

thing given in advance, does the world prove to me not only that it does not belong to me alone but that I can never fully make it—any more than I can make my own life—my solitary possession. On this note, Dodd concludes, the body is ultimately for Husserl, as it was for Plato, something to be overcome.

This book is brimming with insights as it creatively and painstakingly reconstructs Husserl's developing ruminations on the body. While keenly attentive to the context and import of individual texts and their place in the Husserlian corpus, the author remains a critical student of them. The laudable economy of examining the phenomenon of the body as the key to the phenomenon of intersubjectivity provides a unifying framework (though more treatment of the intersection of these problems in chapters two through four might have produced an even richer and more coherent study). For anyone trying to develop a theory of corporeity and especially for those attempting to do so against the backdrop of Husserl's thinking, Dodd's work is invaluable.

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NOTES

1. Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991), §44.
2. James Dodd, *Idealism and Corporeity: An Essay on the Problem of the Body in Husserl's Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), p. 24; subsequent citations of this work will be given in parentheses.
3. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. F. Kersten (Boston: Kluwer, 1982), §149.
4. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Boston: Kluwer, 1989), §145.

Critique and Totality, by Pierre Kerszberg. Albany: SUNY Press, 1997, 274 pp.

As Pierre Kerszberg retraces Kant's critical account of the human being's confounded, if not tortured, attempts to grasp totality, the reader may occasionally lose sight of the general objectives of the book. In fact, my main criticism of the book concerns Kerszberg's somewhat cavalier approach to presenting a clear

structure of thought. Yet, regardless of the occasional confusion, *Critique and Totality* is rich with insight and fresh historical perspectives.

To draw the reader through the complex intellectual pilgrimage to totality, each of the seven chapters progressively addresses the central role that cosmology and, relatedly, the antinomies of pure reason play in Kant's philosophy—this aspect of the book is clear enough. Further, I think there can be little doubt regarding the centrality of the antinomies and cosmology in Kant's work; as a reminder, Kerszberg cites a particularly telling passage: "the antinomy of pure reason . . . that is what aroused me from my dogmatic slumber to the critique of reason itself, in order to resolve the ostensible contradiction of reason with itself" (p. 100).¹ As a result, although this book would prove extremely difficult for the beginning reader of Kant, the emphasis it places on the role of totality and the antinomies of pure reason may provide the keen student with an instructive general orientation.

Below, rather than criticizing or lauding Kerszberg's work, I will simply summarize what I take to be the main points of the book, leaving it up to the reader to make his/her own judgment.

In the opening chapter, "Totality, Finitude and Division," Kerszberg briefly explains the relationship between his book and

Heidegger's work on Kant. After explicating the cosmic concept of philosophy in Kant, Kerszberg sets out to follow and expand on Heidegger's claim that transcendental knowledge cannot ground the positive sciences. To set the stage for this illumination of Heideggerian thought, in the second chapter, "The Mathematical Dream of Philosophy," Kerszberg discusses some of the fundamental differences between mathematical and philosophical thought in the first *Critique*. In particular, Kerszberg draws our attention to two of the major outcomes of the *Transcendental Analytic*, the *Axioms of Intuition* and the *Anticipations of Perception* (A161-76/B202-18). From his consideration of these two outcomes, which comprise the "mathematical principles" of any rational thought, Kerszberg concludes that according to the first *Critique*, the natural world may not be transcendently reduced to anything more than the two fundamental forces of repulsion and attraction. Thus, by way of exclusion, Kant must conclude that the natural world may not be reduced to "origin" and/or "totality." Nor do the notions of origin and totality admit of scientific inquiry. Rather, they must be the objects of a speculative, transcendental inquiry. Yet, necessarily concomitant to this inquiry is a prolonged, if not somewhat labyrinthine, consideration of cosmology and the antinomies of pure reason—and so the

journey towards totality properly begins.

In the third chapter, "An Experiment with Concepts," Kerszberg defines three central notions: cosmological ideas, the Copernican revolution, and Kant's cosmological principle. The first, cosmological ideas, are "those transcendental ideas that refer to 'the absolute totality in the synthesis of appearances'" (p. 55; A407/B434). After having underscored the dependence of the cosmological ideas on the realm of appearances, Kerszberg argues that Kant's Copernican revolution, properly understood, falls out of the distinction between appearances and things in themselves. Generally put, the Copernican revolution follows because things in themselves act as hypothetical proxies, which, although they are not given in experience, help to explain our world. This is similar to the original Copernican turn: we hypothesize that the earth revolves around the sun, rather than vice versa. However, although this hypothesis is not grounded by what seems to be the case—namely, by appearances—its explanatory power is extensive. As such, Kant's Copernican revolution represents a problem for the faculty of reason simply because noumena belong to the realm of reason, not to that of experience.

With the explication of Kant's Copernican reversal in place, Kerszberg goes on to define Kant's

cosmological principle, which reflects a dynamic, albeit structured, picture of the universe as a whole. According to this principle, the world may be viewed as the totality of an infinite series of conditions given for appearances. However, the cosmological principle is not a principle of the understanding, because it is not subject to the limited world of experience. Nor is it a principle of reason, because it does not implore us to construct knowledge through various analogies to the world of experience. "Rather, the cosmological principle 'serves as a *rule* postulating what in the regress ought to happen from us, but *not anticipating* what is given *in the object* prior to all regress'" (p. 69; A509/B537; translation modified by Kerszberg). As such, Kerszberg explains, the cosmological principle must be understood as a combination of the faculty of reason and the faculty of understanding—it is a rule that may not anticipate. However, the cosmological principle necessarily incurs illusion, simply because reason lures us beyond the limits of experience, much as, Kant explains, our speculations about the movements of planetary orbits do (pp. 77-8; A667-73/B690-1).

In the fourth chapter, "Reversing the Order of Time," Kerszberg begins by pointing out that within the realm of the transcendental *a priori*, time may be suspended. As such, the imagination is free to run either backward

or forward through a given series of events. In doing so, the imagination must surrender a certain "givenness" of experience, namely, the forward motion of a sequence. In turn, all appearances may now be transcendently viewed as "unconditioned." Ultimately, the imagination reaches a certain "remotest point," namely, a beginning point in time. This constitutes the reversal of the order of time. After this beginning point has been reached, both transcendental thought and thought concerning appearances may proceed forward through the series. Yet as such, a certain overlap between these two kinds of thought is invoked, at which point it may be said that the "transcendental a priori . . . is forced to mix with being" (p. 89). Further consideration of this overlap takes us to the core of the antinomies of pure reason, for Kerszberg claims: "The arguments developed in the four antinomies are aimed at showing that the reconstruction of immediate experience remains incomplete even from an absolute origin [namely, the beginning point above]" (p. 89). In particular, the antinomies spotlight the inextricable confusion between the phenomena and the noumena, constituting a tragic "point of fracture between reason and the phenomenality of the world" (p. 91). In conjunction with this claim, Kerszberg then presents a detailed, historically informed argument to show that the first

antinomy is nothing more than a declaration of the uncertainty of the relation between the thing in itself and the object of experience.

In the fifth and longest chapter, "A Logic of Illusion," Kerszberg begins by reminding us that the notion of the world in its totality (namely, the world as a cosmological idea) may only be an idea of reason. This is the case because, while the totality of experience is limited, its limits may never be thought as such. As a result, the "world as totality of things is, in experience, an object without [thinkable] limit" (p. 114). Further, after the journey through the reversal of time and the first antinomy, it is clear that this distinction between the "world of sense" (phenomena) and the "world of the intellect" (noumena) has become hopelessly blurred. Yet precisely because the world of experience is part of the totality of things, we may not say that it disintegrates due to its indeterminate nature. Rather, Kerszberg explains, there is, according to Kant, a need for some kind of determination, namely, there must be a schema for this idea. All is not lost, however, since reason may hypothesize a schema for that to which no determinate object corresponds. This is done by an analogy with the world of experience, specifically, an analogy with the "relations between appearances" (p. 118). After an extensive discussion of this matter, Kerszberg ultimately con-

cludes that “the transcendental object is the unknowable x that I come up against when digging underneath the surface of a thing to understand it as an individual” (p. 124). After another lengthy discussion, Kerszberg explains that this transcendental object may be constituted by means of a regressive synthesis, as a “cosmic appearance of an appearance” (p. 150). Nevertheless, the idea of totality has no correlate in experience, and thus, the “critical solution” to the first antinomy is to adopt an empirical concept as the “standard of measure” for totality. Kerszberg concludes that this solution is not nihilistic, but instead, preparatory. In chapter six, “A Reversal of the Reversal,” we discover that for which this is preparatory. Here Kerszberg shifts to a discussion of the *Critique of Judgment*. In this work, Kant offers a potential reconciliation between philosophy (namely, reason and noumena) and experience (namely, “common understanding”). This reconciliation marks the beginning of moral philosophy, leading Kerszberg into a lengthy discussion of the principle of purposiveness, which helps to bring about the “reversal of the reversal.” As such, the focus is once again on the immediate world of phenomena. Generally put, this occurs by “extract[ing the principle of purposiveness] from already constituted physics and metaphysics, instead of being established in anticipation of any

such constitution” (p. 189). In the final, and shortest chapter, “Lost Illusions,” Kerszberg very briefly discusses concepts other than the cosmos, for these may rescue the critical enterprise from the “fragility” of the concept of purposiveness. Generally put, Kerszberg concludes that the “solution” lies in the human being, for the human being is a totality that may be grasped/represented with critical limits. As such, it is the “source of freedom and moral ends” (p. 228).

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1. Kerszberg is quoting Kant's letter to Christian Garve, 1798, in *Kants Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 10 (Berlin: Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1902-), p. 252. All of Kerszberg's citations from the *Critique of Pure Reason* are taken from the Norman Kemp Smith translation (London: Macmillan, 1929) and follow the standard 'A/B' format. References to the book under review will be given parenthetically; in those instances where Kerszberg cites Kant, I will also provide a reference to Kant following the above style. Likewise, my own citations of Kant will also follow the above format.