

# Introducing the Journal of Philosophy of Disability

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Historically, philosophy has too often failed to address central aspects of life. The uphill battle to include inquiry concerning class, race, colonialism, sex, gender, and sexuality in any number of domains of philosophical discourse over the last century is an obvious example of this. So is the exclusion of serious philosophical reflection concerning disability. Despite this challenge, philosophy of disability has increasingly become recognized as a distinct field over the last twenty years. Disability is central to human life. As the saying from disability activism goes: “disability is everywhere, once you know how to look for it.” The field’s pioneers and first-generation knowledge-builders—including Adrienne Asch, Eva Feder Kittay, Susan Wendell, S. Kay Toombs, Anita Silvers, Leslie Francis, Kim Q. Hall, David Wasserman, and Shelly Tremain—raised consciousness about disability as a focal and generative site of philosophical inquiry by demonstrating its centrality to multiple long-established philosophical fields (Asch 1999; Kittay 1999; Wendell 1996; Toombs 1992; Silvers 1994; Francis and Silvers 2000; Hall 2002; Wasserman 2005; Tremain 2005). The scholarship in philosophy of disability has to date been remarkably broad in scope, ranging from work on Parfit’s non-identity problem to Kittay’s feminist critique of Rawlsian social contract theory; from analyses of Feinburg’s open future argument to development of the role of disability in Nussbaum and Sen’s articulation of the capabilities approach; and from Toombs’ phenomenological investigations of embodiment to Hall’s critiques of norms and normality from a feminist disability studies perspective (Roberts and Wasserman 2011; Kittay 2002; Stramondo 2020; Nussbaum 2006; Toombs 2001; Hall 2002).

As these examples demonstrate, disability is discussed in social and political philosophy; feminist philosophy; social epistemology; philosophy of law; aesthetics; metaphysics; philosophy of medicine; philosophy of mind; applied fields including bioethics, engineering ethics, and environmental ethics; and across continental and analytic philosophy, among many other fields and sub-fields. Moreover, in philosophical, academic, and even popular discourse, it has become commonplace to

reference discussions concerning, for example, deaf identity and deaf gain, neurodiversity, dependency and disability, aging and impairment, and even the expressivist thesis. After a steady stream of scholarship from the 1990s onward, work in philosophy of disability expanded exponentially in recent years. The field witnessed major philosophical monographs including Elizabeth Barnes's *The Minority Body* (Oxford University Press, 2016b), Shelley Tremain's *Foucault and Feminist Philosophy of Disability* (University of Michigan Press, 2017), Chris Kaposy's *Choosing Down Syndrome* (MIT Press, 2018), and Eva Kittay's *Learning from My Daughter* (Oxford University Press, 2019), among other titles. Multiple high-profile edited volumes supported by large academic presses, including *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability*, edited by Adam Cureton and David Wasserman, appeared at the same time that entries on debates in philosophy of disability quickly expanded in encyclopedias such as the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. The SEP now has eight pieces engaging the field, including "Disability and Justice," "Critical Disability Theory," "Cognitive Disability and Moral Status," "Feminist Perspectives on Disability," and "Disability: Health, Well-Being, and Personal Relationships."<sup>1</sup> Philosophy of disability is no longer on the fringes of philosophy.

Another reason for philosophy of disability finally taking its rightful place is the wide impact and import of work done by scholars in the field. Philosophers of disability typically deploy innovative and interdisciplinary methods to address complex problems that span the humanities and social sciences, and scholars as well as policymakers have taken notice. The growth of philosophy of disability is a significant boon for those who value interdisciplinary engagement and exchange, for scholarship in this field is of great interest to humanists of all stripes as well as many social scientists whose work engages questions of disability. Given the current state of the large interdisciplinary field of disability studies, this includes those working in nearly every field across the humanities and social sciences, including English, sociology, anthropology, law, education, political theory, psychology, history, gender, sexuality, queer, and trans studies, religious studies, music studies, rhetoric, design, and art theory (Garland-Thomson 2012; Pullin 2009; Nielsen 2012; Simplican 2015; Thomas 2007; Dolmage 2013; Erelles 2011; Kafer 2013; Chen 2012; Howe et al. 2016; Timpe 2019; Ouellette 2011; Hendren 2020).

None of this should be surprising. By virtue of the centrality of disability to all life, philosophy of disability is a field that touches upon nearly every area of philosophical inquiry. Using a wide range of evidence and argumentation, scholars working in philosophy of disability have unearthed two enduring issues within the broader practice of philosophy. First, unexamined assumptions that misunderstand, ignore, or take for granted the role, nature, character, import, and impact of conceptions of human ability and disability. Second, the enormous benefit that philosoph-

ical projects would derive from engaging with the large body of work by disability activists and disability scholars.

However, because of a lack of any dedicated scholarly outlet for work on philosophy of disability, researchers in philosophy of disability have often had to place their concerns under the umbrella of and narrowly relative to tangential or hyper-specialized concerns of other fields. This limiting has negatively impacted the ability of philosophers of disability to carry out research that more rigorously and carefully builds upon the breadth of existing knowledge and debates in the field as well as in disability studies. It is for these reasons that there is an especially pressing and timely need for a peer-reviewed journal devoted to scholarship on disability in the English-speaking world. *The Journal of Philosophy of Disability* has been founded to be a locus for deepening philosophical debates about disability, which is to say, a locus for deepening philosophical debates about a central aspect of being human. The editors are excited for readers to engage with the breadth and depth of the articles in the inaugural issue, and we anticipate that those long-established in the field as well as newcomers will find much to ponder over in the pages that follow.

The issue starts out with Kim Q. Hall's "Limping Along: Toward a Crip Phenomenology," a piece that explores the relationship of philosophy of disability and queer/crip theory with research in phenomenology, including more recent work done under the banner of "critical phenomenology." Taking her own "limp" and gait as a point of departure, Hall explores what it means to "crip" phenomenology as a method, practice, and tradition. Desiree Valentine's "Technologies of Reproduction: Race, Disability, and Neoliberal Eugenics" intervenes upon debates at the intersection of race, disability, and reproduction. She argues that both race and disability are fruitfully understood not simply as produced through contemporary reproductive practices, but also as productive technologies actively at work in how societies think about and "do" reproduction.

In "Supported Decision-making: the CRPD, Non-Discrimination, and Strategies for Recognizing Persons' Choices About Their Good," Leslie Francis takes up the issue of decision-making by people with cognitive impairments, arguing that looking to common features of decisions employed by people without cognitive disabilities—including prostheses, guardrails, relationships, and social contexts—offers insights into issues raised by supported decision-making in such cases. Eva Feder Kittay contends in "Why Human Difference is Critical to a Conception of Moral Standing: An Argument for the Sufficiency of Being Human for Full Moral Status" that being a *human being* suffices for full and equal moral status and that we should reject approaches that require a set of necessary and sufficient conditions in the form of "morally relevant intrinsic properties" to define moral personhood. In short, Kittay offers a novel argument concerning the import of human being that both avoids

charges of speciesism and also shows how standard responses to that charge are morally fraught.

Following Kittay is a reprint from Jürgen Habermas, entitled “Public Space and Political Public Sphere—The Biographical Roots of Two Motifs in My Thought.” Translated by Ciaran Cronin, this is the text of his November 11th, 2004 “Commemorative Lecture” upon the occasion of receiving the Kyoto Prize. We are excited to include this piece here for two primary reasons. First, the biographical/personal relationship between philosophers and disability is understudied and underappreciated. In a way that is not clear in other writings by Habermas, he acknowledges a direct link between his lived experience of disability and his work. Second, the idea that experiences of disability are *productive* of philosophical insights and for philosophical inquiry rings loudly in Habermas’s reflections, a provocative and fecund rejoinder to the historical dominance of what Elizabeth Barnes calls “bad-difference” views of disability (2016b).

Andrea Pitts’s “The Polymorphism of Necro-Being: Examining Racism and Ableism through the Writings of Leonard Harris” examines—for the first time—the writings of African American philosopher Leonard Harris in terms of their relevance for disability critique. Pitts demonstrates how Harris’s writings contribute to the field of philosophy of disability by arguing that his concept of “necro-being” helps reveal mutually reinforcing relationships between race, disability, gender, and class. Turning from living philosophers to the history of philosophy, in “Living in Nowheresville: David Hume’s Equal Power Requirement, Political Entitlements and People with Intellectual Disabilities” James B. Gould analyzes David Hume’s view of the proper societal role of disability services. He shows how Hume’s view is morally opprobrious and why any defensible view of justice must include people with intellectual disabilities. In the last article, “Surviving Sustainability: Degrowth, Environmental Justice, and Support for the Chronically Ill,” Andrew Smith explores the tensions between ecological sustainability and disability justice, specifically in relation to type-1 diabetes. By taking seriously the complexity of “disabled ecologies,” Smith pushes discussions of climate justice forward in novel ways.

In addition to the core eight articles in this inaugural issue, we are excited to include a small cluster on disability and the COVID-19 pandemic. For those who paid attention to the many debates over pandemic response occurring from late March of 2020 onward, disability rights were frequently front and center in national and international media, but all too often because they were being flagrantly, and in some cases illegally, disregarded. Joseph Stramondo’s “Tragic Choices: Disability, Triage, and Equity Amidst a Global Pandemic” strikes at the heart of crisis standard of care protocols, arguing against using quality of life judgments and intensity/duration of treatment metrics and pushing for a world in which bioethicists prioritize changing the upstream conditions that shape the downstream effects of systemic

injustices. In “Disorders of Consciousness, Disability Rights, and Triage During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Even the Best of Intentions Can Lead to Bias,” Joseph J. Fins digs deep into the minutia of triage protocols and procedures—including discussions of the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA) score and the Glasgow Coma Scale—showing how even the best of intentions can prove insufficient when disability rights and disability justice are centered. Finally, the inaugural issue closes out with two book reviews. Melissa Rees writes about *Disability, Health, Law and Bioethics*, edited by I. Glenn Cohen, Carmel Shachar, Anita Silvers, and Michael Ashley Stein and published with Cambridge University Press in 2020, and Erica Bigelow offers a review of Sara Hendren’s *What Can a Body Do? How We Meet the Built World*, published by Riverhead Books in 2020.

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## ENDNOTES

- 1 These monographs, volumes, and encyclopedia entries have been matched by a burst of article-length studies on central topics in philosophy of disability appearing in journals including *Ethics*, *Mind*, *IJFAB*, *Res Philosophica*, *The Hastings Center Report*, *Hypatia*, *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, *Continental Philosophy Review*, *Journal of Social Philosophy*, *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, *Philosophy Compass*, and *Chiasmi International*, among many others (Scully 2018; Barnes 2016a; Reynolds 2018; Dohmen 2016; Barker and Wilson 2018; Sean Aas and David Wasserman 2016; Zala 2018; Francis 2018; Reynolds 2017; Weiss 2015; Hall 2018; Schroeder 2018; Puga-Gonzalez 2019; Rashed 2019; Campbell and Stramondo 2017; Tremain 2019).

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