

Chapter 6

The State University: The University of Berlin and its Founding Contradictions

The creation of the University of Berlin, in 1810, was the result of interaction between the state and philosophy, two human expressions whose relationship, at least since Socrates' death and Aristotle's exile, has tended to be problematical. That university, which became an important model for North American institutions of higher learning, was from the outset a state university; it was designed and run by the state, as opposed to what was previously the rule: institutions dependent on the Church or princes¹. The bind, of course, is that this idea of a modern university, defined by its independence with regard to ecclesiastical and private interests, must henceforth depend on the state to guaranty its independence. This dilemma is already apparent in the philosophical ideas at work in the University of Berlin's early evolution.

The ideas embodied in the Prussian state university project, through the consultative and administrative participation of Fichte, Schleiermacher and Hegel, are in themselves profoundly contradictory. Indeed, this modern notion of a state university seems to rest on two opposing currents of thought that engender two different conceptions of the state and the university's place within it. This contradiction necessarily involves the question of freedom. In the first part of this paper, I will trace the initial philosophical tendency at work in the University of Berlin project; in the second part, I will show how Hegel, arriving at the University only eight years after its founding, stood opposed to this tendency². The original contradiction is still pertinent in contemporary discussion on the university, since it is inevitably discussed in relation to the state.

It is through the notion of *Bildung*, generally translated as "culture" or "education", that I would like to approach the conceptual currents at the work in the creation of the University of Berlin. *Bildung*, in its 18th century philosophical acceptance, carries a Gnostic, even Neo-Platonic

etymological connotation, through its root *Bild* (image or picture), a reference to *energeia*, the radiant light of the good, the beautiful and the true, illuminating the illuminated, regardless of their distance from the light's source. In fact, it is the tension between being in the truth and at the same time being removed from it which is essential to the notion of *Bildung* as it is grasped by the first theorists of the state university: Fichte, Humboldt and Schleiermacher³.

The theoretical dimensions of *Bildung* these thinkers inherited through such loosely defined "movements" as the *Aufklärung*, the *Sturm und Drang*, early German romanticism and speculative idealism, are, to say the least, complex. Nonetheless, a brief genealogy of the concept can be traced using the Leibnizian monad as a point of departure. The monad is a pertinent model since it reflects the tension I see as essential to notions of *Bildung* from the period in question, ie. the tension between perceiving the truth and remaining removed from it. Indeed, the monad, which is defined as nothing other than perception and appetite, is essentially a perception of the truth and an aspiration towards it. The conceptual model of the monad is germane to the two distinct currents of thought I will examine, each of which holds its own notion of *Bildung*.

One current, stemming from the *Aufklärung*, interprets the monad's perceptive aspect in terms of universal reason, as we later find it developed in Kant and Lessing. This fundamentally rationalist view of the human soul produces a universal expression of "humanity": a community of rational beings to which every human belongs, *a priori*. The apologists of universal reason understand the appetitive aspect of the monad as a *Streben*, a tendency and ultimately the "infinite progress" of reason, and therefore of humanity, towards the true, the good, the beautiful, the three unconditioned instances at the heart of Kant's three *Critiques*⁴.

The other current stems from the rejection of *Aufklärung* ideals that characterizes the multifaceted and evanescent *Sturm und Drang* movement. This involves, above all, a refusal to consider reason as an instrument capable of adequately perceiving the truth. Representatives of this movement, tired of the endless wait implied by the notion of infinite progress, find another means to

achieve an edifying vision of absolute truth; the immediate knowledge implied in *feeling* is adopted as an important aspect of *Sturm und Drang* thought, and along with feeling, the promotion of nature as an expression of truth itself. This idea is radically opposed to the Kantian or Hegelian idea of super-natural, and even counter-natural reason.

However, far from abandoning the monadic model with its double axis of perception and appetite, *Sturm und Drang* thinkers reinterpret it to come up with a new notion of *Bildung*. No longer related to reason, the perceiving aspect of the monadic soul becomes a pure "pathos". It is the *immediate* feeling of truth as nature. This immediacy is possible since there is no distance between nature and the feeling soul. They co-penetrate and identify with each other. In fact, the soul becomes nature and nature becomes a soul. The appetitive element of the monad is expressed within this sentimentalist *Sturm und Drang* approach to *Bildung* as a natural instinct. In other words, the natural soul is attributed a *Trieb* or a pulsion. Borrowed from the natural sciences of the time, the notion of *Trieb* applies to the soul as a thoroughly natural entity.

Since nature *is* truth and the soul is a natural entity that knows the truth immediately through feeling, this instinct towards truth may seem superfluous. However, in this context *Trieb* has to be understood as the very soul or animus of nature itself. It is an infinite instinct that is the pulse of nature and therefore the pulse of the human soul as natural. This pulse is expressed in the concept of genius, an entirely natural and therefore creative quality that expresses itself in humanity through art and feeling⁵.

Although nature as *truth* can readily be understood to express itself, through sentimental genius, in the *beautiful*, an expression of the common *good* appears to be missing. This is because the link the *Aufklärung* thinkers establish between universal reason and the good seems to underlie any coherent notion of community. Rejecting universal reason seems to simultaneously preclude any possibility of universal recognition, and therefore any possibility of concrete, ethical good. Indeed, theories of genius and feeling remain essentially individualistic, even solipsistic; they refer

to the individual and his/her natural, interior universality. What is missing is worldly particularity, a necessary though not sufficient condition for ethical good.

Herder's concept of the genius of a people can be seen as a *Sturm und Drang* response to the need for a theoretical instance of ethical or common good. As perhaps the most illustrious representative of this movement, if we except the young Goethe, Herder developed the concept of a people as a natural, shared or specific expression of cultural tradition. If a people remains a unique, singular whole, it is because within it nature is expressed in each individual in a common fashion.

In this context, the monadic appetite for or towards the good is translated into an expression and ultimately an affirmation. The genius of the individual expresses the genius of the people and the genius of the people is expressed in its self-affirmation before other peoples. This self-affirmation is especially manifest in a people's attempts to rediscover its own properties, its "original" myths, traditions and linguistic forms, by purging them of exotic expressions that are the properties of other peoples.

In the late 1700's, this notion of a people's cultural self-affirmation constitutes a new definition of *Bildung*, conceived in terms of a natural impulse or drive, a *Bildungstrieb* directed towards a Golden Age "of nature", more authentic (good, beautiful, true) than the present. This notion of *Bildung* is radically different from the one associated with the *Aufklärung*. For although both involve monadic tension -- of being in the truth (perceiving it) while still being removed from it (tending towards it) -- the *Bildung* defined by the natural self-affirmation of a people is not the infinite progress of universal reason. For the latter, nature remains something external, constraining, a resistance against which reason in its freedom must fight in order to enforce its laws. Conversely, according to the new conception of *Bildung*, it is reason itself that appears as something external, constraining and unnatural.

Two opposing notions of the state and liberty emerge from these two intellectual currents. The notion of a people stemming from the naturalist conception of *Bildung* is "naturally" opposed to

the essentially rational idea of the state that arises from the *Aufklärung*. The naturalist conception sees the state as essentially external and mechanical; it is a clock-work assembly, more or less effective, and related more to necessity than to freedom. Thus for both Herder and Fichte, it is the nation and not the state that expresses the genius of the people.

The concept of freedom, however, proves problematical for the naturalist, *Sturm und Drang* and ultimately romantic current; in rejecting *Aufklärung* reason, these thinkers have to also refuse any idea of freedom that flows from it, whether this means freedom conceived as free will or as Kant's practical reason. In both cases, freedom is based on the primacy of reason and its power to determine nature for the good. The problem is that while the legislative and "liberating" power of reason (against natural determinism) may also be understood as a repressive and heteronomous element, it is not immediately clear how the other pole, ie. nature and natural sentiment, can provide a foundation for the concept of freedom, not only because nature had always been thought of in terms of necessity, but because the immediacy of the nature-soul relation implies an immediate determination between natural feeling and the source of that feeling: nature. Briefly put, this relation seems to annul any distance and therefore any possibility of decision. In the ethical field, this implies that the soul of a people will be a purely natural entity, immediately determined by nature, a condition apparently irreconcilable with any expression of freedom, a fundamental principle of ethical good.

Although they interpret it rather freely, early German romantics find in Fichte's *Doctrine of Science* a theoretical structure able to support a new expression of freedom. In the Fichtean context, freedom appears as the self-positing of the *I*, simultaneously positing a non-*I* by which it limits itself. Perhaps inspired by Spinoza's idea that the Substance's freedom consists in its self-determination (self-limitation), Fichte discovers freedom in the self-positing (self-limiting) of the *I*, a movement he applies exclusively to the subjectivity of consciousness but which the romantics ascribe to nature as a whole. Nature is thus attributed subjectivity. In other words, national genius

and national freedom can now be expressed as self-positing, or natural self-determination. A people's freedom is its self-affirming self-definition, defining itself through its affirmation. This movement is expressed as *Bildung*, not a state's but a nation's. This is the first current of thought participating in the creation of the University of Berlin.

The problem then becomes the apparently paradoxical role of the state in this creation. Indeed, in espousing the *Bildung* project of the German nation, the state, because of its own perceived "mechanical", unnatural "nature", seems, at the same time, to divorce itself from the project. This ambiguity is obvious with Fichte himself. In 1793, before the *Doctrine of Science*, he refuses all state participation in the work of *Bildung*, attributing the educative function to society in general, to the private sphere and particularly to the family, while in 1807, when he was called to the Prussian ministry of education to participate in the creation of the University of Berlin, he then accords the main educative role to the state⁶. However, in taking on this role, the state is nonetheless meant to fill a purely instrumental function, perfectly adapted to its mechanical nature, thus serving the nation in its self-actualization through *Bildung*.

This expression of *Bildung* still draws from the Gnostic or Neo-platonic source I referred to above; universal truth is revealed in a particular people striving to regain the Absolute. Since the state university is grasped as an essentially *national* institution, it requires a special ontological status. With reference to the monadic model I've been using, the state university represents the place where the Absolute is clearly perceived and where the appetite for attaining it is strongest. Fichte's acceptance speech, upon becoming Rector of the University of Berlin in 1811, is remarkable in this regard. Here, the university is seen as nothing less than "the most important institution, and the most sacred thing possessed by humankind". Fichte continues: "Since the communication that takes place there maintains and transmits [...] everything divine that has ever occurred in humanity, within [the university] lives humanity's true being, its uninterrupted life, sundered from all decay, and the university is the visible presentation of our species' immortality,

the visible presentation of the unity of the world, as a divine manifestation, as God Himself."⁷

When the university project is defined in these terms, it is easy to understand why the philosophical research of that time, grappling with the Absolute, was the worthiest of academic disciplines; it embodied the very expression of that project itself. In any case, the university's unique ontological status implies several founding principles. Their trace can still be observed in the university as it is largely conceived in the West, today. These principles are rooted in the romantic conception of *Bildung*, as I have been examining it.

1) The university, an expression of national freedom, must have absolute freedom in relation to the mechanistic state. Moreover, the state must put itself in the service of the university. Thus, in his 1811 University of Berlin speech, Fichte demands "complete freedom, academic freedom in the broadest sense of the word"⁸, for the University, an autonomy declared primarily from any strictly utilitarian ends the state might try to impose on it. The university should not become a professional training school for state functionaries, for example. Even if the German university was, *de facto*, a place where civil servants were educated, the program was not conceived *in view of* this end. Instead, a university education was meant to cultivate in them an appreciation for the *Bildung* project and thus adapt them to the state's assigned role, in the service of this project. In any case, the result was a class of particularly cultivated civil servants. In the same way, although the traditional faculties (medicine, law and theology) provided careers in the professional world, these professions remained subservient to the national project.

2) The university is above all a place for pure research. The idea that the individual efforts of each researcher express a genuine cultural drive (*Bildungstrieb*), and therefore participate in the national project, gave rise to a university system which encouraged innovators. At Berlin, the *Privatdozent* and the *Extraordinarius*, directly remunerated by students attending their classes, and not by the state, were young researchers/doctors "employed" by the university to develop and disseminate the fruits of their personal research and participate in university life while waiting to be

hired by the state as professors.

From its beginnings, the University of Berlin was consequently defined as superior and independent with regard to the state that created it. Philosophy, ie. science, as represented by Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Humboldt and Pestalozzi, not only provided the theoretical underpinnings of the institution but expressed its very spirit, its freedom conceived as an expression of self-determination taking place within a broader expression of national self-affirmation⁹. Hegel, when he arrived in Berlin in 1818, strongly challenged these philosophical foundations and their attendant notion of freedom, along with the ontological status of the university itself. By now examining Hegel's conception of the state university I not only want to show how his vision is opposed to the original one, but how his contrasting vision is also constitutive of the state university institution.

Hegelian philosophy is a philosophy of state in so far as the state is a manifestation of spirit's objective truth rather than nature's; the purely natural is radically devalued by Hegel. He remains fundamentally inspired by the *Aufklärung*, by universal Reason as he found the notion in his youthful readings of Lessing, where it largely surpasses any purely calculative, ratiocinative definition. In Hegel, Reason, which evolves into the concept of spirit, must be grasped as the activity (the life) of thought manifesting itself in the world as the human oeuvre: the state, religion, art and, above all, the ultimate work which comprehends all the others, philosophy. Nature only makes up the raw material for the activity of human thinking. Nature is pure exteriority, devoid of all self-movement and life. As long as nature remains unpenetrated, unworked and unfashioned by thinking, it remains lifeless. Thinking (and human action is also a manifestation of thinking) "kills" this *nature morte* and thus breathes life into it, the true life of spirit. Consequently, *Bildung*, human culture, is neither an expression of nature nor of the fundamentally natural entity that is the nation. *Bildung* is a particular form of objective spirit, situated within a more general manifestation of objective spirit: the state.

Hegel does not deny that *Bildung* has a natural element; the ethical training a child receives in the bosom of the family, ie. the customs, the traditions and the national language, all stem from the natural element in that they are determined by nature in an immediate unreflected way. But this natural aspect is only a moment, the first in a dialectical movement of mediation through civil society, ie. the bourgeois life of production and possession within a system of needs. This movement, as a movement of thought, negates the natural aspect of *Bildung* and thus mediates its immediateness. Education represents the dissolution of the family, the child's first entry into the system of needs¹⁰. The child leaves home, goes to school where the family's particular and selfish interests are mediated or subsumed (but also conserved, according to the economy of *Aufhebung*) to the more universal interests of civil society¹¹. However, this universality (or generality) only appears as such in relation to the family's singular or individual interests. In fact, this relative generality proves to be no more than particular, on the level of the genus or the corporate. Indeed, society is divided into corporations, each one representing a particular interest or need of civil society.

The third moment of this dialectic of objective spirit, of Reason in the world, is that of the state, although this must be grasped as the result of the two preceding moments, i.e. family and civil society; the result preserves them as subsumed but still at work within itself. Thus the concept of state in Hegel is essentially organic rather than mechanistic. It is not only the culmination of a dialectical process, but the manifestation of the whole syllogism of ethical substance in its genuine generality. As with the *Aufklärung* thinkers, the state is defined in terms of reason but instead of being reduced to a rational mechanism, Hegel's state is Reason itself, the life of spirit in its objective moment. Moreover, the state represents actual freedom, more concrete than the formal, abstract freedom of civil society with its juridical or contractual references to the "person". In the context of the state, freedom proves concrete, actualized in institutions. In other words, in state institutions, singular will recognizes general will as its own.

In Hegel, *Bildung* represents an intermediary instance rather than the final, recapitulating moment of objective spirit which is the state. The university moment, which is part of *Bildung*, only acquires meaning within the passage from the natural immediacy of family to the generality of state¹². The university is not, as we saw with Fichte, the crowning of a monadic project both *in* and *towards* the absolute. The university is a preparation for active involvement, a place where man learns formally what he will effect in earnest within the public sphere, ie. within the state taken as the expression of actual freedom. From this viewpoint, academic freedom can only be relative and abstract. For even if the educational process carries, as its significant content, the moments through which it has passed, ie. the moments of family and school, the process remains empty and abstract if it is not completed in the actual, professional life of a corporation of the organic state. To put it another way, in order to participate in the really general freedom of the state, academic freedom must be relativized. Far from serving the university, with its absolutist pretensions, the state has the right to demand that this *particular* corporation recognize its own intermediary role as subordinate to the *general* interest of the state.

It is therefore understandable how Hegelian philosophy became, at the University of Berlin, the official philosophy of this state institution. Indeed, this is not only because of the ultimate right Hegel accords the state and its institutions, but, on a less theoretical level, because of the friendly and professional relations that Hegel enjoyed with the Prussian Minister of Education, Altensein, and the Secretaries Schutze and von Raumer¹³. Already in Nuremberg, Hegel scrupulously fulfilled the many administrative responsibilities that went with his teaching activities, though more from a sense of duty than enthusiasm, and won the admiration of the Bavarian authorities. Of course, Hegel's dedication earned him additional responsibilities and in 1813 he became education Secretary for the city. By the time he left Nuremberg, Hegel had already been a state civil servant (of Bavaria) for eight years¹⁴.

Hegel, however, saw himself as more a pedagogue than an administrator and he tended to

consider the latter responsibilities as impediments to the former function¹⁵. In fact, his own teaching experience provided the basis for his ideas concerning the teaching of philosophy, ie. that it could form a content the learned professor could convey to unlearned students, that philosophy could be taught. The belief that philosophy has real content which "the master possesses, considers beforehand [and which] the students consider afterwards"¹⁶, denotes a pedagogical attitude radically opposed to the one inspired by Kantian critical thinking, according to which philosophy cannot be taught, only "philosophizing"¹⁷ can. It is this idea and the related sceptical tendency that Hegel argues against, in an increasingly polemical fashion, in his pedagogical writings from the Nuremberg and Berlin periods. In fact, the critical trend Hegel encounters at Berlin derives from the romantic notion of *Bildung* I described above. Hegel's assertion that philosophy can (and must) be taught implies another notion of *Bildung*, which ultimately determines philosophy's place within the university and the university's place within the state.

For Hegel, the teaching content of philosophy is the content of philosophy itself. As such, this content is articulated in three moments: as initially formal content, ie. stemming from the area of abstract understanding, with the subject-object split this entails; as logical or dialectical training, which dissolves the hard unilaterality of the first moment so that the third recapitulating moment can take place, the identity of identity and difference, or the system of speculative philosophy as a whole. However, the "soul" of this movement, its animus, is in no way different from the method by which it is taught, which evolves naturally from the content itself. In other words, philosophical content itself moves through these three moments. Teaching has only to follow it¹⁸. In order to understand the position philosophy occupies within the university and how the university relates to the state, it is necessary to take a closer look at this content.

Philosophical content, in its initial moment, must be introduced at the *Gymnasium* level¹⁹, through the teaching of law, ethics and religion. This content is not yet, in fact, philosophy as such, but only the content of philosophy *in itself*, which will later develop along speculative lines (in and

for itself). Studying law and ethics means acquiring the relatively formal knowledge, i.e. by studying the texts of Greek and Roman culture as well as Christian doctrine and dogma. This acquired textual content is the real substance of philosophy, without which it would be no more than empty, abstract reasoning. This is how we should understand the objective claim of Hegelian philosophy, its opposition to any purely subjective, metaphysical construction. According to Hegel's conception, philosophy is nothing as long as it is not philosophy *of* something. This "something" is the content of philosophy. It is not a matter of subjective elaborations, and ideas "thrown into my mind like stones"²⁰. The determinations of philosophy, its textual content, must be learned and this training (or apprenticeship) is the necessary first moment of philosophical education.

The second stage of Hegelian philosophical training, still at the *Gymnasium*, is the one ascribed to the dialectical moment, i.e. to the moment of negativity, of radical scepticism which comes to dissolve the fixed, unilateral knowledge of the initial moment of the understanding we just looked at. Here, then, the term "dialectic" reclaims its ancient meaning, found in Zeno: the confronting of two antithetical and paradoxical assertions in such a way that they contradict each other. Besides the "dialectics of the ancient Eleates"²¹, the Hegelian program included, with some reservations, the Kantian antinomies as well as Aristotelian and Leibnizian logics. The passage between the first moment of formal understanding and second dialectical moment happens quite naturally in that, according to Hegel, the unilateral content of the first moment actually does contradict itself, or rather, the content is, because of its unilaterality, self-contradictory. Learning dialectical thought merely elucidates the contradictory truth inherent in the understanding's way of thinking, in order that it may come to grasp itself speculatively. This is the final, crowning moment of philosophy's teaching; as philosophy *per se* it comprises, within itself, the other moments and their contents, now fully deployed. Speculative philosophy, which fulfils, at the university, the two preceding stages, suspends any possibility of becoming stuck in one or the other; such a fixation

would lead to either a purely formal philosophy of subjective understanding or to a radical scepticism, or involve an unresolved dichotomy of both. Hegel recognizes that the speculative level of philosophy is "naturally what is most difficult"²², and this, for a very specific reason: it is the truth. The place where truth is *taught* is the university.

The difficulties of philosophical instruction, according to Hegel, are to some extent those of teaching the "other sciences"²³, ie. the practical difficulty involved in combining "clarity with depth and an appropriately detailed development" while also requiring that the instruction fall within "time constraints, generally a semester, which must be stretched or shortened depending on the science taught"²⁴. On the other hand, presenting philosophy at the speculative or university level has its own specific difficulties. For as philosophy forms the systematic totality of knowing, ie. the truth, it must comprise all the particular sciences within itself. Rather than simply articulating "several universal formulae"²⁵, it must penetrate and deploy itself in theology, law, natural sciences, art and history in order that these sciences acquire their "remoulding and their acceptance into the new [speculative] idea"²⁶. Thus the "former material"²⁷, the older sciences, must not be abandoned, and the new "materials of the specific sciences"²⁸ must not be ignored; the ultimate meaning and truth of all this material depends on its becoming the object and content of philosophical science. In Hegel, this objective content is contained in his university level teaching manual, the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, the most complete articulation of "his" system.

In fact, the possessive pronoun "his" is completely at odds with Hegel's intention. As opposed to designating a purely subjective construction, the *Encyclopedia* is meant to form the system or the science (the two terms are virtually synonymous in Hegel) of human spirit, the fruits of human thought. Thus philosophy is "a systematic complex of sciences full of content"²⁹, and studying it involves the difficulty, the enormous labor, of learning the content of the "positive sciences"³⁰. As Hegel puts it, "the study of these sciences is necessary for a profound insight into philosophy"³¹. This labour of learning was certainly not foreign to Hegel himself. A voracious

reader, a keeper of "file cards" from the age of fourteen, he could perhaps claim universal knowledge at a time, no doubt the last, when this remained possible. In other words, he possessed a general culture, a *Bildung*, which, in most cases, his students seemed to be lacking, a factor representing, in his eyes, the biggest impediment to the teaching of philosophy. This "lack of knowledge, the ignorance"³² he noticed in his students was not the result of mere gaps in their education, but rather it stemmed from a misguided philosophical conception, widespread at that time: a notion of *Bildung* completely different from the one implied by a general culture, formed through knowledge of objective truth, painstakingly acquired.

In his pedagogical texts, Hegel takes a clear polemical stand against the romantic conception of *Bildung*, which represents, in his view, an obstacle to the development of the speculative Idea. By asserting that "the possession of specific and varied knowledge is superfluous for the Idea and even beneath it"³³, *Bildung* understood as self-affirmation ignores genuine content and contradicts true philosophy defined as the objective totality of knowledge. It is this notion of *Bildung* that lies at the heart of the pseudo-philosophies of critical thinking and sentiment. These are purely subjective and formal expressions of selfish, abstract freedom and represent what Hegel refers to as a "thinking-for-oneself"³⁴. This essentially solipsistic thinking leads to the "absurd madness [...] according to which everyone wants his own system"³⁵. It can only be expressed in "the form of feeling, imagination, confused concepts"³⁶ printed on "one or two pages that supposedly contain everything essential about all of philosophy or one of the particular sciences it contains"³⁷. In his letter to von Raumer on teaching philosophy at university, Hegel takes up the same argument he used ten years earlier in the *Phenomenology's* preface. Immediate knowledge of the truth is ultimately subjective and empty. Thinking-for-oneself, exclusive of true objective content, is nothing more than a thinking-*of*-oneself.

What Hegel is targeting in his criticism of philosophical teaching at the university is therefore ultimately the conception of *Bildung* as the *I's* self-affirming genius, which, reflecting

itself in a people, in the nation, is expressing Nature as absolute freedom. To this conception of subjective, individual and national freedom, Hegel opposes concrete freedom, ie. the shared, particularized freedom within the organic state.

The polemical character apparent in certain of Hegel's Berlin writings attests to this opposition. Within the University of Berlin itself, where Hegel was at odds with Schleiermacher, the "theologian of feeling", this conflict was exacerbated by the murder of the writer-diplomat Kotzebue, in Mannheim in 1819, by the theology student Sand, who was enrolled at the University of Jena. As this fanatical patriot belonged to a *Burschenschaft*, a liberal, nationalist student association, his criminal act provoked severe police repression from the state, which was to stifle university life in Germany for years to come³⁸. When professor De Wette, in Berlin, appeared to excuse Sand's crime (in a letter to his mother), the state relieved him of his teaching responsibilities. Hegel, contrary to Schleiermacher, spoke out in favor of the state's right to do so, "providing it leaves him [De Wette] his salary", an opinion which Schleiermacher judged as "pitiful"³⁹.

No doubt, from Hegel's point of view, Sand's action was an extreme expression of purely subjective, abstract freedom, the actualizing of the "philosophy" of thinking-for-oneself. Such an action rips apart the organic wholeness of the state, to the extent where it reacts, as would an external, mechanistic power, against one of its corporations, and certain individuals. This is the state's right because it is ultimately seeking to re-establish its lost wholeness. The teaching of philosophy must preserve the state from such rips in its fabric, for what is in fact taught is freedom, not the abstract, subjective variety but freedom engendered by the reciprocal recognition at work in the organic state where the university is a particular corporation.

A corollary to this is that Hegel's extensive pedagogical activity is itself sufficient reason to refute any thesis that, according to him, the world has already arrived at the end of its History or actualized absolute knowledge. On the contrary, as long as the teaching of philosophy is felt to be what he called "a need of the time", history is not finished, the lesson of freedom has still to be

learned.

I have attempted to show how two opposing notions of *Bildung* give rise to two opposing ideas of freedom, of the state and of the university's situation within it. In Hegel, although the university can be seen as the embodiment of systematic philosophy and its contents, it remains a specific corporation where this objective content, which has already been grasped by speculative science, is taught. In such a context, academic freedom is relative. Conversely, the other tendency conceives of the university as a place where the truth reveals itself through pure research. In this context, both academic freedom and the ontological status of the university tend towards the absolute. However, in spite of its corporate status within the organic state, Hegel's university, as the embodiment of the philosophical sciences, can be seen as determining the form of the underlying system of education and its institutions. After all, the purpose of this system is to provide students of the *Encyclopedia* the necessary content for their speculative reflections.

NOTES

1. Contrary to what one might think, the first state universities were not French. Revolutionary France dismantled the existing "system" in order to develop a network of "Grandes écoles". Today, these institutions still enjoy state privileges over the universities, which were only reinstated subsequently.
2. In fact, Hegel had already participated in the early definition of the University of Berlin through his correspondence with von Raumer in 1816. See *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. by Moldenhauer and Michel, vol.4 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970) p.418-425.
3. Humboldt was the University's founder, Fichte was the first Rector and Schleiermacher taught theology there from 1810.
4. The notion of the monade represents an interpretive extension of the scholastic and Aristotelian definitions of the soul. This is both an "animus", that which animates and provides movement (the monade's appetite) and a passive, feeling substance (the monade's perception). With the *Aufklärung* thinkers, rational thinking is not a creative act; the purpose of reason's appetite is to gain an adequate perception of the truth, which is already *there*.
5. Both artistic creation and its appreciation involve genius, since both are grounded in true feeling.

6. Cf. Bernard Bourgeois, "La pédagogie de Hegel", the introduction to his translation of Hegel's main pedagogical writings, *La pédagogie de Hegel* (Paris: Vrin, 1990), p. 25.

7. Fichte, "On the Only Possible Disruption of Academic Freedom", *Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. J.H.Fichte, vol.6 (Berlin: 1845-1856), p.454.

8. Ibid.

9. In 1830, 19% of the University of Berlin's students were enrolled in philosophy (which included the natural sciences), a figure which grew to 31% in 1860. T. Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866* (Munich: C.H.Beck, 1984), p.476.

10. Cf. *Philosophy of Right*, § 173 sq.

11. Ibid., § 239.

12. School must bring about this passage between family life and "the higher interest and earnestness of public life". Gymnasium speech from September 2, 1811. *Werke* vol.4, p.352. Or, in the same speech "School is the intermediary sphere that moves man from the family circle into the world." Ibid., p.349.

13. Schutze was Hegel's neighbour; von Raumer received Hegel's report on teaching philosophy at university, written in 1816 while he was still in Nuremberg, two years before he was called to Berlin. Cf. *Werke* vol.4, p.418.

14. In the words of Walter Kaufman: "Anyone who seriously compares Hegel before the age of forty with the Professor Hegel of the last fifteen years of his life is bound to ask: Whatever happened to him? We can now answer that question in a single sentence: for eight long years the poor man was headmaster of a German secondary school." *Hegel: A Re-interpretation* (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), p.174.

15. Cf. Bourgeois, op.cit., p.17.

16. Report to Niethammer, *Werke* vol.4, p.412.

17. Cf. Kant's "Architectonic of Pure Reason" in the first *Critique*.

18. Cf. Report to Niethammer, op.cit.

19. For Hegel, this teaching could be confined to two hours a day, for the last two or three years at the Gymnasium. Cf. B.Bourgeois, "La pédagogie de Hegel", op.cit., p.65.

20. Report to Niethammer, *Werke* vol.4, p.411.

21. Ibid., p.414.
22. Ibid., p.415.
23. Report to von Raumer, *Werke* vol.4, p.418.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p.421.
26. Ibid., p.419.
27. Ibid., p.421.
28. Ibid., p.419.
29. Ibid., p.411. Thus the three parts of the *Encyclopedia* (the sciences of nature, logic and the philosophy of spirit) correspond to the three main university faculties: medicine, theology and law. As with Fichte, but in a completely different manner, Hegel's philosophy can be seen as the expression of the university project.
30. Report to von Raumer. *Werke* vol.4, p.423.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p.421.
33. Ibid., p.420.
34. *Selbstdenken*. Ibid., p.422. The term is taken from Kant's third *Critique*.
35. Report to von Raumer. *Werke* vol.4, pp.422-423.
36. Ibid., p.424.
37. Ibid., p.420.
38. These measures, known as the Carlsbad Resolutions, included, besides explicit recognition of the principle of monarchy, censorship and surveillance of university professors.
39. Hoffmeister's note 10 to *Hegel Correspondence* Letter 359, October 30, 1819.