Husserl’s Phenomenologization of Hume
Reflections on Husserl’s Method of Epoché

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Historically speaking, it is not entirely clear where the roots of Husserl’s method lie buried. In this essay I argue that at least in part, Husserl’s method grew out of a conscious attempt to avoid the logical absurdi-
ties that plague Hume’s epistemology. In fact, in this limited respect, we may say that Hume opened the door to phenomenology but as a sacrificial lamb; Hume was well aware of his self-defeating position, and, perhaps in some respects, the need for an alternative.

To show that this is the case, I have divided my essay into three parts. In the first, I canvass two of Husserl’s more important critiques of Hume in the Logical Investigations. In the second, I remind the reader that ironically, Hume’s mistakes secured him a particularly pivotal role in the history of phenomenology. Finally, in the third section, I show how these mistakes may have incited Husserl’s discovery of the epoché, and thus, transcendental phenomenology.

Criticism of Hume: The Logical Investigations

In the Logical Investigations (1901), Husserl launches a crippling attack on psychologi-

cal empiricism which in places, is shouldered by Hume. Yet Husserl’s criticism does not concern itself with the vast range of detail that we see presented in Hume’s complete body of work. Rather, Husserl focuses on two central problems in the Treatise: 1) Hume egregiously misinterprets the nature of generalities; 2) Moreover, Hume’s entire project is circular.

Husserl’s most extensive discussion of Hume may be found in Investigation II. Chapter 5, Phenomenological Study of Hume’s Theory of Abstraction. Here, he presents a fairly detailed account of the obstacles inherent in Hume’s theory of abstraction, or put another way, Hume’s conception of generality.

Husserl begins by reminding us that Hume thought that one could never have an idea, much less an impression of an abstract or general notion; according to Hume, there are no such things as “general impressions” or “general ideas.” Rather, the Scotsman claimed, particular ideas somehow “represented” general “notions.” For instance, if we should happen to think of triangles in general, we do so by bringing a particular idea of a triangle to mind which we then associate with a list of other (remembered) particular triangles. Subsequently, we “annex” a “general notion” to the particular triangle that was initially brought to mind (see T, 17–25). Along these lines, Husserl cites Hume: “Abstract ideas are therefore in themselves individual, however they may become general in their representation. The image in the mind is only that of a particular object; though the application of it in our reasoning be the same as if it were universal” (T, I, VII). However, Husserl claims that if we nonetheless speak of general ideas, ideas belonging to general names as their meanings or meaning-fulfillments, something must be added to our concrete images to create such generality of meaning. This added element—so the discussion should properly have continued—cannot consist in new concrete ideas, and therefore not in the ideas or names: a conglomeration of concrete images can do more than present

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

SPEP SUPPLEMENT 2001
just those objects whose images it contains. (LI, 403)

In other words, as noted above, Hume’s solution to the problem of abstraction appeals to what we may identify in contemporaray terminology as extensional definitions. For as noted, according to Hume, a “triangle in general” is defined by a set or a list of particular triangles, where that set is as complete as the memory is good (see T, 22–24). Yet Husserl’s remarks cited above amount to the complaint that an extensional set will remain an extensional set without some other “added element”: “a conglomeration of concrete images can do more than present just those objects whose images it contains.” For, the question is, how could a particular triangle ever represent a general triangle with an appeal to more particular triangles (namely, an extensional set)? What is needed then, is an intensional definition that need not be instantiated in a concrete image; a general meaning is the requisite “added element.” However, according to Hume we do not have impressions of general meanings (nor particular meanings, for that matter). Further, given his first principle in the science of human nature (T, 7), human beings possess no ideas that are not rooted in impressions. Thus, it must follow that we have no ideas of meanings that are rooted in impressions either. As a result, if Hume had endorsed the existence of intensional definitions—of meanings, both particular and general—to what could he have appealed? Perhaps the imagination (T, 187–218), but this is not the solution that Husserl presents here. Rather, he writes, it is a “manner of consciousness, the manner of our intention, that makes the difference. A new type of reference makes its appearance, in which we neither mean the intuitively apparent object as such, nor the object of our verbal idea, nor that of our accompanying thing-idea, but the quality or form exemplified in the latter, which we understand in general fashion as a unity in the sense of a species.” (LI, 104). In other words, to account for generalities, if not meanings in general, “a new type of reference” must take the stage. As such, this reference, which is a way of thinking about the object or objects in question, is introduced; it is a “manner of intention” that takes us beyond extensiality, and thus, provides for intensionality. Or, put another way: Husserlian intentionality accommodates intensionality. Relatedly, Husserl remarks: “‘Representation’ must in some manner be reduced to something seizable. This is what a genetic-psychological analysis must achieve: it must show how, in our judgments, we come to apply the mere individual image that we experience, ‘beyond its own nature,’ and ‘as if it were general’” (LI, 404). That is, as noted above, Hume wants to have his cake and eat it too: ideas must remain particular on the one hand, yet on the other hand, mysteriously act “as if [they] were general.” Yet according to Husserl, an extensional set acting “as if” it is intensional, either is intensional, and thus, invokes a “mode of consciousness act[ing] in the sense of intenional experiences” or its acting is in vain—it literally has no meaning (intension).

Hume however, misses this point entirely—he is trapped in the empiricist emphasis on particulars, and concomitantly, the associationist theories needed to relate such particulars. As a result, Hume is a prisoner of a strictly extensional world; and thus Husserl writes: “Modes of consciousness, acts in the sense of intentional experiences, certainly cause discomfort to a psychology and epistemology of ‘ideas,’ which aims at reducing everything to ‘impressions’ (sensations), and associative concatenations of ‘ideas’ (images, the enfeebled shadows of ‘impressions’)” (LI, 404).

This glaring problem undoubtedly helped to push any portion of a foot Husserl may have had in Hume’s extensional world into the intensional, and subsequently, intensional realm of consciousness. In fact, along these lines, Husserl writes:

HUSSERL AND HUME

29

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we do not contradict ourselves if, on the one hand, we say Hume's treatment of abstraction was an extreme case of error, and yet vindicate for it the glory of having shown the way to a psychological theory of abstraction. It is an extreme case of error from the angle of logic and epistemology, for which it is important that experiences of knowing should be investigated in a purely phenomenological manner, that acts of thought should be treated as what they intrinsically are and contain in themselves, so that we may bring clearness to the fundamental concepts of knowledge. Hume's genetic analyses certainly cannot claim theoretical completeness and finality, since they lack a foundation in an adequate descriptive analysis. This does not, however, mean that they do not contain valuable trains of thought, which could not escape notice and have also had a fruitful effect. (LI, 406; emphasis added)

That is, it might be concluded that because Hume's account of generality was so wrong, Husserl had no alternative but to introduce a phenomenological approach; particularly, intentionality. To strengthen this conclusion, note that Husserl makes a similar point some ten years later in his essay "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" (1911):

Had [Hume's] sensualism not blinded him to the whole sphere of intentionality, of "consciousness of," had he grasped it in an investigation of essence, he would not have become the great skeptic, but instead, the founder of a truly "positive" theory of reason. All the problems that move him so passionately in the Treatise and drive him from confusion to confusion, problems that because of his attitude, he can in no wise formulate suitably and purely—all these problems belong entirely to the area dominated by phenomenology. (PRS, 113–14)

Given what we have seen, we may interpret this remark to read: If Hume had not been cornered into his extensional framework as a result of his "sensualism" (empiricism), he would have realized that there must be meanings (intensional definitions) and concomitantly, a "whole sphere of intentionality, of 'consciousness of.'" Recognizing as much, Husserl asserts, would have rescued Hume from his skepticism, a topic to which we now turn.

Husserl uncovers a still more troubling aspect of Hume's philosophy in the opening sections of the Logical Investigations: the circularity of his method. However, this circularity is not particularly sophisticated—in fact, perhaps in acknowledgment of its obviousness, Husserl formulates his discussion under the title: "On Certain Basic Defects of Empiricism." Here, Husserl points out that empiricism engages in the same self-defeating circularity that extreme skepticism does: "Extreme empiricism is as absurd a theory of knowledge as extreme skepticism. It destroys the possibility of the rational justification of mediate knowledge, and so destroys its own possibility as a scientifically proven theory" (LI, 115). In other words, the extreme empiricist cannot justify her own method. This is the case because the method itself is empirical, based on acquired, mediate knowledge. However, such mediate knowledge is not rationally justifiable, since the extreme empiricist contends that no piece of knowledge (including mathematics) is rationally justifiable, much less absolutely necessary. Thus, the conclusions that the empiricist comes to about empiricism are not justifiable, "and so destroys the possibility of a scientifically proven theory." Moreover, the manner in which the extreme empiricist's method is undermined is similar to the way in which the extreme skeptic must face her own tribunal: Is her foundational premise, "There is no truth" true or false? If it is true, then she has contradicted herself, shamefully or not. If it is false, then she has made
no claim whatsoever. And thus, Husserl assimilates this absurdity with the absurdity of the extreme empiricist.

Accordingly, Husserl continues: “Plainly, therefore, the demand for a fundamental justification of all mediate knowledge can only have a sense if we can both see and know certain ultimate principles on which all proof in the last instance rests” (LI, 116). In other words, Husserl takes the absurdity of the extreme empiricist’s approach as evidence for the existence of ultimate principles—principles that do not demand justification, and thus, do not invoke circularity or infinite regress.

Hume’s empiricism, Husserl continues, fares no better, although it is “moderate” in the respect that Hume does allow for a set of rationally justified instances of knowledge, namely, “demonstrative knowledge” (see at least T, 31, 42, 166). Husserl remarks:

it goes no better with Hume’s moderate empiricism, which, despite bouts of psycholgistic confusion, still tries to keep for the pure spheres of logic and mathematics, an a priori justification, and only surrenders the factual sciences to experience. Such an epistemological standpoint can likewise be shown up as untenable, even absurd, for a reason similar to that brought by us against extreme empiricism. Mediate judgments of fact—we may compress the sense of Hume’s theory into this phrase—never permit of rational justification, only of psychological explanation. (LI, 117)

Thus, Hume falls prey to the same circle that plagues extreme skepticism—Hume does not claim that his method is built on demonstrative knowledge, and thus, his method is not rationally justified. Rather, Husserl clearly admits that his method is based on “experience” (see at least T, Introduction), and thus, on empirically comprised, and concomitantly, psychologically dictated “matters of fact.” As a result, Hume’s very method, as well as its conclusions, could be “imagined as otherwise;” recall that any “matter of fact” is based on the relation of causation, which Hume famously deflated into a function of non-necessary habituation (see T, Book I, Part III). Accordingly, Husserl remarks:

One need then but ask how this applies to the rational justification of the psychological judgments (about custom, association of ideas, etc.) on which the theory itself rests, and the factual arguments that it itself employs. One then at once sees the self-evident conflict between the sense of the proposition that the theory seeks to prove, and the sense of the deductions that it employs to prove it. The psychological premises of the theory are themselves mediate judgments of fact, and therefore lack all rational justification in the sense of the thesis to be established. In other words: the correctness of the theory presupposes the irrationality of its premises, the correctness of the premises the irrationality of the theory (or thesis). (Hume’s doctrine is on this showing also a skeptical one). (LI, 117; first emphasis added).

In short then, Hume uses unjustified psychological premises to justify the claim that matters of fact are merely unjustified psychological claims. In this respect, it appears that Hume is nothing short of a self-abusing skeptic; he must not only question his results, but the very manner in which he questions those results.

Why Hume Stands Apart From Other Psychological Empiricists
Moving Beyond the Logical Investigations

Yet ironically, Husserl concedes elsewhere that Hume’s skepticism, although absurd, elevates him above other psychological empiricists, including Locke and Berkeley. This is the case for two powerful reasons: 1)

HUSSELR AND HUME
Not only was Hume painfully aware of his theoretical predicament, he was fully cognizant of the devastating consequences it had for all of natural science—Hume not only sank his own ship, but in his somewhat maliciously obscured manner, took the whole empirical-psychological fleet down with him. Note one of Hume’s disparaging remarks to this effect:

We have . . . no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all. For my part, I know not what ought to be done. . . . The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another. Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I count, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have I any influence, or who have influence on me? I am confused with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d of the use of every member and faculty (T, 269)

2) The very circularity of Hume’s position drove him to a position of ontological indifference, or write large: spatio-temporal indifference, leading him to make conclusions such as: “‘tis in vain to ask, whether there be body or not” (T, 187). In this respect, Hume was much more of a Pyrrhonian skeptic than an academic skeptic, a point that does not seemed to have been missed when it came time for Husserl to formulate his method of epoché. As a result, we will save our discussion of (2) for the next section, where Husserl’s epoché is directly addressed.

As for (1), we find evidence for Husserl’s praise of the consequences of Hume’s skepticism in at least The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (written in 1934–37); particularly, §24 The Genuine Philosophical Motif hidden in the absurdity of Hume’s skepticism: the shaking of objectivism. Here, Husserl writes:

Why does Hume’s Treatise . . . represent such a great historical event? What happened there? The Cartesian radicalism of presuppositionlessness, with the goal of tracing genuine scientific knowledge back to the ultimate sources of validity and of grounding it absolutely upon them, required reflections directed toward the subject, required the regression to the knowing ego in his immanence. No matter how little one may have approved of Descartes’s epistemological procedure, one could no longer escape the necessity of this requirement. But was it possible to improve upon Descartes’s procedure? (C, 89)

That is, yes, Hume presents a form of skepticism, but how, Husserl asks, could it improve on the radical clearing-away that Descartes presents, with “the goal of tracing genuine scientific knowledge back to the ultimate sources of validity?” To answer his own question, Husserl continues:

But now, could the ‘idealism’ of Berkeley and Hume, and finally skepticism with all its absurdity, be avoided? What a paradox! Nothing could cripple the peculiar force of the rapidly growing and, in their own accomplishments, unassailable exact sciences or the belief in their truth. And yet, as soon as one took into account that they are the accomplishments of the consciousness of knowing subjects, their self-evidence and clarity were transformed into incomprehensible absurdity. (C, 89)

That is, despite what appeared to be the permanent entrenchment of the naturalistic method, both Berkeley and Hume successfully showed that scientific theory is itself an
accomplishment "of the consciousness of knowing subjects," and thus, according to scientific standards themselves, science is not "self-evident" and "clear." Rather, as noted earlier, according to Hume, scientific theory—as a result of being based on experience, and subsequently, on the relation of causality—could be "imagined as otherwise." According to this perspective, the fleet was sunk.  

Thus, Husserl continues:

No offense was taken if, in Descartes, immanent sensibility engendered pictures of the world; but in Berkeley this sensibility engendered the world of bodies itself; and in Hume the entire soul, with its 'impressions' and 'ideas,' the forces belonging to it, conceived of by analogy to physical forces, its laws of association (as parallels to the law of gravity!) engendered the whole world, the world itself; not something like a picture—though to be sure, this product was merely a fiction, a representation put together inwardly which was actually quite vague. And this true of the world of the rational sciences as well as that experientia vaga. (C, 89–90)

That is, unlike Descartes and Berkeley, Hume's skepticism was genuinely radical—the entire world, including the self that examined the world, had been called into question. Hume, as Husserl sees it, removed the final obstacles to achieving a truly presuppositionless beginning. Moreover, not only did he undermine the very naturalistic method that he employed, but evidently, so-called objective knowledge as well, namely, "demonstrative knowledge." This is the case because its theoretical existence fell out of the very method of empirical inquiry that Hume had circuitously undermined; Hume had "discovered" the existence of allegedly infallible demonstrative knowledge by way of fallible experience. Thus, Husserl may conclude:

Through Berkeley's and Hume's revival and radicalization of the Cartesian fundamental problem, "dogmatic" objectivism was, from the point of view of our critical presentation, shaken to the foundations. This was true not only of the mathematizing objectivism, so inspiring to the people of the time, which actually ascribed to the world itself a mathematical-rational in-itself (which we copy, so to speak, better and better in our more or less perfect theories); it was also true of the general objectivism which had been dominant for millennia. (C, 90)

As a result of Hume's almost desperate position, Husserl is led to make remarks such as we find in First Philosophy (1923–24):

Humean psychology is the first systematic endeavor of the science of the pure givenness of consciousness; I would say it is the endeavor of a pure egology if Hume would not have presented the ego as a mere fiction ...[Hume's philosophy] is the first systematic and universal draft of the concrete constitutive problematic, the first concrete and purely immanent theory of cognition. We may even say that Hume's Treatise is the first draft of a pure phenomenology. (EP, 156)

That is, as noted, Hume decisively and consciously showed—albeit in a self-defeating manner—that we could not effectively account for scientific theory by way of employing scientific theory. Rather, scientific method is deeply rooted in our psychology. But, proceeding a level deeper into the circle, Hume shows that we cannot account for psychology using an empirical method; namely, we cannot study psychology by way of psychology. For as noted, this method can be "imagined as otherwise." Thus, Hume's acute skepticism did nothing short of pointing the way to a science of "pure consciousness" which did not and could not appeal to

HUSSERL AND HUME

33
scientific method, much less psychology. Instead, the study of pure consciousness is presupposed by the naturalistic method; this was the only way out of the self-defeating absurdity of Hume’s position; this is the “concrete constitutive problematic.” As a result, Husserl may conclude that “Hume’s Treatise is the first draft of a pure phenomenology;” it signaled the irrevocable demand for phenomenology.

**The Need for Intentionality and the Phenomenologization of Humean Indifference: The Epoché**

* A Shared Indifference

As suggested above, we find evidence for Husserl’s praise of Hume’s Pyrrhonian indifference in Husserl’s own method, namely, the epoché. Note for instance, a passage in *Ideas I* (1913): “I am not negating this ‘world’ as though I were a sophist; I am not doubting its factual being as though I were a skeptic; rather I am exercising the ‘phenomenological’ epoché which also completely shuts me off from any judgment about spatiotemporal factual being” (I, 61). That is, like Hume, Husserl’s method is not intended to incite academic skepticism, where the existence of the world and self are dogmatically doubted (namely, where one would make claims like: “There is no world, and there is no self; they are merely illusions”). Rather, like Hume’s method, Husserl’s epoché is a method of indifference, a suspension of belief, but not its universal negation. For keep in mind that the fallible nature of Hume’s very method prevented him from claiming anything with certainty, anything, regardless if concerned the assertion or the denial of his own identity or the nature of the world. Instead, at best, Hume could conclude that it is possible that our respective conceptions of self, as well as the world, are imagined (See T, 187–218). However, not even these theoretical conclusions are certain; in this respect, Hume, like Husserl, was “shut off from any judgment about spatiotemporal factual being.” Not surprisingly then, Hume closes Book I of the Treatise with the following paragraph:

Nor is it proper we should in general indulge our inclination in the most elaborate philosophical researches, notwithstanding our skeptical principles, but also that we should yield to that propensity, which inclines us to be positive and certain in particular points, according to the light, in which we survey them in any particular instant. ’Tis easier to forbear all examination and enquiry, then to check ourselves in so natural a propensity, and guard against that assurance, which always arises from an exact and full survey of the object. On such an occasion we are apt not only to forget our skepticism, but even our modesty too; and make use of items as these, ’tis evident, ’tis certain, ’tis undeniable; which a due deference to the public ought, perhaps to prevent. I may have fallen into this fault after the example of others; but I here enter a caveat against any objections, which may be offer’d on that head; and declare that such expressions were extorted from me by the present view of the object, and imply no dogmatical spirit, nor concealed idea of my own judgment, which are sentiments that I am sensible can become no body, and a skeptic still less than any other. (T, 274)

That is, Hume is fully aware that none of his claims are “certain,” “evident,” or “undeniable.” In fact, he adds at the very end of this passage, not even his skepticism is certain—it is born of the naturalistic method that he so effectively undermined. However, given human custom, it is easier to use words such as “certain,” “evident,” and “undeniable”—although disingenuously—then to persist in his somewhat painful Pyrrhonic indifference.

However, the similarity between Husserl’s and Hume’s method ends here, namely, in their shared indifference. For crucial to note, Husserl’s epoché is formulated

**PHILOSOPHY TODAY**

34
precisely to avoid the glaring circularity of Hume’s skepticism; it emerges from it, but is not to be identified with it.

Intensionality, intentionality and the Circularity of Method: Demands for a Solution

Recall from section 1 of this essay that Hume’s misconceptions regarding generalities showed that there must be a study of intentionality, and concomitantly, consciousness. However, as seen in section 2, this study cannot be carried out by way of psychology. Doing so, recall, would simply repeat the epistemological and logical weaknesses of Hume’s position. As a result, to carry out a study of intentionality, there must be another method available, but to find that method, we must somehow step outside of the naturalistic world—we must suspend it to access a method that cannot be doubted. According to Husserl, this means that the avenue to intentionality and relatedly, the realm of pure consciousness, must be by way of a non-naturalistic method. This avenue is an avenue of indifferenc, a suspension of belief in the world, namely the epoché. In this respect, Husserl must begin where Hume left off, in a state of acute indifference. Yet unlike Hume, Husserl’s epoché is intended to lead us to a “novel science,” namely, the science of phenomenology. Note:

the fully conscious effecting of that epoché will prove by itself to be the operation necessary to make ‘pure’ consciousness, and subsequently the whole phenomenological region, accessible to us. Precisely that makes it comprehensible why this region and the novel science correlated with it remained necessarily unknown: In the natural attitude nothing else but the natural world is seen. As long as the possibility of the phenomenological attitude had not been recognized, and the method for bringing about an originary seizing upon the objectivities that arise with that attitude had not been developed, the phenomenological world had to remain unknown, indeed, hardly even suspected. (II, lines 59–60).

Thus in short, Husserl’s act of indifference is a purifying act, formulated in an effort to take us beyond, if not “beneath” epistemological and logical circularity, while Hume’s indifference is a final result of such epistemological and logical circularity. In this very respect, the absurdity of Hume’s position, resulting in Hume’s skeptical indifference, may have incited Husserl’s discovery of the epoché, yet unlike Hume, he saw that it opened the door to pure consciousness.

In this broad respect, Husserl “phenomenologizes” Hume, offering a solution to Humean absurdities in a manner that the Scotsman could never have, given the fundamental premises of his empiricism; particularly, the idea that all information is founded on experience, not the suspension of belief (namely, the epoché), much less the object it leads to, namely, “pure consciousness.” As such, Husserl seems to have rescued Hume from his claim that:

if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should be esteemed a defect in the science of man, I venture to affirm, that ’tis a defect common to it with all the sciences, and all the arts, in which we can employ ourselves, whether they be such as cultivated in the schools of the philosophers, or practised in the shops of the meanest artisans. None of them can go beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not founded on that authority. (T, xviii; emphasis added)

HUSSERL AND HUME

35
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ENDNOTES

1. It should be noted that Husserl focuses on the Treatise because he did not take the Enquiry particularly seriously, remarking that it is a “badly watered down” version of the Treatise. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 88.

2. Or put another way, can I appropriately define, say “cat,” by running off a list of cats (namely, give an extensional definition), or must I convey the meaning of “cat” which would then allow me to compile my own list, if so desired (namely, should I provide an intensional definition)? In short then, intensional definitions consist of meanings, while extensional definitions consist of lists of particulars.

3. This is the case because many empiricists, including Hume, were atomists, namely, they embraced the idea that our initial information arrives in the form of particular, unrelated bits; recall William James’ “blooming buzzing confusion.” Further, it should be noted that at least Quine would champion Hume’s extensional account of meaning two centuries later. See, for instance W. V. O. Quine, From Stimulus in Science (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).

4. Quine could easily serve as an example of such an “extreme empiricist,” although he is obviously not who Husserl had in mind in 1901. See for instance, “The Two Dogmas of Empiricism” where, in the vernacular of a revolutionary, Quine makes this parallel clear. From A Logical Point of View (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 20–46.

5. This predicament has not been lost on more contemporary empiricists. Quine in fact, struggled with it his entire career. See for instance, his “Epistemology Naturalized”: “This interplay [between epistemology and natural science] is reminiscent again of the old threat of circularity, but is all right now that we have stopped dreaming of deducing science from sense data. We are after an understanding of science as an institution or process in the world, and we do not intend that understanding to be any better than the science which is its object. This attitude is indeed one that Neurath was already urging in Vienna Circle days, with his parable of the mariner who has to rebuild his boat while staying afloat on it.” Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 83–84.

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36

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