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THE DEBATE BETWEEN MENCIOUS  
AND HSÜN-TZU:  
CONTEMPORARY APPLICATIONS

1. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Problem of the Type of Existence of the Subject Matter

The first question which might occur to the student of human nature is whether the inquiry is to be a descriptive or a prescriptive one. One may commence by questioning the soundness of the descriptive/prescriptive distinction. Prescriptions must relate to the basic potential to fulfill them. Chinese philosophy has been both sharper and earlier on this point than Western philosophy. For example, Mencius, unlike Kant, considered that morality must be based on man's nature in order to be practical. In his reply to Kao Tzu, Mencius says:

Sir, can you follow the nature of the willow tree, and make the cups and baskets? Or must you violate its nature to make the cups and baskets?<sup>1</sup>

Aristotle placed great value in the explanatory power of the relationship between potency and actuality. But despite his use of these concepts, he apparently saw no difficulties in holding that man's nature was evil while his highest actuality resided in performing good acts.

The position taken up here is that the inquiry is both a descriptive and a prescriptive one. The descriptive element is the existence of a

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nature the prescriptive element is the aspect of the nature that requires guidance and direction. The prescriptive element must relate to the descriptive element such that what is or can be actualized is congruent with the most basic potential of the nature.

#### B. The Problem of Access to the Subject Matter

Another question which must arise for any student of human nature is how one can lay claim to having any access to a pure datum. This is the problem of culture. Every human nature taken as a datum is already influenced by some culture. Every investigator is influenced by some culture even if she or he could come upon any pure experimental datum. The investigator is influenced by the data and the data are influenced in turn by the investigator: a two-way-Heisenberg effect.

Firstly, it is important refuse to accept *to some extent*, the absolute existence of the problem. The assumption behind the posing of the problem is that real human nature would exist apart from or aside of any cultural context. Contrariwise, it may be arguable that real human nature, at least at some point in history, must always appear from within some cultural context. An experimental Skinner box may distort human nature rather than afford us a vision of its pure essence. In other words, there is no human zoo or, culture is the human zoo.

Secondly, it does not follow that if nature appears within a cultural context that its essence is derived from that cultural context. It is arguable that, to some extent, there is a basic human nature that cuts across all cultural barriers and is discoverable by the investigator.

Lastly: it is part of human nature to become part of human culture. It is part of human nature to influence itself in a certain direction. The descriptive and prescriptive elements are not totally unrelated. The investigator cum philosopher has a responsibility to select and emphasize those features of human nature that most closely answer to its essence. The prescriptive element must be based on the descriptive and can also modify the descriptive so that the descriptive becomes the prescriptive

and vice-versa.

## II. SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATIONS

The basic inspiration for the outlook on human nature that is adopted here is a core insight of Chinese philosophy that human nature is inherently good.<sup>2</sup> This basic inspiration may be re-affirmed from three standpoints: metaphysical, biological and social. In so far as the intent here is to concentrate on human nature rather than on nature in general, biological and social standpoints are the focus of concern, which is why this theory may be labeled the bio-evolutionary-social-theory. While it has been argued in this present work that philosophy should not take its rise from theoretical foundations, in the case of claims which contain a prescriptive element, theory cannot be totally avoided. One attempts to find a prescription which closely corresponds with the most positive direction of the descriptive essence.

If man's nature is inherently good, then his biological nature is inherently good. If the master key to man's biological nature could be isolated, it should provide one with a significant clue to his ethical nature. The master key to man's biological nature is that it is directed towards the preservation of the human species. All human motivations and actions must find their ultimate grounding here. All social evolution can be seen as an extension of the most basic drive of species preservation inherent in the human being.

### *Metaphysical*

From the standpoint of metaphysics, every nature must be itself. Its essence cannot be not to be itself or it would not even be in the first place. If it could be, it would not last for very long. If its essence is to be itself (whatever it is), then it is also its essence to maintain itself in being.<sup>3</sup> A nature cannot be (certainly not for very long) if its basic *telôs* is not to be itself or to destroy itself. From the standpoint of a

metaphysical concept of a nature, human nature cannot be inherently constituted to destroy itself. The basic principle of human nature cannot be other than self preservative.

### *Biological*

The most constitutive *telōs* of any biological species is the principle of self-preservation. Human nature cannot be designed for intra-species conflict because such a design would be at the very least inefficient and at the most ultimately self-destructive. It makes no sense, from a biological standpoint, that a species should be so constituted as to be inherently self-destructive. Survival, rather than destruction is the *telōs* of a biological species. Survival, in terms of the evolutionary theory presented here, must be understood as survival not of the "fittest", but of the species. If evolution were a struggle simply for survival, why would it not have ruthlessly eliminated all altruists, who seem to increase another's prospects for survival at the cost of their own? <sup>4</sup>

There is no basic instinct for aggression or death wish in human nature. Aggression, as is argued below, is always in service of life. The Western dualistic viewpoint, whether Manichaeian good versus evil or Freudian Eros versus Thanatos is not well grounded from the biological standpoint.

### *Social*

Human nature cannot be conceived after the model of a human individual. No human being can even come into existence as an individual. *Minimally speaking*, it requires a society of two in order that one human individual exist in the first place. Human nature is already ontologically social.

If one combines metaphysics with biology, again one reaches the conclusion that human nature cannot be designed for social conflict. If human nature must be social in order to be at all, it cannot be so con-

stituted as to be inherently anti-social. Human nature is designed for social harmony. This is again another core insight of Chinese philosophy which derives from the fundamental insight that human nature is originally good. Original goodness is required as a pre-requisite for social survival. This is a kind of biological equivalent for ethics. This is not to say that an ethical theory must be consequentialist or teleological to be valid. It is also not to say that ethics may not possess its own intrinsic value. It is only to say that ethics can be grounded on bio-evolutionary social theory.

### BIO-PSYCHOLOGY

The core drive of the human species (or any species for that matter) is for self preservation, the philosophical expression of which is life affirmation. Self preservation or survival must of course include reproduction as the species would not survive if it did not perpetuate itself in addition to conserving its present generation. Biological self preservation cannot function on its own: it requires the instrumentality of psychological drives for its implementation. The following description of psychological drives is meant in a very general sense and is naturally much condensed. For purposes of brevity certain physiological and psychological drives have been collapsed. The terms utilized are thus to be understood primarily in a general philosophical sense rather than in the more limited physiological or psychological sense even when they are specifically so designated.

#### BIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL DEDUCTION OF THE EMOTIONS

1. Self-love or self-care or the love of the species for itself is the most basic psychological drive and is the psychological expression of the core biological drive of the human species for self preservation. Self-preservation manifests itself in two forms: (i) conservation; (ii) perpetuation.

1.i. The physiological expression of the conservation of the species

is the appetite of hunger.

1.ii. The physiological expression of the perpetuation of the species is the appetite of sex. The psychological correlate of sexual appetite is sexual drive.

1.iii. When the physiological expression of the conservation or perpetuation of the species is satisfied, the result is happiness. Happiness can also be experienced when one is the recipient of another's desire for the perpetuation of the species such as when one experiences maternal love or, in Japanese cultures, *amae*. Higher orders of happiness may require the satisfaction of higher desires such as aesthetic desires, religious desires, intellectual desires, desires for meaning in life, desires for friendship, and/or desires for small group, community or national affiliation. At a point in social evolution, human happiness may be identified with the capacity for the satisfaction of higher desires such that the possibility of the non-satisfaction of those desires may require the sacrifice of human life. Hence, the case of Masada. Survival of the species, may also take the form of attempts to preserve higher forms of culture at the cost of individual survival.

2. When the well-being of the object of self-love is threatened, the natural response of the human organism is fear and/or the desire to protect the object of self-love. Fear is derivative from the threat of diminution, hurt, loss or the diminution, hurt to loss (real or imagined) of the object of self-love. Fear manifests itself in one of three modes: fighting, freezing or fleeing. Each mode is an attempt to remove the threat to survival.

2.i. Fighting: the response to remove the threatening object by attack. Attack is always defense. Every aggressive act is a fear response or a protective response.

2.ii. Freezing: the response to remove the threatened self via mental avoidance (the object of threat is removed from the mind by panic) accompanied by the lack of physical movement (paralysis) or pretense accompanied by the lack of physical movement (as by playing possum). The psychological form of freezing is manifested as denial.

2.iii. Fleeing: the response to remove the self from the threat by

physical withdrawal via physical movement to escape or hide.

3.i. When the organism responds to remove the threatening object, fear turns into anger or hatred. When the organism fails to remove the threatening object, fear turns into anger against oneself for the failure to take action. Such anger against oneself manifests itself in guilt or shame depending upon the culture in which one finds oneself. If there is no expiation for the feelings of guilt or shame, guilt or shame turns into depression. If depression is allowed to continue for a long time, it may turn into self-hatred, resignation, despondency or hopelessness.

3.ii. Anger is the response of the organism to a short-term threat.<sup>5</sup> Frustration is anger in an incipient stage.

3.iii. Hatred is the fear response of the organism to a long-term threat.

3.iv. Sadness is the response of the organism to the actual hurt inflicted upon or the actual loss or diminution of the object of self-love.

4.i. When fear responds by removing the threatening object whether directly through attack or indirectly by refusing aid, fear turns into guilt. Every case of guilt is actually a special case of shame in which the fear in this case is of the opinion of the self regarded as other.

4.ii. When fear responds by removing the threatened self, fear turns into shame and resentment. Resentment sooner or later must turn into anger or hatred. When resentment turns into anger or hatred it becomes vengeance. Self-punishment is vengeance directed against oneself.

5. Greed is hunger mixed with fear that the organism is not receiving enough for its survival, present or future.

6. Envy is a special case of hatred in which the object of desire is possessed by another but the greed threshold has not yet been passed.

7. Jealousy is a special case of hatred in which the object of desire is possessed by another, but the greed threshold has been passed. Jealousy is divided into two forms:

7.i. Simple jealousy is where one does not want what the other possesses, but one does not want them to possess it either.

7.ii. Covetousness is where one also wants to possess what the other

possesses. In the Biblical story, King David coveted Bathsheeba.

It would be of enormous interest to continue with such derivations. For example, the deductions could be expanded into the realm of specific unethical acts. Lying or promise-breaking can both be seen as special cases of attacking (the attempt to perpetrate injury by damaging or discrediting the threatening object), or freezing or fleeing (to avoid the threat of violence). All cases of lying, in short, would be seen as arising out of either fear or the desire to protect. However, the list of deductions must be cut short in order to carry through with the present argument.

When anger or hatred erupt into the act of removing the threatening object, the result may be injury to the threatening object. The ethical evaluation of such an injury done to another is considered "evil". (Even when the injury is only intended its "evil" or "wrongness" is also assayed in terms of the injury that would have been caused to the other)

What is most important to note is that all emotions are derivative from the master emotion of self-love. Anger or hatred, in particular, are derivative from the lack or threatened lack of self love (by the threat to the proper object of self love). Acts which are labeled as evil arise from emotions which only arise when the existence of human nature is threatened. *The conclusion which can be drawn from this is that evil or the instrumentality of evil (hatred, anger) is not present in original, or undisturbed human nature.*

Thus, Hsün Tzu is mistaken when he asserts that "...man is born with envy and hate." In the above analysis, hatred or envy are not part of original human nature but only arise when the survival of that nature is under threat. Hsün Tzu's full statement is as follows:

The nature of man is evil; his goodness is acquired. His nature being what it is, man is born, first, with a desire for gain. If this desire is followed, strife will result and courtesy will disappear. Second, man is born with envy and hate.<sup>6</sup>

Hsün Tzu is not quite correct when he states that man is born with a

desire for gain. What he has identified as a desire for gain is either a legitimate expression of self-love or hunger, or greed, which is self-love affected by fear (the fear that one will not get or possess enough). If one attempts to satisfy hunger, the natural result is not strife. Under social conditions of scarcity, the social result may but need not necessarily be strife. But if strife occurs, this is not as the result of inherent malice; the occurrence of strife may be a purely social problem which requires a social solution, such as improved production or distribution.

Hsün Tzu is correct in tracing the origin of evil (at least in part), to certain emotional states; it is only that he has not recognized that these states are not inherent to human nature. If Hsün Tzu were correct and man were born with envy and hate, there would be more of a chance that the rest of his argument could be correct. As it is, what he has identified as part of human nature is a second derivative (2, 3.i.).

It would be useful to re-visit an example from the other side, the famous example of Mencius of the child about to fall into a well:

Why I say all men have a sense of commiseration is this: here is a man who suddenly notices a child about to fall into a well. Invariably he will feel a sense of alarm and compassion. And this is not for the purpose of gaining the favor of the child's parents, or seeking the approbation of his neighbors and friends, or for fear of blame should he fail to rescue it.<sup>7</sup>

While Mencius takes this as an argument for an inherent sense of compassion, this sense of compassion can be taken as a special instance of the inherent core drive of species preservation. This is not to suggest that this is how it is intended to be taken by Mencius. But if human nature is inherently good, and one construes this nature to be biological natures, then not only should ethics and biology not be incompatible, they should be positively correlated. In fact, if one wishes to make an addition to Mencius' idea, one can consider both the phenomenon of the spontaneous benevolent action towards a fellow human being in danger and the feeling

of happiness or contentment that follows upon the spontaneous exercise of the fundamental inclination to help one's fellow human being. That one may engage in a spontaneous act to help a fellow human being may be taken as an indication that such an act is in keeping with one's inherent nature since no deliberation need or in fact can precede such an act. That one feels a positive sense of contentment upon the performance of such an act can be taken as a sign that such an act was in keeping with the fulfillment of one's nature in the same sense that a feeling of contentment after eating may be taken as a sign that eating was in keeping with one's nature. One may even take the spontaneous feeling that follows upon an action of gratuitous benevolence as a sign that the action itself must have been the result of an inherent disposition to act and that such an action was followed by a positive feeling as a sign that such an inclination was one which nature wished to reinforce in human beings by rewarding human beings with pleasure at the performance of such an act.

That someone might thereby object that one was performing ethical acts for the sake of the pleasure that they brought, and therefore the acts were not performed for their own sake (or for the sake of helping others), but were performed for the selfish pleasure that they brought, and were therefore selfish, and not selfless acts, would be to miss the point that the acts, when performed, were performed spontaneously and without thought to the possible gain of happiness that was thereby to be derived (which the performer of the act might well not even realize would be a side effect). And even if it were to be argued that one could be performing such acts for the sake of feeling good (or to relieve oneself of the guilt of not performing such acts of guilt in general), the point remains that one has still performed an act to help another whether or not one has derived pleasure (or pain) thereby.<sup>8</sup> If it were in one's nature to be benevolent, then it is consistent that one should feel content when one fulfills one's nature, it would be painful to commit benevolent acts only if such acts were contrary to one's fundamental nature.

It has been objected that the example of Mencius is flawed, because it is merely a reflection of empirical culture rather than nature. How can

one know that the reaction is or is not culturally acquired? Nazis seeing Jewish infants falling into wells might react entirely differently.

In defense of Mencius, it may be said that the reaction to save the child, whether or not culturally taught, is congruent with original human nature. If, in some cultures, the reaction of culture is identical to the reaction of nature, it may be said that that culture is congruent with original human nature. If, in some cultures, the reaction is different from that of nature, it can be said that this is a case where a culture is incongruent with human nature. The example of Mencius may or may not be supportive of how all people will empirically feel, but most of all it is supportive of how human nature's first reaction from the biological standpoint is for the preservation of its own species. The special case of Nazi Germany can be argued to be nonetheless guided by some notion, however distorted, of the preservation of the species. The case of the Nazi is a clear case where the hatred of a group acts to extirpate that threat (real or imagined) to its survival.

What is important to realize is that neither hatred nor fear are ontological realities in their own right; both hatred and fear are parasitic upon love. When survival is assured, fear disappears. Fear only arises when there is a threat to the object of love. Fear has no existence in its own right. Its status is derivative and ontologically dependent. Fear cannot exist unless there is that which is loved. Fear is dependent upon the existence of love for its own existence.

Love, on the other hand, does not require fear for its existence. It is perfectly capable of existing without any dependence upon fear. Love is the primary reality because the species must care for itself, if it is to exist at all. It is the same case with hate and all the other emotions derivative from love. Hatred can only exist so long as there is an object of love which is threatened. When there is no frustration to love, hatred has no existence. Its only existence is as a derivative existence to love, when love is denied. It has no positive existence in its own right. Love, on the other hand, does not require the existence of hate for its own reality. It is perfectly capable of existing in the absence of hatred. Hatred and fear

cannot exist except in the absence of love, since hatred and fear are simply forms of species self-love or individual self-love denied.

### *Social Evolution*

In closing, it may not be amiss to say a word about the "progress" in social evolution. In bio-evolutionary-social theory, however sophisticated mankind becomes, social changes must in turn serve primary biological drives.<sup>9</sup> At this moment or at this stage in social evolution, man runs the serious risk of species destruction in the short run with his supreme weapon of fear, the nuclear warhead, or in the long run with the by-products of greed derived from fear: environmental pollution and its effects on the planet. The lesson of social evolution is that fear, greed and conflict have led humanity to the brink of destruction in a game of species survival brinksmanship.

If man continues to operate out of derivative emotional responses of fear or hatred, the prognosis for species preservation is not good. What is important is the capacity to trust in human nature, and this is not possible if one subscribes to the belief system that human nature is malicious. It is interesting to speculate whether it is simply due to pure coincidence that the nations which first developed the supreme weapon are also those nations that share this belief system.

It has been the intention of this paper to provide some bio-socio-evolutionary deductions, in particular the bio-psychological derivation of emotions, to suggest that original human nature is devoid of malice. Human nature is to be socially harmonious. It is more important today, than ever before, to take notice of this great insight of Chinese philosophy, that man is not anti-social by nature.<sup>10</sup> Social harmony is a pre-requisite to species survival. Chinese philosophy can pave the way for social cooperation if all the nations of the world can take advantage of its rich and continuous insight into the original goodness of human nature.

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## NOTES

1. Mencius, VI A:1. Wing-tsit Chan's translation in Wm. Theodore de Bary, Ed., *Sources of Chinese Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 102
2. Cf., Robert E. Allinson, "An Overview of the Chinese Mind," in *Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots*, (New York: Oxford University Press 1995, Sixth Printing), pp. 1-40. Cf., also Chung-ying Cheng "Chinese Philosophy: a characterization," in Arne Naess and Alastair Hannay (eds.), *Invitation to Chinese Philosophy*, (Oslo: Scandinavian University Books, 1972), p. 148 *et passim*. While Professor Cheng has specific reference to the Confucian tradition in his statements regarding the inherent goodness of human nature, he also seems to refer to the concept of the goodness of human nature when characterizing Chinese philosophy as a whole. At the very least, it can be asserted that this emphasis on the goodness of human nature is a unique feature of the mainstream of Chinese philosophy. The classifier "inherent" is preferable to "innate". While "innate" could conceivably include disposition in a broad sense, *inherent*, is more unambiguous in its meaning. "Inherent" can be understood to stand for that which inheres as a fixed quality, without which the organism would not and could not be what it is. Thus, a disposition to respond aggressively might be innate without being inherent (even if one take aggression as non-malign). Cf., Webster's 2nd Ed.: def. 2 for Inherent: "Involved in the constitution or essential character of anything...inalienable" ...(thus it cannot be taken away). In addition, "inherent" is intrinsically more suitable as a philosophical term since "innate" might also carry certain physiological associations. The view of inherent goodness also goes further than such contemporary viewpoints as those advocated by Montagu, Fromm, *et. al.* Montagu thinks that aggression is a matter of individual variation whereas Fromm allows for non-malignant aggression. Cf. Ashley Montagu, *The Nature of Human Aggression* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 9-11 *et passim* and Erich Fromm, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973). From the perspective of this volume, neither author goes far

enough. In part this is due to their acceptance on some level of the good/evil dichotomy in man in part, it is due to the lack of a psycho-biological etiology of the emotions. Both assume along with their arch-antagonist Lorenz that aggression albeit benign, is a core drive of the human species.

3. Spinoza also reaches a similar conclusion: "Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persevere in its being." (Prop. VI) and "The effort by which each thing endeavors to persevere in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself." (Prop. VII), Part III, "On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions," *Ethics*.
4. Cf., Peter Singer, *The Expanding Circle, Ethics and Sociobiology*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 5. The existence of altruistic behavior in non-human animals is well documented. Singer comments on the behavior of elephants who will attempt to raise a fallen fellow elephant to his feet since an elephant will suffocate under its own weight or may overheat in the sun and dolphins which will group under a wounded dolphin to push it upward into the air, for several hours, if necessary. *Ibid.*, p. 7. The concept of evolutionary ethics is not in keeping with Darwin's theory of natural selection based on blind forces selecting some random mutations rather than others. *Ibid.*, p. 61. The concept of evolutionary ethics advanced here is that human beings can play an active role in guiding the process. Peter Dawkins argues in *The Selfish Gene* that even altruistic seeming behavior is due to the selfish interest of the gene to promote its own survival. However, this argument is unconvincing since it makes no sense that a gene would manufacture such a complex evolutionary structure as a complete being merely to enhance its own survival prospects since surely a simpler being which contained the genetic code in a reproductive amoebic form would serve that purpose well enough. From an Aristotelian point of view, the entity would be defined in any case from its most mature form of existence (as a tree in its full form is considered to be a tree and a seed is defined in terms of its being a potential tree and not vice-versa). In any event, such an argument appears moot since whether one takes the gene or the individual to be the ultimate arbiter of existence, the result is the same. And from the point of view being advanced here, human beings in their mature form can and should play a role in evolution regardless

of whether this is supposedly being programmed by one's genes. However, even if one analyzes Dawkins' argument on its own terms, the arguments which he advances for his conclusion are insufficient. In addition to the fact that the entire thesis is purely speculative, the particular arguments that he advances are capable of further analysis. For example, in his examination of bird warning calls as purely selfish since thereby a bird can gain the protective cover of the flock, Dawkins seems to rule out the possibility that an act can be both self and species interested simultaneously in the very sense that is being advanced in the present treatment. Cf., Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, (new edition), Oxford Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 169-170.

5. Collingwood, on the other hand, can find no genuine state to which hatred refers. He does, however, acknowledge that fear develops out of love although his argument is far different from the one offered here. For instance, he derives love from hunger, rather than the other way around. His argument suffers from not having considered the overall biological purpose of the emotions. However, one should read Part I. of his *New Leviathan* for it contains such of value though his purpose is different from the present one. Cf., *The New Leviathan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 54-71. There is a growing body of literature on the subject of emotions. However, it appears to suffer from the absence of a deductive hierarchy of the derivative emotions which originate from the master emotion of self-love, the failure to distinguish between ontological states of the emotions, the inability to perceive emotions as part of an emotional continuum and from phenomenological obtuseness, and, with the special exception of Plutchik, a separation of emotions from biology. To choose two problematic examples from Ortony and Turner's article, "What's Basic about Basic Emotions," the authors argue that fear is a component of distress because "...if a person swimming in shark-infested waters fears an attack by sharks, then he or she will necessarily find that prospect distressing. This means that distress (as we have characterized it) is a component of fear (as we have characterized it), which in turn means that fear cannot be psychologically primitive..." (Cf., Andrew Ortony and Terrence Turner, "What's Basic about Basic Emotions?," *Psychological Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3, 1990, p. 325.) But being distressed about fear does

not mean that distress is a component of fear. The distress which arises is in reaction to the original feeling of fear and is in no way a component of the fear. The authors continue in the same vein when they state that "...frustration consists of a subset of the attributes of anger." (*Ibid.*, p. 327.) But frustration is not a logical sub-set of anger, it is both an incipient stage of the development of anger and can also arise as a result of the inability to express that anger which can then lead to a different feeling of anger over the consequent frustration. The authors state, however, that "...anger... we believe is formed by a process of specialization out of the more general emotion of frustration." (*Ibid.*, p. 329.) One does not phenomenologically begin with a general emotion and specialize from the general emotion. Fear, as it is argued above in this present work, while itself derivative from the inability of self-love to maintain its objects is prior to the expression of anger. The absence in the above authors of the proper deductive hierarchy of emotions may be a source of the ensuing confusion. The above authors at first shy away from considering certain emotions basic and when they do, the selection of which emotion is to be considered basic (as shown above) seems to go away. Ortony, Clore and Collins state that "...we are inclined to reject the idea that there is a set of 'basic' emotions such that they, together with their combinations account for all the emotions..." Cf., Andrew Ortony, Gerald L. Clore and Allan Collins, *The Cognitive Structure of Emotions*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 25 but, "While we eschew the notion of basic emotions, we do treat some emotions as more basic than others, and we do have a compounding hypothesis for certain emotional states." *Ibid.*, p. 28. For an approach more compatible with the present one, Cf., R. Plutchik, *The emotions: Facts, theories, and a new model*, New York: Random House 1962.

6. Hsün Tzu, 23: "Human Nature is Evil." Wing-tsit Chan, *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, p. 118. Antonio S. Cua argues that Hsün Tzu should not be taken strictly at his word and that he does not really mean that human nature is evil but only that if its neutral self interest leads to strife, then the consequences are morally evil. This argument, while it softens the position of Hsün Tzu and does take his real concern into account, is not Hsün Tzu's own

account but that of Antonio Cua as Hsün Tzu in no place advances such an argument which would make his view of human nature identical to Kao Tzu, which it is not. In any event, Cua's revision of Hsün Tzu does not affect the central point of his argument which is that human beings are born with envy and hate. It is here that Hsün Tzu is wrong as is argued above. Why human beings are branded evil (in terms of nature or in terms of the consequence of that nature) is of no particular significance to the issues advanced here. For Cua's construction of Hsün Tzu, one may be referred to A. S. Cua, "The conceptual aspect of Hsün Tzu's philosophy of human nature," *Philosophy East and West*, 27, no. 4, October 1977, pp. 377, 383, "The quasi-empirical aspect of Hsün-Tzu's philosophy of human nature," *Philosophy East and West*, 28, no. 1, January 1978, pp. 3, 9, 10. There is some biochemical evidence to support the position that reactions that lead to strife are not even biochemically part of the make up of the original organism, but require a distinct biochemical alteration. The organism, while unthreatened (and thus unfeared), would not be prone to violence. Violent acts against another would not be part of the original nature but only part of a disturbed nature. According to Durden-Smith and de Simone:

The limbic system is said to control emotion and what, as we've said, scientists fondly call "the four F's": feeding, fleeing, fighting and sex. And it directs the body's immediate responses to challenge and danger. When a source of danger is recognized... the hypothalamus bids up from the pituitary...a hormone which speeds through the circulation to the adrenal glands with a message to produce cortisol and adrenalin (now usually called ephinephrine). These two substances in turn travel through the circulation to the brain and various organs. They arouse the brain and prepare it for fight or flight.

Cf., Jo Durden-Smith and Diane de Simone, *Sex and the Brain* (London: Pan Books, 1983), pp. 116-117.

What is suggested in the argument of bio-socio-evolution is that human beings, as advanced social beings, have it in their power to socially remove the fear stimuli. Consequently, the violence response need not ever occur. This is

one aspect of the term "bio-socio-evolution" whereby social evolution can turn around and influence biology.

7. Mencius, II A:6. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
8. This is a view put forth by Erik Erikson in his explanation of Gandhi's altruism as a means of expiating unconscious guilt. *Cf.*, *Gandhi's Truth on the Origins of Militant Nonviolence*, 1969. One could go further, however, and argue that even if one were expiating guilt feelings (whether conscious or unconscious ones) that this too could be one of nature's devices for prompting ethical action. If a desired and desirable outcome is produced, then even if guilt feelings were one of nature's *upaya* or skillful means, then there is no need to form a pessimistic view of human nature – e.g., that one is performing good acts for purely selfish reasons. The 'purely selfish' reasons could simply be a ruse for good action – are there then "purely selfish" reasons?
9. This view should be distinguished from the general outlook expressed by those who have identified themselves as socio-biologists. E.O. Wilson, as a prime example, seems to interpret biological drives as somehow in conflict with higher evolutionary ideals and approaches such as social altruism. Consider, Wilson's caricature of saints in general: "Sainthood is not so much the hypertrophy of human altruism as its ossification. It is cheerfully subordinate to the biological imperatives above which it is supposed to rise." *Cf.*, E.O. Willson, *Sociobiology: On Human Nature* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978) p. 166. Michael Ruse in his essay, "Morality of the Gene" quotes this passage from Wilson as indicative of his point of view in general in which such a figure as Mother Teresa would arise in society in conflict with the biological drive towards survival. [*Cf.*, Michael Ruse, "Morality of the Gene," *The Monist* (Vol. 67:2, April, 1984), p. 172]. The problem with the socio-biologists, as distinct from the bio-socio-evolutionary model which is proposed herein, is that biology is seen as a model for human behavior without taking into account its modification, in fact its realization, in social evolution. While Wilson is of course an extreme example of this type of thinking, on the other hand, the consideration of biology abstracted from social evolution seems to be fairly characteristic of this group as a whole. This understanding of biology

would appear to exempt the brain and/or the mind whereby the species could become aware and in fact must become aware of more effective modes of species survival if it is to survive at all.

10. Chung-ying Cheng, "Chinese Philosophy: A Characterization," *Invitation to Chinese Philosophy*, p. 163, *et passim*. While nowhere herein does Professor Cheng explicitly state that it is an insight of Chinese philosophy that man is not anti-social by nature, it seems that he would consider social harmony to be a sub-set of harmony in general. Wing-tsit Chan also seems to express this view: "...the foundation of the Confucian system lies in the moral realm, that is, in human experience itself. The thread is also generally taken to be identical with the Confucian doctrine of central harmony (*chung yung*, Golden Mean). Indeed, this doctrine is of supreme importance in Chinese philosophy; it is not only the backbone of Confucianism, both ancient and modern, but also of Chinese philosophy as a whole. Confucius said that 'to be central (*chung*) [with all]' is the supreme-attainment in our moral life. This seems to suggest that Confucius had as the basis of his ethics something psychological or metaphysical." *Cf.*, Wing-tsit Chan, "The Story of Chinese Philosophy," in Charles A. Moore (ed.), *The Chinese Mind, Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, University of Hawaii Press, 1967), p. 35. *Cf.*, also Robert E. Allinson, "The Confucian Golden Rule: A Negative Formulation," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. 12, No. 3, September 1985, pp. 304-315.