

Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will*

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Abstract: Doxastic involuntarists have paid insufficient attention to two debates in contemporary epistemology: the permissivism debate and the debate over norms of assertion and belief. In combination, these debates highlight a conception of belief on which, if you find yourself in what I will call an ‘equipollent case’ with respect to some proposition p , there will be no reason why you can’t believe p at will. While doxastic involuntarism is virtually epistemological orthodoxy, nothing in the entire stock of objections to belief at will blocks this route to doxastic voluntarism. Against the backdrop of the permissivism debate and the literature on norms of belief and assertion, doxastic involuntarism emerges as an article of faith, not the obvious truth it’s usually purported to be.

We can regard assertion as the verbal counterpart of judgement and judgement as the occurrent form of belief. — Timothy Williamson (2000: 10)

1. Introduction

You’re walking across a meadow. There’s a brownish object in a distant tree, but you can’t tell what it is. Your daughter says it’s a bird and your son says it’s a big piece of trash—a plastic bag or something like that. This is New Jersey so there’s a real question here. You walk toward the object to see who’s right. As you get close it flies away. In this case—and countless more like it—you go by gradual improvements in your evidence from a situation where you are rationally required to suspend judgment on some proposition to a situation where (if skepticism is false) you are rationally required to believe that proposition. And as your evidential situation improves, your evidence provides less and less support to suspension of judgment, and more and more support to belief. According to a view suggested by Conee and Feldman (2004: 102), if your evidential situation improves sufficiently slowly in a case like this, there should be some point where your total evidence supports suspension and belief equally well while ruling out disbelief. Moreover, on this view, if your total evidence supports suspension and belief equally well while ruling out disbelief, suspension and belief will *both* be rationally permissible. Call situations where your total evidence supports suspension and belief equally well (if there are any) ‘permissive situations’. In this paper, I won’t argue that permissive situations are possible. I think they are, but I defend this conclusion elsewhere (Roerber MS). Instead, I will take it for granted that a person might *think* that permissive situations are possible, and even think that she is in one.¹

Permissive situations will be important to the arguments below, so let me pause to correct two mistakes. First, thinking that you’re in a permissive situation with respect to p doesn’t require thinking that your evidence for p isn’t very good. For example, it’s possible to think (a) that belief and suspension are both rationally permissible when it’s virtually certain but not *absolutely* certain

* Penultimate draft. Please cite final draft forthcoming in *Mind*.

¹ My assumption here isn’t about rational belief. Throughout, I will assume just that it’s *psychologically* possible for a person to think that she’s in a permissive situation.

that p is true and (b) that you're in a permissive situation with respect to p because it *is* virtually certain but not absolutely certain that p is true. Second, cases where your evidence supports p and $\neg p$ equally well are not (as many epistemologists mistakenly assume) the closest epistemological analogues of cases where your reasons support ϕ -ing and not ϕ -ing equally well.² Instead, permissive situations are the closest epistemological analogues of cases your reasons support ϕ -ing and not ϕ -ing equally well. After all, suspending on p is a way of not believing p , and, by the lights of most epistemologists, your evidence supports suspending on p *better* than it supports believing p when it supports p and $\neg p$ equally well (*i.e.*, when the probability of p conditional on your evidence is exactly 0.5).

Now, presumably, your estimate of your evidential situation with respect to p can affect whether you feel compelled to take a given doxastic attitude toward p . If you're like me and you think that your total evidence doesn't give you the slightest hint whether p is true, you'll find yourself compelled to suspend on p . And if you're like me, in a situation where your total evidence seems to establish without question that p *is* true, you'll find yourself compelled to believe p . But what if you think you're in a permissive situation? In this case, if you're like me, you won't find yourself compelled to believe p , and you won't find yourself compelled to suspend on p either. Instead, you'll simply find yourself unable to *dis*believe p . Of course, it's possible that you're not like me. But even so, this much seems uncontroversial: there are possible cases where a person thinks she's in a permissive situation with respect to p and she neither feels compelled to believe p nor feels compelled to suspend on p . Call these cases 'equipollent cases'. More specifically, let's stipulatively define 'equipollent cases' so that S is in one just in case (a) she thinks that she's in a permissive situation with respect to p , (b) she neither feels compelled to believe p nor feels compelled to suspend on p , and (c) she feels a stronger attraction toward each of believing p and suspending on p than she feels toward *dis*believing p .

Equipollent cases are psychologically possible, and, as I'll argue in this paper, they cause serious problems for doxastic involuntarism. By 'doxastic involuntarism', I mean the thesis that we never have direct voluntary control over our beliefs. More carefully, I mean the thesis that we never have direct voluntary control over our beliefs *because we can't believe at will*. What's the difference between direct voluntary control and belief at will? Different philosophers mean different things by these terms, but I will stipulatively define them as follows.

- (D1) S ϕ -d at will =_{df} S decided to ϕ and then carried out her intention to ϕ by ϕ -ing, in such a way that her intention to ϕ was directly causally responsible for her ϕ -ing.
- (D2) S had direct voluntary control over her ϕ -ing =_{df} S ϕ -d at will and her will was *free*, in the sense that she had control over whether she decided to ϕ in the first place.

On these stipulative definitions of 'at will' and 'direct voluntary control', having direct voluntary control over whether you ϕ entails that you can ϕ at will, but being able to ϕ at will doesn't require

² For example, Curley (1975: 198), Alston (1989: 266-7), and Peels (2014: 695) all seem to assume this.

having direct voluntary control over whether you ϕ .³ Why define ‘at will’ and ‘direct voluntary control’ this way? Because, as Steup points out (2017: 2674), the debate between voluntarists and involuntarists isn’t supposed to depend on the debate between libertarians, compatibilists, and hard determinists. The core idea behind involuntarism is supposed to be that, even if hard determinism is true and nobody has free will, belief and action are still importantly disanalogous in at least this sense: while it’s possible to perform various *actions* at will, it’s never possible to believe any proposition at will, at least for creatures like you and me. Properly understood, involuntarism is equivalent to this disanalogy thesis.

As Steup (2000), Booth (2007), Hieronymi (2009), Peels (2015), and many others point out, involuntarism is the reigning view. In fact, it’s so widely accepted that it’s standardly taken as a datum, and even epistemologists who would clearly benefit if it were *false* seem unwilling to question it.⁴ The literature contains widespread disagreement about *why* involuntarism is true, but little disagreement about *whether* it’s true. Indeed, the involuntarism debate is really more of an in-house debate about the best understanding of involuntarism than a debate between involuntarists and *voluntarists*. As Boyle observes, ‘[t]he explanation of the impossibility of believing at will, and the precise nature of this constraint, are matters of controversy, but that there is truth here that needs explaining is not terribly controversial’ (2009: 119-20).⁵

Yet this lack of controversy is remarkable. Involuntarism is a very strong thesis. It says that there is literally *no* case—not even a merely *possible* case—where someone with normal human cognitive capacities believes something at will (Reisner 2013, Peels 2015, *etc.*). It’s also counterintuitive. I don’t mean that *epistemologists* find involuntarism counterintuitive. Most of them don’t. But as Turri, Rose, and Buckwalter (2018) show, involuntarism is pretheoretically

³ When is an intention to ϕ *directly* causally responsible for your ϕ -ing? I can’t give necessary and sufficient conditions, but, for present purposes, we can simply note that your intention to ϕ isn’t what I’m calling ‘directly’ causally responsible for your ϕ -ing if you’re in anything relevantly analogous to Feldman’s (2001) light switch case or Davidson’s (2002) mountain climber case.

⁴ For example, in their book-length answer to the question how we should regulate our intellectual lives, Roberts and Wood state explicitly that they don’t want to even *suggest* that involuntarism is false (2007: 62-3). In their defense of the thesis that it’s possible to deliberate about what to believe, Shah and Velleman assert without argument that belief at will is ‘notoriously impossible’ (2005: 502) and then argue that people mistakenly think we can’t deliberate about what to believe because they think this follows from the fact that we can’t believe at will (p. 504). In a recent contribution to the disagreement debate, Elgin (2010) argues that much of the disagreement literature rests on a mistake because ‘[b]elief is not voluntary. ... My response [to a peer’s disagreeing with me] is not under my control. Debates about whether I should suspend belief in the face of peer disagreement are wrong headed. They are like debates about whether I should be less than six feet tall. I don’t have any choice’ (pp. 60-61). And to give one more example, Booth (2015) argues that it’s a contingent truth that we can’t believe at will by assuming that it’s a *truth* that we can’t believe at will and then arguing that it’s not a conceptual truth. Obviously, if it’s not already established that we can’t believe at will, this argument won’t convince anyone that it’s contingently *true* that we can’t believe at will.

⁵ In fact, it’s *so* uncontroversial that even some prominent cases of apparent controversy are really best construed as mere verbal disagreements. To give two examples, while Naylor (1985) explicitly describes herself as defending belief at will, and Ryan (2003) explicitly describes herself as rejecting doxastic involuntarism, Naylor bases her argument for belief at will on cases where *S*’s intention to believe *p* is not *directly* causally responsible for the formation of her belief in *p*, and Ryan bases her argument against involuntarism on cases where *S* believes *p* intentionally, but no intention is causally responsible for the formation of her belief in *p*. Since neither Naylor nor Ryan gives us a case of belief at will (as I’m using that term), I think it’s best to view both of them as *agreeing* with the view I’m calling ‘involuntarism’. So even here, there’s no clear controversy about the *content* of the view.

counterintuitive, in the sense that it's inconsistent with the intuitions of the folk. What's more, involuntarism threatens obvious truths about the relationship between belief and action. To quote from Audi, who is himself an involuntarist,

[b]elief is profoundly analogous to action. Both are commonly grounded in reasons; both are a basis for praising or blaming the subject; both are sensitive to changes in one's environment; both can appropriately be described as objects of decision and deliberation, and beliefs can appear quite action-like when conceived as formed by assent or by acceptance. These similarities can make it plausible to think of belief as sometimes (directly) voluntary in the sense that, like raising our hands, believing is sometimes done 'at will'. (2015: 27)

Right! So why are most epistemologists involuntarists? Given all this, involuntarists surely have the burden of proof, and behind the widespread acceptance of involuntarism, we should expect to find knock-down, drag-out arguments for the view. But as I'll argue in this paper, nothing in the literature even approximates a compelling argument for involuntarism. There are natural conceptions of belief on which it's hard to see why someone in an equipollent case couldn't believe at will, and involuntarists have produced virtually no reason for thinking that these conceptions of belief are mistaken. As a result, involuntarism emerges as an article of faith, not the obvious truth it's often purported it to be.

2. Belief in the Image of Assertion

Which norms govern assertion? There are many answers to this question, but epistemologists as diverse as Wright (1996), Williamson (2000), Adler (2002), Huemer (2007), and Sosa (2010) all think that the norms that govern assertion also govern *belief*. Why think the norms of assertion also govern belief? For various reasons, but these philosophers agree with the likes of Peirce (1903: 140), Geach (1957: 80), Frege (1970: 1-2), Ramsey (1931: 144), and Dummett (1981: 362) that belief is the internal analogue of assertion. According to Williamson, for example, 'we can regard assertion as the verbal counterpart of judgement and judgement as the occurrent form of belief' (2000: 10).

This conception of belief will be important for the remainder of this paper, so notice that Williamson calls judgment a *form* of belief, and contrast his view with the following passage from Shah and Velleman.

Ordinarily, the reasoning that is meant to issue or not issue in a belief is meant to do so by first issuing or not issuing in a judgment. A judgment is a cognitive mental act of affirming a proposition ... It is an act because it involves occurrently presenting a proposition, or putting it forward in the mind; and it is cognitive because it involves presenting the proposition as true—or, as we have said, affirming it. A belief, by contrast, is a mental state of representing a proposition as true, a cognitive attitude rather than a cognitive act. ... Reasoning aims to issue or not issue in a belief that *p* in accordance with the relevant norm by first issuing or not issuing in a judgment that *p* in accordance with the corresponding norm. (2005: 503)

On Shah and Velleman's view, my judgment that *p* is not itself a belief in *p*, occurrent or otherwise. By judging that *p*, I might cause myself to believe *p*, and if I believe *p* while I'm still in the act of judging that *p*, then (presumably) my judging that *p* gives my belief the property of being presently occurrent. But my judgment isn't a belief. This isn't the view we get from the Williamson passage.

On that view, my judgment that p is *itself* an occurrent belief in p , not just something I might do while believing p that would make my belief in p occurrent. Williamson doesn't say much about the nature of belief, but he's clear that, on his view, knowledge is the norm of both assertion *and* belief because believing p is the 'mental counterpart' of asserting p (2000: 11), which 'stands to asserting p as the inner stands to the outer' (ibid: 255). Since it's hard to see how believing p could be the mental counterpart of asserting p if the mental acts that actually resemble assertions (namely, judgements) are not themselves beliefs, Williamson's view of belief suggests that judgements aren't just *kinds* of beliefs but *paradigms* of belief.⁶

What are judgments, then? Williamson doesn't say, but he seems to accept something like Shah and Velleman's account of judgment, and for present purposes, we can assume that their account is correct. According to Shah and Velleman (ibid: 503-5), S judges that p at t just in case, at t , she affirms p in order to affirm the *truth*—in order to affirm the correct answer to the question whether p . And on their characterization, in the paradigm instance of affirming p , you affirm p by performing the mental analogue of asserting it—namely, having a conscious thought with p as its content (ibid). So consider, for example, the proposition that Jones is the murderer. In the paradigm case, I affirm this proposition by consciously thinking to myself something like 'okay, Jones did it; he's the murderer'. If I do this in order to affirm the *correct* answer to the question whether Jones is the murderer, then, on their view, I *judge* that Jones is the murderer. More generally, on their account of judgment, if I perform the mental act of consciously thinking to myself ' p ', and if I do this in order to affirm the correct answer to the question whether p , I thereby judge that p .

As we noted above, on Shah and Velleman's view, a judgment that p is not itself a belief in p ; instead, it's just (at most) the proximal cause of a belief in p .⁷ Since effects can't precede their causes, Shah and Velleman must say that, even though judging that p consists in affirming p in order to affirm the correct answer to the question whether p , it's possible to judge that p without *already* believing p . And of course, Williamson must say the same thing. For if judging that p requires that I already believe p , then my judgment that p can't *itself* be my belief in p , occurrent or otherwise. Instead, if judging that p requires that I already believe p , then my judging that p must be something I'm doing *while* believing p . Is it possible, then, to judge that p without already believing p ? Yes. Just imagine some time t at which I don't believe p , imagine that, at this time t , I *do* believe that p is likely to be true, imagine some later time t^2 at which I affirm p in order to affirm the correct answer to the question whether p , and imagine that I do this on the basis of just my belief that p is likely to be true. Here's a case where I judge that p without already believing p , so it's no strike against Williamson or Shah and Velleman that, on both of their views, it's possible to judge that p without already believing p .

⁶ On this way of thinking, it's no accident that we use the expression 'suspension of judgment' to talk about withholding *belief*. It's also worth noting that, on a sensible interpretation of the data produced by Turri, Rose, and Buckwalter's (2018) study, the folk tacitly rely on something like Williamson's conception of belief. (Thanks to all three of these authors for helpful correspondence about this question.)

⁷ I say 'at most' because, on their view, my judgment that p might fail to cause a belief in p . (More on this below.)

Call Williamson's view 'JB', since it says that judgments are *beliefs*, and call Shah and Velleman's view 'JC', since it says judgments are just potential *causes* of beliefs. Which is more plausible—JB or JC? I'm strongly inclined to say the former. First, I don't see why we should agree with Shah and Velleman that no judgment is a belief. They provide virtually no argument for this thesis. They assert that beliefs are mental states while judgments are mental acts, and this is the closest they come to arguing that judgments aren't beliefs. Apparently, the reader is supposed to deduce for herself that, because no act is a state, no judgment is a belief. Of course, this argument assumes that *all* beliefs are states, and presumably this is what Shah and Velleman mean when they say just that beliefs are states. So why think both that all beliefs are states and that no act is a state? Arguably, some acts *are* states. Consider Sosa's example of the street performer's acting like a statue at some tourist site. According to Sosa, the person's performance can count as a state (2007: 23). But the performance *just is* the person's acting like a statue, so the performance can't be a state unless it's both an act *and* a state.

Even if no act is a state, however, I don't see why we should agree that every belief is a state. In fact, to put my cards on the table, I'm unsure why any philosopher thinks *any* belief is a state. I know philosophers are in the habit of calling beliefs 'states', but I share van Inwagen's (2007) puzzlement about this habit. A state is just a condition that something is in at a given time. Serenity, agitation, and unemployment are states. Unemployment is just the condition that a person is in when she doesn't have a job, agitation is just the condition that a person is in when something's bothering her, and so on. Is any belief *itself* a condition that someone is in at a given time? To my ear, the affirmative answer sounds like a category mistake. A person can be in the condition of *believing something*, of course, but a person can also be in the condition of (say) *shooting* something, and it doesn't follow that shots are states. And while a person can be in the condition of *having* a belief, she can also be in the condition of having a goldfish (for example), yet goldfish aren't states. Now perhaps philosophers are just speaking loosely when they say that beliefs are states, or perhaps they're using 'mental state' as a term of art and taking it for granted that, because beliefs are mental states (in this stipulative sense), beliefs must be states. If so, fair enough. But on any loose use of the word 'state', or any stipulative use of the term 'mental state', asserting without argument that no act is a state just begs the question against JB.

Perhaps, then, when philosophers say that beliefs are states, they just mean that beliefs are *static*, in the sense that they're fixed, unchanging entities, the way a bruise or a tattoo might be fixed and unchanging. Okay. But now, why should we agree with them? *Nonoccurrent* beliefs seem static in this sense. But if it were clear that *all* beliefs are static in this sense, then it would be equally clear that no judgment is a belief, and (presumably) we wouldn't see the likes of Peirce, Geach, Frege, Ramsey, Dummett, Sosa, Wright, Williamson, Adler, and Huemer saying that belief is the internal analogue of assertion. In any case, whatever explains why philosophers often call beliefs 'states', arguing for JC requires more than just asserting that beliefs are states while judgments are acts.⁸

⁸ Note that JB doesn't entail the thesis that Audi calls 'behavioral doxastic voluntarism' (2015: 93-4). According to this thesis, believing is an action-type. JB entails that some beliefs are acts, but it doesn't entail that believing is an action-type, since (for example) JB is consistent with the thesis that nonoccurrent beliefs aren't acts. If, however, JB is tantamount to the thesis that judgments are events of belief formation (as I'm inclined to think it is), then JB *does* entail the thesis that

Second, while I don't see any non-question-begging reason for accepting JC, I do see excellent reasons for rejecting it. As Shah and Velleman make clear, JC entails that it's possible to judge that p without believing p . 'Exactly how one accomplishes the transition [from judgment to belief] is of course ineffable', they say, 'but it is a perfectly familiar accomplishment, in which a proposition is occurrently presented as true in such a way that it sticks in the mind, lastingly so represented' (p. 503). So consider a scenario where I judge that p and it *doesn't* stick in my mind. Then, if JC is true, we have a case where I judge that p without believing p . Yet as Boyle points out (2009: 130-32), the idea that I might judge that p without believing p is hard to understand, since the truth-orientation of judgment seems to guarantee that I believe the propositional contents of my judgments, at least while I'm in the act of judging. Now perhaps JC has significant theoretical advantages over JB and we should prefer JC to JB even though it's hard to see how someone could judge that p without believing p . But arguably, JB has the advantage even here. After all, JB fits much better than JC with two of the most powerful paradigms in contemporary epistemology: Williamson's own knowledge-first paradigm and the virtue-theoretic paradigm we get from Sosa (2007, 2011), Greco (2010), and others, which says that beliefs are performances that are relevantly analogous to an archer's shot, a batter's swing, and other paradigm examples of action.

Considerations along these lines give JB a decisive advantage over JC, I think. But there's another serious alternative to JB: the view that Boyle himself defends. According to this view, my judging 'does not stand to my believing as means to end or cause to effect, but as expression to condition expressed' (2009: 132-33). Call this view 'JE', since it says that judgments are neither causes of beliefs nor themselves beliefs, but *expressions* of beliefs. Which is more plausible, then—JB or JE? Here I'm genuinely agnostic, but I do have a slight preference for JB. First, while I understand the suggestion that our *assertions* express our beliefs, I'm puzzled by the thought that our judgments express our beliefs. If I assert that p , I express to my audience that I believe that p . But if I *judge* that p , to whom do I express my belief in p ? Myself? If so, why would I do this? To let myself know that I believe p ? If so, how could I know to express *this* to myself—instead of (say) the proposition that I *don't* believe p —unless I already know that I believe p ? We can do cartwheels trying to answer these questions, or we can avoid them entirely by simply accepting JB.

Second, I don't see why Boyle himself prefers JE to JB. Boyle is defending a view that he calls 'the thesis of active belief', which says that our agential relation to our own beliefs is relevantly analogous to our agential relation to our own actions (p. 121). At best, JE is merely *consistent* with this thesis. In contrast, JB plainly supports it. So why does Boyle accept JE instead of JB? He explains at length why he prefers JE to JC, but the following passage is the closest he gets to explaining why he accepts JE instead of JB.

[Belief] is not ascribed in the continuous sense: we say '*S* believes p ', not '*S* is believing p '. And with good reason: in ascribing a belief to a person, we do not imply anything about what he is *up to*: he need not be thinking any particular thoughts, or performing any particular (voluntary) actions. ... To ascribe a belief that p to a person

Audi calls 'genetic doxastic voluntarism' (ibid), which says that *forming* a belief is *sometimes* an action. On this way of thinking, JB says that an act of judging that p would be an act of belief formation.

seems at most to imply something about his dispositions, about what he would do if —, not what he is actually doing. (p. 137)

This all seems right, but it hardly counts against JB. First, *judgment* isn't ascribed in the continuous sense. Instead of saying 'S is judging that *p*' or even 'S judges that *p*', we say 'S *believes* that *p*'. Second, and more important, while it's true that a person might believe *p* at *t* without performing any mental action at *t*, this just entails that it's possible to believe *p* at *t* without judging that *p* at *t*, and thus that some beliefs aren't judgments. It doesn't follow that no judgment is a belief, or even that some judgments aren't beliefs. So it's unclear why Boyle accepts JE instead of JB.⁹

Of course, these considerations don't establish that JB is true. Far from it, and I'm not myself convinced that JB is true. But if nothing else, these considerations do show that JB is at least defensible. If JB is even defensible, however, then involuntarists cannot just *assume* that it's false, or give arguments for their view that take it for granted that JB is false. A successful argument for involuntarism must *show* that JB is false, or at least that involuntarism is true even if JB *isn't* false. Either way, involuntarists can't simply ignore JB.¹⁰

3. The Argument from Equipollence

With this in mind, suppose Jones has been charged with murder and we've attended the entire trial. We've just heard the closing arguments, we know that we aren't going to get any further evidence relevant to the question whether Jones is guilty, and while the jury is deliberating, a friend asks what we think. You say Jones did it and I say that I'm not sure. We then explain our answers and eventually agree that, conditional on the total evidence, our different attitudes are both rationally permissible. So now suppose that, as we sit there talking, I neither feel compelled to start believing that she did it, nor feel compelled to continue suspending judgment on this proposition. I'm in an equipollent case. Also, suppose I'm intellectually courageous. By my own lights, I'm rationally permitted to pursue the acquisition of true belief by believing that Jones did it, and I'm also rationally permitted to safeguard against the acquisition of false belief by

⁹ Actually, Boyle probably accepts JE instead of JB because he's worried about picking a fight with involuntarists. As he says in the opening paragraph of his paper, '[m]ost contemporary philosophers agree that, in one significant sense, what we believe is not up to us: we simply cannot believe at will ... [T]he observation that our beliefs are not under our direct voluntary control suggests a challenge that defenders of [the thesis of active belief] must face' (pp. 119-20).

¹⁰ Objection: Yes they can, since JB is obviously false! After all, a judgment can't be a belief without playing the right functional role, but many judgments don't last long enough to play the functional role of a belief. Reply: If functionalism is true, something that lasts only nanoseconds can play the functional role of a belief. Suppose I'm a soldier, I step on a landmine and I'm blown to pieces right when I realize that I've just stepped on a landmine. This might happen (unfortunately), so either functionalism is false or something can play the functional role of a belief while lasting almost no time at all. Here it's worth noting that *most* beliefs are gone almost as soon as they're formed. It's the first day of class. I'm learning my students' names. One student says his name is Bernie. I believe him, but as soon as the next student introduces herself, I realize that I've already forgotten the first student's name. I walk down the hall to the restroom. On the way, I observe that your door is open, that it's windy outside, and so on, forming all variety of beliefs about my environment. By the time I get to the restroom, however, I've already forgotten all this trivia. And good thing too, since I won't need any of it in the future. As we make our way through life, we're constantly acquiring and then 'deleting' useless information, and we're often unable to retain even the information we need. As a result, most of our beliefs are gone almost as soon as they're formed. Longstanding beliefs are unusual, in the sense that they're considerably less common than fleeting beliefs, and our theories of belief should capture this fact.

continuing to suspend judgment on this proposition. If I were intellectually cautious, I would pick the latter option. Since I'm intellectually courageous, I pick the former and then carry out my intention to believe that Jones did it by affirming that Jones did it—by consciously thinking to myself 'Okay, Jones did it'. Of course, it's possible to affirm that p without judging that p , and if I'm not trying to affirm the *correct* answer to the question whether Jones did it when I think to myself 'Jones did it', I'm not *judging* that she did it. But in the case we're imagining, I *am* affirming that Jones did it in order to affirm the correct answer to the question whether she did it. So, in the case we're imagining, I judge that Jones did it, and I do this as a direct causal consequence of my intention to believe that she did it.

With this in mind, consider the following argument. (Call it the 'argument from equipollence', or the 'AFE' for short.)

- (1) I judged at will that Jones is guilty.
 - (2) My judgment was itself a belief.
- ∴ (3) I believed at will that Jones is guilty.

This argument is valid—at least given the details of the case and the natural assumption that, when I judged that Jones is guilty, I took my judgment to be a belief. As I will argue below, however, nothing in the entire stock of objections to belief at will threatens either premise of this argument, since nothing in the entire stock of these objections threatens JB or the assertion that I judged at will that Jones is guilty.¹¹

4. Objections to Belief at Will

The literature contains two kinds of objections to belief at will: conceptual objections and psychological objections. According to the former, belief at will isn't even conceivable; nothing that it's possible to do at will could fall under the concept BELIEF. According to the latter, belief at will *is* conceivable, but we can't do it; attention to our actual psychological abilities reveals that we lack the capacity. In this section, I will argue that no conceptual or psychological objection to belief at will threatens the AFE.

To see why no conceptual objection threatens the AFE, it's only necessary to note the following. First, contrary to arguments forwarded by Williams (1973), Scott-Kakures (1994), and others, there's no reason to think I must have believed that Jones did it before I judged that she did it, nor any reason to think that, if I *didn't* believe that Jones did it before I judged that she did,

¹¹ The AFE bears some resemblance to the arguments in Raz 1999, Ginet 2001, Frankish 2007, Nickel 2010, and McHugh 2014. As Sylvan (2016) and Archer (2017) note, however, these arguments require that permissive situations are actually possible. Since the AFE only requires that a person might *think* that she's in a permissive situation, arguments against permissivism threaten the arguments in Raz 1999, Ginet 2001, Frankish 2007, Nickel 2010, and McHugh 2014, but they don't threaten the AFE. It's also worth noting in this context that, even if Proust (2013) is right that the phenomenology of intending is absent in many mental acts—and I think she *is* right—it neither follows that it's *always* absent nor follows that the *intention itself* is always absent. (Presumably, the *phenomenology* might be absent in a case where the corresponding *intention* isn't absent.)

then I must have had a dim view of my epistemic position with respect to the proposition that she did it, or somehow changed my mind about my epistemic position with respect to the proposition that she did it.¹² Second, contrary to arguments from Buckareff (2004), Hieronymi (2006), Setiya (2008), Schmitt (2015), and others, there's no reason to think that I must have judged that Jones did it for extrinsic reasons, merely practical reasons, or any other reasons that would suggest that my judgment wasn't aimed at truth. Third, contrary to arguments from Winters (1979) and others, even though I judged that Jones did it on the basis of considerations relevant to the truth of the proposition that she did it, this doesn't suggest that my judgment couldn't be relevantly analogous to an action I might perform at will. For example, suppose I assert *p* on the basis of my belief that *p* is sufficiently likely to be true. Then I assert *p* on the basis of considerations relevant to its truth, but it doesn't follow that I don't assert *p* at will. After all, my asserting *p* on the basis of my belief that *p* is sufficiently likely to be true is consistent with my deciding to assert *p* and then carrying out my intention to assert *p* by asserting it, in such a way that my intention to assert *p* is directly causally responsible for my asserting *p*.¹³

Fourth, contrary to arguments by Buckareff (2006), McHugh (2014), Booth (2015), and others, there is no reason to think that my decision to believe that Jones did it couldn't have been causally responsible for my judging that she did it. Plausibly, if I'd found the evidence compelling, then I would have gone straight from considering the evidence to judging that Jones did it, without ever deciding to believe that she did it. But of course, I didn't find the evidence compelling. By hypothesis, it didn't trigger whatever cognitive process automatically produces judgment when I do find the evidence compelling, and, as a consequence, I wouldn't have judged that Jones did it if I hadn't decided to believe that she did it. Fifth, contrary to arguments from Audi (2015) and others, there is no reason to think that I caused myself to judge that Jones did it in a way relevantly analogous to the way I might cause myself to blush (*e.g.*, by thinking about something embarrassing which then causes me to blush). If there's any sense in which, by deciding to believe that Jones did it, I caused myself to judge that she did it, I caused myself to judge that she did it in exactly the way I would cause myself to raise my arm in a paradigm case where I raise it at will. Sixth, contrary to arguments from Peels (2014) and others, there seems no reason to think it's an *essential* feature of my doing something at will that, after I decide to do it, I can still control when I do it and for how long. To see why, just imagine a case where my reasons for snapping my fingers are perfectly counterbalanced by my reasons for not snapping them, and suppose it's obvious to me that, if I'm ever going to snap them at all, I should snap them *right now*. We can easily imagine that, in this case, *if* I decide to snap my fingers, I'll be compelled to snap them immediately. And we can also imagine that, since I don't know how to control the duration of a snap, I won't be able to control the length of my snap either. But even with these suppositions, it clearly doesn't follow that I can't snap my fingers at will.¹⁴

¹² As Boyle points out (2009: fn. 19), even if JE is true, a judgment might take place at the exact moment that the corresponding belief comes into existence.

¹³ As this case illustrates, it's possible to perform an *action* on the basis of what Hieronymi calls 'constitutive reasons' (2006: 51).

¹⁴ Objection: But even if I can't control when I snap them or for how long I snap them, I can still control *how* I snap them. Reply: I can also control how I judge that Jones did it. I can judge that she did it by thinking to myself 'Jones did it', by

Seventh, and finally, even if Buckareff (2004), Proust (2012), Audi (2015), and many others are right that it's possible to accept a proposition without believing it, there is no plausible notion of acceptance on which it's clear that my judgment that Jones murdered Smith was an instance of acceptance, and simultaneously clear that no instance of acceptance is a belief. On Proust's notion of acceptance, for example, I accept p if I decide to regard p as true while thinking that p might not be true (ibid: 319). On this notion of acceptance, it's not just *obvious* that no instance of acceptance can be a belief, and even if this were obvious, my judgment that Jones murdered Smith wouldn't be an instance of acceptance, since I wasn't, at any time, treating that proposition as true while simultaneously thinking that Jones may not have done it.¹⁵

There are, of course, other conceptual objections to belief at will. But these are the best of them, and the best-known of them. And in any case, it should be clear enough why no conceptual objection threatens the AFE. The basic problem is simply this: no conceptual objection threatens JB, yet, if JB is true, belief at will seems about as hard to conceive as assertion at will.¹⁶

To see why the best psychological objections in the literature don't threaten the AFE, it's only necessary to note two things. First, the vast majority of psychological objections in the literature focus on the wrong kinds of cases. Even if we agree with Curley (1975), Alston (1989), Nottelmann (2006), Booth (2015), and many others that we can't believe at will in cases where p strikes us as obviously false, cases where p strikes us as obviously true, and cases where p strikes us as exactly as probable as its negation, this is all irrelevant to the case we have been considering.

thinking to myself 'Jones is the person who murdered Smith', by thinking to myself 'the proposition that Jones is the murderer is true', and so on. And in any case, this is all beside the point. For as Steup points out (2017: §10), the idea that you can't do something at will unless you can control *how* you do it is tantamount to the idea that you can't decide to ϕ and then carry out your intention to ϕ by ϕ -ing unless you can control how you ϕ , which is simply implausible. Consistent with your ϕ -ing at will, there might be only one way you're able to ϕ .

¹⁵ Cf. Archer forthcoming. If my thinking ' p might not be true' can count as my having a 'belief-discordant implicit attitude toward p '—as Archer calls it—then many of the attitudes that Archer classifies as beliefs will also be instances of acceptance, *on Proust's notion of acceptance*. If find Archer's view compelling, so I'm inclined to think that many beliefs *are* instances of acceptance on Proust's notion of acceptance. (Readers who balk at this conclusion should bear in mind arguments by Lewis (1982), Davidson (1985), Egan (2008), and many others that it's possible for a person's mind to be 'fractured' or 'compartmentalized'.)

¹⁶ Objection: If it's possible to judge at will in an equipollent case, then it should be possible to judge *unintentionally* in an equipollent case. But this doesn't look possible. After all, in an equipollent case, what could cause the judgement other than an *intention* to judge? As O'Brien (2013) points out, it *is* possible to judge unintentionally. But in all of her examples, it's some in-the-moment conviction that p is true that causes you to judge that p , and this is important because, by the very definition of 'equipollent case', you're not *in* an equipollent case at t if, at t , some conviction that p is true causes you to judge that p . Since it's hard to see how you could judge unintentionally in an equipollent case, it's doubtful that you can judge at will in an equipollent case. Reply: I agree with O'Brien that it's possible to judge unintentionally, and I agree that it's hard to see how someone could judge unintentionally in an equipollent case (though I'm sure we could fabricate some *recherché* example). Even if it's literally impossible to judge unintentionally in an equipollent case, however, the first premise of this objection seems unmotivated. It's not true *in general* that, if you can do something at will in a certain kind of case, then you can do that thing unintentionally in that kind of case. You can shoot someone at will in a case of murder, for example, but you can't shoot someone unintentionally in a case of murder, for, by the very definition of 'murder', it's not *murder* if you shoot the person unintentionally. What matters here is simply whether you satisfy every necessary condition for doing something at will. If, in an equipollent case, you decide to judge and then carry out your intention to judge by judging, in such a way that your intention to judge is directly causally responsible for your judging, then you *do* judge at will in that case. This is true even if you couldn't have judged unintentionally *in that case*. The possibility of judging at will in an equipollent case might entail the possibility of judging unintentionally *somewhere*, but even so, it's unclear why it should entail the possibility of judging unintentionally *in an equipollent case*.

Alston at least considers cases where the proposition in question doesn't seem obviously false, obviously true, or exactly as probable as its negation. But his comments about these cases are susceptible to straightforward empirical refutation. After asking us to consider some philosophical or religious view that seems more plausible than all of its competitors, Alston says this.

The most obvious suggestion is that although in these cases the supporting considerations are seen as less conclusive, here too the belief follows automatically, without intervention by the will, from the way things seem at the moment to the subject. In the cases of (subjective) certainty belief is determined by that sense of certainty, or, alternatively, by what leads to it, the sensory experience or whatever; in the cases of (subjective) uncertainty belief is still determined by what plays an analogous role, the sense that one alternative is more likely than the others, or by what leads to that. Thus when our philosopher or religious seeker 'decides' to embrace theism or the identity theory, what has happened is that at that moment this position seems more likely to be true, seems to have weightier considerations in its favor, than any envisaged alternative. Hence *S* is, at that moment, no more able to accept atheism or epiphenomenalism instead, than he would be if theism or the identity theory seemed obviously and indubitably true. (p. 266)

The central idea in this argument—that belief always follows automatically when someone finds a philosophical or religious view more likely to be true than its competitors—might accurately describe Alston's mental life, but it misdescribes my own. I find virtue epistemology more plausible than its competitors, for example, but I don't believe it or any of its competitors. I'm suspending judgment. Now perhaps I'm missing Alston's point. Perhaps he just means that, if someone finds a philosophical or religious view more plausible than its *negation* (rather than just its competitors), then belief follows automatically. But even this is false. I am suspending judgment about the pragmatic encroachment debate, for example, even though I find interest-relativism slightly more plausible than its negation.

Of course, in these kinds of cases, Alston might say that I'm *compelled* to suspend judgment, and thus that I'm agreeing with the spirit of his view. But even if I can't help but suspend judgment in these cases, there's still an important difference between these cases and equipollent cases. Again, in the main case that we have been considering, I don't just find the proposition that Jones did it more plausible than its negation; I find this proposition considerably more plausible than its negation. I find it so plausible that I think I'm rationally permitted to believe it. Of course, I don't find it so much more plausible than its negation that I find myself *compelled* to believe it. But I don't find myself compelled to suspend judgment on this proposition either. So, like virtually every psychological objection in the literature, Alston's objections target cases that aren't relevant to the AFE.

Second, without arguments against JB, there's little reason to think that, in an equipollent case, anyone would have any trouble believing at will, and there's even *less* reason to think that, in an equipollent case, *everyone* would have trouble believing at will. Presumably, in an equipollent case, even Curley and Alston could easily *judge* at will. Why, after all, couldn't they? And even if in fact they couldn't, nothing interesting would follow. Anything might prevent a specific individual from doing something at will, and there's a glaring asymmetry between arguments that say 'I can do it, so somebody can', and arguments that say 'I can't do it, so nobody can'. The first are deductively valid while the second are egregious instances of hasty generalization. Given this asymmetry, it seems completely dogmatic to insist that it's psychologically impossible to judge at will. And of

course, if JB is true, an instance of judgment at will might be an instance of belief at will. Since none of the psychological objections in the literature threatens JB, none of the psychological objections in the literature poses any serious challenge to the AFE. But as we saw above, the best *conceptual* objections in the literature don't threaten the AFE either. The upshot? While epistemologists often feel safe taking involuntarism as an established fact, nothing in the literature even approximates a compelling argument for the view.¹⁷

5. Epistemically Rational Belief at Will

If the arguments in the previous sections succeed, then involuntarism isn't nearly as plausible as its current widespread acceptance suggests. Even if these arguments do succeed, however, we might wonder whether belief at will could ever be *epistemically rational*. According to Sylvan (2016), belief at will is possible, but epistemically rational belief at will isn't. On his view, we can believe at will when we think that we're in a permissive situation with respect to the relevant proposition; because permissive situations aren't possible, however, we'll always be *wrong* when we think that we're in one; as a consequence, epistemically rational belief at will isn't possible (p. 1659). Moreover, according to Sylvan, because epistemically rational belief at will isn't possible, our ability to believe at will doesn't 'constitute a significant form of doxastic control' (ibid). If Sylvan is right, then the upshot is presumably that the arguments in §§1-4 don't establish anything interesting, even if they work, since they don't lend any credibility to rational belief at will.

I think Sylvan's arguments against permissive situations are resistible (see Roeber MS), but for present purposes I will assume that they work. Given this assumption, is Sylvan correct that belief at will can't be epistemically rational, or correct that, because belief at will can't be epistemically rational, our ability to believe at will wouldn't constitute a significant form of doxastic control? I want to say 'no'. Perhaps our ability to believe at will would be *more* significant if exercising it didn't require being epistemically irrational, but this doesn't entail that it's *not* significant. And in any case, the nature of belief is interesting in its own right. Even if epistemically rational belief at will isn't possible, and even if this entails that our ability to believe at will doesn't constitute a significant form of doxastic control, we learn something interesting if we learn that it's possible to believe at will. So, even if epistemically rational belief at will isn't possible, it doesn't follow *just from this* that the arguments in §§1-4 don't establish anything interesting.

This is the first thing to say in response to Sylvan's conclusion. The more important point, however, is that it's hard to see why Sylvan thinks that a belief formed at will must be epistemically irrational. On Sylvan's view, in the situation we have been considering all along, either I am

¹⁷ It's worth noting in this context how often epistemologists use lucky guesses as examples of beliefs that fall short of knowledge. Consider the following passage from the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* entry on the analysis of knowledge, for example: 'Suppose that William flips a coin, and confidently believes—on no particular basis—that it will land tails. If by chance the coin does land tails, then William's belief was true; but a lucky guess such as this one is not knowledge'. Here it's taken completely for granted that a guess can be a genuine belief. Or, for another example, consider this passage from Lemos's *An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*. 'True beliefs that are mere lucky guesses or mere hunches or based on wild superstitions are not instances of knowledge' (2007: 6). Again, a lucky guess is supposed to give us a clear example of *belief* that falls short of knowledge. But of course, *guessing* is something you can do at will. So, if these guesses really are beliefs, then presumably guessing at will can be a way of believing at will.

rationally required to believe that Jones did it, or I am rationally required to suspend judgment on this proposition. It's consistent with Sylvan's view that I'm rationally required to believe that Jones did it, so assume that this is true. Then it follows that, if I believe *at will* that Jones did it, then I do *at will* exactly what epistemic rationality requires. In this case, presumably, both the belief that I form and my forming it are epistemically rational. My *suspension of judgment* was irrational, of course, but surely that doesn't entail that either the belief that I've formed or my forming it is now *also* irrational. So why does Sylvan think that, because permissive situations aren't possible, if I believe *at will* that Jones did it, then my belief can't be epistemically rational?

Sylvan doesn't say. He seems to think it's just obvious that, if permissive situations aren't possible, then any belief formed *at will* would be epistemically irrational. But perhaps, if pressed, he would give something like the following argument: *If my total evidence makes belief in p rationally obligatory and I don't find myself compelled to believe p, then there's something wrong with me cognitively and my forming the belief is epistemically irrational in something like Plantinga's proper functionalist sense (1993: 136-7). On the other hand, if my total evidence makes belief in p rationally obligatory and I do find myself compelled to believe p, then I won't be in position to believe p at will. So, either way, we won't have a case of fully epistemically rational belief at will.* So far as I can tell, something like this is the best reason for agreeing with Sylvan that, if permissive situations aren't possible, then epistemically rational belief *at will* isn't possible either. But the second premise of this argument is disputable (see Steup 2017, for example), and its first premise seems unmotivated anyway. If being rationally required to believe *p* were *luminous* in Williamson's (2000) sense, then it might be plausible that I'm not functioning properly if my total evidence makes belief in *p* rationally obligatory and I don't feel compelled to believe *p*. But it's doubtful that my being rationally required to believe *p* is luminous (ibid: ch. 4).¹⁸ And in any case, even if it is luminous, I see no reason to think it follows that my *belief* (or my forming the belief) manifests any cognitive defect. Surely, if it's luminous, it was my *suspension* that was defective.

As a consequence, I see no reason why we should agree with Sylvan that, because permissive situations aren't possible, any belief formed *at will* would be epistemically irrational. And of course, if Sylvan is wrong and permissive situations *are* possible, then it's even more plausible that a belief formed *at will* might be epistemically rational. Either way, I see no way to argue that, while belief *at will* is possible when the relevant person thinks she's in a permissive situation, *epistemically rational* belief *at will* is still impossible. The upshot is that, if belief *at will* is possible, there seems no reason why it couldn't be epistemically rational. And even if it couldn't be epistemically rational, it seems dogmatic to continue insisting that it's impossible. Either way, involuntarism should lose its grip on contemporary epistemology, and epistemologists should (in my view) stop tolerating the bald assumption that involuntarism is true.¹⁹

¹⁸ See also Roeber MS.

¹⁹ For helpful comments and conversation about all variety of topics related to this paper, I would like to thank Robert Audi, Matt Benton, Mark Boespflug, Cherie Braden, Wesley Buckwalter, Brian Cutter, Sam Newlands, Bob Pasnau, Mike Rea, David Rose, Matthias Steup, John Turri, Fritz Warfield, Craig Warmke, the students in my 2016 seminar on doxastic voluntarism (Paul Blaschko, Graham Clay, Liz Jackson, Ting Lau, Luke Riel, Chloe Uffenheimer, and Louise Williams), two anonymous referees for this journal, one anonymous editor for this journal, an audience at Notre Dame's Center for Philosophy of Religion, and an audience at the University of Colorado.

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