

be that his discourse on discourse, his meta-discourse, neither lends itself to, nor pretends to, the 'systematic development of politics'. Simmons is not unaware of these difficulties, but his language, the language of 'Levinas' politics', often betrays a forgetfulness, and with that the possibility of a more refined consideration, of them.

**Jeffrey Dudiak**

The King's University College

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Over a period of forty or more years, John Searle has covered a considerable amount of philosophical territory. This collection of eleven papers is one of the first 'comprehensive introduction[s] to John Searle's work' (i), including papers on speech acts, the intentionality of perception, consciousness, the Chinese Room Argument, and Searle's more recent views on social constructions, freedom and rationality. Neophyte readers will find the book highly accessible because it consists of clearly written papers introduced by Barry Smith's highly informative introductory paper. For those familiar with Searle's work, though many of the papers contain substantial exposition, explication, and defense, at least half of them contain sufficient critical or elaborative argumentation to be of significant interest. Given Searle's sizeable impact on analytic Philosophy, the book is a welcome introductory exploration of Searle's philosophical work.

Largely shaped by the seven years he spent at Oxford (1952-59) under the tutelage of Ryle, Strawson and, especially, Austin, Searle rejected the prevalent 1950's view that 'major philosophical problems' can be dissolved by linguistic analysis (1-2). In its stead, Smith tells us (2), Searle has developed a down-to-earth, realist approach to genuine philosophical problems, which, grounded on the correspondence theory of truth, rejects philosophical theories (e.g., linguistic behaviorism, eliminative materialism) by reduction to absurdity and attempts to 'build' a 'unified theory of mind, language, and society' from the knowledge of the various scientific disciplines.

Searle's career began, mainly, with work on speech acts (1962, 1965, 1969). Performative utterances, Austin told us, are actions that 'bring about some result' (5), and which may or may not be successful. Austin endeavoured to categorize and catalogue a large number of 'expressions' and 'actions', but

it was Searle who provided 'a theoretical framework' for unifying speech acts through 'rules [*regulative* and *constitutive*], meanings, and facts' (6). 'The central hypothesis of Searle's [1969 *Speech Acts* is that] speech acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with certain constitutive rules' (7).

In 'Intentions, Promises, and Obligations', Leo Zaibert claims that 'promises are the most important' speech act that Searle investigates, because, in promising, we 'create social reality by engaging in speech acts that give rise to obligations' (52-3). Zaibert argues that, despite Searle's famous 'How to Derive "Ought" from "Is"', Searle's system 'neglects the realm of morality', which is 'significant' because morality and moral obligations constitute a very important part of the world.

George P. Fletcher offers a further analysis of Searle's theory of speech acts by analyzing Searle's treatment of the 'counts as' relationship in connection with the law. Fletcher grants that this relationship 'presupposes the use of language', but, interestingly, he argues that it does not follow that 'brute facts exist prior to their description in a language' (87), for without language, a world of objects would lack 'differentiation' and hence would not constitute individuated (brute) facts. Unfortunately, this suggestion, reminiscent of problems with logical atomism, is not connected with logical atomism nor pursued to a terminus.

In 'Action', Joëlle Proust investigates Searle's unorthodox attempt in *Intentionality* (1983) to show how 'actions performed without a prior intention are still intentional' (102). Utilizing Searle's 'conditions of satisfaction' and 'direction of fit' notions, Proust explicates Searle's untraditional 'intention-in-action' and questions whether it can accommodate impulsive actions (106).

'Consciousness is central to John Searle's philosophy of mind,' Neil Manson argues in 'Consciousness', for, according to Searle, 'mind, meaning, and social reality depend upon consciousness' (128). According to Manson, Searle overcomes our philosophical problem with consciousness (a natural, *unproblematic* phenomenon) by offering a 'higher-level property' account of consciousness, which constitutes a foundation for 'his theory of intentionality, linguistic meaning, and social reality' (148) while avoiding dualism and various forms of reductionism (144-5).

Fred Dretske's 'The Intentionality of Perception' is undoubtedly the most critical paper in this collection. Dretske argues that Searle is mistaken in claiming that perceptual experiences have intentionality (i.e., intentional, 'self-referential content') and that 'nothing much works in the way Searle says it works,' since Searle's 'theory of experience' 'is the cornerstone of his theory of intentionality, mind, and language' (156). The crux of Dretske's disagreement with Searle lies in Searle's claim that 'all seeing is seeing *that*' (*Intentionality*, 1983, 40). Dretske rejects this claim, saying that '[o]ne can see, hear, or feel a yellow station wagon without knowing what a yellow station wagon is' (160). On Dretske's view, it is true that 'Bob sees Alice' even if 'Bob believes he sees Greta' — on Searle's view, 'Bob sees Alice' is false if 'Bob believes he sees Greta' is true. One wonders, contra Dretske, first,

whether one can see anything without seeing something *as* something (e.g., 'Freda sees something larger than a breadbox and smaller than an elephant moving over by the cottage, in the dark — but isn't sure what it is'), and, second, whether if 'Bob believes he sees Greta' is true, 'Bob sees Alice' is false, though 'Alice is the object that is causing Bob's visual experience' is true?

In 'The Limits of Expressibility', François Recanati examines Searle's rejection of the 'largely unquestioned' 'Determination View', which claims that 'meaning determines truth conditions' (189). According to Recanati, Searle rejects the Determination view because he rejects 'contextualism' in favour of the 'Principle of Expressibility', which states that 'the content of a speech act — what the speaker communicates and the hearer understands — cannot be equated with the content of the sentence uttered in performing that speech act' (193).

In Chapter 10, 'The Chinese Room Argument', Josef Moural explicates Searle's most famous argument, as Searle presented it in 1980 and more recently. Though Moural's explication is very clear at many junctures, he is mistaken in saying that '[t]he Chinese Room is intended by Searle primarily as a polemic device against the research program that he calls *strong Artificial Intelligence*' (221). Strong A.I. is a claim, not a research program, and Searle's aim is to refute this claim. Moural argues, without cogency, that the Systems Reply forces Searle to 'claim only "I implement the program and it is conceivable that no understanding occurs"' rather than 'no understanding occurs' (251).

The remaining three papers — Nick Fotion's 'From Speech Acts to Speech Activity', Brian O'Shaughnessy's 'Sense Data', and Kevin Mulligan's 'Searle, Derrida, and the Ends of Phenomenology' — offer, respectively, a sketch of one way in which Searle's theory of speech acts could be extended as a theory of speech *activity* (i.e., 'discourse', 'language-games'), one type of sense-datum theory that 'can handle objections of the kind John Searle makes to sense-datum theories generally' (171), and an exploration of Searle's criticisms of Continental Philosophy. Most noteworthy in these three papers are Mulligan's dual claims (Endnote #43) that 'the three most influential philosophers of the twentieth century' were 'Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Derrida' and that all three 'arrived at the view that what they were doing ... was not a part of philosophy' (285-6). The first claim is false if only because Russell must displace one of Heidegger or Derrida. The second claim is strange since Mulligan seems aware (286) that the later Wittgenstein viewed genuine Philosophy as a type of therapy.

*John Searle* offers us very interesting examinations of the work of one of the most important philosophers of the past fifty years. It will be up to the reader to decide, however, whether, as Smith claims, Searle's 'work represents a new way of doing philosophy' (29).

**Victor Rodych**

University of Lethbridge