A Conjectural Solution to the “Easy” and “Hard” Problems of Consciousness

1.1 - Introduction

This article incurs a dialogue and a solution of the “hard problem” of consciousness that includes its own argument and solution in addition to criticisms of salient theories of consciousness that would otherwise conflict with the material of this deduction. Instead of attempting to extract productive Consciousness from unconscious material, this article has instead determined an over-arching “innate” faculty unique to humans that (although currently undescribed due to the indeterminacy of its origin), whereby the perspectivism of “images” (themselves that possess the attribute of being *passively* related to conscious function) form the ability for consciousness to be manifested. Naturally, the author interprets Bollands’ (Bollands, 2019) result as incompatible with a truly functioning solution of the Hard Problem.

This article postulates an expressive focus on the two “modes” of consciousness (whereby consciousness is recognised in non-volitive frames of mind, as opposed to any exploration of logic): the phenomenal consciousness and the physicalist singularity.

Where *infinity* is achieved under the pretense of human conceptual arguments, we may assume firstly of a “manifold” that is collective of the *cumulative* reason that stems from (in accordance with one primary idea of this human conceptualisation) Kant's categories.

Of course, however, in pragmatic terms, the true manifold is never attained by any mind and within one's accumulation of all information, only one idea can be individually and singularly apprehended by the mental faculty.

This notion of Consciousness deviates from the simplicity of the *reason* that was introduced by Kant while retaining the structural significance of his reason as a development made upon individualized self reason. Bucke's three types of Consciousness are nullified to remove his “simple” and “cosmic” consciousnesses (organized in a manner akin to some Great Chain of Being) and instead to render them as being produced by the Consciousness of the Self.

Wilber's *Spectrum of Consciousness* (Wilber, 1993) does also make an error in assuming a progressivism in Consciousness – therefore creating differently interpretable Consciousnesses on account of (and this is true because a mode of accumulation is used, therefore each part's matter is indistinguishable to another) the decidedly equal Conscious apprehension – as such, the *Consciousness of the Self* is rendered to elucidate these higher states of perception. A contrast is intended to be found in the aforementioned two “modes” of non-volitional consciousness (phenomenological consciousness and the singularity) and the series of consciousnesses that have been described by Wilber.

The second section of this article elucidate this perception of Consciousness and introduces solutions to both the “Easy” and “Hard” Problems (while including a propositional structure described as the “athematic”), the third qualifies supplementary protocols in tandem with an introductory “Results” section, the fourth includes the Conclusion and a set of other conjectures that are indeterminable, but not necessary for a true description of the Hard Problem.

2.1 - Outline of Consciousness

Consciousness, where its presence is unneeded in logical tasks, makes it separate from the conceptualisation of objects of reason (regardless of their physical or non-physical apprehension) and presents itself under a separate intuition; truly, this is asserted in consciousness’ case as a distinct phenomenon under the prerogative of scientism even if this text should be continental in its stature. The faculty for consciousness to be produced is innate: that is certain, but it bears no deterministic organ on account of how it is and It is therefore asserted that the physicalism (it should be noted by the reader that the terms “physicalism”, “singularity”, or a combination of the two describe the singular perspective granted by the the sensibility) one holds: knowledge of one's singular physical apprehension in spatial character (yet not a temporal character) akin to the singular capacity that the mind's conscious faculty possesses (this is a *passive* consciousness, any image that should be formative to the whole subjective must act as a passive form). It is the unity where lively *happenings* in the context of immediate action are observed as actions where one's physical placement – in which one is the *subject* in a world of phenomena and is attached to themselves in relation to a world (which is qualified by sensibility) that is not themself; for reference, this paragraph incurs a description of the Easy Problem.

This paper suggests therefore a significant criticism of Nagel's *What is it Like to Be a Bat?* whereby the subjective essence of experiences renders them diffuse on account of the relation made to the individual; physical experiences, are however, objective in qualifying their own innateness: one may walk, run, or see – what they do *see* or how they may *walk* can alter on account of unique and individualized sensibilities, but they are altogether convergent to the same ideal – and these are limited to the perceptive consciousness that is held in that quality of the subject.

Unconscious stimulants are not supplicant to Consciousness, yet the singular apprehension – while it may be supposed as an unconscious apparatus itself – is constituent only in conscious functions and therefore it is an effectively latent object of perception; consciousness is not derived from matter that is not exclusively unconscious, but rather the sensibility as part of the image is the cause.

2.1.1 - Phenomenal Consciousness

The Consciousness that is formative in describing a self-awareness (typified in sentiments where one expresses knowledge such as “I know that I exist”) is manifested as a thought itself in precisely the same manner that any other non-sensory thought is produced; it is such that any profundity attached to conscious sentiment must be part of the predicate that is manifest towards the phenomenal consciousness. The sentiments of phenomenal consciousness (as described above) are not rendered on logical constructions, they are instead á priori constructions.

Understand that the subject-physicalism of the previous sections is lower on the scale of developmental predicate than the phenomenal consciousness, but that they are derived from the same, physicalist image whereby the phenomenal consciousness must be described on account of a conceptual link to the physicalist image.

2.1.2 - The “Hard Problem”

After covering an initial “easy problem” for manifestation, this article now considers a transference whereby the image supplies a manifest reason. It has been observed that the expression of phenomenal consciousness is entirely a priori (indeed, what makes the study of consciousness particularly compelling is the a priori nature that has been attached to such events as phenomenal consciousness; the specifics of what *a priori* should mean where it does not pertain to phenomenal consciousness are the Kant’s Categories for they, akin to one’s own self-realization (as expressed in commentaries of one’s own volition) without the phenomenological statement “I know that I exist” whereby the idea is understood as a necessary component ), and that this occurs on the same conceptual stage as other articles of a priori thought.

In practice, one does not accept Kant's Categories – assuming that this subject is aware of the idea – to individually determine thought, a synthesis of the categories – therefore a categorical bloc – forms a preclude for which human thought is active upon. This is akin to statements of *subjective experience* where any form must be predicated by the “I feel” assertion.

The “robot”, which is unlimited in its capacity for logical thought within the ideal of the manifold, the *categorical bloc* is influential only on account of the preconceived human influence thereof.

For as many agents of phenomenal consciousness as can be expressed, it is held that the *contextualizing* sentiment – “I” – is unnecessary where logical assertions of being are to be made (which, if we do recall, are absent from the Conscious form) – and when sentiments are to be expressed that are phenomenological (described in “I exist”, “I feel”, and “I am”) as opposed to “I”, then they are explicitly conditional in that they are expansionary upon the manner of the Self.

In tandem with the identity given by the Easy Problem and the animalistic sensibility where one entity only possesses its “*mind*” in the context of an immediacy with its sensory state. This, in the context of the innate reproduction, renders the physical singularity – where the exterior (these descriptors are used for the purpose of relativism) is defined as the common sensibility, and the interior is the apparent (for such the “Easy Problem” solution is reconceived) image of that singular physicalism.

What IIT and GWT fail to discuss is that certainly, the manifold (in their characterization, specific brain activity) is conducive to consciousness, but that it isn’t structuralist, but rather it introduces the stimulants that are sources of sensibility for the interior apprehension of the singular physicalism. The consciousness capacity that we hold now is uniquely limited on its supplication to being – in terms of Jung’s two psyches, it is the Shadow that is dominant as expressive of the actions of the Consciousness while the other Self is manufactured (recall that this is what we *strive* towards as opposed to already are) from the perception of productive form.

Finally, owing to the fact that the manifold is capable of producing a great variety (although notably, limited) quantity of interpretable forms, the acts of Consciousness, particularly phenomenal consciousness, are most usually recalled facts about ourselves. The miraculous ideal that we describe as Consciousness is usually one part of a synthetic unity of thought – it is the recalled predicate that governs other thought; it is the *illusion of constancy* that has been far too influential in discussion about the phenomenon.

2.2 - The Athematic

It is such that our Consciousness suggests its own specificity in the derived . This specificity will hence be described as “theme”. In such, we may also define an “athematic” – which, in the context of the physicalism that this text has described – is not anchored by the idea of the singular, physicalist apprehension of the Consciousness. This is a “bastard construction” that is dependent on the bare, non-constructivist faculties of the brain (the organs (importantly, this idea is a replacement of the “philosophical zombie”) retain their original stature), whereby the functional basis is akin to that of the animal: in how particularly that we cannot assume a computer-like character for their minds (where evolutional material becomes dominant as some automated quest for survival), but rather as a characterized (if not homogeneous) idiosyncrasy; the actions of specific, evolutionary animals are formative under their idiosyncrasies – such which humans do not ourselves possess. The hypothetical condition of the philosophical zombie so described (Chalmers, 2019) is false in practice (*human* behavior is intrinsically linked to the consciousness that we understand as an effect), and indeed, we may even assume the mechanism of the interior physicalist singularity to be conducive instead to alternative interior outcomes (whereby it does not inform any consciousness), and instead manifests the ideal of the philosophical zombie that where it had originally been impossible.

We must also understand that animals are privy to the same essence (but not extent) of function that the human prefrontal cortex acts with, such that any degree of *logic* (whereby this is more occupied with Deweyan decision-making (Cherlin, 2020)) can be applied for the animal’s decision-making – a logic, however, that is exclusively occupied with immediate sensory demands as opposed to processes that are defined in the context of the dominant manifold.

2.3 - Existentialism

Only one's manifold can inform Existentialism – as expressed, it is neither propelled by dread nor fear, but in the individual acceptance of character. Anyone may experience a proto-Existentialism that is made without the academic precondition. Existentialism, as its authors should profess (Copleston, 2009; Camus, 1957), is a non-worldly identity; to make a “realization” of the difference that any Self should hold against the reality that one is attached to; a – in the model of Consciousness that has been described, the Self is recognised whereby Consciousness is held as one (of many) unique faculties; it is initiated by the impetus granted by the physicalism, but it otherwise finds retention in its placement as memory (from which our knowledge is more developed). The function of the Self (in the context of the physicalism) is disjoint with any euphoric statement such as “I exist”, any personal autonomy (footnote: the autonomy of the state that exists as part of a intersubjective is *more* of an autonomy that is realized in the mind itself.

3.1 - Results

The main structure that this article proposes is the “whole subjective”. The sentiments of phenomenal consciousness (which is the Consciousness of Self) are produced as part of that whole subjective, and the developmental predicate that is rendered innately on the imagery of the physicalism rather than on a collective of separated images that is constructed where such images are referential rather than constructive.

The functional innateness accepts only the consistent image (in which it falls under the idea of common sensibility) whereby the transference of the worldly isolation to the mind is rendered by the capacity of the aforementioned innateness (as opposed to the study of a potential NCC). One may disagree with the Innateness – perhaps it should be suggested that the capacity now for humans to understand alternative perspectives or to produce abstract thoughts would render us outside of the assumed *bubble* that we are in; naturally, for the characteristic “narrow-mindedness” of the non-intellectual to be qualified, we must assume that no *conscious* means of deduction has been applied to interpret the single-mindedness of the human nature and, it should be functional of the intelligentsia to opt towards any such mental prerogative that they should so desire.

Contrary to many of the contemporary theories of Consciousness, this theory – and indeed, this discussion is significantly derivative upon the Global Workspace Theory (Baars, 2015) – this theory does not approach any degree of “intellectual” complexity to be registered in some equivalent form to consciousness. In this sense, we qualify some advancing consciousness (outside of the influence of biological means) whereby the normativity that we should observe among all consciousnesses ; the model that has been proposed in this text instead follows the assumption that equivalent conscious experiences (as suggested in the “modes” of the introduction: the phenomenal consciousness and the physicalist singularity) are isolated relative to the manifold that is apparent, in the same manner that the governing sensibility in the form of the Nervous System.

3.2 - Jungian Connectivity

In constructing an idea referential to Jungian psychology (specifically whereby an article of “real-life” perception relative to the psyche is concerned), it is important to understand the slight divergences that are assumed in contrast between his study and my own. In the “dreams” (for lack of a more analytical word), Jung's interpretation includes a setting and object (whereby symbolic relevance is to be derived) as a contextual simulacrum of real-life events and manifests a derived significance – as a contrary idea, this image of the physicalism requires does not induce any analysis predicated on extraction, but it possesses its own isolated and pre-emptive deliverance of faculty.

3.3 - Subjective Experience

Subjective Experience, for the qualitative infinity that has been descriptively served to it, possesses none of these things under the description of the qualia; it occupies a finitely-scaled response to any stimulant. All stimulants are responsible for the specificity that occupies the reaction towards themselves. In that we must assume any subjective experience to be at least partially derivative on an individual origin (most usually but not always from the same object that the subjective experience is predicated on), then the limited attributes that are associated to that object are contributory in influencing a further transference to other objects, but only where these traits are proximally shared.

3.4 - Final Propositions

 A large proportion of theoretical ideas, particularly IIT, view Consciousness as a predominately manifest idea (a cause-and-effect . The entire prerogative of “linked information” is relies on the qualitative application of that information – each expression of consciousnesses varies where one's facilitated knowledge should vary; this is why we can understand where IIT serves the “pretty hard problem” as opposed to the “hard problem” of Chalmers (Mindt, 2017).

In assuming that “the world is everything that is the case” (McManus, 2006), Wittgenstein has postulated an image composed of atomic (and molecules thereof) sentences; therefore, his “image” is aptly such, it is a product of perspectivism.

3.5 - Cognitive Closure

Although an application of Kant’s categories has been used to define a restriction of all information that should find its origin therein (and all information does mean *all information*), this article instead chooses to interpret that a development of that information into a great collative may perhaps be formative outside of those barriers (under the pretense that they are a posteriori). This “great collative” is simply akin to the thought that we apply now: the multiple bases of reason, taboo (et cetera) influence the final, produced thought.

The New Mysterianism (McGinn, 1989) that has been prolific is quite incidentally related to the naturalism of consciousness that this article proposes, but it is contingent to the generic idea of *innateness* for an origin of Consciousness (in assuming that, where IIT or GWT are concerned, the synthetic development of one’s apparent knowledge should be subject to be able to assume some origin of phenomenon for Consciousness).

On the idea that the superposition of the Self is such that it cannot recognise its own individualized and intrinsicized *character*, but rather only representative, correlative (indeed, the idea of the NCC is inadequate to describe Consciousness in terms of its character) – akin only to how we may recognise normativity among all psyches or divergence presented by neuroses.

4.1 - Conclusion and Significance

In that this article is the first to formally elect itself towards the “bridging question” described by Chalmers (Chalmers, 1995), any suggestion of certainty under which we may assume that this formalization of Consciousness is unquestionably true is incorrect, but the uniqueness of an expressed plausibility where yet the notion of the Consciousness has yet been undescribed marks its own step-forward. This article is mostly founded on the perspective of a philosopher of the mind against that of the cognitive neuroscientist – functioning components are propositional and representative of methods that are descriptive on a conjectured function of initiating conscious function.

This theory is in itself incomplete. There exists no correlation of the extent to which any requisite innateness can be described: it may be omnipresent as a psychical component of most physiological, neuronal parts of the brain, or apparent as within a specific organ that is salient only within the developmental, infantile state. For a postulate (as must be delivered by any conjectural article) to be described for the origin of the innateness, it is suggested that the ocular information is conferred in the cerebral cortex where the innate mechanism should occur.

The Study of Consciousness cannot be induced without the Death of what we deem the Spirit – the necessary *characterisation* of the Consciousness in order to *describe* it therefore limits our own perceptive infinity (for a conjecture, the flawed, *true* nature that occupies the singularity leads us to a false perception of what is definitively the consciousness.

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