard” and dialogised when it indicates that it does in fact hear them. To this extent, polyphony and dialogism are different ways of construing the intertextuality of speech (see Todorov Genres in Discourse x): polyphony emphasises the voices of others in speech, dialogism acknowledges the “presence” or “existence” of those others, whether or not it demonstrates their different styles of speech. In Derridean terms, dialogised speech might be said to construct the metaphoric presence of speakers and addressees. This constructive potential within speech is important to the novel, which relies upon the presumption of presence through metaphoric voice to create its speaking subjects—but also, as Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism shows, to construe the object position of the addressee as though it too were the subject of an enunciation by implicating that enunciation in the speech of the speaker. Thus, the subject of the enunciation is always deictically unstable—it shifts back and forth between subjects and objects, turning objects into speakers and giving voice to what is outside the subject of the enunciation as it is instanced. This quality of speech is what enables enunciative layering within a single utterance, which is, effectively, what the novel achieves, and what it relies upon in order to be what it is—that complex layering of enunciation that Todorov identifies.

The same disruptions to the spatiotemporally defined borders of the novel and its world/s can occur wholly within its conceptual precincts. Interlocutors in the novel,
Genre and the mediation of space and time

Genre theory, because it addresses questions of scene, situation, and response, takes account of these “complex and multifaceted” processes of speech. What this theory makes apparent is that a complex genre like the novel adopts those active and responsive aspects of ordinary communication, which are formative of the literary work, to create in the reader (as addressee) the expectation (and presumption) of a situation that is not actually present to them. One of the ways in which contextual and other formative elements of a genre might be conveyed is through the implication of thematically organised worlds. Worlds within a novel (and arguably in any discourse) are thematic unities—collections of knowledges sustained through narrative conventions and rhetorical organisation (Frow *Genre* 75-76). In a novel, worlds are generated, not simply through description, but according to implied generic features—those aspects of phenomenal experiences that are generally taken as given, but which might be characterised in certain ways by delimiting their spatiotemporal boundaries. These worlds are what Bakhtin defines as chronotopes: worlds generated through motif or description, through words or phrases that have attracted certain meanings within an artistic context like the novel. For Bakhtin, the road is such a motif, but also the dell and the dale (suggestive of a rural idyll), castles and town squares, and even everyday conceptions of countries like Australia, Italy, Canada, etc. Borrowed from Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, Bakhtin “give[s] the name chronotope (literally, ‘time space’) to the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature” (Bakhtin *The Dialogic Imagination* 84): “In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time,
as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history” (84).

Bakhtin begins the essay on the chronotope by identifying three basic types of novels originating in ancient Greece. These are the adventure novel of ordeal, the adventure novel of everyday life, and biography. Adventure time and its chronotopic variations run through these forms, with the specific temporal attributes of each form determined by the spatialised representation of the protagonist’s experience as it is represented in the narrative. Hence, in the first instance, adventure time organises the experience of ordeal as this plays out across foreign seas and landscapes by bringing the hero and heroine back to the original condition of their romantic intention, before the ordeal disrupted the couple’s consummation of their love. In doing so, adventure time demands that there be no alterations in terms of age or physical endowment—it effectively resets the spatiotemporality of the narrative to enable consummation to take place as though its disruption had not in fact occurred. Bakhtin cites Voltaire’s Candide (1759) (in which the hero is unassailed, but the heroine defiled and transformed into a hag) as parodically founded on adventure time. Contemporary representations of adventure time can be found in television series that depict major catastrophes befalling the inhabitants of a city (for example, early episodes of Torchwood [2006], and CSI Miami [2002]), yet which, for the most part, effectively obliterate the damage done by depicting the city and its inhabitants as unchanged in subsequent episodes. It might signal this in the repeating images of its opening credits where characters and scenes are depicted each week in identical terms: they return to their original form each week despite the ordeals endured in the preceding episodes.

The road, for Bakhtin, features in novels, actually and metaphorically as “the life course of one seeking true knowledge” (Bakhtin Dialogic Imagination 130). In the adventure novel of everyday life, interior life is externalised through opportunities for seeing life as it is encountered on the road or through magical transitions such as metamorphosis (in the latter instance, Bakhtin uses the example of The Golden Ass). The

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69 Bakhtin identifies two types of biography—Platonic biography and rhetorical biography—with each making use of different chronotopes. Platonic biography typically employs the chronotope of the road metaphorically instanced as the life path of seeking knowledge. Rhetorical biography, in which the life’s action of the subject are laid out for all to see, typically uses the chronotope of the public square (agora). Bakhtin The Dialogic Imagination 130, 31.
road, notably, with what might be regarded as its propensity for looped excursions taken off route, enables reflection upon different times and places brought up via associations found in encounters or through “real-life” adventures. Cormac McCarthy’s novel, *The Road* (2006), instances both, as does Chekhov’s “The Steppe” (1888).

Vision time, which Bakhtin locates in Dante’s *Divine Comedy*, introduces intersecting forms of time: in real time, visions are brief, but the vertical axis of vision time (intersecting with a linear historical time such as biographical time, for example), enables greater expression of the moment through the spatialisation of the vision in which “the temporal logic of this vertical world consists in a sheer simultaneity of all that occurs” (Bakhtin *Dialogic Imagination* 157). Vision time might be utilised in dream sequences, but the chronotope as Bakhtin identifies it in Dante’s work is uniquely complex in its structure of simultaneity. The looped excursions that I have identified as occurring in novels of the road might be said to function similarly to vision time, except that the quality of simultaneity is lost: though they may or may not result in condensed time, they nonetheless always return the protagonist to the point of departure, or very near to it. In this they bear some correlation to Dante’s vertical axis of vision time except that the spatial world they generate is one of depth—where the hitherto two-dimensional quality of the surrounding landscape shifts from being a “view” to a space of interaction and involvement. Then the road becomes a lost thread that must be retrieved in order to survive the ordeal or adventure that takes place away from it.

Beyond these chronotopic texts, Bakhtin identifies the folkloric chronotope, which, he explains, evinces historical inversion:

> The essence of this inversion is found in the fact that mythological and artistic thinking locates such categories as purpose, ideal, justice, perfection, the harmonious condition of man and society and the like in the *past*. Myths about paradise, a Golden Age, a heroic age, an ancient truth, as well as the later concepts of a ‘state of nature’, of natural innate rights and so on, are all expressions of this historical inversion. To put it in somewhat simplified terms, we might say that a thing that could and in fact must only be realized exclusively in the *future* is here portrayed as something out of the *past*, a thing that is in no sense part of the past’s reality, but a thing that is in its essence a purpose, an obligation. (Bakhtin *Dialogic Imagination* 147)
For Bakhtin, by far the most significant examples of chronotopic elements at work in narrative are to be found in the work of Rabelais. The Rabelaisian chronotope breaks up ordinary relations in order to establish new contiguities that accentuate other, sometimes grotesque, elements of being that generate new meanings—at the same time, elevating the ordinary and the base so that defecation, sex, etc., are of as much relevance as the conventionally noble pursuits of life:

The sexual series functions, as do all the abovementioned series, to destroy the established hierarchy of values via the creation of new matrices of words, objects and phenomena. He [Rabelais] restructures the picture of the world, materializes it and fleshes it out. The traditional image of the human being in literature is also re-structured in a radical way; moreover, it is re-structured in a way that benefits ‘unofficial’ and extraverbal areas of his life. The whole man is brought out on the surface and into the light, by means of the word, in all the events of his life. But throughout all this the human being is not deheroicized or debased at all, nor does he in any sense become a man of ‘low life’. We might say rather that in Rabelais there is a heroicization of all the functions of the life of the body, of eating, drinking, defecating and sexual activity. The very hyperbolization of these acts contributes to their heroicization; they lose their commonplace quality, their everyday and naturalistic coloration.” (Bakhtin Dialogic Imagination 192)

The Rabelaisian chronotope, Bakhtin tells us, is based on the folkloric chronotope of collective life and productive growth. In Rabelais, good is expansive, evil is mean and small. Thus, Rabelais’s influence upon contemporary novels can be seen in works like Susan Sontag’s The Volcano Lover (1992) and Jeanette Winterson’s Sexing the Cherry (1989), with their emphasis on amassing strange and diverse objects in collections. Indeed, many contemporary texts would seem to utilise aspects of Rabelais’s chronotopic vision of elevating the ordinary and the mundane to that level on which higher ideals might operate. Advertising on the Internet (particularly when re-interpreted as a form of entertainment via its inclusion on sites such as YouTube), would seem to raise the arguably low genre of advertising to an aesthetic and interpersonal realm that accentuates its significance. We might say that postmodern life in general is highly Rabelaisian.
In contrast to the proliferating capacity of the Rabelaisian chronotope, in the idyllic chronotope “an organic fastening-down” takes place—there is “a grafting of life and its events to a place, to a familiar territory with all its nooks and crannies, its familiar mountains, valleys, fields, rivers, and forests, and one’s own home” (Bakhtin *Dialogic Imagination* 225). The early works of Thomas Hardy make use of this chronotope, for example, with later works addressing the metaphorical destruction of the idyll or questioning and undermining its veneer (*Tess of the D’Urbervilles* 1891) and sometimes incorporating elements of a failed or negatively constructed Bildungsroman (*Jude the Obscure* 1895). The chronotope of the country house is a version of the idyll, as is the family novel. The idyllic chronotope can be found in many contemporary works; but, as Bakhtin writes, although these may differ substantially in many respects, each owes a great deal to Rabelais, who reinterpreted “the traditional schemas of ancient literature” (*Dialogic Imagination* 239). The use of diverse and sometimes intersecting chronotopes in the same narrative—the dissolution of one time and the privileging of another—derives from this even-handed approach to the sublime and the ridiculous that Bakhtin locates in Rabelais and remains very much a feature of the novel today. Indeed, contemporary works make use of chronotopic shifts to develop alternating semantic frameworks that cast their predecessors in anachronistic terms—even when these depict remoter times. For example, A.S. Byatt’s novel *Possession* (1990) achieves just this by introducing a sexually progressive couple from the Victorian era into the fusty and prudish world of 1980s academia.

Chronotopes are thus recognisable iterations defined in generically spatiotemporal terms. They are recognisable because literary conventions have established their use. Taking the sociological approach to genre, we might note that, as with forms of speech, forms of time and space (as place) are also formed out of ordinary everyday usage: they derive from the ordinary situations of speech.

The presence or otherwise of speakers would therefore seem to be an important determining feature of speech, and yet presence is always a construction in speech, and it is this which enables such diversity in terms of enunciative layering (where the speech of one speaker is framed within the speech of another). This question of how presence is “given” or mediated is always a question of genre. Genre supplies coherent practices, established intersubjectively through speech, that identify speakers in spatiotemporal

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terms, and which set out the relations between speakers and addressees in terms of space and time. Thus, unmediated speech, I argue, is speech in which the phenomenal and causal relations of space and time are implicitly or explicitly consistent with the spatiotemporal givens of the utterance. Generic mediation in the literary text might therefore entail the construal of space and time in terms that differ from the spatiotemporality in which the utterance is actually given. In the case of the novel, this generally results in an utterance being represented as deriving from the speech of someone other than the author who is otherwise and effectively the speaker of the novel as an entire utterance (Bakhtin *Speech Genres* 98-99).
Chapter 2. Metaphor, Motive, Embodiment

The approach I take in this thesis views genre as a rhetorical relation, whereby rhetoric is the end result of a system of relating concepts to one another: it describes recognisable and repeatable patterns that are themselves changeable and which result in the mutable concepts we identify as genres. Genre, as a set of rhetorical practices, becomes a recognisable form through its role in delimiting the text as a certain kind of meaning. Contemporary genre theory acknowledges the mutability of genres, having moved away from the taxonomic approach which strives to classify and identify texts in relation to generic conventions, thus resulting in the reification of genre. This shift between a poetics and a taxonomic approach reveals the productive confusion between these two poles—that genre is something that conveys repeatable form and content (even if these prove difficult, if not impossible, to define) and is itself a rhetorical relation responsible for the text’s meaning in terms that go beyond the semiotic system of language.

In assigning genre a dual meaning I am identifying two different rhetorical dimensions—that which sees genre as a form, and that which sees it as a relation. These are respectively the semiotic and syntagmatic dimensions. (When genre is given in semantic terms, we are generally speaking of the cited text as an example of the “content” of a given genre.) Importantly, the terms that I employ to delimit these three dimensions are themselves metaphors: what I mean to say is that we construct meaning in terms that are like the effects defined by these terms. Elsewhere I will refer to these dimensions as form, content, and function, or as body, mind, and relation. What I hope to achieve by the shift in my use of terms is to convey the ways in which we delimit meaning as kind, whereby meaning is given a function or results in a reified concept or form, or performs more conventionally as semantic content. I also want to stress that I am talking about metaphoric constructions; I do not intend to delimit ontological or phenomenological criteria beyond metaphoric values.

The basic premise underlying my argument is that genre itself describes a conceptual relation much like that between the components of a metaphor. Metaphoric relations entail finding likeness in unlike things. Generic relations are, of course, far more complex when taken as the coherent meaning units represented by texts because these entail diverse groupings of various ways for drawing likeness—ways that involve conceptual and metaphorical contiguity in the first instance (before similarity can be found), as when concepts are brought together and juxtaposed, or objects are imagined
as spatially connected. Rhetorical terminology provides sets of contiguous relations that are well established as discursive practices. These relations include conceptual actions like the forms of reduction, extension, and contiguity established as hyperbole, litotes, metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and syllepsis, for example. These figures represent different dimensional approaches to the formation of meaning, where the terms addressed are regarded formally, semantically, or as relations. Rhetoric is, in some sense, therefore, genre in action: it defines the mediating, meaning-making power of genre. It is a conceptual action that strives to unite abstract concepts with concrete objects as a means of attaching meaning (the concept) to what is otherwise of itself neither meaningful nor meaningless (the object)—though, of course, the rhetorical relation can only mediate between the generic concept and the idea of the text.

By focusing on the role of the four metaphors of voice, view, setting, and event, I mean to address these units of meaning as they are rhetorically organised through narrative (and in relation to other speech genres) in diverse ways that include their literal value and their linguistic function. But rather than focus on their grammatical significance, which is how narratology construes the first two of these terms, I want to emphasise the productive effect of the confusion of meaning generated by these metaphors through their usage as meanings, forms or signs, or in functional terms.

Taking the novel to be something more than narrative, my analysis of these metaphors demonstrates their integral value and relevance in determining the kinds of meaning that are established in the novel. By identifying generic variance in meaning, I hope to show how these four metaphors are differently construed according to whether they are taken in formal, semantic or syntagmatic terms. My argument will be developed here and in the chapters that follow. I identify the rhetorical dimensions of meaning that may apply to any given term, concept or metaphor in greater detail in Chapter 3, which deals with theory relating to language and meaning, where I argue that our competence as users of language depends upon our ability to negotiate the complex variability of meaning as a kind. By focusing on kinds of meaning, I am moving beyond those linguistic systems that are directed at achieving clarity rather than celebrating ambiguity. Furthermore, although linguistic semantics identifies different kinds of meaning (referential, ideational, behaviourist, verificationist, etc.), this is not the distinction I intend to make here (see Lyons *Linguistic Semantics* 40-45).71 There are correspondences,

but these arise, I argue, because the metaphoric value of any concept—including “meaning”—has the potential to oscillate between semiotic, semantic, and syntagmatic usage. And these oscillations enable the diversities that are productive of metaphoric relations—of achieving correspondences, that is.

Each of the four metaphors outlined briefly thus far comprises a complex array of rhetorical figures and conventions that are identifiable in relatively discrete terms and which function in ordinary speech. Nonetheless, their discreteness is in many respects illusory, for they overlap one another; and the distinctions, when pressed, are hard to discern—sometimes, even, impossible to distinguish. Their mutability does not mean that they are incomprehensible, however. As metaphors, they are based on our shared experience of embodiment, and this accounts for their repeatability which supports their prevalence in speech. This will be explained more fully in this chapter where I also address the metaphoric constructions inherent in speech through an explication of Derrida on voice, and a reading of the social theorist Gergen on theoretical language.

Kenneth Gergen identifies himself as a constructionist, which at first glance makes him a strange companion to Derrida. However, what Gergen observes (independently of Derrida it would seem) is that speech must be propositional in order for it to be meaningful. He identifies observational language or empirical speech as non-propositional, but finds that, apart from the reporting of data, most so-called empirical speech entails hypotheses about motive, where motive identifies a subject acting in relation to an object. Gergen observes that we construct speech as though we are speaking in terms of actions and objects, but we are really addressing the motivations behind actions made in relation to objects. Hence, we might say, that empirical speech, when it is meaningful, is inherently propositional, theoretical, and founded on meanings that have been intersubjectively established. This kind of speech is _rhetorically_ observational and objectivist, though it characterises itself as phenomenally accurate.\(^{72}\)

Of course, language that is deemed to be phenomenally accurate is considered literal. The constraints of literal meaning will produce a kind of stability insofar as

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\(^{72}\) Lakoff and Johnson reach a similar conclusion, remarking that “since the natural dimensions of categories (perceptual, functional, etc.) arise out of our interactions with the world, the properties given by those dimensions are not properties of objects _in themselves_ but are, rather, interactional properties, based on the human perceptual apparatus, human conceptions of function, etc.” Lakoff and Johnson, _Metaphors We Live By_ 163.
meaning that is literal is fairly consistent (with a low degree of variability) and this makes it verifiable as a meaning. But, if we concede (after Derrida) that all meaning is metaphorical, then verification is merely a consequence of constraining the meaning value of a given metaphor to observational terms of limited semantic value, thus achieving little more than signification. Veridical speech therefore does not result from any semantic stability in the wider sense, but from its limited scope in supplying hypotheses. Meaning, in the widest sense, is inherently unstable: it oscillates, I argue, according to different rhetorical orderings, which we might identify as semantic, semiotic, or syntagmatic.73

The relevance of these rhetorical orderings for literary theory will be addressed in Chapter 4 where I discuss narratology as a discipline that, in certain instances, seeks to stabilise the diversity of metaphoric values available to a given term. Structuralist approaches such as these will still use a range of rhetorically shaped meanings, but because they identify as empirical and observational, they will seek out the more literal meanings in the first instance in establishing the framework of their theory. Meaning must be constrained in this way for theory to achieve coherence. Oscillations to metaphoric meanings are highly productive, however. Indeed, as I argue, oscillation in terms of kinds of meaning is inherent to our speech practices and cannot be avoided. This is because the three rhetorical dimensions that I outline (semiotic, syntagmatic and semantic) reproduce the schema of embodiment that Johnson defines by corresponding, respectively, to form (as body), function (as experienced relations), and meaning (as content, which also correlates to the mind).

It should again be noted that I am not engaging the discipline of linguistic semantics but formulating a theoretical basis for understanding the formation of meaning based on genre and my reading of Derrida in terms of the novel. Thus, I do not identify a paradigmatic dimension because any distinction that might be made between it and syntagmism can be subsumed within the structural/relational aspect of metaphoric meaning. I base my metalinguistic system on genre and the schema of embodiment outlined by Mark Johnson in *The Body in the Mind*. In doing so, I identify three rhetorical dimensions to metaphoric meaning: semiotic, semantic, and syntagmatic meaning—as

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73 As noted in the Introduction to this thesis, the “literal” is a certain kind of metaphor—one functioning at the lower end of metaphoricity—as such they possess a greater degree of semantic stability.
alternative formulations of those semantic functions identified as body (form), mind (content), and relation (function). Hence, whereas cognitive linguistics, as a discipline, links “the metonymic and the metaphoric poles […] to the syntagmatic and paradigmatic potential of language,” I argue that both metaphoric and metonymic values apply across all three rhetorical dimensions and, that although they bear some correspondence with the two domains of literal and non-literal meaning, not all metonyms are literal (Dirven “Metonymy and Metaphor” 76). Nonetheless, whether metaphor or metonym is invoked, every concept depends upon the correspondence of conceptual contiguity with spatiotemporal contiguity: as I argue in Chapter 3, the metaphoric and conceptual juxtaposition of concepts is at which all meaning begins.

The rhetorical dimensions I identify constitute the different ways in which we explain, in intersubjective terms, our bodied relation to the world. Speech always entails the implicit or explicit identification of outer form and inner content and the relation of each to the other and to the external world. In simple terms, we personify and objectify in order to mean because this basic schema (of embodiment) is the only way in which we can relate to the world—including relations of self to self and self to others. It is because literal meaning will have associated with it certain metaphorical meanings and hypotheses that render it useful as a sign, that some metaphoric constructions of speech seem phenomenally real. These are the reified concepts that are referred to in speech as though they had a formal quality other than that of abstraction. Though “literal,” these constitute metaphors and may even function as discrete hypotheses that, more often than not, are taken as verified, for the slide from literal assignation to metaphoric meaning is easily overlooked simply because it is so prevalent and necessary to meaning-making. The self, as Hans-Georg Wolf argues in *A Folk Model of The “Internal Self”* (1994), is a metaphorical construction along these lines—it results from, and is productive of, hypotheses about how we experience certain brain functions. I address Wolf’s argument in Chapter 4; however, I am not concerned here with the wider repercussions of detailing meaning in these terms. I mean to identify the role of metaphoric construction in the formation of

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the meanings that constitute the novel and, since the constructive principles underlying selfhood are the same as those that apply to verisimilitude in the novel, Wolf’s argument only has relevance for these reasons. Indeed, it might be said that chronotoposes are, like the self, reified metaphors whose slide from literal meaning to higher degrees of metaphoricity is obscured by their symbolic value, and the extent to which this corresponds to the schema of embodiment.

Accordingly, it should also be apparent that the rhetorical action of genre as a system of mediated conventions is relevant beyond formations like the novel. For this reason, I touch upon theories that address the rhetorical effect of speech more broadly. Derrida’s account of voice as a metaphoric construction of self-presence in speech enables me to infer that speech is, in Derridean terms, language supplemented by meaning. This inference is important to my argument that genre, through rhetoric, supplies a metalinguistic semiotic system for the construal of meaning.76 I explain Derrida’s argument in more detail subsequently in this chapter and in Chapter 4. Terms like supplementarity, trace and differance are employed by Derrida in different ways to address the same meaning effect, which is the hypostatisation of metaphoric speech and meaning, and the productive proliferation of meaning on these terms. Derrida is couching this effect in variable ways in order to get around the reification of metaphoric value that so easily happens when concepts are objectified. Importantly, he is using these rhetorically as syntagmatic terms, terms that define actions and relations rather than objects: supplementarity and differance describe an action and a relation, although supplement and trace supply conceptual objects that are added and suggest absence, respectively. But even in the case of the supplement, which Derrida identifies as a meaning effect of differance, our attention is drawn to the syntagmatic value of the term. This is because Derrida is striving for a certain kind of meaning. He wants to identify those relations responsible for the hypostatisation of key metaphors such as voice and presence.

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76 Bakhtin calls for such an approach but addresses this in different terms—terms that are bound up with his theory of dialogism and double-voiced discourse: see Pam Morris, ed., The Bakhtin Reader: Selected Writings of Bakhtin, Medvedev and Voloshinov (London: Edward Arnold, Hodder Headline, 1994) 102.
On these terms, language might thus be seen to function as an absent-presence in speech. That is, speech constructs the trace of language as an overarching self-defining semiotic system that is otherwise absent (you cannot, after all, put language as a coherent whole into speech: you can only implicate its presence and its authority in relation to what you say). Language exists nowhere but as this trace (of its absence) in speech—and by speech, I mean both oral and written forms of what Saussure terms *parole*. Thus, there is only *parole*. There is no *langue*, except as the trace—as that which is constantly deferred. There is only speech. Language is a metaphoric construction of speech, on the same terms as the self, we might say. As a construction, it attains coherence and hypostatization through the repeatability of those meanings and rhetorical gestures that trace its presence in speech. What this means, as far as this thesis is concerned, is that, with language being absent, speech needs some other means by which to mean. Rhetoric, as I have already identified, supplies this need; but rhetoric is really just another way of viewing generic mediation, for the metaphoric constructions of voice, view, setting, and event constitute the units of any speech genre, including narrative. For this reason, in making my argument, I rely on both Derrida and Bakhtin: Bakhtin because his theory of speech genre provides a means for addressing the diversity of speech in the novel, and thus a way around the presumptions of narrative theory that confine our understanding the narrative function alone; and Derrida because he has identified the constructive role of metaphor in speech.

**Derrida and the Addition of Meaning**

Derrida in his essay “Differance” uses differance as a means of responding to and identifying the interrelations of meaning he locates between speech (*parole*) as an enactment of relations between signs (language, *langue*), and the corresponding meaning of which speech is itself a sign. (Later, we will discuss Derrida’s view that voice is a meaning produced by the semiotics of speech). This is apparent in the opening sentence of the essay where Derrida writes: “The word ‘to differ’ seems to differ from itself” in that it indicates and expresses different meanings (Derrida *Speech and Phenomena* [1967])

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77 Early Bakhtinian writing (published under the name of Volosinov) is consistent with this Derridean reading of Saussure’s semiotics. For a summary of the Volosinov/Bakhtin view on language, see Morris, ed., *The Bakhtin Reader: Selected Writings of Bakhtin, Medvedev and Voloshinov* 67.
What it indicates is distinction; what it expresses is deferral. That is, speech (instanced here in a word) both signifies and means something; as an enactment of language directed at conveying a specific meaning, it expresses itself—that is, speech reveals (expresses) itself to be functional in that it is indicative of that which it describes or means; and in being indicative, speech itself is different from the meaning that it conveys.

With speech expressing and indicating different things, the difference between the two must be overcome if meaning is to succeed. This entails, I argue, the same process of shifting between the different semantic, semiotic, and syntagmatic values attributable to speech, which also includes oscillations between relations that are established metonymically (contiguous and akin to spatiotemporal relatedness) and metaphorically (through likeness), and the related shifts between subjective and objective perception, whereby bodily actions are deemed objective and thought subjective (though deemed to have access to the objective data derived from bodily actions). Speech, Derrida argues, succeeds in indicating its meaning because, like the word differance, it defers itself in terms of its expressive function: what is deferred and distanced from our immediate perception is speech’s difference from what it indicates. Speech is not what it means, in other words, but it performs as though it were that indicated meaning—just as “difference” is not difference in actuality. Rather, it stands as the indicating remark of a difference taking place elsewhere (the experienced object relation). Difference differs from itself as a remark (speech), as meaning (indication), and as deferred relation (that which has been observed, or experienced, and spoken about) in so far as it is, in each instance, distinct in spatiotemporal terms—as remark, meaning, and experience.

It is through the assemblage of these differences (of speech, meaning, and experience) that Derrida’s differance is to be found. And in this assemblage of difference what is found, or rather added, is yet another meaning, arising out of the juxtaposition of remark, indication, and the gestured phenomenon. This meaning, Derrida argues, is itself a deferral—it is the deferral of absence. Diferrence, in other words, just as difference is functional but silent (Derrida *Speech and Phenomena* 133), is itself absent from this relation.

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of assemblage. Differance performs what it is employed to describe, or rather express, and in doing so it reveals itself to be absent:

Now, how am I to speak of the a of differance? It is clear that it cannot be exposed. We can expose only what, at a certain moment, can become present, manifest: what can be shown, presented as a present, a being-present in its truth, the truth of a present or the presence of a present. However, if differance is 79 (I also cross out the “is”) what makes presentation of being-present possible, it never presents itself as such. It is never given in the present to anyone. (Derrida Speech and Phenomena 134).

Differance’s absence is apparent through the supplementation that its meaning effects—it must be made to mean because it is otherwise absent. This is why Derrida insists that differance is neither a word nor a concept (Derrida Speech and Phenomena 130).80 Differance is not the meaning that inevitably supplements the silence of differance as an assemblage: rather, it expresses the effect of that assemblage, which is to silently acknowledge absent relations by hiding their absence—by establishing, through contiguity, likenesses between the assembled elements; in short, by seeming to

79 The translation from which I quote presents this “is” within a square as opposed to striking through it as I have done here because I am unable to reproduce the original typographic effect.
80 Derrida’s insistence at such times goes against what is practically evident, for it is not possible to demarcate a term in this way and expect that it will retain this quality once its significance and import has been accepted. Rather, Derrida’s insistence might be read as determined by the need to restrict the rhetorical oscillations that the metaphor of differance might otherwise engage by seeking to retain the term’s functional quality and by avoiding the reification of its conceptual “content.” It is neither a word—that is, it is neither a form, or a semiotic sign—nor a concept—that is, semantic content. This neither nor is really an attempt to prevent what cannot be prevented. Just as structuralist accounts of narrative elements such as voice and view cannot retain their syntagmatic function but will be utilised in novels like Peter Carey’s True History of the Kelly Gang to designate something other than narrative function and characterological relations to the narrative function, so differance must eventually succumb to its own reification. In this thesis, for example, it performs as that fine hair splitting that is the difference between what is absent and what stands in for what is not there. By these terms, it has become a frame through which categories of meaning are delimited.
supplement the lack of relation with a metaphoric relation, the supplement stands in for what would otherwise be present. In this way, supplementarity rhetorically insists upon the existence of something that does not exist: it creates, through the implication of absence or lack, a sense of what is now absent having been once present or otherwise expected but now removed. Once removed, or having its presence deferred, it is irrelevant that what is absent is not in fact present. Its existence having been established, the non-present signals its deferred presence by its very absence. Its deferral is what constructs it: “It belongs to no category of being, present or absent” (Derrida Speech and Phenomena 134).

Likening that does not announce itself as such is rhetorically metaphoric. If metaphors establish likenesses between unlike things, then the juxtaposition of these elements of speech and phenomena is a metaphoric action. The relations that are produced are metaphoric rather than factual—though this does not preclude their facticity in experiential terms. They are relations of juxtaposition and contiguity, and the meaning this produces is simply that of their having been brought together and assembled. Speech therefore establishes metaphoric relations between remark, meaning and phenomena through relations of adjacency and contiguity—all other relations, apart from contiguity (which is itself metaphoric in some sense), are metaphoric and imposed: supplemented; these metaphoric relations are the absent “facts” linking language to speech, speech to meaning, and meaning to phenomena. Meaning, in other words, is supplementary.

Without the constructive effect of deferral, the function of speech as the expression of this deferral, when brought to our immediate attention, risks disrupting the (indicative) meaning effect of speech as it relates to the phenomenal world. The function of Derrida’s term is therefore to draw attention to differance as both the distinction that is made between that which is otherwise identified as similar purely through this relation of assemblage. Taken as an assemblage (rather than a word or a concept) of remark, meaning and signified phenomena, differance reveals—in the same way that the two words difference and deferral are brought together to form differance—the ways in which metaphoric relations when brought together with conceptual objects, create a specific meaning: that of a primordial presence whose absence is noted in the very traces of that absence left in speech itself.
In other words, we think we are talking about the phenomenal world, but we are really talking about the meanings we bring to the world. We do this consciously whenever we designate a term to broadly define a set of relations in the way that Foucault identifies lines of discourse. Whereas Bakhtin, as we shall see, insists on the eventfulness of life and on acknowledging the metaphoric relation between a concept and the flow of events, Derrida’s project is to reveal the constructed nature of our concepts and the problems this poses for our exploration of the world of meaning. Since to defer entails a temporalisation of the relation between the terms or concepts that are brought together, to differ also means to temporalise and to spatialise by metaphorically taking a detour away from the absent originary object. Speech swerves from the object it describes; the originary object is removed (crossed out) yet present as the trace of its primordial presence. Thus, it becomes possible by this means to construct a sense of something that is not there.

This forms an intrinsic part of the relation of contiguity expressed through differance. Everything that language—by bearing a literal relation to the phenomenal object as a semiotic medium—attempts to define is a construction, therefore, because what is said is not the object itself but the meaning we attribute to it: we equate meaning (which we impose upon a world that is neither meaningful nor meaningless) with the object itself. Derrida therefore identifies differance as the primordial relation of contiguity whereby the juxtaposition of signifier and concept (or signified) enables the attribution of the sign to the phenomenal object. From there we construct further relations of metaphorical contiguity, and the metaphoric relations that proliferate are largely what we speak about when we attempt to get to the heart of any matter. This is not to say that we cannot make useful observations about the phenomenal world, but that what we develop in our understanding is an understanding of the meanings that we have formulated, and the way in which these meanings relate to one another (see Derrida Speech and Phenomena 141). The same problem that Gergen will define in scientific speech that hypothesises hypotheses arises for Derrida in every discourse and in all speech.

With the trace indicating the absence of presence—you cannot have presence and the trace—language is therefore structured around a play of absences whereby presence is deferred (and difference implicated in the metaphoric constructions necessary in order to build meaning out of other meanings). Grammatology, a term coined by
Derrida in a much larger work, *Of Grammatology* (1967),\(^81\) describes this movement from a semiotic system recording primordial traces to a system that results in the proliferation of differances through the play of metaphoric contiguity. Derrida notes this effect in the work of Rousseau in a section entitled “Nature, Culture, Writing,” noting that:

“Rousseau is not alone in being caught in the graphic of supplementarity. All meaning and therefore all discourse is caught there” (Derrida *Of Grammatology* 246). Derrida’s main argument in relation to Rousseau is that voice, as Rousseau uses the term, is a metaphor that he regards as phenomenal because it is widely understood as the means by which speech is given expression.

Because we are able to make distinctions between what is said and how it is said, it seems logical that we might sense an originary, irreducible form or sense of voice as the means by which an utterance is given and to go beyond meaning itself to voice as it exists in a natural sense—before, and irrespective, of meaning; in other words, to instance the voicing of an utterance without meaning. Rousseau attempted to do just this. As Derrida writes, “Rousseau condemns writing as destruction of presence and as disease of speech. He rehabilitates it to the extent that it promises the reappropriation of that of which speech allowed itself to be dispossessed” (Derrida *Of Grammatology* 142). Derrida reveals in his analysis of Rousseau that the natural is equated with the actual—that in our metaphorised descriptions which identify objects and events as natural and originary, the presence of the materiality (before us and in our presence) is itself taken to be inherent and the metaphoric relation (between concept and object) is ignored or else presumed to be supplementary to the thing itself. This is what I meant to express when I said that Rousseau was striving to locate the instance of voicing a statement without meaning. He had attempted the impossible of removing meaning from a metaphoric relation while keeping that relation intact; to remove meaning in these circumstances is to remove the conceptual object to which the supplement of meaning is added; hence Rousseau stands little chance of finding the originary natural voice since it exists only as a trace—as the presumption of an object to be supplemented—and nowhere else. The supplement is in fact a substitute for what the materiality of voice lacks:

But the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It intervenes or insinuates itself *in-the-place-of*; if it fills, it is as if one fills a void. If it

represents and makes an image, it is by the anterior default of a presence. Compensatory [...] and vicarious, the supplement is an adjunct, a subaltern instance which takes-(the)-place [...]. As substitute, it is not simply added to the positivity of a presence, it produces no relief, its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness. Somewhere, something can be filled up of itself, can accomplish itself, only by allowing itself to be filled through sign and proxy. The sign is always the supplement of the thing itself. (Derrida *Of Grammatology* 145)

Derrida describes the reasoning behind our conceptions of voice as follows: words are inseparable from their meanings “because the voice, producer of the first symbols, has a relationship of essential and immediate proximity with the mind.” The voice “signifies ‘mental experiences’ which themselves reflect or mirror things by natural resemblance” (Derrida *Of Grammatology* 11). Language becomes the convention by which these experiences are organised, and voice becomes indissolubly tied to presence:

The notion of the sign always implies within itself the distinction between signifier and signified, even if, as Saussure argues, they are distinguished simply as the two faces of one and the same leaf. This notion remains therefore within the heritage of that logocentrism which is also a phonocentrism: absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of meaning [...] and the self-presence of the subject. (Derrida *Of Grammatology* 11-12)

In this way, voice signifies the presence of a speaker, and language, in its organising

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82 Here I am explicating Derrida’s argument rather than making an argument of my own. For the reasons outlined elsewhere, I am not striving to resolve issues relating to resemblance or how it is that linguistic sign systems are effectively used to communicate perceptions. I address instead the formulation of abstract concepts (rather than percepts), since these supply the metaphoric values that enable the second order abstractions that transform relations of contiguity into their metaphoric forms of likeness, sameness, similarity. I rely on Derrida for my methodology and utilise Johnson in demonstrating the extent to which embodiment is entailed in the formulation of abstractions. Thus, the tensions between their critical positions do not need to be resolved, and neither would I wish to establish their positions as similar. They approach metaphor from different directions (metaphorically speaking), and it is enough to note that there are sufficient correspondences to locate a coherence that reflects the ubiquity of metaphoric construction.
capacity and proximity to voice-as-being, correlates this presence in a meaningful form: “Logocentrism” supports “the determination of the being of the entity as presence” (Derrida Of Grammatology 12). Voice thereby becomes an indicator of presence—a sign that has a natural manifestation and an inherent meaning—it becomes a primordial truth, and that truth is presence.

This reasoning represents the first layer of metaphorical contiguity necessary for other metaphorical relations to be established. The first step is substantiation: linking the meaning to the object with a tenacity that conflates the two—meaning and object become one—voice is presence, and the presence of a self that thinks. It is an indicator of selfhood and hence very different from noise, which leads us only to the event of noise being made, not the presence of a self who thinks. The literal (substantiated) meaning is available for further application and abstraction. In this way, meaning proliferates and may do so to the point where the “literal” becomes metaphorical, and the metaphorical, literal:

Thus, within this epoch, reading and writing, the production or interpretation of signs, the text in general as fabric of signs, allow themselves to be confined within secondariness. They are preceded by a truth, or a meaning already constituted by and within the element of the logos. […] When it seems to go otherwise, it is because a metaphoric mediation has insinuated itself into the relationship and has simulated immediacy; […] all that functions as metaphor in these discourses confirms the privilege of the logos and founds the “literal” meaning then given to writing: a sign signifying a signifier itself signifying an eternal verity, eternally thought and spoken in the proximity of a present logos. The paradox to which attention must be paid is this: natural and universal writing, intelligible and nontemporal writing, is thus named by metaphor. A writing that is sensible, finite, and so on, is designated as writing in the literal sense; it is thus thought on the side of culture, technique, and artifice […]. Of course, this metaphor remains enigmatic and refers to a “literal” meaning of writing as the first metaphor. This “literal” meaning is yet unthought by the adherents of this discourse. It is not, therefore, a matter of inverting the literal meaning and the figurative meaning but of determining the “literal” meaning of writing as metaphoricity itself.

(Derrida Of Grammatology 15)
This interchangeability of meaning, as either literal or metaphorical, is precisely what enables representation—without it we could not “reproduce” material objects symbolically and figuratively while conveying a sense of their actuality in spite of their formal condition as concepts. The creative process relies upon the imperceptible shift in meanings from the primary metaphoric relation of literalness as presence or being, to the secondary relations of meaning that attach to the object-presence (or, in the case of persons, self-presence). And it is in this way that we encounter the trace of something that is not there except as the absence of that which is gestured through the trace (Derrida Of Grammatology 65). This trace of what is absent allows us to call up its presence through relations of contiguity: metaphorical proximity suggests the (occluded) presence of that which is not present, and the trace comes to stand for what it is metaphorically proximal to:

I would wish rather to suggest that the alleged derivativeness of writing, however real and massive, was possible only on one condition: that the “original,” “natural,” etc. language had never existed, never been intact and untouched by writing, that it had itself always been a writing. An arche-writing whose necessity and new concept I wish to indicate and outline here; and which I continue to call writing only because it essentially communicates with the vulgar concept of writing. The latter could not have imposed itself historically except by the dissimulation of the arche-writing, by the desire for a speech displacing its other and its double and working to reduce its difference. If I persist in calling that difference writing, it is because, within the work of historical repression, writing was, by its situation, destined to signify the most formidable difference. It threatened the desire for the living speech from the closest proximity, it breached living speech from within and from the very beginning. And as we shall begin to see, difference cannot be thought without the trace. (Derrida Of Grammatology 56-57)

Nature is that which is not postponed or deferred (though it may be occluded and corrupted) through the description that we make of it; it is in closest proximity to us by being immediately present, making our own self-presence an inherent quality of the natural. It is that which language strives to get closest to without adornment, having no need to do so. It is literality itself. In other words, it is the ideal object that the metaphoric relation creates based on our perceptions of the real world; and it is the first
stage of abstraction—a stage in denial of itself as abstraction. Nature is the literal meaning, rather than what the literal gestures at. Rousseau, however, thinks it is the object itself, and that a lack of self-presence renders the supplementation of nature necessary: “It is indeed culture or cultivation that must supplement a deficient nature, a deficiency that cannot by definition be anything but an accident and a deviation from Nature” (Derrida Of Grammatology 146).

Speech is, on these terms, taken to be natural: it has a materiality that presents itself accurately in its abstract form—hence the abstraction of speech as a concept correlates to the event of speech in a way that is literal. The tightness of this correlation is responsible for the confusion between object and concept. Invariably, it is the concept that will be examined, and which Rousseau inevitably interrogates in his search for natural voice. It is because the concept is so tightly correlative of the object that it is taken as a form of presence. In other words, speech performs naturally because it indicates a material presence; but

When Nature, as self-proximity, comes to be forbidden or interrupted, when speech fails to protect presence, writing becomes necessary. It must be added to the word urgently. I have identified in advance one of the forms of this addition; speech being natural or at least the natural expression of thought, the most natural form of institution or convention for signifying thought, writing is added to it, is adjoined, as an image or representation. In that sense, it is not natural. It diverts the immediate presence of thought to speech into representation and the imagination. This recourse is not only “bizarre,” but dangerous. It is the addition of a technique, a sort of artificial and artful ruse to make speech present when it is actually absent. It is a violence done to the natural destiny of the language […] (Derrida Of Grammatology 144)

Speech can therefore be supplemented with what it lacks and in this way we might write into our voice a quality it does not in fact possess. Hence, we move away from natural voice by the introduction of language because meaning necessarily supplements what is deficient in nature: language would otherwise be superfluous and voice alone enough—

What does Rousseau say without saying, see without seeing? That substitution has always already begun; that imitation, principle of art, has always already interrupted natural plenitude; that, having to be a discourse,
it has always already broached presence in differance; that in Nature it is always that which supplies Nature’s lack, a voice that is substituted for the voice of Nature. (Derrida Of Grammatology 215)

Derrida writes in Speech and Phenomena that “voice simulates the conservation of presence, and [...] the history of spoken language is the archives of this simulation” (Derrida Speech and Phenomena 15). Voice in this sense is what Derrida would term a nonself-presence: that is, voice as the conception of a materiality strives to make present what is in fact absent from the concept itself—the physical being of presence—in other words, voice in its physical form. It occludes its relation of proximity, or metaphorical contiguity, through literality, which is a type of metaphoric relation whereby the signified is equated with the material object itself. Meaning strives to overcome its ancillary status in relation to physical presence through *trace* and *differance*. The anxiety of absence is nonetheless implicated in those presumptions of presence that infiltrate and sustain meaning as concept. In other words, conceptualisation is itself the means by which presence is conserved in spite of its lack. What Derrida reveals is that, in attempting to disentangle what is in actual fact inextricable, writers like Rousseau create metaphorical avatars to perform in a way that permits the extrication of perceived phenomena in a process that treats abstractions or meaning on the same terms as the phenomena. In some instances, where the difference is perceived—as is the case with Rousseau—the ancillary and proximal nature of the supplemented meaning is identified and singled out as the addition. And the addition of something implies the existence of that to which it is added: “whether it adds or substitutes itself, the supplement is *exterior*, outside of the positivity to which it is super-added, alien to that which, in order to be replaced by it, must be other than it. Unlike the complement, dictionaries tell us, the supplement is an ‘*exterior* addition’” (Derrida Of Grammatology 145).

Metaphors are necessarily employed to effect what is in fact an impossible estrangement between that which supplements and that which is supplemented. The estrangement is impossible because neither supplement nor supplemented can exist independently of each other: they come into being on the basis of their mutual inferiority and relevance. The supplemented lacks and the supplement compensates for that lack. It is a way of meaning and hence is a metaphorical abstraction—one that positions the supplement as evidence of the originary nature of the other: in other words, the primordial quality of one is predicated on the secondary nature of the other (the supplement). (This same action enables literary forms like the novel to construct an
otherwise absent “primary” world from the traces of that world insofar as these are to be found in supplementary gestures, where these gestures are implied or directly “given” through the construal of utterances.) The supplement is therefore a gestured meaning—“gestured” in the sense that it makes its meaning figuratively rather than semantically because its presence means a certain thing. But deficiency is a necessary element of meaning making: meaning itself is supplementary; and one that offers endless scope for proliferation, since what it lacks becomes supplemented, and so on, ad infinitum.

Further, any addition, at the same time that it supplements, paradoxically “produces” what it lacks itself (Derrida Speech and Phenomena 89). In this way we construct a unified whole that appears to be amenable to the distinctions we strive to make. This can be seen in speech and writing, which supplement and stand in for the materiality to which they refer rather than actualise. Speech and writing are then said to “voice” the voice of a speaking subject; “voice,” supplemented and substituted, becomes a metaphor for those qualitative features that are ancillary to it—ancillary insofar as they are descriptively and rhetorically “carried” by it, and contain conceptual material that voice, as it is understood in phonic terms, does not possess. This conceptual material is the meaning of tone and accent which gets re-invested in our re-configured notions of voice in its primordial sense—hence, Rousseau seeks the primordial inarticulate aspect within the non-presence of voice as metaphor and for this reason he cannot find it.

It is impossible to pinpoint the distinction between sense (as sentient) and sense (as meaning) in the movement from natural to (what we might call) cultural voice in Rousseau’s terms (that is, from neume83 to speech): there is only the supplementing and

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83 *The Neume. We shall, then, examine how Rousseau operates when, for example, he attempts to define the limit of possibility of the thing whose impossibility he describes: the natural voice or the inarticulate language. No longer the animal cry before the birth of language; but not yet the articulated language, already shaped and undermined by absence and death. Between the prelinguistic and the linguistic, between cry and speech, animal and man, nature and society, Rousseau looks for a limit ‘being born,’ and he gives it several determinations. There are at least two of them that have the same function. They relate to childhood and to God. In each, two contradictory predicates are united: it is a matter of language uncontaminated by supplementarity.

“The model of this impossible ‘natural voice’ is first that of childhood. […]"
performative cultural voice and the absence of natural voice—an absence to which we give meaning by inserting its representative signs as a presence in our conceptions of voice: “For no continuity from inarticulate to articulate, from pure nature to culture, from plenitude to the play of supplementarity, is possible” (Derrida Of Grammatology 255). Natural voice is speech before speech—an impossibility, but nonetheless the trace of an originary something that defines, by its absence, the speech that is voice in its supplemented form, which we might term cultural voice: natural voice is, rather, “the neume: pure vocalization, form of an inarticulate song without speech, whose name means breath, which is inspired in us by God and may address only Him” (Derrida Of Grammatology 249).

Derrida, in “The Law of Genre,” identifies the circularity of this constructive feature of speech in Maurice Blanchot’s “The Madness of the Day” (1949) where Blanchot’s narrative promises to give an account of itself through the narrator’s experience but proves to be only an account of its intention to give account. Derrida clearly admires Blanchot in the production of this text, but his influence upon Derrida and his grammatological analysis can be seen more clearly in Blanchot’s critical writing on the disappearance of literature. Blanchot identifies literature as a lost object whose nonexistence—and the realisation of such—causes a crisis in the literary artist who can only resolve this by giving the cherished status that literature otherwise held to the work of producing the work of art. The crisis can be read in Blanchot’s identification of Hölderlin as a poet “for whom the poem is essentially the poem of the poem” (Blanchot “The Disappearance of Literature” 139). Here literature takes on the form of non-presence: it is the poem the poet has not written but which was nonetheless instrumental in the writing of the poem that was in fact produced. This attempt to get to the originary presence—the poem as that which is absent but whose existence is intimated in the trace of its being in the textual poem—positions the poem as merely representative of this

“To speak before knowing how to speak, such is the limit toward which Rousseau obstinately guides his repetition of origin. […] the supplement must announce itself without having been produced, lack and absence must have begun without beginning.” Derrida, Of Grammatology 247.


absent originary object: a semiotic differance, in other words, operates to construct the
object that is not there by establishing a comparison between the poem-as-it-is-given and
the poem as it exists elsewhere and nowhere (in a spatiotemporal deferral of its being in
relation to the printed poem).

What this means for the artist attuned to the absence of the true work in the
produced work itself, is that the act of composition becomes, itself, the pursuit: the focus
turns upon the activity of aesthetic production, with that productivity—not the object—
constituting the heart of the matter. This becomes necessary because the object itself is
inferior, since it is not the originary poem but a trace of its absence that exists to occlude
the imposture of art posturing itself as art—of a literature that is not the
literature. Given
the inferiority of the finished work in these terms—its failure to manifest the striven-for
object of art—it is not surprising that the artist directs his or her focus to that aspect of
the creative process that remains authentic. Nonetheless,

and yet, in respect of art, we constantly speak of experience. It would
seem right to see in the concern which drives artists and writers, not the
pursuit of their own interests, but a concern which demands to express
itself in works. The works ought, then, to play the most important part.
But is this the case? Not at all. What attracts the writer, what stirs the
artist, is not directly the work, but its pursuit, the movement which leads
to it, the approach of what makes the work possible: art, literature and
what these two words conceal. So it is that the painter prefers the various
states of a painting to the painting itself, and the writer often wishes to
accomplish almost nothing, leaving in a fragmentary state a hundred tales
whose interest had been to lead him to a certain point and which he has
to abandon in order to try to go beyond that point. And so it is that, in a
further surprising coincidence, Valery and Kafka, separated by almost
everything, close to each other in their sole concern to write rigorously,
come together in asserting that, ‘All my work is nothing but an exercise.’
(Blanchot “The Disappearance of Literature” 140)

Blanchot then reveals how literature is constructed as (what Derrida would term)
an originary or primordial presence that is inscribed in the text through its absence and
which is achievable only as a failure to achieve, and marked by a striving that constantly
overreaches or falls short of the mark because the mark is itself an illusory point of
reference for a presence that exists in no other sense than as a constructed, projected presence that is always deferred (and hence absent), and different from that which is produced in its name. In other words, Blanchot identifies what Derrida would call the mark of differance—

literature thus contested as a worthwhile activity, as the unity of genres, as a world which might offer refuge to the ideal and the essential, should become the increasingly present, albeit hidden, preoccupation of those who write and, in this preoccupation, should offer itself to them as that which has to reveal itself in its ‘essence’.

A preoccupation in which, it is true, what is at issue is perhaps literature, but not as an assured, definite reality, an ensemble of forms, nor even a tangible mode of activity, but rather as that which never directly reveals, confirms, or justifies itself, which one only approaches by turning away from it, which one only grasps when one goes beyond it, in a pursuit which must in no way be concerned with literature, with what it ‘essentially’ is, but which, on the contrary, is concerned with diminishing it, neutralizing it, or, more accurately, with descending, in a movement which ultimately eludes and disregards it, to a point where all that seems to speak is impersonal neutrality. (Blanchot “The Disappearance of Literature” 141)

The sirens, in Blanchot’s essay “The Song of the Sirens,”86 can thus be read as a metaphor for literature: “Men have always made a rather ignoble effort to discredit the Sirens by accusing them flatly of lying: they were liars when they sang, frauds when they sighed, fictions when they were touched—nonexistent in every way; and the good sense of Ulysses was enough to do away with this puerile nonexistence.” This allusion to literature is also buried in the notion that you cannot get to Capri by choosing to sail to it (Blanchot “Song” 445-46). But Blanchot insists this is not an allegory because the rules are the same in each instance: “The rule is therefore silence, discretion, forgetfulness”

(Blanchot “Song” 446). One must forget that textual literature, as it is produced in the book, is not the literature that the sirens’ song promises:

These are necessary contradictions. All that matters is the work, the affirmation which is in the work, the poem in its compact singularity, the painting in its own space. All that matters is the work, but ultimately the work is only there to lead to the pursuit of the work; the work is in the movement which takes us towards the pure point of inspiration from which it comes and which it seems it can only reach by disappearing.

All that matters is the book, such as it is, far away from genres, outside the categories—prose, poetry, novel, chronicle—with which it refuses to align itself, and whose power to impose its place and determine its form it denies. A book no longer belongs to a genre, every book pertains to literature alone, as if literature held in advance, in their generality, the secrets and formulae which alone allow what is written to be accorded the reality of a book. It would seem, therefore, as if, the genres having dissolved, literature alone were asserting itself, shining alone in the mysterious light which it propagates and which each literary creation multiplies and reflects back—as if, then, there were an ‘essence’ of literature.

But the essence of literature is precisely to evade any essential characterization, any affirmation which would stabilize or even realize it: it is never already there, it is always to be rediscovered or reinvented. (Blanchot “Disappearance” 141)

The book exists outside the categories of genre in the way that, as Hirsch argues, failed correspondences will always arise in relating genres to texts. If genre organises literature, then it is not the “literature” of the book but the disappeared literature toward which the writer strives, and having disappeared, all that can be descried is the promise—the genres “in their generality” lose shape and dissolve. Having dissolved, literature is deemed to prevail, but this too is illusory. Though Blanchot does not go so far as to say this, it would seem that genre operates in that same illusionary primordial landscape of literary creation as the place that is the poet’s projected destination in the creation of the book—the book being the product of that striving, and what is achieved when one meets only
with the promise of the sirens’ song: that promise, remaining forever a promise, can
never produce what it holds forth for redemption.

What Blanchot’s argument reveals, when read alongside Derrida’s explication of
differance, is that, although we use genres and other models in forming and
understanding a text, the pursuit of literature as an absent indefinable quality and object
obliterates the distinctions that genres elaborate or propose; literature must necessarily be
all things—possible in all works—in order that it remain the orginary presence towards
which the text strives. Blanchot is not advocating that we do away with genres, but
explicating a system of thinking about the creative work that is inscribed in the work
itself as a trace. Genres threaten this conception of literature and hence are to be resisted:
literature and genre exist in tension with one another as concepts that reveal, through
their condition as an unfulfilled promise, the work of art as something passing between
the two (though it might strive to move away from one toward the other, in doing so it
risks its status as either literature or genre). In passing between the two, what is achieved
is neither literature nor genre but the book: the phenomenal world supplies an object
that exists independently of literature and genre as meanings.

**Hypothetical Language**

The social theorist Kenneth Gergen addresses the contingencies of speech on different
terms. He determines that language, when styled as empirical and thus objective and
literal, nonetheless introduces abstractions in the form of hypotheses. Indeed, hypotheses
are essential if empirical speech is to be meaningful or, at least, produce utterances that
do more than record data or signify the presence of objects in respect to that data. This
has consequences for social theory, Gergen argues, because hypotheses record perceived
internal states—and rely on the speaker’s competence in identifying the internal state of
the object (its motive or intention) with the external behaviour or action. This is so even
in the case of inanimate objects. Hypothetical language attributes motive—it determines
“internal states” and thus presumes interiority to be universally applicable and productive
of external acts.

The difficulty of speaking about the objects we attempt to describe—the problem
of establishing empirical links between meaning and ontology—is that speech is
rhetorically organised around feeling and interpretation of event and rarely, if ever,
simply describes an action or an object without conferring meaning. Gergen illuminates
the problem when he writes of “motive language,” noting that, essentially, in our
attempts to describe persons, we are in fact describing not them or their actions but the ends toward which those actions are directed; we fail to observe this because we typically shift the linguistic reference to instance the description as belonging to a person or his/her behaviour:

It is not thus to the movement [sic] themselves that such terms refer but to their accomplishments. [...] To say that a person X is trying to kill Y tells nothing about X’s precise movements; however, the description does indicate that as a collection their end point is what would be termed the demise of Y. [...] The results of an actor’s conduct can be described without reference to the actor him or herself. One may say [...] ‘I am helped’ or ‘I am put in pain,’ and thus refer to the results of another’s activity with reference to the other’s actions. [...] Through th[e] relocation in designatum, ‘I was helped’ as a description in the language of ends becomes ‘he helped me’; ‘I was put in pain’ becomes ‘he aggressed.’ Through such a displacement in referent the language comes to function as description of persons in motion. (Gergen Toward 83-84)

And in being put in motion the description becomes meaningful. Motion, or event as the reified and discrete sense of a particular movement, is activated in rhetorical terms: it becomes a repeatable concept only once it is given meaning. To define actions even in the simple terms used by Gergen when he writes, “I was put in pain,” is nonetheless to activate the motion of a malignant sensation—to give it immediate value by locating it in “me” as a happening that I experienced. To deny it any temporal quality would be to remove all subjective sensation: I cannot describe the effect of any action without giving it a temporal slant, for in order to place an object in motion I must impute my sensory response to its movement and confer that sensation to the object in motion. This applies even to my bodily sensations, whereby pain becomes the collective term for a series of bodily transformations. These changes—the differences that are to be measured in my body from one moment to the next—become motile when they are described as pain. The result is a language that appears to describe observable actions but does not in fact do so:

In saying of a person, ‘he is eating,’ ‘he is friendly,’ or ‘she is hostile,’ one is not referring to the specific spatiotemporal movements of the target.
Rather, one transcends the particulars of the ever-changing surface and treats the descriptive terms as if they referred to internal tendencies or motives. Thus, the ostensible referents for person descriptors generally lie ‘within’ the individual. It is this inner world that is typically granted the power to originate and control the goal-directed actions of the person.

In effect, we confront a language of person description that does not refer to observables but to hypothetical dispositions or motives within the person. The language of motives operates essentially as an autonomous domain of discourse, which may be used at will to account for virtually any observable configuration of human activity. [...] In broad terms, it may be said that the ‘contents of psyche,’ those powers, motives, intentions, needs, wants, urges, tendencies and so on, that are endowed with the capacity to direct human behavior have no ontological status, but appear to do so because they are objectified through linguistic practice. They are essentially reified by-products of human communication practices. (Gergen Toward 84-85)

This no doubt adds to the difficulty faced in the social sciences in terms of finding invariables, or formulating abstract rules, since our observations of human behaviour intrinsically entail the estimation of motives (see Gergen Toward 90). It is also, presumably, the underlying principle of Gergen’s constructionism; our construction of the social environment begins at the point of observation, reinforced in our descriptions: “Thus, for example, an analysis of communication that confined itself to vocal utterances would not enable one to make sense of such action; clarity is achieved only when one comprehends the meaning (intention, or motive) of the speaker” (Gergen Toward 89).

One might conclude, on this basis, that the role of language is primarily to express motive and intention in a predictive or descriptive manner and that this also applies to inanimate objects and abstract concepts—that is, we personify everything at this fundamental level of communication by using language that expresses motivation (conceptual language, for example, is rich with metaphorical use of verbs that cannot possibly apply to the objects being discussed).

The consequence of using language that is not truly denotative of its objects is that this translates to scientific discourse, or theory, as a process of relating hypothetical constructs “not [...] to an observable [...] but to another hypothetical construct” (Gergen
Toward 92). What takes place is the generation of two different languages in social science: theory based (elaborating the hypothetical) and empirical or observational language. But so-called empirical observations do not describe the actions as they are observed, only the motives presumed to drive them; as such, “[t]hey are essentially forms of interpretive language, for which the referents are nonobservational” (Gergen Toward 101). The implications of Gergen’s argument on this point will prove relevant in relation to Johnson’s argument that our experience as embodied beings provides the basis on which we formulate meaning. We attribute the same experience of being a mind within a body and a body that has a mind to everything we encounter by presuming that every external object or action has an internal cause and an external form. Motive language is formulated on this basis—that we liken our experiences to the “experiences” of external objects and events by imputing a similar ontology and relation to these.

It is here that Gergen comes closest to Derrida, and in a sense, his argument reveals the same problem of language by a different route. Gergen does not go so far as to say that all language hypothesises about motive but suggests that language when it fails to do so is essentially of little meaning value outside the small scientific circle in which it arises as observational language. And even then, such observational language is meaningless when removed from the full range of statistical and other recordable aspects of the events, or when expressed without reference to the motive language that scientists employ as “empirical” rather than hypothetical: one cannot take observational language out of its tightly constrained context and make sense of it independently. “Theoretical” language, on the other hand, mixes with ordinary language and even utilises objectified notions like “rape” “war” etc. (Gergen Toward 102-106); for this reason, it serves as the means by which scientists communicate their “empirical” observations to the world (not realising that they have already theorised their “observations” in their “empirical” language). It also limits or determines the language that might be used from the observational level by determining the object of the exercise, or the focus of the research.87

87 If all this seems to deny the possibility of giving an accurate account of our experiences, one should not despair, Gergen argues, since these languages add to the accumulation of our understanding of the world and place the scientist at the forefront of this process of accumulation: rather than the scientist waiting for her or his findings to be taken up by another, in communicating those findings s/he is giving immediate account of her/his understanding and,
The relationship between the two languages is interdependent, since “a commitment on either level constrains what may be said at the other” (Gergen Toward 111); but this interdependence, as Mark Johnson will indirectly argue, is generally denied by the Objectivist school of thought, which favours the empirical speech of science. Gergen’s analysis, however, reverses the emphasis that Johnson makes when he argues that non-propositional schemata, implicated in the observational language identified by Gergen, are the unacknowledged components of all theoretical speech. Gergen takes this as given, but that is because he views the observable data in descriptive terms and fails to address their non-propositional character. What Gergen terms elaborative language is basically the language of proposition as Johnson defines it. Yet Johnson is less concerned with the failure of empiricism in reaching beyond the expression of observable data than he is with the need to establish that embodiment determines all motive speech. Whereas Gergen’s analysis shows that embodiment (which is not limited to sentient beings) is the only observable data that can be accurately described (that is, free of elaboration), Johnson informs us that this data is the source of all metaphoric language. The observable data supplies the terms upon which the metaphors of elaboration are expounded through a discourse that addresses motive rather than objects. Gergen tells us that language beyond observational data is invariably elaborative and theoretical. Metaphor thus enables the elaborations we call theory.

**Metaphoric Embodiment**

Mark Johnson begins, in *The Body in the Mind*, by noting that the objectivist perspective holds that meaning and rationality are abstract operations of the mind and are therefore independent of the bodily experience. That is, knowledge and meaning are transcendent. Johnson’s theory of embodied imagination is constructive. It gives imagination a central role in establishing interaction between objectivist demarcated territories of mind and body via image schemata: “imagination is both *bodily* and *rational*” and it is “only by recognizing this interactional character of imagination [that] we can hope to explain the nature of meaning” (M. Johnson *Body in the Mind* xxix). By “image schema,” Johnson means an abstract pattern of a non-propositional nature “that can be manifested in rich images, perceptions, and events” (M. Johnson *Body in the Mind* 2). One such example is

the “compulsive force” schema (of events like aeroplanes moving down a runway, of perceptions such as peer pressure, and tectonic shifts). These non-propositional patterns of meaning are nonetheless explained in propositional terms: “my present sense of being balanced upright in space at this moment is surely a nonpropositional awareness that I have, even though all my efforts to communicate its reality to you will involve propositional structures” (4). Johnson argues that these non-propositional image schemata “emerge from our bodily experience” (M. Johnson Body in the Mind 5). Such patterns are non-literal, though they are tied up with literal concepts.

These non-propositional structures operate in the background from which meaning emerges—often metaphorically invoked in the background to the language used so that the metaphor forms part of the reasoning process and may be expressed in propositional form though it derives from “preconceptual structures of experience” (M. Johnson Body in the Mind 13). Metaphors, therefore, are not simply background to meaning but form part of that meaning if we “challeng[e] the exclusive identification of meaning with propositional structure” (M. Johnson Body in the Mind 10). This may go against objectivist notions of reasoning and on such terms be cast as invalid, but it is nonetheless a form of reasoning that we use and understand, even though it might fail to live up to the objectivist ideal of logic (M. Johnson Body in the Mind 12). It is upon the pragmatic relevance of such bodily experience, and its relation to our capacity for abstract reasoning, that Johnson founds his argument: “in order for us to have meaningful, connected experiences that we can comprehend and reason about, there must be pattern and order to our actions, perceptions, and conceptions” (M. Johnson

88 Lakoff and Johnson’s work in Metaphors We Live By has been widely received and addressed in disciplines such as semantics, cognitive science and linguistics. However, some argue that their widely successful “experientialism” is universalising and stems from essentialism. Social constructionists argue for the influence of “culture-specific constructs” (and emotions are considered by some theorists to fall within this category). I take the view that Johnson’s schema of embodiment provides the basic divisions by which we categorise concepts in generic terms as bodily/external/formal, mental/internal/semantic, and relational/functional/syntagmatic, but that the meanings we form are not necessarily logically derived from this schema and are constructed intersubjectively through consensus and rhetorical practice (that is, as a social and discursive construction). See René Dirven, “Introduction,” Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast, eds. René Dirven and Ralf Pörings (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003) 12.
This dynamic pattern is supplied by our non-propositional bodily experiences as these take recognisable form (no doubt through the accumulation of experience by which the pattern then becomes discernible).

Johnson uses the term “schema” in its original sense as a non-propositional structure of imagination (M. Johnson *Body in the Mind* 19); so “image schema” by this definition is not the system of knowledge that schema today represents, which typically describes or depicts identifiable (stereo-typed) sequences within an event (and is therefore inherently propositional—establishing relations between each episode to make a sequence of related smaller events or properties that are described in their totality as the “event”). Indeed, Johnson uses schema in the same way as Adena Rosmarin when relating her theory of genre. Rosmarin argues that a schema supplies not simply an image of what is seen, but what is understood (Rosmarin *The Power of Genre* 18-19). Children, for example, draw heads with hair around the perimeter of an oval shape, not because that is how they see human heads, but because they comprehend that hair is attached to the surface of the head: their schema integrates two different forms of perception—what they feel and understand in sensory terms and what they see in image terms—and in integrating these perceptions, aspects of information are altered, truncated or simply obscured in order to form a coherent drawing. The schema is made up of embodied experiences, just as Johnson argues, and those embodied experiences are those of having hair and a head and of seeing people with hair on their heads.

In adopting this definition of schema, Johnson borrows from Ulric Neisser, who sees “schemata as malleable structures of perception and motor programs,” which “do not operate propositionally in the Objectivist sense,” though they may form the basis upon which propositional structures are later established (M. Johnson *Body in the Mind* 21). This enables Johnson to link Kant’s image schema (which “connect[s] concepts with percepts”) to the embodiment schemata that form the basis of his own theory of the body in the mind (M. Johnson *Body in the Mind* 21). For example, our experience of being bodily beings, physically bounded and contained, that move in and out of borders (rooms etc.) and manipulate objects in and out of other bounded entities (including ourselves: food goes in, comes out as waste), provides the basic non-propositional schema by which we order our conceptual world—and from which we draw certain inferences—in relation to the “in-out” schemata so widely used. Of course, our ability to form propositions enables us to describe this non-propositional state; nonetheless, our bodily experience determines our thought on this fundamental level, and our bodily
experience is non-propositional.

Importantly, “image schemata are not rich, concrete images or mental pictures” but “structures that organize our mental representations at a level more general and abstract than that at which we form particular mental images” (M. Johnson Body in the Mind 23-24 emphasis original). They are something very like genres according to the way in which Johnson describes them (M. Johnson Body in the Mind 28-29). Though they may comprise visual, tactile and other perceptual modalities, image schemata transcend these—somehow generalising the spatiotemporal perceptions that kinaesthesia entails to produce “abstract analogs” based on “physical processes or operations” (M. Johnson Body in the Mind 25). Johnson summarises his argument as follows:

I would like to suggest [...] possible experiential bases for some logical connectives and inferential structures. In particular, I want to suggest that image schemata constrain inferences (and thus reasoning) in certain basic and important ways. They can do this because they have definite internal structure that can be figuratively extended to structure our understanding of formal relations among concepts and propositions. It is in this special, non-Objectivist sense only that image schemata can be called ‘propositional’ (=continuous patterns with sufficient internal structure to constrain inferences). Because schemata are so central to meaning structure, they influence the ways in which we can make sense of things and reason about them. (M. Johnson Body in the Mind 38)

Johnson’s image schemata are thus like genres in terms of their capacity for mediating meaning by constraining inferences and directing the figurative structures that determine what is relevant in each case. Image schemata are rhetorical, in other words. These structures are themselves simply organised—what is important is their repeatable nature—and hence Johnson's necessary elaboration of different gestalts for force is so self-evident as to become laboured at times. He goes to such lengths, however, in order to render plausible his claim that these experiential image-schematic gestalts “are themselves meaning structures” (M. Johnson Body in the Mind 48), that is, they are the basis rather than the background to all our understanding. In doing so, he examines empirical data on the usage and meaning of modal verbs, which “is actually an investigation into a further cluster of extremely significant patterns of experience and understanding”: “When we enquire into the senses of must, may, and can, we are exploring the image schemata
present in situations of the sort we encounter daily: feeling ourselves able to act in certain ways (can), permitted to perform actions of our choosing (may), and compelled by forces beyond our control (must)” (M. Johnson Body in the Mind 49). In this, Johnson relies on the work of linguist Eve Sweetser, who sees links between the root and epistemic senses of modal verbs in terms of the metaphorical use of the physical world in thought: relations in the physical world metaphorically structure the mental world. He incorporates Sweetser’s argument by relating the root meanings of modal verbs to specific image schemata: must denotes compulsion or force, may entails the absence or removal of restraint, and can involves enablement image schemata (M. Johnson Body in the Mind 51-52).

The same modalities can be found at work in rhetorical figures in terms of the semantic goal of persuasiveness and the organisation of relations that direct our understanding of these in simple terms as “this, not that,” which generally involves the application or removal of compulsion in conceptual terms through the use of patterns that emphasise one aspect over another. That is, in Johnson’s terms, “we understand mental processes of reasoning as involving forces and barriers analogous to physical and social forces and obstacles,” and reasoning, I argue according to Gergen’s observations, entails rhetorical choices in terms of how we relate or separate (in language) the diverse concepts and objects that we perceive in relation to the material world (M. Johnson Body in the Mind 53). “[T]he voice of pure reason”, for example, as Johnson argues, functions in the epistemic sense as the force vector that constrains or enables thought (M. Johnson Body in the Mind 54). Moving on to an image schema of balance, Johnson argues that much of what we know as psychological, systemic and logical balance is a metaphorical projection from the image schema as it is based on our bodily experience of being balanced. Johnson points out:

Metaphorical projection is only one way we achieve order and structure in our experience that we can make sense of. Another type of projective structure is metonymy, which deals with part-whole relations. But metaphor proves to be one of the better examples of imaginative schematic operations, because it allows us a glimpse of creation of

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89 Johnson, following John Searle, then applies his image schema of force to speech acts to show that the propositional content is rhetorically organised to produce a certain type of force (the illocutionary force of assertion, question, direction etc.) Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind 58.
meaningful structure via projections and elaborations of image schemata. (M. Johnson *Body in the Mind* 100).

Image schemata form the basis of the sense we make of related metaphors and the extension of metaphors, as well as polysemy and consistency through historical change: they provide a system of relatedness that can be coherently established across complex extensions of meaning and usage that move from the more concrete experience of being embodied toward abstract and nonphysical expressions of experience (M. Johnson *Body in the Mind* 104-107).

Johnson details several image schemata and their significance for our intellectual life (the identification of stress factors and their impact, for example, entails a shift from the image schema that sees the body as a machine to the balance-based schema of homeostasis). He argues for “an enriched view of rationality that includes structures of imagination” (141). Structures of imagination include acts or processes of categorisation, schemata, metaphorical projections, metonymy, and narrative structure (M. Johnson *Body in the Mind* 173). These same elements ought to be included in a theory of meaning, Johnson argues, along with an account of polysemy and semantic change over time (M. Johnson *Body in the Mind* 191-193):

For the non-Objectivist, meaning is always a matter of human understanding, which constitutes our experience of a common world that we can make some sense of. A theory of meaning is a theory of understanding. And understanding involves image schemata and their metaphorical projections, as well as propositions. These embodied and imaginative structures of meaning have been shown to be shared, public, and “objective,” in an appropriate sense of objectivity. (M. Johnson *Body in the Mind* 174)

This thesis endeavours to give some account of polysemy and semantic change on these terms by identifying the rhetorical dimensions through which metaphorically derived meaning oscillates. These are dimensions that correlate to the schema of embodiment, whereby form is body, content is mind, and structure is material relation or degrees of contiguity. The metaphoric values that we attribute to the material world have the capacity to oscillate in terms of these three dimensions of experience. At the same time, they might shift in scale—moving from apparently empirical and literal meaning to higher degrees of metaphoricity.
Johnson disputes the objectivist complaint that “the conflation of reason with imagination can only lead to relativism” (M. Johnson *Body in the Mind* 195). But, of course, if imagination is restrained and constrained by shared image schemata (shared on the basis that we all have, or perceive ourselves to have, bodies that encounter repeatable and identifiable experiences that can be metaphorically projected into abstract thinking), then the complaint can be easily done away with. It is not that we share imagination, but that we are physically alike in the most fundamental sense: we share the human form. Our physical likeness leads to likeness in experience—where the predictability of such relies upon objectivist reasoning about the empirical world: “image schemata can have a public, objective character (in a suitably defined sense of ‘objective’), because they are recurring structures of embodied human understanding” (M. Johnson *Body in the Mind* 196). Johnson rejects the dichotomy of objectivism vs. relativism, a stance which seems to imply that relativism is an inevitable product of those processes by which the shared image schemata are projected onto other experiences through the faculty of imagination, but that the nature of bodily experience itself produces identifiable patterns that are objectively shareable with others, even though they are, in their specific instantiation, personal and relative. He writes, “Our realism consists in our sense that we are in touch with reality in our bodily actions in the world, and in our having an understanding of reality sufficient to allow us to function more or less successfully in that world” (203).

The multidimensional aspects of metaphor—which I have identified according to Todorov’s triad and Johnson’s schema, and which (as I will subsequently explain) underpins the proliferation of metaphors that Derrida observes—supply diverse ways of construing the conceptual objects and events that make up a given meaning, whereby our attention is focused on: the object or event as the *sign* or form of some meaning, the *meaning* as the object/event’s internal aspect, and the role and relevance of the object or event in *relational* or functional terms. We construe abstractions in terms that identify these with external form or body, or internal content (such as motive and intention as aspects of mind), or function (in terms of how these abstractions produce tangible effects or relations). At any given time, and in terms of any given metaphor, metaphor *functions as a sign that means*. Voice is a metaphor that means the range of qualitative features we associate with voice in phonic terms. View is a metaphor that can be construed literally or with higher degrees of metaphoricity so that it might mean either or both sensory or epistemic and deontic perception. The role and relevance of view—
either as a form or meaning—is the work that view, as a metaphor, is employed to perform. In the novel, this work is the construction of subject and object: the viewer (subject) who sees the view (object) that can be seen. *View*, in these diverse terms, is therefore fundamental to the construction of narrative, as well as the world and subject positions through which this world of eventfulness is related. Narrative, similarly, can be rhetorically construed as a sign that means relatable eventfulness, whereby the relating of this eventfulness establishes its relevance in intersubjective terms. Thus, narrative establishes coherence across the speech genres that are employed in the novel—even in the case of those speech genres that have their own narrative and communicative function within the social world of the text—for relevance in narrative terms is what binds together these disparate speech genres.

The importance of narrative’s role is its manifestation of what Bakhtin terms responsive understanding in speech communication, and which I argue takes the form of relevance (as a form of “understanding”) in the literary narrative. Further, narrative, as a speech genre, is transformed in the novel, as I argue in Chapter 4, when it is given in modal or semantic terms that entail the modification or loss of certain key functional units—the most significant variation occurring in relation to the speaker or narrator. That is, although it is weakened and loses the formal attributes of a speaker specific to the novel as an extended narrative—and may even introduce a different narrator specific to a different speech act within the events of the novel—the metaphoric values of a voice and view as these relate to the speaker of the text overall are nonetheless sustained. These metaphors, in so far as they construct the absent-presence of a speaker (which might be a narrator or implied author) are implicated in the relevance of those events to the novel overall within the narratorless section. It is not surprising that theories of the novel have focused on narrative, for the speech genre of narrative underpins any utterance that strives to express meaning over and above significance by addressing the semantic value of the utterance in spatiotemporal terms. Narrative helps us relate our bodily experience to one another through the construal of eventfulness in terms that correspond to our shared experience of embodiment. By composing narrative in terms of our shared experience of seeing, speaking, hearing, and (importantly for Johnson’s theory) acting, the novel creates correspondences between the text, as a body, and the reader as a mind—with the text, as a body, being temporarily brought within the reader’s mind to create the effect of verisimilitude, whereby the bodily experiences and the
internal (emotional and intellectual) responses to these as given in the text, become the reader’s imaginatively conceived bodily, intellectual, and emotional experiences.
Chapter 3. Language, Speech, Meaning

The image of external things possesses for us the ambiguous dimension that in external nature everything can be considered to be connected, but also separated. The uninterrupted transformations of material as well as energies brings [sic] everything into relationship with everything else and make one cosmos out of all individual elements. On the other hand, however, the objects remain banished in the merciless separation of space; no particle of matter can share its space with another and a real unity of the diverse does not exist in spatial terms. […]

Only to humanity, in contrast to nature, has the right to connect and separate been granted, and in the distinctive manner that one of these activities is always the presupposition of the other. By choosing two items from the undisturbed store of natural things in order to designate them as ‘separate’, we have already related them to one another in our consciousness, we have emphasized these two together against what ever lies between them. And conversely, we can only sense those things to be related which we have previously somehow isolated from one another; things must first be separated from one another in order to be together. […] In the immediate as well as the symbolic sense, in the physical as well as the intellectual sense, we are at any moment those who separate the connected or connect the separate. (Simmel “Bridge and Door” 5)\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{90} Georg Simmel, trans. Mark Ritter, “Bridge and Door,” Theory, Culture and Society 11.5 (1994). A similar insight is subsequently expressed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, where (without reference to Simmel) they write: “We do not ask ourselves how we can see one thing \textit{as one thing} because we assume that the unity comes from the thing itself, not from our metal work, just as we assume that the meaning of the picture is in the picture rather than in our interpretation of its forms. The generalized Eliza effect leads us to think the form is causing our perception of unity, but it is not. We see the coffee cup as one thing because our brains and bodies work to give it that status. We divide the world up into entities at human scale so that we can manipulate them in human lives, and this division of the world is an imaginative achievement. Frogs and bats, for example, divide the world up in ways quite different from our own.” (Fauconnier and Turner \textit{The Way We Think} 8).
If a network of contiguity joins everything in this world—if everything is connected—then in so far as the material world is concerned, it is connected in space and time alone; all other relations derive from intellectual achievement. To “separate the connected or connect the separate” is to identify some fundamental, if ambiguous, meaning and that meaning (regardless how pertinent it may seem) does not exist in a material sense but arises as a correlate to these material relations—relations of being connected or separate in space and time.91 Space and time do not bend in order that remote objects might be united in thought, for although the process of thought is a material event, the intellect operates in terms of conceptualised space and time alone. That is, it employs metaphorical correlates—conceptions that lack materiality, but which display similar properties to real space and time. Thought is at liberty to unite what is otherwise remote in a material sense because it does not work with material objects, events or relations, but deals solely in conceptions of these; it can seemingly override natural (spatiotemporal) relations of physical distance or closeness, imposing symbolic ones instead; and in doing so, it sometimes suggests a physical proximity that does not exist.

Metaphor is typically understood to supply temporary and unstable relations in the process of likening by placing unlike things together in order to reveal the limited respects in which they are similar. But all thought—all our ideas—whether substantiated or not, rely on the metaphoric relation and only make their meaning appear concrete through repeated usage. We only notice this, however, when the relation performs inadequately and the unity of object and meaning becomes questionable. Hence, the esoteric is characterised by insubstantiality because it is determined according to patterns of likening that perform relatively weakly. This weakness is naturally regarded with suspicion. But the same “weak” relations of likeness support artistically determined relations. What is impractical in ordinary terms proves useful for the purpose of making meaning where that meaning is artistically formulated and understood to be such.

91 “If experience does have meaning and is not merely a particular piece of reality […], then surely experience could hardly come about other than in the material signs. After all, meaning can belong only to a sign; meaning outside a sign is a fiction. Meaning is the expression of a semiotic relationship between a particular piece of reality and another kind of reality that it stands for, represents, or depicts. Meaning is a function of the sign and is therefore inconceivable (since meaning is pure relation, or function) outside the sign as some particular, independently existing thing.” V.N Volosinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* 28.
In this chapter, I argue that metaphor supplies the basic means by which we connect or separate those aspects of experience that we characterise as either intangible or material, and that this constitutes a “reading” of experience in terms that enable us to position these experiences on the same conceptual plane and in relation to one another, despite their very different qualitative features—that is, despite the distinction of one being “real” and the other imaginary, felt, or purely intellectual. By bringing these different types of experiences together, we are reproducing our expectations in a bodily sense as beings with minds and bodies. This entails the characterisation of experience as either belonging to the position of being a subject or of being an object. We arrive at these metaphorical positions via bodily entailments like point of view, utilising our experience as seeing bodies to characterise these abstractions in terms that construe one as inmaterial and related to mental processes (subjective) and the other as material and real in the same sense that our body is experienced as real and externally apparent (objective). The mind thus becomes the site of subjective experience and the body supplies experiences that can be intersubjectively realised and thus held to be objective. What this means for the novel is that its symbolic values are likely to be characterised along the same lines, that it will endeavour to reproduce the same relations when establishing verisimilitude. Verisimilitude is always sought on some fundamental level, even in texts that breach expectations of reality, because the attribution of meaning to the phenomenal world relies upon the intersubjectively determined expressions of experience that constitute metaphors. Nonetheless the novel will likely seek another form of meaning beyond verisimilitude, for to mean only that this text resembles reality is not, of itself, of sufficient interest—some other meaning (about reality, perhaps) must be given in the artistic text. It is when the relations of separating and connecting establish meanings in excess of verisimilitude that we typically identify the presence of a rhetorical figure like metaphor—but also other rhetorical figures, like analepsis, hyperbole, any form of repetition, and even litotes because in understatement what is excessive is the degree to which the meaning lacks what it might be expected to convey.92

In Metaphors We Live By, Mark Johnson and George Lakoff outline the function of metaphor as a means of communicating, including relating to ourselves our ordinary everyday experiences. The level of agreement these standardised metaphors achieve

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92 Verisimilitude does not entail the construal of every aspect of reality but results from an ordering of what is deemed essential for the effect of reality.
means that they are rarely questioned and seldom disrupted. Their work here reveals the extent to which we rely on metaphor to create meaning. Lakoff and Johnson do not seek to disturb the use of these metaphors; nonetheless, in identifying their prevalence in ordinary communication they might be understood as performing the same kind of interrogation of speech initiated by Derrida when he seeks to reveal the reification of metaphorical constructions inherent to what he calls grammatology—where grammatology describes the nature of discourse as language supplemented with meaning.

Metaphorical constructions are relevant in any speech act, since the semiotic system of language relies upon a metaphoric construal of the relation between signifier and signified; but it is particularly important for speech in the narrative mode, which relies upon the construal of eventfulness in order to convey its meanings. This construal of eventfulness is actually a complex network of metaphoric relations established between signs. It relies upon our capacity to hold an awareness of the sign as an abstract concept while at the same time regarding it as though it were the material object to which it refers. This duality of semiotic value and semantic content establishes the metaphoric relation: it enables us to regard the sign and the meaning in dual terms that oscillate between taking the sign to be a form (body) that is paradoxically abstract and taking the meaning (content) to be a concept that is materially evident. We thus shift between positions that take the sign as a material object (writing, for example), as an abstraction (language, or the word, to be more precise), and which take meaning to be both an abstraction (the idea of the thing) and to stand for the thing itself and thus slide into hypostatisation. In simple terms, we shift between positions that concretise and deconcretise the metaphoric values used to signify in order to get beyond the simpler strategy of signification and create a more complex meaning. Such complexity is inherent to narrative because it relates signs and the ideas they represent to one another to create the effect of eventfulness.

Anton Chekhov’s short story, “The Student” (1894),93 provides an example of the creative process at work in just such metaphorical relations—both in terms of the character’s thoughts (as these reproduce ways of thinking that are recognisable to us as fellow thinkers) and in the organisation of the story itself. In this story, the trainee priest Ivan Velikopolsky senses a material connection to the divine, established through the

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correlations he locates between two materially distant events: Peter’s denial of Christ and two peasant women’s reaction to his telling of it:

He looked round. The solitary light was still gleaming in the darkness and no figures could be seen near it now. The student thought again that if Vasilisa had shed tears, and her daughter had been troubled, it was evident that what he had just been telling them about, which had happened nineteen centuries ago, had a relation to the present—to both women, to the desolate village, to himself, to all people. The old woman had wept, not because he could tell the story touchingly, but because Peter was near to her, because her whole being was interested in what was passing in Peter’s soul.

And joy suddenly stirred in his soul, and he even stopped for a minute to take breath. “The past,” he thought, “is linked with the present by an unbroken chain of events flowing one out of another.” And it seemed to him that he had just seen both ends of that chain; that when he touched one end the other quivered. (Chekhov “The Student” 259)

Sensitive to the vibration of what Chekhov might have meant as Schopenhauer’s causal chain, the student finds the experience uplifting, for in making the connection he essentially locates relations of contiguity between two separate events; and this contiguity (though he identifies it through a material connection of space and time flowing forth in an endless stream of existence) he conceives mystically—as though the ends of the chain had been brought together and Peter were “near” to the crying woman. He is uplifted simply to discover that there is a connection; and, it would seem, he is content to go on in ignorance of what that connection might be in order to retain the mystical reverence he feels at locating a point of relation. This mystical connection enables a renewal of faith, for the joy felt by Ivan Velikopolsky stems from having overcome his earlier pessimistic musings that everything is disconnected but nonetheless locked in a hopeless pattern of meaningless repetition:

And now, shrinking from the cold, he thought that just such a wind had blown in the days of Rurik and in the time of Ivan the Terrible and Peter, and in their time there had been just the same desperate poverty and hunger, the same thatched roofs with holes in them, ignorance, misery, the same desolation around, the same darkness, the same feeling of
oppression—all these had existed, did exist, and would exist, and the lapse of a thousand years would make life no better. And he did not want to go home. (Chekhov “The Student” 257)

The joy that Ivan Velikopolsky experiences derives from his location of meaning in what had hitherto seemed meaningless. This is the nature of any intellectual activity and Chekhov seems acutely sympathetic to the human condition in this story: that we must locate meaning in order to go on. It is this need that drives all our intellectual engagements. “The Student”—indeed, any literary work—depends for its success upon our capacity to identify the relevant events on the basis of their being separate in space and time, and to reconnect them on the basis of their having a shared symbolic value: it does not matter if we are unable to divine their precise value (though it enhances our enjoyment of the piece), we can nonetheless appreciate the transformation in Ivan Velikopolsky’s state of mind. It is enough just to have made the meaningless meaningful; Chekhov’s story identifies the crudeness of this impulse by supplying another, more straightforward reason for the women’s distress, suggesting that the act of locating meaning, rather than the meaning itself, is of primary importance. We are told first of all that, “as it was Good Friday nothing had been cooked, and the student was terribly hungry.” Then Ivan Velikopolsky sees the widows’ fire and goes over to warm himself by it:

The widow Vasilisa, a tall, fat old woman in a man’s coat, was standing by and looking thoughtfully into the fire; her daughter Lukerya, a little pock-marked woman with a stupid-looking face, was sitting on the ground, washing a caldron and spoons. Apparently they had just had supper. (Chekhov “The Student” 257)

The subtle meaning that eludes the student, and which seems to have eluded many readers of this story, is that the women have realised the connection themselves: like Peter, they have been faithless, for they have clearly failed to observe the Christian orthodox ritual of fasting on Good Friday.\(^\text{94}\) The ends of the chain have been united by

\(^{94}\) Ronald Johnson, for example, characterises this as a story relating to the meaning of life, but discusses this in terms of the epiphany that the Easter story enables the student to experience, which amounts to the “vision of his place in the world reaffirm[ing] his spiritual vocation”: Ronald L. Johnson, *Anton Chekhov: A Study of the Short Fiction*, Twayne’s Studies in Short Fiction, ed. Gordon Weaver (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1993) 69.
the student’s own storytelling, for the two women have mistakenly taken the young man’s intention in telling the story to be an admonishment.

Ivan Velikopolsky’s storytelling will no doubt have its consequences—and this too is the subtle significance of Chekhov’s story—for in all likelihood two women in such circumstances would not fail to observe the fast in future. Thus, the meanings we make do have significance and can materially affect our lives. The success or otherwise of the meanings we make will depend on how closely they answer our need to relate to the material world—how they affect, enhance, or enable our physical interactions in the world. In many instances, the meanings created seem so far removed from reality as to appear irrelevant to our need to relate to the real, but every intellectual exercise—no matter how abstract—functions in a social sense, if not in an entirely practical sense, by enabling the establishment of relations among people. Ivan Velikopolsky’s status as a trainee priest is significant in this regard: his joy amounts to joy that he has located a meaning that will be useful to him in his social world where previously his thoughts were in danger of alienating him; and it is perhaps for this reason that he does not delve further—though were he to do so, he might locate the meaning he needs in his ability to “tell the story touchingly” and thereby satisfy that need pragmatically rather than mystically. Beyond Ivan’s own musings, critical interpretation might locate other distinctions: the hard life of the peasant—a life of manual labour as opposed to intellectual rigour—would make fasting particularly devastating; or else it might contrast the sensitivity of the apparently stupid younger woman and the student’s complaisant self-assurance. From there countless other significances may be found; but although the possibilities are endless, the meanings we make are not overcome by the extent of that possibility but will depend upon the network of metaphorically contiguous and actual relations already established and observed of the world in which this story is set, as well as the one in which it is read. These contiguities arise, first and foremost, in the utterance and are held in abeyance by the conceptual structures that enable their remembrance: the rules and conventions that govern the intellectual process of making meaning.

Metaphor or Metonymy?
Derrida’s attention to the problematic question of voice and the nature of the utterance—its role in making meaning—confronts the reification of metaphor in speech. Meaning is not the focus here, however, except in a very fundamental sense—the terms on which Simmel locates it as a basic relation of contiguity that is either established or
disrupted. Viewing these relations in terms of contiguity, I argue, enables both the distinctness and the vagueness that accompanies our comprehension at such times: that this or that might be meant, or intended only partially, and that this partial connection means something other than what might be established distinctly or denied outright. In other words, I locate degrees of contiguity in the meaning-making process, and the conceptual device that best describes this is, I argue, metaphor. The metaphoric relation operates as the means by which the conceptual aspect of any utterance is linked to a material context. We can see this in Derrida’s observations about the act of categorising, which functions outside the conceptual object and its material correlate as these are joined under generic terms. This ascribing gesture, taken to be an inclusive mark of generic belonging, is neither an attribute nor an originary condition of either the categorising concept or the material object. The gesture identifying the generic trait is, in other words, supplementary:

If I am not mistaken in saying that such a trait is remarkable, that is, noticeable, in every aesthetic, poetic, or literary corpus, then consider this paradox, consider the irony (which is irreducible to a consciousness or an attitude): this supplementary and distinctive trait, a mark of belonging or inclusion, does not properly pertain to any genre or class. The re-mark of belonging does not belong. It belongs without belonging, and the “without” (or the suffix “-less”) which relates belonging to non-belonging appears only in the timeless time of the blink of an eye (Augenblick).

(Derrida “The Law of Genre” 64-65)

Neither relatable on its own terms, nor an internal feature, the gesture of identifying is the relation of contiguity itself—the bringing together of concept and material object (the latter, albeit, in its conceptualised form). The law of genre that Derrida implicates here and in his essay’s title is, I want to argue, contiguity, adjacency, juxtaposition, metaphor, supplement—ancillary relations that arise only to connect (or to separate) and which exist outside the object itself. Contiguity does not inhere in the thing itself, but is a relation imposed from without. As Derrida tells it, “[o]ne cannot conceive truth without the madness of the law,” which is the law of genre; and the law of genre is itself a supplementarity (Derrida “The Law of Genre” 80).

These relations of contiguity and likeness go to the heart of language itself as a semiotic system. In outlining the effects of aphasia on patients, Roman Jakobson
identifies two aspects of language: combination and selection, which rely upon establishing relations of contiguity (metonymy) and similarity (metaphor) respectively (Jakobson and Halle *Fundamentals of Language* [1956] 75). Contiguity functions as the means by which language is formed into statements. The term is used loosely by Jakobson to describe both the bringing together of concepts within an utterance and the conceptual proximity of concepts as words and terms related to other words and terms through their denotation of aspects of, or objects adjacent to (or part of), the primary concept or object. But in terms of the utterance (as text) and the adjacencies established by contiguity, the effect of this bringing together does not, I would argue, produce any meaning other than significance. Another level of contiguity is needed to enable interpretation. Similarity is, on this second level, the conceptual equivalent of contiguity, where the distinction between contiguity and similarity is really a distinction between degrees of contiguity as it is mediated along chains of causation—a distinction of how close objects are to one another metaphorically and how they come to be related despite their distance. Jakobson sees contiguity as a relational alternative to similarity, but in doing so he identifies relations on a secondary conceptual level, established only after the primary condition of significance has been determined by bringing the concepts together. Importantly, these concepts are already brought together in the mind of the linguist (and the ordinary user of language), and these already established relations of metaphorical

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95 Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, *Fundamentals of Language*, Juana Lingaruarum, ed. C.H. Van Schooneveld (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1971). The distinction I subsequently make emphasises the role of contiguity in every instance that meaning is made. In making this observation I am writing from my own field, which is literary genre theory and not linguistics or semantics. My observation in this respect applies to meaning formation as a conceptual process rather than a linguistic occurrence and follows Simmel in identifying this rudimentary capacity as the basis on which any distinction is made (with the process of distinction being based on conceptually separating or connecting conceptual objects and other abstractions). Significantly, Renate Bartsch demonstrates that “there are many cases which can either be viewed as metaphor or as metonymy, without one way of understanding excluding the other,” and argues that the shift between metaphor and metonym results from changes in perspective whereby similarity and situation are variously regarded as determining features. This is consistent with my identification of metonymy as the conceptual correlate of spatiotemporal contiguity. Renate Bartsch, “Generating Polysemy: Metaphor and Metonymy,” *Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast*, eds. René Dirven and Ralf Pörings (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003) 49.
contiguity enable the specialist to determine the effect of aphasia on the patient, who is either unable to establish relations of contiguity (cannot form sentences) or similarity (cannot employ or comprehend metaphor but may describe objects according to their function and other associations).

The patterns of language that Jakobson identifies are apparent in other “semiotic systems” like cinema and the plastic arts. Indeed, they are utilised to a greater or lesser degree according to the aesthetic goal—in other words, any imbalance between the two systems of organising thought need not be the product of disease:

Some oscillation [between metonymy and metaphor] occurs in sign systems other than language. A salient example from the history of painting is the manifestly metonymical orientation of cubism, where the object is transformed into a set of synecdoches; the surrealist painters responded with a patently metaphorical attitude. Ever since the productions of D.W. Griffith, the art of cinema, with its highly developed capacity for changing the angle, perspective, and focus of ‘shots’, has broken with the tradition of the theater and ranged [sic] an unprecedented variety of synecdochic ‘close-ups’ and metonymic ‘set-ups’ in general. In such motion pictures as those of Charlie Chaplin and Eisenstein, these devices in turn were overlayed by a novel, metaphoric “montage” with its “lap dissolves”—the filmic similes. (Jakobson and Halle Fundamentals 92)

The distinction that Jakobson makes between similarity as a metaphoric relation and contiguity as metonymic (see Jakobson and Halle Fundamentals 83-84) is significant, for it identifies the process of relating concept to materiality (through metonymic relations) and of abstracting that relation so as to elide its conceptuality and speak of it as though it were a materiality (via metaphor)—a necessary step if we are to speak succinctly and directly. That is, in the first stage when relations of contiguity are observed, it is in the material sense: we note that certain objects and events go together in space and time. Our conception of these relations is always metonymic. But in order to make use of these basic conceptions, it is necessary to rearrange the order of things—to break down objects and events into parts and to identify other possible relations outside the material world of spatiotemporal contiguity. Were we not to do so, we would function like one of Jakobson’s aphasics and produce only lists with limited scope for meaning. The process of making meaning therefore entails the oscillation between metonymic and metaphoric
relations, since it is necessary to refer to the materiality at some point in the process of abstraction. Jakobson identifies this when he writes that a “competition between both devices, metonymic and metaphoric, is manifested in any symbolic process” (Jakobson and Halle *Fundamentals* 94-95).

This oscillation is also apparent in theory (and in the language used to explain theory, as Gergen has shown). Using a comparison in reading practices—between journalistic prose and poetry—Jonathan Culler shows how an alteration to the format of the prose (so that it looks like a lyric poem) establishes a different set of expectations in the reader. What is interesting here is the metaphoric use of viewpoint hidden within a rhetoric of expectation: what we see in a text is what we expect to see—and what we expect to see is itself formed by the activation of certain preliminary expectations (that prose fills the whole line and lyric poetry does not):

> This is clearly different from the way in which one interprets journalistic prose, and these differences can be explained only by reference to a set of expectations with which one approaches lyric poetry: that it is atemporal […], that it should cohere at a symbolic level […], that it is complete in itself […], that it expresses an attitude […]. Our set of expectations about lyric poetry—our notion of lyric poetry as a genre—leads us to look for these particular types of intelligibility. (Culler “Toward a Theory of Non-Genre Literature” 256)

The expectations that Culler identifies here operate on a secondary level of expectation. They arise only once the primary expectation has been established as fact through the visual sense. But because the visual apparatus initiates an embodied (rather than meaningful) relation to the text it is implicitly discounted, such that the propositions that are subsequently formulated, based on our expectations about texts that take on this appearance, and which constitute the second level of identification made through abstract reasoning, are taken as the primary stage of identification. In looking at the text we have already seen what we need to see in order to identify the genre of lyric poetry. What we have seen are the formal attributes of the journalistic prose converted into a poem:

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Yesterday on Route Seven
A car
Travelling at sixty miles per hour rammed
A sycamore
Its four occupants were
Killed. (Culler “Toward” 256)

Our sensory perception of the work is therefore the first thing to enter our understanding, and it is probably for this reason that theorists, explicitly or implicitly as Culler does (though he contradicts this implicit reasoning in his critical approach), privilege form (ontology) over content (meaning): meaning can only come once we have seen. Genre theory on these terms is itself organised according to the schema of embodiment via the metaphor of sight.

This movement from bodily experience to metaphors of embodiment has relevance to what has been discussed in relation to Derrida and voice, and to the constructive potential of language in social theory in observing a world that is mutable—Gergen having developed his constructionism on the basis that scientists influence the outcome of their research, notes that they also influence future outcomes by making their discoveries public and because they prescribe preferred behaviour in their studies (every question is itself rhetorically directed to a preferred paradigm). Individual freedom is derived from this adaptability, which Gergen identifies as reflexivity: at any given moment we may reflect upon our actions in relation to past occurrence and reformulate our conception of the present moment; likewise, we may, with reference to present experience, reformulate our conceptions of the past. We rewrite our life story according to the prevailing winds and circumstances in which the telling of it becomes relevant.

Interestingly, the two languages identified by Gergen would seem to loosely correlate to the distinctions noted by Jakobson, with theory-based language relying on metaphoric relations, and observational language on metonymy. And, similarly, what Gergen locates in science we might identify as a long-accepted approach in artistic works. Metaphor, because it enables the transgression of space and time, which otherwise limits the relatedness that material objects might bear to one another, is essential for conceptual movement. It is this relation that characterises eventfulness and which, when it exceeds the metaphoric constructions necessary for verisimilitude, also signals symbolic values such as those suggested by the student’s reasoning in Chekhov’s story. Stylistic
differences such as those identified by Jakobson will determine whether spatiotemporal contiguity is privileged over conceptual forms; but whether metonymy or metaphor is preferred, in any case, the organisation of concepts will entail some aspect of the other. Finally, metonymy, though it bears close relation to spatiotemporal contiguity, is still metaphoric: it is the representation of metaphorical adjacencies of space and time. The relations we observe are metaphorically contiguous insofar as they do not describe material adjacencies but identify conceptual proximities through likeness. The first stage where relations are metonymic is nonetheless formative of metaphorically contiguous relations because the materiality has been conceptualised in order that it be analysed and broken down into its constituent parts: the object in question is not the material object but our conceptualisation of that object—the idea of it.

I should pause here to acknowledge that literary theory has traversed this ground before me; but I want to distinguish my position from what developed out of Jakobson’s findings in the latter part of the twentieth century. Metaphor and metonymy became popular distinctions in literary theory shortly after Jakobson published his observations. But almost as soon as its popularity soared, “this cosmic couple passed out of fashion again,” as Barbara Johnson describes it in *A World of Difference* (1987) (B. Johnson 155).97 Why this might have occurred is something Johnson is herself interested in addressing. However, I want to argue that the problem goes deeper than the complexities that she sees as missing in this bipolar approach to meaning. Johnson’s own definitions of metaphor and metonymy reveal the nature of the problem—why it might be that this cosmic couple fizzed—the problem being that it becomes impossible to distinguish metonymy from metaphor (see B. Johnson *A World of Difference* 157-158). What Johnson’s account of the difference between these two poles reveals is that in speaking about the meaning-making process, we have come to substitute descriptive terms for the stages of making meaning. That is, we have shifted from describing a conceptual process to speaking of the metaphors employed to describe the process: metaphor and metonymy are metaphors for certain conceptual actions; but Johnson and even Jakobson before her have construed these descriptive terms as the conceptual actions they describe:

> The words *metaphor* and *metonymy* are [...] classical tropes traditionally defined as the substitution of a figurative expression for a literal or proper one. In metaphor, the substitution is based on resemblance or analogy; in

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metonymy, it is based on a relation or association other than that of similarity (cause and effect, container and contained, proper name and qualities or works associated with it, place and event or institution, instrument and user, etc.). (B. Johnson *A World of Difference* 155)

Moving from spatiotemporal relations of contiguity to metaphorical contiguity as metonymy, theorists like Johnson will inevitably find both versatility and contradiction in the meanings they attribute to these rhetorical figures. This is because the meaning of metonymy as a metaphor oscillates in rhetorical value—it shifts from a semiotic value to a syntagmatic function before becoming semantic. (We might even go so far as to say that metonymy is the *function* of metaphor.) The primary value upon which metonymy is based—which is spatiotemporal contiguity—does not oscillate, however; and it is for this reason that metaphoric values must be introduced, for otherwise little more than signification would be achievable. Space and time, as literal meanings, describe relations of material contiguity. And this literal value begins its rhetorical oscillations simply by signifying spatiotemporal contiguity, because this signification soon comes to mean contiguity in abstract terms—as association—and these are the terms with which Johnson begins. The problem is that we have already begun to speak of the metaphoric substitutions (and metonymy is a metaphor for the things it substitutes) as soon as we observe meaningful relations. Any connection, other than spatiotemporal contiguity, relies upon metaphoric values. The spatiotemporal relations of contiguity, or adjacency in space and time, have no meaning value other than adjacency in a literal sense. Metonymy, as contiguity in a literal rather than metaphoric sense, can do nothing more than signify. Metaphor and metonymy, contrary to Jakobson's reasoning, are not two separate poles, but different ways of describing the act of making meaning. All meaning is metaphoric. And it begins on these terms:

1. Contiguity describes a spatiotemporal relation;
2. This is the fundamental relation upon which all meaning is founded, for meaning relies upon abstractions of space and time;
3. Metonymy is the abstraction of that relation—it is a metaphoric form of spatiotemporal contiguity in that it is similar to the relations of adjacency established in space and time;
4. This form of contiguity is the first stage in making meaning; it is the first metaphor, and it is a literal meaning in that it refers back to spatiotemporal contiguity; but it is nonetheless a metaphor signifying spatiotemporal
contiguity in abstract terms;

5. From here it becomes possible to establish more complex abstractions founded on metaphorical contiguity, which are not constrained by space and time; and these are the relations that we commonly refer to by the trope of metaphor—likening being a metaphoric form of contiguity and the conceptual action that began the process (although “likening” is construed in different terms at this stage of the meaning-making process: whereas in the first instance it is a function, the meaning value of likening is emphasised in the latter stages);

6. Thus, we move from metaphoric relations of spatiotemporal contiguity to drawing likenesses between concepts and conceptual objects that have been metaphorically brought together (i.e., made contiguous in non-spatiotemporal terms).

Meaning is therefore established in stages and on other levels by introducing further relations of contiguity, which in turn sustain some degree of similarity even when the final outcome is determined to be difference. In this way, meaning is revealed to be the product of a complex structuration of contiguous relations that are either denied or sustained in a process that presumes—not the obvious binary demarcations suggested by a choice of either/or—but the possibility of degrees of contiguity. These degrees of metaphorical contiguity effectively correlate to the variable relations established in space and time through relations of causation, whereby objects and events might be deemed related to, though remote from, one another. Physical remoteness is transferred into the conceptual plane as degrees of likeness. As paradoxical as this may seem it becomes possible, by this means, to identify relations between objects based on a likeness or likenesses where a far greater degree of difference than likeness is discernible. This is essentially the conceptual action described in the production of metaphor; and metonymy is metaphor at the lower end of abstraction—it is as close as a concept gets to the thing that is being conceived or phenomenally perceived.

Importantly, what Gergen’s insights reveal is that all speech (oral and written) is rhetorical—even empirical and observational speech: the choices we make in terms of how we relate our observations about the phenomenal world and the abstractions that are built upon it (though they may seem far removed) are organised with certain objectives in mind, and we name those objectives in broad terms when we describe speech as empirical, euphemistic, scientific, fantastic, poetic, etc. Everyday speech
supplies the strategies we adopt in communicating through (what Bakhtin calls) secondary speech genres—which include scientific discourse and literary forms such as the novel: “texts always carry the generic traits of primary speech acts” (Just “The Modern Novel” 392). And those generic traits are fundamentally rhetorical. Thus, oscillations to the rhetorical dimension of metaphor can be found incorporated, and even emphasised, in theory.

The genre theorist E.D. Hirsch comes close to delineating the kinds of meanings that I identify via Todorov’s triad, whereas Michel Foucault strives to delimit the kind of meaning given to “the statement” in his work on discursive formation, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. In the next section, I discuss correlations between the two theorists’ arguments and show how an understanding of what Foucault means by the term “statement” demands fixing its metaphoric value to the syntagmatic rhetorical dimension. Foucault insists that the statement is a function rather than a concretised conceptual object or form.

**Discursive Formation and Rhetorical Genre Theory**

Saussure, Hirsch tells us, “revealed the supreme importance in speech of the simple distinction between a possibility and an actuality,” but the central position of genre—both as a system of hit-and-miss guesses (extrinsic genres) and the intended and comprehended sense or idea of what is meant by an utterance (its intrinsic genre)—is neglected by Saussure’s linguistics (Hirsch *Validity* 88-89, 69):

> Between the enormously broad system of types and possibilities that constitute a language, and the individual speech acts that have made it and continue to make it, there are mediating type concepts which govern particular utterances as meaningful wholes. It is difficult to say whether these necessary concepts, which I have called intrinsic genres, belong more to *langue* or to *parole*, and it would be incorrect to subsume them under either category. (Hirsch *Validity* 111)

These mediating type concepts might be said to inhabit Michel Foucault’s enunciative field—a conceptual space encompassing the relevancies pertaining to a statement and its formation—and to therefore also form part of the concepts governing language and

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speech as well as being relevant to the specific speech act.\(^9\) That is, rather than being distinctly of language or of speech, genres—as Hirsch defines the term—work across each, enabling the expression and comprehension of meaning by their ability to be relevant in either sense (as a meaning implicated in a speech act or as a convention of language). Meaning, for Hirsch, is constructed through our understanding and usage of convention whereby a mutuality of expectation, based on the joint effect of language and speech, is established. Importantly, Hirsch is identifying types of meaning according to whether these refer to the function of the meaning (as per “the relationship” between the speaker and addressee), the form the meaning takes in language, and its semantic content:

By ‘type of meaning’ I do not, of course, intend to imply merely a type of message or theme or anything so simple as a mere content. The interpreter’s expectations embrace far more than that. They include a number of elements that may not even be explicitly given in the utterance or its context, such as the relationship assumed to exist between the speaker and interpreter, the type of vocabulary and syntax that is to be used, the type of attitude adopted by the speaker, and the type of inexplicit meanings that go with the explicit ones. Such expectations are always necessary to understanding, because only by virtue of them can the interpreter make sense of the words he experiences along the way.

(Hirsch \textit{Validity} 72)

Hirsch’s identification of types of meaning reveals his theory’s sensitivity to the rhetorical orderings of meaning, which I have identified as semantic, semiotic and syntagmatic. These dimensions represent generic positions based on what Johnson terms the non-propositional schema of embodiment which underlies the persistent sense (and

\(^9\) The enunciative field is “the correlate of the statement—that to which it refers, not only what is said, but also what it speaks of, its ‘theme’—which makes it possible to say whether or not the proposition has a referent: it alone decides this in a definitive way.” Significantly, and in correspondence to Hirsch and Bakhtin’s criticism of linguistics, “one cannot say a sentence, one cannot transform it into a statement, unless a collateral space is brought into operation”; this collateral space is, for Foucault, the enunciative field: “The associated field that turns a sentence or a series of signs into a statement, and which provides them with a particular context, a specific representative content, forms a complex web.” Finally, “[i]f one can speak of a statement, it is because a sentence (a proposition) figures at a definitive point, with a specific position, in an enunciative network that extends beyond it.” Foucault, \textit{Archaeology} 89-90, 97, 98, 99.
intersubjectively established proposition) of there being some relation of inner to outer—this proposition resulting in the more refined sense of form, content and function/relation as integral. Further, in elaborating the types of meaning conveyed by an utterance, Hirsch is not thinking in terms of individual or specified points of view. Although the role of speakers and addressees is relevant to the communicative function and the utterance’s meaning, unlike Bakhtin, Hirsch’s focus is not insistent on the importance and significance of these rhetorical positions to the utterance as a form of communication. In this Hirsch is closer to Foucault, whose attention is on the statement and the enunciative function rather than on the roles and positions taken up by speakers and addressees.

Foucault stipulates that his inquiry into the archaeology of knowledge will begin by renouncing a search for origins and the assumption that everything has already been said. In what would appear to be a reference to Derrida, Foucault stipulates that he will not presume that discourse, as it is manifested, represents a deficiency and is therefore dependent upon these origins and what has already been said. This is not to say that these themes of discursive continuity should be wholly rejected—rather, he wants to uncover the rules that make these assumptions formative (Foucault *Archeology* 25). To achieve his project, he needs to define a discursive unit—the statement—for to understand discursive formation is to understand the relation between statements (see Foucault *Archeology* 31 and 38).\(^{100}\) Despite its terminology, the statement does not have, or take, concrete form. Rather, it is a function:

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\text{The statement is […] a function of existence that properly belongs to signs […]. One should not be surprised, then, if one has failed to find structural criteria of unity for the statement; this is because it is not in itself a unit, but a function that cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities, and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and space. (Foucault *Archeology* 86-87)}
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\(^{100}\) Importantly, “[d]iscursive relations are not […] internal to discourse.” “Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations), we will say, for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive formation.” Foucault, *Archeology* 46, 38.
Foucault explains that the statement has a correlate—the enunciative field. It is the enunciative field that “contains” the formative rules and assumptions that orient our perception of the statement and enable it to fit within a discourse, both immediately and subsequently, and which lend to the statement its “surface effect,” based, as this effect is, on “more firmly grounded unities” (Foucault *Archaeology* 26). These surface effects are the quasi-institutional unities attained by discourses, which are responsible for constraining statements in terms that serve to confirm and legitimize the formation of such unities (Foucault *Archaeology* 26-27). Looking beyond these surface formations to the enunciative field therefore offers scope for getting behind these formations. Thus, implicated in this project is the assumption that awareness of this will liberate us from the constraints imposed by these discursive unities.  

Foucault’s project is also to give effectiveness to the statement in cultural-historical terms: “However banal it may be, however unimportant its consequences may appear to be, however quickly it may be forgotten after its appearance, however little heard or however badly deciphered we may suppose it to be, a statement is always an event that neither the language (*langue*) nor the meaning can quite exhaust” (Foucault *Archaeology* 28). Dissolving the unities that otherwise constrain our comprehension of the statement enables an appreciation of invisible unities—“other forms of regularity, other types of relations” (Foucault *Archaeology* 29)—which might be effected through discourse beyond the formation of those quasi-institutional regularities that are superficially apparent.  

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101 “I would like to show with precise examples that in analysing discourses themselves, one sees the loosening of the embrace, apparently so tight, of words and things, and the emergence of a group of rules proper to discursive practice. These rules define not the dumb existence of a reality, nor the canonical use of a vocabulary, but the ordering of objects.” Foucault, *Archaeology* 48-49.

102 Thus enabling the discovery of: “Relations between statements (even if the author is unaware of them; even if the statements do not have the same author; even if the authors were unaware of each other’s existence); relations between groups of statements thus established (even if these groups do not concern the same, or even adjacent, fields; even if they do not possess the same formal level; even if they are not the locus of assignable exchanges); relations between statements and groups of statements and events of a quite different kind (technical, economic, social, political). To reveal in all its purity the space in which discursive events are deployed is not to undertake to re-establish it in an isolation that nothing could overcome; it is not to close it upon itself; it is to leave oneself free to describe the interplay of relations within and outside it.” Foucault, *Archaeology* 29.
insistence on the materiality of the statement that supplies its contrary unrepeatable aspect. A statement has a certain historicity that makes its repeatability impossible. Foucault is thus identifying different facets or properties of the statement—aspects, I would argue, that depend upon its metaphoricity at a given moment: to acknowledge a statement’s repeatability is to regard its iterable formal aspect; to determine that it is not repeatable is to accord it a place within a complex historicity of space and time that cannot be re-enacted—that is, it is to observe its function as effect.

Foucault’s enunciative field supplies a term for describing, collectively, the rules and conventions Hirsch sees as essential in the mediation of meaning between speakers and receivers. The enunciative field comprises the “laws of possibility, rules of existence for the objects that are named, designated, or described within [the statement], and for the relations that are affirmed or denied in it” (Foucault *Archaeology* 91). By calling upon pre-existing conventions the statement, which (again it must be noted) Foucault defines as the enunciative function (Foucault *Archaeology* 87-88), produces a set of relations that are fixed in terms of the spatiotemporality of the utterance in concrete terms. Importantly, the statement exceeds the definable attributes of the utterance by being something other than the utterance: rather, the context and representative content of the utterance is transformed into the statement by the values encoded in the enunciative field (Foucault *Archaeology* 98).

Foucault, for the most part, avoids “meaning” in explicit terms. His reasons become apparent when he explains the functionality of the statement in terms that supply semantic uniformities through the conditions in which it is given:

I now realize that I could not define the statement as a unit of linguistic type […]; but that I was dealing with an enunciative function that involved various units […]; and, instead of giving a ‘meaning’ to these units, this function relates them to a field of objects; instead of providing them with a subject, it opens up for them a number of possible subject positions; instead of mixing their limits, it places them in a domain of coordination and coexistence; instead of determining their identity, it places them in a space in which they are used and repeated. (Foucault *Archaeology* 106)

The statement is a signpost to the enunciative field, in other words. It is the discursive function of establishing metaphorical contiguity. It is a “modality that allows [the group
of signs to which it refers] to be something more than a series of traces […]]; a modality that allows [this group of signs] to be in relation with a domain of objects, to prescribe a definite position to any possible subject, to be situated among other verbal performances, and to be endowed with a repeatable materiality” (Foucault *Archaeology* 107). Repeatable and reified meanings (formal, functional, and semantic), constitute the formative elements of what he terms the statement’s correlate, its enunciative field. The enunciative field contains all that is generic and repeatable. It is formed in relation to each statement and represents the rhetorical values, the sets of knowledge, the rules and conventions governing language and social practice—in short, anything that might be relevant to the formation of meaning. The content of this field is determined according to the materiality of the utterance, which is also a materiality belonging to the statement. Thus, the statement determines what goes into the enunciative field, since the space and time in which the statement is given determines the correlate that enables its realisation as an enunciative function. But, as Foucault has already informed us, the enunciative field is, paradoxically, also that which transforms the utterance into a statement.

This circularity is a rather complex way of saying that utterances have a meaning value over and above linguistic meaning, and this meaning value (the statement) is functional. In order to convey this meaning value as something other than meaning, Foucault establishes, presumably unintentionally, a Derridean differance by supplementing the “empty” concept of the statement with its correlate. Foucault’s statement is “empty” by design—it is constantly evading definition, except as a function, which is itself a curiously empty concept. A function “does” or “intends,” but it does not exist in any discernible sense in the same way that objects exist—conceptual or otherwise. It achieves something very like that apprehended by Gergen in terms of motive speech. The statement might be characterised in formal terms (and, syntactically, this is how Foucault actually speaks of it), but if it is, it is only ever as a form without content. Thus, a function is not an event, since an event can be construed as having content in the form of the subjects, objects, interior relations or the smaller events that constitute it. Indeed, Foucault goes so far as to warn that the statement “must not be treated as an event” (Foucault *Archaeology* 104). It is not the utterance, therefore. If it is anything, a function is the meaning given to an action that produces a result. Hence, the statement is not the result of the enunciative function. But Foucault cannot bring himself to say this outright. He seems to be striving for a certain effect. It is as though he is trying to get past something—and meaning would seem to be what he is striving to avoid.
in this instance. Thus, as the enunciative function, the statement is not the meaning but the end toward which meaning makes—which is the rhetorical effect of meaning. And the rhetorical effect of meaning is the whole point of communication. We speak to a purpose, to get something done. This perhaps explains the rhetorical effect of Foucault’s own argument: a focus on meaning is distracting because it presents itself as the object in evaluative terms; once realised, once meaning is achieved, it would appear that the point of the statement has also been realised. But to stop at meaning is to stop short of speech’s purpose. Speech’s communicative function is to influence others. Hence, the statement (as a unit of discourse) is not the utterance, and it is not the meaning of the utterance as it is made up of linguistic units, but is a term that describes the potential effect (intended or otherwise) of meaning. Being functional and potentially formative, it relies upon the repeatability of our discursive practices, and the meanings that are generated through these, in order to be effective.

The statement, Foucault tells us, is capable of bearing “a particular relation with a subject”—a speaker, in other words. Yet the subject itself is also “a particular function” that is also “an empty function” and a “neutral position” (Foucault Archaeology 92, 93, 94). In other words, the enunciative function, which may be taken up by you or me, and whose relation with its subject will alter the semantic value of the statement if its linguistic content is merely repeated, actively constitutes the statement by providing both a place from which to speak and by giving effect to speech (Foucault Archaeology 97).103

103 This ambiguity, as a product of rhetorical oscillation, is evident in the repeatability of the statement in that Foucault characterises it as not repeatable in a specific sense (“for, despite its materiality, it cannot be repeated”), yet repeatable in terms of its mode of existence, which is distinctive from the space and time of its occurrence: “The statement, then, must not be treated as an event that occurred in a particular time and place, and that the most one can do is recall it—and celebrate it from afar off—in an act of memory. But neither is it an ideal form that can be actualized in any body, at any time, in any circumstances, and in any material conditions. Too repeatable to be entirely identifiable with the spatio-temporal coordinates of its birth (it is more than the place and date of its appearance), too bound up with what surrounds it and supports it to be as free as a pure form (it is more than a law of construction governing a group of elements), it is endowed with a certain modifiable heaviness, a weight relative to the field in which it is placed, a constancy that allows of various uses, a temporal permanence that does not have the inertia of a mere trace or mark, and which does not sleep on its own past. Whereas an enunciation may be begun again or re-evoked, and a (linguistic or logical) form may be reactualized,
Although Foucault does not express it in these terms, the statement appears to be paradoxically two things at once: the rhetorical effect produced by the utterance (statements “are repeated, reproduced, and transformed”—“the meanings to be found in them are multiplied” [Foucault *Archaeology* 120]); and a function taken up by a subject, where the usefulness of that function is founded on the presumed effectiveness of meaning conveyed through speech.

Significantly, the statement is repeatable (see Foucault *Archaeology* 120, for example) and in being repeatable it would fit with Hirsch’s notion of intrinsic genre. Hirsch observes that the rhetorical norms determining the type of utterance as it is encountered present as much a set of expectations as a set of interpretive features. As Hirsch reasons, making a mistake about the rhetorical norms that apply in each instance will lead to an error in interpretation since “[a]ll understanding of verbal meaning is necessarily genre-bound” (Hirsch *Validity* 76). The conventions that direct our understanding are, for Hirsch, organised by type, hence it is important to get the type of utterance right. Hirsch sees genre as a system describing the rhetorical relations that exist between an utterance and its meaning. He divides genre into two categories: on the one hand we have genre as a set of broadly defined expectations; on the other, we have the intrinsic sense of what is said. An intrinsic genre is therefore a specified type of meaning that operates as a convention or set of conventions for making meaning. As such, it operates in advance of the utterance as it is formed. Extrinsic genres supply the broad basis on which to begin to appreciate the meaning of an utterance; intrinsic genre, as the narrowed conception of what the idea of the utterance is, differs from the extrinsic genre of the utterance. Indeed, it will invariably contradict it because it represents a complex interpolation of a plurality of rhetorically ordered generic senses or ideas:

This description does, however, raise problems of its own—the most important one being that “genre” still represents an imprecise and variable concept. A generic conception is apparently not something

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the statement may be repeated—but always in strict conditions.” Foucault, *Archaeology* 102, 104-105, emphasis original. This is why my repeating of “I meant nothing by The Lighthouse,” in the pages that follow, will require addressees familiar with its origins so that my repeating constitutes both a remembering of the statement and a usage of that aspect that might be repeated because I am able to invoke some of the same correlative relevancies, conventions and knowledges that make up the enunciative field of the statement as it existed as the utterance of Virginia Woolf.
stable, but something that varies in the process of understanding. At first it is vague and empty; later, as understanding proceeds, the genre becomes more explicit, and its range of expectations becomes much narrower. This later, more explicit and narrow generic conception is, to be sure, subsumed under the original, broad generic conception, just as a variety is subsumed under a species. (Hirsch *Validity* 77)

Genre’s variability, as I have argued, results from its metaphoricity—its fluctuating value as a sign, medium, form, relation, meaning, etc.—its oscillation, in other words, between the different rhetorical dimensions through which a concept is comprehended. Meaning, for Hirsch, is intrinsically generic until it is particularised, and this enables speech to form in a generically meaningful way before its specific meaning has been established by the completion of the utterance (Hirsch *Validity* 86). This can be seen, for example, in the phrasing, “We had fallen in…,” in that this partial expression is on the way to a generic sense that jars with the completed phrase, “We had fallen in need of a housekeeper,” suggesting that, in a novel of repressed love (Ishiguro’s *The Remains of the Day* 53), the implicatures of romantic love are present in the meaning formation of this utterance and are intentionally there, although it is also intended that they be struck out by the implications of the completed utterance: work, not love, forms part of the intrinsic genre of the completed utterance; but love (denied and repressed), not work, forms the foundation of the thought driving this utterance.

A clearer sense of what both Hirsch and Foucault mean might be reached by examining Virginia Woolf’s reply, “I meant nothing by The Lighthouse,” to Roger Fry’s “confusion” as to the symbolic value of the lighthouse in her novel *To the Lighthouse* (1927). For Hirsch, the extrinsic genre of this utterance would be anti-rhetorical—as in a reversal of the euphemism that has implicitly been read into the symbol of the lighthouse. Its intrinsic genre might best be explained by turning to Foucault’s conception of the statement. Here, the statement is not the meaning of the sentence as linguistics would have it, but the repeatable sense that is brought into play by the foregrounding of those elements at work in the enunciative field—and, importantly, the transformation of these elements by their being called into play at the moment the

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statement is uttered. These include the kinds of rules and conventions of language called upon by the discipline of linguistics; it includes the rhetorical conventions that enable the comprehension of euphemism and of rebuttal; and it includes the contextual elements that elaborate our understanding of the statement. Those circumstances suggest a dialogical relation: a condition of denial and of doubting that denial—a situation in which the euphemisms that have been inferred are called into question but not entirely erased. And this statement is repeatable in some sense—I might use it myself should I feel that my meaning in a given circumstance has been taken too far or misinterpreted. I might say, “I meant nothing by the lighthouse,” and those aware of Woolf’s protest, and the elements that prevailed in the condition of its enunciation, will understand what I mean: that I protest the derivative constructions that have been made and yet cannot wholeheartedly disprove them (for the lighthouse must mean something), and that they must understand this and respect my denial, even as they doubt it. This sense, as I give it here, is not entirely accurate, and yet there is enough of it at work within our different conceptions of what is meant for us to share a deeper sense of what is repeatable about Woolf’s utterance “I meant nothing by The Lighthouse”—and to enable us to understand what it is, this thing which Hirsch calls an intrinsic genre, and this thing which Foucault terms the statement. Importantly, it must be acknowledged that what I offer in explicating Woolf’s statement, and making use of it in a repeatable sense, is not an implied meaning; it is a direct intention that depends upon a set of knowledges or metaphoric values—and those knowledges determine the generic status of the utterance in this instance: they determine what Hirsch would call its intrinsic genre, which includes explicit and implicit elements to form the sense of what is meant. The statement, as a function in Foucault’s terms in the example above, is the effect that Woolf intended her words to have: it is the rhetorical effect, captured in the dialogised expression of the other’s meaning (which Fry himself did not insinuate, but which Woolf credits him as implying)—a kind of wrist-slapping how dare you even begin to presume to decide what I meant! And thus, it instructs him to go no further on the point.

Hirsch defines context along lines that might be roughly related to those delimited by Foucault’s Archaeology in that context is both the specific, material, spatiotemporal situation of the utterance, and the sets of knowledges, rules, conventions,
relevancies and genres that enable the formation of meaning. Hirsch’s distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic genre—the sense or idea of the utterance (Hirsch \textit{Validity} 102) in the first instance as a kind of meaning (101), as opposed to its classification under a “broad genre concept” (110), like the gothic mode for example—explains why our expectations of these broader conceptions of (an extrinsic) genre are often not met when we come to apply their standards to a specific text. For Hirsch, we can only get close to defining and identifying extrinsic genres (and falsely so) because intrinsic genres must be identified in relational terms to other texts rather than in any definitive sense outside their interpreted meaning:

\begin{quote}
The model for this relationship is not, however, a simple genealogical chart. The parents of the intrinsic genre are sometimes very numerous, and they may have widely different provenances. Furthermore, the description of these antecedents does not define the genre, any more than the description of its elements defines the meaning of a metaphor. The best way to define a genre—if one decides that he wants to—is to describe the common elements in a narrow group of texts which have direct historical relationships. (Hirsch \textit{Validity} 110)\end{quote}

These common elements, in the case of an intrinsic genre, are what make up Foucault’s enunciative field. In the case of extrinsic genres, these fit more comfortably within taxonomic conceptions of genre—of genre as a historically sedimented concept that is constantly changing because the texts that contribute to our conception of it are invariably different from one another in some way. That is, extrinsic genre is genre as Fowler means the term; but it is also more than this in that it defines genre in terms of meaning rather than form and relies on form as a kind of meaning. Finally, extrinsic genres might also be found within an enunciative field. In either case, genre reveals itself to be a rhetorical investment—a meaning and a mode of meaning that functions in terms

\footnote{“[S]uch aspects of a context as purposes, conventions, and relationship to the audience are not outside the meaning of the utterance but constitutive of it. They are not only aspects which must be construed but also aspects which are intrinsic to meaning. […] By ‘context’ we mean a construed notion of the whole meaning narrow enough to determine the meaning of a part, and, at the same time, we use the word to signify those givens in the milieu which will help us to conceive the right notion of the whole. […] In other words, the essential component of a context is the intrinsic genre of the utterance.” Hirsch, \textit{Validity in Interpretation} 87.}
of both communication and interpretation (and therefore as a shared understanding between speaker and addressee) as speech is given and received—a relation that is, as Bakhtin terms it, dialogic and which is itself inflected in the utterances that flow between interlocutors.

Although he achieves this through a process of negation (see, for example, Foucault *Archaeology* 88), Foucault would appear to be acutely aware of the oscillating rhetorical value of the statement—its propensity to mean, be, and function at one and the same time. Its ambiguity as an object of possibility that cannot be identified in any “real” terms (one cannot point to it and say it is here or there) is a consequence of its “mode of existence,” which is the same condition of existence that confounds a precise identification of genre and of literature. The rhetorical nature of the statement—its formative role and its self-formation—is characteristic of all speech. Supplementing language with its meanings, speech is as illusory an object as genre and statement. Typically, we fall back on its phonic and linguistic attributes and in doing so we lose sight of its otherness—its difference from these apparent attributes. On similar terms, we might go so far as to say that the statement is itself a differance—there but not there, construed as one thing whilst being another: identifiable only as a trace and supplemented by the enunciative field, which is also the means by which the statement’s absence is deferred.107

Ambiguity is perhaps the only way around something whose mode of existence—like the statement—is variable. But this does not necessarily render Foucault’s argument invalid or neutralise his terminology—specifically, the statement. The diversity of meanings implicated by Foucault via the constant shifts in the rhetorical dimensionality he invokes will be evident in any discourse based around complex concepts and their existence, function and relation to what we experience as phenomenally real. Indeed, such oscillations are so prevalent that identifying them explicitly would result in confusion: whilst we need to be able to negotiate these shifts in order to understand a speaker’s meaning, our navigation of them is an intellectual process that is submerged rather than superficially apparent. These are category mistakes that we necessarily make in order to produce meaning, but we have to suspend our

107 Unlike the statement, the enunciative field is given in concretising terms (Foucault also characterises it as a space). See Foucault, *Archaeology* 97.
awareness of any logical error in order to proceed. To speak only in terms of meanings that are rhetorically indicative of form, for example, would render speech redundant and pointless. Some juxtaposition between the different aspects of being—between what Mark Johnson terms the non-propositional experience of being embodied consciousness, where mental experience bears an integral relation to bodily being and sensation—is needed. Form, content, and relation must be placed in contiguous relations that defer these categorical differences without obliterating them. All reasoning, therefore, stems from a process of equating different “categories” to one another in order to realise likenesses and produce meanings that depend upon such correlations. In identifying the enunciative field as the correlate of the statement, Foucault is indicating just this kind of correspondence.

Foucault becomes clearer in his meaning at those points in his argument where he specifically identifies differences in the rhetorical dimension of the concepts he invokes. By designating the statement a function, and the field as a rhetorically undisputed conceptual space, Foucault enables shifts in identification between the two terms, such that the paradoxes arising in one context, the statement, can be resolved by substitution with its correlate, the enunciative field, where paradoxes are more easily resolved because the enunciative field can take every kind of meaning into itself. The enunciative field is given in concrete terms: it is a field—a reified metaphor enables us to consider it in terms of all three rhetorical dimensions as something that has a form and internal features (conceptual objects and the abstract relations existing within the enunciative field). This metaphor thus enables the relation of internal content and external form in logical terms that can then be applied to the statement. The statement, in contrast, is destabilised as a concretised metaphor: we are constantly reminded of its intangibility and of the absence of any interior aspect or content by the virtual ineluctability of its attributes and the incoherence of its form. But when Foucault claims that, despite the materiality of the statement, it is not repeatable, and subsequently argues that it is repeatable in strict terms (Foucault *Archaeology* 102-104), he is shifting between the statement and its correlate. The contradiction is resolved not by clarifying the terms on which a statement is repeatable but by attributing the repeatable aspect of the statement to its correlate, the enunciative field, which he implicates in the explanation he gives of the statement being “[t]oo repeatable to be entirely identifiable with the spatio-temporal coordinates of its birth,” and by stipulating the enunciative field as possessing a generic quality in terms of rules, conventions, formations, etc. (Foucault *Archaeology* 104).
Thus, the statement sits between the utterance and the enunciative field—between its expression and the sedimented meanings that take shape in semantic, syntagmatic, and semiotic terms—but it is rhetorically given as closer to one than the other. This is how Foucault achieves the subordination of the utterance and privileges the statement as the determinant of both utterance and enunciative field, whilst also characterising it as the “product” arising out of the transformative relations between the two.

Critical interpretation, based as it is on the archive, reveals itself to be a fine-tuned reading of the oscillations in meaning that characterise any metaphor. This is perhaps because “[w]hat archaeology tries to describe is not the specific structure of science, but the very different domain of knowledge” (Foucault Archaeology 195). It is for this reason that it is possible to locate innumerable discursive “paths” to the implicated meanings of the archive. Every concept turns through these three-dimensional aspects. Sometimes a concept is given in terms that require an appreciation of its mutable and multiple forms. Sometimes it is given with explicit emphasis that it is to be understood in strictly limited terms. Constrained it may be, but even in such instances, meaning turns through its various guises by taking on form, content, and relation in ways that correspond closely or remotely to the literal value of these terms—in ways that oscillate in metaphoric scale.

**Generic Mutability and the Unstable Metaphor**

Blanchot’s argument, discussed briefly in Chapter 2, is in certain respects consistent with Hirsch’s argument that failed correspondence is inevitable between texts and genres. Correspondences will fail because meaning depends upon the mutability of linguistic signs—signs that might be taken literally or metaphorically as meanings and which, in moving from the literal through higher degrees of metaphoricity, move through different rhetorical dimensions that characterise meaning in terms of form, content, or relation. What this thesis means to achieve, in developing its account of the role of genre in the mediation of meaning, is an understanding of meaning as dependent upon metaphoric constructions that oscillate between the rhetorical dimensions of semiotics, semantics and syntagmatics. These dimensions supply meanings that shift according to degrees of likeness—from the literal to the metaphoric—and according to the schema of embodiment: where body is form, mind is content, and the relation between these supplies a “reason” for contiguity (and other forms of relatedness), which we can see active in the concept of eventfulness. Our bodily experience becomes fundamental to meaning—and thus our reasoning presumes being as the starting point of all meaning. In
speech, as Derrida has argued, this fundamental proposition is given as presence. But it also takes the form of eventfulness, where being is indissolubly tied to being in space and time. The eventfulness of life is implicated in our speech because it stands for the experience of embodiment itself. We cannot make meaning (beyond signification) without implicating event (through Gergen’s motive language)—whether this takes the form of temporal or spatial movement.

The novel supplies the demonstration of my argument in this instance, but the relevance of our experience in spatiotemporal terms is evident in other speech forms. If, as Johnson argues, our metaphoric constructions stem from the abstraction of the non-propositional schema of embodiment (whereby the construction of the mind-in-the-body-and-the-body-in-the-mind constitutes the relation that each element has to the other), then we might recognise the first stage of metaphoric construction to be that stage whereby the meaning, structure and signs of this schema are identified, at which point it becomes propositional. This first stage would seem to be the construal of what we experience mentally as *content*, and what we experience bodily as *form*, with *relations* within and between each sustaining their coherence as separate entities that are nonetheless interdependent. From here, content is construed as *meaning*, form as medium and *sign*, and relation as *structure* in a functional sense. Nonetheless, these are each metaphoric constructions that imprecisely reproduce a likeness with their corresponding terms. The meanings and rhetorical effect of each is different, however—just as the designated terms of semantics, semiotics, and syntagmatics reproduce a metaphoric likening to meaning, form, and structure, respectively, and also identify marginal differences that cannot be fully articulated. These three groupings constitute the different rhetorical dimensions of the schema of embodiment, and these dimensions, I argue, can be found operating in relation to every metaphor—each represents an identifiable oscillation in metaphoric meaning, which may or may not entail oscillations in metaphoric “scale” (in the way that metaphors might be construed as having a high degree of “literality” or higher degrees of metaphoricity and/or abstraction).

Having identified three dimensions, it ought to be stressed, however, that these are not fully definable or finite categories. They are useful because they are effectively reified concepts that are widely employed and related to one another across different discourses. Further, to call them reified concepts is not to say that we have lost awareness of their condition as abstractions, but that we nonetheless use them as though they were materially evident. Thus, we come to talk about semiotic systems as though they had
formal consequence and for this reason, media—though conceived as ontologically different to signs—become inseparably welded to the semiotic framework, and the semiotic system itself comes to be concretised as though it were the body in which content is to be found. Semantics, as meaning, and otherwise an abstraction, achieves form as a practice (a syntagmatic relation) that coalesces as a discipline. Syntagmatics does likewise, but it also has a metaphoric meaning that is easily construed in concrete terms as event (and also as form through the metaphoric values of “structure”).

Derrida’s *Grammatology* and his other writings elaborate how difficult it is to resist the internal constructions of language (supplemented with meaning to produce speech) and avoid imputing the rhetorical relations of the semiotic system to the phenomenal world. We oscillate in our talk about concepts and objects by moving between stances that view the object as independent of language and then by speaking of the linguistic sign as though it were the object. It is because literal meaning is characterised as having phenomenal equivalence that any critical approach seeking validation on empirical terms will favour the rhetorical dimension that presents the greatest stability of literal relatedness. Structuralist approaches to narrative, for example, focus on the syntagmatic value of a given metaphor for this reason. The possibility always remains, nonetheless, that a different rhetorical dimension might apply, and the meaning of a concept will thereby oscillate between degrees of literality and metaphoricity according to the rhetorical dimension employed—semantic, semiotic, or syntagmatic—with the semiotic and syntagmatic dimensions offering greater degrees of literality, and the semantic dimension proffering metaphoricity of the widest range and highest order. Hence, when I identify structure as a metaphor for the rhetorical organisation of a text, organised according to the sense of connectivity that we experience in relation to our mental and bodily experiences, I am invoking the semiotic and semantic value of structure as a sign that means connectedness.

Hans-Georg Wolf, in far greater detail but without direct reference to Derrida, addresses the same meaning-making processes that I have described here in these broad terms via Derrida, Gergen, and Johnson. Wolf, who identifies himself as a constructionist and attacks the constructed concept of self in his published thesis, *A Folk Model of The “Internal Self” In Light of the Contemporary View of Metaphor: The Self as Subject and Object*, develops his argument in relation to the work of theorists such as Gergen and
Johnson.\textsuperscript{108} Wolf argues more specifically in relation to the construction of selfhood that “our notion of ‘self’ only exists as part of a linguistic ontology” (Wolf \textit{A Folk Model} 11). Our conception of self has evolved metaphorically, a point Wolf persistently signals by placing terms like “mind” and “self” in quotation marks. The problem with these terms is that, having adopted them to describe the cohering of certain cognitive structures—what Wolf seems to mean when he describes experience mediated by the general perspective of “culture”\textsuperscript{109}—we have, over time (or perhaps almost immediately), taken these described events for objects: that is, the term “self” describes a collection of perceived mental “processes” (like thought) that establish the conceptual “event” of “personal” coherence, and this experience of coherence is metaphorically construed as an object (the self). The effect of this construal is that “we are no longer aware of the underlying metaphoricity” of the self because these “[s]hifts in the way of seeing become forgotten” (Wolf \textit{A Folk Model} 56).

The shift that Wolf describes here is a shift from a syntagmatic non-propositional experience of “self” to a semiological and propositionally instantiated semantics of selfhood—what I have termed a shift in rhetorical dimension, in other words. Wolf argues that what we are doing is “invent[ng] truths to make reality usable”—effectively adding meaning so that we might theorise experience. But he warns, “[w]e still cannot say anything about correspondences of these truths to the true nature of things” (Wolf \textit{A Folk Model} 93); and he concludes on this basis that “we should give up the quest for foundations, for an ontological grounding of our theoretical claims and simply view them as another form of social practice” (Wolf \textit{A Folk Model} 79). Science and folk wisdom (as Wolf defines common [sense] constructions of knowledge) make use of metaphoric models and are each subject to the limitations these pose—that is, neither conveys truths about the natural world, since our linguistic observations or propositions do not correspond ontologically with experience: they do not depict reality but represent our structured ways of conceiving it. The “self” does not exist in object terms but is “enacted” in our attempts to theorise about it—it is effectively generated by the

\textsuperscript{108} Wolf’s acknowledgements suggest that Johnson mentored him in his research.

\textsuperscript{109} A term signifying shared models of cultural knowledge (Wolf 108) that might include Bakhtin’s chronotopes. See Hans-Georg Wolf, \textit{A Folk Model of The “Internal Self” In Light of the Contemporary View of Metaphor: The Self as Subject and Object}, Anglo-Saxon Language and Literature (1994) 108.
metaphors employed to describe those experiences we categorise as self-related. Relying on Lakoff and Johnson, Wolf argues that metaphor enables us to “comprehend partially what cannot be comprehended totally” and this “is especially true for the ‘self’” (Wolf, A Folk Model 128). The overall thrust of Wolf’s argument is therefore that our conceptions of selfhood are reified metaphors, which developed in science and folk theory over time to give account of our experiences; as such, the self is constructed, it does not exist except, possibly, as an interpreting capacity of the brain which is therefore “self”-generating in that it develops its metaphorical language as a means of explaining experiences, including its own function.  

I do not propose to resolve these ontological aporia of selfhood: but I find Wolf’s observations about the constructed nature of the self to be useful for literary theory given that fictional texts strive to achieve just this. The novel is, in some respects, very much like that part of the brain that generates statements implicating a coherent self behind its elaborations. In literary theory, this self is generally identified as the narrator and sometimes the implied author. Specifically, I want to look at the construction of the narrator as a presence in the text—applying Derrida’s observations about voice to early writings in the field of narratology by the structuralist Gérard Genette. But before turning to consider Genette, it will be useful to consider structuralist approaches more broadly and discuss what these approaches mean in terms of metaphoric construction.

Because meaning is metaphorically constructed, it is always possible to identify the

110 Wolf argues that, although as persons we might experience a nonverbal sense of what it means to be a person, we can only do so in a “transcendental sense that escapes language and theory altogether and that belongs to some mysterious realm beyond human understanding”; beyond this, “there is no ‘pretheoretical sense of self’” because perception interferes with our sensing of everything and we cannot help theorising about what we sense; therefore we can never comprehend the self in a pre-theoretical sense. Wolf, A Folk Model 133, 32.

111 There have been a number of developments in studies of narrative as it relates to fields extending beyond literary theory (These include the work of Galen Strawson and the controversies generated in a fairly intense discourse on the subject: see, for example: Galen Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” Ratio 17.4 (2004), and James L. Battersby, “Narrativity, Self, and Self-Representation,” Narrative 14.1 (2006). I do not propose addressing the issues raised in these debates as it is not my intention to enter into broader philosophical questions on and of selfhood, but to focus instead on how literary genre theory might prove useful in widening our appreciation of how meaning is mediated in the novel.
content of a given thing—even if this content can only be characterised as emptiness. Likewise, there is always a discernible structure—even in the simplest of forms. And, of course, virtually anything might function as a sign for something. In identifying qualities like emptiness, simplicity, and signification, we are establishing likenesses between conceptual or phenomenal objects and, in this case, the pre-existing concepts of content, structure and sign. In doing so, we are bringing different conceptualisations into relation with one another and ordering those relations according to coherent rhetorical practices—practices identifiable in broad terms as semantic, syntagmatic and semiotic (though these practices themselves also oscillate in their metaphoric value, further complicating and obscuring the category mistakes that inevitably result). These practised “forms” of conceptualisation underpin all our metaphoric constructions by constituting conventions for determining the type of relatedness to be established via metaphor. Every metaphor has the potential to fall into any of the three rhetorical dimensions. This is how it is that a metaphor might mean and function at the same time—by emphasising what is signified, by standing as a sign, and by functioning as a relation that runs through meanings and signs to establish degrees of contiguity akin to what we know as adjacency in spatiotemporal terms. These rhetorical dimensions constitute different ways of separating and connecting, in other words.

Signs invariably separate by drawing attention to a restricted field of meaning, which constitutes the semantic “content” of a given concept. This conceptual act of separating or demarcating is necessary in order that these signified concepts might be brought together to form new concepts and new conceptual objects. Structuralist approaches favour metaphoric constructions that identify relations between concepts. In doing so, they are focusing on the meaning that arises between signs when concepts are separated or connected. This meaning is the effect of contiguity shaped by the semantic value of the sign. Thus, the semiotic and semantic dimensions of a metaphoric construction are still relevant. But structuralism subordinates these to the syntagmatic dimension in order to formulate a meaning that addresses the unity that is formed by these relations. In addressing these relations as a unity, the syntagmatic dimension is also—like the metaphorical caste of semantics as content—concerned with the metaphorically interior aspect of a concept and how its unity, as a concept, came to be.

Gergen’s, Wolf’s, and Johnson’s methodologies privilege syntagmatic relatedness. In this they share something with that school of literary theory termed structuralism, but because their methodologies also address the semantic and semiotic dimensions of
metaphoric construction, it would be reductive to identify constructionists with structuralism. Indeed, structuralists are not as one-eyed as the term infers. It is not possible to shine a light through the metaphorical prism that constitutes the rhetorical dimensions of any metaphor without illuminating every aspect: something of the diversity of its colouration will be suggested and is implicit in the decision to take a particular rhetorical stance. Yet the strategies deployed by Gergen, Wolf, and Johnson, because these enable each (in their own way) to address the effect on meaning derived from syntagmatic relations between signs, oscillate more openly in their focus between syntagmatic and semantic values. This is not to say that this diversity enables them to resolve the issues they address. With the exception of Johnson (whose project is to identify metaphoric construction as founded on the non-propositional schema of the body), each theorist reaches a point in their syntagmatic focus where the coherence of their argument threatens to dissolve because it is itself propositional and based on theoretical language founded on metaphoric constructions whose rhetorical effects cannot be constrained.

Gergen deals with this by suggesting the development of a new meta-theory since the meta-theory of logical empiricism has constrained generative theories of social transformation (Gergen Toward 108-12). Wolf takes up the challenge, but on his own terms, searching for a semiotic structure founded on embodiment that will avoid the construction of selfhood he finds so problematic. But having briefly explored the possibilities stemming from neuroscience (which produce statements about emotions devoid of emotive content: “the coding vectors in specific neural pathways [are] resonating in the nth layer of my peristriatal cortex” [Wolf A Folk Model 274-75]), Wolf quickly dismisses it as a semiotic meta-system. He offers no alternative, however, but observes that by unsettling the supremacy of the metaphors we employ, he has made room for more productive models. His reasoning is selective, however, in that, by proffering the neuroscience metaphors, he completely ignores Gergen’s point that even the so-called empirical language of science is hypothetical and, when it is not, it carries little meaning-value. It gets out of its empirical straitjacket by its ability to relate to wider concepts—and this is of course achievable through metaphor (“coding”, “pathways” and “resonance”, for example, are applied as metaphors in the scientific description of emotion).

Significantly, Wolf’s example is itself syntagmatic—and taking this rhetorical stance enables him to describe emotions in terms that empty out the “content” that we imply
when we use the term “emotion.” It is because of his abhorrence of the self as it is currently constructed that he loses sight of the significance of the overarching metaphor of the body in the mind that his mentor has detailed, for every metaphor works according to this paradigm of internal content and external form, with both form and content being syntagmatically formulated: interiority has its structures, and these are supplied by the bodily experience of being in the world. Wolf clearly wants a less coherent structure to the self than the coherence of a body in the mind—a body that thinks and moves in relation to an interiorised world or worlds. He goes into some detail in terms of the schema of the overarching and contradictory metaphor of the self, arguing that by making the self both subject and object—a consequence of Cartesian dualism—within this collection of metaphors, we have arrived at the harmful conclusion that the self is something to be worked on. This conclusion is harmful because it means that we will always be striving for self-fulfilment. Thus it is that he suggests that we take up Gergen’s call for a generative meta-theory by changing the language of our metaphors, thereby regenerating our theory of self. My argument proposes that, rather than being a consequence of Cartesian dualism, the self is construed as both subject and object because this construal is necessary to the formation of meaning—concepts like “self” are formed out of metaphoric oscillations that entail shifting in the meanings generated by the schema of embodiment in terms of speaking, hearing, doing, and seeing. These shifts amount to rhetorical “movements” between positions that see and

112 Wolf knows that metaphors are essential for meaning making, and thus is not suggesting that we do away with them, just that we get a better set—one that evolves from the ground up by basing itself on the neurological sciences. In this he once again fails to realise that the sciences are driven in what they seek by the “folk wisdom” that has provided the inadequate model: that is, our language and beliefs about human emotions determine the parameters of the research conducted by scientists (Gergen, once again)—and without setting such parameters to their research, scientific progress would be very slow indeed.

113 ‘Doing’ and ‘seeing’ are rhetorically functional—they fall into the syntagmatic dimension of meaning in that they do not take form but describe how forms relate to other forms or how form and content relates to one another. They achieve this effect as a meaning generated through speech, regardless of whether someone is doing or seeing in actual fact. Since the latter instance does not concern me, and I focus on how speech constructs and reifies its concepts, I am attending to the rhetorical diversity of metaphor to shift through the categories of form, content, relation whilst maintaining coherence throughout—from the initial formulation to the last. That coherence takes the form of the metaphor as a virtual entity—which is the effect of
are seen, that speak and hear, that act and are acted upon—terms that are founded on a
construal of the mind as subject and the body as object, but which also enable the
conception of each in alternate terms.

Whether this will resolve anxieties of selfhood, I cannot say. In my reading of
Genette’s narratology I take the opposite view to Wolf: arguing that what is needed—as
far as the novel is concerned—is less restraint in our use and awareness of the metaphors
by which the presence of a narrator is constructed. I argue against constraining
metaphors to one rhetorical dimension for the sake of clarity in the first instance of
interpretation. Rather than finding a new way of speaking about the different functions
and aspects of narrative units, I argue that we should make greater use of the ambiguity
inherent in what is already available.

verisimilitude and refers to the characterological constructions of the novel—or of virtual
eventfulness—which we term as narrative—is evident in the overall coherence of the literary
work and of the novel as a form: we accept and expect that any described functions of seeing and
doing will relate to entities, described or not—form is never far away where function and relation
are invoked, and similarly with content. Neither can form remain empty for long.
Chapter 4. The Metaphors of Voice and View in the Novel

At the apex of the wedge is the river town of Wangaratta and you might imagine the Ovens River running along the eastern side of the wedge. It would be simplest to say the Broken River makes the western side of the wedge that’s a lie but never mind. The King River is more obliging cutting right down the centre of the wedge to join the Ovens River exactly at Wangaratta. Next you must imagine the pie slopes up from Wangaratta where the land is very flat. It were near here in Oxley that Annie were married but the boy and the grisly man spent the afternoon travelling to higher elevations along the centre of the wedge. By late afternoon having left the limits of selection they poked up a long winding ridge and by early evening they was definitely entering big country. At last they picked a path down a densely wooded gully to a mountain stream. (Carey *True History of Kelly Gang* 71)

Narrated in the first person, Peter Carey’s novel about the life of Australian bushranger Ned Kelly is a virtuosic performance of what Bakhtin would term social voice or heteroglossia. Based on the idiom, syntax, grammar and expressiveness of Kelly’s own account of his actions in the Jerilderie Letter of 1879,114 *True History of the Kelly Gang* successfully conveys identifiable traits of Kelly’s “voice” (Eggert “The Bushranger’s Voice” 121).115 It also incorporates other aspects derived both from Carey’s personal experience and from the editorial process, is toned down to some extent by virtue of the latter, and introduces expressions Kelly himself would not have used.116 Identifying these

114 Edward (Ned) Kelly, “The Jerilderie Letter,” (Project Gutenberg, Australia, 1879). The original document is held at The State Library of Victoria. A digitised copy and typed transcript is available via the library’s online catalogue, and is the original source of the Gutenberg copy.


116 Carey writes in the “Acknowledgements” that “I laboured for four exhilarating weeks in collaboration with my editor Gary Fisketjohn, whose green spiderweb annotations […] resulted in a tighter, truer, better book”: Peter Carey, *True History of the Kelly Gang* (St Lucia, Brisbane: University of Queensland Press 2000) 401. Elsewhere, Paul Eggert suggests that Fisketjohn’s contribution included the excision and/or stylisation of colloquialisms: “While I found it curious at first that an American editor could be so effective with clarifying Australian idioms the utter, if slightly irritating consistency with which the non-standard features are imposed must be part of
elements, along with the specific attributes of Kelly’s own speech, enjoins a diversity of cultural and social groupings that intersect and, in some instances, compete with or contradict one another. Nonetheless, Carey’s use of what he identifies as Kelly’s “original voice—uneducated but intelligent, funny and then angry […] with a line of Irish invective” (Carey quoted in McCrumm “Reawakening Ned”) supplies qualitative features we might associate with the bushranger’s voice, making a convincing performance consistent with the idiosyncratic syntax and grammar of the Jerilderie Letter. Here is a sample of the Letter:

there was a warrant for me and the Police searched the place and watched night and day for two or three weeks and when they could not snare me they got a warrant against my brother Dan And on the 15 of April Fitzpatrick came to the Eleven Mile Creek to arrest him […] he asked Dan to come to Greta with him as he had a warrant for him for stealing Whitty’s horses Dan said all right they both went inside Dan was having something to eat his mother asked Fitzpatrick what he wanted Dan for. the trooper said he had a warrant for him Dan then asked him to produce it he said it was only a telegram sent from Chiltren […] Dans mother said Dan need not go without a warrant unless he liked and that the trooper had no business on her premises without some Authority besides his own word The trooper pulled out his revolver and said he would blow her brains out if she interfered. (Kelly Jerilderie Letter)118

Fellow bushranger Joe Byrne is understood to have served as Kelly’s amanuensis and his role might be located in what would appear to be a scribal slip from first to third person. Although it is possible to read this portion of the Jerilderie Letter as consistent with


formalities of the time and therefore not disruptive of person, the identification of “his mother” and “Dans mother” as opposed to “my mother” can be read as a scribal intrusion, given that elsewhere Kelly identifies his relations possessively—referring, for example, to “my mother’s house” in his opening address (Kelly *Jerilderie Letter*).

This intrusion of another’s perspective is possibly parodied in the novel’s third-person digression, evident in the epigraph above. Yet, unlike the Letter, *True History* gives us Kelly as author and scribe and in doing so constructs its own paratextual material to sustain the exclusion of Byrne.119 Carey may be replicating and enlarging the *Jerilderie Letter*, but he obscures its potential as the collaborative effort of Byrne and Kelly, reducing Byrne’s contribution to emendations concerning events that Kelly himself could not have fully described (Clancy “Selective History” 175).120 It is only here, through the narrative shift from first to third person, that any acknowledgement of Byrne’s contribution as scribe might be found. The ambiguity itself may well be a mimetic gesture, therefore, but its effect is troubling insofar as it strengthens Kelly’s authority by seeming to perform an aspect of character rather than an instance of collaboration.

Shifts in speakers might be signalled by textual markers or by adopting different expressive qualities and speech patterns, which may or may not include a change in grammatical person. In this instance, however, the speech style of the speaker/s of the first- and third-person sections remains the same. The shift in person is apparent but, I want to argue, it is not necessarily a shift in the identity of the speaker because, although the grammatical voice shifts, its qualitative features are largely unaltered. The shift nonetheless introduces a significant change in that the narrative, although it continues the story in all respects, refers to Kelly as “the boy” and adopts a generalised approach to the description of key figures like the bushranger Harry Power, whom Kelly knew well enough but who the narrative depersonalises as “the grisly man.” This has the effect of distancing the speaker from the objects and events being related: the narrator and the boy would appear to be distinct persons, and Harry Power a virtual stranger. Because the subject positions of the first- and third-person narratives appear distinct, shifting from the first-person narrator to “the boy” (for the most part), two different speakers seem to

119 Byrne is given an editorial role through the archivist’s description of Parcel 8. Carey, *True History of the Kelly Gang* 209.

emerge—speakers sharing the same cultural values and influences insofar as they are consistent in their sympathies/antipathies toward certain individuals and in their ideological, moral, political, and emotional values. Put simply, we have Kelly speaking of himself, then someone speaking about him as a child. We have a shift in mood but, I argue, not necessarily a shift in speaker.

More broadly, these shifts are important for our understanding of how voice works in the novel form, specifically in determining who is speaking. As Carey’s description of Kelly’s voice reveals, voice, as it is generally understood, refers to those qualitative elements that are associated with tone, idiom and style, and which are relevant precisely because they are describable. These features are more commonly associated with voice because they describe how it sounds, being bound up in our aural, emotional and intellectual experience of voice. Kelly’s voice is for Carey the means by which the reader can “imagine the emotional life” of the bushranger (Carey quoted in McCrumm “Reawakening Ned”); it serves as an entry point into this character’s subjectivity through the organisation of his thoughts and the manner of their expression.

Paradoxically, as far as literary theory is concerned, the subjective qualities produced through voice mean that stylisations of speech may be indicative of character point of view rather than what is understood to be narrative voice, because they might function in narrative as inflections of speech that do not correspond to the established voice of the grammatically instanced speaker—offering a focalised perspective instead. This is voice as heteroglossia—social voices that inflect the speech of the instanced speaker. Views, whether in the literal sense as in what is seen or metaphorically as opinion, are nonetheless dependent upon the semiotic system that enables their expression. In the literary text, language constructs opinions as voiced (spoken) by individuals, or else as the generalised stances that one hears expressed in the world by others. Titles, for example, express a cultural meaning rather than a personal opinion. Thus, the title of the novel *We Need to talk About Kevin* (2003) by Lionel Shriver, though seemingly personal, constructs a speaker whose role as speaker is largely displaced by the generalising effect of the text’s function as a title. This suggests that, as a title it is read/received/heard rather than spoken and its intrinsic meaning as a title is therefore not, “you and I need to talk about (our son) Kevin,” but that *the avoidance of one’s fears* (where those fears are characterised as Kevin—the person who enacted them) *can no*
longer be sustained once these fears have been realised/actualised. As an ordinary statement, “We need to talk about Kevin”—because it displaces the unspeakable act and identifies instead a person (Kevin)—reveals through its use of euphemism the personality of a speaker who, even after the event, cannot articulate the horrors she has always been afraid to speak of. In contrast, when this phrase is utilised as a title, these same qualities of speech become culturally versatile and aural: the speaking position indicated reveals itself to be a shared convention of language: “we” becomes “one” and the inferred meaning is “one ought to talk about such things,” which becomes, “novels like this need to be written because society must talk about these kinds of events if it is to change its destructive course.”

Speech situation, as this is rhetorically instanced through genre, will therefore determine the nature of the voice as this is metaphorically given. In other words, it is the conventions governing the speech situation as this is formally given which indicate whether voice stands for view or the presence of a speaker. Titles invoking vernacular expressiveness or intertextuality suggest a double function along the lines sketched above: voice stands for both a particular speaker and for the generalised view. If this is possible in this context, the question remains as to whether such double voicing, as Bakhtin would term it, applies in relation to other kinds of speech—narrative for example. This chapter addresses the possibility of qualitative features associated with voice being indicative of both a speaker and a distinctly “other” perspective. This “other” perspective arises where grammatical indicators suggest a distancing between the speaker and the narrative, resulting in a repositioning of the speaking subject as an object within the point of view constructed by his/her own speech. Speech and speaker are effectively disentangled and demonstrated to be conceptually extricable. What this means for narrative theory is that the structural certainties that have been developed according to linguistic practises can no longer be relied upon in determining the borders of subject and object within the literary text.

**Elaborating Ambiguities**

I have argued that genre theory allows for movement between the diversity of possible rhetorical stances. Contemporary genre theory, which acknowledges the mutability of genre, has this capacity because an acceptance of generic instability implicitly allows that the metaphors which constitute a concept might signify, mean and function at the same time: that these meanings might operate in different ways—formally and semantically, for
example—according to the uses to which they are put. A fair degree of consistency will apply in relation to key structural metaphors but there is always potential for some slippage—particularly in the artistic text, which may strive to explore the limits of convention by invoking such instability. Interpretation, therefore, cannot be sustained by logically derived implicatures founded on empirical observation alone. Some constraint will be necessary in certain contexts, but the text and our understanding of how widely the metaphor might have been extended—the extent to which it oscillates between literality and higher degrees of metaphoricity, and between semiotic, syntagmatic and semantic usage—will supply the parameters according to which the critic might delimit her reading.

The potential for critical interpretation offered by a multidimensional approach is demonstrated in Mieke Bal’s “Poetics, Today,” an essay in which she explicates the diversity of meanings identifiable under the metaphor of vision in literary texts. Bal proposes a scientific poetics that is descriptive, as opposed to a prescriptive aesthetics (when description becomes prescription). She relies on her mentor Hrushovski, later known as Harshav, and his contribution to the poetics of metaphor and character. For Harshav metaphor is the relation that transfers literature to the visual via “a convergence of frames [...] or discourse” (Bal “Poetics, Today” 484) and by which “vision offers a different model of the relationship between subject (of analysis) and object (the text)” (Bal “Poetics, Today” 485). This “neat distinction between subject and object on which the very notion of metalanguage is based becomes problematic,” Bal argues, “once visuality is taken into account” (Bal “Poetics, Today” 485). Bal makes use of Marcel Proust’s Remembrance of Times Past to demonstrate her point: “As it happens,” she writes, “a questioning of the clear and subordinating relationship between subject and object lies at the center of the experiment Proust conducted. He did this in a poetics of subjectivity (a modernist tenet), which attempts to test its own premises by exploring in detail the limits of the subject and the relation between a wavering subjectivity and the object whose status is equally under scrutiny” (Bal “Poetics, Today” 485).

This brings to the fore what Bal describes as “the fundamental problem of a literary science: the relationship, the antagonism, and the entanglement of subject and object” (Bal “Poetics, Today” 485). Proust’s visual poetics are constituted in a process of emulation of the visual whereby doubt about knowledge of the empirical world (what is behind it), provokes the “taking” of it (visually) as a snapshot. She explores this through Marcel’s recollection and confusion of a signature, standing as both “a character, and a
metaphor of a character” and represented as a “figure of changing names” (Bal “Poetics, Today” 486). The passages describe Gilberte signing her name and a telegram whereby Gilberte’s poor handwriting has caused the clerk who transcribed it to misinterpret her name, so that Marcel seems to have received a message from the dead Albertine, resurrected in the confusion of a signature. Here, “realism must yield to semiotics” (489), for, importantly, the visual image invoked is flat, like the page of literature. The same flatness is apparent in Proust’s visual poetics of Marcel’s snapshots:

It is as if this appeal to semiotic difference is needed in order to make a case—prescriptively—for a form of narration in which plausibility yields to experiment and subjectivity is detached from individuality. Person becomes character, character becomes structure, flesh becomes sign, and names [...] are not only joined together but actually and explicitly confused, so that two long and major stretches of the narrative lose their semblance of realistic narrative and yield to sign reading. Both “doing” and “being” lose their defining power to produce a character, and only flatness, failed naming, remains. (Bal “Poetics, Today” 489)

This movement from the semantic to the syntagmatic and finally to the semiotic dimensions of metaphoric construction, enables the signature to “‘pass’ for what it is not—an index of existential subjectivity” (Bal “Poetics, Today” 489).122

Bal also writes about perspective in painting as an example of the visual representation of a subject position explicable in a scientific poetics that enables the correlation of “speech acts with acts of looking” (Bal 479). What is implicit, rather than explicitly conveyed in her analysis of this point, is that perspective—as a sign, rather than a meaning—enables the subject of the enunciation (the painter) to be established in spatial terms (outside the text) through the indicative function of the sign, which implicates a “speaker”:

In his seminal book L’origine de la perspective, Damisch posits that perspective provided painters—the “speakers,” that is, not the

122 Proust’s visual poetics here is founded on graphics and not on painting or any other visual genre, and this is partly what sustains Bal’s claim that Proust, as a modernist author, “takes postmodern vision as his poetic model” Mieke Bal, “Poetics, Today,” Poetics Today 21.3 (2000): 497.
receivers— with a network of indexical signs equivalent to the system of enunciation in language. This is a fundamentally anti-iconic conception of visuality. To show the basic symbolicity of visual representation, Damisch demonstrates various possibilities of relating to the “law” of perspective. Either one obeys or ignores the law, in which case two narrative situations are unambiguously represented, or, as a third possibility, one only puts in a sign or two of it, not necessarily coherent within the work but enough to make the “law” work: to make sure it will be assumed, endorsed by the viewer. (Bal “Poetics, Today” 497-98)

This, Bal tells us, is “how perspective, even within the practice of painting, is a discourse: it can be intertextually signified without being obeyed yet it will be read” (Bal 498). With Damisch’s account of perspective coming “as close as one visually gets to ‘third person’ narrative with an invisible narrator,” visuality in narrative offers more than the (character) perspective on events that narrative theory more broadly takes it to be, whereby perspective is equated with a point of view operating from within the scene (a viewpoint, that is, operating from within the novel, as opposed to outside it) (Bal “Poetics, Today” 497-98).

Bal’s approach, as it fits within the discipline of narratology, reinforces a multidimensional strategy, demonstrating that the structuralist stance might be destabilised to the advantage of literary interpretation. Her observations here support an argument for positioning the role of seeing, as it is represented in the utterance, as an alternative to “voice” in narrative where voice constitutes the speaker.123 Taking the

123 Bal further remarks: “In his analysis of perspective, Damisch (1987: 345) sees it as a device for the demarcation of subjectivity. He shows a keen sense of the issue when he writes, in a passage of great theoretical momentum: ‘In order for the things in this world to become objects for perception, the subject must take distance from itself. . . . But that movement, even in its slight theatricality, remains subjected to the law which is the law of representation: the distance the subject takes in relation to the object . . . allows him to escape to the immediately lived experience; but he can only discover that he is implicated, irremediably so, in the spectacle which takes its truth from that very implication.’ This implicatedness is the very essence of the system of perspective—and of the ontology of the subject. Overcoming it constitutes the system’s major motivation. Its analysis helps Damisch to understand the ‘difference within’ perspective as illusion, bound up with realism but not with reality, a provider of the illusion of original and autonomous subjectivity. Ironically, the subject who needs to see its origin mirrored in the
metaphor of perspective—with its recognisable rules or “laws”—as the speech of the painter (who might conceivably be adopting a position that is generic or somehow “other” than her own as “author”), it becomes possible, in relation to a literary text, to construct more than one speaker of the same utterance—or at least, more than one position from which to signify: a speaker whose use of a semiotic system places her outside the rhetorical dimension it invokes as the user of it; and another (designated the narrator in narrative theories) within it who is linguistically constructed as a sign by the relations of grammar and syntax that identify the narrator as the owner of the voice, and whose syntagmatic value is semantically translated within the semiotic dimension of the text as presence. Visuality on these terms therefore constructs the presence of a narrator outside the text—a narrator whose absence in the text is elided through the grammatically constructed presence of a voice within that text. View and vision, in other words, effectively sustain the construction of a speaker by enabling the grammatical elements of the semiotic system to construe the narrator as being, at one and the same time, inside language (as a voice) and outside the text (as the speaker of signs from which it is formed)—seeing/composing from without and speaking from within. This relation is inverted in those critical accounts (which Dorothy Hale elaborates more fully and which I will discuss briefly below) that enable the construction of a speaker outside the text who sees into it from a position within it.

The paradox produced by this example does not undermine the meaning that voice and view generate across each of the three rhetorical dimensions. Bal’s call for a poetics of scientific description rather than of aesthetic prescription might be read as a call to observe such paradoxes without attempting to resolve them according to an overarching system. Coherence, in other words, might be contingent: it might emerge and dissolve according to the shifts that take place (often imperceptibly) between the dimensional values of a given metaphor. The significance that these different dimensions have for meaning becomes apparent when we consider their effectiveness more broadly—which is of course what Jameson does when he identifies Propp as a structuralist focusing on economic forces, and Frye as wedded to a semantic order founded on nostalgia.

In terms more specific to the novel, Dorothy Hale takes a similar approach in her system of perspective, ‘that subject which is considered “dominating” since it appears to be established in a position of domination, is tenuously established (ne tient qua’a un fil’.” Bal, “Poetics, Today,” 497-98.
Here, in analysing the use of these two metaphors (voice and view) in theories of the novel, she highlights the ethical principles governing these metaphors. What Hale’s account reveals is that each theory or discipline depends upon different conceptualisations of these two metaphors—conceptualisations that, I would argue, either accord the metaphor of view a syntagmatic function that unifies the descriptive effect of fictional narratives which embed multiple perspectives, or else privilege its semiotic and semantic scope (whereby viewing is showing and showing is a kind of speech). In the first case, Hale notes in the structuralist account of narrative that “the subject remains a coherent and singular consciousness possessing a distinctive point of view; but rather than being conceptualized as the origin of language, the phenomenological subject is situated within language” (Hale Social Formalism 66). This reveals how far Bal goes beyond typical structuralist approaches to the metaphor of view, which is not surprising given that Hale’s focus here is on Barthes and Genette rather than on post-structuralists like Bal. Interestingly, Hale’s account of the structuralist stance also reveals it as reproducing the syntagmatic relation implicated in Johnson’s account of the mind in the body, whereby the mind integrates its material and intellectual functions by placing the body in the mind. If we relate Hale’s account to Johnson’s schema, we can see that, whereas view is only ever interior to narrative, voice, for structuralists, is both (metaphorically) the body and the mind. As the indicator of a speaker, it supplies the textual body that constitutes narrative and the subjectivity (the mind that speaks) whose speech is constitutive of form—it embodies what it tells:

\[\text{With ‘voice,’ the novel theorists of the second wave mean to demonstrate that the opposition between showing and telling is moot: showing cannot be better than telling, because showing is not an alternative to telling; in literature, it is simply an illusion produced by telling. There can be no objective representation, in other words, because language necessarily reflects—or, for Barthes, constitutes—the subjectivity of the agent who produces it. ‘Voice’ thus designates for the second wave the authentic self-expression of identity that is integral to and inevitable in any act of novelistic communication. (Hale Social Formalism 67)}\]

On this account, view—both in terms of visibility and the capacity to see—as a solely internal feature that both represents and means, is, the glue that binds it all together by enabling both the subjective and objective perspective; the metaphor enables the construction of a subject that can see and be seen. But its syntagmatic capacity, as the glue that binds narrative, arises through narrative voice as it is defined according to linguistics. If view is to be given by structuralists a syntagmatic function over and above other metaphoric uses (semantic or semiotic), it is by subordinating it to voice and attributing to each a specific grammatical function. This grammatical turn seeks to stabilise any oscillations in metaphoric value by privileging the speaker as authority. Although the metaphor of viewpoint may function as a sign and as a meaning in different instances, narratology, as I will demonstrate in relation to Genette’s early writing in this field, makes these secondary to its syntagmatic function. This is evident in Hale’s account of Genette’s use of the metaphor:

As we have already seen, the impulse to place point of view under the grammatical category of ‘mood’ emphasizes the primary importance Genette ascribes to his definition of narrative as a ‘verb’; subjectivity—the author’s, the narrator’s, and the character’s—is relegated in this model to the ‘traces’ left on the narrative discourse. In his description of the mimetic nature of discourse, Genette, further depersonalizes subjectivity by separating the issue of character from the structural function of point of view. (Hale Social Formalism 87)

This distinction is widespread in literary criticism and used by theorists outside the field of narratology. For example, D. A. Miller, writing on Jane Austen, identifies free indirect style as representative of character point of view (Miller Jane Austen 27). Obscuring the vocal qualities that the alternative term, free indirect discourse (FID) more openly addresses, Miller, like many critics relying on this distinction, turns voice into vision at his convenience. The use of these metaphors, more broadly and outside the discourse of literary theory, is otherwise unstable, which is why narratologists like Genette work so hard to define them. But in its insistence on the clarification of terms, narratology elides other considerations. It is not that narratology disputes the metaphorical diversity of voice, but that its poetics makes no room for its significance. And yet, these other values are pertinent not only to cultural-historical analyses, but also to theory.

Tone, diction, and idiom do not construct presence in specific terms—rather they indicate a generalised cultural perspective: they are metaphorically construed as views, and as opinions they are intersubjective.

The shift in Carey’s *True History* presents problems in these terms. The point of view instanced is clearly that belonging to the third-person speaker, though the voice is Kelly’s, for the narrator’s point of view determines the generality of the descriptive terms where once these were specific and personal. Had the novel been narrated wholly in the third person, an unproblematic reading of Kelly’s point of view, suggested by the use of his voice, would be possible. But the shift undermines this—Kelly’s point of view gives way to another, instanced in the shift that takes place in narrative voice. Carey, in other words, inverts the convention. This is not an instance of free indirect style or discourse, where grammatical mood is at odds with the speaker’s position, and tenses align with the implicated subject position of another. The same features of voice that might identify character point of view must, in the absence of any disparity of mood or tone, function in respect to narrative voice to convey something of its speaker’s subjectivity, and this seems apparent here: the speaker shares Kelly’s subjective emotional and intellectual perspective, but no longer occupies the subject position.

This sharing of perspective is generally constructed by conflating the enunciative and subject positions—merging the speaker with the subject of the utterance by suggesting that the narrator is looking over the shoulder of the character whose subject position is either explicitly given, as here, or implied, as in free indirect discourse. Yet vocal quality, as it is patterned in speech, conveys something more like a response to events rather than a literal (visual) perspective: one sees from a subject position and, of course, one speaks from a speaking position, and the two will not always coincide. Seeing is receptive rather than responsive and this means that feeling, thinking or otherwise responding internally cannot be conveyed by visual references but (when not explicitly described) must necessarily be evinced in the tone, pattern and content of the speech in which it is implicated. If such speech is not given as part of the subject’s enunciative act, then it retains its interiority as thought or else represents the interiorising of another’s enunciation—converting someone’s speech, if you are the narrator, to your narrating thoughts. The latter is instanced in focalisation, as it is typically understood. But the concept too neatly merges the literal meaning of “a point of view” with the metaphorical, and this is important because the metaphorical aspect of a point of view pertains to
qualitative features of voice, instanced as language, syntax, idiom, tone, etc—all of which determine how voice metaphorically sounds.

The relevance of these qualitative features can be seen in the critical discourse on Carey’s novel that lauds the performance of the bushranger’s voice (see O’Reilly 493),
but the importance of individuated speech patterns has also been raised by literary theorists troubled by the demarcations of character and narrator along the lines of grammatically determined speaking positions. Richard Aczel, for example, calls for an “opening up” of “the concept of voice” by restoring “the realm of ‘how’—tone, idiom, diction, speech style—to a central position among the configuration of essential first questions of narrative voice” (Aczel, “Hearing Voices” 469).127 Aczel clearly means to include those qualitative features encompassed by what I have identified in Carey’s description. This thesis argues for the importance of such features of voice, which I group here under the term cultural rather than social voice (in line with my reading of Derrida on Rousseau), in not only identifying a speaker, but in locating that speaker in relation to a subject position; it further elaborates the function of cultural voice in both clarifying and disrupting assumptions about the identified speaker in relation to narrative voice (which takes on an indicative function like Rousseau’s natural voice) through strategies such as polyphonic speech and shifts in grammatical person. This of course does not mean that only those texts employing the first-person might elaborate the coherence of a speaking entity—a speaker’s subject position may be implicated at various instances across a third-person narrative and, at the very least, will function in descriptive passages where the points of view of the novel’s characters are not apparent. It is by this means that the subjectivity of the speaker infiltrates the narrative—as with Jane Austen’s narrators who implicate themselves in relation to various points of view.

Tone, accent, idiom, and style all invoke the sense of a personality, even though these qualities might be shared amongst groups of persons. These are features relating to voice as it is heard; and they amount to a metaphorised and conceptual conflation of both the sound and the hearer’s response to that sound, with that response also affected by what the voice says. These elements coalesce to form aural-meanings that seemingly

provide an historical overview of the speaker’s emotions, intentions, and past influences—enabling the broad identification of a voice’s cultural-geographic attributes. Insofar as it contains the traces of its history, voice situates its speaker in space and time beyond the present moment of the utterance. This added spatiotemporality is important in terms of the meaning as it is imputed and because it offers an alternative to the immediacy of the utterance which insists on the presence of a speaker. These qualitative aspects of voice enable the absence of a speaker whose presence is marked as something once instanced but no longer insisted upon. It is just such qualities that, united with grammatical indicators that present the writing as unmediated when narrated in the first-person, enable the identification of Kelly as the speaker and narrator, suggesting that the question of who is speaking is both a question of the speaker’s (grammatical) position in relation to the enunciative act and the speaker’s position in relation to the material contained within it. This has consequences for our understanding of the narrative act and for the conferral of personhood upon the narrator through the blending of grammatical person and personality. That is, in determining a narrator’s identity, two very different approaches to voice are needed—and these do not necessarily lead us back to the same speaker: duality is inherent in the act of writing and speaking because these two positions of relation stand for different measures which may or may not coincide. These measures take stock of different values: on the one hand, they are concerned with locating a speaker in terms of the narrative function; on the other, they are concerned with identifying the speaker with a person by relating speech to identifiable aspects of a speaker’s subject position.

True History’s shift in person performs this difference: the narrator, identified as Kelly in the first-person section extending for more than seventy pages, becomes, momentarily, an unidentified speaker; but the quality of that speech is identifiable with the subject position of the earlier speaker and with the boy Kelly, who is predominantly the subject of the third-person digression. Whether or not Carey meant to have Kelly as iconic figure write the life of Kelly the man, the shift here gestures toward this.128 By attempting to position the text as archival material on a par with the Jerilderie Letter, it might be said that the novel offers little scope for “unpick[ing] the myth” (Gelder and

128 The shift in person actually takes place before the quoted passage and begins more starkly: “The boy imagined the famous bushranger knew where he were going” Carey, True History of the Kelly Gang 7.
After the Celebration 83),

for the use of Ned Kelly’s voice would seem to give him a chance, at last, to be heard and (sympathetically) judged, counteracting his failed attempts to publish the Jerilderie Letter and other accounts during his lifetime. Further, as historical subject, Kelly’s account in the novel is underwritten by his story’s tragic outcomes in a manner not possible in the Jerilderie Letter. The novel distinguishes itself in this respect through a narrative strategy that enables Kelly to fulfil the mythic proportions he is to attain in Australian lore—an attitude prefigured by, and perhaps narcissistically entailed in, the self-aggrandising tone of the Jerilderie Letter and its self-justificatory stance. Certainly, the narrator adopts an attitude to the events of his life that positions him as the author of, not just his own actions, but events overall, whilst simultaneously presenting his younger and less immediate self (or selves) as the victim of injustices inflicted by others.

Carey’s voicing of the bushranger therefore complicates distinctions between voice and point of view by revealing qualitative features of voice to be important to the question of who is speaking the narrative. The Jerilderie Letter offers some insight into the problematic function of narrative voice for, taken on the whole, the Letter offers two speakers—one subsumed by the other but breaking forth at times, undermining any presumption of narrative voice deriving from a single speaker. Admittedly, Kelly is purposefully positioned as the only speaker of the Letter, and if his authority is to be maintained, then the scribal intrusion must be read as error and its impact downplayed. The novel would appear to take this stance by diminishing Byrne’s scribal role while signalling its presence. Kelly’s authorship, in contrast, is emphasised. A sympathetic instancing of Kelly’s authority would seem to take place when the narrator Kelly remarks of his younger self: “Now it is many years later I feel great pity for the boy who so readily believed this barefaced lie I stand above him and gaze down like the dead look down from Heaven” (Carey True History 135). Kelly paradoxically usurps the role of omniscient narrator, undermining the implied helplessness of the man to alter who or what he has become, whilst instancing contradictory elements to his character—a feature more apparent in the Letter through a less benign mixture of humour and bloodthirsty reckoning. This aggrandised perspective is sustained elsewhere, as noted by Laurie Clancy in terms of Kelly’s self-conscious dramatisation of events—although Kelly, in a

manner more consistent with the tone of the Letter, asserts his potency descriptively instead of performing it through narrative voice. This reveals Kelly’s omniscient perspective to be a feature of character and not simply a narrative strategy employed for the telling of the tale. In Clancy’s words:

Increasingly throughout the novel he sees himself to some extent as a performer or even as a playwright. Of the troopers Hare and Nicolson he says that though they ‘thought themselves famous as the capturers of Harry Power they never imagined they would be captives in a drama devised by me’. And again, ‘We could look down from the Warby Ranges and see the plumes of dust rising off the plains and know the police was actor in a drama writ by me’. (Clancy “Selective History” 55)

In being indicative of character, Kelly’s omniscience and his asserted omnipotence reveal themselves here to be qualitative features of the character’s voice. Thus, this quality, when it is taken up grammatically elsewhere, functions as both a determining feature of narrative voice and as an indication of character point of view. The resulting ambiguity brought about by the shift in mode from first to third person is thus resolved by reading narrative voice, as it is grammatically instanced, as performative of character: Ned Kelly is still speaking even though he has adopted a mode of speech that contradicts this grammatically by positioning himself outside his pre-defined subject position. In doing so, these digressions self-consciously perform objectivity. This is consistent with the persuasive object of the narrative, evident in the lines that open Kelly’s narrative: “I lost my own father at 12 yr. of age and know what it is to be raised on lies and silences my dear daughter you are presently too young to understand a word I write but this history is for you and will contain no single lie may I burn in Hell if I speak false” (Carey True History 5). The paternal tone of the narrator is significant here. With speech established at the outset as hyperbole, it becomes possible to read the novel’s assertions as reflecting the urgency, intensity, and desperation of a man whose softened perspective is implied in the task at hand (recounting and explaining his actions to his daughter).

This softening strategy, plus the toning down of Kelly’s voice as it appears in the Letter, means that identification becomes possible in a broader range of readers—sophisticated and unsophisticated alike. Paul Eggert, noting Carey’s explanation that he was comfortable with Ned Kelly’s patterns of speech, having once known people who spoke as the bushranger did, observes in turn that the idiom he encountered in his own
boyhood in Sydney is also potentially infused in Kelly’s voice as it is contained in the novel (Eggert “Bushranger’s Voice” 33). In saying as much, Eggert is possibly responding to a deep-seated anxiety about the occlusion of his own working-class background by an educated accent. Whatever the reason, Eggert’s recollection of his own childhood experiences validates Carey’s assertion that he knew people who spoke like this once; and Carey’s assertion links, via Eggert’s validation, the rural and urban working-class Australia of the 1950s and 60s to the rural underclass of the 1870s from which Kelly comes, while his successful integration of the Jerilderie Letter reinforces the connection and effectively states (as implicated in Eggert’s own identification): people spoke like this in Kelly’s time, they spoke this way in my childhood, and they probably speak this way still, somewhere out there, remote from the world I now inhabit.

**Identifying the specific within the generic: Natural and cultural voice**

The different values attached to natural voice as Rousseau meant to define it, and cultural voice as something akin to what Bakhtin identifies as heteroglossia, can be more clearly elaborated in relation to those elements of a novel that are not generally considered narrative components—at least not according to Genette’s system of classification, which identifies titles and chapter headings as paratextual. Genette considers these and a range of other incidental speech genres to be extraneous although relevant to the primary text. Paratexts arise both within the text as peritext, or outwith as epitext. In this way, a text and its paratexts might be closely intertwined and peritextual, or they might be “off” the text and outside the book (epitextual), existing as written documentation pertaining to its construction and reception, for example (Genette *Paratexts* 144). Whether entwined or en exergue, these textual elements and extraneous texts constitute paratexts because they are proximal and contiguous to the text, but not part of it:

> The criterion for distinguishing the epitext from the peritext […] is in theory purely spatial. The epitext is any paratextual element not materially appended to the text within the same volume but circulating, as it were, freely, in a virtually limitless physical and social space. The location of the epitext is therefore anywhere outside the book—but of course nothing precludes its later admission to the peritext. (Genette *Paratexts* 344)

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Here epigraphs and “intertitles” (chapter headings, for example) might appear in the book, but they are not part of the text—the text being that essential element around which everything that is not the text is organised:

More than a boundary or a sealed border, the paratext is, rather, a threshold [...] that offers the world at large the possibility of either stepping inside or turning back. It is an “undefined zone” between the inside and the outside, a zone without any hard and fast boundary on either the inward side (turned toward the text) or the outward side (turned toward the world’s discourse about the text), an edge, or, as Philippe Lejeune put it, “a fringe of the printed text which in reality controls one’s whole reading of the text.” Indeed, this fringe, always the conveyor of a commentary that is authorial or more or less legitimated by the author, constitutes a zone between text and off-text, a zone not only of transition but also of transaction: a privileged place of a pragmatics and a strategy, of an influence on the public, an influence that—whether well or poorly understood and achieved—is at the service of a better reception for the text and a more pertinent reading of it (more pertinent, of course, in the eyes of the author and his allies). (Genette Paratexts 1-2)

Though apparently unrelated—except through their common structure in terms of reasoning—Genette’s distinctions are of interest to the question of voice because the title, intertitle, and other internal elements that we might deem off the text, as Genette describes it, do not typically imply a locatable speaking subject; they are off the text, I would argue, because they are not voiced through the narrator or through any character—they are not expressed by narrative voice. Here, the grammatical indicators of a speaker—which determine narrative voice for the narratologists—do not create the same effect as that achieved in the narrative text. Something about the generic conventions that shape this kind of utterance holds back the inference that grammatical voice is natural voice—or presence, suggesting that the presumption of a specific speaking presence in the narrative text is a rhetorical convention. That the same convention is not sustained in the genre of the title (though it may be purposefully introduced by stylistic elements suggestive of personality and/or speech), tells us that the construction of presence is a primary determining factor of speech genre; but, rather than making a choice between representing presence or not (because the latter is not possible given that the trace of presence is inherent to speech because language will be
construed as the semiotic body whenever it is supplemented with meaning), the choice comes down to kinds of presence. We are talking of degrees of presence, in other words, and degrees of metaphorical contiguity—where contiguity is established through likening which accords (in spatialised terms) with adjacency in time.

A specific speaker is not presumed in the case of titles because titles and intertitles are neither taken to be the utterance of the novel’s narrator nor their author—whether real or implied—but operate categorically. Thus, presence as a trace within an utterance is not uniformly equal across speech genres. A speaker is not sought; locatability is not what voice indicates in these instances. Instead, it is a title’s cultural value that is established in the process of discerning its meaning by these terms. A sense of voice is paradoxically uncovered in “hindsight” (that is hindsight as a rhetorical stance rather than actually after the fact [of reading, in this case])—although not in terms of identifying a specific speaking presence. Titles indicate, rather than a speaking subject, the act of categorising in terms of the generic and qualitative features of voice as an expression of meaning rather than of person, or even of personality. Carey’s novel aptly demonstrates the paradoxical quality of a title “spoken” through cultural voice without actually indicating the presence of an identifiable speaker. In Eggert’s words:

Keneally’s *Complete Inner History of the Kelly Gang and their Pursuers* (1929) was the first sympathetic account of the bushranger. Drawing upon it, J. M. S. Davies’s “The Kellys Are Out: New Kelly Gang History” was serialized in November-December 1930 in the Melbourne *Herald*. Davies developed a more complete narrative dramatization. Whole slabs of dialogue are invented; and the Jerilderie Letter, published for the first time, fifty years after Kelly’s death, is nested into the history of which it is a part, cut up into heavily regularized and bowdlerized chunks of quotation, its text adjusted at will to suit the narrative context that Davies was providing. Davies did not allow himself to be hampered by what a later generation of scholarly editors would see as the historical witness of the document’s exact wording and presentation.

Carey knows that professional historians do not write like this any more. His *True History* is, in one sense, a self-conscious retrieval, a postmodern adaptation of this simpler attitude towards history-writing, of an earlier style of telling a “true story.” More obviously, it is a radical,
literary adaptation into the first person of—and an extended, imaginative
meditation on—the Jerilderie Letter itself. (Eggert “Bushranger’s Voice”
125)

Eggert’s reference to these and other titles throughout the article have the effect of
moving us through the “natural” evolution of the title as description to the title that
describes the novel in this instance. The title in each instance is not presented wholly as a
personal assertion—though it summarises the attitude of its chief narrator in the case of
True History and intimates the stance of its author in the other examples. Rather, every
title purports to stand for something more than a personal attitude; and this account of
titles preceding this novel’s own conveys a range of attitudes towards Kelly’s personal
account of the reasons for his bushranging—attitudes that Genette might locate
paratextually in newspaper reports and other documents of the time, but which Bakhtin
would situate, as Eggert does, within a generic conception of a particular class or group
of people whose way of life is somehow implicated in their speech.

This difference in styles of presence—ranging between generic and specific—is
of course rhetorically determined. But what specifically shapes the convention of
generalising as opposed to specifying a locatable presence? It comes down, I would
argue, to the rhetorical dimensions that are invoked. Narrative utilises all three rhetorical
dimensions, as Genette’s summary of its definition(s) will reveal.

**Structuralist Approaches to Voice and View**

Vladimir Propp uses the principle of organic morphology to describe the variance
apparent in texts which otherwise possess a deeper consonance in terms of structure.
This consonance fundamentally relates to the story structure within fairy tales; Propp
reduces characters, objects and events to their basic function by identifying individuals in
the role of giving or receiving and by determining the role of place by similar terms
(according to whether it serves as a destination or a point of departure, for example). He
identifies the ways in which the basic structure of the fairy tale is maintained while the
narrative detail is altered through various strategies, which include elaboration and
reduction. His argument revolves around a key dimension of thinking about narrative as
a series of events stimulated or affected by certain actants (characters) that have specific
functions.

Propp has been identified as a precursor to contemporary narratology (Duff)—a
methodology that strives to identify and delimit the narrative features and functions of
texts (novels are generally its focus). In terms of defining the eventfulness of narrative, Propp’s identification of the role of place has largely receded (in theory, though not in criticism) and the focus is now squarely on actants—which, we might say, has been extended to include enunciative actants such as narrators and implied authors. This extension is itself compelling, given that the narrative function—and speaking, in general—has become the central issue. The focus breaks down to consider questions of who is speaking, whose position is being represented, and how this position is represented. For example, is this position presented dramatically through dialogue, or diegetically through narrative as reported speech, or else indicated by visual or epistemic restriction of field, as in focalisation? Voice and point of view are entangled within these questions, and narratology (at least at its inception) devotes a great deal of time to insisting that point of view be located in relation to character, and voice be located in relation to the narrative function. It is a complicated argument that stretches across a range of theorists and, like Propp’s strategy, entails a process of reduction that often overlooks the contradictions that occur in literary works. Nonetheless, narratology offers important distinctions enabling us to identify the levels of speech in a narrative, which critics, following a perspective taken by theorists such as Todorov and Michel Pêcheux (see Pêcheux Language, Semantics, and Ideology 64), identify as embedded speech.

Embedded speech is an important feature of the novel, as Todorov emphasises. Novels demonstrate a complex layering of enunciative levels, which we might think of as beginning with the authorial construction of the text, moving through to different layers of narrative voice, characters’ speech embedded within the narrative voice and represented as dialogue or as reported speech/thought, or inflected in the narrator’s voice through free indirect style or discourse (FID). As well as the speech of others embedded in the narrator’s speech, characters’ thoughts and speech might embed the speech or actions of other characters by directly quoting, paraphrasing and reporting that speech, or by their thinking and speaking in a way that is reminiscent of other characters (borrowing their phrasing, ideas, sphere of interest). These layers might go even deeper, since they replicate patterns apparent in our own discursive experiences as well as those that have developed in more specialised discourses.

What this brief sketch of theory reveals is that the displacement of place has resulted in a separation of time and space whereby the temporal differences between speakers are used to demarcate abstract zones where speaking takes place. Worlds are of course definable within these speech events, but they are tellingly subordinated, revealing that narrative theory organised under a structuralist paradigm sees narrative as beginning with the narrative act: all elements of the narrative are thus subordinated to the structure that is discernible according to the nature of this event. It thus becomes important to determine not only who is speaking, but also questions of personality, often centring on matters of reliability. Conversely, Bakhtin’s theory of voice and viewpoint in the novel, because it relies on a different conceptualisation of voice—one that moves beyond grammar and linguistics—overcomes the hierarchies of embedding that narratology emphasises. Bakhtin’s approach to these aspects of experience in the novel enables the voices of other “speakers” to vie with the grammatically constructed implication of the narrator as a presence in the text. Such vying becomes inevitable when we view the discursive relations in narrative according to their full metaphorical import: the narrative becomes capable—through metaphoric voice and viewpoint—of moving through different representational phases of structure, meaning, and symbolic function.

Defining narrative

The body in the mind which Johnson identifies at work in a range of common expressions can thus be found in narrative theory, which frames the text (as semiotic body/form) within the enunciative act of a speaker (whereby the utterance supplies meaning as content). The speaker in such cases is—more often than not—personified. The personified narrator thereby becomes the body that speaks the text; and in speaking, the narrator produces both the content and form of the text. Genette demonstrates this reasoning when he defines narrative: “We currently use the word narrative,” he tells us, “without paying attention to, even at times without noticing, its ambiguity, and some of the difficulties of narratology are perhaps due to this confusion” (Genette Narrative Discourse [1972] 25). The confusion that Genette notes as ambiguity is the oscillation of narrative as a metaphor between the rhetorical dimensions of semiotic, semantic and syntagmatic meanings. Genette goes on to identify these meanings in the following terms:

The first meaning—the one nowadays most evident and most central in common usage—has narrative refer to the narrative statement, the oral or
written discourse that undertakes to tell of an event or series of events […]

A second meaning […] has narrative refer to the succession of events, real or fictitious, that are the subjects of this discourse, and to their several relations of linking, opposition, repetition, etc. “Analysis of narrative” in this sense means the study of a totality of actions and situations taken in themselves, without regard to the medium, linguistic or other, through which knowledge of that totality comes to us [...].

A third meaning […] has narrative refer to an event that is recounted, but the event that consists of someone recounting something: the act of narrating taken in itself. (Genette Narrative Discourse 25-26)

Stipulating the first meaning as “the narrative statement”—which is “the oral or written discourse that undertakes to tell of an event or series of events”—Genette’s first account involves a rhetorical stance that sees narrative in terms of its semiotic function. This is narrative as a sign operating on a level over and above the semiotic medium of language. What it signals is the telling of events through language—narrative supplements language with narrative significance: narrative is indicative of discourse having narrative content. This identification of the utterance with the relations it recounts predicates the rhetorical shift whereby these relations (of syntagmatic value) are also content (a semantic value) and that content itself becomes narrative in the second definition: narrative as “the succession of events.” The eventfulness of narrative is now the meaning of narrative, signalling an oscillation between the semiotic and semantic dimensions of rhetorical formulation. By the time we reach the third meaning, we have already been primed for oscillations to meaning, and it becomes easy to equate the act of narrating (a syntagmatic function) with the events and the statement it contains: the narrative events are in the narrative statement, and the narrative statement comes out of a narrative act. Narrative means narrating.

The speaker, implicated as the neglected literal medium in the first definition, thus becomes the metaphoric sign (is indicative) of narrative; oscillating back to literality, the speaker is now configured as the formal body containing the proto-narrative of mental discourse—the narrative of events (the second meaning) before it is narrated—by which the syntagmatic act of narrating is the compositional force that unites the speaker (form) with their speech (content). This relation of relating (the narrative act) thus defines narrative, for it binds the medium (speaker) with form (speech) and content (event).
With the speaker as medium and events as content, the rhetorical dimension of each shift so that medium becomes syntagmatic by its association (metonymic contiguity) with the act of speaking; and content is cast as semiotic—narrative is a sign that a narrator is present. This leaves room for meaning to be located elsewhere, which is what the third definition achieves. Narrative is the meaning that results from the union of speaker and event—hence, narrative is telling:

Without a narrating act, therefore, there is no statement, and sometimes even no narrative content. So it is surprising that until now the theory of narrative has been so little concerned with the problems of narrative enunciating, concentrating almost all its attention on the statement and its contents, as though it were completely secondary, for example, that the adventures of Ulysses should be recounted sometimes by Homer and sometimes by Ulysses himself. (Genette Narrative Discourse 26)

The speaker may now be construed as the primary element in this structuralist definition, making the question of who is speaking of prime importance in a structuralist account of narrative as discourse. Genette puts this fairly plainly himself, when he writes that narrative discourse “constantly implies a study of relationships: on the one hand the relationship between a discourse and the events that it recounts (narrative in its second meaning), on the other hand the relationship between the same discourse and the act that produces it, actually (Homer) or fictively (Ulysses) (narrative in its third meaning)” (Genette Narrative Discourse 27). Genette’s theory, founded as it is on the (empirical, though generalised) observation that narratives emanate from narrative acts, enables him to define narrative as the structured relations determined by the speaker. Genette’s definition (the third definition of narrative, as he describes it) thus moves through each rhetorical dimension: by being indicative of speech, by meaning narrating (the verb) rather than narrative (the noun), and by encompassing the complex interrelation of these three definitions. The disparity between what is being related here—the category mistake of identifying correspondences between the act of narrating and the textual object as a speech genre—is deferred indefinitely.

This is not to condemn Genette’s theory as impractical, but to highlight the diversity of meanings operating even within the constraints that he imposes upon narrative meaning. The rhetorical dimensions have simply been reorganised in relation to different compositional aspects of the definitions he supplies. Yet a dimensional
reorganisation of metaphoric meaning is potentially available on different terms—
possibly of infinite variety. Some of these will be more workable than others—it will
depend upon the artistic choices available to the writer within the broad context of the
enunciative field that correlates to the composed statements of narrative. This is because
narrative is a speech genre that entails the expression of eventfulness in terms of
embodiment. As a speech genre it refers to a totality of what is entailed, and what is
produced and producible: the constructed presence of speakers and addressees, whereby
speaking and seeing are the metaphoric attributes of embodied consciousness; of what is
seen (object and place) and what occurs in terms of embodiment (eventfulness); and the
varieties of other meanings that might be construed rhetorically from the basic
compositional elements of narrative, which I identify as the metaphors of voice, view,
setting, and event.

By arguing for a diversity of definitions, I am defining narrative in terms of
rhetorical genre theory. Admittedly, this diversity will result in a definition that is not
logically coherent (or sustainable in the way that narratology supplies a relatively stable
definition) because coherence is transient, rather than fixed, and depends upon finding
stable relations in a constantly transforming set of conceptual units. This entails the kinds
of shifts identified by Derrida in relation to the history of writing, whereby metaphors
are concretised, and literalities metaphorised. It is a definition, in short, that
acknowledges the oscillation that occurs between literal and metaphorical constructions,
between degrees of contiguity. This means that the definition is plural rather than
singular, and it is a plurality that is always potentially greater than two, since the degrees
of likeness are infinite. A working definition of narrative is helpful because it settles the
rhetorical oscillations into a comfortable range of variables, constraining what would
otherwise be unmanageable. But to insist upon a stable definition is to constrain the
metaphors of voice, view, setting, and event in terms that themselves become
unmanageable, for what results is the need for further constraint—as each component
has its own capacity for metaphoric oscillation—with each constraint serving the
meaning that sustains the coherence of the favoured rhetorical dimension (syntagmatic in
this case), and the subordination of the other rhetorical forms of meaning (semantic and
semiotic) to its overall scope. Yet the coherence that is sustained is merely
metaphorical—it is not the coherence of a discernible structure, though it seems very
much like this. At some point the metaphor of structure will fall down. Theory usually
stops short of this. It falls silent on its own flaws, and we cannot expect it to do
otherwise, for even when a theory gestures toward the criticism it anticipates, it is unlikely to go so far as to fall on its own sword. Every theorist is—like the student, Ivan Velikopolsky, of Chekhov’s story—seeking the social value of making meaning; critical interpretation, as Hirsch observes, depends upon consensus, and this dependence invariably reflects a social need—in terms that are either immediately pragmatic, or eventually so.132

The double-voiced quality of titles reveals that presence, when implicated through genre, is invoked via another layer of metaphoric construction over and above that of language. When voice and view, for example, are constructed at higher degrees of metaphoricity, the meaning that is constructed is not presence in a literal sense, but something metaphorically akin to presence and construed as expressiveness and opinion rather than the phonic voice and visual perception of an individual. A title, as a speech genre, subordinates this constructive effect of language (which is to implicate a locatable speaking presence) to the generically determined metaphors of voice and view, which construct presence in generalised rather than specific terms. Titles therefore mean something as much as they stand for the text they entitle. Their semantic function is complexly entailed in their generic status, which contemplates a diversity of rhetorical orderings—whereby the title might stand for the paraphrased thoughts of a character or narrator, which is at the same time the generalised view of the community into which it enters as a discursive practice as well as being the speech of the novel’s author. But neither is the title the specific utterance of any of these represented parties. Instead, it is a generic overview of each, and each guise lends its meaning to the other, enabling the title’s meaning to float free of any specific individual.

Similarly, narrative takes meaning from a specific text. But it is not a meaning that can be defined succinctly. Rather, narrative is the meaning that is formed through the integrated relations established in the text between the metaphors of voice, view, setting and event, relations which are necessary for the construction of subject, object, space and time. The novel may therefore be defined as a narrative that comprises and integrates a diversity of speech genres; the extent of this diversity determines the novel’s size, scope, and other attributes, which are then identifiable generically through the

132 Literary criticism relies upon concurrence of opinion, even as it disputes particular methods, analyses and interpretations; as Hirsch writes, “the practical goal of every genuine discipline is consensus.” Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation ix.
meanings they produce. What this means is that novels produce meanings that are formed in the same way as metaphors (by establishing likeness between their component parts), and these metaphors, if they are repeatable and transferrable, may themselves be utilised to form the larger units of meaning we call genres.

**The “units” of narrative**

Having defined narrative, Genette then identifies three determinations of narrative dealing with temporal relations, modalities of representation, and the act of narrating; each of these is identified in grammatical terms as, respectively, tense, mood and (narrative) voice:

- those dealing with temporal relations between narrative and story, which I will arrange under the heading of *tense*; those dealing with modalities (forms and degrees) of narrative “representation,” and thus with the *mood* of the narrative; and finally, those dealing with the way in which the narrating itself is implicated in the narrative, narrating in the sense in which I have defined it, that is, the narrative situation or its instance, and along with that its two protagonists: the narrator and his audience, real or implied. We might be tempted to set this third determination under the heading of “person,” but […] I prefer to adopt a term whose psychological connotations are less pronounced […] this term is *voice* […] for us *voice*, since it deals with the narrating, will refer to a relation with the subject (and more generally with the instance) of the enunciating […]

As we have seen, the three classes proposed here, which designate fields of study and determine the arrangement of the chapters that follow, do not overlap with but sort out in a more complex way the three categories defined earlier designating the levels of definition of narrative: *tense* and *mood* both operate at the level of connections between *story* and *narrative*, while *voice* designates the connections between both *narrating* and *narrative* and *narrating* and *story*. (Genette *Narrative Discourse* 31-32)

Genette thus sets up a structural relation between the determinations of narrative and narrative itself. Separating voice from story enables him to position voice as the mediator of those relations between narrative and story—because, presumably, a story needs to be told and a narrative must be narrated. There must be a speaker, in other words. Having eschewed terminology that suggests personification, Genette conveniently personifies the
narrative function here in order to keep the narrative voice distinct from character perspective, which he subsequently hives off under the grammatical category of mood:

This obviously is the function the Littré dictionary is referring to when it defines the grammatical meaning of mood: "name given to the different forms of the verb that are used to affirm more or less the thing in question, and to express… the different points of view from which the life or the action is looked at," and this definition on good authority is very valuable to us here. Indeed, one can tell more or tell less what one tells, and can tell it according to one point of view or another; and this capacity, and the modalities of its use, are precisely what our category of narrative mood aims at. […] “Distance” and “perspective,” thus provisionally designated and defined, are the two chief modalities of that regulation of narrative information that is mood […] (Genette Narrative Discourse 161-62)

Reducing these three determinations to their grammatical form has an interesting effect. Firstly, tense determines mood, according to “the different forms of the verb that are used to affirm more or less the thing in question.” Tense will therefore determine the temporal relations between narrated event and perspective. Secondly, modalities of representation, when reduced to grammatical mood, can only make sense when mood is defined as indicative of point of view, or perspective in the broader sense of the term as a metaphor for knowledge, opinion, and visual scope. Hence the visual metaphor represents aspects originating internally within a seeing subject as thought or feeling. When point of view refers to visual perception in a literal sense, as Genette will subsequently inform us, it can be understood by the narrator as effectively standing at the same point in the landscape as the character in question, focusing his/her attention in the same direction. This difference between employing the term metaphorically and using it in a near literal sense will enable Genette to distinguish between, what he calls, internal focalisation (“seeing” or perceiving events through a character’s thought and feeling) and external focalisation (seeing as a character sees). The two forms of focalisation thus entail different directional perspectives—either looking into character, or looking out from character, but never both at the same time. This effectively deprives

133 External focalisation is therefore unlikely to produce any grammatical wrinkles that might suggest a perspective other than the speaker's, but will merely entail, as Genette defines it, a narrowing of scope.
characters of self-expression in narrative terms, although they might speak through
dialogue and see when described as seeing. Characters are thus entirely subordinated to
the narrative function, which is personified in theory, even when not in narrative terms.

As the first element in Genette’s triad of narrative discourse, *tense* being the
grammatical determinant of mood and voice, does not itself (unlike mood and voice)
supply a category of person or subjectivity within narrative. Tense is determinative
insofar as *mood* is indicated when the syntax of some aspect of the utterance does not
correspond grammatically with the tense of the utterance as appropriate to the speaking
subject (the grammatical *voice*). Genette defines *tense* as a determination “dealing with
temporal relations between narrative and story,” but significantly and logically it also
operates at the level of syntax, not just in terms of the broader temporal organisation of
the story (Genette *Narrative Discourse* 31). What it determines are the categories of mood
and voice as these relate to: in the case of *mood*, “those [determinations] dealing with
modalities (forms and degrees) of narrative ‘representation’”; and in the case of *voice,*
“since it deals with the narrating,” it refers “to a relation with the subject (and more
generally with the instance) of the enunciating” (Genette *Narrative Discourse* 31-32).

In this way, Genette’s triad becomes a binary that collapses into a monad—two
possibilities open up in respect to questions of who is seeing and who is speaking the
storied elements of the narrative—with speaking alone being representative of the
narrative function. By the time Genette responded to the various criticisms addressed at
his theory of focalisation, the term had acquired widespread critical usage and was an
important descriptor of character perspective evident in a narrator’s speech.134
Nonetheless, Meike Bal takes a different approach to focalisation in detailing what she
calls secondary focalisation, which enables the focaliser to be a character—effectively
giving some narrative authority to character. But Genette does not believe it is possible
for two speakers to operate in the same utterance—whether metaphorically through view
or in more literal instances of voice. Perhaps this is because secondary focalisation comes
very close to placing the focalised subject in the position of being the subject of (at least
part of) the enunciation. This clearly was not Genette’s intention as he makes clear in the
sequel to *Narrative Discourse* (1972), *Narrative Discourse Revisited* (1983):

134 As Genette himself notes: “The distinction between the two questions ‘Who sees?’ (a question
of mood) and ‘Who speaks?’ (a question of voice) is generally accepted today, at least in
principle” Genette, *Revisited* 64.
For me, there is no focalizing or focalized character: focalized can be applied only to the narrative itself, and if focalizer applied to anyone, it could only be the person who focalizes the narrative—that is, the narrator, or, if one wanted to go outside the conventions of fiction, the author himself, who delegates (or does not delegate) to the narrator his power of focalizing or not focalizing. (Genette *Narrative Discourse Revisited* 73)

It would be hard to find a clearer expression of Genette’s personification of the narrative function than this. This attitude is implicated elsewhere: “I do see that a narrative may mention a glance that perceives another glance,” he writes, “but I do not believe the focus of the narrative can be at two points simultaneously” (Genette *Narrative Discourse Revisited* 76-77). A character cannot focalise because someone else has got there first, it seems. The seat is already occupied by the personification that Genette has already effectively acknowledged as unconscionable. As Genette explains in response to Bal’s extension to his theory, focalisation is a narrative term; hence, any instances of what Bal terms “secondary focalisation” ought to be called perception, intuition, imagination, etc. Focalisation is narrative perception, not character perception (Genette *Narrative Discourse Revisited* 76-77). Characters, in other words, cannot author themselves or their experiences in the way permitted by Bal. In Genette’s words:

The distinction between the two questions “Who sees?” (a question of mood) and “Who speaks?” (a question of voice) is generally accepted today, at least in principle. [...] There would have been no point in taking great pains to replace point of view with focalization if I was only going to fall right back into the same old rut; so obviously we must replace who sees? with the broader question of who perceives? [...] So perhaps it would be better to ask, in a more neutral way, where is the focus of perception? —and this focus may or may not [...] be embodied in character. (Genette *Narrative Discourse Revisited* 64)

Genette’s earlier disavowal of personifying terms makes good theoretical sense, and yet his strategy contradicts his stated intention. Narrative theory (and Genette’s *Paratexts* [1987] might be included here) addresses the problem of narratorless sections in a novel by identifying other roles (like that of the arranger and the implied author). Peter Carey’s *True History of the Kelly Gang* presents precisely this kind of problem because it
begins with fictive paratextual material—through the speech genres of archive and
newspaper reportage—and in doing so introduces a range of speakers but no narrator, in
Genette’s terms, in respect to the novel. A personified homodiegetic narrator of the
novel is not instanced until the first-person account that opens the declared contents of
the first archival parcel. With the speaker of this section styled as the bushranger, Ned
Kelly, it might be presumed that the narrative begins here. But of course, it begins with
the fictive paratexts that occur on the unnumbered pages that precede it. These fictive
paratexts can be said to have narratives of their own and identifiable subjectivities that
narrate these, but they also supply important information and are part of the story—
although their integration is not fully entailed until the closing sequence, which
effectively explains their relevance. Whereas it is clear that the authors of the journalistic
writing and archival records do not perform the function of narrating the narrative of the
novel, as inserted speech genres, it cannot be said that these paratexts are embedded
within the speech of a personified unifying other. The novel at this point lacks a narrator.

The author’s function is of course to construct a narrative that conveys
subjectivities other than his or her own (even if this includes an implied author), and this
entails the construction of other speakers. In constructing those speakers, embedded
speech will operate in some—but not necessarily all—elements of the narrative. It is not
necessary to enfold all speech—and every voice, by implication—within the overarching
speech of a narrator. Yet Genette’s definition leads him to construct his theory on this
basis—he cannot do otherwise, though he may claim a versatility that the constraints of
his definition do not logically permit. A narrator’s seeing and speaking must be integrated
with the seeing and speaking of characters (or, where there is no overarching narrator,
then the speech acts of characters must refer and respond to one another) if the narrative
is to succeed and be more than a collection of represented speech acts. This integration
takes place in a number of ways—one of which Genette has located in focalisation. The
effect of focalisation is to allow a shift in perspective from a speaking narrator to a
character and back again—and to do so in a way that enables the separation of those
sensory functions of seeing and speaking so that the view of one character might be
integrated with the speech of another (that other being the narrator) or the speech of one
responsively entailed in the other’s point of view—which is possible between any
subjectivity, speech genre, or speech situation.

In changing the point of view, it is always possible that there will be a change in
speakers, or that there will be moments of ambiguity, when voices merge (as in FID).
When this happens, the spatiotemporality of the narrating event and that of the character’s voicing of her response to an event within the narrative become entwined, enabling the reader’s involvement in two subjectivities at once, as an effect of grammatical mood being oriented to someone other than the speaker:

An abbey!—yes, it was delightful to be really in an abbey!—but she doubted, as she looked round the room, whether anything within her observation, would have given her the consciousness. The furniture was in all the profusion and elegance of modern taste. (Austen *Northanger Abbey* 178, emphasis added)\(^\text{135}\)

An approach that insists less upon the constancy of narrative voice would enable a reading of the italicised phrasing as “spoken” by Catherine herself, well after the event of being in the abbey. In other words, a shift in speaker is signalled—but metaphorically rather than in grammatical terms—indicating a character in the act of reflecting upon her past self. With this view, the novel might be read as the interplay of different metaphorical voices, which are instanced grammatically or by other means. At the same time, by being included within a narrative, this metaphoric voicing of perspective functions as narrative, which requires (for the sake of coherence) that the thought be situated within the experience of Catherine at the moment when she entered the abbey. In this way, Catherine’s subjectivity is complexly naïve and self-reflective—she seems to relish the excitement and mock herself at the same time. The narrative function remains intact, but the relation between the narrative as the utterance of a *personified* narrator is momentarily broken; what comes across instead is the organisation of a character’s thoughts in which that character (as a subjectivity) is both present in (and in immediate relation to) her past, surveying herself with ironic awareness from a future perspective—a perspective that is at once present to the reader. This construction of thought mimics thought as we know it of ourselves when we reminisce: it becomes possible (sometimes through scent, for example) to evoke in one’s memory the sense of being present in that past and at the same time hold an awareness of oneself as the person who remembers. Narrative instances such as these, although they convey ironic awareness, have, for this reason, a rhetorical quality that confers a certain tenderness of perception: “what a dear fool I was!” it seems to say.

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Catherine’s speech at this moment is therefore nostalgically constructed: it breaks
the narrative mode to reproduce the everyday speech style of nostalgia. What we have
here is a shift in speech genres: although it remains coherently integrated within the
narrated events that constitute the narrative as a composition, the dominant discursive
style shifts from narrative to nostalgia. That its nostalgic quality is not immediately
apparent is a consequence of its incorporation and modification in the literary text, which
requires that it reproduce the remembered moment for the reader who otherwise has no
memory of the event to reconstruct. This transformation of narrative offers even greater
inroads into establishing the coherence of a narratorless narrative. Moments like these in
the narrative are evidence of the novel’s integrated aspect as the speech of unified
speaker (who might admittedly be more than one person), with that speaker being the
unified subjectivity that is constructed by the author (or authors) for the purposes of
authoring the work. We personify this speaker as the narrator, but sometimes what we
have is not so much a narrator as a person of flesh and blood stepping into the mindset
of someone who is seeing the events of a past time unfolding. Authoring, that is, entails
making a character of one’s perceptual function (personifying that aspect of oneself that
sees and interprets) in order that the vocal function might adopt the separate subjectivity
of a speaker who “perceives” the subject of the visual experience and regards him/her in
“objective” terms. That speaker, through their authority as speaker, adopts the perceptual
authority of the subjectivity that sees and knows, but the demarcation is always evident—
and indeed necessary—because it is only by separating the functions of speaking and
seeing that any subjectivity is created: the dialectic of matched and mismatched meanings
that are generated through this process produces (and enables) the dialogic interplay of
voice and view that mimics our internal experience of being a single subjectivity capable
of questioning what she sees, feels and “knows.”

This complex entanglement of the subject of a visual experience being the object
of a speaker’s “perception,” as well as the subject of the narrative overall, enables the
reader’s engagement in several perceptual positions at once. If reading comprehension
can be said to involve moving through the different situations of speech and address,
then comprehending bodily experiences beyond the enunciative function might also be
entailed. It follows, for example, that these other positions might involve seeing and
being seen, acting and being acted upon. In the same way, that is, that speech entails
both the speaker’s and the addressee’s positions, viewing and acting entail rhetorically
constructed subjects and objects. Engagement with these different positions requires
shifts between subject and object positions—with these shifts being directed according to the oscillating values of the primary metaphors of voice and view—thus sustaining a range of impressions relating to object and event (or form and content as opposed to function), which is represented as both voice and voicing, or seeing and being seen.

Genette’s theory of focalisation, and of narrative discourse more broadly, is a centripetal system centring on the authority of a unified speaker. It relies upon the constructed presence of a speaking subject, and as such is formulated upon a metaphoric instantiation of voice. It is as though Genette is thinking in terms of voice as it occurs in a phenomenal sense. Yet metaphoric and ontological conceptions of voice both rest on the belief that voice exists independently of speech and is indicative of a (speaking) presence. The relevance of this will be apparent later in this chapter when we discuss Derrida and voice; for now, it supplies a basis on which to counteract Genette’s centripetal reasoning with a Bakhtinian approach to voice—an approach that steps outside the limitations of an enclosed analysis based around grammar and syntax to acknowledge the social nature of the utterance: in doing so Bakhtin’s approach situates voice and view within the oscillating contexts of the intersubjective experience of the narrative (as the story [told] of) a series of events.136

The problem remains of disentangling narrative as story from narrative as a modality of speech. This confusion is no doubt in part responsible for the ubiquity of

136 The novel, for Bakhtin, is dialogic, and dialogised speech is speech that incorporates, through its responsive understanding, the social forces determining it as a discursive formation. Dialogised speech, therefore, does more than attend to the enunciative function. As Tony Crowley expresses it: “The conflict of opposing tendencies is characterised by Bakhtin as the perpetual dialogic struggle between centripetal forces whose aim is to centralise and unify, and centrifugal forces whose purpose is to decentralise. The crucial point is that in their struggle the relations between such forces will differ in their forms and effects at different historical periods. At one time, and under specific historical conditions, centripetal forces will organise a certain form of discourse as the centralised, unified, authoritative form, and thus monoglossia and monologism will be effected. At another the centrifugal forces will be victorious and any such attempts at unity will become impossible. All forms of discourse and representations of language become dialogised in this process as effects whose forms are created by the particular historical arrangements of the opposed forces at any one time.” Tony Crowley, “Bakhtin and the History of Language,” *Bakhtin and Cultural Theory*, eds. Ken Hirschkop and David Shepard, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001) 182-83.
“narrative” as a term in contexts that at first glance do not seem to convey a story or speak as if to tell one. Marie-Laure Ryan takes issue with the widespread use of the term narrative across a range of discourses where it is used euphemistically to encapsulate an ambiguous attitude to the described subject:

Whether it is due to the postmodern loss of faith in the possibility of achieving truth or knowledge, or to current interest in the functioning of the mind, the current tendency to dissolve ‘narrative’ into ‘belief’, ‘value’, ‘experience’, ‘interpretation’, ‘thought’, ‘explanation’, ‘representation’, or simply ‘content’ challenges narratologists to work out a definition that distinguishes literal from metaphorical uses. Neither bowing to current fashion nor acting like a semantic police, this definition should prevent the inflation of the term from getting out of hand, but it should also help us understand the mechanisms of this inflation by disclosing the genealogy of the metaphorical uses. (Ryan “Toward a Definition of Narrative” 22-23)\(^{137}\)

With a rhetorical flourish that implicates her own theory of discourse as “current” and all others as anachronistic, Ryan offers some examples of “[p]revious definitions of narrative” by Genette, Gerald Prince, H. Porter Abbott, Paul Ricoeur and Peter Brooks, which mostly centre around notions of event and temporality. A more detailed analysis reveals change, causation, and subjective experience to be relevant. Ryan’s definition is too lengthy to quote here. To summarise, narrative must have a spatial, temporal, mental, and formal/pragmatic dimension. That is, narrative must present elements identifiable with, or corresponding to, subjectivity, and a world existing in space and time (see Ryan 29).

Ryan attempts to untangle the question of narrative by addressing its semiotic status; she tells us that “[s]yntax is the most problematic area for a definition of narrative, because the concept applies only to semiotic systems with clearly definable units that combine into larger linear sequences according to precise rules. But there is no such thing as clearly definable ‘narrative units’ comparable to the words or phonemes of language” (Ryan “Toward” 24). This is a rather sweeping statement that makes no attempt to understand itself but simply presumes that there is nothing as comparably

ubiquitous as the word or the phoneme at the semiotic level on which narrative operates. If we were to question this assertion, we might begin by, firstly, addressing the question of where narrative takes place. If it is relatable to a semiotic system, then clearly, narrative has a semantic value: it is a form of meaning making. This is not the kind of meaning invoked through words and language alone, but would seem to operate in addition to, and at some remove from, linguistic meaning. What kind of meaning does narrative make, then? Given what we know of meaning as it is structured beyond the semantic relations of words, in those terms that Jakobson describes, is it possible that narrative takes place on the same abstract level as metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, etc.? Is it not possible, that is, that these elusive (non-existent) narrative units are the metaphoric elements at work in discourse? Might narrative comprise those metaphoric relations between the meaning units of language (words and phonemes) and the phenomenal world—those relations responsible for the enactment of language in speech? Might we define narrative as that meaning conveyed through integrated relations of subjective and objective being in time and space—or, to put it another way, define narrative as the integrated meaning of metaphoric voice, view, setting, and event? If so, then narrative can be said to supply the meaning that results from a represented perspective (or perspectives) on an embodied engagement with the world. The units of narrative are the four metaphors that enable the construction of subjectivity, space and time: voice, view, setting, and event. These metaphors might of course be known by other terms, but they are nonetheless recognisable enough as I specify them here.

The importance of space and time and of subjective experience is evident even in Ryan’s highly wrought rhetoric of the scientific element at work in narratology. She writes, for example:

To make this text [a recipe for custard] into a story it would be necessary to imagine individuated participants, for instance a chef as agent and the patrons of his restaurant as beneficiary, give the agent a particular goal (acquire a third Michelin star), and assume that the events happened only once, instead of being endlessly repeatable. Conversely, to read a story as a set of instructions, for instance the episode in *The Odyssey* that describes, step by step, how Odysseus builds a boat to escape from Calypso’s island, you would have to ignore Odysseus and his goal (return to Ithaca), and extract from the description of particular events a protocol that can be
performed over and over again, with you or me or anybody else in the role of agent. (Ryan “Toward” 25-26)

In other words, narrative depends upon the experience of a subjective being whose experience of embodiment is characterised in relation to specific details of space and time, which are specifically enacted as event. Or, to put it more simply: the metaphors of embodiment that cast our experience of being in the world in relatable terms form the constituent components of any narrative: narrative, as a form of meaning, can be said to occur when meaning is conveyed via a representation of voice, view, setting, and event in integrated relation to one another.

The integral relatedness of these four metaphors, I would argue, must be instanced in order for narrative to arise. To demonstrate this, I will use an example supplied by Ryan, which she argues is not narrative according to her definition:

The universe started out as cold and essentially infinite in spatial extent. Then an instability kicked in, driving every point in the universe to rush rapidly away from every other. This caused space to become increasingly curved and resulted in a dynamic increase of temperature and energy density. After some time, a millimetre-sized three-dimensional region within this vast expanse created a superhot and dense patch. The expansion of this patch can account for the whole of the universe with which we are now familiar. (Ryan “Toward” 31)

Ryan opens her essay with a complaint about the metaphoric use of narrative—she seeks a literal usage. These metaphorical narratives (Lyotard’s Grand Narratives, for example [Ryan “Toward” 30]) operate at some remove from the primary metaphors of embodiment. Narrative, I argue, is the consequence of these metaphors being brought together as a unity. In the passage above, voice functions as a style of speech that encompasses both scientific empiricism and a relaxed, matter-of-fact self-evident knowledge: we have a speaker with a rhetorical tone of everyday-knowledge-meets-scientific-research. In this text, view is located in description, with the viewer being the addressee—in this case, the reader who is invited to see the universe forming before her eyes, in the same way that an artistic discourse invites the reader to visualise the flower or the leaf or scene that it describes. Space and time are accounted for in the setting of outer space and the event of cosmic change. All four metaphors are in place, but the relation between voice and view is distinct: voice instructs the view. Integration therefore
takes place between subjectivities in an act of communication, rather than within a single subjectivity that sees and speaks in the way that a character in a story sees and speaks.

This distinction between voice and view is the mark of description. It presents a certain type of narrative. That it arises in the context of a scientific discourse and is hypothetical (as opposed to arising in a novel and being fictional or fictionalised) does not make it any less a narrative. The integrated meaning of embodiment in time and space is nonetheless conveyed, but embodiment takes shape as a relation of address—the integrated relation between the metaphors of voice and view occurs as an act of communication. That is, in Bakhtinian terms, these metaphors are operating as the implicated subjectivities generated by the dialogic relation: as addressivity between speakers. Here, view entails comprehending—what Bakhtin calls responsive understanding—and this view is implicated in the speaker’s position, which presumes the audience’s interest and capacity to understand complex meaning conveyed in these rhetorical terms.138

To further our definition: narrative is itself a speech genre—one that takes on certain qualities according to the ways in which the metaphors of embodiment in the world establish an integral relation. The recipe that Ryan cites can nonetheless be taken as narrative—a narrative that generalises subjectivity to the point where it becomes completely open: the subjectivities generated by both voice and view acquire this quality; as do space and time—setting and event—insofar as these take on a completely open and generic value: the setting can be anywhere that makes it possible for you to perform these actions; the time is the time it takes you to complete them. Narratives like these that are entirely generic supply a schema into which other content might be inserted. Hence, the speech genre of the recipe offers a repeatable format that organises its subject and object relations according to the framework supplied by second-person narratives, whereby subject and event are described in terms that position them outside the narrative text. In other words, a recipe still supplies the basic elements of narrative, since recipes are constructed around the second person, even though grammatical person is rarely given. The difference between fictional narratives that employ the second person and

138 Note, for example, Bakhtin in the essay on speech genres: “we do not understand the meaning of a given word simply as a word of a language; rather, we assume an active responsive position with respect to it (sympathy, agreement or disagreement, stimulus to action).” Bakhtin, Speech Genres 86.
instructional texts like recipes is that, in the case of a recipe, the eventfulness of narrative is contingent, whereas in a work of fiction the convention is to accept the projected event as hypothetically given:

Let me give you a very rough idea of the territory it is not an easy bit of land to learn so 1st I will give you a simple picture you must imagine a great wedge of pie with a high ridge around its outer crust they call that ridge the Great Dividing Range. (Carey True History 71)

Carey’s text locates a specific place, whereas a recipe does not. But the same generalisation of space and time can be found in other fictional works—the opening to Italo Calvino’s If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler supplies an example of this. As with the implications of space and time in a recipe, these locations and events of being are positioned as your time and space: you implicitly cook in your time and place, and—as Calvino would have it in explicit terms—“you” also read from your own time and place (whether at the beach or in an armchair, as he attempts to characterise it). The versatility of narrative in this respect answers the question that Ryan poses but it does not answer the question of how it is possible for narrative to proliferate as a metaphor or euphemism for other speech genres. The answer is that each of the speech genres Ryan identifies—“belief’, ‘value’, ‘experience’, ‘interpretation’, ‘thought’, ‘explanation’, ‘representation’, or simply ‘content’”—is potentially like a narrative. Narrative is a kind of meaning: it is rhetorical and as such it is meaning operating on a level above the semantic value of language; it is meaning that makes use of the metaphoric values built around our experiences of embodiment in time and space to produce the sense of eventfulness. Any of these terms where these involve expressions of eventfulness might therefore be metaphorically narrative—and they might also be narrative in formal terms if they entail expressions of embodiment that result in eventfulness. Further, if the event occurs within the narrative, then we have a narrative text; if it is situated outside the text, then we have a narrative act (the act of narrating).

Daniel Just tells us that, in the 1980s, the post/structuralist Jonathan Culler “claimed that narratology should replace genre theory in order to allow critics to accommodate the contemporary experience of literature as non-generic.” “It is,” Just writes, “the success of the argument presented by Culler that explains why in the past thirty years there has been more talk about narrative modes than genres” (Just “The Modern Novel” 390). Whereas genre theory may have once (and long ago) insisted upon
a rigid observance of the strictures of kind, in contemporary theory it now supplies the versatility missing from certain branches of narratology. Genette’s species of seeing in the novel is a useful trope but we reach the limits of sense when we try to push the metaphor too far by limiting perception and voice in this way. And when we reach those limits, concentrated as they are around the central principle of a unified speaking subject—limits which are, in Bakhtinian terms, centripetal—the consequence must surely be to turn things around. This is certainly the route the novel has taken. Genette’s theory—though he targets modernist texts by authors such as Proust—relies upon the centripetal unity of a narrator (in relation to specific utterances, if not over the entire novel). But Just's analysis of the modernist novel suggests that these authors were introducing centrifugal dispersals of the novel's former coherence of person, form, and event by constructing texts that self-consciously exposed the variety of speech genres on offer to the modernist novelist; it is not surprising therefore that lists, recipes, and other unconventional speech genres have entered the narratives of novels; James Joyce is exemplary of this strategy in modernist texts:

[The nineteenth-century novelist’s] experiments with language, tenor, and plot revealed that the limits of the novel were expandable, and that its self-confrontations grew organically from its need to demonstrate its ability to appease contradictions.

Indeed, much more substantial trials were yet to come. The Modernist use of interior monologue, intrusions of involuntary memory, and depictions of a numb self-enclosure, together with a formal fragmentation of the plot and a parody of the Western canon, all presented open challenges to the principles governing the nineteenth-century novel. The new stylistic devices of Joyce, Proust, and Mann depicted characters with rich interior lives and complex ties to other characters and events, thereby triggering a swift transformation of the previous way of representing personhood. But despite the breakdown these characters now had to undergo, the notion of the individual remained a formative principle even for these novelists. Although Leopold Bloom, Marcel, and Adrian Leverkühn were, as personalities, exposed to uncontrollable disturbances of their psychological cohesion—their unruly mental processes showed that they were not self-coinciding subjects in complete self-control—it is paradoxically the very attention devoted to the minute descriptions of
their self-fragmentation that attests to the fact that the individual as a concept determining the form of storytelling was far from left behind. (Just “The Modern Novel” 385-86)

It would seem that the impulse to locate a subject is very strong. We should not be surprised that narrative theory aims to achieve this. What I would urge, however, is an awareness and acceptance of the fragmentations possible—of breaks in coherence in relation to the enunciative function—such that the narrative act might not be locatable in an identical (if unidentified) speaker, but might at times metaphorically disperse and be, in representational terms, absent.

Culler considers that the “essence of literature is not representation, not a communicative transparency, but an opacity, a resistance to recuperation which exercises sensibility and intelligence” (Culler “Toward” 258). The text must leave room for the reader to appreciate her own creativity in reading, and the “job of literary theory is to specify the forms of this game” whereby a reader is herself a player involved in “the procedures used to defer meaning, and the procedures of recuperation” (258). Metaphor, as Culler defines it, becomes the perfect tool of such a game: “the force and interest of a metaphor is proportional to the distance that separates its two terms” (260). Although he does not apply this definition to the “game” of genre itself, Culler’s own theorising about non-genre literature would seem to fit within the field of rhetorical genre theory, which sees genre as a semiotic system for generating meaning—meanings that are not simply communicative but interpretative, and in being so are necessarily ambiguous and not fully defined.

The point of this might be comprehended more clearly by returning to the novel discussed earlier in this chapter. Richard Aczel argues that voice’s problematic staging of presence, as he summarizes Derrida, is also written into concepts like dialogism and heteroglossia (Aczel, “Commentary” 705),139 and this might be said to account for the generic aspect of personal expression locatable in idiosyncratic patterns of speech like that conveyed in True History and the Jerilderie Letter. The performative nature of the narrative voice in light of the shift in person, together with its effectiveness as a voice representative of a certain social class, therefore, complicates its status as the voice of a specific individual. What is achieved is a broader identification than Kelly’s own voice

might permit—one that goes beyond the rural underclass of the late nineteenth century and extends to working-class Australia, past and present, as it turns out. And whereas the Jerilderie Letter, with its condensed narrative, swerving from violent threats to lengthy explanation and self-vindicating excuses, is less likely to encourage identification in the reader, the composite nature of Kelly’s voice (softened as it is by the inclusion of other tones) enables this in the novel. This is where it becomes possible to comprehend how the performative nature of voice in speech entails its nonpresence, for the generalised sense of a social group is clearly constructed as a presence that occludes its own absence by performing the cultural attributes of that mutable and heterogeneous cultural group.

Nonetheless, the term “cultural voice,” though convenient, does not merely specify these broad demarcations. Cultural voice, as I mean the term, derives from distinctions drawn by Derrida in his analysis of Rousseau’s search for “natural voice” in the section of Of Grammatology entitled “Nature, Culture, Writing.” Derrida does not employ the term cultural voice specifically, but instances it in negative terms when he identifies Rousseau’s conception of natural voice as voice in an originary pre-cultural sense. Both natural voice and cultural voice are metaphors employed to delineate certain qualities of voice as it is “conveyed” in speech. Natural voice, for Rousseau, is presence: it has no meaning and no other entailments; and it is originary insofar as it does nothing more than announce this primordial truth. Derrida’s explication in Of Grammatology and elsewhere reveals that natural voice is perceived as extricable from those features I gather under the term cultural voice—the latter being the accretion of culturally derived distortions that overwrite natural voice, which must of course include language itself. It is presumed, on this basis, that those qualitative features irrelevant to the indicative function are distinguishable from natural voice as presence; and this presumption would appear to be reproduced in narratological distinctions of voice where the speaker is identified as the person who is grammatically instanced and logically entailed in the performance of the enunciative act.

The reasoning that presumes the existence of voice in a natural state—free of cultural attributes like language—necessarily takes all other features in terms of vocal and semantic quality as supplementary to voice itself. As supplementarities they obscure the original pre-cultural voice, and yet, as Derrida reveals, this primordial voice exists in speech as nothing more than the trace of its presence—it is not a presence but an absence. The addition of meaning in the form of attributes of cultural voice (language, tone, and other qualitative features), therefore supplements an absence or a lack, rather
than a real object, revealing that “natural voice” as it is conceived in these terms is an abstraction founded on a system of proliferating metaphors that stand outside the object that is sought, whilst paradoxically being carried by it in speech. In other words, voice as it is perceived in speech is a construction: I perform my voice whenever I speak by writing its presence into my speech. The voice in speech is wholly (self) reflexive and it exists in no other form than this gesture of insistence. As Donald Wesling and Tadeusz Slawek write: “Turning voice into script does not make the vocal vanish; rather it creates its nervous proliferation. The speaking voice multiplies its productivity to present a convincing argument for its own existence, to get out of the ‘pit of inexistence,’ and to cover up traces of its transgressive activities” (Wesling and Slawek *Literary Voice* 158-59).140

Natural and cultural voice encompass that proliferation of metaphors by which we attempt to write voice into the utterance itself and give meaning to the otherwise “inarticulate cry” of natural voice (Derrida, *Of Grammatology* 166). Derrida uses a metaphor to describe this proliferation when he writes in *Speech and Phenomena* of “the broad daylight of presence, outside the gallery” of which “no perception is given us or assuredly promised us” (Derrida *Speech and Phenomena* 104). Here the gallery stands for those metaphors and other conceptual material that make up our conception of voice. Voice itself is the world outside the gallery in which the meaning is contained and which is metaphorised in the artwork: just as the world is represented in a painting, but is not the painting itself, so voice is represented in speech but is not speech itself. So too speech is in voice, as the painting is in the world; and in being in the world it is inextricably tied, through its meanings, to that world, and incapable of existing without it.

The paradox of voice occluding its absence in phonic terms by performing its presence metaphorically in speech is pertinent here because it demonstrates distinctions made in terms of literary voice that affect our reading of a text. These distinctions are significant beyond the domain of literary theory, informing readers more generally, but they are also neatly demarcated in critical interpretation. Importantly, “[t]he subject of the enunciation is […] ‘always a construction of the receiver, not the grammatical subject of the utterance’” (Coste 167, cited in Aczel “Hearing Voices” 475).141 In other words,


the speaker stands outside the speech act, but the content of the utterance sustains the inference of presence—in the same way that phonic voice is inferred from the qualitative features of speech correlating to the aural-meanings derived from sound. The problematic function of the trace marking the presence of something that is absent—constructing presence within the utterance itself—becomes apparent when numerous speakers seem to be available in relation to the same speech act. For narratologists and literary theorists more generally, character point of view functions to resolve the confusion of other speakers being implicated in the narrative by positioning these within a different space and/or time to the utterance in which they are embedded—in the same way, for example, that reported speech logically entails citation.

The rules of language presume the inalienability of a voice from its utterer, and though these rules countenance acts of expression that might distance the one from the other (such as paraphrase, citation, dramatic performance, etc), speech and writing are nonetheless organised around spatiotemporal assumptions of causation—in other words, the causal chain between speaker and voice is to be found in the grammatical, syntactical and speech conventions that enable the paraphrasing, citation, and the embedding of another’s speech. With the assumption of presence built into the rules of grammar, logic and rhetoric that determine our competence as users of language, every reader can be said to tacitly accept absence as presence. It is not surprising therefore that the same paradigm might be found, as Derrida identifies, in theoretical frameworks that incorporate, as relevant, notions of voice, speech and utterance. Genette, for example, proposes three categories (“time of the narrating, narrative level, and person”) which are designed to locate the narrator in terms of time, space and person: in other words, to pinpoint the speaker at the moment of speaking—to locate the narrator within his or her fictional space and temporal perspective relative to the story (Genette, Narrative Discourse 216). This is location in relation to the act of enunciation, as distinct from speech being historically, geographically, and culturally localised.

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142 See, for example, Derrida’s analysis of phenomenology as underpinned by the theoretical structure of its not being metaphysics, which it casts as a form of not-being in a wider sense in terms of its condition as nonpresence—as though, like natural voice to cultural voice, it was the originary seed of phenomenology without itself being phenomenological. Derrida, Speech and Phenomena 6-7.
Given that speech logically entails a single speaker, polyphony must be located and vested in the narrative voice because it threatens to destabilise the narrating speaker’s presence by introducing the spatiotemporalities of other speakers that differ from that of the narrative act. The third-person section of the Jerilderie Letter must thus be reconciled with the first-person speaker, and this might be achieved by viewing it as a stylised expression of objectivity. That is, except as error, Byrne’s perspective is not grammatically entailed, even though it may be historically instanced. The generic boundaries of the letter insist upon such reconciliations, but shifted into the genre of the novel, the potential for other speakers is activated, even when grammatical person is not an issue, as when, for example, the heteroglossia of Catholicism infiltrates Kelly’s narrative in his remark that Harry Power “went out into the bush I heard him cry every foul word you could imagine thus must the outcast cry in Hell” (Carey True History 78). The jarring pronouncement seemingly activates a speaker from a different conceptual space—conjuring a priest whose voice is activated in the remembered phrasing. The genre of the letter, however, would lodge this more squarely within the personality of its speaker, eliding the layering of space and time otherwise apparent in the novel. In this way, the novel potentially implicates different spatiotemporalities through the investment and deferral of voices that are represented as being no longer present; and narrative voice is the means by which the confusion of these different cultural voices is resolved.

The indeterminacy of free indirect discourse is overcome by viewing those aspects of speech grammatically inconsistent with narrative voice as representative of subjectivity rather than subject position, with the anomaly of the implied subject position submerged in the narrator’s empathic mind-reading: in this way, narrators are seen to enter into the subjectivities of character, informing and enhancing their own speech with the visual, emotional and intellectual perspective of the character. Character voice, when it operates outside spatiotemporal norms, thereby becomes point of view in both the literal and metaphorical sense. It is because voice in its broader terms comprises variable grammatical and qualitative features (as opposed to the more stable presumptions that attach to grammatical person), that narrative voice must be narrowed to the narrative function and emptied of all other meanings. This is necessary in order to overcome the potentially deceptive nature of inflected speech in the same way that Rousseau’s natural voice is voice without language or meaning. Narrative voice traces in fact a nonpresence: it is an empty category that must be filled with a speaking presence through the addition of (aurally defined) meanings—those same inflections to speech that have the potential
to implicate subject positions other than the narrator’s in connection with the narrative function—hence the problematic dispersal of voices as these imply and numerate subject positions obliquely or remotely consistent with enunciation.

The vulnerability of narrative voice as an isolated measure of presence can be found in those shifts in person taking place in *True History*. These might be suggestive of self-aggrandisement, as I have already asserted; but they also arguably serve as marks of psychological trauma by representing—without performing—a shift in tone. It is significant that Kelly’s speaking position shifts when he details his travels with the bushranger Harry Power. The novel describes the boy Kelly’s unwilling apprenticeship in the “profession” of bushranger. The narrator’s feelings about this are conveyed by the shift in person enabling the retention of the boy’s emotions of frustration within the dry humour that pervades the scene’s description. This dual expression of emotion (coming from the narrator’s past and present) is apparent when the boy Kelly tries to return home:

My mother sighed and shook her head. Dear God Jesus save me.

I said I aint in trouble.

[…………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………..]

I come home to help.

You can’t come home. I paid the b----r 15 quid to take you on. You are his apprentice now.

The mother and the son stood separate in the middle of the home paddock. The chooks all droopy and muddy the pigs with their rib cages showing through their suits. The waters of the Eleven Mile already receding leaving the spent and withered oats lying in the yellow mud. The son felt himself a mighty fool he’d been bought and sold like carrion. (Carey *True History* 102-03)

This reading of psychological trauma belies the grammatical indicators of a shift from one speaker to another. It suggests instead an emotional response that produces the distancing effect of third-person so that the speaker might empathise with his earlier self through the dialogic engagement of his past and present selves, evident in the mixture of childish description (the “droopy” chooks) with a more mature appreciation of the scene
(“the spent and withered oats”) culminating in the strange entanglement of metaphor in the expression “bought and sold like carrion”—that is, bought and sold like rotting flesh as opposed to meat or livestock. In this reading the voice of the narrator retains its identification with the narrator of the earlier section who has been established as Ned Kelly, but in doing so the text produces a generalised sense of Kelly. That is, the grammatical shift indicates a shift in the speaker’s style of expression: the narrating entity, regardless of identity, has shifted his own perspective by momentarily absolving himself from the task of performing presence.

Aczel writes, “it is the notion of self-presence and immediacy which Derrida is, first, and foremost, out to deconstruct” (Aczel, “Over-Hearing” 599). This highlights the pertinence of Wolf’s observation that the self is metaphorically instated in language on the levels of grammar, theory and narrative—with the metaphors used to sustain its conception as an object having become so commonplace as to be hypostatized (Wolf A Folk Model 127). The constructed nature of voice becomes apparent in writing or in speech when cultural voice and natural voice achieve the impossible, and person and personality become extricable. Voice engages in the differentiation and deferral that Derrida terms differance, as Aczel explains, and I would add, it cannot do otherwise. The writing in the voice, of which Derrida writes (Derrida, “Le facteur de la vérité” 465), is the implication of presence inherent in our speech and organised by the conventions and rules of language. It is not enough to locate a speaker in grammatical terms, however, for that empty category must be filled with more persuasive expressions of presence if narrative voice is to “get out of the ‘pit of inexistence’.” For the most part these different aspects of voice—the one gesturing presence and the other supporting that presence through indicators of personality and cultural situatedness—will coincide. It is at moments like this one in Carey’s novel, where they do not coincide, that we might glimpse the constructed nature of our conceptions of voice in a general sense. Carey’s novel reveals how it is possible for these different forms of voice to contradict their conceptual demarcations by disrupting the presumption of presence as it is instanced grammatically, thereby enabling cultural voice to stand for a speaker’s absence as a form

of presence, whereby absence invokes a generalised sense of the speaker. By moving from one narrative mode to another, Carey seemingly breaks the relation established between the identity of the narrator and the narrative act, and this break performs the conceptual break that exists in terms of these two classes of metaphor. This strategy also enables a recession in time, whereby the expanding of narrative distance corresponds with a retrieval of time that renders the past immediate:

Now said he I promised you some proper boots.

[…………………………………………………………………………
……………………………….]

Soon the boy were sitting in a purple velvet chair with a cove in a suit and fancy collar attending him yes Sir no Sir Mr Power Sir.

This lad will be wanting a pair of elastic sided boots with Cuban heels.

Very good says the cove taking one of the boy’s dirty aching feet to measure very careful with a tape.

Soon he came back with a brown cardboard box marked ARTHUR QUILLER & SON and when the lid were lifted the boy did not dare believe what he saw nestled in the bed of pure white tissue. The cove placed the box on the floor then went away and while the boy were still wondering what he was meant to do the cove returned with a pair of woollen items. (Carey True History 75)

The identity of the narrator in these third-person digressions would seem to shift from Ned Kelly to Kelly’s disembodied voice. Such a break cannot be sustained for long without disrupting the cohesion of natural and cultural voice established in the preceding pages through first-person narration. The disruption itself is effectively effaced, however, when Carey re-establishes the connection between this seemingly disembodied narrator and Kelly by adopting a style of expression that enables a relatively smooth return to the first-person mode of narration. This is achieved by Kelly invoking the paternal relation in the conclusion of the third-person account of the boy Kelly being fitted with new boots, enabling this portion of the narrative to be read as a stylised demarcation of self: “My darling girl,” he writes, “your father never knew what he were looking at for he never wore socks in all his life” (Carey True History 75-76, emphasis added).
Grammatical indicators of relation—a shift to second person, together with the use of possessive pronouns integrated with terms of endearment that readily connect with familial relations and endearments uttered in the first-person narrative—enable the sense of the speaker’s identity having been the same throughout. What may have appeared disrupted with the turn to third person is revealed in hindsight to have been a shift in the speaker’s reflective mode. This is enabled by the consistency in cultural voice that pervades the text. The disruption is not immediately apparent, since Kelly has already embarked on descriptive sections that characterise the landscape as both familiar to the speaker and strange to the reader—adopting the tone and style of speech that imply a mixture of familiarity and awe—and it is only when the boy Kelly is described in the third person that the change in mode is truly apparent.

Disjunction between a past self and the contemporary version might result in nostalgia, but in this novel the grammatical shifts create the disturbing sense of the superhuman, emphasising Kelly’s grandiose prefiguring of his iconic status in Australian lore. This effect is sustained, rather than the presumption of a person distinct from Kelly as narrator, precisely because the cultural voice remains largely the same across the pronoun shifts. The narratological conception of voice can only signal this disruption and identify a shift in focus along these lines. It proves limiting, but for reasons that go beyond the need to identify a personality in relation to a speaking person. What I mean by this is that the grammatical indicators of a speaking subject do not always operate to indicate position as opposed to subjectivity but might emphasise instead aspects of personality and personal experience. The pinpointing of a speaker in space and time does not solve the question of identity; it serves only to identify the relation between speaking position and the described action—metaphorically instanced as proximity, immediacy, or distance. Elements of voice—cultural voice in other words—that supply something more than the assertion of a speaker are therefore necessary in order to comprehend the relevance of a particular speaking position and the reasons for any alterations. The two voices, that is, despite Rousseau’s best efforts, are not logically extricable in the context of linguistics and ordinary usage. They are extricable, however, in abstract terms insofar as these terms are metaphors for reified concepts. In aesthetic works it becomes possible to construct an utterance in relation to which these two forms of voice function to gesture presence in a manner that either enhances and sustains the other, or else introduces a distinct presence different from the grammatically designated speaker, thereby disturbing the presumption that these vocal formulations are integral to one
another alone. Cultural voice, in other words, promiscuously attaches itself to various speakers—speakers whose presence may be gestured in grammatical terms, but also according to different demarcations of space and time (demarcations that gesture toward an intersubjective experience of place in a timeframe distinct from that of the immediacy of the utterance).

What Carey’s novel reveals is that having disturbed the presumed integrity of the bond between natural and cultural voice, it is possible to reconnect the two through indicators of identity in culturally and personally determined terms. Identity (*ipse*) in this context being different from “sameness” (*idem*), the establishment of an identifying cultural voice as the same across the two different constructions of narrative mode confers sameness of identity. Cultural voice (as a history of selfhood) is inherently nostalgic and constructive of person by hindsight. Natural voice (as presence) is invariably immediate. One might presume, therefore, that these differences will compromise the coherence of a speaker. Yet the relational and qualitative sameness of cultural voice in this novel successfully contradicts any spatiotemporal differences—although the suspension of a unified natural and cultural voice has an interesting effect. In *True History* the implicit disavowal of a specific locatable presence, united with the motility of cultural voice, results in the performance of non-presence as omnipresence—softening the anachronistically Australian quality of the voice and enabling the perspective of as many eyes as might see through the social and cultural perspective implied in the voice. This suggests that omniscient narration is a style of speech that strives to disperse the localizable presence of a speaker. It offers an alternative to performative strategies of polyphonic speech such as heteroglossia, although it may operate alongside these as well. When used in unison, as here, the narrator becomes a

145 Ricoeur sets out the distinction in the following terms: “The second philosophical intention, implicitly present in the title in the word ‘self,’ is to distinguish two major meanings of ‘identity’ [...], depending on whether one understands by ‘identical’ the equivalent of the Latin *ipse* or *idem*. The equivocity of the term ‘identical’ will be at the center of our reflections on personal identity and narrative identity and related to a primary trait of the self, namely its temporality. Identity in the sense of *idem* unfolds an entire hierarchy of significations [...]. In this hierarchy, permanence in time constitutes the highest order, to which will be opposed that which differs, in the sense of changing or variable [...]. [I]dentity in the sense of *ipse* implies no assertion concerning some unchanging core of the personality.” Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992) 2.
speaker for its time, character-type, class, and anyone who might nostalgically identify with these. At the same time, cultural voice enables the possibility of a return to the specificity of presence, and the ambiguity of who speaks? recasts this potentiality so that Kelly is always prefigured in the opening left by the absence of natural voice. The effect produced is of the merging of two enunciative positions—the general and the specific—with each engaged in an empathetic account of the younger Kelly’s experience: we get the sense of the two voices (the one apparently objective and the other subjective) united in their disgust.
Chapter 5. Setting and Event in the Novel: The chronotope

In the Introduction I argued that chronotopes are metaphors whose metaphoric quality is obscured by the extent to which they correspond to our bodily experience. Embodiment in the novel, it should be noted, is generally construed as the effect of verisimilitude. In this final chapter I argue that there is a symbiotic relationship between chronotopes and their corresponding themes, and that the relation between chronotopic motifs, such as the country house, and the thematic elements which I identify in this context as propriety, is ordered according to the schema of embodiment in which form is perceived to have content—the outer has an inner aspect and each bears relation to each. The chronotope, in other words, supplies the form by which theme is given: each anticipates and paradoxically precedes the other. Thus, the country house supplies the thematic content of propriety and, conversely, wherever matters of propriety are invoked, it will be formally represented in respect to certain anticipated domains—those spatiotemporalities conducive to it, whether the country house, the boudoir, the courthouse, or a public forum in which a private conversation takes place. The chronotope supplies the framework, “body,” or vehicle necessary for the conveyance of meaning. Form and content thus relate to one another in the way that the components of a metaphor achieve unity and produce new meaning—a meaning different to the meanings brought to bear by each component independently.

In Bakhtin’s terms, stories that are set in recognisable worlds—or in definable places within worlds—are chronotopically determined in that the limits and scope of the defined world determine what takes place within it.\(^{146}\) The story’s temporal features are likewise governed by the relativity of time in relation to the thematic focus of place. Chronotopes supply ways in which verisimilitude might be constructed. They also supply

\(^{146}\) John Frow defines these worlds in the following terms: “The thematic content of a genre can be thought of as the shaped human experience that a genre invests with significance and interest. In formal terms this shaping is expressed as a set of *topoi*, recurrent topics of discourse, or as recurrent *iconography*, or as recurrent forms of argumentation. […] In those genres of discourse that tell stories set within a recognisable world, the thematic content will be kinds of action, the kinds of actors who perform them, and the significance that accrues to actions and actors.” Frow, *Genre* 75-76. Emphasis original.
points from which to depart from reality. By establishing a recognisable form of space and time, chronotopes are also rendering the foundation from which the appearance of a literal world (a world that is ordered by “literal” relations insofar as these conform to established norms like causation) might be altered and enhanced through the addition of further meaning—meaning that exceeds the “literal” construction.

Chronotopes create the effect of a specific time and place through consistency in how the objects and events are depicted in space and time. This consistency relates to ordinary repeatable forms of experience as these are related intersubjectively through speech: we accumulate meanings that are chronotopic through discourses that depict places and events as unfolding in an identifiable space and time. I can recognise a train station in visual terms when it is depicted in a film, and my expectations of how time flows in this space will be both met, disrupted and reformulated by the coherence that is established in that place when events unfold. Hence, a train station might be a quiet, isolated and lonely place by night, or a bustling community in constant transition by day. Yet it might also be depicted as a lonely, isolated spot by day—suggesting geographical remoteness—thereby depicting two chronotopes at once: that of the train station and the remote destination at the end of the line. The two comfortably co-exist because such representations have been offered numerous times in a wide variety of texts. Chronotopes, therefore, are rarely unadulterated, but will often be blended with other chronotopic aspects, or follow in succession—with these succeeding episodes of space and time often united in an overarching motif that supplies chronotopic values: motifs like those identified by Bakhtin as the road in autobiography, the castle in gothic tales, the idyll in family narrative. It is this movement in chronotopic space and time—a movement that suggests a going out of one place and time whilst somehow staying within its influence—that ties and unties the knots of narrative, as Bakhtin so colourfully describes it.

In this chapter, the chronotope of the country house is explored in three novels: Kazuo Ishiguro’s *The Remains of the Day* (1989), Jane Austen’s *Mansfield Park*, and Virginia Woolf’s *To the Lighthouse*. To begin with, however, I rely on elements evident in two of Ishiguro’s earlier novels—*A Pale View of Hills* (1982) and *An Artist of the Floating World*.
(1986)—in order to elaborate the importance of distinctions in metaphoric and literal meaning in the formation of space and time in realistic and symbolic terms.

**Meaning as Literal Constraint and Metaphoric Excess**

If all speech is metaphoric and everything is, by extension, symbolic, then what remains to be determined is what distinguishes certain symbolic references from others in the novel: what is it that makes some elements stand out and seem more meaningful and symbolic than others? Rhetoric provides the short answer in this instance, for rhetoric supplies the means by which a metaphoric value might be emphasised whilst simultaneously retaining a literal value. Repetition, exaggeration (whether by enlargement or reduction), and logical inconsistency (e.g., hendiadys, metalepsis and syllepsis), are ways in which an extra meaning value might be attributed to a particular object, event, or the relations between these. The excess of meaning produced is what distinguishes those elements interpreted as symbolic from those that we determine to be merely literal. Thus, objects and events can be said to hold greater meaning when a metaphoric meaning over and above their literal value is apparent. These objects and events become symbolic in the novel by representing meaning that is either rhetorically emphasised as relevant (through repetition, for example), or which exceeds that required of reality/verisimilitude.

This does not mean that only realist novels can create the latter stand-out effect created by excess. The departure from reality is, at such times, a departure from the reality of the constructed world or worlds of the novel. One of the ways in which this might be achieved is when the given objects and events differ in spatiotemporal terms from the objects and events around them. Although they remain thematically linked to the world/s in which they are given, and thus retain coherence as functional units of narrative eventfulness, their distinctive spatiotemporality renders them anomalous and this sets them apart: for in order to reconcile any anomaly, a new metaphoric value must be found that can be related to the literal meanings generated through verisimilitude. Thus, the symbolic value of those conceptual objects and events that are spatiotemporally out of step with the world in which they are given is interpreted in terms that enable a retention of their correlation to verisimilitude as a form of meaning.

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The chronotope sets the spatiotemporal benchmark of the world in which the narrated events of the novel are given; yet this spatiotemporal fluidity can be relatively fluid in that it might cede to a different tempo and will most likely shift in spatial terms. The
predominant space and time of a novel might also be intersected by another chronotope supplying a different spatial and/or temporal aspect. This happens in Ishiguro’s *Floating World* when the domestic tempo of retired life is intersected by the spatiotemporality of post-war reconstruction. This intersection produces an anomaly in the age of the narrator’s grandchild, Ichiro, who miraculously acquires an additional three or five years of age and maturity (moving from what would appear to be three to eight years of age) in the space of what is otherwise measured as a year.149 His advancement in these terms can be linked symbolically to the rapidity of change in the reconstruction of a city, society, and a culture devastated by war (Ishiguro *Floating World* 26-27). Furthermore, with reconstruction supervised by The United States under the Occupation, Ichiro’s fascination for American cultural icons like The Lone Ranger and Popeye the Sailor Man, marks him figuratively as Japan, depicted as a nation that has “come to look like a small child learning from a strange adult” (Ishiguro *Floating Worlds* 30, 152, 185).

149 Ichiro’s age is not given in the first part of the novel. However, he is described as a “little boy” and his behaviour is consistent with a child of three or four years of age in the first part of the novel, set in October 1948. When, for example, his mother tells him not to “stare” (glare) at his grandfather, Ichiro responds “by falling on his back again and waving his feet in the air.” We are told that Ichiro’s father is a war veteran, and it is implicit that Ichiro is a child of his father’s return, since he is not old enough to have been conceived before the war. By rights, he ought to be little more than three years of age, but his age remains ambiguous except when it is explicitly given in the later section covering October to November 1949. The ambiguity surrounding Ichiro’s age would appear to be deliberate. In the later section Ichiro projects greater maturity when meeting his grandfather’s question, “How old are you now?” with, “I believe I’m eight. Please come this way, Oji. I have few things to discuss with you.” And he is clearly eight years old in the later section, however. His manner is now markedly different and consistent with a boy of eight and his mother and aunt openly refer to his age in these terms. In contrast, nothing in his behaviour the year before could be realistically attributed to a normal boy of seven. His behaviour in 1948, in contrast to 1949, is otherwise consistent with the behaviour of a small boy. Then he is given to yelling redundant statements and demands and climbing over tram seats the way a toddler might. Further, his artwork is remedial, and his manner so rigid that it would be considered abrasive in anyone but a very small child; but perhaps the most subtle yet compelling evidence of his being a toddler rather than a larger boy in 1948 is the image of his mother fastening his sandals for him. Kazuo Ishiguro, *An Artist of the Floating World* (London: Faber & Faber, 1986) 14, 16, 135 & 157, 81, 78.
Although the post-war years are significant in this novel, the dominant chronotope is that set by the narrator whose attitude, life experience, and personal circumstances supply a very different tempo. Here, professional retirement and a recession to domestic life construct a spatial fluidity and temporal seesawing amenable to nostalgia and reflection. The novel’s narrator, Ono, wanders aimlessly into rooms and returns, in thought if not in body, to the significant places of his earlier professional life. Nonetheless, this personal world of reminiscence is encapsulated within a world of cultural, social and material change—characterised by the chronotope of post-war reconstruction. This affects relations between elders such as Ono and his children who appear to relate to him with a mixture of deference and rebellious insolence, yet who also openly deny incidents of the latter quality when prompted by the old man’s remembering: at such times Ono’s daughters respectfully tell him that someone (euphemistically and implicitly he) must be mistaken (see Ishiguro Floating World 107, 191-94). Ono is a man whose own world has lost mooring and become an island of neglected meaning and significance, “floating” above a bustling urban world. He is a man who struggles to establish relevance in what is, for him, a new and foreign world—a social world of industry, as opposed to pleasure, and a personal world of retirement and cultural uselessness in place of his former professional activity and social value.

This example shows that, although a novel might depart from reality, the worlds within it are precisely those worlds in which the events described are possible, and by which events bear a coherent relation to one another. These relations are usually established through spatiotemporally determined causation: events might be remote and apparently unrelated to one another, yet they are connected by being of the same time, by occurring within spatial zones that are geographically or temporally connected. Events that take place in different timeframes or differently configured worlds are typically distanced and made distinct from one another by either narrative description marking such difference, or through their construal on different terms—as the product of different speech acts and/or speech genres. Indeed, we get a sense of the worlds in a novel through speech situation (Frow Genre 41), which entails the projection of time and place such that individuals or events are situated in specific places within the past, present or future. Shifting between different speech situations is one way in which alternative worlds might be given, therefore. And Ishiguro makes particular use of enunciative shifts in a way that enables him to convey a great deal, at times complicating
or contradicting the more straightforward depiction conveyed through the narrator’s voice.

This strategy proves particularly useful given that Ishiguro’s novels are all narrated in the first person. His first novel, *A Pale View of Hills*, in particular, is distinguished by an anomaly in spatiotemporal terms that invites deeper critical reflection upon what is meant by such disruption to the space and time of the novel. In what has come to be known to critics of Ishiguro’s work as the pronoun slip, the character and narrator, Etsuko, addressing her friend’s daughter Mariko, who is about to leave for the United States with her mother Sachiko, uses what appears to be the wrong pronoun. When the girl complains that she does not want to go, Etsuko, who logically ought to employ the pronoun *you*, expresses herself inclusively when she replies, “In any case...[i]f you don’t like it over there, we can always come back” (Ishiguro *Pale View* 173). It is a passage that has caused considerable debate and some consternation among scholars. As Wai-chew Sim writes, “what is most shocking for us is that, without anything in the way of obvious signposting, Etsuko suddenly shifts into her own familial reveries. Ostensibly, she is trying to persuade Mariko to be sensible, to go home. Yet she suddenly says” as though speaking to her own daughter several years later about their impending departure to the United Kingdom, “that, ‘If you don’t like it over there [overseas], we’ll come straight back’” (Sim “Kazuo Ishiguro” 87, parenthesis and emphasis original). Etsuko has shifted between two different speech situations, embedded as these are in her framing narrative. This shift, which breaks the logical relation set up before the embedded dialogue is given, and which also characterises that dialogue up until the point of the slip, supplies what amounts to an excess of meaning in relation to the narrated event. The effect is that Etsuko is presented as speaking to two young girls at one and the same time—two into one, in other words (hendiadys)—despite their existences being temporally distinct. What we have, in effect, is the surfacing of one world within another. That is, one world irrupts within another, causing the displacement of identities described. Sim overcomes the disparities between these two worlds (which take the form of an overlapping of characters who cannot be one and the same) by interpreting the overlay as a psychological conflation of two similar experiences, leading to identification with the individuals in the earlier episode.

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In order to understand how this critical response is possible, we need to identify the different chronotopes at work in the speech of the narrator at this point. Three constructions of space and time operate in this episode through the construal of three different speech situations, as established in the novel from the outset. In the first instance, the narrator Etsuko is speaking or writing about her past life in Japan before motherhood and her subsequent divorce and second marriage. This spatiotemporality from which she speaks is the world of her contemporary existence as a woman in her fifties, living in England in the 1980s and recalling the past—her recollection stirred by the recent suicide of her eldest daughter Keiko. Her world in this respect is implicitly that world pertaining to the moment, place and act of writing, informed, as it is by her past, and her anticipation of the future, and mediated by unresolved grief and a faintly acknowledged but ill-defined sense of guilt and responsibility for her daughter’s death. By recalling and citing her speech and that of the child Mariko, Etsuko is embedding the present (the “contemporary” world in which her speech functions in an immediate sense) with the spatiotemporality of another speech act—one from her past. But this embedded speech is conflated with yet another spatiotemporality—one that is largely defined through Etsuko’s silence on the subject. Her pronoun slip here is the event that tells us that, like her friend Sachiko, she found herself having to take an unwilling child away and overseas. Her own daughter, Keiko, is thus positioned in similar emotional (and possibly spatial) terms to Mariko, whose neglect by her mother initiates and possibly sustains the friendship that Etsuko develops with Sachiko.

It is through the embedding of these two spatiotemporally defined speech acts in the overarching one from which she narrates that Etsuko is able, as a narrator, to instance the world of her youth, of her life in Japan. This world of the past is itself two worlds, for it is a world that stretches from one definable arena (that encompassing the early years of her marriage and post-war Japan) to another (some years on, when her eldest daughter is a child of similar age to Mariko). This subsequent world is closely related to the other, sharing many features in common. But it is nonetheless distinguishable by the different perspectives of the protagonist and spatiotemporally defined speaker in each instance. The conflation of the two is nonetheless significant, for it supplies an excess of meaning through the rhetorical trope of hendiadys, which rises up like a double-headed monster—hence the shock expressed by critics such as Sim.
By recalling and performing these earlier speech acts, Etsuko’s narrating successfully embeds these two worlds in her present as a site of psychological abutment, bringing this confusion, furthermore, into the contemporary context in which narrating takes place: a context through which we, as readers, are able to observe this layering of experience and meaning. By attending to these spatiotemporal differences—as indicated by the excess of meaning relative to the defined past—these two earlier worlds are evidenced. As well as uniting the two children, the figure of hendiadys connects the narrator, Etsuko, with her wayward and careless friend, Sachiko. It becomes apparent, through this conflation of different temporal events, which perhaps take place at the same venue (tellingly a bridge that unites two sides of the city), that the two women are not manifestations of the same character. Rather (as the novel reveals elsewhere) they share certain experiences in common, just like the two girls. Their actions, although to different degrees and in different temporally defined worlds, reflect the consequences of motherhood undertaken in difficult circumstances. In one instance, this is characterised as callous self-interest; in the narrator’s case, it is a pervading sense of guilt and the ambivalent affection by which motherly love becomes a weighty responsibility that makes the association with Sachiko’s careless attitude meaningful in terms of Etsuko’s internalised response to her own mothering. The ambiguity generated by this episode—by the blurring of identity—thus achieves some clarity on this point because it suggests that Etsuko subconsciously feels that she has contributed to her daughter’s death through her own acts of self-interest. And it proves a particularly useful strategy in this instance because it enables Ishiguro to maintain the reader’s awareness of Etsuko’s own lack of insight without undermining it by having her come to such a realisation herself.

This kind of excess in terms of meaning is really a substitution: the reality effect of one world is replaced by a realistic element from another temporally defined world that does not correspond to the relations established in the first world—the world in which Etsuko is not the mother of the child she is speaking to. In Ishiguro’s second novel, *An Artist of the Floating World*, the substitution derives from a contemporary world rather than from the past—revealing that the worlds of the novel might be determined according to point of view rather than diachronic distinctions. Given that chronotopes are intersubjectively formed, it is conceivable that they might delineate different temporalities in relation to the same objects and events according to the context in which they are given. That is, the differences between contemporaneous chronotopes will necessarily be determined by the relativising influence of metaphoric perspective. Here,
in this novel set after the war, the viewpoints determining space and time are both
collective and personal, with Reconstruction representing the view of the many, and
nostalgia situated in relation to the narrator’s position.

**Setting the Tempo: Country-house time**

Chronotopes can be said to possess a predominantly literal aspect in the sense that they
work with conceptions of space and time that are phenomenally determined, even if the
phenomenal is exaggerated, diminished, aestheticised, or relativised in some terms. As
argued, contemporary yet different chronotopes might be defined according to point of
view—both in literal and metaphoric terms. In literal terms, this might mean distinction
between seeing Japan in terms of reconstruction or of domestic life. These literal views
are clearly entangled with metaphoric view, since each also represents a characteristic
worldview or way of “seeing”. Chronotopes defined according to metaphoric points of
view are epistemic and deontic constructions that supply literal values. In this way,
opinion determines material content: a political attitude will determine setting as well as
shape the characters and events that are entailed within it.

In this section I argue that Jane Austen’s *Mansfield Park*, Virginia Woolf’s *To the
Lighthouse*, and Kazuo Ishiguro’s *The Remains of the Day* differentiate the social relations of
characters according to the organising rubric of the country house. The organisation of
the protagonists’ personalities and inner lives is manifested in corresponding terms to the
diversity of social spaces in the country house that each occupies. The effect of the
chronotope upon the thematic aspects of each novel is predictably the same in so far as it
produces a pervasive insistence upon propriety and the implied threat of social exposure.
These similarities are a consequence of the shared values attributable to the settings and
events that characterise the chronotope of the country house. It is because the country
house is also an intersubjectively established metaphor (and collection of metaphors, or
“knowledges” as per Frow) that consensus arises in terms of what is relevant in
determining and ordering the lives of the depicted characters and the tempo of those
experiences thematically determined by place.

Virginia Woolf presents a commentary that breaks down the spatial coherence
and multidimensionality of the country house through an emphasis on the geometrical
aspects of architecture to address gendered social responsibilities. Mrs. Ramsay, who “could not bear incivility to her guests” and who “had the whole of the other sex under her protection; for reasons she could not explain,” is the focal point of these responsibilities, which entail self-repression by women in the management of antisocial behaviours in men (Woolf *Lighthouse* 10). Here propriety operates as feminine self-restraint: the socially and self-imposed duty of controlling one’s emotions for the sake of others is manifested through the designated function of windows and doors and the significance each has for two key figures in this novel, Lily Briscoe and Mrs. Ramsay. Lily even notes, when trying to characterise what was special about Mrs. Ramsay that “[s]he opened bedroom windows. She shut doors” (Woolf *Lighthouse* 55). The window, as a threshold that should not be crossed but which nonetheless opens onto the world and as an opening through which one can see and be seen, represents social containment and self-control: Mrs. Ramsay, framed in the window, is shown in a suitably feminine role as she reads to her youngest child; the window presents her social self, in other words, whereas the triangular shape reproduced by the two figures provides a geometrical representation of Mrs. Ramsay’s “natural” self, irrespective of its social duties.

Kazuo Ishiguro’s *The Remains of the Day* also differentiates the social relations of its characters according to the rubric of the country house. For Ishiguro, these demarcations occur in the novel’s narrator and chief protagonist, Stevens, as an anxiety of selfhood. This takes the form of a desire, despite the reflective mode of the narrative, to keep his interiority interior and the coterminous fear that that interior space is in fact

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151 I include the Ramsay’s house on the Isle of Skye as a country house on the basis that its proportions, though not described in distinct terms, possess the amplitude of one: the accommodation of both servants and guests, as well as a large family, the sense of extensive grounds, the orchard and its winding paths, where one might walk and paint—possessing scope for both privacy and intrusion—are all elements typical of the country house. The novel contradicts this to some extent in its final pages by describing Cam’s difficulty in distinguishing the house from the others she can see on the hillside as she looks back from the boat (180-181); however, regardless of any ambiguity as to its grandeur, grandeur is certainly implied in terms of the social relations and the negotiation of space: Mrs. Ramsay’s management of the dinner table reproduces the gendered divisions of earlier times where politeness and propriety were intensified in mixed groups. In regard to the latter, see Michèle Cohen, *Fashioning Masculinity: National Identity and Language in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Routledge, 1996).
empty.\textsuperscript{152} Manifested as a neurotic and pervasive urge to conceal himself, and reproduced in diverse actions, such as scurrying when out of place, and as a seamless and professional attention to his employer's needs to the point of invisibility, Stevens's anxiety reproduces the social and physical structures that determine the availability of space to the servant who, though he might move through the capacious living spaces of the country house, cannot enjoy or use them according to their designation. The domestic worlds of Darlington Hall and Mansfield Park are particularly demonstrative of the complexity of the country house in terms of the usage and designation of public and private space: as Hina Nazar argues, the home is not wholly or mostly private but negotiates the same relations as the political arena by incorporating the social and the public within its apparently private realm. Further, propriety operates effectively as the explicit or public expression of what ought to be privately held implicit principles governing one's interactions and relations with others; it serves as a form of collective judgment that informs or otherwise relates to one's privately held principles and decisions: thus “Austen identifies individuals as socially embedded persons whose subjectivity is developed, in significant ways, in an intersubjective context” (Nazar “The Imagination Goes Visiting” 157).\textsuperscript{153} Nazar observes that Austen's work questions the simplistic demarcation of interior and exterior life in terms of private (domestic) worlds and public arenas. That is, individuals are shown to be negotiating, not just their relations with others in society, but their internal relations in terms of judgment. In this way, society operates within the mind as much as through external relations with others. Austen’s, Woolf’s and Ishiguro’s novels dramatise the mediation of these contrasting roles of being both a private person in a public sphere, and a public thinker in a private world.

\textsuperscript{152} The writing of the journal performs this anxiety as a gesture designed to fill up an otherwise empty space. Stevens’s doubts as to his internal attributes are brought to the fore in his handling of the sacking of two Jewish maids: when Miss Kenton challenges his decision, he abrogates his opinion to the subordinating authority of Lord Darlington. His anxiety is further emphasised by his attempt to extend this abrogation to Miss Kenton: Kazuo Ishiguro, \textit{The Remains of the Day} (London: Faber and Faber, 1989) 145-46, 56-58.

Bakhtin’s notion of the chronotope, as it describes the fusing of time and space in generic models, offers a starting point for thinking about the ways in which the unstated aspects of character are organised to enable consistency in what is expressed. In this respect, space more so than time appears to underpin or govern thought, and yet it is the specific temporal quality of the country house that enables the pensive element in these novels. The more dramatic transformations of time take place elsewhere—leaving the minutiae of daily life to the country house: the micro, rather than the macro, is at stake here. This enables the detailed reflection that characterises novels of this genre. A dual temporality therefore functions in respect to this chronotope (indeed, such a structure may be said to operate in relation to all chronotopes), with “real time” (as it implicitly exists elsewhere in the story world) posing a disruptive threat to the tranquil pace of country-house time. It is no accident, for example, that Stevens, steeped for all his adult life in country-house time, should idle at 15mph as he drives along a straight stretch of road on his journey to Cornwall (Ishiguro *Remains* 71). Even at this relatively early stage in the development of the motor car, it presents a ridiculous sight: a large, elegant Ford, designed for comfort and speed, chugging along back roads at considerably less than the ubiquitous Sunday driver’s 20mph. Although Stevens declares that this enables his enjoyment of the scenery, it also suggests something more, for as he explains, this is not the first time he has slowed the car to such a pace (Stevens elsewhere describes bringing the car to a standstill when anxiety overtakes him [Ishiguro *Remains* 23].)

As well as being indicative of timidity, Stevens’s pace introduces to the outside world the stultifying effect of country-house time. The grandeur of the country house imposes a certain temporality, which these novels exploit in the representation of thought. It is as though the extra time needed to traverse its domains were imposed upon the mind, with characters having ample time for reflection, and impulsivity in thought or deed banished. The slow pace of country-house time, in contrast to the rapidity of change measurable outside its borders, enables the elaboration of these anxieties through the performance of character. Austen’s novel organises characters’ thoughts along these lines through an extensive representation of the main character’s interiority as impacted by the social relations connected to the physical structures of Mansfield Park with its extensive grounds, its Parsonage, its White House. Drawn out across the length and breadth of Mansfield Park’s vast and indifferent geographies, Fanny’s pensive manner threatens to overwhelm the narrative with its tedium. The bright, rude humour of her rival Mary Crawford is easily the more appealing—not only for her love-interest and
cousin Edmund, but for readers also; after all, the novel would be a dry and uneventful tale without the Crawfords.\textsuperscript{154} Thankfully they bring the rush of city time with them: London wafts in, introducing a change of pace that stalls in the reified air of country-house time. It soon recovers that momentum, however, when these city dwellers return once again from the city and when the inhabitants of the country house return, themselves, from adventures abroad in London, Portsmouth and Antigua. Even Fanny Price is invigorated in bustling Portsmouth where she rediscovers her effectiveness in the domestic realm, overcoming the passivity imposed upon her by the tempo of Sir Thomas’s patrician time.

In Ishiguro’s \textit{The Remains of the Day}, the sense of change happening in the world outside—represented as the imminence of war and its aftermath—reinforces the stability of the country house as the slow-moving centre, or hub, around which all these changes occur (Ishiguro \textit{Remains} 121-22). Ishiguro uses spatial metaphors of this sort throughout his novels to represent zones of self that have been demarcated against scrutiny, and which, in times of crisis, must be re-entered in order to retrieve the past and embrace the future. This is apparent in his other works, namely \textit{When We Were Orphans}, \textit{A Pale View of Hills}, \textit{An Artist of the Floating World}, and \textit{The Unconsoled} (1995). In these novels, the protagonists enter constructed living spaces—dwellings that are specifically relevant to the narrative (respectively: a labyrinthine dreamlike childhood home; an old-style cottage in the midst of high-rise development; a city under reconstruction, an artist’s studio set within a mountain valley; and apartments, hotels and out-of-town palatial residences that fail to hold their shape). His characters negotiate these places as though penetrating into the deeper corners of their psychic memory—often evasively, reluctantly, and always with considerable tension and a sense of distortion. The narrators develop their histories against these dwelling places: these are homes that stand for what has been lost, with retrieval figured as an impossible reconciliation of past and present—a reconcilement that is either desired or feared. What sets \textit{Remains} apart in this respect is the reversal of this psychic structure: Stevens is within the memory space he strives to reclaim—although it is his temporary departure from that place that enables and motivates the narrative he writes. It is also significant, that in this instance, the dwelling remains

materially remote from the rest of the world. Whereas the novels *Pale View*, *Unconsold*, and *Orphans* situate these built structures in city landscapes, *Remains* strives to bring the world to the country house, whilst simultaneously keeping it remote so as to preserve it from the depredations of world war.\(^{155}\)

The remoteness of the country house not only “protects” it from the hardships of social and personal loss, but also restricts its influence upon the world outside its borders, as Ishiguro’s novel ironically demonstrates through Lord Darlington’s failed attempts at political influence. And yet the two worlds are never wholly separate but intersect: “real time” intercedes at moments to disrupt the serene indifference that Darlington Hall seems to represent in respect to ordinary life. The tempo of life within the country house as determined by privilege, the languorous life suggested by its scope, is denied Stevens, who, “in the midst of dealing with the many demands being made” of him (Ishiguro *Remains* 92), must rush, furtively, in the pursuance of his duties—with one absurdly constructed example of displaced responsibility seeing him dash across the lawn to conceal himself behind a bush (see Ishiguro *Remains* 93). Demonstrating the pronounced anxiety of selfhood operating in this novel—the fear of there being no self to be found—Stevens, as a working man, introduces the energetic productivity of the world outside Darlington Hall as home to the aristocracy. This productive component of the country house (of servants in the pursuance of their duties) is, like the rural world of agriculture and farming, correspondingly concealed from view; Stevens and his staff, furthermore, stand in contradistinction to the ineffectual efforts of Lord Darlington’s politics, derided as amateurism.

In Woolf’s novel, the thematic of propriety is secondary to broader questions of human relationship. Yet the chronotope of the country house similarly imposes its temporal order upon *Lighthouse*. This is evident even in the emphasis given to the passage of time as “that long gallery” to be walked down, or as “a dark passage” that seems to a

\(^{155}\) *Floating World*, however, similarly constructs an idyll cut off from the changes of war: the artist’s school of his youth stands cut off from the damaged cities of Japan. Ishiguro’s latest novel, *Never Let Me Go* (2005), employs a similar enunciative framework and chronotopic structure through the narrator’s remembered childhood as a “boarder” at an isolated country institution and school, known as Hailsham. Kazuo Ishiguro, *Never Let Me Go* (London: Faber and Faber, 2005).
child to be beset with demons, and which has an understated but devastating impact upon the lives of the inhabitants of the house (Woolf *Lighthouse* 60, 23). By rendering the catastrophic effects of time’s passing for the most part outside the country house, whose inhabitants experience these changes elsewhere, *Lighthouse* reproduces the chronotope’s organisation of minutiae within the protective ambit of the country house from which the deeper eviscerating effects of time have been expelled (see Banfield “Time Passes” 502-04). \(^{156}\) This enables the stalled movements, the lingering effect of contemplation, suspending the moment of encounter long enough to expose what might be overlooked in fleetingly “real time.” This can be seen in Woolf’s novel where the physical shape of the spaces and objects that embody those relations organised by propriety—most clearly expressed in the openings of windows and doors, and in the function of objects such as tables\(^{157}\)—is represented conceptually as rectangular. Doors represent the containment of the self within the social world; they open onto interior spaces as well as onto the world outside the home. Doors therefore serve to regulate zones of privacy within the private space of the home: they represent self-management in the intimacies of life. The private self is concealed behind a metaphorical door, representing that aspect of oneself that one should preserve in complete privacy (Woolf *Lighthouse* 30). Formal and natural human relations are thus delineated by geometrical shapes—the former by a rectangle and the latter by a triangle (which, notably, is given in relations of mother and child as depicted in Lily’s painting [Woolf 58], but also in terms of the self’s relation to itself as “a wedge-shaped core of darkness, something invisible to others” [Woolf 69])\(^{158}\), with the self also

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\(^{157}\) Ann Banfield addresses the philosophical significance of the geometry of the table in her book *The Phantom Table*, which includes its relevance to representations of time and space; however, here I address the subject in different terms by arguing that thought in this novel is thematically organised according to architectural space as a structural metaphor that elaborates the conventional use of such metaphors through the sociality of the country house and its impact upon the thoughts of characters such as Ramsay, Mrs. Ramsay and Lily Briscoe. Ann Banfield, *The Phantom Table: Woolf, Fry, Russell and the Epistemology of Modernism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2000.

\(^{158}\) Paul Tolliver Brown makes this connection between Mrs. Ramsay’s interior shape and the shape used by Lily Briscoe to depict her in the painting she completes in part 2 of the novel: Brown, “Relativity, Quantum Physics, and Consciousness in *To the Lighthouse*,” 46.
taking shape as a column or spray of water (42) or “an august shape; the shape of a dome” (58). These shapes—whatever form they take—are given as aspects of the self that are intimate, private, and beyond the influence of adulterating social behaviours.159

The influence of outside time is nonetheless essential in effecting change within the parameters of the country house. It is significant, for example, that Sir Thomas of Mansfield Park has, at the outset of the novel, given up his house in town, indicating his retirement from the strains of public life and his deeper immersion in country-house time. It is no wonder that his business dealings abroad founder, and it is no accident that his return from Antigua initiates a change in pace (a ball for Fanny, dinners at the Parsonage, the entertainment of his nephew William, the proposal by Crawford). Even the corrosive influence of the play, Lovers’ Vows, comes from without—initiating changes that threaten the tranquillity of life in the country house. These outside influences are threatening because the symbolic weightiness of this architectural space demands a sense of permanence, which alteration offends. Mansfield Park, as the domestic heart of the nation and the symbolic centre of the self, cannot tolerate (material or moral) violence and death, which ought to take place elsewhere. Rapid or major changes in the form of decline and death stand in tension with the country house’s underlying temporality of permanence. When introduced, these grander narratives of loss bring about either the complete disruption of country-house time and the undermining of its status, or the transformation of its idyllic temporality into anguish and/or languishment, slowing the effects of such changes according to its languorous pace. The infighting among the daughters of the Price household, for example, might be said to reproduce the disagreement between the three sisters Lady Bertram, Mrs. Norris and Mrs. Price. In contrast, this tension is removed from immediate experience—it takes place off-stage and beyond the precincts of Mansfield Park, from which troubles of this nature must be banished if the pleasures of scope and the pace of life of the country house are to be fully enjoyed. To occupy oneself with the kind of anxieties produced by family ruptures,

159 In comparison to her husband, who is open and makes public his emotional needs (44-45), Lily Briscoe perceives Mrs. Ramsay to be inscrutable: “she imagined how in the chambers of the mind and heart of the woman who was, physically, touching her, were stood, like the treasures in the tombs of kings, tablets bearing sacred inscriptions, which if one could spell them out would teach one everything, but they would never be offered openly, never made public.” Woolf, Lighthouse 57.
when time is set at a pace conducive to reflection, would render the subjective experience of country-house life intolerable. Lady Bertram’s stupefied air is in a sense essential to the maintenance of her peace of mind. Indeed, her physical inertia repeats the mental inactivity of her inner life, which cannot brook trouble of any description. It is only when her son’s life hangs in the balance, and this reality is itself brought home to her senses and her intelligence by Tom’s physical removal from London to Mansfield, that Lady Bertram is stirred into a state of agitation. She writes letters, she is effusive, she greets Fanny on her return from Portsmouth—that is, she rises from the sofa to which she has, for the most part and in parody of Cowper’s lament, been steadfastly attached.¹⁶⁰

Nonetheless, the temporal quality of the country house is clearly upheld in Austen’s novel, which privileges country-house time through a decisive and moralizing condemnation of the architectural alterations made (or to be made) both to Mansfield Park and nearby Sotherton. Furthermore, major changes to the social relations of characters (elopement, life-threatening illness, financial loss) take place principally away from Mansfield; only those that preserve the social relations of Mansfield Park (Fanny and Edmund’s marriage, Tom’s recovery) occur within its precincts. This suggests that the remoteness of the country house not only “protects” it from the depredations of

¹⁶⁰ See William Cowper, The Poetical Works of William Cowper, The Aldine Edition of the British Poets, vol. II (London: William Pickering, 1830). In The Task, whose first volume is entitled “The Sofa,” Cowper writes about the development of this aid to ease (from three-legged stool to chair etc.), but then addresses the waste of time spent lounging about when nature has such beauties. The poem finds him rambling across countryside, no doubt upon some grand estate. He remarks upon the screens and colonnade of trees, the peasant’s hut, for its rustic charms (perhaps not unlike the Price household in terms of the rudeness of its architecture and furnishings). Here in particular he describes the picturesque, but having mused how lovely it would be to live in that cottage, the realities of the peasant’s harsh life come to mind, and he dismisses the idea. Thus, Cowper summons a sensibility that was to prevail in the mid 19th century, though his poem’s speaker is at odds with this early development of the picturesque, which according to Gilpin, ought to be made free of moral judgment. Arguably, beginning with Lady Bertram indolent and on a sofa, and with Fanny quoting Cowper as she does and engaging the matter of the slave trade (which Cowper’s Task likewise does), and having many other similarities of subject matter, Austen’s Mansfield Park incorporates major themes and textual elements from Cowper.
social and personal loss, but also determines the effectiveness of its influence upon the world outside its borders.

**Thinking in thematic space**

If the outside world provokes bustle and confusion, then the imposition of country-house time upon a social space outside its borders has a tranquilising effect, as Stevens’s driving suggests. In *Mansfield Park*, this influence results in Fanny successfully subduing her younger sisters, resolving their dispute, and preparing Susan for entry into country-house life. The Price household at Portsmouth falls woefully short of those manners Fanny has come to expect and this is expressed as much through architectural terms as through behaviour—with behaviour nonetheless being governed and illuminated chiefly by the spatial and structural inadequacies of the poorer dwelling.

Fanny was almost stunned. The smallness of the house, and thinness of the walls, brought every thing so close to her. [...] *Within* the room all was tranquil enough, for Susan having disappeared with the others, there was soon only her father and herself remaining; and he taking out a newspaper—the accustomary loan of a neighbour, applied himself to studying it, without seeming to recollect her existence. (Austen *Mansfield Park* 382)\(^{161}\)

The impropriety of deserting a guest—of leaving a visitor alone or unattended—is ambivalently constructed as the presumed familiarity due a daughter. But Fanny at this moment is between these two roles. By presuming the latter, her family fails to (re)socialise her out of the former. The presumption of one denies her the privilege of the other, since a courteous bestowal of formal regard would have enabled Fanny the authority and pleasure of politely eschewing such formality, thereby reacquainting herself as daughter and sister. Denied the chance for self-determination in terms of her position within the house, Fanny is never properly received at home and inevitably feels the inadequacy of the house’s social space. Mansfield Park becomes, in correlation to this deficiency, superior in every respect, including in terms of its own deficiencies—the harassments suffered at the hands of her Aunt Norris—which all dissolve into the finer

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(architectural) virtues of harmony and regularity: “Every thing where she now was was in full contrast to it. The elegance, propriety, regularity, harmony—and perhaps, above all, the peace and tranquillity of Mansfield” (391)—all qualities enabled by (and architecturally descriptive of) the grander proportions of the one, and deficient in the other in terms of scale as much as manners.

Away from Mansfield Park, Fanny’s thoughts are briefly given freer reign. But Fanny’s mental liberty must not be confused with hypocrisy or psychological repression. Representative of the demure and obedient young woman who honours and respects the values and wishes of her uncle, Fanny is bound to honour the latter’s implicit injunction against cousins in love (Austen *Mansfield Park* 7). The suppression of her thoughts is founded on awareness, therefore. For, despite her internal silence on the subject, Fanny’s illicit desire for her cousin Edmund is apparent throughout. This is particularly clear in her focalised response to her removal to Portsmouth, where she is sent to contemplate her refusal of Henry Crawford. Portsmouth is characterised as “the home which was to put Mansfield out of her head, and teach her to think of her cousin Edmund with moderated feelings” (Austen *Mansfield Park* 391). We know that this is Fanny’s perspective, and not the narrator’s, because it has no bearing on the story as it unfolds: Fanny does not learn to moderate her feelings. Indeed, these lines reveal the extent of Fanny’s immoderate desire for her cousin, given that the real reason for her exile has nothing to do with Edmund and everything to do with her denial of a suitor in Henry Crawford. That her consciousness sees the banishment as relating to the former reveals how much her expressed thoughts are underpinned by unexpressed desire. And it is significant that this implicated admission should come during her stay at Portsmouth where “she could think of nothing but Mansfield, its beloved inmates, its happy ways” (Austen *Mansfield Park* 391). At Portsmouth, she has allowed those thoughts to escape and manifest as the explicit negation (“moderated feelings”) of an implicit wish (immoderate desire), which further reveals how much her thoughts, while at Mansfield, are demarcated into public and private zones: only when she is outside its borders can she think so much and so freely about it.

Thought may be explicitly described or implicated in action, word or focalised expression but its character is determined, judged and reinforced through the demarcations of setting and event. “Architectural spaces,” as Emily Rohrbach observes, “particularly deliver us into issues of subjectivity. […] Descriptions of rooms, for
instance, point to the question of Fanny’s subject position” (Rohrbach “Austen’s Later Subjects” 739). As well as organising movement—spatially and temporally—the country house, therefore, offers scope for realising subjectivity and comprehending the complex interiority of character. Thinking in the novel is rarely a straightforward matter. Thought, unremarked yet correspondent and dialogic, supplies the metaphysical “action” of the novel. The thoughts of character, narrator, author, and the generically organised thoughts we call convention, culture, and society, all inform and challenge the reader to identify their complex structures and interconnections. Thought offers possibilities that cannot be contained within the story—unexplored territory, willed experiences, and apprehensions—and not surprisingly proves to be an important organisational feature in that it offers the alternatives against which the narrative strives. Alan Palmer identifies this important aspect of the novel’s organisation when he writes of Bakhtin’s sensitivity to the “inherently dialogic nature of inner utterance” by which we come to understand the “complex relationship between the inaccessibility to others of a character’s thought, and the extent to which the same thought is social, public, and available to others in the storyworld” (Palmer “Fictional Minds” 39). Indeed, the organisation of thought in the novel hinges upon its sociability or otherwise—upon questions of transparency, and the interaction and involvement of the unremarked. As Palmer has identified, thought is both public and private in that some motivations are apparent whereas others are not, and the novel replicates this demarcation of social and secret thoughts within the mind. This is achieved rhetorically by making meaning, as it relates to the thoughts of characters, explicit or implicit. It represents thoughts explicitly by openly engaging the remarked and unremarked of other characters and events, thereby revealing their inherently dialogic nature; this may or may not produce gestures that respond to the circumstances at hand—it may result in self-restraint, or it may in fact describe gestures or thoughts that are more antisocial than social. Then, of course, beneath this layer of explicitly defined and reported thought lies thought that is discernible only by


163 As William Galperin writes, “the missed opportunity in Austen figures an alternative history: a history that, while unfulfilled and unwritable, does not lack a material sanction, which proves the sanction, in turn, for something that lingers in the face of disappointment or even in the felicity of marital closure.” William H. Galperin, “‘Describing What Never Happened’: Jane Austen and the History of Missed Opportunities,” *ELH* 73.2 (2006): 357.

implication: those thoughts that a character “guards” for whatever reason—whether because they lack awareness of themselves, are highly self-disciplined, self-conscious, or deceitful. These thoughts are rhetorically marked as inaccessible to other characters, or even to the thinker themselves, by their being all but inaccessible to the reader—they are marked off in the way that private zones are demarcated in the home: that is, a geometrically figured distinction operates in all spatial metaphors. A line is drawn between private and public thought, with private thoughts contained within an imagined shape that readily fits the geometrical principles at work behind the built structures inhabited by people.

Fanny has her private spaces within the household, in particular her bedchamber (the white attic room), which, though referred to, is never accessed by the reader. She also has her personal public space. Claire Lamont finds that “the former school-room renamed the East Room, is a metaphor of” Fanny’s “inner life” (Lamont “Domestic Architecture” 230). I would suggest, however, that it represents a liminal zone between Fanny’s private inner world and the more demanding social spaces of the country house, with that private world largely pitched beyond the intrusive scope of the narrative. As a liminal space it is vulnerable to the intrusion of anyone who might seek Fanny out (see, for example, Austen Mansfield Park 168). The possibility of being intruded upon is further heightened because of the nature of the house in which Fanny! resides. Nonetheless, we find Fanny in her sanctuary at times of crisis and reflection, or when simply in need of respite from the sociality of country house. The country house therefore offers a thematic characterisation of a deeper structural metaphor at work in this novel—that of being appropriately within and without the different social spaces that make up the worlds inhabited by characters, together with the particular constraints placed upon individuals in the negotiation of social space as these are defined through the principles of propriety applicable in each circumstance.

Fanny’s East room is, in a sense, the limit and extent of her authority in terms of space. The rest of the house (apart from her private chamber, at least in the immediate

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165 Austen writes: “The room had then become useless, and for some time was quite deserted, except by Fanny.” Austen, Mansfield Park 151.

sense of authority) comprises spaces whose access and usage is determined by others; and this, as much as any social standing, class distinction, or relations of service, subordinates Fanny to those members of the household who are not restricted in this way. Lady Bertram, for example, is described at the outset of the novel as “a woman who spent her days in sitting, nicely dressed, on a sofa” (Austen *Mansfield Park* 19); and thereafter, for the length of the novel, her idling goes unremarked by those around her. Bodies therefore move in space and in doing so respond to, at the same time as they demarcate, the social borders of their world: the zones of privacy, sociability, familiarity, subordination, and the liminal spaces that enable the intersection of the social positions that are produced. The tempo of activity is delimited according to the codes governing these spaces, with disruptions to temporal convention signalling a breach of social order as much as a change in place or pace—as instanced by the rowdiness of the Price household.

Standing proud as a symbol of aristocratic tranquillity, the country house reflects, in its implicated authority, the institutionalisation of courteous behaviour in the organisation of space within the house and the co-ordination of activity in and around it. The country house in Austen’s day possessed both grandeur and aesthetic appeal, with an extravagance calculated to excite awe and admiration (Wall *The Prose of Things* 186). Indeed, their owners anticipated their public nature: country houses like Mansfield Park and nearby Sotherton were open to members of the gentry for visiting, and this sometimes determined those extravagances, particularly in terms of the ornaments and statuary which filled these homes and their pleasure grounds (Mandler *The Fall and Rise of the Stately Home* 3-10). Mansfield Park and Sotherton are therefore more than private homes: they are monoliths divided into publicly accessible zones, private chambers, and

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liminal spaces that mediate between the wider public and the privacy of the household. Privacy here defends more than sleeping quarters and dressing rooms; it also guarantees the sanctity of kitchens, pantry, servants’ quarters and any other working spaces designed to maintain the serene administration of public zones; indeed, the virtual absence of the serving classes and the spaces they inhabit in Austen’s novels might operate as a gesture of propriety itself.

Space, therefore, is never wholly one thing or another; rather, the individuals who occupy the spaces within the country house are constantly negotiating their borders and their uses according to convention and their own authority and desires. Thus, the spaces of the country house do more than govern movement, for over and above the organisation of privilege and the subordination of inferiors, Austen’s novel privileges the spatiotemporal properties of the country house to such an extent that its borders (and the patterns of behaviour and movement these demand) are replicated in the workings of its protagonist’s mind. Fanny Price governs her thoughts as if those thoughts inhabited a space as formidable, as magnificent and as emotionally austere as the public spaces of a grand country house, with its reception rooms, its libraries, its refined parlours and its elegant dining rooms. Just as conversation in these real spaces must be governed by propriety, so a character’s thoughts must be controlled and kept within the bounds of what is socially or contextually acceptable. In Austen’s novel, the propriety that governs the interactions of young women who are “out” in society is effectively revealed through narrative strategies that get behind the outward shows of gesture and spoken word to appraise the inner thoughts of characters. Although mediated through narrative voice, the orientation of free indirect discourse to mood corresponding to character, rather than to narrator, opens up the mind of the character in a way that circumvents any habits of self-censure. A novel like Mansfield Park, narrated as it is in the third person, deploys those strategies that effectively give access to the thoughts of characters through description and focalisation. ¹⁶⁹ Thoughts might manifest in such a text explicitly yet unwittingly of their thinkers, who interact with others according to their outward social

¹⁶⁹ “Hence, contrary to the logic of its epigrammatism, Austen Style finds its most congenial expression in the Novel, where it splits into two mutually exclusive, and definitive, states of being: (godlike) narration and (all-too-human) character.” Miller, Jane Austen, or the Secret of Style 42. See also Roy Pascal, The Dual Voice: Free Indirect Speech and Its Functioning in the Nineteenth-Century European Novel (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977).
displays, or else be revealed by implication—suggesting a lack of self-awareness, or repression; but, in a novel like *Mansfield Park*, with its emphasis on propriety, it might equally represent a form of self-command, suggesting that the management of interiority through the demarcation of “public” (or readable) thought and private sense or feeling is a distinction between thought that one permits oneself to entertain and thought that must be contained. In other words, thought itself becomes something that is either in or out—private or public—*within* the interiority of the mind. Fanny’s reported thoughts, for example, are consciously overwritten with “concerns” that contradict her implicit desire (see Austen *Mansfield Park* 366-67). She internalises the authority of her superiors, in conflict with her private imperatives, and only rarely admits the conflict to herself:

> To think of him as Miss Crawford might be justified in thinking, would in her be insanity. To her, he could be nothing under any circumstances—nothing dearer than a friend. Why did such an idea occur to her even enough to be reprobated and forbidden? It ought not to have touched on the confines of her imagination. (Austen *Mansfield Park* 264-65)

As Ruth Bernard Yeazell writes of this passage, Fanny, “the alert mental housekeeper has [... ] quickly spotted” the transgressing thought “and rushed to remove it” (Yeazell “Boundaries” 144). The distinction is that Mary Crawford may think of Edmund with romantic interest, Fanny may not. Mary’s thoughts may dwell upon the subject of marriage to Edmund, but Fanny must exercise restraint and banish the unspoken even from the realm of thought. Yet given that thought is itself a private matter, just where is she supposed to banish it to? The answer must surely be somewhere deep within the mind itself, since to push it outside the spatial bounds suggested by the metaphor would logically entail making it public.

Thus, the demarcating mind, in which thoughts are either allowed or forbidden, reveals itself to be a mind that is divided into “public” and “private” spaces. Fanny’s mind has its private chambers, we might suspect, given the narrator’s remark that she “must have been a happy creature in spite of all that she felt or thought she felt, for the distress of those around her” (Austen *Mansfield Park* 461, emphasis added). This statement describes Fanny’s mental state after she has successfully secured Edmund as

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her future husband and after the near death of his elder brother Tom and the adultery of their sister Maria. It reveals Fanny to be the possessor of feelings she does not acknowledge or recognise. Those feelings might best be characterised as thoughts which she fails to express coherently to herself: sentiments and desires operating within a private domain of unexamined thought. Fanny’s desire for Edmund may be constantly welling in the background. We might, as readers, be annoyed with her silence on the subject. But Fanny, as Yeazell points out, is consistent in this one respect: she does not allow herself to think openly of Edmund in this way, for when the idea briefly surfaces, she swiftly sweeps it aside: if Fanny’s mind is itself metaphorically a mansion, then she persists in respecting the private spaces of that house as much as she respects the authority of Mansfield Park’s other inhabitants—Sir Thomas Bertram, in particular.

Ishiguro’s *The Remains of the Day*, set in the years including and surrounding World War II, is also concerned with the propriety required by social visibility. For its narrator, Stevens, the kind of propriety with which he deals is that determined by standards of professional behaviour. Less concerned with his own socialising, Stevens is a professional keeper of propriety insofar as it is his responsibility, as butler, to maintain the standards of gentility pertaining to Darlington Hall’s cultural superiority as home to the elite. His role is ostensibly to manage the “socialising” of his employer, Lord Darlington, by ensuring that everything runs smoothly and seemingly without effort or strain. Maintaining “a dignity in keeping with his position” becomes the guiding principle by which he lives (Ishiguro *Remains* 33). Not surprisingly, this requires considerable self-command in order to conceal from Lord Darlington and his guests the ordinary and the more pivotal crises of day-to-day life, the most notable being the death of Stevens’s father within the Hall during a highly charged political conference (97-111). Indeed, the life of the serving classes, in general, is largely outside Lord Darlington’s perception, taking place in those peripheral quarters (33) and “back corridor[s]” (89) of the house where servants gather or pass. Away from those back corridors, when performing duties in and around the house proper, servants are subject to self-regulating propriety on a scale that exceeds that demanded by the elite whom they serve. This is evident when Stevens Senior collapses with a heavily laden tray before Lord Darlington and his guests in the lead up to his eventual decline and death. Implicated in the various responses to the event is the mortifying realisation of impropriety—and the loss of that “precious jewel” (Ishiguro *Remains* 52), dignity—as though Stevens Senior had behaved improperly by collapsing so publicly. The response, which is to relegate the old man to less public
duties, emphasises the nature of the breach, representing, as it does, very little by way of concern for his wellbeing. In contrast, when one of Lord Darlington’s guests over-exerts himself while at leisure as a tourist in London (94), the condition of his feet is repeatedly called to the attention of the professional serving classes (which include the doctor, called to attend the dying Stevens Senior). M. Dupont’s feet are exposed, bathed and drawn to Stevens’s attention “every few hours” (Ishiguro Remains 95), demonstrating Dupont’s superiority in every respect by emphasising, through such explicit means, what would otherwise be an excessive and thereby improper publicising of one’s own bodily needs.

Stevens negotiates the spatialised expectations of the country house with greater confidence than Fanny Price because he is able to incorporate these into the requirements of his profession as butler. Propriety, as in Mansfield Park, works two ways in this novel by securing the subordinate’s deference to authority, which is offered in direct response to the superior’s implied authority. Viewed in this light, Stevens’s repeated emphasis on dignity, and its manifestation in manners, reveals itself as an attempt to locate honour in subordination. For Stevens, subordination becomes a choice when translated into self-command rather than forbearance. Ishiguro explores the extent of the oppressive effect of these power relations upon the mentality of the servant by constructing a character that takes his role in sustaining propriety to extremes. Even outside the performance of his duties, Stevens mediates his relations through his professional capacity, with the result that his excessive civility translates as coldness. In this sense he is blending in with the wrong crowd, so to speak, by abjuring the emotionalism of the lower classes with whom he works and evincing the repression of “the frigid upper classes” (Mandler English National Character 171) for whom he works. Coldly expressed courtesy comes to describe all his interactions, cutting him off from the lower classes, with the result that the working class expressiveness and warmth of Darlington Hall’s housekeeper, Miss Kenton, eventually gives way to self-defensive behaviour and finally to insults (Ishiguro Remains 230; see also Fluet “Immaterial Labours”). Stevens, we might say, is in the habit of privileging propriety over emotion, through his adherence to what Rebecca Walkowitz calls “professional formalism: an ideal

of grace under pressure, which means maintaining one’s role under any condition, no matter how alarming or dangerous” (Walkowitz “Unimaginable Largeness” 233). Invariably, however, he comes across as conflicted and smelling of inconsistency, if not duplicity.

Amateurism was, by the 1960s at least, a well-established if lamented guiding principle of Britain’s ruling classes (Mandler English National Character 106-07). Its antithesis, professionalism, while seemingly situated above the rote activity of the undisciplined masses, nonetheless relates to the performance of duties of employment rather than the duty of moral imperative claimed by the elite in their “well-meaning” amateurism. Stevens’s “professionalism” therefore marks him as a member of the working classes. Lord Darlington effectively sees professional behaviour as a euphemism for duplicity (Ishiguro Remains 107)—as indeed it is, in a sense, if we consider that, for Stevens at least, it entails performing, or inhabiting, a role (43). Seen in this light, Stevens’s desire to inhabit his professional role represents a desire to erase all trace of the mimetic nature of his gestures: by eliding all signs of a private self, Stevens implicitly and erroneously believes that he will overcome the duplicity of his public performance, so abhorrent to his employer. Dignity becomes Stevens’s mantra (McCombe “The End of (Anthony) Eden” 95) in effect because it signals the reification of aristocratic propriety—of the man performing his duties with such immersion in the culture of propriety as to be the physical manifestation of those very ideals. In disguising his working-class status, therefore, Stevens is not striving for higher social status; rather, he is erasing those signs that might remind Lord Darlington of his personhood—creating the “illusion of absence” (Ishiguro Remains 75) by which he conceals or masks his difference, if not his person.

If the insertion of outside time through misplaced responsibility serves to quicken the pace in Remains, and the imposition of country-house time upon a space outside its borders has a moderating effect in Mansfield Park, then Woolf’s novel succeeds in conveying this effect in what are ostensibly structural terms—terms that govern the

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organisation of the narrative itself. Demarcating time to its central passage by a section that links the two halves of the country-house narrative in the same way that a Palladium-style passage might unite two wings of a stately home, *Lighthouse* captures a sense of time in its structure.175 Privileging time within interior space in the first instance (in the section entitled “The Window”) by effectively halting time outside the home through the forestalling of events outside it, external (or world) time is reinstated in this novel by the return to the Ramsays’ summer home and the completion of those tasks that had been left undone. The internal and external environment of “The Window” and “The Lighthouse” are thus connected by the metaphoric passage of time given in the middle section, “Time Passes.”

*Lighthouse*, in this way, blends the temporality of both ordinary (material decline of the aging house) and catastrophic (world war) *time passing* with country-house time in order to reach its conclusion—in order for the past of childhood summer holidays to release its hold, and time, once again, be allowed to move on. This integration is itself prefigured in the first part of the novel where time’s passing outside the house is effectively arrested (the journey to the lighthouse is never begun and Lily’s painting is interrupted). Here, in contrast to *Remains* and *Mansfield Park*, the chronotopic elements of the country house are symbolically given in clearly defined geometrical terms. Mrs. Ramsay is annoyed that “every door [in the house] was left open,” for this contributes to the shabbiness “of human relations, how flawed they are, how despicable” (Woolf *Lighthouse* 48), reflections which undermine her edict of civility (32).176 In contrast, the material shabbiness that Mrs. Ramsay notes of the furnishings in her home is seemingly naturalised as the inevitable consequence of living according to the full scope of such a grand house by filling it with a large family and array of companions (31-32). Indeed, the explicit description of the house’s decline in this early section of the novel is trumped by

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175 Woolf’s own notes for the novel are consistent with this analysis for they depict the palladium layout as “Two blocks joined by a corridor.” See Lee, “Introduction,” xiv.

176 Leaving doors open overcomes privacy, as Mrs. Ramsay’s thoughts reveal: “She listened. The drawing-room door was open; the hall door was open; it sounded as if the bedroom doors were open; and certainly, the window on the landing was open, for she had opened that herself. That windows should be open, and doors shut – simple as it was, could none of them remember it?” Woolf, *Lighthouse* 32-33.
the height of sociability attained within it around the dinner table, the result of sustained moments of self-command (see Matro “Only Relations” 217-18).177

The social superiority of the country house depends upon self-mastery of the kind Mrs. Ramsay commands at the dinner table, but it also relies upon the personal mastery of every individual involved—the self-command that enables one to overcome one’s inclinations in the interests of the social group. This ideal of intersubjective unity, which is artificially achieved through interactive and sustaining gestures of propriety, nonetheless relies upon Mrs. Ramsay, who must perform as an agent of harmony in order to facilitate the brief moment of unity that eventually comes from this enforced sociability.178 Mrs. Ramsay notably covets the table centrepiece as the symbolic landscape in which she might roam free of any need to close doors. This arrangement, formed by her daughter Rose and comprising grapes, pears and bananas in a large seashell, supplies a submerged landscape (brought up from the bottom of the sea):

Thus brought up suddenly into the light it seemed possessed of great size and depth, was like a world in which one could take one’s staff and climb up hills, she thought, and go down valleys, and to her pleasure (for it brought them into sympathy momentarily) she saw that Augustus too feasted his eyes on the same plate of fruit, plunged in, broke off a bloom there, a tassel here, and returned, after feasting, to his hive. That was his way of looking, different from hers. But looking together united them. (Woolf Lighthouse 105-06)

A symbolic relation between the table ornament and the diners is signalled in the paragraph that introduces the fruit platter: “Now eight candles were stood down the

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178 See Paul Tolliver Brown, “Relativity, Quantum Physics, and Consciousness in Virginia Woolf’s to the Lighthouse,” Journal of Modern Literature 32.3 (2009): 45: “Mrs. Ramsay’s orchestrations and influence also extend beyond the ordered table. Not only does she arrange the spaces that surround her according to a form she both intuits and creates, but she is capable of attracting and influencing elements that at first appear outside of her control. […] Not only does the relative force of Mrs. Ramsay bring others together spatially, but she also has the capacity to warp and slow time.”
table, and after the first stoop the flames stood upright and drew with them into visibility the long table entire, and in the middle a yellow and purple dish of fruit” (Woolf Lighthouse 105). This account of candles lighting up the long table is almost immediately repeated—this time to emphasise the faces that are arranged along it: “Now all the candles were lit, and the faces on both sides of the table were brought nearer by the candle-light” (106). Unity is also emphasised by the shutting out of the night, with the world outside obscured by the windowpanes shimmering like the sea from which the treasured bowl of fruit seems to come. Then, it is, that “[s]ome change at once went through them all” (106), that change being the unity of the marooned upon a desert isle, which of course romantically refigures their presence on the Isle of Skye (11) by pitching that event as though it were taking place in a mythical landscape and in broadly metaphoric, rather than actual, terms: “and they were all conscious of making a party together in a hollow, on an island; they had their common cause against all that fluidity out there” (106).

The fluidity of the outside world is metaphorically the ocean of turmoil that characterises the temporal world—the world from which this small party has been momentarily evacuated, with the allusion to their being “shipwrecked” and safely huddled together in a warm hollow by the shore. Hence the reinstatement of outside time in the novel’s middle section, “Time Passes,” has a devastating effect upon the country house in this novel. External time is released from the static hold of the country house through the material decline of that house and its household. This release is given symbolically in the final section through key members of the household entering into and completing the journey to the lighthouse and through the finalisation of Lily Briscoe’s painting. Yet world time—that is, time outside the stultifying effects of the country house—is depicted in the lengthy passage of time within the middle section of the novel. This section narrates the death of key figures—deaths that significantly take place elsewhere. Momentous change is thus represented in this narrative as though off-stage and signalled here (in this early stage of the novel) as the dark, fluid, timeless and abstract condition of the world seen (or not seen) through the windowpane.

In literal terms, the fluidity “out there” is the watery impression conveyed by the darkness seen—not as a space, but as an amorphous colour that is only given definition by the shape of the closed window—and by which the diners are isolated from society outside. Mrs. Ramsay’s fleeting moment of unity, which recaptures what Lily strives to
represents as she paints Mrs. Ramsay and James framed by the terrace window, loses shape when the mediating influence of sociality can no longer be ignored, and sense must be made of what is said. Perhaps this is the product of the thinker’s attempt to fix it in her memory as an event arranged within a certain social space, for it is not the memory that one longs to retrieve. Memory, in effect, is the condition that obliterates the event of being intersubjectively united in the moment. This is emphasised structurally in *To the Lighthouse* by the removal of time’s passing in a subjective sense from the objective realisation of major changes (war and depredation) to the country house itself and to its social relations (in the reported deaths of Prue, Andrew and Mrs. Ramsay). In contrast to Austen’s text, in which the temporal quality of the country house is clearly upheld, Woolf notes the depredations of time and the corroding influence of nature pitted against the country house and its manicured grounds. In another sense, however, it can also be said that Woolf pitches the country house beyond the sphere of time’s influence: death becomes ambiguous, doubtful, and is dealt with almost ambivalently by those who return to occupy the Ramsays’ summer home.

Rectangles, as the primary structural component of the country house, represent, in this novel, human relations mediated through the organising rhetoric of formal space. These formal human relations might be likened to what Thomas Matro identifies in the aesthetic relation in terms of “the unity created by displacing shapes, masses, and colors” (Matro “Only Relations” 214). Triangular shapes are represented as purely

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179 Matro writes: “This vision of unity, which entails a merging, a disappearing of any sense of separation, differs from the unity created by displacing shapes, masses, and colors, ‘the attractions of the eye,’ around a central line that, by a process of juxtaposition, emphasizes the relations among the elements but paradoxically implies their separateness. The aesthetic relations Lily plans to establish are thus quite unlike the human relationships she desires but strikingly similar to the relationships and feelings she experiences.” Thomas G Matro, “Only Relations: Vision and Achievement in *To the Lighthouse*,” *PMLA* 99.2 (1984): 214. Ultimately, these mediated relations drive the desire for a sense of unity that is unattainable in this form, for it can only achieved by accident, as it were—by the accident of nature that enables Mrs. Ramsay and Mr. Bankes to achieve mutual empathy over a “specially tender piece” of beef, whereby “all his love, all his reverence had returned; and she knew it.” Woolf, *Lighthouse* 109, 97. That Mrs. Ramsay desired the beef to be tender, that it was, and that Bankes was impressed by its tenderness, succeeds in creating the intimacy Lily strives for in human relations because it is not concerned
relational (that is not reified in built structures) and unmediated, being the product of natural objects existing in relation to one another in a state of contingency, for these relations might dissolve at any moment and reform at another.\footnote{Importantly, “[i]t is through ‘the moment’ that [Woolf] works out her literary impressionism”: Banfield, “Time Passes” 486.} Triangles are also an important compositional element in aesthetic creations of the sort depicted in the novel through Lily Briscoe’s painting. The novel, however, eschews the classical rhetoric of the triangle as a component of design and addresses it as an object of study, with its objective form demonstrated in relational terms (mother and child, Mrs. Ramsay and James, sitting upon the sofa that looks out upon the terrace). These contingent triangular forms, which manifest rhythmically as waves (Woolf \textit{Lighthouse} 69) or briefly as shadows (“as a wedge of darkness” [69-70]) and other forms, together with the socially embodied rectangular spaces of the country house—produce what Randi Koppen characterises as Woolf’s “distinguishing between the experiencing body and the body as ‘what one says and does,’ the social body” (Koppen “Embodied Form” 380).\footnote{Lily Briscoe, for example, thought of “how life, from being made up of little separate incidents which one lived one by one, became curled and whole like a wave which bore one up with it and threw one down with it, there, with a dash on the beach.” Woolf, \textit{Lighthouse} 53. Randi Koppen, “Embodied Form: Art and Life in Virginia Woolf’s \textit{to the Lighthouse},” \textit{New Literary History} 32.2 (2001).} Such distinctions, however, belie any conception of selfhood as intricately informed by the social and postulates an essential self at odds with the social world rather than intimately integrated and formed by it.

Thus Mr. Ramsay’s emotional expressiveness offends propriety because it disrupts the tidiness of this demarcation (see Woolf \textit{Lighthouse} 23). His glazed expression while ranting poetry and stumbling into a private conversation between Lily Briscoe and William Bankes claims propriety falsely through negation, as if to say, \textit{You are in my world because I cannot see you}. It implies that in \textit{their} seeing him, Lily and Bankes have “entered” where they ought not to intrude. Ramsay’s interiority, when externalised in this way, makes the social sphere of his country house his personal private space, contradicting the sociability of his wife and the actions that sustain the participation of his guests. Mrs. with its own appearance (its social “aesthetic” value), in the way that the mediated relations controlling the dinner-table conversation are.
Ramsay’s thoughts pursue this inconsistency by defining the breach architecturally: windows, she thinks, should be open, doors closed, since closed doors prevent intrusions of this sort. That this edict is rebelliously enacted through the slamming of doors (Woolf *Lighthouse* 28) and the communication of private moments through thin partitions upstairs (12), with communication taking place between husband and wife/father and child via a window opening onto the terrace (36-37), emphasises the dysfunction of spatial relationships operating within this household, which result in embarrassing intrusions like Ramsay’s. Nonetheless, the use of architectural space to figure dysfunction serves to deflect the immediate embarrassments associated with any such breaches of propriety: guests who feel they have intruded upon a private moment are bamboozled by the ambiguity of the moment—*just who is responsible?*—since it is possible that they, themselves, have misinterpreted the use of space, and are out of step with the organisation of the country house (see, for example, Woolf *Lighthouse* 23).

The personalities of the inhabitants of the Ramsay household are therefore mediated by the architectural spaces of the house. Interiority is transformed through social interaction: Mr. Ramsay is eccentrically performing his thoughts and the performative nature of his behaviour defines it as social, despite its apparently antisocial aspect. He means to be heard. His guests may be left with a feeling of having intruded, but it is Ramsay who invariably intrudes upon their physical space by “blundering” into the garden where Lily and Mr. Bankes are politely conversing. The social body, as a geometrically defined space, enables the correspondence of these personal responses, whose intercourse represents “meditations on the relationship between spatiotemporal placement (of objects, bodies) and memory, between the body in space and in sense-making, (auto)biographical project (understanding the other and one’s experience; how and what one remembers and understands)” (Koppen “Embodied Form” 384). In Lily’s painting, for example, the personal and natural aspect of the self in relation to itself and others (a triangular form) is framed within the social (rectangular) self: the woman sitting with her son upon a sofa and visible through an open window. Woolf’s novel emphasises the restrictive nature of these embodied social relations—formulated around the dining table, or illustrated conceptually as a kitchen table (which Lily is told to imagine as a means of explaining Ramsay’s philosophy of subject and object [Woolf *Lighthouse* 28]).

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182 As Michael Lackey writes: “Indeed, as a philosopher, Mr. Ramsay has adopted a metaphysician’s perspective of the world, which is to say that he sees the world through the
Lily significantly imagines the table scrubbed clean and wedged in the fork of a pear tree—a rectangle lodged in a triangle. Thus, Ramsay’s native self—his “fiery unworldliness” (Woolf *Lighthouse* 29)—is given in Lily’s imagination as Ramsay’s outer form; his social self is concealed within the rough raw energy of his native, or natural, self. This is in stark contrast to the way Lily sees Mrs. Ramsay, as a triangular form framed by a window. This difference between husband and wife means that the possibility for social relations is affected by the roughness of Ramsay’s native self-exposed to view, and the concealment of what ought to be the outer cultured layer governing social relations. In Ramsay, what ought to be his available and external self, out on show for all the world to see, is given to philosophy and stuck in an impractical position within the fork of a tree. The consequence is his awkward manner and rudeness—the metaphorical absence of the thinker in the public domain: Mr. Ramsay, “hung round with that solitude which seemed to be his natural air” (Woolf *Lighthouse* 25) is mentally “absent” at dinner as he broods “like a person in a dream” (Woolf *Lighthouse* 77), just as he is characterised as materially absent from the ideas he reaches for through the image of the isolated kitchen table. This is in stark contrast to the feminine embodiment of the natural self, which entails the recognition of an internal form (most notably a wedge-shaped core that reproduces itself in shadows and in the transient shapes of table decorations and waves) that subsides at those moments when social unity is required. The wedge-shaped core cedes to the authority of social relations around a perceptual lens of ‘angular essences.’ So if Mr. Ramsay were to experience ‘lovely evenings, with all their flamingo clouds and blue and silver,’ he would reduce it all ‘to a white deal four-legged tabled.’ (Michael Lackey, “Modernist Anti-Philosophism and Virginia Woolf’s Critique of Philosophy,” *Journal of Modern Literature* 29.4 (2006): 83.

183 While sailing in the company of four others and on looking back to the shore “He had found the house and so seeing it, he had seen himself walking on the terrace, alone.” Woolf, *Lighthouse* 181.

184 “But the great irony persistently ignored in criticism of the novel is that the ‘shape’ of Mrs. Ramsay’s and Lily’s creations is the very shape of the confusion they and others experience, not the shape of some idealistic oneness or of some reality that only art can uncover and then hold. Though Lily believes Mrs. Ramsay could make ‘of the moment something permanent’ and hopes that her own painting might likewise capture life, what Mrs. Ramsay’s creation and Lily’s painting finally ‘capture’ is the experience, the common process of thought as the two women worry over questions about instability and permanence, chaos and shape, knowledge of another or
dining table, or else is transiently manifested in the relation between mother and child symbolically framed in a window.

Social unity, as it is embodied through the submission of the feminine personality to the social space at hand, nonetheless achieves a reconfiguration of the shape at the centre of its being through the relational shape of social unity: personal unity or coherence (a wedge-shape core) submits to the artificial structure of the social (represented as the gathering around a rectangular table), shaping that event into a new unity that is briefly embodied through a succession of relations which result in the achievement of an ineluctable intersubjective (social) understanding. As Ann Banfield observes: “Mrs. Ramsay’s gathering together the disparate company around the table stills, solidifies: ‘Mrs. Ramsay saying, “Life stand still here”; Mrs. Ramsay making of the moment something permanent (as in another sphere Lily herself tried to make of the moment something permanent)—this was of the nature of a revelation. In the midst of chaos there was shape; this eternal passing and flowing … was struck into stability’… The sense-data become a solid object” (Banfield [quoting from *Lighthouse*] “Time Passes” 494-95). For Lily Briscoe, it is the realisation of a self through bodily movement, and the insignificance of the artwork itself except as the record of the artist’s embodied gestures (Koppen “Embodied Form” 382) that succeeds. Her unconcern for what might happen to her painting (that the Ramsays might stow it under a sofa, in the attic, or throw it away [Woolf *Lighthouse* 173]) depends upon the value she holds for this expression of her self to herself: Lily (in the final section of this novel) has achieved a kind of intersubjective experience of self, mediated by the perceived presence of Mrs. Ramsay’s form upon the sofa, casting a triangular shadow upon the terrace long after her death. This relational network overlays the chronotopic structure of the novel, giving it a dimensionality that enables the integration of subjectivity and structural metaphor: “the aesthetic techniques of juxtaposition and contrast and the subsequent emphasis on ‘relations’ as first explained in Lily’s references to her painting appear in every aspect of the novel: the attitudes and responses of all major characters, the styles, the scene development, the sentence structure, as well as the novel’s division into three parts—all betray a similar ‘design’” (Matro “Only Relations” 216). And, being divided into three, the novel

ignorance, and love or hate.” Matro, “Only Relations: Vision and Achievement in *to the Lighthouse*,” 219.
structurally gestures toward those unmediated relations rather than itself in reified form
as a finished object (the novel may equate with Lily’s painting, as critics have suggested,
by evincing a rectangular form, but Woolf wants us to see the process of its making,
which is symbolically triangular) (Matro “Only Relations” 212, 217).

These geometrical aspects are always available to the novelist and may be
represented in various ways. In *Floating World* the narrator Masuji Ono’s house is
architecturally significant in that it possesses features uncommon to most Japanese
houses. A garden corridor, a long annex looking out onto the garden, runs between the
two wings of the house, which stand at some distance from each other. This corridor
links the east and west wings, although the latter is never described in these terms but is
designated as the main house. The name of the east wing clearly associates it with the
East (as the Orient is to the Occident), but also to the past through a reference to it as
the home of the architect’s parents: “This corridor was so extravagant in its length that
some people have suggested Sugimura built it – together with the east wing – for his
parents, whom he wished to keep at a distance” (Ishiguro *Floating World* 11). This past is
both ancient (a place of ancestors and the old orient) and modern (the pre-war era cut
off from the present and the future through the depredations of war). Importantly, “[t]he
bulk of the bomb damage had been to this section of the house,” with lesser damage
sustained to what we might identify as the west wing of the house (Ishiguro *Floating
World* 11). Thus, a contemporary space that has relevance to the world in which the
novel is narrated, is given in terms that enable a corresponding chronotopic value that
casts it as remote in space and time. Yet what is an eccentric architectural style in
Japanese terms is common enough in British and European mansions as the palladium
style in which wings are linked by a central causeway— as the composition of Woolf’s
novel (with its two halves joined by the passage of time) is in the palladium style. The use
of this architectural form, as it is employed here and in Ishiguro’s novel, suggests that the
palladium style signals a disconnection between the past and the future. In *Floating World,*
it signals a disconnection between East and West, along with a loss of wealth and status.
In Woolf’s novel, the syntagmatic framework implies that the lengthy passage of time
depicted in “Time Passes” unites the two sections either side of it by functioning like a
dark passage from which a child sets out and eventually emerges as an adult.

Anxieties of selfhood might be said to characterise these novels’ different
engagements with issues of propriety and interiority, revealing in each case different
reflections upon the dangers of exposure that selfhood, as interiority, threatens. In Ishiguro’s novel, we encounter in Stevens the more contemporary and possibly anachronistically postmodern fear of there being no self to be found. In Austen we meet the anxiety of there being too much self (in terms of character as something in need of shaping and restraint), whereas Woolf’s novel counters the confidence invested in self-restraint by suggesting that the self, when overwritten in this way with its social cares, becomes submerged, contained, inscrutable and possibly disempowered. In exploring selfhood in these oblique terms, To the Lighthouse, Mansfield Park and The Remains of the Day emphasise, in the uses each make of domestic interior space, the importance of propriety in the management of the country house’s social spaces. This is further replicated in the stylisation of thought as either overt or tacit: explicit and out, or contained in that it is expressible only by implication. Thus, it is possible to portray thought as being either or both observable, with an exteriority akin to speech, or hidden and interior, with potentially undecipherable meanings. The representation of such paradoxical qualities succeeds in the novel when thought is taken outside its closed realm (where it remains unexpressed) and is given expression through the same strategies that might apply to speech. This objectively unnatural, unmimetic procedure (of expressing the unexpressed) demands correlations with the reader’s subjective experience of thinking and perceiving. It is because thought is such a private and enclosed experience that the representation of characters’ thoughts will be naturalised by the reader, transforms the character’s “form” of thinking into something recognisable to the reader’s experience. In this chapter I have demonstrated how this is achieved, not only through the conventional use of the structural metaphor that governs our understanding of subjectivity and of thought, but as this metaphor is integrated with the thematic relevancies that unite characters in an intersubjective organisation of thought as event. In this instance propriety supplies an integral unifying feature through which to interpret the disparate motivations and thoughts of characters. Woolf’s novel addresses these interior demarcations of self in psychological terms—using the geometrical forms of architecture and natural environment, apparent in the summer house by the sea, to signify zones of self whereby desire forms like a wave before it is consciously realised, and where public displays of the self to itself (within one’s interiority) compete to defeat or achieve their object. Stevens, similarly, relegates zones of his interiority to the authority of his lord and master to such an extent that he refuses to develop or entertain any opinion outside the realm of his butler’s duties. Whereas this is most clearly pronounced in terms of events that are
apparently politically driven, it results in an abrogation of moral responsibility that proves pervasive. A first-person narrative like Remains can only convey hidden or even discrepant thoughts by rhetorical modalities that get beneath the explicit expression of personal opinion and experience to reveal inconsistencies pointing to ulterior meaning. This strategy inevitably produces the effect of “unreliability” (Phelan Living to Tell About It 31)—presenting the narrator as dishonest, misleading, or emotionally repressed and lacking insight. Thus, it is not surprising that, in order to compensate for the diminution of his moral authority, Stevens pays excessive attention to the apparent “moral” responsibilities of the job at hand—in other words, his duties. Stevens’s failure to consider issues beyond his professional capacity forces him to develop his opinions on life more broadly in terms that render it analogous to the duties of a butler. This effectively diminishes the issue at hand such that only those aspects that can be equated to the role he himself undertakes or aspires to (that of professional servitude) enters the scope of his reflective capacities. The more nuanced and complicated aspects of political, moral and personal opinion are simply discarded as irrelevant, leading to the impoverishment of his character and life experience.

The question/issue of implied thought offers many challenges for the reader and critic alike, but it might be argued that narrative strategies like those employed in these novels create in the reader an awareness of the emotional register of character by means of a subliminal intonation of that subject’s submerged feelings and thoughts. With so much complexity and layering entailed in the construction of these enunciative aspects, the chronotope, through its generic flexibility—which gives it the capacity to quickly convey a sense of time and space and how subjects might move within those boundaries—provides the means to conceptualise what is otherwise impossible: the exteriority of interiority in the explicit expression of thought; and the sense of a more deeply unexpressed interior perception.

Conclusion. Metaphor, Genre: Tying and untying the knots of narrative

Wayne C. Booth notes in the opening to *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (1961)\(^\text{186}\) that pre-emptive knowledge and certainty in terms of character and motivation “has been present in most narrative until recent times”—“even Homer writes scarcely a page without some kind of direct clarification of motives, of expectations, and of the relative importance of events” (4). Booth is observing a condition that is denied us in reality—except rhetorically (rather than actually) through hindsight. Although empirical observation builds up a fair degree of stability in terms of meaning, in the literary work at least, it does so by insisting on the kind of precision and stability that fixes the terms of narrative to the syntagmatic dimension. This is achieved in structuralist accounts by making everything in narrative functional. Function addresses its lack—the absence of any form or content—by basically performing itself; that is, by being functional. What function lacks in terms of its own materiality (for it is wholly conceptual), it makes up for by the “reality” of its impact. It addresses its lack by being effective: this is a case of the conceptual moving the actual. It is the primary rhetorical aspect behind notions of causation and hence free will (without getting into questions of metaphysics and keeping to meaning as it is rhetorically instanced). Function is clearly a rhetorical product—an absent-presence. Yet we might say that this is the condition of any purpose or motive. Purpose and function are dialogically rhetorical relations in that they are responsible for uniting meaning and materiality within the speaker or thinker’s mind and/or speech where the thinker/speaker imputes motive as the internal attribute of some external form. This external form is most obviously seen in the instance of another person, but the rhetorical attribution of motive, purpose or effect is also achieved in relation to any object (animate or inanimate) when it is personified in the way that Gergen identifies in motive speech. Landscapes can therefore have “motive” by appearing sinister, for example, where there is no person to whom a sinister intention might be directly attributed; and so too function is necessarily personified by me in this paragraph in order that I might describe its rhetorical value in speech.

What is important in making these observations, insofar as the novel is concerned, is that the relation between a speaker and the objects personified in speech is always dialogical and intersubjective because the internal and external being of the other

is anticipated or given in dialogical terms within the mind/speech of the speaker. This
dialogical relation is a consequence of the way in which we construct meaning in diverse
terms. By identifying and utilising different kinds of meaning, it becomes possible to
relate these different forms to one another, dialogically: one form of meaning always
anticipates another and cannot stand in isolation. This can be seen in the notion of
function or relation itself. As an “empty” concept, the syntagmatic dimension of
meaning is incapable of going beyond its primary condition, which is explanatory of
mind and body, form and content, internal and external. Function is an empty category
because it is a relation rather than an object, and therefore relies upon the versatility of
form and content—a versatility that enables these kinds of meanings to shift their
metaphoric values into other kinds. By this I mean that what is given in semiotic terms
might, by altering the object to which it is conceptually contiguous, shift into a semantic
value and become content as opposed to form. The syntagmatic dimension lacks this
versatility because it can only refer. It is the condition of contiguity observed of space
and time, translated into conceptual conditions of metaphoric contiguity—as cause and
effect, as motive, as purpose and other conditional terms. This limitation—which is the
limitation of non-being—nonetheless produces something of value, which is certainty.
This is certainty in meaning as it relates to the material world. We can be certain that
inner relates to outer, for example, but what inner and what outer is always contingent. At
any moment, that which we designate external (the body, as a form with interior content)
can become internal (the body in the mind, or the body in the world). The effect of these
shifts entails an alteration in meaning, and the meaning that is ultimately “changed” is
meaning in its syntagmatic form. Shifting between the rhetorical dimensions of semantic
and semiotic value enables a corresponding shift in the purpose of the relation that is
contiguity. The condition of contiguity does not change, but its objects are constantly
moving in relation to one another, and this alters the value of contiguity, which is its
meaning. The syntagmatic thus becomes semantic—it is an internal quality: this is how
contiguity becomes motive. By attributing motive to a stable semiotic value or form, it
becomes possible to fix the otherwise oscillating relations between the semantic and
semiotic dimensions. Thus, meaning becomes the motive of the mind whose form is
given in person or, in the case of the novel, character. The “artificial” authority that
Booth observes necessarily results from construing meaning in relation to events when a
personality is not otherwise given as the author of any motive or intention. In such
instances, omniscience is the inevitable effect.
The eventfulness of narrative therefore requires a subject—an interior perspective—through which its relations of contiguity can be given. Thus Homer can be confident that the meanings he locates in relation to certain events are stable in a way that we ourselves cannot be certain of when contemplating the meanings pertinent to our lives. This effect of narrative is to fix metaphors as forms, each in specific syntagmatic relation to a semantic value, whilst retaining the advantage of rhetorical oscillation. This advantage means that, despite the fixing of meanings in relation to conceptual objects and events, it is possible to convey a plurality of meaning in different kinds. This is because one meaning is privileged as literal and all others are given as symbolic. This capacity for fixing the form of experience is responsible for the omnipotent “artificial” authority present in narratives like that of the Iliad (see Booth The Rhetoric of Fiction 4-5) because it reproduces, in metaphoric form, the materiality we associate with lived experience. Motive, which accounts for this artificial authority, is imputed to the metaphoric reality through the same process of attribution that is given in ordinary life, but in fiction it is fixed rather than contingent. The narrative “knows” where it is going, and this knowledge closes off the possibilities that would otherwise arise. Motive in fiction pre-empts narrative outcomes. In life, motive or intention are outside relations of spatiotemporal causation because they are interpretive—they are forms of meaning and do not describe material actions, as Gergen has noted, but internal states. In the novel, emphasis falls on the authority imputed to internal states as motive and intention affecting outcomes: fiction supplies a space in which it is possible to be certain that we have free will—that our choices have the desired and intended consequences that we anticipate—or, conversely, that God or fate intervenes and directs our lives. Thus, the artificial authority of narrative constructs an authorising presence. Omnipotence is built into narrative meaning and is either scaled back or inflected with other authorities according to the narrative style adopted. Integration is achieved through narrative, I argue, by the construal of voice, view and setting in respect to time and space—where setting is, like the body in the mind, brought within the interiority of a constructed subjectivity; time and space affect visual perception, and the spatiotemporal sensations of embodiment are represented in our metaphoric constructions of subjective and intersubjective experience in terms of what we call event.

In taking the novel as our focus in a study on the mediation of meaning, and by incorporating Johnson’s account of the importance of bodily experience in relating what we “know” to others, we can now say that it is a meaning’s likeness to our experiences as
embodied consciousness that makes it seem phenomenally real. The imputation of meaning to the world (and the transference of rhetorical relations to that world)—which Derrida uncovers in the works of Husserl (*Speech and Phenomena*), Lacan (“Le facteur”), and Rousseau (*Of Grammatology*)—is thus organised according to the principle of embodied consciousness. We occlude the metaphoric nature of meaning, however, by characterising it in terms that presume equivalences between speech and phenomena—in which case, the meaning is said to be literal. The designated literality of these metaphors reinforces our sense that the meanings we construct are real. The division we notice in terms of our bodily experiences—the division between body and mind—is reproduced in our conceptualisations of the phenomenal world and also in the meanings that we produce based on these literal concepts.

Metaphor proliferates by correspondence. Correspondences that are mediated by other minds and bodies are deemed to be like our own because we share the experience of embodiment; similarity in this context is thus the literality of an experience that is not our own. Novels rely on correspondences in these terms. Although conscious of their fictional status, readers will liken the experience of characters and narrators to their own experiences because these characters—even when their forms are described as vastly different to our own—are given to us in terms of embodiment through the metaphoric constructions of voice and visual perception, and of being in a world delimited in spatiotemporal terms in that the embodied consciousnesses of character and narrator are able to interact with the fictive world’s objects and thereby experience eventfulness. It does not matter that bodily existence is either denied or not described, since language is built upon metaphors of embodiment and these metaphors implicitly locate presence in absence, as Derrida has shown. With correspondences relatively easy to make—a matter

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187 Derrida’s differance—the absence of what is apparently presented—has relevance for narrative theory, for differance is also apparent in Blanchot’s exploration of the tale: just where is the tale itself, he asks—in the event, the telling of it, or is it a determined point toward which the tale-as-telling strives? “Yet if we regard the tale as the true telling of an exceptional event which has taken place and which someone is trying to report, then we have not even come close to sensing the true nature of the tale. The tale is not the narration of an event, but that event itself, the approach to that event, the place where that event is made to happen—an event which is yet to come and through whose power of attraction the tale can hope to come into being, too.” Blanchot “Song” 447. The tale, in other words, is as elusive as literature. It is what Blanchot identifies as the sirens’ promise.
of bringing things together, conceptually, or setting them apart—and our immediate experience resembling the meanings generated by metaphoric construction, we proceed to liken these meanings to other constructed meanings (made by ourselves and others) to such an extent that the resulting proliferation of metaphors constitutes our intersubjective world, and the individual worlds that comprise it—those worlds which Bakhtin calls chronotopes, a term that functions “almost as a metaphor (almost, but not entirely)” (Bakhtin Dialogic Imagination 84).

This intersubjective experience of eventfulness is what Valerie Nollan identifies as the chronotope. Nollan writes that “answerability is bound up with the ‘subjective experiencing’ of Russia as a ‘once-occurrent’ homeland.” Nolan describes Bakhtin’s discussion of the chronotope of Italy in Pushkin’s poem ‘Parting’ as “the ethical component of the aesthetic act” that “emerges only from writers’ ‘affirmed participation’ in a highly personalized, unrepeatable flow of events” (Nollan 77-78).188 Bakhtin’s essay on forms of time and the chronotope does not itself go so far as to establish its coherence in these terms. Yet, as the example from the much earlier work, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, shows, chronotopes are intersubjective spatiotemporalities delimited by motifs that relate to a generic eventfulness (as in the road, the castle, the town square, the country estate, the open field, the valley, the urban landscape, airport lounges, train stations, etc.) or by identification with a specific place (as in a particular country like Italy or Australia).

The concretising effect of the chronotope (see Mihailovic Corporeal Words 47)189 enables the enrichment of metaphor in visceral terms such that the space and time of reading cede to that given in relation to the various speech situations of the novel. Yet chronotoposes might operate descriptively, without disrupting or mediating space and time, to rhetorically invoke certain feeling responses to a text. We can see this when Nollan writes that: “the nexus for this force” apparent in Village Prose “happens to be the Russian village as a microcosm of Russia. Village Prose works exemplify that Russia


exists as a cultural construct made viable in each individual’s mind through centuries of religious, literary, and socio-political activities that have contributed various aspects to the country’s identity—one transmitted and modified from one generation to the next” (Nollan 79). Gary Morson explains that what this means is that ethical choices entail an appreciation and acknowledgement of the unformalisable aspects of experience and “a recognition that choice and responsibility are immanent in every prosaic circumstance and not just at crises or catastrophic moments” together with “an acknowledgement that there is no escape from—no alibi for—choice under such conditions” (Morson “Bakhtin” 1076). Our appreciation of the chronotope in Nollan’s terms reveals that there is no alibi for being because even if you cease to be authentic in your appreciation of the world, you nonetheless impart your influence upon the experiential flow of once-occurrent being by participating in the intersubjective process of constructing meaning through the communication of experience. You must nonetheless accept responsibility for your acts—whether these relate to prosaic or significant moments in life—and for the world as you create it through your contributions to the flow of events. “Russia” depends upon an intersubjective response to the experience of Russia as a ceaseless flow of events, whether that experience is largely personal or wholly constructed out of and influenced by the sedimented meanings of others. Once within it, you cannot simply step out of the flow without having contributed in some sense, and if you attempt to divest yourself of responsibility for the generative effect of being in this flow of events—for the force of the metaphor it creates, and which in turn influences our engagements with the world and the eventfulness of that world—then you are nonetheless accountable for your act of refusal, for this too has a generative effect; this too determines our intersubjective relation to the world.

Bakhtin writes that the “chronotope in literature has an intrinsic generic significance” (Bakhtin The Dialogic Imagination 84-85). Morson sees it as the field in which possible actions become realisable and particularised in concrete form (Morson “Bakhtin” 1082-83). In this sense Bakhtin might be said to celebrate the creative force of metaphor in the construction of meanings that enable the contemplation of being beyond what is materially realised in life. And it is the generic quality of the chronotope—its function as a unit of meaning, or rather as a conglomerate of possible meanings that take the form of actions and events, of characters and of objects in relation to these—that makes the chronotope such a potent force in the construction of concrete metaphors. These metaphoric forms shape the “reality” of the novel; they are
the “material” from which the worlds of the novel are generated. But they also constitute a kind of reality in that, as the determinate features of a specific chronotope, they have potency. For Bakhtin, as Morson explains, chronotopic experiences constitute, insofar as they influence and determine our relation to the world, a form of reality that supplants the authority of reality as thoughtless existence—that is reality outside meaning: “Real life, true historicity, and genuine individuality are to be found in what is left over—in what Bakhtin called the ‘surplus’—after all rules are applied and all generalizations have been exhausted. In that surplus we find ‘the singular world in which we create, become aware, contemplate, in which we live and in which we die’” (Morson “Bakhtin” 1074).

This surplus is the world of thought, of realisation, and communication. It is the space in which meaning is made and where metaphors proliferate without necessarily taking shape in speech, or without thought being constructed as an alternative to writing and to speech. It is meaning independent of the abstractions or rules necessary for its formation through language. It is that which is added to language to form speech, conceived on its own terms—that is, outside its relation to language and the formative environ of speech—it is the meaning we find in form, in structure, in schema, and is what Johnson terms non-propositional: in the most paradoxical sense, it is meaning before meaning. Bakhtin is nonetheless acutely aware of the creative force of speech. He locates authenticity in meaning outside speech and language, though he acknowledges the importance of speech in bringing that meaning to an intersubjective relation. As Michael Holquist, an early translator of Bakhtin’s work writes: “Bakhtin conceives of language as having a peculiar intermediary status between [what is] given and created, which is why it can be used to bridge the gap between matter and consciousness, as when mind represents the world” (Holquist “Answering as Authoring” 309). If Derrida’s task was to reveal how it is that conceptual processes are identified as real objects through the addition of meaning in our engagement with the world, then Bakhtin’s is to celebrate this generative force of meaning and insist upon our ethical engagement in every choice, “in every prosaic circumstance” (Morson “Bakhtin” 1076). The importance of giving ourselves authentically to the task of constructing our contemplative world is made apparent through the example of the chronotope as it is instanced imaginatively, for its influence is profoundly intersubjective. Each choice that we make, for example, in recalling our experiences of place, contributes to the shared sense we construct of that place: Italy, Russia, Australia—or any such place—as Valerie Nollan’s essay shows, is not the object-place that we take it to be, but a metaphor for those accrued encounters we
associate with place and which constitute the flow of events related to the experience of Italy, or of Russia, or Australia. Each of these places is a sedimented intersubjective experience held in a state of meaning that enables us to see the event of relatable experience as an object—the specific object we call place.

Once we realise the impact of our prosaic choices upon our intersubjective relations, we might understand why each choice must be ethically made, for we are all like so many butterflies flapping our wings and generating meanings that will then inform the actions of others. Our meanings affect how we respond to one another. These realisations, however, take us beyond the scope of this thesis. What is important in terms of the formation of the novel as a coherent set of meanings is the organisational effect of the chronotope—what Bakhtin describes as its significance to narrative. Chronotopes, he writes, “are the organizing centers for the fundamental narrative events of the novel. The chronotope is the place where the knots of narrative are tied and untied. It can be said without qualification that to them belongs the meaning that shapes narrative” (Bakhtin The Dialogic Imagination 250).

I have argued that Mark Johnson’s schema of embodiment provides the basic divisions by which we categorise concepts in generic terms. These are the rhetorical dimensions I have identified as semiotic, semantic, and syntagmatic dimensions, which I relate to, respectively: body, form, sign, external/outer aspect; mind, content, meaning, internal aspect; and structural relations, functional aspect, process, system, contiguity. What is notable about these three categories is the eventfulness of the syntagmatic dimension in contrast to the seemingly static or object-like conceptions generated in the

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190 Michael Holquist describes this in the following terms: “For Bakhtin, the unity of an act and its account, a deed and its meaning, if you will, is something that is never a priori, but which must always and everywhere be achieved. The act is a deed, and not a mere happening (as in ‘one damned thing after another’), only if the subject of such a postupok, from within his own radical uniqueness, weaves a relation to it in his accounting for it. Responsibility, then, is the ground of moral action, the way in which we overcome the guilt of the gap between our words and deeds, even though we do not have an alibi in existence—in fact, because we lack such an alibi: ‘It is only my non-alibi in being that transforms an empty possibility into an actual answerable act or deed...’” Michael Holquist, “Foreword,” Toward a Philosophy of the Act, eds. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov, University of Texas Press Slavic Series (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993) xii-xiii.
other contexts: whereas it is possible to hold a perception of body and mind, form and content, in static, spatial terms, the category of relation and function is temporal. When it is not—when characterised as structural, for example—it shifts into the formal category. With a foot in each camp, structure reveals itself to be a concept that inherently oscillates in meaning. But structure is not alone in possessing this quality. The metaphors we employ are founded upon pluralities of meaning that enable even greater versatility in rhetorical terms because the dimensional divisions are themselves unstable: body, form, and sign do not equate, but rather, correspond to one another. Each rhetorical dimension is itself mutable, although it remains identifiable according to the terms on which meaning is given.

I want to argue that these are terms through which space and time are characterised as conceptually equivalent to what we understand these concepts to represent phenomenally. Space and time—whatever form these concepts take—are still metaphors that rely upon, as much as they enable, the delineation of form, function and meaning. Time, for example, is a process in literal terms—it is syntagmatic rather than essential; but time must be regarded as an object in order for its significance and importance to be conveyed effectively. Hence, we talk of time as something that can be lost or given (Lakoff and Johnson *Metaphors We Live By* 8). Time in literal terms is generally silent. Given through the syntagmatic dimension (implicated in the modality of verbs), time is a function rather than an identifiable object or meaning. This is apparent when we wish to emphasise the effect of time as a process, we identify an object to which it applies and scale back the metaphoricity of our speech in relation to time. Time thus becomes an active relation which can be measured, as when taking a pulse. Nonetheless, it quickly takes on a formal character once it has passed and become an object once again. Time, in other words, is always potentially an object and an event. It oscillates in its metaphoric values between the rhetorical dimensions of semiotic, semantic, and syntagmatic kinds of meaning.

The orienting values of space whereby objects are identified and located in relation to the subject who perceives them (as up or down, near or far [see Lakoff and Johnson *Metaphors* 56]), when joined with the active processes of time, create the environment in which objects become engaged in the syntagmatic event. *Event* might be characterised as the form taken by space and time when these are specified, as opposed to generic. In generic terms, space and time must be extricated from the materiality they otherwise define. This is so, even though space and time are also understood to be
inextricable. Indeed, it is because we are dealing with metaphoric values that the inextricable becomes extricable; for it is only as a concept that space exists independently of time and vice versa, or that these generic concepts exist independently of the events they characterise. We identify semantic differences in terms of space and time in order to create a specific meaning—a meaning that characterises our experience of embodiment. This meaning is the difference produced by subject and object whereby we become the stable perceiving centre around which events unfold. Time and space, on these terms, exist independently of the subject engaged in the act of perceiving because space and time can be seen to unfold before the perceiver, and can therefore be regarded as existing externally in relation to the subject. This is not to say that we consciously consider ourselves outside space and time but that our ability to separate these concepts enables the construal of subject and object in terms that suggest a slight disjunction between the spatiotemporalities of these two conceptions (with this difference widening as time passes and as we “move further way” from the event). This difference enables the distinction itself. It allows us to separate ourselves from events in order to construe those events independently of our own being in the event, and to then resituate ourselves as subject and object in different terms, and according to the explanation we intend to make. Thus, we oscillate in rhetorical terms by construing ourselves in temporal and spatial guises as effective (performers of motive or action, and thus adjacent to the syntagmatic action) or passive (as the subject or object, independent of the action). The subject may be the originator of any motive or action, but it is not the action itself. Thus, when we shift in rhetorical dimension, we achieve what Derrida identifies as differance. Concepts are distinguished or conflated according to the rhetorical dimensions employed in each case.

Thus, causation might be said to be the basic meaning achieved through the unity of the two concepts, space and time. This fundamental meaning—which is a construal of contiguity as “intentional” or directed by some originating force—is the meaning that underpins every metaphor, and it is the reason speech is inherently directed at describing motive, as Kenneth Gergen terms it. In its syntagmatic guise, for example, time is the silent partner of any motive because it is implicated in every action, as is space because it enables the semiotic and semantic dimensions that supply the objects that are causally connected. I should emphasise here that I am not speaking in ontological terms but identifying the metaphoric values given to space and time in speech.
Eventfulness is but one of the meanings that we give to contiguity as a conceptual action. I say this because every meaning is itself given a new meaning when put to use: when meaning is given a syntagmatic or semiotic function, it becomes necessary to attribute another semantic value; hence, the proliferation of metaphors that Derrida observed. For example, “spatial” and “temporal” require a semantic object as a referent, not simply because the rules of language demand this, but because the rhetorical value of the metaphor has shifted from object-terms (which confer the versatility of form, content, and function) to functional terms alone. But, as Derrida’s grammatology reveals, the new meaning that we give to this metaphor will always be a construal founded on differance, which means that this new semantic value is presumed to be the same conceptual object, but its likeness to the originary concept marks it as a trace and thus likeness is necessarily deferred in order that the trace might stand for the concept it replaces. It is on this basis that a new metaphor is born. Likeness between concepts must be deferred (metaphors eschew the methodology of simile, in other words) because the act of likening depends upon the likened concepts being distinct and separate.

Eventfulness is therefore (and by these means) the meaning given to contiguity once contiguity is construed as a causal relation. As the meaning given to the unity of

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191 Derrida’s observations in this respect can be found across a range of texts in that it constitutes a significant element of his thesis. It is most clearly articulated in Speech and Phenomena, Of Grammatology and The Postcard (specifically, “Le facteur de la verité”).

192 This is exampled in Lakoff and Johnson’s explication of the metaphors employed to describe the concept argument. Detailing the metaphors of journey and container, whereby an argument is implicitly construed as a journey and/or a container, we can see that what is occurring in such cases is a shift in the rhetorical dimension being emphasised: in seeking to define an argument in functional terms, a new meaning is needed and that meaning is the semantic value carried by the metaphor of the journey or the container. An argument, in other words, is given as something that functions or performs as a journey. Therefore, an argument means what a journey means, which entails taking a certain path. Path (or discursive formation by any other terms) comes to stand for argument. Further, the examples themselves demonstrate oscillation in rhetorical dimensions in that the journey metaphor is characterised in formal terms as the topological form or structure that an argument takes and the container metaphor construes its metaphoric values as content. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) 91-94.
space and time, and the unities and distinctions that take place in space and time—and because it is a metaphor rather than a materiality—it is possible to construe eventfulness in diverse terms. Because it is a meaning, rather than a materiality, eventfulness can be represented in static terms. This is event as a form. Construed in static terms, an event is a space of possibility that translates to place as the accretion of specific kinds of eventfulness; for example, “home” is the semantic sedimentation of domestic events. Other places might accrue a concrete and static eventfulness; places such as universities, countries, cities, offices, etc., all of which accrue meanings in terms of events that are reified as place, with these meanings merging with conceptualisations of the object in phenomenal terms. Metaphors relating to place rely upon this process of de-temporalising the event. The conception of being in or out, for example, characterises an either/or experience as a static choice between two options rather than a movement from one to the other. Yet any comparison between being in or out represents a conceptualisation of spatiotemporality—it is movement in a meaningful, rather than actual, sense. It is movement slowed to a standstill and characterised in wholly spatial terms so that motive or choice might be conveyed in place of temporal change.193

This is what I mean to delineate by the metaphor of “setting.” Setting is a term that identifies the spatial aspect of the event—whereby the event both proceeds from and determines itself according to (spatiotemporally) unique yet repeatable elements that are rhetorically definable and generic. Setting, as an intersubjectively recognisable place, provides the basis for characterising the event in semantic and semiotic terms. We might characterise this in terms like those given by Foucault to demarcate the statement and its correlate by saying that setting is to event as enunciative field is to the statement. Each is the correlate of the other. Setting enables the perception of the spatiotemporally (once-occurrent194) unique event within a recognisable rhetorical precedent. The chronotope, therefore, is the means by which we transform events into the metaphoric objects of our personal response—metaphors through which we formulate the detailed abstractions

193 In Austen’s novel, Mansfield Park, this motive is imputed in moral terms that characterise the entry of young women into society.

194 Bakhtin uses this term throughout an early work entitled Toward a Philosophy of the Act. For an explication of the relevance of this term to the chronotope, see Valerie Nollan “Russia as a Chronotope” 77-78.
that capture a certain sense of what that moment meant to us and to others in an
accumulated relation of similar experiences: Italy, which Bakhtin instances in his early
writings on Pushkin’s poetry, is a metaphor for all these felt responses to experience. We
cannot have an “Italy”—or a sense of Italy—without the force of this organising element
of thought, or without the influence of others’ responses to their experience of Italy as
others before them have “encountered” it. And it is the chronotope, as a conceptual time
and space, that enables the concrete nature of these (metaphoric) relations as the interior
aspect of the eventful place we call Italy.

Thus, the same meaning structure governing the statement, as Foucault defines it,
characterises the event. This is because, in being syntagmatic metaphors, both statement
and event are ostensibly functional and, in contrast to the rhetorical dimensions that
characterise form and content, the syntagmatic dimension is inherently temporal. The
statement, as Foucault informs us, is the enunciative function; the enunciative field,
though it too has a function, is rhetorically the object that the statement “acts” upon and
through to produce meaning. The enunciative field is predominately semiotic and
semantic in its rhetorical force in that it both possesses and supplies form and content.
Setting is, like the enunciative field, also potentially functional, yet like the enunciative
field it is conceptually given in terms that rhetorically define it in space. These concepts
convey metaphoric values that are weighted toward spatially definable meaning effects.
They are stable concepts in the sense that they retain a meaning that gives them a
concrete value. But in order that they might generate new meanings (and do more than
supply repeatable forms), these metaphors require the mediating effect of a temporalising
concept. Temporalising metaphors supply meanings beyond the limited scope of the
spatial metaphor, for without them setting and field would do little more (semantically)
than signify. In order to proliferate their metaphoric values, stable concepts (like setting
and enunciative field) need the transformative capacities of time. Eventfulness, therefore,
is a metaphor of the syntagmatic rhetorical dimension. It is metaphor as a relational
meaning, whereby conceptual objects are related to one another in space and time. It is
the effect of identifying meaning in contiguity; whereas setting provides a perspective on
event in advance of the events (it sets the tone, so to speak, and establishes our
expectations).
In his introduction to the second volume of *New Literary History* Special Edition on Genre, Ralph Cohen gives an overview of the collection and in doing so elaborates the different ways in which genre is seen as a category that expands and alters so greatly over time that earlier members may be distinctly at odds with later ones. This view of genre is at odds with those approaches that see genre as a relation or process of meaning making. Rhetorical genre theory sees genre, not as a category, but as the act of categorising itself—but categorising here also describes the end result of the rhetorical relation which is described by metaphor. Putting concepts together supplies a basic and unique category in the first instance. Placing that category into a contiguous relation with another concept or category will result in a seemingly stable category—one that is moving away from its initial uniqueness and on toward a generic condition. In this sense, the texts of a given genre are related by virtue of their contribution to the meaning of that genre through the metaphoric relation of drawing likenesses between specific texts and the generalised abstraction of these texts, which we then relate to genre. This process of establishing likenesses between texts in both a specific and abstract sense results in the imaginative production of the conceptual object we call genre. We then refer to this conceptual object as a structural metaphor based around our bodied experience of *in and out*. Rather than describing the process of likening, the term *genre* is generally taken to constitute a metaphorical container into which we can place the likened objects. Genre nonetheless identifies a process or event (of making meaning) in the first instance, with the structural metaphor used to convey the action in material terms. With genre functioning as both a rhetorical relation and an abstract object it is not surprising that genres, as categories, fail to meet taxonomic standards. Despite this failing, it is equally unsurprising, given the important function of structural metaphors, that we should turn a process into an object. Yet, given that meaning making relies upon the repeatability of the meaning, this paradoxical relation of identifying a set of similarities between texts as a conceptual object (a genre) is itself essential to the making of meaning. This is because generic relations provide the conceptual schema for the formation of units of meaning (genres) that operate on a level beyond the primary semiotic system: genre enables discourse to move beyond the limits of the linguistic sign by recognising and identifying the complex relations between generic signs as a metalinguistic system—a semiotic system that operates through the unified effects of *langue* and *parole* and which takes shape as the

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meanings generated by the utterance and deriving from a conceptual apparatus over and above that responsible for defining linguistic semantic content. These meanings are of the kind that Hirsch identifies as intrinsic genres. They include Foucault’s conception of the statement and the relations that Bakhtin identifies as dialogic; and, in terms of the novel and this thesis’s interest in identifying the ways in which meaning is mediated, they include the metaphors of voice, view setting and event—metaphors which, through their ubiquity, function generically to sustain and activate the broad range of conventions that are responsible for the rhetorical effects of fiction.
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