Introduction

Suppose you are looking at a red apple. Thomas Reid famously thought that your perceptual experience consists of two components: a non-intentional sensation of redness and a non-inferential judgment or belief that it is an apple (Reid 1785). On his view, each component plays a distinctive role: the sensation determines the state’s sensory phenomenal character and causes the non-inferential judgment or belief which in turn secures reference to an external world object and represents its constant, perceiver-independent properties.

Early 20th century sense datum theorists like C. D. Broad, H. H. Price, and C. I. Lewis held similarly that your perceptual experience involves two components that play these roles, differing from Reid only in taking the first component to be a sensing of a sense datum and its redness (Broad 1929: 153, Lewis 1929, Price 1932: 147, for discussion see Burge 2010: Ch. 4, Firth 1965: 214-219).1

These Reidian two-component views thus take your perceptual experience to involve a sensory component that determines its sensory phenomenal character, and a conceptual component that secures reference to an external world object and represents its constant, perceiver-independent properties. Not surprisingly, they have come under heavy criticism. For example, many people have argued that it’s implausible that we can separate what determines your perceptual experience’s sensory phenomenal character from what secures reference to an

1 Wilfrid Sellars is frequently thought to have also held such a view and to have differed from Broad, Lewis, and Price only in rejecting the idea that the sensory component, “the given”, is epistemically significant (Coates 2007, Smith 2002). However, Niels Skovgaard Olsen has recently convincingly argued that Sellars’s developed view was in fact quite different (Olsen 2009).
external world object and presents us with its perceiver-independent properties. Rather, a single unified state does both at the same time (Burge 2010: Ch. 4, Firth 1965: 223, Smith 2002: 74).

The dominant reaction to this criticism has been to think that there’s no need to take your perceptual experience in the above case to consist of two components at all. However, recently there’s been an increased interest in granting this while arguing that your overall “perceptual” state nevertheless consists of two components. For example, Jack Lyons, Chris Tucker, Brit Brogaard, and myself have all argued that your overall “perceptual” state in the above case consists of a perceptual experience of the apple and its redness, roundness etc. and accompanying seemings that it is red, it is an apple etc. (Brogaard 2013, 2014, Lyons 2005, 2009, Reiland 2014, Tucker 2010).\(^2\) On our view (or at least my view) the perceptual experience in the above case indeed secures reference to an external-world object and presents us with its constant, perceiver-independent properties all by itself. However, the accompanying seemings account for differences in recognition and play an indispensable role in providing evidence or justification.\(^3\)

These more Kantian two-component views thus take your overall “perceptual” or “quasi-perceptual” state to involve a perceptual component that determines its sensory phenomenal character, secures reference to an external world object, and represents its constant, perceiver-independent properties, and a conceptual component that accounts for differences in recognition and plays a role in providing evidence.\(^4\) In contrast to the Reidian views, the Kantian ones seem to me to be on the right track. However, I also think that we need a lot more clarity and precision about what the components are like and how exactly they’re related. Furthermore, I think that

---

\(^2\) Lyons and Tucker sometimes call the first event a ‘sensation’. I think this is somewhat misleading and threatens to obfuscate the difference between the Reidian two-component views and the novel ones. I’ll explain why further below.

\(^3\) John Bengson, Enrico Grube, and Dan Korman (hereafter BGK) have defended a view on which your overall “perceptual” state in the above case involves what they call ‘sensory awareness’ of the apple and its redness and a ‘perceptual experience’ that it is red, it is an apple etc. (BGK 2011). Like least some of the above authors think of perceptual experience, BGK think of their sensory awareness as an objectual and non-conceptual state. And like the above authors think of seemings, BGK think of their perceptual experience as a propositional and conceptual state. However, some doubt is cast on whether the two views amount to the same by the fact that Bengson later argues that his perceptual experiences are not supposed to account for recognition and are thus distinct from seemings (Bengson 2015).

\(^4\) Thinking of these views as Kantian is apt only on a reading of Kant on which intuitions can occur and be fully referential without concepts. (See Hanna 2005) On readings on which intuitions are not taken to be fully referential without concepts this view will seem quite Anti-Kantian.
achieving this would help us to outline the best version of the popular dogmatist view of evidence and better understand why it is widely found attractive.

Accordingly, my main aims in this paper are threefold. First, as a way of providing more clarity and precision about the components, I want to distinguish between mere sensations like seeing pitch black all around you, hearing ringing in your ears, and feeling warmth on your arm and perceptual experiences like seeing a red apple, hearing a bird singing, and touching a ball. Sensations have a sensory phenomenology in presenting us with sensory qualities like colors, being analog in Dretske’s sense, and being fine-grained. For example, seeing pitch black all around involves an analog and fine-grained awareness of a determinate shade of blackness all around you. In contrast, perceptual experiences have in addition a perceptual phenomenology characterized by objectification and related dualities of perspectivity/completion and variation/constancy. For example, seeing a red apple involves not only an awareness of a determinate shade of redness, but also awareness of being confronted with a whole three-dimensional object from a particular perspective.

Second, I want to argue that both mere sensations and perceptual experiences (= experiences) need to be distinguished from accompanying seemings that passively assign things into conceptual categories and thereby tell you something about them. For example, when you see pitch black all around you and you have the relevant recognitional ability it will also plausibly seem to you that it is black. Similarly, when you look at a red apple and have the relevant recognitional ability it will also normally seem to you that this is an apple. On this view, seemings are interface states which mediate between sensation/perception on the one hand and central cognition on the other by putting sensory or perceptual data into a conceptual format usable by the cognitive system.

Finally, I want to use the above distinctions as a basis for arguing that the best version of the popular dogmatist view about evidence is one which claims that it’s neither experiences nor

---

5 A terminological clarification. Although I argue that we need to properly distinguish between mere sensations and perceptual experiences it will be useful to have a term that covers both in opposition to accompanying seemings. I will reserve ‘experience’ for this purpose. Thus, ‘an experience’ means either a mere sensation or a perceptual experience. To jump a bit ahead, I will argue that we need the following distinctions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiences</th>
<th>Seemings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mere Sensations</td>
<td>Sensory Seemings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptual Experiences</td>
<td>Perceptual Seemings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
seemings by themselves, but rather the right sorts of composites of experiences and seemings that provide evidence. Experiences are non-conceptual and by themselves blind: they don’t tell us anything in terms of the categories we think in. Seemings are conceptual but by themselves empty: they don’t even putatively present it with any truth-makers for what they tell us. In contrast, the right sorts of composites are both sighted in telling us something in terms of our categories and full in putatively presenting us with something that we can point to as a truth-maker for what we’re being told.\(^6\)

I will proceed as follows. I will start by distinguishing between mere sensations and perceptual experiences and provide characterizations of each (Section 1). I’ll then argue that both can be accompanied by seemings which are to be further distinguished from judgments (Section 2). Next, I’ll discuss how seemings are formed and how experiences and seemings are related (Section 3). Finally, I’ll argue that the best version of the dogmatist view about evidence is one which claims that it’s the right sorts of composites of experiences and seemings that provide evidence (Section 4).

1. Mere Sensations vs. Perceptual Experiences

BGK and later Bengson by himself have argued that there are sensory experiences which present us with just sensory qualities by themselves:

Consider cases in which one’s entire visual field is filled by a single color. You close your eyes and see only black. You are no doubt aware of a color: black. But you do not have an experience whose content is that something is black. After all, not only do you not see something—not the room, not space, not anything—that is black, but you do not even seem to see something black. You simply seem to see black. (BGK 2011: 170-171)

[Consider] comparatively familiar cases in which, with eyes wide open, one’s entire visual field is filled with color. You are sailing offshore past dusk and find yourself immersed in a sea of stormy blue-green and similar shades. Or you are out for a walk on a dark, cloudy night, without a flashlight (torch); you look around, gazing intently, and you find yourself confronted with a

\(^6\) Let me note that in doing the above I’m not defending dogmatism, but merely trying to arrive at what I think is the best version of it. For interesting alternatives see Lyons 2009, McGrath 2015.
peculiar shade of black (perhaps ebony, bean, or jet) in all directions: as they say, it is 
*pitch black*. In these cases, you are no doubt presented with a color: a shade (or shades) of blue-green 
or black, respectively. (Bengson 2013: 801)

Let us go along with BGK in thinking that in such experiences we’re just presented with sensory 
qualities by themselves. However, BGK assume and Bengson argues further that such 
experiences are genuinely perceptual (my boldface):

I see no reason to deny any of the experiences just described entry to the class of mental states 
that an adequate theory of visual perceptual experiences must accommodate. Focusing on the 
experiences in the pitch black and stormy blue-green cases: **notice that each is hardly 
different from normal or ordinary visual perceptual experiences**: you are not engaging in 
standard acts of imagining or remembering, but are looking around (as you do in ordinary visual 
perceptual experiences), eyes wide open (as they are in ordinary visual perceptual experiences), 
enjoying a visual experience of—indeed, **visually perceiving**, or seeing—a particular shade (or 
shades) of color. (Bengson 2013: 802-803)

Although I agree that a theory of *visual experience* should accommodate such cases, I don’t think 
that a theory of visual *perceptual* experience needs to. Rather, I think we need to distinguish such 
cases of mere sensation from ordinary perceptual experiences (Siegel 2011: Ch. 7, Smith 2002). 
Let’s see why.

Consider the following three sorts of experiences discussed by BGK and Bengson:

- **Visual**: Seeing pitch black all around you.
- **Auditory**: Hearing ringing in your ears (Bengson 2013: 800).
- **Tactual**: Feeling warmth on your arm.

---

7 I find this quite plausible, if it is consistent with claiming that we’re presented with the qualities *at* specific 
locations of your visual field like on the feature-placing theory of early vision defended by Austen Clark. (Clark 
2000, 2004). However, one might disagree that the eyes-closed cases and the eyes-opened cases involve a similar 
phenomenology. Although the former might not exhibit any objectification (see below), the latter might be thought 
to exhibit at least some. Thanks to Dan Cavedon-Taylor for discussion.
All of these seem to have a *sensory* phenomenology characterizable by presenting us with sensory qualities, being analog in Dretske’s sense, and being fine-grained. Let’s take each in turn.

Each such experience of a particular modality presents us with only certain sensory qualities. Vision presents us with color (more precisely, hue, saturation, and brightness), audition with volume, pitch, and timbre and touch with what Matthew Fulkerson has recently called intensive features like thermal qualities (hot/cold), texture qualities (smooth/rough) etc. (Fulkerson 2014: Ch. 5). It is clear that such experiences can’t present us with sensory qualities that are exclusive for a different modality. For example, you can have a visual mere sensation of redness, but you can’t have one of heat. However, it’s also clear that they can’t also present us with any type of kind properties like being an apple. To do that, they would first have to present us with objects which belong to these kinds or which are taken to belong to those kinds.

Each such experience is also *analog* in Dretske’s sense in encoding a wealth of sensory qualities at the same time (e.g. like in a picture) rather than in discrete units (like in a proposition or a sentence). (Dretske 1981: Ch. 6) For example, when you see stormy-blue green all around you, you see all the different shades at different points of your whole visual field at the same time.

Finally, each such experience is *fine-grained* in that it presents us with more finely discriminated qualities than our non-demonstrative conceptual repertoire. More precisely, it presents a subject with a maximally determinate quality as far as a particular dimension of variation relative to her discriminatory capacities. For example, in visual merely sensory experience you’re presented with shades like redness\textsubscript{13} and redness\textsubscript{14}, the differences between which are determined by your discriminatory capacities (Clark 2000). And, as is frequently remarked, for almost all of us such experiences present us with more finely discriminated or determinate qualities than our color concepts cut. (Evans 1982, Heck 2000)

The above sorts of experiences can be thought of as mere sensations. As I said above, I think we need to distinguish them from ordinary perceptual experiences. To see why, let’s now look at examples of latter.

Consider the following sorts of experiences:

*Visual:* Seeing a red apple.
**Auditory:** Hearing a bird singing.

**Tactual:** Touching a ball.

All of these experiences are similar to the above mere sensations in having a sensory phenomenology. They present us with sensory qualities, are analog in Dretske’s sense, and fine-grained. Yet, they’re also radically unlike them in having a distinctively *perceptual* phenomenology characterizable by objectification and related dualities of perspectivality/completeness and variation/constancy (Church 2013, Noë 2004, 2006, Siegel 2011: Ch. 7).\(^8\) Let’s take each in turn.

Contrast seeing pitch black all around you with seeing a red apple on a table. In the former case you don’t seem to see an object that you’re confronted with apart from your own state. When you move or shift your gaze your experience could slightly vary, but there is no sense of an object staying the same or being independent of your experience. In contrast, seeing a red apple on a table involves the *objectification* of both the apple and the table – when you move or shift your gaze your experience varies, but there is a distinct sense of the objects’ staying the same and being independent of your experience.\(^9\) Something similar can be said about hearing a bird singing where it’s the sound that is objectified and in relation to which we can move, as well as touching the ball where it’s the ball that becomes objectified and which we can tactually explore (Fulkerson 2014: Ch. 6, O’Callaghan 2007: Ch. 3, 6).

Objectification is closely related to the perceptual duality of perspectivality and completeness and completion more generally. Consider again looking at a red apple on the table. On the one hand, it’s natural to think that in some sense you only see its facing surface and its qualities as given from your particular egocentric perspective. After all, only the facing surface reflects light to your retina, its backside does not. Yet, at the same time you clearly have a visual sense of the apple’s being a whole, three-dimensional object.\(^10\) This is an example of the duality

---

\(^8\) Tyler Burge has also at length argued that objectification, completion, and constancies are necessary for perception. However, his discussion is focused on perception in general, including unconscious perception, and not perceptual experience. (Burge 2010)

\(^9\) At least in the case of vision, objectification is closely related to *figure-ground separation*. In the case of seeing pitch black all around you nothing pops out as a figure against the ground. In contrast, in the case of seeing a red apple on a table both the apple and the table pop out.

\(^10\) It is sometimes said that we strictly speaking only see the object’s surface and not the object itself. This is a mistake. There is no sense to be made of the claim that we see an object’s surface apart from the object. After all,
of perspectivality or of what’s given from your perspective vs. completion. For an example of completion more generally consider seeing the tail and the hind legs and the head and the front legs of a cat behind a picket fence. Again, in some sense you only see the unoccluded parts. Yet, at the same time you experience the cat as a complete object. (Noë 2004: 60) Nothing like this duality and no completion more generally is present in the case of mere sensations like seeing pitch black.\(^\text{11, 12}\)

Finally, objectification and the previous duality are also closely related to the perceptual duality of variation and constancy. Here are some examples:

*Shape Constancy*: Consider the age-old example of looking at a circular coin or a plate first from head on and then from consecutive moderately oblique angles. It is obvious that if you turn the coin something in your experience changes. Yet, at the same time you also have a visual sense of its shape staying the same. After all, imagine how different it would be to experience the object morph in front of your eyes.

*Color Constancy*: Consider looking at whiteboard first in daylight then in a classroom light. It’s again obvious that something in you experience changes. Yet, at the same time you also have a visual sense of the whiteboard’s remaining a uniform color. After all, imagine how different it would be to experience the object change color.

*Size Constancy*: Consider walking down an alley approaching a tree. It’s again obvious that something in your experience changes. Yet, at the same time you also have a visual sense of the tree as retaining its size. After all, imagine how different it would be to experience the tree actually grow.

Alva Noë has argued at length that such duality of perspectivality or perspectival variation and constancy is necessary for an experience to count as genuinely perceptual (Noë 2004).\(^\text{13}\) But again, nothing like this duality is present in the case of mere sensations.

---

the object’s surface doesn’t pop out against the object as background (McNeill 2015). The truth in the vicinity is that we strictly speaking see only the object’s surface qualities, the qualities of its facing surface.

\(^\text{11}\) For a discussion of perspective in audition see O’Callaghan 2007: Ch. 6.

\(^\text{12}\) The duality of perspectivality/completeness and the case of occlusion involve *amodal* completion. This is to be distinguished from *modal* completion where a contour or surface is *seen* even though there is no corresponding stimuli in the retinal image (e.g. as in the case of a Kanisza triangle).

\(^\text{13}\) Let me emphasize that I’m not committing myself to Noë’s account of these phenomena. For alternative accounts see for example Briscoe 2011, Matthen 2010, Nanay 2010.
Finally, it is interesting to note that there is a perceptual impairment that doesn’t impact sensation but only perceptual experience: *apperceptive agnosia*. In apperceptive agnosia subjects have sensations in a particular modality, but completion and constancy are disturbed. As a result, although they have some sort of sensory experiences they don’t really see things like we do as is evident from their inability to copy figures.

This is how I propose we distinguish between mere sensations and perceptual experiences. As we have seen, there’s a clear and principled way of doing this in terms of the fact that only the latter have a distinctively perceptual phenomenology characterized by objectification and the related dualities of perspectivality/completeness and variation/constancy.\(^{14}\)

Before we proceed let’s consider a wrinkle. I allow that perceptual experiences have a sensory phenomenology. One might wonder whether mere sensations might therefore somehow be components of perceptual experiences in which case the distinction might be thought to be not as clear-cut. But it is an open question whether sensations are separable components of perception or perceptual experiences and whether they’re needed for perceptual experience at all (for some discussion see Burge 2010: Ch. 4, Church 2013: Ch. 1).\(^{15}\) And in any case, even if sensations were components of perceptual experiences, it wouldn’t matter for my argument in this section because it’s clear that *mere* sensations can occur without perceptual experiences and this by itself shows that the two need to be distinguished.

\(^{14}\) Ian Phillips has recently argued at length that afterimages are not examples of mere sensations, but are genuinely perceptual because experiences of them exhibit some of the distinctively perceptual phenomenology. However, he also seems quite suspicious of the distinction between mere sensation and perceptual experience in general. This seems to be at least partly because he’s interested in defending what he calls ‘purism’: the idea that visual experience can be characterized in terms of “a subject’s apparent perspective on external, public reality” without any appeal to qualia (Phillips 2013: 417). But one might be a purist about mere sensations, for example, by thinking that when we see pitch black we’re presented with sensory qualities at specific locations of your visual field, yet claim that genuine *perceptual experience* goes beyond this in exhibiting objectification. In other words, one might grant that mere sensation and perceptual experience are generated partly by the same sorts of processing, yet claim that the latter requires a further sort of processing.

\(^{15}\) For example, notice that perceptual experiences of an object can occur without sensations of any of the object’s sensible qualities. For example, suppose you’re playing field hockey and are using a stick to touch a ball. You’re having tactual sensations of the stick and its sensible qualities, but not of the ball and its qualities. After all, you can tell whether the stick is hot/cold, but you can’t tell whether the ball is. Still, your perceptual experience is primarily of the ball and its properties.
2. Experiences vs. Seemings

Above, we characterized mere sensations as having a sensory phenomenology and perceptual experiences as having both a sensory and perceptual phenomenology in involving/being:

1) Presentation of Sensory Qualities (Sensory)
2) Analog (Sensory)
3) Fine-Grained (Sensory)
4) Objectification (Perceptual)
5) Duality of Perspectivity/Completion (Perceptual)
6) Duality of Variation/Constancy (Perceptual)

I will now argue that both mere sensations and perceptual experiences can be accompanied by seemings which account for differences in recognition and play an indispensable role in providing evidence.

Consider two people, someone who has only very coarse-grained color concepts (e.g. RED, BLUE, GREEN) and can’t recognize navy by sight and someone who has more fine-grained ones (e.g. CRIMSON, NAVY, FOREST) (these people are standardly called the Novice and the Expert). It’s plausible to think that when the Novice and the Expert are in the same dark and stormy environment and have the same sorts of discriminatory capacities then they could have the exact same sensation of navy blue all around them. However, it’s also plausible to think that it seems to the Novice only that it’s dark blue or black all around, whereas it could seem to the Expert that it’s navy all around.

Similarly, consider two people, someone who doesn’t know Saul Kripke by sight and someone who does. It’s plausible to think that when they look at Kripke from the same vantage point and have the same sorts of discriminatory capacities then they could have the exact same perceptual experience of him. However, it’s also plausible to think that he only seems to be Kripke to the Expert and that’s what at least partly grounds her recognition of him.16

Finally, consider two people, someone who doesn’t know anything about chess and doesn’t have the ability to recognize chess pieces by sight and someone who does. It’s plausible

16 For further discussion of perceptual recognition of individuals see Dokic 2010.
to think that when they look at the same knight and all else is equal then they could have the exact same perceptual experience of the knight. However, it’s also plausible to think that the object further seems to be a knight only to the Expert and that’s what grounds her confident judgment that it is a knight.


Before saying how seemings differ from experiences we need to discuss the use of the word ‘seems’ which we used above to talk about seemings. It’s standard to distinguish between epistemic and phenomenal uses of perceptual verbs like ‘seems’. An example of an epistemic use is ‘It looks like Rose is honest’ whereas an example of a phenomenal use is ‘Rose looks tall’. Berit Brogaard has recently provided an illuminating discussion of the distinction. She thinks that epistemic uses tell us about the subject’s cognitive state concerning what is subjectively probable conditional on her evidence. As such, the states they ascribe cease to exist in the presence of a defeater if the subject is rational. (Brogaard 2015) Thus, if you say that ‘It looks like Rose is honest’ because it’s subjectively probable conditional on your evidence, you’re likely going to retract that when you acquire some evidence that she’s dishonest. In contrast, phenomenal uses tell us about how things seem to us in a more robust sense. And as such, the states they ascribe don’t cease to exist in the presence of a defeater. For example, when you look at a basket full of wax fruit it can still seem to you that this one is an apple even though you know it isn’t.

Epistemic uses of ‘seems’ report on subjects cognitive states and not on what people who use cases like the above to introduce seemings have in mind. However, phenomenal uses are frequently thought to report on such seemings. It’s therefore also standard to call the relevant

17 We can find the use of these sorts of cases and the idea that there is a distinction to be drawn on their basis already in Kant:

“If a savage (Wilder) sees a house from a distance for example, with whose use he is not acquainted, he admittedly has before him in his representation the very same object as someone else who is acquainted with it determinately as a dwelling established for humans. But as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is different in the two. With one it is mere intuition, with the other it is intuition and concept at the same time. (Kant 1992, quoted in Hanna 2005: 262).

Here the Kantian mere intuition is our perceptual experience, whereas the Kantian concept is an accompanying seeming.
seemings *phenomenal* seemings and many people think that they encompass not only sensory and perceptual seemings, but also memory seemings and intellectual seemings or intuitions (Brogaard 2013, Chudnoff 2013, Lyons 2015, Huemer 2001). However, this is potentially confusing since at least some people take phenomenal uses to report on composites of experiences and the accompanying seemings and not *just* seemings. For example, when we said above that it seems navy all around only to the Expert we could be reporting on both her sensation and her seeming that its navy all around and not just the latter. Your own use can be tested by asking yourself whether you find it’s conceptually possible to lack the experience while the seems-claim is true. If you find this incoherent then you implicitly construe of the phenomenal uses as reporting on both. If you find it coherent, then you construe of them as reporting only the seemings. This is, of course, mostly just a terminological issue, but it’s important to realize that the way I use the word here, the relevant seemings are distinct from the experiences they accompany.

So how do seemings differ from experiences on the one hand and judgments on the other? On my view, seemings have a quasi-cognitive or cognitive phenomenology, if any, are conceptual (and therefore digital in Dretske’s sense and coarse-grained), passive, reportive, and isolated. Let’s take these in turn.

Phenomenal seemings have a quasi-cognitive or cognitive phenomenology, if any. One way to characterize it would be as *recognitional* since it is seemings that give rise to the Expert’s sense of recognition. Another way to characterize it is as a matter of passive conceptual categorization. We can understand this better once we look at the sense in which seemings are conceptual, passive, and reportive.

---

18 It’s common to confound seemings with each. For example, the sense datum theorists thought that what I’ve characterized as perceptual phenomena (e.g. completion, constancy) are cognitive or conceptual and a matter of something like my seemings. In contrast, consider Christopher Peacocke who once said that: “we need a threefold distinction between sensation, perception, and judgment.” (Peacocke 1983: 6). Peacocke distinguishes between sensation and perception, but then thinks of the cognitive and conceptual only as a matter of judgment.

19 In previous work I used the term ‘quasi-sensory/quasi-cognitive phenomenology’, suggested that seemings have it, and argued that this explains the phenomenal contrast between experts and novices like in the above cases (Reiland 2014, see also Lyons 2005, 2009). Two comments. First, I now regard the old term confusing. ‘Quasi-sensory’ was just used to point out that seemings are like experiences in being passive. But there’s nothing sensory about them. So I now prefer to just use ‘quasi-cognitive’. Second, one could resist the idea that seemings have any phenomenology if one would find a way to explain the contrasts in a different way. Then one could claim that seemings have no occurrent phenomenology, but are nevertheless access-conscious. I won’t take a stand on this here. For some discussion see Carruthers & Veillet 2012 and other articles in Bayne & Montague 2012.
Judgments are conceptual in that when we perform the judgment that \( x \) is \( F \) we’re employing our concept of \( F \). If we lacked that concept and were unable to think of things as being \( F \)’s then we couldn’t perform the judgment. Similarly, seemings are conceptual in that when it seems to us that \( x \) is \( F \) our concept of \( F \) gets employed. If we lacked that concept and were unable to think of things as being \( F \)’s then we couldn’t have seemings to the effect that things are \( F \)’s. This is what makes both of them digital in Dretske’s sense in coding a discrete bit of information, and coarse-grained in not discriminating any more finely than our conceptual repertoire.

Despite the shared conceptuality, judgments and seemings differ insofar as their activity/passivity, reportiveness, and isolatedness. Whereas in judgment we’re actively employing our concept, we’re doing something, in the case of seemings our concept gets passively employed, something happens in us.\(^\text{20}\) In other words, judgments are made by us qua whole persons and involve assigning things in conceptual categories and undertaking a commitment. In contrast, seemings are products of a sub-personal perceptual or interface system (e.g. in the case of vision this is done by something called late vision) that assigns things into conceptual categories. In making a judgment it is you who represent an object as belonging to a category whereas in the case of a seeming it is the sub-personal system which does the representing. And when it does this it in effect tells you that something is the case.\(^\text{21}\)

\(^{20}\) This is something John McDowell likes to emphasize with his distinction between conceptual capacities being \textit{operative} in what he (misleadingly) calls perceptual experience (passive) versus the \textit{exercising} of conceptual capacities in judgment (active). (McDowell 2009: 251).

\(^{21}\) Are seemings to be distinguished from beliefs or occasions of belief formation? This depends partly on how you prefer to use ‘belief’. For example, Lyons is happy to identify token seemings as I have characterized them with perceptual beliefs \textit{if} they’re accepted or endorsed (Lyons 2005: 242-243). Lyons’s view depends on a psychofunctionalist theory of belief on which whether a token state is a belief is not an essential property of it. However, he allows that seemings and beliefs are different \textit{types} of states.

More radically, Eric Mandelbaum has recently argued against what he calls the Cartesian Theory of Belief Fixation on which we always first entertain or consider a proposition and then either actively accept it (= judgment), suspend judgment, or actively reject it (= denial). Instead, he thinks, we should adopt a Spinozan theory on which upon entertaining or considering a proposition we immediately passively accept it upon which we can then furthermore either actively accept it (= judgment) or actively reject it. Furthermore, he thinks that these passive acceptances of our sub-personal systems are beliefs because beliefs are sub-personal phenomena in contrast to judgments. Thus, he might think of our seemings as paradigm case of occasions of belief formation (Mandelbaum 2014) I think that although the Spinozan theory is interesting and might be true, it’s at least somewhat unnatural to call the passive acceptances beliefs. For example, it’s frequently thought that one of the most distinctive characteristics of beliefs is that they’re truth-normed for you qua a whole person and thus in need of justification whereas on this view they aren’t.
In fact, I find it illuminating to think of seemings on a parallel with testimony. In the case of testimony, someone tells you that p. Similarly, in the case of seemings your sub-personal system tells you that p. This is the sense in which seemings are reportive.22

Here’s yet another way of making the same point. Judgments are truth-normed for you qua a whole person. When you judge falsely you’ve done something incorrect and have made a mistake. Seemings are not. When it falsely seems to you that p you’re not doing anything incorrect and are not making a mistake. (Your sub-personal system is, in some sense, making a mistake. I’ll come back to this in the next section). This is also why judgments are rationally evaluable and in need of evidence, whereas seemings are not.

Finally, unlike judgments which are not isolated from your background beliefs, seemings are at least somewhat isolated. For example, when you know that you’re confronted with a basket full of wax fruit you won’t judge that this one is an apple. Nevertheless, your perceptual or interface system responsible for the production of seemings might still tell you that it’s an apple.

In sum, phenomenal seemings involve/are:

1) Assigning Things Into Conceptual Categories (Cognitive)
2) Digital (Cognitive)
3) Coarse-Grained (Cognitive)
4) Passive (Interface)
5) Reportive (Interface)
6) Isolated (Interface)

Our above discussion and the list illustrate the differences and similarities between experiences, seemings, and judgments. Both experiences and seemings are passive and isolated or products of Kantian receptivity in contrast to judgments which are active and a product of Kantian spontaneity. Both seemings and judgments are conceptual in contrast to experiences which are either merely sensory or sensory-perceptual. Finally, seemings are unique in being reportive.

22 It’s common to make something like this point. For example, Chris Tucker says that seemings are assertive. (Tucker 2010). However, it’s important to distinguish between the sense in which judgments are assertive vs. the sense in which seemings are. In judgment you undertake a commitment (like in the case of making an assertion) whereas in the case of seemings it’s as if you’re being told that something is the case.
And their passivity, isolatedness, and reportiveness are why it’s best to think of them as perception-cognition interface states and not full-blown cognitive states (or at least not critically or reflectively cognitive states like judgments).  

3. Formation of Seemings

Let’s go back to our cases where an Expert sees navy all around or sees a knight. I claimed that in these cases the experiences are accompanied by seemings. How are seemings formed? And how are the experiences and seemings related?

Let’s start by discussing what sort of systems produce seemings. Above I said that it’s either your sub-personal perceptual or interface systems. Following Jack Lyons, a system is an isolable cognitive mechanism that is specialized for a particular task. Lyons suggests that the system that produces perceptual seemings is a specifically perceptual system in taking as input data from the world and not from the larger organism (for discussion see Lyons 2005: 239-243). On this view, a perceptual system produces perceptual seemings; some other analogous designated system produces memory seemings etc. An alternative view is that all seemings are produced by an all-purpose interface system which takes as input data from designated input systems like perception and some part of memory, but not from central cognition. Although it’s an interesting empirical question which view is correct, there’s no need for us to take a stand on this here.

How do the relevant systems produce seemings? It’s a common idea that the systems produce seemings by taking some sort of input data and conceptualizing it. This has the effect mediating between sensation/perception on the one hand and central cognition on the other by

---

23 In this paper I remain neutral about the metaphysics of perceptual experience. However, I actually think that there’s another way in which perceptual experiences and seemings differ. I think that Naïve Realists and some recent Representationalists are right in emphasizing that perception or perceptual experience either relates us to or represents only particulars, objects and their property-instances, and therefore isn’t a propositional attitude. On the Naïve Realist side, see Fish 2009: Ch. 1 for the claim that we’re aware of the blueness of the Pacific Ocean and not just generic blueness; see Johnston 2011: 194-195 for the claim that we experience tropes versus properties; and see Travis 2013: 839-840 for the claim that perception involves only history/the non-conceptual (=objects and their features) in contrast to thought which involves generality/the conceptual (= properties). On the Representationalist side see for example Burge’s claim that the format of perceptual representation is like that of a complex demonstrative ‘This F’ where the property attribution only guides reference to a particular (Burge 2010). See also the discussion in Nanay 2012, Schellenberg 2010, 2011a, 2011b. In contrast, seemings are propositional attitudes.

24 For similar ideas see also Burge 2010: Ch. 11, Brogaard 2013, 2014.
putting the sensory or perceptual data into a conceptual format usable by the cognitive system. In
Dretske’s terms the system responsible for production of seemings takes the analog, fine-grained
data and converts it into a digital, coarse-grained format (Dretske 1981: Ch. 6).

How does the conceptualization work? Here’s one view (Burge 2010: Ch .11, Johnston
2011, Lyons 2007). First, notice that individuals come with certain distinctive profiles of sensory qualities and perceptible properties. Similarly, things belonging to certain kinds are similar to each other insofar as their profiles of sensory qualities and their perceptible properties. For example, shades of red are similar to each other with respect to their hue and apples are similar to each other with respect to their color, perceiver-independent shape, size etc. Let’s call such profiles “looks” (in the case of audition we could call them “sounds”, in the case of touch “feels” etc.) (compare Johnston 2011: 199-201, McGrath 2015).25 Then we can say that individuals have particular looks etc. and things belonging to certain kinds have typical looks etc..

Second, the idea then is that the systems that produce seemings encode a range of pairings of distinctive or typical looks with conceptual categories of individuals and kinds. These pairings are analogous to beliefs that some person with a distinctive look belongs to the individual category Kripke, something with a particular color look belongs to a category like navy, and something with an apple-y look belongs to the category apple. And the systems produce seemings by taking data about looks as input, employing the encoded pairing, and yielding the relevant seeming as output. For example, a system could take data about an object and its apple-y look as input, employ the pairing of apple-y looks with the category apple, and then produce the seeming that the object is an apple.

There’s a range of further interesting questions about this process. Let’s start by discussing the nature of the input data about looks. Notice first that the sensory and perceptual input data are different, resulting in a difference in the content of the seemings. Sensory data don’t specify an object and sensory seemings can’t therefore be singular or de re. Rather, they can just tell you things like that it is navy all around. In contrast, perceptual data specify an object and perceptual seemings can therefore be de re and mostly take the singular form <this, an apple>.

25 On one use ‘sound’ is used to talk about the things heard, e.g. a type of object or an event (see O’Callaghan 2007). On the above use it is instead used to talk instead about a particular profile of auditory qualities of volume, pitch, and timbre etc. that the thing heard can have.
Here are some further questions about the input data. Is it pre-conscious and are experiences and seemings formed in parallel? Or are experiences formed before and do they then serve as the input data? Jack Lyons seems to hold the former view and allows that zombies could have seemings (Lyons 2005: 246, 2009: 51-54). But one might also think that it’s the experiences that serve as inputs. Again, this is an interesting empirical question we don’t have to take a stand on right now.

Another question pertains to the conceptual categories. Are there any restrictions on what sorts of categories systems can assign and thus on what sorts of seemings we can have? The above picture gives us some help without settling it. First, the systems can in principle assign only those categories of individuals which have a distinctive enough look. For example, even though some person can seem to you to be Kripke and perhaps your car can seem to you to be your car, a generic brand new CUP copy of the *Critique of Pure Reason* that you just ordered can’t seem to you to be your copy because it doesn’t yet have a distinctive look. But of course what counts as distinctive enough in a particular case and whether there are other constraints are tricky questions. Similarly, the systems can assign only those categories of kinds which have a typical look. For example, even though things can seem to you to be apples and perhaps even Fuji’s or Gala’s, they can’t seem to you to be apples bought yesterday from Trader Joe’s because these sorts of things lack a typical “look”.

A further question concerns the connection between talk of recognitional abilities and the picture of seemings production provided here. Above I portrayed recognitional abilities as necessary for seemings. Here I’ve talked about systems together with encoded pairings as producing seemings. The connection is as follows. A person’s ability to recognize Fs is not prior to the production of seemings of Fs. Rather, it consists of having a system that produces seemings of Fs that is furthermore integrated in the cognitive economy such that its outputs can be taken in by central cognition. Thus, the systems that produce seemings explain recognitional abilities and seemings explain recognition, not vice versa.

Finally, it’s crucial to understand that seemings are not produced as a result of cognitive penetration. In a genuine case of cognitive penetration some cognitive state (e.g. a belief, desire, fear etc.) causally influences the production of a perceptual or interface state by leading to its occurrence or affecting its nature (for discussion see Lyons 2011, Stokes 2013). What is crucial

---

26 Thanks to Chris Tucker for pressing me to clarify this.
is that the perceptual or interface can occur independently of the cognitive state. On this picture of seemings nothing like this happens. The systems that produce seemings rely on encoded pairings which are acquired through some sort of learning process which pairs looks with conceptual categories. But they then typically produce seemings by relying on these pairings in a bottom-up manner in response to the input data. There is no cognitive penetration by recognitional abilities since those are explanatorily posterior to systems producing seemings. And there is no penetration by the subjects’ background beliefs because they play no role at all. Of course, none of this is to say that seemings couldn’t be cognitively penetrated. It’s just to say that on the above story they normally aren’t.

Let us now proceed to questions about the relations between experiences and seemings. Could experiences occur without any seemings? Yes! Consider *associative agnosia* which leaves intact one’s ability to perceive spatial form and copy figures, but robs one of the ability to recognize objects as the objects they are. As Teuber famously put it, the agnosics get “a normal percept that has somehow been stripped of its meaning” (Teuber 1968: 293). On the current view this is most naturally explained by claiming that they have an intact ability to perceptually experience, but something is wrong with the system responsible for the production of seemings, or, more precisely with the part of the system responsible for the production of seemings that deals with object categorization (compare Tucker 2010: 531). As a second example, consider *semantic dementia* which brings with it an erosion of conceptual capacities, robbing one of the ability to recognize objects as the objects they are and perhaps even the ability to handle them correctly (Wu 2008: 1023). On the current view this is again most naturally explained by claiming that something has happened which leads to a lack of seemings. In the case of associative agnosia there’s something wrong with the system that produces seemings such that it can’t utilize our conceptual capacities. A natural thought is that what’s lacking are the pairings between looks and categories. In the case of semantic dementia there’s something wrong with the conceptual capacities themselves to the effect that they’re not there to be utilized. In both cases experiences and seemings can be pulled apart in that the former can occur without the latter. Thus, it’s clear that experiences could occur without any seemings.

Finally, could seemings occur without any experiences? Possibly. The first way this could happen is if it’s true that the input data to seemings is pre-conscious. Then it’s possible that we get no conscious experience at all, yet we get seemings. Second, even if experiences serve as
input data, it might be possible that the system responsible for seemings could be stimulated proximally to produce seemings (compare Lyons 2005: 243).

In sum, seemings are formed by perceptual or interface systems by taking some sort of input data about looks, sounds, and feels and conceptualizing it. In some cases like when one is impaired by associative agnosia or semantic dementia experiences can be had without any accompanying seemings. And it is also possible that seemings could be had without any experiences.

4. Evidence

Contemporary internalist epistemology of perception is dominated by a view that goes by the names of dogmatism or phenomenal dogmatism (Chudnoff 2013, Pryor 2000, Tucker 2010), phenomenal conservatism (Huemer 2001, 2007), and seemings internalism (Lyons 2011, 2015). Here are some of the ways it’s been stated both in the perceptual case and more generally:

If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. (Huemer 2007: 30)

Necessarily, if it seems to S that P, then S thereby has prima facie (non-inferential) justification for P. (Tucker 2010: 529)

If it perceptually seems to you that p, then you thereby possess some prima facie justification for believing that p. (Chudnoff 2013: 84)

Its seeming to S as if p is a prima facie reason for S to believe that p. (Lyons 2015).

On this view, something experience-related that can be captured with a ‘seems’-statement is claimed to provide some degree or prima facie justification, evidence, or reason to believe. But

27 I think of dogmatism as a view about immediate prima facie justification, evidence, and reasons to believe. Matthew McGrath has recently argued that immediate justification can’t be justification by evidence or reasons (McGrath 2015). His argument relies crucially on the assumption that there is a “high bar” on what is required for one to have the proposition that p as reason: namely, that one must at least have a justified belief that p. However, dogmatists should plausibly reject such a “high bar” and claim that much less is required (for discussion of how one could explain the phenomena motivating taking there to be a “high bar” without positing one see Schroeder 2011).
what exactly? Is the claim that it is experiences by themselves that provide evidence? Or is the claim that what I call seemings by themselves that provide evidence? Or is the claim that it is some sorts of composites of experiences and seemings that do?

There are familiar, broadly Sellarsian reasons to not take dogmatists to claim or at least for them to not claim that it is experiences by themselves that provide evidence. First, although this is controversial and I’m staying neutral on this in this paper, it might be thought that experiences lack propositional content (see fn. 23). However, as Sellars claimed, it’s plausible that only states with propositional content can provide evidence or reasons (Sellars 1956). After all, on lots of views, evidence or reasons just are propositions.

Second, sensations and perceptual experiences are non-conceptual. But, as John McDowell has insisted, internalists are plausibly committed to the following principle:

\[ \text{Access: A state can provide one a reason for something (performing an action, acquiring or maintaining a belief) only if it puts one in a position to cite its content as one’s reason. (McDowell 1994: 165)} \]

But if experiences are non-conceptual then, even if they have propositional content, they would still be blind in the sense that they wouldn’t put their subject in a position to cite their contents as one’s reasons. This is because non-conceptual states do not talk to us in our language: they do not articulate their contents in terms of our conceptual categories.

Finally, consider the above intuitive examples involving expertise. Many people agree that the Novice’s experiences don’t intuitively provide evidence for her to judge that it is navy blue all around, that this is Kripke, and that this is a knight, even though they’re the same as the Expert’s.

There are also reasons for dogmatists not to claim that it is seemings by themselves that provide evidence. Dogmatists usually think that the experience-related state that provides

---

28 I think that this is what McDowell takes to be the true import of Davidson’s dictum that “nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief but another belief” (Davidson 1986). He differs from Davidson in insisting that something perceptual can be like belief in putting one in a position to cite its content as a reason.

29 For further discussion, see Lyons 2009: Ch. 3.

30 Some dogmatists like Chris Tucker in fact do claim that it’s seemings by themselves that provide evidence (Tucker 2010). I’ll outline my doubts about this view below.
evidence does so in virtue of its phenomenology (Chudnoff 2013, Huemer 2001, Pryor 2000, Tucker 2010: 533). But consider what having a seeming by itself without an experience would be like. It would be like being told by an inner voice that something is the case (e.g. that it is black all around you, that this is a knight). But as Jack Lyons has put it, this would be exactly “like blindsight, but with confidence” or like the state Laurence Bonjour’s clairvoyant Norman is when he “just knows” that the president is in New York (Lyons 2015). And it’s hard to see why an internalist would take this sort of phenomenology by itself to be evidence-providing. An externalist might take such a state to be evidence-providing if the seemings-formation processes are reliable (Lyons 2009). And an internalist might take such a state to be evidence-providing together with the subject’s background belief that the seemings-formation processes are reliable. But it’s hard to see why an internalist would take this sort of phenomenology by itself to be evidence-providing.

Instead, I think dogmatists should claim that it’s the right sorts of composites of experiences and seemings that provide evidence: those where the experience has a phenomenology that is appropriately related to the content of the seeming. Related how? Michael Huemer claims that the state that provides evidence does so in virtue of being a forceful one in the sense that when one is in it “it seems to one that something satisfying the content of the experience actually exists, here and now” (Huemer 2001: 79). Similarly, but even more illuminatingly, Elijah Chudnoff claims that the state that provides evidence for believing that p does so in virtue of its presentational phenomenology with respect to the proposition that p in the following sense:

[W]hat it is for an experience of yours to have presentational phenomenology with respect to p is for it to both make it seem to you that p and make it seem to you as if this experience makes you aware of a truth-maker for p (Chudnoff 2013: 37)

My proposal is that dogmatists should claim that for a composite of an experience and a seeming to provide evidence for believing that p, the experience has to have presentational phenomenology with respect to p and the seeming has to have the content that p.

Let’s first say a bit more about how I understand what it is for an experience to have presentational phenomenology with respect to p. Here are three different ways of unpacking
what Chudnoff says above. Take the composite of your perceptual experience of a knight plus a seeming that this is a knight. On the strongest reading for the experience to have a presentational phenomenology with respect to the proposition that this is a knight it has to be accompanied by a further seeming to the effect that this experience makes you aware of a truth-maker for the proposition. This is much stronger than the intuitive idea. It requires a further seeming that refers to the experience and categorizes it as something that makes you aware of a truth-maker for the proposition that this is a knight. But this feels like an overintellectualization. First, it’s highly unlikely that we could have such complex seemings. And second, it has the damming consequence that people who lack the conceptual resources to think of truth-making can’t have any evidence at all.

On the weakest reading for the experience to have presentational phenomenology with respect to the content of the seeming is for it to have a phenomenology such that it putatively presents you with something that is in fact a truth-maker for the content. This is weaker than the intuitive idea. It doesn’t set any constraints on what the experience of the putative truth-maker has to be like vis-à-vis the content of the seeming. But consider the following case. You’re in a dimly lit room and see a bishop on the table while it seems to you that this is a bishop. However, suppose that due to the poor lighting your experience doesn’t present you with its bishop-y look. Instead it presents you with a mere pointy chess piece look which, if you’d explicitly reason from it, would lead you at best to conclude that it’s either a bishop or a queen. It isn’t unreasonable to think that this composite doesn’t provide evidence for the belief that this is a bishop. And it isn’t unreasonable to conclude that this is because the experience doesn’t have presentational phenomenology with respect to the proposition that this is a bishop.

On the intermediate reading the experience has to putatively present you with something that is in fact a truth-maker for the content of the seeming in a revelatory way. The idea is that the experience has to present the truth-maker in a way that presents its relevant look. For example, for the experience of a bishop to have a presentational phenomenology with respect to the proposition that this is a bishop it has to present you with its bishop-y look.31

31 Thanks to Eli Chudnoff for discussion.
I understand presentational phenomenology according to the intermediate reading. But why should internalists be happy to take the composite of an experience with a presentational phenomenology with respect to the proposition that \( p \) together with the seeming that \( p \) to be to be evidence-providing? Here it is useful to look at Mark Johnston’s recent discussion of the epistemic function of experience as opposed to something like our seemings by themselves (Johnston 2011).\(^{32}\) Johnston thinks that the epistemic function of experience consists of the fact that experiences put us in touch with truth-makers. Furthermore, he thinks that when we have an experience which puts us in touch with a truth-maker together with an accompanying experience as (= a seeming) we have a special sort of license or ratification for our judgments that we would lack otherwise:

Suppose I see a pineapple there and see it as a pineapple. Typically, I will also be aware of my seeing the pineapple there and of my seeing it as a pineapple. Moreover, in such cases I will indeed have the immediate perceptual belief that there is a pineapple there. … Now suppose that some irritating interlocutor asks me “By what right do you believe that there is a pineapple there?” Relying on my awareness of my [perceptual experience], and my awareness of myself as enjoying such [an experience], I say “I see the pineapple there and I see the pineapple as being there”. I have completely answered the irritating interlocutor. I have produced my license to believe that there is a pineapple there. (Johnston 2011: 204)

Note that what Johnston takes to be required for providing a license are four states:

a) seeing the pineapple; (= veridical perceptual experience of a pineapple)
b) awareness of seeing the pineapple
c) seeing the pineapple as a pineapple (= its seeming to you that this is a pineapple)
d) awareness of seeing the pineapple as a pineapple

\(^{32}\) Johnston talks of ‘sensory awareness’ and later refines it to talk of ‘attentive sensory episodes’ or ‘ASE’s’ but it’s clear from what he says that it more or less amounts to talk of ‘experiences’ as we’re using it, that is, as an umbrella term for both sensations and perceptual experiences.
Of course, on most views a) and b) collapse: the perceptual experience of the pineapple involves being aware of having it, there’s no space between these states. Similarly, it’s possible that c) and d) collapse: the seeming involves awareness of having it. This follows if seemings have a phenomenology and have it essentially. However, even if one denies that seemings have a phenomenology essentially one could still think they’re necessarily access conscious. Nevertheless, it is also possible to think that c) and d) don’t collapse and that you could have a seeming without awareness of it. On such a view awareness of a seeming would require a further, monitoring state that picks up on it.

Now, Johnston thinks that the epistemic function of experience is to provide an actual license in the sense of something you only have when your experience is “veridical” (Johnston 2011: 205). It follows that when you’re hallucinating you can’t provide an actual license to believe. Yet, even when you’re hallucinating you’re in a very different position than a confident blindsighter or Norman or anyone else who just has the seemings by themselves. Namely, you can provide a putative license for your belief by pointing to the experience as presenting you with a putative truth-maker for what your seeming tells you.

This helps us explain why internalists should be happy to take the composite of an experience with presentational phenomenology with respect to the proposition that p together with the seeming that p to be evidence-providing for the belief that p. Being in such a composite state involves:

a+b) experiencing something (e.g. navy blue all around you, a knight) in a revelatory way and awareness of experiencing it

c+d) seemings (e.g. that it is navy blue all around you, that this is a knight) and awareness of having them

---

33 Different views will explain this differently. On a deflationary view to say that one is aware of an experience is just to say that in having the experience one experiences it. However, on a higher order view like HOT to say that one is aware of an experience is to say that there’s a higher order state that is about it (but there’s no separation because the higher order state is also what makes the underlying state into a conscious experience at all). On a reflexive view to say that one is aware of an experience is to say that it is about itself (but again, there’s no separation between the experience and the awareness since the self-reference is what makes the underlying state into a conscious experience at all). For discussion see Block 2009: 1115.
Having c)+d) gives you the feeling of being told that something is the case. And having a)+b) grounds your ability to provide a putative license for your belief: your ability to point to something as a truth-maker for what you’re being told.\(^{34}\)

**Conclusion**

In this paper I’ve focused on the *Kantian* two-component views. I first suggested that we need more clarity and precision about what the components are like and how they’re related. To that effect I argued that we need to properly distinguish between mere sensations and perceptual experiences on the one hand, and both from accompanying seemings on the other. In Kantian terms, it’s the sensations and perceptual experiences that provide the *intuition* without which thought would remain empty of any particular content. And it’s the seemings that bring into operation the *concepts* without which intuition would remain blind or useless to us qua thinking creatures.

I also suggested that drawing these distinctions would help us arrive at the best version of the popular dogmatist view of evidence and better understand why it is frequently found attractive. To that effect I argued that a dogmatist should appeal to the right sorts of composites of experiences and seemings in a story about evidence because these are both *sighted* in telling us something in terms of our categories and *full* in putatively presenting us with something that we can point to as a truth-maker for what we’re being told.\(^{35}\)

---

\(^{34}\) This also shows the deeper reason behind the intuition that seemings by themselves couldn’t provide evidence. This is because they would be *empty* in the sense of not putting us in touch with any truth-makers. This is significant in two different ways. Consider first what having a sensory seeming that tells you that it is black all around would be like without a sensation on which it is based. What you lack is awareness of an array of sensible qualities that you could point to as a truth-maker for what your seeming tells you. But now consider further what having a perceptual seeming that tells you that this is a knight would be like without a perceptual experience on which it is based. Here your seeming is empty also in the further sense that you don’t have the slightest clue what ‘this’ refers to or what you’re being told anything about!

\(^{35}\) I want to thank Mike Barkasi, Tim Bayne, John Bengson, Jake Berger, Brit Brogaard, Dan Cavedon-Taylor, Bartlomiej Chomanski, Elijah Chudnoff, David DiDomenico, Jerome Dokic, Richard Grandy, Alex Grzankowski, Peter Hanks, Uriah Kriegel, Ben Lennertz, Janet Levin, Heather Logue, Jack Lyons, Shyam Nair, Bence Nanay, Casey O’Callaghan, Nico Orlandi, Adam Pautz, Francois Recanati, Jake Quilty-Dunn, Mark Schroeder, Susanna Siegel, Charles Siewert, Jeff Speaks, Chris Tucker, and audiences at Bled, Institut Jean Nicod, and Rice University for helpful comments and/or discussion.
References


Bengson, J. 2013. “Presentation and Content”. Nous, 47, pp. 795-807


*Philosophical Issues*, 21, pp. 289-311


