Nietzsche on Free Will

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Forthcoming in: Meghan Griffith, Neil Levy, & Kevin Timpe (eds.): Companion on Free Will. Routledge.

1) The Puzzle[i]

Nietzsche's works confront the reader interested in the issue of free will, or, more generally, of freedom, with an interpretive puzzle. On the one hand, in both his published work and unpublished notes, passages abound where he seems to explicitly deny that we have anything like free will. On the other hand, Nietzsche often appeals to the notion of freedom and its cognates, in particular when he is in the business of sketching his own ideal of humankind. I shall offer a brief but illustrative sample of both cases.

In *Human, All Too Human*, the "total unfreedom of the human will" is said to be our "strongest knowledge" (HUH II, "Assorted Opinions and Maxims" 50). In *Daybreak* we read:

> We laugh at him who steps out of his room at the moment when the sun steps out of its room, and then says: "*I will* that the sun shall rise;" and at him who cannot stop a wheel, and says: "*I will* that it shall roll;" and at him who is thrown down in wrestling, and says: "here I lie, but *I will* lie here!" But, all laughter aside, are we ourselves ever acting any differently whenever we employ the expression: "*I will*"? (D 124)

In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche claims that the notion of "will" is but one of the "illusions and phantasies" of the "'inner world'" (TI, "The Four Great Errors" 3). The same diagnosis applies to the idea of the "'*will as causal agent*'", of "consciousness ('mind') as a cause" and of "the 'I' (subject) as cause" (ibid.). Thus, the very idea of mental causation substantiating the conception we have of ourselves as free agents is rejected in all its usual variants. Moreover, Nietzsche's rejection of free will seems to go hand in hand with his acceptance of determinism, as suggested, for instance, by the aphorism from *Daybreak* just quoted. In an unpublished note from 1887, we read that "to occur and to occur necessarily is a *tautology*" (KSA 12, 1887, 10[138]). Finally, (some version of) determinism seems presupposed by some of the ideas Nietzsche most wholeheartedly advertises, such as eternal recurrence and "*amor fati*".

I now turn to the second set of passages—those appealing to freedom ant its cognates. In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche devotes an aphorism to his own "*idea of freedom*", its first characterization of it being "the will to be responsible for yourself" (TI, 'Skirmishes of an Untimely Man' 38). Elsewhere, he envisages an ideal "free spirit" characterized by a "self-determination, a *freedom* of the will, in which the spirit takes leave of all faith and every which for certainty, practiced as it is in maintaining itself on light ropes and possibilities and dancing even besides abysses" (GS 347). At least at face value, such passages seem to put forward a positive notion of freedom.

(In the *Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche introduces the character of a "sovereign individual" whom he describes, *inter alia*, as a "master of a *free* will" (GM II 2). Interpreters claiming that Nietzsche proposes a positive ideal of freedom usually take the "sovereign individual" to embody it. What role this figure plays in the *Genealogy* remains highly controversial and has become the topic of an entire sub-literature. As it is impossible here to go into the details of such an intricate debate, I shall simply sidestep it.)

2) What's Beyond Dispute

A first step toward a resolution of the interpretive puzzle consists in determining the specific notion of free will usually targeted in Nietzsche's writings. The claim I would like to defend is that the relevant notion amounts, roughly, to the capacity to *ultimately originate* the course of one's action. But what does this mean precisely? An action is ultimately originated if by backtracking the causal chain that lead to it we find that the last ring is the agent. Moreover, the agent's contribution cannot itself be the result of another causal chain starting outside of her. To have a handy label, I shall refer to this notion by the label *ultimate free will*. Roughly, it corresponds to the notion of free will that incompatibilists—both hard incompatibilists and libertarians—agree in seeing as grounding ascriptions of moral responsibility. Nietzsche typically pursues two different lines of criticism against it. On the one hand, he questions its theoretical cogency as such. On the other hand, he tries to undermine its validity by arguing that it depends on a set of dubious evaluative commitments.

Aphorism 21 from *Beyond Good and Evil* nicely illustrates the first strategy:

> The *causa sui* is the best self-contradiction that has ever been conceived, a type of logical rape and abomination. But humanity's excessive pride has got itself profoundly and horribly entangled with precisely this piece of nonsense. The longing for "freedom of the will" in the superlative metaphysical sense …, the longing to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for your actions yourself and to relieve God, world, ancestors, chance, and society of the burden—all this means nothing less than being that very *causa sui* and, with a courage greater than Münchhausen's, pulling yourself by the hair from the swamp of nothingness up into existence. (BGE 21)

It seems clear that Nietzsche's target is here ultimate free will as characterized above. To think of oneself as free in such a "superlative metaphysical sense," he tells us, amounts to think of oneself as a *causa sui*, i.e. as the genuine originator of oneself. This conception, however, is incoherent. But why is it so?

Advocates of ultimate free will usually acknowledge that many of our actions depend on our character or on previously acquired habits. Nonetheless, they argue, such actions can be said to be free in the relevant sense—for instance, as accountable in terms of merit—as long as we can say of the agent that "he was responsible *for being the sort of person he had become at that time*" (Kane 1996: 39). In other words, ultimate responsibility is transmissible from past free actions to current necessary actions, provided that the latter derives from traits, habits, etc. which have been brought about by the former. According to Nietzsche, however, this condition cannot be met, as no one is ever responsible—in the ultimate sense—for what one is at a certain time, for this is always part of some causal chain starting outside of one (on this point see Fischer (2007: 66–70), who also refers to Nietzsche's argument (70); for a full endorsement of Nietzsche's *causa sui* argument, see Strawson 1994):

> What is the only teaching *we* can have?—That no one *gives* people their qualities, not God or society, parents or ancestors, not even *people themselves* (this final bit of nonsense was circulated by Kant—and maybe even by Plato—under the rubric of "intelligible freedom"). *Nobody* is responsible for people existing in the first place, or for the state or circumstances or environment they are in. The fatality of human existence cannot be extricated from the fatality of everything that was and will be. (TI, "The Four Great Errors" 8)

However, if what we consist in is just a "piece of fate," we must conclude "that nobody is held responsible any more, that being is not the sort of thing that can be traced back to a *causa prima*" (ibid.).

The second strategy pursued by Nietzsche aims at showing that the conception of ultimate free will embodies a specific, and to his eyes highly questionable, evaluative stance. It is, namely, a certain "type of man"—the "majority of the dying, the weak and the oppressed of every kind"—who "*needs* to believe in an unbiased 'subject' with freedom of choice" (GM I 13). More specifically, Nietzsche argues that the extraordinary success of the psychological framework based on the conception of ultimate free will is due primarily to the justification it provides to our current practices of punishment: "Whenever a particular state of affairs is traced back to a will, an intention, or a responsible action, becoming is stripped of its innocence. The notion of will was essentially designed with punishment in mind, which is to say the desire to *assign guilt*" (TI, "The Four Great Errors" 7).

To summarize, Nietzsche offers two reasons to reject ultimate free will. First, it amounts to an incoherent conception. Second, it expresses a contemptible, resentment-driven evaluative stance: no freedom worth wanting would look like that.

3) The Real Issue

In the previous section, I argued that Nietzsche rejects ultimate free will. This can be taken to mean that he rejects any notion of freedom whatsoever. A reading along these lines would therefore construe Nietzsche as a hard incompatibilist (see Leiter 2015). On an alternative reading, Nietzsche's dismissal of ultimate free will is still consistent with less "superlative" conceptions of freedom. According to this second strategy, he would therefore turn out to defend a version of compatibilism to the effect that, though determined, we still may be, in some sense, free (see, for instance, the recent pieces by Guay 2002, Gemes 2009, Richardson

2009, Rutherford 2011, Constâncio 2012). The real controversy among Nietzsche interpreters concerns this point.

To start addressing this crucial issue, it is helpful to briefly consider Nietzsche's take on determinism. After having exposed the inconsistency of ultimate free will, aphorism 21 from *Beyond Good and Evil* invites the reader to "carry his 'enlightenment' a step further and to rid his mind of the reversal of this misconceived concept of 'free will:' I mean the 'un-free will,' which is basically an abuse of cause and effect" (BGE 21). In a similar vein, both "free will" *and* "unfree will" are counted in the *Antichrist* among the "imaginary causes" postulated by Christianity (A 15). Should we then read the claim that the notion of unfree will is as ill-thought as that of free will as indicating that Nietzsche does not hold determinism to be true after all? This would be an overhasty conclusion, for his point in BGE 21 is merely that the conception of the will as "unfree" derives from a misapplication, or misunderstanding, of the concepts of cause and effect. Nietzsche often expresses skepticism about thinking of events as instances of universal causal laws. Relevantly, as it is surely no coincidence, aphorism 22 from *Beyond Good and Evil* is among the passages where he puts forward precisely this kind of criticism. It seems thus natural to read BGE 22 as explicating the way in which the notions of cause and effect are usually misunderstood such as to lead, *inter alia*, to the fallacious picture of an unfree will targeted in BGE 21. Most important for our issue, however, is that the positive view Nietzsche puts forward in BGE 22 ends up claiming "the same thing about this world," namely "that it follows a 'necessary' and 'calculable' course, although *not* because laws are dominant in it, but rather because laws are totally *absent*" (BGE 22). In a similar vein, we read in *Gay Science*: "Let us be aware of saying that there are laws in nature. There are only necessities" (GS 109). From this, there are two conclusions we can draw. First, Nietzsche does not question determinism as such, but only a nomological construal of it appealing to universal causal laws. Second—and for our issue more importantly—, he thinks

that by dropping the nomological construal we (can) obtain a version of determinism that no longer entails that the will is unfree.

Elsewhere Nietzsche addresses another misconception of determinism's consequences he labels "Mohammedan fatalism," i.e. the view that each of us, however hard one tries to elude one's own fate, is doomed to succumb to it. This view, Nietzsche argues, motivates our natural discontent in response to determinism:

> The fear most people feel in face of the theory of the unfreedom of the will is fear in face of Mohammedan fatalism: they think that man will stand before the future feeble, resigned and with hands clasped because he is incapable of effecting any change in it: or that he will give free rein to all his impulses and caprices because these too cannot make any worse what has already been determined. (HUH II, "The Wanderer and His Shadow" 61)

Nietzsche makes here two points. First, Mohammedan fatalism is incoherent, since once determinism has been accepted the very idea of someone trying to resist one's destiny simply ceases to make any sense at all, for every effort we might possibly seem to make in order to avoid our fate would just be *part* of it. Second, this means that not only "the struggle is imaginary, but so is the proposed resignation to fate" (ibid.). This last point is particularly relevant, as it highlights that for Nietzsche our lacking (ultimate) free will does not mean we have no choice but to surrender to alien forces just because "there's nothing we can do."

This cursory survey shows that Nietzsche takes determinism to entail neither that we lack any kind of freedom whatsoever, nor that we are completely at the mercy of extrinsic factors. Though this leaves room for compatibilism, it hardly suffices to conclude that that is the position he endorses. So it looks we have made no real progress concerning the main issue of disagreement. Fortunately, BGE 21 offers again a precious clue as to how to move forward.

There, he writes that "in the real life it is only a matter of *strong* and *weak* wills" (BGE 21). This seems to suggest two things. First, the kind of freedom that can be said, if at all, to obtain in our world is a matter of degree. Second, what determines its reach—the degree of freedom each of us enjoys—is the particular constitution of one's will. To spell out these points, we first need to know more about Nietzsche's view of the will.

4) Nietzschean Will

Remarkably, Nietzsche's own picture of how the will works is to be find in aphorism 19 from *Beyond Good and Evil*, i.e. at a textual location very close to where he rejects the complementary notions of "free will" and "unfree will" as traditionally thought of. Again, this seems to suggest that the notions of "strong will" and "weak will" alluded to in BGE 21 are to be understood in light of the general model of the will sketched in BGE 19 (on this aphorism see Leiter 2007, Clark, Dudrick 2009). Nietzsche starts by pointing out that an instance of willing is a complicated psychological phenomenon, involving a range of different mental ingredients. First, and less important for his account, there is a "plurality of feelings" (BGE 19), both bodily and not, which contributes to its overall phenomenology. Second, willing involves what Nietzsche calls a "commandeering thought." Third, its most distinctive feature consists in its being a specific kind of "*affect*," namely, "the affect of the command" or, in another formulation, "the affect of superiority with respect to something that must obey" (BGE 19) A straightforward relation seems to obtain between these last two and more central elements: willing is essentially the "affect of the command" because a "commandeering thought" is its basic ingredient (BGE 19). What looks quite puzzling is, rather, Nietzsche's overall talk of commanding and obeying. Only by taking a brief look at his philosophical psychology we will be in a position to make sense of it.

The basic notion of Nietzsche's psychological philosophy is that of drive (Richardson 2004; Katsafanas 2013). Roughly, a drive is a disposition to behave in certain ways. For

instance, the sexual drive is a disposition to engage in a typical range of mating behaviors. Each of us, Nietzsche claims, is constituted by a number of such drives. As the many drives we harbor typically make for different, often blatantly opposite inclinations, an open contrast—or at least a constant tension—ensues between them. How are such conflicts resolved? An option here would be to think that some higher-order power, as the self's rational capacities, intervenes and settles the contrast by mediating between the drives. Nietzsche, however, rejects this solution: while "'we' believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at bottom it is one drive which is complaining about the other" (D 109; see also BGE 117). Whatever "procedure of our intellect" participates in the conflict's resolution, it acts only as "the blind instrument of another drive" (D 109). Thus, rather than seeing the transactions between the drives as negotiated by some external power, Nietzsche holds that their mutual arrangement results *directly* from the power relations obtaining between them. *If* such power relations prove somewhat stable, the drives end up building a hierarchical structure in which some drives dominate the others.

This framework illuminates Nietzsche's talk of command and obedience in BGE 19. The "commandeering thought" at the heart of any willing is issued by the dominant drive to the subordinated drives that are supposed to execute it. Nietzsche also appeals to this model in order to explain the peculiar phenomenology of agency. Accordingly, one typically "identifies himself with the accomplished act of willing" (BGE 19), i.e., in a case of success, one assumes—at personal level—the perspective of the dominating drive which—at subpersonal level—managed to have the subordinated drives help execute its own command. Put it differently, "the one who wills take his feeling of pleasure as the commander" (ibid.).

5) Strong and Weak Wills

According to Nietzsche, episodes of willing result from the specific arrangement of one's drives. With this conception in place, we are finally in a position to examine in which sense

such episodes may be taken to express a will that is either "strong" or "weak." I shall start by investigating the latter case.

That a given episode of willing fails to be realized does not suffice to render one's will, on that occasion, weak. If I want to take a ride with my bicycle and find that it has been stolen, my desire will of course remain unsatisfied. Nonetheless, it would make no sense to characterize my situation as a case of a weak will. For the will to prove weak, the agential failure must depend on the subject herself, and not just on some external factor—as if I were to renounce the ride for not being able to overcome my usual laziness. In short, weakness of the will presupposes that something goes wrong *within* the agent.

What goes wrong in the akratic case is usually taken to be one's incapacity to act according to one's best judgment. Nietzsche's story, however, is a different one. As his model has it, successful agency occurs when the command issued by the dominant drive is executed by the subordinated drives. If this does not happen, no action follows to one's willing. As my want remains unsatisfied in virtue of something which goes wrong within myself, a case of this kind suitably qualifies as one of weakness of the will.

The key question, here, is about what precisely goes wrong. Under which conditions does the "commandeering thought" end lacking the solicited enforcement? Many of the things we do—in particular, many of those we most care about, as tacking a degree, climbing a mountain, or get married—can be seen as realization of corresponding wants. Such situations, however, require that we *keep on* wanting the relevant thing. Concluding a degree takes a couple of years. To climb a mountain, I have to persist and go on until I have reached its peak. As the necessary motivation and strength are often hard to preserve, such are the cases in which our will is most likely to fail. According to Nietzsche's picture, this happens when the hierarchy holding between one's drives turns out to be too unstable to guarantee the achievement of such goals.

The most blatant cases of failure are those where "anarchy threatens inside the instincts and … the basic structure (*Grundbau*) of the affects, which we call 'life,' has been shaken" (BGE 258; translation changed). In such a condition, the agent's drives simply cease to stay in any clear arrangement whatsoever. For Nietzsche, this kind of "corruption" is typical of historical periods characterized by profound cultural change, like pre-revolutionary France or Greece during the twilight of the tragic age. Europe in the late 19th century is another such case: "In times like this, giving in to your instincts is just one more disaster. The instinct contradict, disturb, destroy each other; I even define *modernity* as physiological self-contradiction" (TI, "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man" 41; see also BGE 200, 208).

The way in which the will fails out of weakness lets us clearly appreciate what it means for it to be strong: to possess a stable hierarchy among one's drives. What this condition is supposed to enable is a certain kind of *independence*. To appreciate this point, consider again the case of anarchic will. For Nietzsche, weakness is due to the fact that—absence a dominant drive—any impulse coming from the outside is able to trigger one of our drives. Instead of acting, one merely reacts to external stimuli. Genuine action requires on the contrary that we not succumb to the urges of the many diverging drives: "the *first* preliminary schooling for spirituality" consists in "*not* to react immediately to a stimulus, but instead to take control of the inhibiting, shutting (*abschliessenden*) instincts" (TI, "What the Germans Lack" 6; translation changed). As this capacity to master the diverging inclinations constituted by our drives puts one in a position to pursue and realize one's goals, we can call it *enkratic independence*.

6) Is a Strong Will a Free Will?

Nietzsche rejects the traditional conception of free will according to which we have the capacity to ultimately originate our actions. He rather suggests to distinguish between strong and weak will. What makes one's will strong or weak is its particular constitution. A will

resulting from a stable order between one's drives counts as strong, as it enables one to perform demanding actions such as climbing a mountain or taking a degree. Weakness of the will depends, on the contrary, on a chaotic arrangement between one's drives. In such a condition, we are simply hostage to arbitrary inclinations.

In *Twilight of the Idols* Nietzsche claims that "[f]reedom means that the manly instincts which take pleasure in war and victory have gained control over the other instincts, over the instinct for 'happiness,' for instance" (TI, "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man" 38). Conversely, he presents the kind of weakness embodied by an anarchic will as an illustration of "'[w]hat I do *not* mean by freedom'" (41). This straightforward mapping of strength and weakness of will onto, respectively, freedom and lack thereof may lead one to think that Nietzsche simply identifies the latter notions with the former ones. This, however, would be a mistake.

Nietzsche's appeals to freedom and its cognates usually involve a feature that cannot be captured just in terms of strength of will. The clearest statement of this feature appears in one of his unpublished note: "*That you command to yourself*, that means 'freedom of the will'" (KSA 12, 1885-1886: 1[44]; see also GS 347, quoted in Section 1). This is a recurrent theme in his published works too. "Individuality" and "freedom of thought" requires that one "esteem oneself according to one's own weight and measure" (GS 117). A "well-turned-out person" stands out for his having only "a taste for what agrees with him" (EH, 'Why I Am So Wise' 2: 77). In *Beyond Good and Evil*, we read that a "faith that establishes rank order" is a prerequisite of "nobility" (BGE 287) as well as that the "noble type of person feels that *he* determines value" and is thus one who "*creates values*" (BGE 260). This is the reason why Nietzsche holds that "*true philosophers are commanders and legislators*," those "who first determine the 'where to?' and 'what for?' of people" (BGE 212).

These passages bring out a second notion of *independence* that seems crucial to the ideal Nietzsche tries to convey by resorting to freedom talk. Roughly, the picture emerging is

that of an agent who pursues goals she has herself established. However, as something appears to be a goal worth pursuing only from a certain evaluative viewpoint, the decisive feature is that one be able to set the *values* by which one guides one's life—that one be, as Nietzsche puts it, a self-legislator. Let us call this capacity *evaluative independence*. How is it to be achieved?

Nietzsche holds that a "person's valuations reveal something about the *structure* of his soul and what the soul sees as its conditions of life, its genuine needs" (BGE 268). As the structure of one's soul consists in the arrangement between one's drives, one's evaluative viewpoint results from that very arrangement. Thus, evaluative independence also depends, at least in part, on a specific makeup of the soul. Nietzsche believes that socialization makes us internalize values by which we then guide our life. As an outcome, the members of a given community just end up conforming to the same set of imperatives coming from the outside—an "all-too-natural *progressus in simile*" (BGE 268). Note that nothing prevents this process of internalization to result, by certain individuals, in the obtaining of a stable order in one's soul. Put differently, and as testified by many cases of ascetic conduct or fanaticism, that one's valuations are firmly grounded in one's soul is fully compatible with those valuations expressing imperatives to which one simply defers. This means that to merely possess a strong will does not suffice to make one a self-legislator in Nietzsche's sense.

How then can one be able to create one's own values? A certain value can be said to be *mine* only if it reflects my nature. Thus, to be in a position to create values expressive of what I call my genuine self, I need to discover what "piece of fate" I happen to be. Though this clearly amounts to an exercise of self-knowledge, it is hard to figure out how Nietzsche conceives of it. Some interpreters (Guay 2002; Katsafanas 2011) argue that conscious self-reflection plays a decisive role in this process. This suggestion, however, does not seem to fit well with Nietzsche's profound skepticism about, if not straightforward denial of, consciousness' efficacy. Others (Richardson 2009; Rutherford 2011) argue that this kind of

self-knowledge is made possible by genealogical inquiry, which, by uncovering the values embedded in our moral and, more generally, cultural practices, enables us to loosen the grip they have on us. This second strategy seems more in tune with Nietzsche's own recommendation that, in order to become "human beings who … give themselves laws, who create themselves", we must first "become *physicists*" (GS 335), i.e. learn more about our mundane nature of beings embedded in a physical and historical environment.

Let us take stock. According to Nietzsche strength of will makes for enkratic independence and therefore constitutes a necessary condition for the *pursuit* and—lacking insuperable external impediments such as my bicycle's having been stolen—the *realization of one's goals*. However, it does not suffice for the kind of evaluative independence consisting in the capacity to *create one's own values*. This, however, is what Nietzsche praises as the rarest and highest accomplishment a human being can possibly attain.

7) Freedom or Not?

Our initial puzzle is still unresolved. In Nietzsche's middle-to-late works, the recurring appeal to "freedom" and its cognates is designed to convey his ideal of the highest human type: the creator of new values. But are we to take such a freedom talk at face value? Is Nietzsche really talking about (some kind of) freedom?

Leiter (2015) firmly rejects this conclusion by defending a hard incompatibilist reading. He recognizes that Nietzsche presents a strong-willed human being capable of self-control as his own ideal of humankind. However, Leiter argues that it involves no genuine notion of autonomy and, therefore, freedom. Other scholars favor compatibilist accounts (see the references provided in Section 2). On a compatibilist view, all that is needed for one to be free is that one determines "from within" one's actions. Accordingly, these interpreters suggest that Nietzsche's account of (what I have here called) enkratic and evaluative independence articulates precisely such a picture of freedom.

In my view, it is very hard to adjudicate this debate. It is not only that each account has to deal with apparently recalcitrant passages—after all, this is a quite common trouble, and not only for Nietzsche's scholars. The conceptual side of the issue also seems intractable. On the one hand, compatibilists could point out that Leiter ties autonomy too tightly to responsibility: as Nietzsche rejects the notion of ultimate free will precisely because it substantiates ascriptions of moral responsibility, we should expect him to endorse a thinner notion of autonomy. On the other hand, Leiter could retort that compatibilist construals of freedom typically aim at preserving the intuitive appropriateness of such ascriptions: someone who is held free in the compatibilist sense still counts as morally accountable for what she does. This, however, cannot work in Nietzsche's case. Moreover, what can Nietzsche possibly mean with "responsibility" given that he rejects any morally relevant construal of the notion?

This tension seems to point to a deeper problem: the fundamental, probably unresolvable ambiguity or, if you prefer, context-sensitivity characterizing Nietzsche's usage of the word "freedom" and its cognates. More precisely, it seems that the way in which he employs freedom talk depends on the particular target Nietzsche has on a certain occasion. For instance, when he is attacking Christianity, he targets the freedom talk based on the notion of ultimate free will which he thinks underlies its practices. When he develops his critique of modernity, on the contrary, he resorts to freedom talk in order to convey his own counter-ideal. Thus, it is the specific purpose a certain work or even passage has what confers to it its characteristic compatibilist or incompatibilist flavor.

[i] For comments on an earlier draft I thank Ken Gemes, Paolo Stellino and Kevin Timpe. Nietzsche's works are abbreviated as follows: A, *Antichrist*; BGE, *Beyond Good and Evil*; D, *Daybreak*; EH, *Ecce Homo*; GM, *Genealogy of Morality*; GS, *The Gay Science*; HUH, *Human, All Too Human*; TI, *Twilight of the Idols*. References to these works are followed by book or essay number (roman) and/or title (if needed) and section or

aphorism number (arabic). References to Nietzsche's unpublished notes are to the *Kritische Studienausgabe* (KSA), followed by volume number (arabic), year, and note number. Translations from KSA are mine.

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