Thomas Aquinas and Mulla Sadra on the Soul-Body Problem: A Comparative Investigation

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The Problem

The human being is one being in the order of existence but it is a composite reality of the body and the soul. The idea that the human being consists of two distinct things/dimensions is basic to any consideration of the relationship between the soul and the body. The problem is: how we can explain the relation between the human soul, a nonmaterial essence and the body, a material essence. This problem which is one of the most important in Aquinas’ metaphysics and in Sadra’s philosophical psychology, is called the mind-body problem in modern western philosophy due to the fact that ‘mind’ was used instead of soul for the first time by Descartes.

Investing this problem, we begin by examining Aquinas’ treatment of the problem, attempting to show how Aquinas provides an alternative solution through appeal to Aristotle. Next we deal with Sadra’s response to the Avicennan paradigm of his day. In conclusion we will compare the two theories of Aquinas and Sadra.

The view of Aquinas

Aquinas dealt with the soul-body problem in his works comprehensively. This question came in Q. 76 of Summa Theologiae, the longest article of the treatise, after the issue of the soul’s nature. In addition, he discusses various explanations of the relation/unity of soul and body in Summa Contra Gentiles (II, 56, 68-70), and in Questiones disputate De Anima. Thomas has discussed, firstly, various alternative theories of the unity of the soul and the body in a dialectical inquiry, next he attempts to show numerous difficulties which rise for the thesis proposed by Plato (424-348 BC) (and Augustinians) and Averroes (1126-1198) as most famous commentator of Aristotle’s text in his time.

Aquinas’ treatise reveals many significant points. Through the dialectical encounter with Platonic and Islamic philosophical views of soul and body, he is able to introduce and refine a number of principles: the relationship between first and second act, substantial form as principle of being and unity, the potential nature of the soul, and the dependence of the intellect upon sense...
Aquinas’ position on the Plato-Augustinian Theory

Aquinas deals with Plato’s doctrine on the soul-body problem, but he thinks that this theory faces with a great difficulties. Thomas firstly quotes the Plato-Augustinian theory:

The intellectual soul is not united to the body as form to matter, but only as mover to movable, for Plato said that the soul is in the body ‘as a sailor in a ship.’ Thus, the union of soul and body would only be by contact of power. [...] On Plato’s theory, then, a man is not one unqualifiedly speaking, nor, consequently, is he a being unqualifiedly speaking, but a being by accident. In order to avoid this, Plato asserted that man is not a being composed of body and soul, but that the soul itself using the body is man.2

According to this passage, which was based on the definition of the human being as ‘a soul using body’, soul and body were separate substances, but each soul had its own body, for which it had been created and to which it would be restored at the final Resurrection.3 Here, it may be expected that the Augustinian theory on relation between soul and body follow entirely in the wake of the Platonists. Aquinas rejects the Plato-Augustinian theory, because he thinks that Platonists have to suppose that the soul is united to the body through some intermediary, since diverse and distinct substances cannot be bound together unless something unites them.4 In reply to the question of ‘Whether the soul is joined to the animal body by means of some other body?’ he argues such:

If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united to the body merely as a motor, it would be right to say that some other bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any animal whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant from it by means of something nearer. If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, [...] it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body. The reason of this is that a thing is one, according as it is a being. Now the form, through itself, makes a thing to be actual since it is itself essentially an act; nor does it give existence by means of something else. Wherefore the unity of a thing composed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by reason of its very nature is united to matter as its act. Nor is there any other cause of union except the agent which causes matter to be in act, as the Philosopher says.5

For this reason, Aquinas holds that the best approach is to understand the soul as the form of the body. Indeed, he proposes an essential relation between soul and body. In this view, none of their presumed entities are necessary if the soul is the form of the body. Since:

Anything whatever inasmuch as it is a being is one. Hence, a form is united to prime matter by virtue of itself and not by any other bond, because a form, by its very nature, gives to matter its act of existing.6

Therefore, Aquinas claimed that a spiritual substance, which is united with a body only as its mover, is united with it only through power (potentiam vel virtutem). In other words, a spiritual substance united to a body merely as its motor is united to it by way of pure force without material contact, but the intellectual soul is joined to its body, as we will show soon, as the form by which it exists. Therefore, the intellective soul is united with the body as a form through its being.7

Aristotelian-Thomistic Theory

Aristotle defined the soul in the second book of De Anima as ‘the first entelechy/perfection of a natural organized body possessing the capacity of life.’8 This definition clearly implies that the soul is not a separate substance, capable of existing independently of the body. It is the entelechy of a
natural organized body, which must be accounted as an immanent principle organized body. Thus, the soul is not a principle ‘apart’ from the body which animates it.\(^9\)

At the same time, Aristotle in the same work extends the question as to whether the soul may not be the entelechy of the body, in the sense in which a pilot is the entelechy of a ship.\(^10\) This question reflects Aristotle’s doubt as to whether the human intellect may not be separable after physical death, while the rest of the soul deceases, and it is probable that he believed in the survival of the human intellect after it is developed by purely intellectual operations. Here, Aristotle’s inconsistently with the first view holds, with Plato, that the body is a mere instrument employed by the soul.\(^11\)

Philosophers throughout the various periods of philosophical psychology have adopted these two views. In our discussion, it is worthwhile to consider Aquinas in a way that could display the best aspects of Aristotle’s theory proposing an alternative solution for the soul-body problem. His understanding of the soul-body problem led him to adopt the first view of Aristotle, avoiding the outcomes of the Plato-Augustinian theory. His view can be formulated as follows:

1. The human soul is a formative principle of the body.\(^12\)
2. The human soul is an immaterial, substantial, simple, and incorruptible form.\(^13\)
3. The human soul is a substance in its own right and the substantial form of the body. The soul informs a unity so that the act of being/existing\(^14\) of the compound whole is the soul’s act of being/existing on the other.\(^15\)

In support of the first proposition Aquinas, following Aristotle, writes:

The intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed [...] the reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in act; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore this principle by which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body.\(^16\)

From the above argument Aquinas concluded that the human soul’s mode of existence is the substantial form constituting the material substance that the human being is. It is entirely different in nature from that of lower forms, including the animal soul and the souls of other living things. It means that its existence transcends material things. It also means that the immateriality of the intellectual soul is not endangered if, at one and the same time, it is a substance in its own right and the substantial form of the human body. Here though Aquinas agrees clearly with Aristotelian substantialism, he passes beyond it with regard to his doctrine of ‘act of being/existing’.

In keeping with this doctrine, the soul and the body do not exist independently. Rather the intellectual soul is the actualizing form of the body. Since ‘forms dependent on matter as regards being do not have being themselves, strictly speaking: rather, the composites have being through the forms.\(^17\) The soul, which is the form of the body, has its being only in the being of the body and cannot exist or act apart from it. The human soul manages it, though, through its faculties and forces.\(^18\) Here it should be added that this theory is clearly rooted in the other theory of being, in terms of esse or the act of being/existing.\(^19\)

**The View of Mulla Sadra**

The long history of the soul-body problem goes back to the first period in the history of Islamic philosophical psychology, which is an amalgamation of Aristotelianism and Neo-platonism created by later Hellenic philosophy, particularly as expressed in the Neo-platonising commentators of
Aristotle. Muslim philosophers more or less shared a common background regarding the soul-body problem, which was neither Platonic nor Aristotelian exclusively but a mixture of both of these elements in varying degrees according to differences of temperament and individual inclination.\(^2\)

The soul-body problem for medieval Muslim thinkers, at the same time, was mostly a metaphysical problem. It was to a much lesser extent seen as an epistemological and a semantic problem. This is not to say that they were not concerned with epistemological and semantic problems, but that the soul-body problem was not merely such a problem.

Earlier, Ibn Sina (980-1037) and al-Suhrawardi (1154-91) for the most part had an influence on Sadra’s theory about this problem. However, we try to take just Ibn Sina’s view into account. Ibn Sina, who was influenced by a host of classical and Hellenistic philosophers, agreed with the Aristotelian definition of the human soul that it is ‘the first entelechy of a natural body possessing organs insofar as it commits acts of rational choice and deduction through opinion; and insofar as it perceives universal matters.’\(^3\) He held with Aristotle that the soul is the form/entelechy of the body but contrary to him claimed that the soul is a subsistent being in its own right, and a complete substance independent of any relation it has to the body.

Ibn Sina writes:

The soul comes into existence whenever a body does so fit to be used by it. The body which thus comes into being is the kingdom and instrument of the soul. In the very disposition of the substance of the soul which comes into existence together with a certain body—a body, that is to say, with the appropriate qualities to make it suitable to receive the soul which takes its origin from the first principles—there is a natural yearning to occupy itself with that body, to use it, control it, and be attracted by it.\(^2\)

More concisely, according to Ibn Sina: (a) the soul, according to its definition, is the form of the body. (b) The human soul is an immaterial and spiritual substance capable of existing independently of the body. (c) The soul comes into existence together with a certain body, to use it, control it, and be attracted by it.

**Mulla Sadra’s Theory: The Gathered Reality of Human Beings**

Sadra begins discussion on the soul-body problem in a passage of his with classification of six kinds of connection (al-ta‘alluq), by which a thing is related to another.\(^9\) It should be noted that Ibn Sîna, before Şadrâ used this division but in a shortened form in Kitab al-Shifa’ and Kitab al-Najat.\(^4\) Sadra writes:

First: the connection via quiddity and meaning, both mentally and extra-mentally, such as the connection of quiddity to existence. Second: that of essence and reality, such as the connection of contingent to necessary. Third: that of essence and being-species (al-naw‘īyyaḥ) together with the essence of that which is connected and its being-species, such as the connection of the accident black to its subject such as body (al-fa‘iṣṣ). Fourth: that of existence and its individuation as temporal creation and subsistence (biḥāṣab al-wu‘ūjūd, huḍūṭan wa baqa‘ān) to the nature connected to it and its being-species, such as the connection of form to matter. Fifth: that of existence and its individuation as creation but not as subsistence (biḥāṣab al-wu‘ūjūd wa al-taḥāṣkhāḥhus, huḍūṭan la baqa‘ān), like the connection of the soul to the body, according to us [that is, Sadra, himself]. Sixth: the connection of a thing to a thing for the gradual perfection and acquisition of virtues for the existence (biḥāṣab al-isṭiḥkāl wa ikṭisāb al-ṣawālīk bi al-wu‘ūjūd), not with respect to the root of existence, such as the absolute connection of the soul to the body according to the majority of philosophers.\(^5\)
What is clear from the text is that Sadra regarded the soul and the body connection, somehow as the 'withness' (ma'īyyah) of the matter and form, in which there is no inseparability between the two. Indeed, it is a logical withness. Sadra says that:

The ruling-property of the soul at the beginning of its generation and creation is the ruling-property of the material natures, which needs the matter indetermined in existence, and it also connects to the bodily matter which is indetermined in existence so that its ipseity (al-huwiyyah) keeps changing by the successive transformations and successive attachments to measures.

So, each one of the soul and the body needs the other in some way which does not entail circularity. In other words:

The body needs the soul for its actualization, not for its particular aspect but for its absolute aspect. The soul needs the body, not for its aspect of the absolute, intelligible reality, but for the existence of its individual determination and the creation of the psychic ipseity.

Therefore, according to Sadra’s explanation, the soul requires a body both in its creation but not in its survival.

The Foundations of Sadra’s Theory

Sadra’s solution, indeed is concluded from: (a) his specific view on form-matter (hylomorphism), and (b) his principle of createdness (buduth) of the soul, which should be attentively understood under his innovative metaphysical principles, specifically the primordiality of existence (asalat al-wujud), the systematic ambiguity (al-tashkik) of existence, and substantial motion (al-barakah al-jawbariyah). Based on these metaphysical principles Sadra rejects the Peripatetic theory, which as we mentioned above, the soul is connected to the body because of perfection and acquiring virtue in existence (istikmal wa ichtisab al-fadilah li-al-wujud). Let us to explain Sadra’s theory in light of his basic metaphysical principles.

The Natural Unified Composition of the Form Matter

According to Sadra’s opinion, the soul is the first perfection/entelechy (kamalun awwalun) for the natural organic body possessing the capacity of life. As is clear from the definition, Sadra accepts that the connection of the soul with the body should be analysed according to the Aristotelian theory of form-matter composition (al-tarkib al-tabi’i al-ittibadi).

He argues that status of the soul qua soul is the same as everything else naturally embodied in matter, since the modality of their being is one of connection (with a body), because its status is the same as everything else naturally embodied in matter. However, Sadra comes to propose a new interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine, considering his metaphysical principles: primordiality of existence, systematic ambiguity of existence (tashkik al-wujud) and substantial movement, as we will show soon.

As to the prevailing Aristotelian theory of form-matter connection, the body as prime matter, is mere potentiality, but becomes actualized when form (human soul), is connected to it. There is a necessarily mutual need between soul and body, as two parts of the human being’s essence, which constitutes a kind of composition in the external world by way of ‘unification’. There is a complete agreement among all peripatetic philosophers (notably al-Farabi (872-950) and Ibn Sina) that this kind of form-matter composition is a natural annexed composition (al-tarkib al-tabi’i al-indimami).

Here, however, Sadra offers another kind of unification, which is opposed to it, that is, natural
unified composition.\(^3\) He repeatedly emphasizes that ‘the soul has an essential connection with the body; the compound of the two is a natural, unified compound; that simultaneously in each one there is substantial, essential movement.’\(^3\) Sadra also, based on this theory, argues that if the soul did not have the unifying relationship with its body, then, the bad temperament of its body or the breaking down of unification of its parts would not be painful to it as sensory pain, such as the intellective or imaginative pain do.\(^3\)

Therefore, the human soul in Sadra’s view is corporeal in existence and disposal, spiritual in subsistence and intellection (jismaniyat al-buduth wa al-tasarruf; rubhaniyat al-baqa’ wa al-ta’aggul). Thus, the thing in its perfect state occurs necessarily in actuality, while in the privative state it is contingent and potential. For this reason, again one can argue for the unification of matter with the form (in all natural being).\(^3\) Therefore, that is an inherent connection, which relates to the root of existence.

According to the Sadrian view of the ambiguity and substantial movement of existence, the human soul has many levels and stations, from the beginning of its generation to the end of its goal; and it has certain essential states and modes of being.\(^3\) For this reason, the soul and the body are the levels of one existent. The body is the stage (martabah) of hardness and heaviness for that being while the soul constitutes a degree of lightness and subtlety. So, the unified mobile/moving existence of the soul as an imperfect being has an innate inclination or yearning towards its perfection, from the ‘corporeal substance’ degree toward ‘immaterial substance’ degree.

The soul is a ‘corporeal substance’ in its first state of generation. According to the principle of corporeal in existence, spiritual in subsistence of the human soul, Sadra argues that existence of the soul is not a created existence, but a subsisting existence; the former is material, the latter is separate from the matter. That is clearly counter to the preceding major philosophers, which held the principle of spiritual in existence and subsistence. Now, its state at the creation is not like its state at its perfection and going towards the Active Principle.\(^3\) Therefore, the human soul, which becomes immaterial, simple, and an incorruptible form, needs the body merely because of its creation/origination. However, it simultaneously connects to the body for the gradual perfection and acquisition of virtues for existence. Up to this point, Sadra agrees with those philosophers, who believe that the human soul connects to the body but for the acquisition of perfection. That is because souls at the beginning of their generation are devoid of perfections and existential attributes. It cannot actualize these perfections except by the way of employing the tools of the body.\(^3\)

**Conclusion**

Aquinas and Sadra both challenged the theories of their day on the soul-body relation. As we have above seen, these theories were the Platonic-Augustinian theory and Ibn Sina’s theory, respectively. These two different solutions to the problem have seemingly just one origin. The soul is a subsistent being in its own right, a complete substance independent of any relation it has to the body. Then, the connection between soul and body does not produce an absolute oneness, but it is a union being only accidental. Aquinas and Sadra both argued that the connection between soul and body is an essential connection and not an accidental connection.

For Aquinas and Sadra the coming into being of an immaterial substance in the course of time does not present any great difficulty. The reason that they both gave was that the creative influx is a permanent causality, namely God, which gives being to all new entities that appear in the course of the universe’s development. Therefore, according to his view, the human soul is directly created by God at the end of a biological process that leads to the production of a new human individual. Aquinas and Sadra, however, explain this view, in different ways. Aquinas, for his view on the subsistence of the soul, thought that when the body is prepared, God gives the soul to it. However, Sadra based on the principle ‘the soul is corporeal in existence, spiritual in subsistence’ (jismaniyat
al-buduth, rubāniyyat al-baqā) held that the soul is corporeal at the beginning of its creation.

Both Aquinas and Sadra consider the soul-body problem as a metaphysical problem and to a much lesser extent an epistemological and a semantic problem. As we have seen above, Aquinas and Sadra both used Aristotelian concepts to explain unifying the soul and body through their conceptualisation of the human soul as a substantial form. Indeed, both philosophers used Aristotelian terms as the starting point to explain the problem. So, the influence of Aristotle to both figures cannot be overlooked.

On the one hand, there are some innovative concepts or even common interpretations in Aquinas and Sadra equally, which influenced their solution. In Aquinas, for instance, one faces the key term ‘act of being/existing’. This was a re-conception of the Aristotelian essence as potential to the act of existing. Also in Sadra we find ‘unified composition’, which was a new interpretation of the natural annexed composition. On the other hand, important conceptual differences between Aquinas and Sadra can be found. Both figures think of the connection of the soul to body not merely as an ‘incidental appendage’, instead as an ‘essential composition’. Here, both consider the relationship of the soul with the body as an intimate relationship, like the relationship of form and matter. Sadra however, on the theory of unified composition presents a new kind of relation of the soul/form to the body/matter. This is a novel explanation of composition which actually relates to his metaphysical principles.

### Table of Key Transliterated Terms

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See, Thomas Aquinas, Man: (Ia. 75-83). Summa theologæ/St Thomas Aquinas. [General ed.: Thomas Aquinas, Vol. 11 (Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Ia.76. a. 6; Also, for more material on several aspects of this account of intermediaries between soul and body, See, Norman Kretzmann, the Metaphysics of Creation, and Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), p. 325 ff.

ST, Ia. 76, a. 7 (with omission).

Thomas Aquinas, Questiones disputate De Anima, trans. by John Patrick Rowan (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co, 1949), a. 9.


Ibid, II, 1, 4, 415 b.

Ibid, I, 4, 413 a.

ST, Ia. 76, a. 1; Cf. Ibid, a. 2, a. 4, and, a. 7.

ST, Ia. 75, a. 5; ST, Ia. 76, a. 1; ST, Ia. 76, a. 4.

Aquinas uses the expression actus essendi synonymously with esse. See, David B. Burrell, ‘Mulla Sadra on ‘Substantial Motion’: A Clarification and a Comparison with Thomas Aquinas,’ Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies 2, 4 (2009), 369-86.

ST, Ia. 76, a. 1.


ST, Ia. 76, a. 6. 

See, Anthon C. Pegis, At the Origins of the Thomistic Notion of Man (New York: the Macmillan company, 1963), p. 36.


Avicenna, Kitāb al-najāt, ed. & trans. of book II, chapter VI with historico-philosophical notes and textual improvements on the Cairo as Avicenna’s Psychology by Fazlur Rahman (Westport (Connect.):
22 See, Avicenna, p. 57.

23 Šadrá considered the mode of connection of the soul to the body’s problem in most of his works, specifically in the *al-Asfār*, repeatedly. In eighth and ninth volumes of the *al-Asfār*, he devoted the problems related to the body and soul in a fragmentary form and in the third and the sixth volumes under the other topics, such as knowledge, substance, and accident and so on. It should be noted that he did not approach to the problem in all place with the same manner, rather sometimes in his discussion try to go by preceding philosophers, e.g., Peripatetic philosophers, due to this one cannot somehow realize in a simply way. For a full discussion of the soul-body problem in Šadrá’s view, see, e.g., ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Daftari, ‘Mullá Šadrá and the mind-body problem: A critical assessment of Šadrá’s approach to the dichotomy of soul and spirit,’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Durham University, 2010).<http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/506/>[accessed 25 April 2011]; A. Pahlawán, ‘Rabi‘yi nafs wa badan az nazarí Mullá Šadrá [The relationship between the soul and the body in Mullá Šadrá’s view], (Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb Institute Publications, 1387 AH (solar), 2008).

24 See, Avicenna, p. 58.


38 See, Burrell, p. 370.