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SCIENTIFIC THEORY OR PRACTICAL DOCTRINE?

The doctrine of the eternal return contains an indeterminate multiplicity of ideas. Present only in the germ, what is ultimately desired is that these seeds should sprout and become the *tree of life.* This is Nietzsche's allegory of the *development of doctrine* in the penultimate aphorism of the second book *The Gay Science* (106) – the preliminary draft of which is based on one of Zarathustra's allegorical speeches.[1] Life and doctrine may not be split apart. That makes all the difference for theory in the modern, strictly scientific sense of the term.

Nietzsche makes this clear with the allegory of the *tree of knowledge.* Its fruit is inedible: instead of the *truth* which, according to Christian belief, will *make one free*, there is only *probability* and *illusory freedom*, concealing the actual submission of the "man of theory" to the constraints of known natural laws. Thus the danger for the man of theory is that the known yields not life but death.[2] Because that is the inevitable result of the modern theory-ideal in the natural sciences, Nietzsche valorizes the conceptual differentiation: "Probability but no truth, appearance of freedom but no freedom – it is on account of these two fruits that the tree of knowledge cannot be confounded with the tree of life."[3] These differences forbid the identification of the *tree of knowledge* with the parable and its reflection in the biblical image of the *tree of Paradise.* This tree in the middle of the garden of animals is the tree of the knowledge of "good" and "evil," tasting the fruit of which is forbidden by God, because it means death (Genesis 2:15-17).

The knower in Nietzsche's use of the image is not concerned with consuming the fruit, but rather with cultivating the seed of doctrine.[4] And he knows what a developing tree – along with its roots and branches – needs for growth. Nietzsche articulates this in a maxim from The *Gay Science* advising his disciples as propadeutic to the knowledge of evil – to be further deepened through his teaching – to examine the lives of the best and most fruitful individuals and peoples, and to ask "whether a tree that is supposed to grow to a proud height can dispense with bad weather and storms; whether misfortune and external resistance, some kinds of hatred, jealousy, stubbornness, mistrust, hardness, avarice, and violence do not belong among the *favorable* conditions without which any great growth even of virtue is scarcely possible? The poison from which weaker natures perish strengthens the strong – nor do they call it poison."[5]

B. Babich (ed.), Nietzsche, Theories of Knowledge, and Critical Theory: Nietzsche and the Sciences I, 187–197.

Nietzsche's comparison mirrors the different allegories of the tree of knowledge in one another and alludes to widely differing traditional motifs, as in the just cited biblical myth of the snake, which only partially satisfies his intended design. The snake promises humanity the knowledge of good and evil and along with it, according to the Bible, a "being like unto God's" (Genesis 3:5) – whereas the fruit of knowledge offers precisely not life but death. Allegorical language is not sufficient to elucidate the connection between life and doctrine. It must therefore be grounded in argument and elaborated in terms of its theoretical premises and consequences. And for it to claim and take root in the earth, it must be believed for some time. To "believe" means to *maintain* an idea or doctrinal principle *as true*.[6] A few examples are necessary. There are three aspects in which the doctrinal structure of the idea of the eternal return can be systematically reconstructed: (a) its expository form; (b) its proof; and (c) the presumptive consequences of belief in the teaching.[7] These features are distantly reminiscent of Kant's general *concept of doctrine* and his understanding of "belief" as "holding something as true." [*Für-Wahr-Halten*].

Any doctrine – Kant with this word assigns that concept traditionally associated with the Christian *doctrine of faith* [*Glaubenslehre*] a new position in the whole of his philosophy – "if it is intended to be a *system,* i.e., a whole of knowledge ordered according to principles, is called a science."[8] Kant went on to make a distinction between the principles for the formation of scientific *theory* (as altogether related to determinations of nature) and the formation of *doctrine* according to principles arising from the experience of freedom in the world. Only moral-practical and aesthetic doctrines can have principles independent of any *theory*.[9] Why? Because Kant limits the use of this fundamental term of Greek philosophy to its modern sense: empirical science's determination of nature as the *existence of all things under law*.

Therefore – according to Kant's notorious motto from the preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787) – knowledge must actually be denied in order to make room for faith in the truth of moral-practical principles of reason.

Kant insisted, after all, that doctrine is characterized by a certain formal method, either *acroamatic* (where listeners attend to a teacher) or *erotematic* (where dialogue enlivens doctrinal exposition). With his questions, the instructor engages the student's movement of thought; developing the student's aptitude for certain concepts (the "germs" of doctrine) through the empirical examples given in reply to these questions.[10] And in the end it might be emphasized that, according to Kant, the subject's *form of self-instruction* must correspond to the subjective conviction of truth, as the fundamental ground of any doctrine. Consequently, an instructional dialogue between teacher and student can only be successfully conducted if the instructor has already educated himself: a *conditio sine qua non* which, accurately perceived, is entailed by the principle of the categorical imperative ("Behave each time so that the maxims of your will can simultaneously have the value of a universal declaration of law.") and is expressed in every case of its application under natural conditions of moral action (in the form of the *thought experiment:* "Ask yourself if you

could regard your intended behavior as possible through your will, if this behavior were to take place according to a law of nature of which you yourself were also a part.")[11]

All these stages in the Kantian concept of doctrine, beginning with the allegory of thoughts planted as seeds, through their dialogical development up to the necessity of belief in the truth of principles of practical reason, have their counterparts in the formal structure of Nietzsche's idea of the eternal return. We call them the *legitimizing form* [*Begründungsform*] of the doctrine, where a doctrine employs Kantian procedures in its construction: thought experiment, apagogic proof derived from the falsity of the converse of a claim, and empirical arguments. Nietzsche introduces these procedures in the attempt – far removed from Kant, to be sure – to clarify the *infinity structure of time* as presupposed by his doctrine of the eternal return, along with the formal relations of space conditioning our self/world experience and the finite experiential factor of "power" [*Kraft*]. On the occasion of his first presentation of the doctrine in the *Zarathustra*-poem, Nietzsche refers this structure to our finite experience of time, illuminated via the symbol of the gate of time and its doorway in the "Moment" [*Augenblick*], in the allegory of the endless lanes of past and future which simultaneously collide and diverge there.[12]

This attempt at clarification is a *prelude,* in the sense of a provisional *play of thought* (*lusus ingenii*), alluding to the experiences of time in the Roman myth of *Janus,* the God of the great gateways and passages in the change of months and seasons. This attempt does not reach its goal, because the allegory is inadequate to the thought of the eternal return and its legitimating structure only incompletely grasps the tenor of the doctrine. That is, for Nietzsche its place is not in a temporally lived transition point, the Moment of the temporal conversion of past and future, but rather *in history:* as *midpoint* [*Mitte*].[13] The doctrinal content is richer than suggested by the representational and allegorical form as well. It grows out of fore-structures eluding the grasp of transcendental or empirical-scientific procedures. "Time" for Nietzsche is neither a form of intuition nor "inner" sense but rather "real" – it corresponds with the perceived flow of things.[14] "Real time" flows without coming to an end; it has no beginning and is thus "eternal" or "absolute." And it is perceived as unspeakably slower by us as we experience it, just as a day seems very long to us, compared to the same day in the sensory experience of an insect. In short: real time is synonymous with the phenomenon of *eternally recurring Becoming* which is inaccessible in everyday time and which, in its absoluteness, must be sought in the mythically expressed temporal experiences of primeval humanity, whereas the experience of time lived in the Moment is relative to the beginning and ending time of an organic being like the human. The experience of time which occurs in the Moment is the expression of a specifically modern way of thinking which Nietzsche takes from the relativistic doctrine of time of his contemporary, the biologist Karl Ernst von Baer.[15]

Nietzsche called his doctrine [*Lehrstück*] of the eternal return the "formula of the highest affirmation,"[16] a Yes-saying without reserve regarding the tragic events and misfortunes of our temporal existence. This presupposes still further

doctrinal formulas which affirm being as a whole: from another vantage, with an altered perspective, before a higher authority. That is Nietzsche's case indeed. For, in the poetic form of presentation of his philosophy, the doctrine of eternal return is preceded by the *doctrine of the overman* and the *will to power*. Neither "founds" the highest formula of affirmation; they are "overtures" for the doctrine of eternal return which they accompany and elucidate. They are, as it were, *high* formulas which artistically charged Nietzscheanism reduced to slogans at the beginning of the century and were soon thereafter politicized in the intellectual world of the European *Weltbürgerkrieg*. They seem as far removed as possible from the Kantian legitimizing form of transcendental philosophical thought. And anyone who understands Nietzsche based on the history of his intellectual influence could indeed with the historical appearance of politically well-intended justification assert that the continuity of the philosophical tradition in Germany ends here.

But that would be historical delusion. This is because almost nobody knows what the Kantian "formula of the moral law" is philosophically supposed to mean. For Kant, this was no new principle of morality in the sense of one newly declared, as if the philosopher had to teach the world what to think and do from here on in, as if formerly the world had been ignorant of all that or else had been completely mistaken. Not unlike the way in which the mathematician uses a formula which precisely determines the method to be applied in order to ensure the solution to a problem,[17] the philosopher too uses formulas for the purpose of conceptualizing highly complex experiential content and the requisite abbreviation of cognitive process. According to Kant, *formulas* provide *rules,* the expression of which "serves as a pattern for imitation."[18] They are indispensable for facilitating the overview of complex situations involving action "for expressing the relation of objective laws to to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being – for example, of the human will."[19] That the categorical imperative is "formal" means precisely: its rule, or subsumption under it (a *case* of the rule), adds nothing to the content of morality; rather, it is the conclusion or consequence which is only "invoked" as such: "the formula does not add to the content."[20]

Nietzsche does not understand a formula as a mere rule for subsequent application or which serve as the model for artistic or other types of imitation. Rather, art is itself the creator of form and rule – "art" here understood as the "will to overcome Becoming, as 'eternalization' [*Verewigen*], but shortsightedly, perspectivally each time, repeating as it were the tendency of the whole in miniature. What *all of life* shows [is] to be regarded as a reduced formula for this trend as a whole: therefore, a new determination of the concept 'life' as will to power."[21] With this formula in mind (which generally, up to Heidegger and Löwith, had been conceived not aesthetically but politically – and thereby horribly misconceived), Nietzsche explained that formulas simplify or abbreviate the description of an entire phenomenal field. One who constructs a formula and uses it for the purpose of abbreviating and facilitating possible knowledge has by so doing not "affirmed a 'law,' but instead raises the question, how it is

that something here repeats itself? – it is an assumption too that the formula correlates a complex of provisionally unknown forces and force-explosions."[22]

In this way, the formula of "will to power" is used to ask which event at the basis of life continually repeats itself. Its "content" is synonymous with the formulaic description of the aforementioned phenomenon of reciprocally effective complexes of force which come to explode in a regularly repeating sequence, without entailing determinate lawfulness. The formula of the "return of the same" expresses the repeatedly self-igniting power-event, only from the other side and with alternate verbal means. That is how Nietzsche – along with Kant – recognizes a variety of formulas for the description of identical or similar instances of experience (natural occurrences and/or actions), articulating their fundamentally recursive character. With Kant, Nietzsche insists that we add nothing to events with the subsumption of instances of experience under such formulas, but instead merely "abbreviate" the whole of experience in thought. But, unlike Kant, Nietzsche disputes the idea that with formulas we simultaneously construct "laws" in order to then confirm them in the instantiation of the rule. Rather, formulas such as the "will to power" simply move us to ask the question of how and why something would regularly repeat itself in this or that case. We do not know lawful sequences of events; we can only form conjectures as to which reduction or increase in force draws its final "consequences" in any case. And it amounts to pure "mythology" thereby to presume that such "forces obey a law in such a way that, as a result of such obedience, they yield the same phenomenon for us each time."[23]

As this passage shows, Nietzsche's concept of a "formula" is no less critical than Kant's. Their differences cannot be overlooked, and it would be easy to emphasise these differences even more. Here what matters to us is to put the common ground between Kant and Nietzsche into relief, the way in which both thinkers exceed their formulas, invoking the same name for this procedure of formulaic abbreviation. I am referring here to the striking fact that the later Kant connects the schema of transcendental philosophy as a triadic "system" of rational ideas ("*God*, the world, and the *human being* as a person, i.e., as a being unifying these concepts") in increasingly novel articulations in relation to the name *Zarathustra:* "*Zoroaster*, or, philosophy the totality of its domain subsumed under one principle."[24] The explicit reference to Zarathustra-Zoroaster may be disregarded for the moment. Here, what interests us is that Kant deduces these ideas as key-concepts of human self/world experience in his transcendental derivation of the Ideas from the spirit of moral self-legislation (autonomy) – upon which he determines his concept of God within the limits of (human) reason alone.

BETWEEN IDEALISTIC PANTHEISM AND PANTOLOGY IN PRACTICAL INTENTION

According to the later Kant, transcendental philosophy is the further development of this approach to the doctrine of *self-positing* in that "act of consciousness whereby the subject becomes the originator of itself and, thereby, also of

the whole object of technical-practical and moral-practical reason in one system as well – ordering all things in God, as in one system (Zoroaster)."[25] According to Kant, transcendental consciousness "creates," in a single identical act of thought neither *theoretical* nor *practical* but *poietic* ("inventive"), a unified whole *(pan)* made up of the essentially interrelated elements of our experience. These elements, in the horizon of ancient and modern metaphysics, we are accustomed to interpret as *kosmos, systema, mundi, world.* From this highest standpoint of transcendental philosophy, the relation between God and world is thematized from the perspective of the human observer of the world ("*kosmotheoros*") who "creates the elements of knowledge of the world himself, *a priori*, from which he, as, at the same time, an inhabitant of the world, constructs a world-vision in the idea."[26]

Kant's late work infers from this that the thinking subject produces "its" world as the object of possible experience in space and time, although he expressly distinguishes between (a) "creating" formal elements of knowledge (such as the formal relations of attraction and repulsion of moving forces which make possible our perception of force) as well as further empirical interpretation in the use of "formulas" which these elements supply, and (b) "invention" (such as that of a divine universal force of "nature").[27] Indeed, Kant ultimately goes so far as to ask whether the idea (as an "Idea of reason") should come before the thinker, the light before the one who sees it, only to deny both questions: "the force of thought must come first." From this Kant further concludes that one has to have the concept of *seeing* before one can have the representation of light, and not the other way around, "because subjectivity first makes objectivity possible (Lichtenberg)."[28] This argument finds its counterpart in Nietzsche's interpretation of the myth of Prometheus, according to which light was not "stolen" from the Gods, but was instead "created" through titanic forces.[29] As to whether Nietzsche was familiar with Kant's train of thought on Lichtenberg, whom Kant cites several times, and who both men esteemed, cannot be discussed here. In the following, we are interested in their material connection – Nietzsche's proximity to Kant – which, even given the great distance between the two, may not be overlooked.

In the *Zarathustra*-poem, the whole of philosophy appears in three parts. The figure of Nietzsche's Zarathustra confronts us in Part I as the teacher of the overman who has, for the love of humanity, overcome his own life in the spirit of the Kantian ethic by means of the *one* fundamental virtue of moral self-legislation (autonomy): "One virtue is more of a virtue than two, because it is more of a noose on which ... catastrophe may hang."[30] The noose upon which the "I act" hangs is the body, the temporal fate of each of us: *Ego-fatum.* Part I is a Preface, a "prooemium" for that "great noon," where the human being "stands in the middle of his way between animal and overman and celebrates his way to the evening as his highest hope."[31] The doctrine of the overman is based not on a *fact* but rather a possibility for thought which we can picture in several ways (through an animal, through a demigod, or through a God as the moment of culmination of the entire world-process).

The idea of the overman embraces the event of life in the world (the scale from animal to humanity and over and beyond humanity) and the interweaving of creation and procreation through the whole line of generations. That is the theme of Part II, where Zarathustra himself confronts us as an *example* for the doctrine of the overman and the gravity of its realization. Here it is not Zarathustra who is the teacher, but life itself. It teaches him its secret: the foundation of ethical self-legislation concealed by Idealism – in the heightened sense of *self-overcoming* as Nietzsche understood it – which is at work in every living being as *will to power.*[32] The basis for this aspect of the doctrine is, indeed, a *fact*, the "ultimate" fact which we run up against as the fundament of all experience. Each and every thing arises from this fact: both the need of simple folk to rule and be ruled and their need for duty and devotion to others, as well as the desire for truth in those few wise individuals in whom the will to power expresses itself as the drive to comprehend all existence. The will is the source *and* the transformation of all distress,[33] the necessity of a continual struggle in thought over the interpretation of life and the *power* that accumulates in (or is appropriate to) it, that is to say, life's ability to be increased through the critical elimination of obsolete interpretations of being which negate humanity and the world, converging in the metaphysical doctrine of God as the only affirmative power of being – a convergence which *negates time* according to the onto-theological approach of that "extreme hypothesis": the assumption that God's existence is supratemporal and eternal, so that it excludes other gods.

The *possibility of affirming time* is the axis around which Part III revolves, wherein Nietzsche attempts to follow the path of creation to its end with the connecting thread of the "great noon" in the *Zarathustra* work.[34] It is the attempt, in man's creativity "over and beyond itself," in the direction of a transcendental theology – for which Kant had already cleared the way – to unite the doctrine of the overman with the doctrine of the world as "will to power" into a *pantology*: the doctrine of the totality of beings.[35] Of course, on the basis of the path taken by Zarathustra, the result, from our perspective, turns out to be rare enough: "God is a conjecture, but I desire that your conjectures should be limited by the thinkable." And: "God is a thought that makes crooked all that is straight, and makes turn whatever stands."[36] These two preliminary conceptions of the doctrine of God, limited to what can be thought and its illustration, allow us to ask whether from this background "creation over and beyond oneself" is at all possible for a creator? And might the united whole thus obtained ever fit with the idea of God which links humanity and world together, serving as the basis for a pantology?

These questions come up in connection with Nietzsche's astonishing recognition of the *deification of Becoming* in the philosophy of transcendental Idealism. Nietzsche appreciates the "significance of German philosophy (Hegel): to conceive of a *pantheism* in which evil, error, and suffering are *not* felt to be arguments against divinity."[37] And he criticizes the fact that "*this magnificent initiative*" was misused in the name of the state and the historical past by the powers-that-be, as if it sanctioned the "rationality of whatever happens to be in power." Behind all this, Nietzsche was concerned with the

understanding of *time* as "intuition of Becoming" and of the appearance of the eternal and divine in the Moment of time. Whoever looks upon the entire history of culture through the eyes of the post-Idealist generation and sees it as a chaos of evil and noble, true and false conceptions, will first understand, according to Nietzsche, what satisfaction Schelling and Hegel must have felt in their idea of God-*becoming*: i.e., of the omnipresence of the divine in the universe which manifests itself in the transformations and destinies of humanity, so that everything would not be blind mechanics and a meaningless, purposeless play of forces: "the deification of Becoming is a metaphysical outlook – down from the lighthouse and over the sea of history, as it were – in which an overly historicizing generation of scholars found their consolation."[38] That issue cannot be clarified within the scope of Part III of the *Zarathustra*-poem, since Nietzsche merely rejects historically qualified pretensions to moral excellence on the part of biblical, Christian monotheism in favor of Greek polytheism, maintaining that the divinity of the whole consists precisely in the fact "that there are gods but no God."[39]

Thus, to conclude, we must maintain the rudiments of a philosophical doctrine of God in the later writings, where, taken as a whole, we are confronted more or less with the following situation: according to Nietzsche's pantological principle, the only possibility for reserving a meaning for the concept of God would be to conceive God *not* as the "driving force" behind the world-process as a whole, but rather "as the *maximal condition*, as an epoch – which would explain its further development as well as every event that preceded and led up to it."[40] This is a line of thought which has its precursor in Kant's question whether one could ask: "this (present) world and then the *future* world, or does a world only exist in *epochs*?"[41] It unfolded through German Idealism's Dionysian conception of God via Goethe, on through Hölderlin and Hegel, and on up to the late Schelling.[42] It reaches its summit in the speculative-theology of Nietzsche's later works: "God as the moment of culmination: existence [is as] an eternal deificiation and de-deification. But *no high point of value* – rather a high point of *power*." "*God, the highest power* – that's enough! Everything follows from it, including – 'the world.'"[43]

When Nietzsche maintains that there are signs of such reflections in his metaphysics of art ("God, conceived as an emancipation from morality, taking into himself the whole fullness of life's antithesies and, in a divine torment, redeeming and justifying them" [WP 1035], he can partially rest on a convergence with Goethe's and Hegel's pantheistic way of thinking. This proximity comes from an affinity in thought, which leads Nietzsche precisely to seek distance. Vis-à-vis this affinity which identifies the world or nature with an extra-moral God (not, however, as its goal), one understands why Nietzsche strives to find an antithesis to idealistic pantheism with his doctrine of the eternal return of the same: "For 'everything perfect, divine, eternal' *likewise* compels one to *believe in the 'eternal return'*! Question: has a pantheistic disposition of 'yes' to all things become impossible as morality has conceived it? In fact, it is solely the moral God who is overcome. Does it make any sense to think of a God 'beyond good and evil'? Would a pantheism be possible in *this*

sense? Might we take the idea of the purpose out of the process and *nevertheless* affirm the process?"[44]

Nietzsche responds to these questions with his doctrine of the eternal return: "That would be the case if, within that process, in each of its moments, something were *attained* – and always the same."[45] Accordingly, a pantheism on a par with, say, the practically affirmative perspective of Goethe would be possible: "All comfort in life is based upon a regular recurrence of external things. The change of day and night, of the seasons, of flowers and fruits, and whatever else meets from epoch to epoch, so that we can and should enjoy it – these are the proper springs of earthly life."[46] According to Nietzsche, Spinoza had reached a similarly affirmative relation to existence, insofar as for him "each moment has a *logical* necessity: and, through his basic logical instinct, he exulted over just such a world-structure [*Weltbeschaffenheit*]."[47] Hegel's way of thinking stands in the middle, between Spinoza and Goethe. What unites them, in Nietzsche's view, is the will to deify the universe as well as the everyday, "in order to find *peace* and *happiness* in contemplating and exploring it; Hegel sees reason everywhere – standing before reason, one is allowed to *surrender* to it and *be content.* With Goethe, a kind of almost *joyful* and *trusting fatalism* appears which does not revolt, which does not grow weary, which strives to form a totality out of itself, a belief that everything is redeemed as good and justified only in the totality."[48] And when Nietzsche, guided by the same belief, ultimately points to "God" as the *moment of culmination* in the change between de-deification and deification, we have to take this word (from the Latin *culmen,* the summit) symbolically – as the highest position of the stars, their path through the cycle of noon. In Nietzsche's speculative theology, both are meant at the same time, the moving midpoint between the extreme de-deification of the universe and its instantaneous reversal to the anticipation of the approaching God: the arrival of eternity in the "great noon" of time.

Great noon – in the end, that is Nietzsche's word for the epiphany of Dionysus in the moment of culmination of both Moment and eternity, the high point of time. It is the fork in the path where the anthropological thought connects the theological and cosmological ideas of Kantian pantology, the abyss in human being reaching toward its summit, where both [men and cosmos] absolutely divergent at the heart of world converge in the epiphany of God, to be in one *single* moment, the "same."

From this point we may uncover the theme of pantology in Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*-poem. It is the prelude to a late-Idealist fugue in which successive doctrines seem to free themselves from and nonetheless again and again to seek one another, because they are joined in a leitmotif. And that is the attunement to the imminent event of the noon hour, the rise of that world epoch of the eternal return of all great things, through which "no 'eternal will' wills,"[49] but temporal will strives to affirm itself seeking to eternalize its finitude in infinite repetition. Thus, according to Nietzsche, the doctrine of the eternal return reveals the secret of the will to power's expression of the secret of life. And even the doctrine of the overman finds its legitimation in that will. For the overman is, precisely, the man who wrestles with the most powerful thought in

order to take hold (in the supreme exaltation of intellectually disciplined will to power) of that thought's conceptuality and importance for life at the brink of the abyss of human self-experience: "What returns, what finally comes home to me, is my own self and what of myself has long been in strange lands and scattered among all things and accidents ... I stand before my final peak now and before that which has been saved up for me the longest ... 'Peak and abyss – they are now joined together.'"[50] This dramatic wrestling with thought and its incarnation in a long thinking struggle, executes the theme composing Books I-III of *Zarathustra.* And Book IV, included as a *coda,* has its leitmotif in Zarathustra's call to the great "*fight* [*Ringkampf*] concerning the use of the *power* humanity represents."[51]

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NOTES

[1] Cf. *Nietzsche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe,* Ed. G. Colli & M. Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967-1977), 14, p. 253. [Hereafter noted as KSA.]

[2] Cf. KSA 2, 108; *Human, All Too Human,* trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 60. See section 109 with reference to the "immortal verses" of Lord Byron: "Sorrow is knowledge: they who know the most/Must mourn the deepest o'er the fatal truth,/The tree of knowledge is not that of life." Nietzsche sets Byron's complaint of "ceremonial foolishness" ["feierlichen Leichtsinn"] over against Horace's Epicurean question of why the soul tires of eternal worries at all *(Carmina* II, 11, 11-14). He stresses, however, that one cannot become a "leader and educator of humanity" without the experience of suffering (*ibid.*).

[3] KSA 2, 540; *Human, All Too Human,* II, 1.

[4] *Ibid.*, 406, 533.

[5] KSA 3, 390; *The Gay Science,* 19, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), pp. 91-92.

[6] *Nachlaß,* Fall 1887, 9 [41], KSA 12, 354. The source is Immanuel Kant, "What is Orientation in Thought?" (1786), in the Prussian Academy Edition vol. VIII, p. 141(hereafter Ak.); *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), Transcendental Doctrine of Method, Ch. II, Sec. 3, Ak. III, p. 532 ff. The young Nietzsche had already cited Kant's proposition from the Preface to the Second Edition of the Second *Critique,* "I had to hold back knowledge in order to make room for faith [*Glauben*]" (p. 19), with the additional remark: "Very important! A cultural necessity forced his hand!" *Nachlaß* Summer 1872-beginning of 1873, 19 [34], KSA 7, 426 ff.

[7] *Nachlaß,* Winter 1883-1884, 24 [4], KSA 10, 645.

[8] Kant, "Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science," Preface, Ak. vol. IV, p. 467. *Philosophy of Material Nature,* trans. J. W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), p. 3.

[9] Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals,* I: Metaphysical Elements of the Doctrine of Rights (1797), Introduction, Ak. VI, p. 217.

[10] *Metaphysics of Morals,* II: Metaphysical Elements of the Doctrine of Virtue (1798), Ethical Doctrine of Method, §50, Ak. VI, p. 478.

[11] *Critique of Practical Reason*, Part 1, Book 1, Ch. 1, §7 On The Typic of Practical Judgment, Ak. V, p. 30 and 69. On philosophy as a "Science and Wisdom," with both as doctrine (*doctrina*) of "teaching oneself," cf. *Opus postumum*, Ak. XXI, p. 6 ff.
[12] Nietzsche, KSA 4, 197 ff.; *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. W. Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage, 1954/1968), III, "On the Vision and the Riddle."
[13] *Nachlaß,* Winter 1883-1884, 24 [4], KSA 10, 645.
[14] *Nachlaß,* Spring-Fall 1881, 11 [184], KSA 9, 513.
[15] *Welche Auffassung der lebenden Natur ist die Richtige?* [Which Is the Right Conception of Living Nature?] (1860), cited in the Heraclitus chapter of the Basel lectures on the pre-Platonic philosophers (1872), in *Philologica* III, GOA 19, 174 (cf. section IV, § 10).
[16] See Nietzsche, KSA 6, 311; *Ecce Hom*o, trans. R.J.Hollindale (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1979), p. 80.
[17] Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason,* Preface, note, Ak. V, p. 8; cf. von Wolff-Metternich, *Die Überwindung des mathematischen Erkenntnisideals: Kants Grenzbestimmung von Mathematik und Philosophie*, (Berlin/New York 1995), pp. 76 ff and 92 ff.
[18] Kant, *Logic*, trans. Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz (New York: Dover, 1974) Introduction IX, p. 84 ff. (Ak. IV, p. 77.)
[19] Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans. H.J. Paton, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), part II, p. 81 (Ak. IV, p. 414.)
[20] Kant, *Opus postumum*, Fascicle I, Folio I, ibid., Ak. XXI, p. 12.
[21] *Nachlaß,* End of 1886-Spring 1887, 7 [54], KSA 12, 313.
[22] *Nachlaß,* End of 1886-Spring 1887, 7 [14], KSA 12, 299.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Kant, *Opus postumum*, Fascicle 1, Folio XII, Ak. XXI, p. 156; *Opus postumum*, trans. E. Förster and M. Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 256.
[25] *Ibid.*, Folio VI, Ak. XXI, p. 78; p. 245.
[26] *Ibid.*, Folio III, Ak. XXI, p. 31; p. 235.
[27] *Ibid.*, Folio IV, Ak. XXI, p. 52 ff; p. 242 ff. Folio V, Ak. XXI, p. 63.
[28] *Ibid.*, Folio V, Ak. XXI, p. 69.
[29] Nietzsche, KSA 3, 53; *The Gay Science,* 300, 240 ff.
[30] KSA 4, 17; *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Preface,"Zarathustra's Prologue," 4, p. 127;
[31] KSA 4, 102; *Ibid.*, I: "On the Gift Giving Virtue," 22, p. 190.
[32] KSA 4, 147; *Ibid.*, II: "On Self-Overcoming," 12, pp. 225-228.
[33] KSA 4, 269; *Ibid.*, III: "On Old and New Tablets," 30, p. 269.
[34] KSA 4, 262; *Ibid.*, p. 310. Nietzsche here admits that he "picked up" the word O*verman* along the way, as it were. He admits to having gathered it from the path of classical and romantic literature from Hölderlin and Jean Paul up to Goethe. In his *Juvenilia* the word appears first in an essay on Byron's "Manfred." Cf. BAW[2], p. 10.
[35] Cf. Kant, *Opus postumum*, Fascicle I, Cover, p. 3, *ibid.*, p. 6 ff.
[36] Nietzsche, KSA 4, 109 ff.; *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, II: "Upon the Blessed Isles," p. 198.
[37] *Nachlaß,* Fall 1885-Fall 1886, 2 [105], KSA 12, 113.
[38] KSA 2, 200; *Human, All Too Human*, I, 238.
[39] Cf. the two talks in *Zarathustra*: "Of Rebels" and "Of Old and New Tablets", *ibid.*, pp. 230 and 254.
[40] *Nachlaß,* Fall 1887, 10 [138], KSA 12, 535.
[41] Kant, *Opus postumum, ibid.*, p.70. See the author's "*Epoche, Epochenbewußtsein*," in: J. Ritter et al. (eds.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 2, (Basel/Stuttgart 1972), p. 597 ff.
[42] Cf. Manfred Frank, *Der kommende Gott*, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982/1988), p. 188 ff.
[43] Nietzsche, *Nachlaß*, Fall 1887, 9 [8], KSA 12, 343; 10 [90], *ibid.*, 507 ff.
[44] *Nachlaß,* Summer 1886-Fall 1887, 5 [7 1], KSA 12, 213 ff.
[45] *Ibid.*
[46] *The Autobiography of Johann Wolfgang Goethe*, trans. John Oxenford (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1974), Vol. II, p. 206. Goethe, *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Part 3, Book 13, Hamburger Ausgabe, Vol. 9, p. 578.
[47] Nietzsche, *Nachlaß,* Summer 1886-Fall 1887, 5 [71], KSA 12, 214.
[48] *Nachlaß,* Fall 1887, 9 [178], KSA 12, 443.
[49] KSA 4, 209; *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* III: "Before Sunrise," p. 278.
[50] KSA 4, 193 ff.; *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, III: "The Wanderer," p. 264.
[51] *Nachlaß,* Fall 1883, 16 [66], KSA 10, 523; KSA 4, 297 ff.; *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* IV.

NIETZSCHE, THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE, AND CRITICAL THEORY

NIETZSCHE AND THE SCIENCES I

Edited by

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in cooperation with

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IN MEMORIAM

Walter Schmid
1910-1997

PRO OPERE GRATIAE

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NIETZSCHE, HABERMAS, AND CRITICAL THEORY

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The publisher's permission to translate Tilman Borsche's essay "Intuition und Imagination" in Mihailo Djurić and Josef Simon, eds., *Kunst und Wissenschaft bei Nietzsche* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1986) is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks are also expressed here for the publisher's permission to translate Jürgen Habermas's "Nachwort" to his collection, *Friedrich Nietzsche, Erkenntnistheoretische Schriften* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968).

I take the happy opportunity herewith to affirm my respect and admiration for Robert S. Cohen and I thank him for suggesting and for encouraging my work on this volume, as well as for the range of his contributions to its scope. As always, too, Patrick A. Heelan has my constant gratitude for his insight, critical advice, and indispensable personal support. I am also inspired by his enthusiasm for philosophy and the breadth of his ongoing research interests in both philosophy and science. The institutional support provided by the Graduate School of Georgetown University is also gratefully and acknowledged because the practical labor on this collection was in considerable part supported by the research project, *Hermeneutic and Phenomenological Approaches to the Philosophy of Science*, directed by Patrick A. Heelan, S.J., William A. Gaston Professor of Philosophy.

In an important way, this work first began when as a doctoral student I visited a conference on the topic *Nietzsche: Kunst und Wissenschaft* in the Spring of 1985 at the IUC in Dubrovnik in the former, peacefully united Yugoslavia, with the aid of a Fulbright Fellow's small travel grant. There I immediately recognized the need for a book which might adumbrate the key differences and points of contact between the German language reception of Nietzsche's philosophy and Anglophone approaches to Nietzsche – especially with regard to formal and epistemic issues. Particularly influential were Günter Abel, Tilman Borsche, Volker Gerhardt, Friedrich Kaulbach (†), Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Birgitte Scheer, and Josef Simon. Beyond my own effort to engage the challenge of thinking between English and German reflections in *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science* (1994), the current collection represents some of the many different voices and scholarly perspectives in this tradition, as various in the Anglophone as they are in the German contributions below, a range also including other voices and languages – here presented in English to facilitate the communica-

tion that remains still to be broadened between different language traditions and different scholarly formations.

Beyond the direct personal trajectory of this collection, the tradition of reading "Nietzsche and the Sciences" dates from Nietzsche's earliest interpreters. Supplementing the pioneering insights of Hans Vaihinger and Abel Rey, Alwin Mittasch, Oskar Becker, and, more recently, Milič Čapek must be acknowledged. Contemporary currents continue with Robin Small's work on recurrence and the theory of time and Angèle Kremer-Marietti combines research on Nietzsche with a special expertise on Comte. Walther Ch. Zimmerli's influential paper on Nietzsche's critique of science, published here for the first time in the present volume, as well as for the broader work of Jean Granier, Reinhard Löw (†), and Dieter Henke (with reference to theology and Darwinism), and the still-as-yet untapped insights of Dieter Jähnig's reflections on the problem of science as a philosophic problem with regard to the origins of art in history and culture encourages further research on the themes collected here. Further: the new and growing interest in Nietzsche and truth (and including science, metaphysics, and epistemology) on the part of new scholars, especially those hailing from analytic philosophical quarters, may well be expected to enhance the project of understanding Nietzsche's thinking while at the same time highlighting a theme that both invites and supports the possibility of continental/analytic dialogue.

I express my deep personal thanks to David B. Allison, Richard Cobb-Stevens, Theodore Kisiel, Alexander Nehamas, Tracy B. Strong, and Marx Wartofsky (†). I also thank Alasdair MacIntyre for his kind encouragement as well as for the balanced example of his thoughtful Preface to Volume Two. And, I thank Holger Schmid not only for his assistance with both collections, working with me to correct literally every one of the translations from the German, but also for philosophic conversation in Nietzsche's own spirit on the esoteric kernel of antiquity, language, poetry, and music.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

In general, references to Nietzsche's works are abbreviated and included in the body of the text. References to all other works are listed in the notes to each individual contribution, though this may vary with different authors. In addition, because this collection is not intended for the specialist reader alone, an effort has been made to keep references as general as possible. Specialists will not find this rigorous but it is hoped that by the same token, nonspecialists may find the discussions less forbidding. This is an overall guide. Some essays will employ individual conventions.

NIETZSCHE'S WORKS:GERMAN EDITIONS

GOA *Werke. Großoktav-Ausgabe*, 2nd. ed., (Leipzig: Kröner, 1901-1913).

KGB *Briefwechsel. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. by. G. Colli and M. Montinari, (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1975 sqq.).

KSA *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe* (München/Berlin, New York: DTV/ Walter de Gruyter, 1980). Cited as KSA followed by the page number. Some authors include notebook volume and number.

KGW *Nietzsches Werke (Kritische Gesamtausgabe)* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967 ff.) Cited as KGW followed by the page number.

NIETZSCHE'S WORKS: ENGLISH EDITIONS

The following abbreviations refer to in-text references to English translations of Nietzsche's works. The original date of publication is listed in parentheses. The manner of citation, whether to essay and section number or to section number alone, or to specific page numbers in the translated edition is also noted in the notes to each essay. Citations have been standardized only where possible and references are not always to the same translation. Where more than one current translation of the same original work is used in the essays to follow, listings are given below in order of citation frequency. The specific reference is also listed whenever possible in notes to each essay.

PT *Philosophy and Truth. Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's*, (1872-3), ed. and trans., Daniel Breazeale (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979). *Das Philosophenbuch*, originally published in

Nietzsches Werke, Vol. X, ed., Ernst Holzer and August Horneffer, (Leipzig: Kröner, 1907), pp. 109-232; KSA 7, 417 ff., and elsewhere. English source edition cited by page number.

TL "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," (1873), pp. 77-97 in *Philosophy and Truth*. KSA 1, 875-890. See also "On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense," pp. 246-257 in Sander Gilman, Carole Blair, David J. Parent, ed. and trans., *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language*, (Oxford University Press, 1989). Cited from *Philosophy and Truth* by the page number.

PTG *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, (1873), trans. Marianne Cowan (Chicago: Gateway, 1962). KSA 1, 804-872. Cited by page number.

BT *The Birth of Tragedy and the Case of Wagner*, (1872), trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1969). Cited by section number.

UM *Untimely Meditations*, (1873-76), trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Cited by page number.

HH *Human, All Too Human*, (1878-80), trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Cited in some essays by volume, part, and section number.

D *Daybreak*, (1881), trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Cited by section number.

GS *The Gay Science*, (1882), trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974). Cited by section number.

Z *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, (1883-85), trans. Walter Kaufmann, in Kaufmann, ed., *The Portable Nietzsche*, (New York: Viking Penguin, 1954). Cited by page number. See also *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1961). Certain essays also include section headings.

BGE *Beyond Good and Evil*, (1886), trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973). See also *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966). Cited by section number.

GM *On the Genealogy of Morals*, (1887), trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1967). Cited by essay and section number.

AC *The Antichrist*, (1895), trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Viking Penguin, 1968); see also Kaufmann, *The Portable Nietzsche*. Cited by page number.

TI *The Twilight of the Idols*, (1889), trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Viking Penguin, 1968); see also Kaufmann, *The Portable Nietzsche*. Cited by page number; certain essays list section headings or shortened titles as indicated in italics in the following listings. For convenience in

referencing other translations or the original text, the section titles corresponding to cited page ranges are: "*Foreword*": 21-22; "*Maxims* and Arrows": 23-27; "The Problem of *Socrates*": 29-34; "'*Reason*" in Philosophy": 35-39; "How the '*Real World*' at last Became a Myth": 40-41; "*Morality* as Anti-Nature: 42-46; "The Four Great *Errors*": 47-54; "The '*Improvers*' of Mankind": 55-59; "What the *Germans* Lack": 60-66; "*Expeditions* of an Untimely Man": 67-104; "What I Owe to the *Ancients*": 105-111.

EH *Ecce Homo*, ([1888] 1908), trans. R. J.Hollingdale (Harmondsworth/London: Penguin, 1979, 1992). Cited by page number; certain essays list essay headings and section numbers. For convenience in referencing other translations or the original text, the section titles corresponding to cited page ranges are: "*Foreword*"; 33-36; "*Epigraph*": 37; "Why I Am So *Wise*": 38-50; "Why I Am So *Clever*": 51-68; "Why I Write Such Excellent *Books*": 69-77; "The Birth of Tragedy": 78-83; "The Untimely Essays": 84-88; "Human, All Too Human": 89-94; "Daybreak": 95-97; "The Gay Science": 98; "Thus Spoke Zarathustra": 99-111; "Beyond Good and Evil": 112-113; "The Genealogy of Morals": 114-115; "Twilight of the Idols": 116-118; "The Wagner Case": 119-125; "Why I Am A Destiny": 126-134.

WM *The Will to Power*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968). Cited by section number. For corresponding *Nachlaß* references please see the recent double concordance to the KSA and KGW editions by Scott Simmons in *New Nietzsche Studies* I:1/2 (1996): 126-153. See also Marie-Luise Haase and Jörg Salaquarda, "Konkordanz. Der Wille zur Macht: Nachlass in chronologischer Ordnung der Kritische Gesamtausgabe," *Nietzsche-Studien* 9 (1980): 446-490.

OTHER WORKS

KdrV I. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990). Also listed as CPR with reference to *The Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1929).

NSI Babich, ed., *Nietzsche, Theories of Knowledge, and Critical Theory: Nietzsche and the Sciences I* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999).

NSII Babich, ed., *Nietzsche, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science: Nietzsche and the Sciences II* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999).

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