Chapter 1

What It Means to Take Chinese Ethics Seriously

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When in 238 BCE his "guests" (*ke* 客) had compiled the *Lüshi chunqiu* 呂氏春秋 (Master Lü's Spring and autumn annals), a work "completely covering all topics of heaven and earth, of the myriad things, and of ancient and present times," Lü Buwei, the chancellor of Qin, displayed the work at the market gate of Xianyang, hung one thousand pieces of gold over it, and promised the money to any one of the wandering scholars from the other states or any one of the "guests" who was able to add or subtract a single word.[1]

If we take this episode from the third century BCE not as a singular event, but as representative of the intellectual situation of the time, it contains two important aspects of relevance for the topic of my paper. First, the Chinese authors creating the body of texts that we deal with today when we speak about "Chinese philosophy" or philosophy in China and philosophical ethics in particular laid claim to the validity of what they said or wrote. Second, the authors addressed this claim to an audience that we may call a public audience. Even if their writings, as in the case of the *Lüshi chunqiu*, were meant to influence the rulers of their time, they presented the writings to a general public that at least comprised the literate intellectuals of the then known world. Many late Zhanguo (5th century–221 BCE) texts were distributed extensively, and they prove the existence of widespread intellectual discussion. Rather than being isolated events, in Legalist judgments these developments "brought into disorder the common people" and became a serious threat to political stability (cf. Li Si's famous speech at the palace banquet in Xianyang in 214 BCE).[2]

Why are these aspects of relevance for "taking seriously" Chinese thinkers? My simple answer to this question would be: Because these aspects show

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that these thinkers themselves expected to be taken seriously, and that they addressed this expectation to all of their possible listeners or readers. By "taking seriously" I mean above all respecting their claims to the rightness and truth of their positions and statements and treating these claims as we would treat any other claims of this kind in normal conversation.

The texts in question are not "dead" bodies as are their physical media (silk, paper, wood, etc.) but, in general, they are expressions of meaning (*Sinneinheiten*) authored by human beings and directed to other human beings. The basic hermeneutical relation is a relation between subjects on equal terms, not between a subject (the researcher) and an object (the text as a "source"). It is only within the framework of this basic relation that an objectifying attitude (speaking *about* a text or the human being behind it rather than speaking *with* him or her), too, has its legitimate place. The objectifying attitude is appropriate inasmuch as we do not only have to *understand* the *reasons* of an author, but we also have to *explain* possible *causes* behind his or her work. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, when dealing with a text, we are never merely dealing with some "material" but also with a human subject that is addressing us and whom we ourselves can address.

If it is true that behind the "sources" we have to deal with human co-subjects, we cannot assume rules for engaging with these subjects other than those rules that we observe in everyday communication with human co-subjects in general. This would mean that a text imparts sense to the reader and that the reader can comment on this sense with "yes" or "no" answers. In doing so, he or she will do justice to the *dialogical*, and not monological, situation of understanding, which philology shares with normal conversation. Thus, in understanding (*verstehen*) a text, one should take into account that understanding is embedded in the context of coming to an understanding about something (*sich verstaendigen über etwas*). As Hans-Georg Gadamer has put it, "Understanding means, first of all, understanding each other. Understanding is first of all agreement (*Einverständnis*). To understand is always to come to an understanding about something."[3]

In order to illustrate my point, it is helpful to observe how we ourselves approach philological work (I again speak from the perspective of a Westerner dealing with Chinese texts, reading, for example, the *Lunyu* (Analects) or the *Mozi*, although this perspective is not Western-specific). The fact that what appears to be an interesting or good argument in these texts appeals to us, or what appears to be a poor argument might cause us to shake our head, bears witness to an imagined simultaneousness, a conversation between reader and author. Thus, we not only try to understand the meaning that the author

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intended, but to come to an understanding with him or her on a certain topic—in the given case, his or her ethics. In taking Kongzi and Mo Di (Mozi) as an example, I would like to suggest that this is true even when our authors have long been dead, as is the case in all classical philologies. These authors, too, are never mere objects of research, but partners in a conversation, albeit a *virtual* one. And the conjectures, hypotheses, and interpretations by which we try to make sense of their writings are only substitutes for our questions to the authors and for the answers they can no longer give.[4] The philological standards of objectivity, correctness, conscientiousness, and so forth, are rooted in the ethical "eye-level principle" (*Prinzip Augenhoehe*) rather than in a separate scientific ethos—they directly follow from the respect and sincerity that is due in communicating with human beings regardless of epoch or culture. This frame of mind is crucial in dealing not only with one's own tradition, but also with foreign thought. There is a restriction in Gadamer's hermeneutics in this respect that has to be overcome in order to make his approach fruitful for intercultural understanding (see below).

If the communication model for philology is sound, we cannot remain indifferent to the intentions and normative goals that have flowed into the text, just as in actual conversation; the texts are not only a "source," they, or their authors, also speak to us. Except for texts written for purely private reasons—and even these texts are in a public language that is not the sole possession of the author—they address a world of recipients that is open in time and place. Sociologically, this does not necessarily correspond to a full-fledged "civil society" in late Zhou China, but to the existence of an enlightened intellectual layer of society with open membership, and self-conscious in the sense of recognizing the binding force of intellectual ties vis-à-vis all other specific social relationships—as in the Greek idea of *cosmopolis*, the humanistic "conversation of high minds," or Mengzi's "friendship with the scholars (*shi* 士) of the world."[5] Strictly speaking, however, the argument is not sociological. It is rather assumed that together with the intellectual activity as such a universal horizon of meaning and validity claims is opened that encompasses all recipients wherever and whenever. Thus, the philologist who tries to understand a text shares a world and starts a shared history with it.

When philology begins, an intellectual community comes into being that comprises the interpreter, the (scientific) community to which the person addresses the work, and the authors of the texts in question—the relationship is a triadic rather than a dyadic (researcher and audience) one. In philological work, we not only anticipate the expectations of our future readers toward us (i.e., to deliver a competent work), but also the expectations of the ancients both

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toward their contemporaries and their future audience. It is only the positions that change: We have to take "our" authors just as seriously as we ourselves would like to be taken by those who follow us.

Taking the foreign authors seriously concerns already the accurate translation and interpretation of a text—foreign authors have a right to be represented as objectively as possible in other languages, and we have a corresponding obligation to them, not only to our readers. Foreign authors likewise have the right to have their validity claims respected by those to whom they speak or write, and this is any possible reader at any time and in any place. This does not imply that we should embrace antique ideas and forms of life. But it does imply that we should endeavor to separate what is anachronistic from what is not. In other words, it implies that we should examine the truth and rightness of the respective positions that may hold even today and be ready not only to criticize, but also, as the case may be, to learn something—not only *about* the authors, but also *from* them. As Max Scheler, who has declared himself a follower of a "cosmopolitan world-philosophy," has written, what matters is "not only to register historically Chinese and Japanese 'wisdoms,' but also at the same time to scrutinize them objectively (*sachlich prüfen*) and make them a *living* element in one's own thought (emphasis added)."[6]

However, the hermeneutical approach I am suggesting here is far from uncontroversial. It contradicts assumptions about understanding otherness (*Fremdverstehen*) in general, a widespread self-image of the hermeneutical sciences dealing with other cultures including Chinese studies, and a certain view of Chinese thought.

As to "understanding otherness" in general, in the corresponding literature the possible outcome of the process of intercultural understanding is often anticipated by—as I see it, premature—misgivings of all kinds. The classic representative of this position is Victor Segalen, who argued that with regard to foreign thought we have to "begin with the admittance of noncomprehensibility."[7] The main motive for this cautiousness is a fear of ethnocentrism, of reading one's own categories into foreign thought. According to Peter Weber-Schaefer, to take an example from German East Asian studies, *Fremdverstehen* is "occidental self-interpretation resulting in inevitable distortion." If we can understand East Asia, then it is only as "a European construct," not as an "external reality."[8] An important source for such a radical perspectivism is Gadamer's *Wahrheit und Methode*. As quoted above, Gadamer stresses on the one hand that understanding cannot be reduced to a mere "understanding of sense" (*Sinnverstehen*) but implies "coming to an understanding about something." On the other hand, he assumes that the interpreter is part of what he or she is trying to understand

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(*Zugehoerigkeit des Interpreten zu seinem Gegenstande*), inasmuch as he or she is subject to the "concrete bonds of custom and tradition" (*konkrete Bindungen von Sitte und Ueberlieferung*).[9] Paradoxically, this has made Gadamer an inspiration for East Asian cultural traditionalism, although the reduction of the "matter" (*Sache*), of the "something," which is the topic of "coming to an understanding" (*Einverstaendnis*), to an element of a shared heritage limits the relevance of his approach for a theory of *intercultural* understanding.

As to the self-image of Western cultural sciences (*Kulturwissenschaften*), it is more or less comparatistic, although in practice research can be "dialogical" in the sense that I am defending here on a theoretical level (this might be the case particularly in the United States, given the large number of Chinese scholars in the American scientific community). The preferred hermeneutical point of view is that of the neutral researcher who collects facts and, perhaps, discusses similarities and distinctions in comparison to his or her own historical or contemporary home discourse. Most Sinologists would regard leaving the distanced perspective on the "sources" for getting involved in the "message" of the text as unscientific. As Hans-Georg Moeller has put it with regard to the topic of human rights in a critique of my own approach, "the question as to whether or not traditional Confucianism is compatible with the modern conception of human rights can be put either as a scientific question or as a political or juridical one, but not for all these fields at the same time." As Moeller says, what one expects in a "scientific publication" has to be "descriptive and analytical."[10]

Weber-Schaefer has called East Asian studies (*Ostasienwissenschaften*) "comparative cultural sciences" that try "to explain East Asia to themselves rather than to the East Asians."[11] Undoubtedly, comparison is a necessary and legitimate element of cultural sciences. The problem is the programmatic priority attributed to it in its self-definition, which means to substitute conversation *with* others for conversation *about* them. I fully agree, therefore, with Hermann-Josef Roellicke's polemic against the "priority of comparative methods" in Sinology, because it undermines the real primacy of being addressed or even "being hit" (*getroffen werden*).[12] If comparison in the final analysis is not embedded in the endeavor to come to an understanding about something (*Verstaendigung ueber etwas*), it remains instrumental and haphazard, and it can just be replaced by the search for mere contrast.

This is indeed suggested by a number of Sinologists, including Rolf Trauzettel ("In conscious one-sidedness, I would like to take only the first step of the comparative method and that is to confront in a contrastive way the phenomena which at first sight seem to have similarities"[13]), Mathias Oberth (Sinology should "think in the direction of difference, not in the direction

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of unity"[14]), and Hans-Georg Moeller ("The task of comparative studies is precisely to make the texts more comprehensible by contrastively 'dispelling' them of seemingly similar 'ideas' "[15]). Perhaps the most prominent advocate of this view in Chinese studies is Chad Hansen, who suggested as early as 1972, "In such cases where parallel comparisons are invalid, a new approach is required. Contrastive analysis must replace comparative analysis in comparative philosophy. . . . We ought to abandon the frenzied search for forced parallels between Chinese and Western thought."[16]

Against these approaches, I would like to defend an alternative conception of understanding alien thought (*Fremdverstehen*) that does not necessarily discard the spectator's perspective altogether but embeds it in the wider perspective of a participant in a dialogue.

However, there are arguments in favor of the position of the quoted authors. I have already mentioned the well-founded suspicion that an accommodationist heuristic might lead to the projection of our own ideas and values into foreign thought (a historical example of this is the "figuristic" approach to China by seventeenth-century Christian authors eager to discover traces of the biblical tradition in China). This suspicion, however, does not take us far from a principled point of view, since it makes us sensitive to *empirical* problems of interpretation that, once known, do not remain the same but can be avoided or at least lessened.

Another type of argument suggests that an accommodationist heuristic fails not only because of ethnocentric prejudice on the part of the interpreter, but also because it is not corroborated by the other side of the process of understanding, the Chinese "material." Many Sinologists or Western philosophers would find the idea of "taking Chinese philosophical ethics seriously" meaningless, because they question to the present day that "philosophy" and "ethics" ever existed in China in the first place. They argue that due to linguistic, mental, or developmental reasons philosophy could not emerge in China, that it is an exclusively Western tradition invented by the Greeks, and that it was only much later imported into other cultures. Accordingly, "Chinese philosophy" is an invention of the twentieth century in the course of modern Chinese identity management.[17] And given the absence of philosophy in premodern China, "ethics" as a theory of moral action would become a misnomer, too. Doubt has also been cast on whether the term "truth," certainly a cornerstone of a hermeneutics that takes validity claims seriously, can be meaningfully applied to the texts in question.[18]

One type of argument poses a special challenge to my hermeneutics of communication or serious conversation. It is, in short, the argument that such

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a hermeneutics must fail because the *language* of the texts in question has no communicative function, at least not in the sense that I have suggested. Rather, it serves other purposes.

The weaker variant of this view is that the normative Chinese texts in question are not addressed to a general audience but only to the powerful, above all to the ruler. According to the German Sinologist Hans-Otto Stange, this marks the decisive difference between Greek and Chinese thought.[19] A similar view has been put forward by Nathan Sivin and G. E. R. Lloyd in recent publications.[20] Accordingly, Chinese authors would reject conversation with discussants outside the hierarchy, and even more so with foreigners.

The harder variant is that Chinese texts in general do not aim at being "understood" in the sense of an intellectual, rational apprehension of ideas or argumentative agreement (*argumentative Verstaendigung*). The texts rather aim to achieve the *practical effect* of a direct influence on the members of the language community. Marcel Granet, the initiator of this view, has even attributed this feature to the Chinese language itself. In his *La pensée chinoise*, perhaps the most influential Western Sinological work of the last century, Granet writes that Chinese language has a "latent imperative value," that it aims at "effectivity" and "action effects" rather than "following strictly intellectual requirements."[21] Chinese words function like models (Granet's expression is *emblemes*), which through an "affective and practical force" evoke a certain behavior.[22] Language is not meant to make propositions on facts; it is not descriptive, theoretical, or argumentative; but, in the terminology of modern speech act theory, it is one-sidedly perlocutionary.

It is generally overlooked that this influential theory is not just one theory among other Sinological theories about China and that it not only concerns a specific Sinological topic. Rather, the theory is *paradigmatic* in the sense that it affects the whole attitude of Sinology to its subject matter. It concerns language per se as our common medium and therefore has grave hermeneutical implications.

Chad Hansen has reformulated Granet's theory independently of the French Sinologist on a much more elaborate Sinological and linguistic basis. According to Hansen, the grammatical features of the Chinese language, above all what he calls the "action structure" of verbs denoting mental activities, foster a function of knowing in terms of the practical "knowing how" referring to habitual, correct behavior rather than a propositional, theoretical "knowing that."[23] Correspondingly, the Chinese texts would not aim at truth—a word that should accordingly be eliminated from our vocabulary for analyzing Chinese "philosophical" texts—but at effecting social results. Following Hansen, Roger

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Ames and David Hall have ascribed a "nonpropositional character" to the Chinese language.[24] Whatever this might mean, such a language would hardly communicate *reasons* that could be the topic of an evaluating discourse and of "yes" or "no" comments, but it would operate as a nonreflected *cause* to shape conventional behavior.

It appears unfeasible to enter into a virtual "discourse" with the authors of the ancient Chinese texts on this basis. It would also have a bearing on the translation and interpretation of these texts: the claim to a good translation and interpretation would be based only on the expectations of our own readers, but not on those of the Chinese authors. This is because the—allegedly—syntactically rooted uniquely suggestive power of Chinese would necessarily be lost when translated into differently structured languages.

Views of the Chinese language in the tradition of Granet can also be found in the writings of the German Sinologists that I have quoted already as advocates of a contrastive heuristic. Here, too, the key to understanding—or, better, *explaining* Chinese culture—is the relationship of the Chinese thinkers to language. According to Moeller, language for these thinkers is "not yet medial, not communicative, and not an expression of thought"; it is not for "expressing individual consciousness," but for the "suggestive control of behavior." In short, it has "no hermeneutical function."[25] Trauzettel has ascribed to ancient China "a usage of language in an early stage of civilization that was retained much longer than in the Occident." The characteristic of this language lies in its "prescriptive" rather than "descriptive" function. In the "monism of the old Chinese systems of thought," which does not make a difference between language and the world in the first place, language is not seen as a "medium" but as "a thing among other things."[26]

If these statements are sound, they would rule out a communicative hermeneutics and would, by confounding content and method, not only justify but necessitate a contrastive approach. The respective theories can only be presented as objectifying and external, and their representatives cannot see themselves as "spoken to" by the corresponding texts and in a shared situation of "coming to an understanding." The respective writings are clear about this implication. To take Moeller as an example, the behaviorism he ascribes to the Chinese mind repeats itself in the scientific practice of the Sinologist—he pursues "perception in the sense of *observation*" (*Erkennen im Sinne von Beobachten*).[27] The language of the Chinese texts does not allow for coming to an understanding on a common topic—"one cannot have a conversation in this language."[28] Thus, what is missing on the Chinese side is not only *subjects* with a sovereign command

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of language, but also *co-subjects* of a communication. In the final analysis, this conception leads directly into behavioral science.

However, can we be sure that these heuristic approaches, which replace the "principle of eye-level" by a "principle of difference" or a "principle of divide," are appropriate to the Chinese "sources" in question? Is it perhaps true that the Chinese "authors" do not want to "be taken seriously" in the sense described above, let alone by a foreign interpreter? To my mind, the reverse is the case: the mentioned theories project their own pattern into their research objects. It is interesting to notice that Max Weber, one of the most influential multipliers of the contrastive approach to China, admitted this when he explicitly omitted all commonalities between China and the Occident in favor of a counter picture experiment.[29]

Still, we have to look at the Chinese texts and see which one of the conflicting approaches is suggested by them.

Let me start with the thesis that normative Chinese texts, and thus the group of documents that, more than other documents, bring up the question of coming to an understanding about a common concern, are not directed to a public audience, but to the rulers. As I see it, this thesis fails to take into account the intellectual atmosphere of "axial age" China, where the belief in all authorities is severely shaken in the political, social, and mental crisis of the epoch. In this crisis, which induced the new normative thinking and Chinese philosophical ethics in the first place, the normative discourse takes on much broader dimensions and much more critical directions than merely being a vehicle of consultation for the powerful. There is plenty of positive and even more negative evidence of this fact. Nearly every late Zhou text bears witness to the wide influence of all kinds of theories and opinions even among the "stupid masses."[30] It was exactly this *public* reasoning, not only some private opinions of critical intellectuals, that motivated the Qin to launch their attack on the "scholars" in 214 and 213 BCE.[31]

As to the linguistic arguments, they deprive classical Chinese of its propositional dimension in favor of its performative and perlocutionary dimension. That language is not regarded as "medial," that is, as a means for conversation about something, but as a direct cause, contradicts the view of the *Zhuangzi* that "words are there for getting hold of meaning" 言者所以在意.[32] Xunzi's conventionalistic theory of language,[33] again, is hardly compatible with a view of language in terms of "things" (cf. Trauzettel's statement above). I have argued elsewhere that normative Chinese texts are not marked by a one-dimensional regulative structure, but by a constative-regulative double structure.[34] It is true

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that the authors in question also aim at the "effect" of their ethical teaching. However, effect is not achieved by causal conditioning and immediate triggering of a certain behavior but—exceptions notwithstanding—by giving arguments, and these arguments can in turn be evaluated as convincing or not convincing. In order to give force to these arguments, it is a frequent rhetorical device to present ethical statements, in other words, rightness claims, by analogy with logical statements or statements about facts (*Tatsachenbehauptungen*), that is, truth claims, routinely combined by conjunctive elements like 猶, "it is like . . . ," 譬之猶 or 譬之若, "it can be compared with . . . ," and others. Examples are Mengzi's statements, "Human nature is good as water flows downward" 人之性善猶水之就下, or "Humaneness wins over inhumaneness just like water wins over fire" 仁之勝不仁也猶水勝火,[35] or Han Fei's statement, "A starving man will not survive if he does not eat anything for a hundred days in order to wait for millet and meat. If one waited for Yao and Shun in order to govern the people of today, this would be like the talk of waiting for millet and meat in order to rescue a starving man" 且夫百日不食以待梁肉, 餓者不活; 今待堯舜之賢乃治當世之民, 是猶待梁肉而救餓之說也.[36] Here, both authors obviously furnish their different normative programs rhetorically with one and the same claim to objective truth, a truth that is evident for anyone who lives in the same world of facts, rather than in the same world of culture-specific convictions. In these and similar cases, there is a special preference for "hard" facts like water flows downward, water wins over fire, a blind man cannot see colors, a deaf man cannot distinguish sounds, and so forth, which is surely due to the conviction that these facts are so unshakable that they cannot be called into question. If we make explicit the validity claims in those arguments in direct speech, it would, to take Mengzi as an example, go as follows: "Everyone who accepts the sentence 'Water flows downward' as true, and that is every human being, has also to accept my sentence 'Human nature is good' as true, together with all consequences for the right moral practice. And since it cannot be doubted that water flows downward, it can also not be doubted that human nature is good." Mengzi's aim to influence the behavior of his contemporaries and Han Fei's aim to destroy the belief in past models are communicated by way of demonstratively fostering the ethical and political claims with the force of an objective truth that can rationally be accepted by every human being who is a member of the same objective world.

I therefore draw the conclusion that Chinese texts do not undermine, but rather corroborate the appropriateness of, even the indispensability of, the culture-transcending communicative hermeneutics that I have suggested, with the implication of taking validity claims seriously, irrespective of time and

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place. This would rule out the systematic priority of comparative, contrastive, and objectifying approaches without denying their scientific value altogether and would give a systematic priority to those heuristic approaches that from the beginning assume a common horizon of meaning and make it possible to understand the foreign world and foreign history as part of our own world and our own history—like Karl Jaspers's theory of the "axial age," Lawrence Kohlberg's "cognitive developmental theory," or Karl-Otto Apel's discoursive ethics, which I have used in my own Sinological research.[37]

To take validity claims "seriously" is not to endorse them without examination. It means the decision for a hermeneutical paradigm based on the principle of eye-level communication that includes judgment—it does not rule out "yes" or "no" comments, but rather facilitates and enforces them. One will not necessarily become a Confucian by taking Confucian ethics seriously, the more so since, by the same logic, one would also have to become a Daoist or Mohist by taking Daoist and Mohist arguments seriously. There is only one preference for specific ethical positions that is justified by the hermeneutics of communication: a preference for those positions that on thorough examination help to promote or anticipate the principle of communication itself, as against tutelage, force, and exclusion.

Notes

1. *Shiji, Zhonghua shuju bianjibu* (ed.), (Beijing: *Zhonghua Shuju*, 1959), 85:2510.

2. Ibid., 6:254 f.

3. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (Truth and Method) third edition, (Tuebingen: Mohr, 1972), 168 ("Verstehen heißt zunaechst, sich miteinander zu verstehen. Verstaendnis ist zunaechst Einverstaendnis. . . . Verstaendigung ist also immer: Verstaendigung über etwas").

4. Cf. for this topic Karl-Otto Apel, "Die hermeneutische Dimension von Sozialwissenschaft und ihre normative Grundlage" [The hermeneutical dimension of social science and its normative foundation], in *Mythos Wertfreiheit? Neue Beitraege zur Objektivitaet der Human und Kulturwissenschaften*, eds. Karl-Otto Apel and Matthias Kettner (Frankfurt and New York: Campus), 17–47.

5. *Mengzi* 5B8, in *A Concordance to Meng Tzu*, Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series (reprint, Taipei: Chengwen, 1966).

6. Max Scheler, "Der Mensch im Weltalter des Ausgleichs" [The human being in the world age of equalization], in *Philosophische Weltanschauung* by Max Scheler (1927; Munich: Lehnen, 1954), 106.

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7. Victor Segalen, *Die Aesthetik des Diversen: Versuch über den Exotismus* [Essay on exoticism: An aesthetics of diversity] (Frankfurt: Qumran, 1983), 44.

8. Peter Weber-Schaefer, "Spiegelbilder Oder: Was geschieht, wenn Ostasienwissenschaftler versuchen, Ostasien zu verstehen?" [Mirror images: What happens when East Asianists try to understand East Asia?], in *Politisches Denken Chinas in alter und neuer Zeit*, eds. Oskar Fahr, Wolfgang Ommerborn, and Konrad Wegmann (Muenster: LIT, 2000), 13, 15.

9. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, 249.

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21. Marcel Granet, *La pensée chinoise* (Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1934); quotations on pages 40, 43, 59, 43, respectively.

22. Granet, *La pensée chinoise*, 43, 27 ff.

23. Cf., for example, Chad Hansen, *Language and Logic in Ancient China* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983); "Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy, and 'Truth.' " I have discussed Hansen's theory in Heiner Roetz, "Validity in Zhou Thought: On Chad Hansen and the Pragmatic Turn in Sinology," in *Epistemological Issues in Classical Chinese Philosophy*, eds. Hans Lenk and Gregor Paul (Albany: State University of New York Press), 69–112.

24. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Thinking through Confucius* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 301.

25. Hans Georg Moeller, "Die chinesische Lehre von Formen und Namen (*xingming zhi xue*) aus der Sicht einer Philosophie des Zeichens" [The Chinese teaching of forms and names (*xingming zhi xue*) seen from the perspective of a philosophy of the sign], in *Zeichen lesen, Lese-Zeichen: Kultursemiotische Vergleiche von Leseweisen in Deutschland und China*, ed. Juergen Wertheimer (Tuebingen: Stauffenburg, 1999), 494 ff; *Die Bedeutung der Sprache in der fruehen chinesischen Philosophie* [The meaning of language in early Chinese philosophy] (Aachen: Shaker, 1994), 136, 145.

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27. Moeller, *Die Bedeutung der Sprache*, 115.

28. Moeller, "Die chinesische Lehre von Formen und Namen (*xingming zhi xue*)," 28.

29. Cf. Max Weber, *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Konfuzianismus und Taoismus, Schriften 1915–1920*, Studienausgabe der Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe Band, vol. 1, no. 19, eds. Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer and Petra Kolonko (Tuebingen: Mohr, 1991), 19. Weber gives a "typological" account that presents what is "of typical importance with regard to the great distinctions of the spirit of economic activity" and "neglects other aspects." It does not claim to give a "well-rounded" picture, but stresses opposites. A portrayal without this accent "would have to express more emphatically than is possible here that all qualitative differences in reality can somehow be interpreted as quantitative differences of mixtures of single factors" (ibid.).

30. *Xunzi*, chap. 6, p. 57, in Wang Xianqian, *Xunzi jijie*, vol. 2 of *Zhuzi jicheng* (Hong Kong: Zhonghua, 1978).

31. *Shiji*, 6:254 f.

32. *Zhuangzi*, chap. 26, p. 407, in Guo Qingfan, *Zhuangzi jishi*, vol. 3 of *Zhuzi jicheng* (Hong Kong: Zhonghua, 1978).

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33. *Xunzi*, chap. 22, p. 274; Heiner Roetz, *Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age: A Reconstruction under the Aspect of the Breakthrough towards Postconventional Thinking* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 295, n. 23.

34. Roetz, "Validity in Zhou Thought."

35. *Mengzi* 6A2 and 6A18, in *A Concordance to Meng Tzu*; cf. also *Mengzi* 2A4, 2A6, 4A3, 4A7, 4B7, 5B7.

36. *Hanfeizi*, chap. 40, p. 300, in Wang Xianshen, *Hanfeizi jijie,* vol. 5 of *Zhuzi jicheng*, (Hong Kong: Zhonghua, 1978).

37. Cf. Roetz, *Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age*, chap. 3.

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