BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

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In *The Greatest Possible Being* Jeff Speaks argues that Perfect Being Theology (PBT) fails in the jobs it purports to do, guiding us to attributes ascribable to God, allowing us to distinguish between the “dispensable” and the mandatory attributes, and helping us formulate a plausible semantic theory of “God”. He offers a number of clever and carefully worked out arguments, and, having shown the failure of PBT, concludes with some suggestions for thinking more productively about God. Speaks works with the assumptions, intuitions, and definitions of much contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Call his version of PBT, C (for contemporary) PBT. I assume that he properly characterizes CPBT and leave it to its practitioners (CPBTians) to make the case if their work has been misrepresented. Speaks invokes St. Anselm of Canterbury as an early proponent of PBT and quotes Anselm (and Augustine and Aquinas) now and again. But their method is different from CPBT. Call Anselm’s version T (for traditional) PBT. I offer a rough outline of some of Speaks’ arguments, noting points where any PBTian might hold that he has moved too quickly. Then I note how TPBT differs from CPBT and avoids Speaks’ main arguments against CPBT.

CPBT, as Speaks understands it, sets aside God’s existence and reasons for believing in God. The project is to decide what properties God has, based on a modal claim: God is the greatest actual being, the greatest possible being, or the greatest conceivable being. There should be a “greatness condition”, that is “a condition on properties which is such that a property’s satisfying that condition, together with the relevant modal principle, entails that God has that property” (p. 11). The condition should satisfy “Entailment”; if a property F satisfies the condition it is a property of God. And “Informativeness”: “it should be possible (without reliance on prior substantive claims about God) to see that some interesting candidates to be divine attributes satisfy the condition” (p. 12). Speaks uses the schema (with many subsequent variations) for comparing beings having, and not having, property F in possible worlds w and w*:

(i) ◊∃xFx & (ii) ∀x∀y((Fx_w & ¬Fy_w) → x_w > y_w)

In Chapter 2, that God is the greatest actual being is easily dismissed, since one can posit some limited being as the greatest actual being whose attributes do not satisfy the greatness condition. Speaks moves to the greatest possible being (GPB) and introduces the problem of “trumping”; for any standard attribute applicable to God — omnipotence, let’s say — we can imagine x is omnipotent and y is not, yet y is greater than x because y has other attributes that outweigh x’s on the greatness scale. Suppose x is merely omnipotent, lacking in knowledge and goodness, while y “lacks a few trivial powers” but is omniscient and perfectly good. Wouldn’t y be greater than x? The trumping problem applies for any proposed attribute.

Restricting x and y does not succeed, even restricting them to God in w and God in w*. One problem is that PBTians standardly argue that God is necessarily GPB. For any F, God is necessarily F, or neces-
sarily not F. But the restricted greatness condition begins *possibly* (God is F), which, given that neces-
sarily God is GPB, entails God is F and so is trivial (p. 32). Suppose we consider conjunctive attributes,
for example “Triple-O,” the conjunction of [P] for every state of affairs s which it is possible for anything
to bring about, x can bring about s; [K] for every true proposition p, x knows that p; and [G]: in every
situation, x does the morally best thing which x can do. The trumping problem arises again. Might not a
being that is [necessarily G] & [P] & “knows everything but a few insignificant proposition” be greater
than Triple-O? To solve this iteration of the trumping problem, the tempting move to necessarily Triple-
O reintroduces the problem of triviality (p. 42). After pointing out that further attempts to save the con-
junctive strategy fail, Speaks moves (Chapter 3) to “God is the greatest conceivable being”.

What should “conceivable” mean here? It must be different from “possible”, and it must avoid “trou-
bleshooters.” A trouble-maker satisfies three conditions, “(i) God would be better if F than if not F. (ii)
It is conceivable that God is F. (iii) It is not possible that God is F” (p. 54). Speaks focuses on a negative
understanding of conceivable: p is negatively conceivable if it is unable to be ruled out. Why not a posi-
tive approach? Speaks often treats “conceivable” and “imaginable” as synonyms. He asks, “What would
it mean, for instance, to positively conceive of God’s being omnipotent, or perfectly good? Certainly we
can’t imagine these claims being true in any straightforward sense” (p. 56). And that constitutes the argu-
ment for the negative approach. PBTians, both traditional and contemporary, may think Speaks moves
too fast here. We cannot imagine omnipotence, if that means make a picture in our minds of all that it is
to be omnipotent, but there is a vast literature on how the limited human being can talk and think about
God. Might not a “conceiving” less robust than imagining nonetheless allow for positively conceptualiz-
ing divine attributes? For example, Speaks uses “omnipotent” in the trumping argument, suggesting that
he and his reader share intuitions about “an omnipotent being” on some positive understanding.

On the negative approach the question is what property cannot be ruled out based on either logical
consistency or on some broader epistemic notion. The various proposals lead to trouble-makers or de-
volve into proposals about possibility. For example, suppose “p” is conceivable iff Say that F is being able
to make the radii of a circle unequal. Speaks discerns a trouble-maker: God would be better if He could
do it. It is conceivable that God can do it, and it is not possible that God can do it. Denying this conjunc-
tion involves appealing to what God can *possibly* be or do (pp. 56–58). Speaks tries other definitions
of negative conceivability, but none is successful.

Chapter 4 moves to Impure Perfect Being Theology; GPB has every property meeting a certain des-
cription, labelled a G-property. In comparing the greatness of two beings we might focus on “absolute
greatness”; greatness simpler in terms of, for example, possession of intrinsic goods. But the trumping
problem arises again (p. 85). Alternatively we can compare greatness between members of a kind. But it is
difficult to assign God to the appropriate kind, and whatever likely kind we choose, the trumping problem
is inescapable.

Chapter 5 addresses “hidden attributes”. There seem to be conflicts among standard divine proper-
ties: If God is free, then couldn’t he have failed to create, but if creation is good, must he not create? If God
makes libertarian free creatures, how can he foreknow their free choices? If omnipotence is the ability to
actualize any possible state of affairs, doesn’t that conflict with perfect goodness? And granted that there
seem to be conflicts, God may have attributes of which we have no suspicion which conflict with the at-
tributes the PBTian tries to derive, properly producing PBT skepticism.

Given the apparent conflicts, couldn’t PBT at least help distinguish the mandatory from the dispensa-
ble attributes (Chapter 6)? For example, one atheist argument goes, God is said to be omnipotent, which
means He is able to actualize all possible states of affairs, but He is also said to be perfectly good, which
means He cannot bring about some evil state of affairs. QED, no God. The PBT defense “weakens” one
of the conflicting attributes, by showing that it was impossible for God to have and hence dispensable,
permitting a reconciliation. But, argues Speaks, since the “weakened” property was taken to be one the
GPB ought to have, this move could just as well demonstrate that there can be no GPB (p. 123).

Any PBTian might take issue with the way Speaks couches this argument. If A, B, and C are arguing
about some divine property — say freedom — and A insists that freedom is the ability to choose between
good and evil, while B understands freedom to entail open options, but not necessarily with moral significance, and C understands freedom as the ability to exercise one’s will in total independence of anything outside of oneself, it would be dogmatic of A to insist that B and C have dispensed with divine freedom and in effect denied the existence of GPB. Rather, A, B, and C — all defending GPB’s freedom — might go on to explain why their own understandings capture what is so great about freedom. This is a standard PBT move.

Chapter 7 deals with the effort of “perfect being semantics” to fix the meaning of “God”. Is it a proper name? A descriptive term? Not being a philosopher of language, I will not attempt to outline or assess the arguments here. It seems odd that one would assume that a term used for so long, world-wide, in so many disparate contexts could in fact have “a” meaning. Those engaged in PBT often explain how they intend to use the word “God”, but that is not the same thing as setting out “the” meaning of the term. But perhaps I missed the point, here.

Having shown that CPBT fails, Speaks in Chapter 8, offers positive suggestions for thinking about God. He notes that both Anselm and Aquinas start by proving the existence of God, before they derive the divine attributes, but he finds this unpromising since many CPBTians are skeptical of the power of the arguments for God’s existence. Instead we must simply allow substantial assumptions as foundational and proceed from there. “For instance, one might take as one’s foundational attribute the property of being capable of offering human beings genuine salvation; or the property of being a suitable object of faith; or the property of being deserving of worship” (p. 156). Speaks very briefly describes ways in which starting from these attributes could guide the process of determining the divine attributes, distinguishing the mandatory from the dispensable ones, etc.

Speaks grants that making these attributes foundational would limit participants in the discussion. More puzzling is the claim that starting with these attributes is likely to be more fruitful than past efforts at PBT. The history of Christendom shows that salvation, faith, and worship-worthiness are concepts open to wildly differing interpretations. And it seems unlikely that one of these starting points will facilitate discussion between the theist and the non-theist, as Speaks hopes (p. 158). Many a non-theist does not believe he needs salvation, and mocks faith and worship.

Let me suggest a more plausible foundational claim, which allows TPBT to avoid Speaks’ arguments. It is derived from Anselm’s (and Aquinas’s) method where both (as Speaks noted) begin with proofs for God. Even those who do not find the proofs watertight might agree that they point to an absolute and independent source of all. This is clearer in Anselm’s Monologion, than in the Proslogion, but even in the latter work, having demonstrated the existence of that than which a greater cannot be conceived, the first attributes Anselm ascribes to God are existing necessarily and independently of anything else, being the creator ex nihilo of everything not God, and being the source and standard for all goods. (I read the Proslogion argument differently from Speaks, but this is not the place to discuss that vexed issue.). This starting point has broad consequences. For one thing it means that simplicity is among the first attributes ascribed to God, since complexity entails being caused and being “decomposable” if only in intellectu. Although, quoad nos, it is appropriate to speak as if God has a variety of different properties, we should understand that they are all one in God. Speaks quickly dismisses the simplicity issue (pp. 17–18). but if one embraces simplicity as a basic divine attribute, Speaks’ way of setting up the schema for the greatness condition is a non-starter. It asks us to compare x possessing some property — say omnipotence — with y not possessing that property. But if one is used to understanding that God’s simple act involves His perfect power, which He exercises by knowing, and which is itself the standard for good, then the comparative strategy of the greatness condition cannot be applicable to “properties” of God, since a being lacking one of the “properties” would lack them all.

Further, starting where Anselm and Aquinas start entails a very different understanding of the typical attributes than many CPBTians assume. Take omnipotence. In the contemporary literature it is often taken for granted that, in addition to God and what He makes, there are, existing independently of God (perhaps as platonic abstracta), possible worlds, states of affairs, propositions, properties, moral truths, etc. On TPBT the most fundamental understanding of divine power is that nothing with any sort of ontological status at
all exists independently of God. A being dealing with external abstracta is less powerful. (Anselm makes the provocative claim that the possible and necessary are grounded in the will of God which is immutable, eternal, and could not be other than it is. Aquinas grounds possibilia in the nature of God.) And since being is good, God’s creative power is the source and standard for all goods. Moral truths are the rules by which the created agent can reflect God. The point is that the way Speaks has set out many of his examples, including the examples to motivate the trumping problem, fail on TPBT. No being is TPBT omnipotent without being omniscient and perfectly good, and so for all attributes we can plausibly assign to God. Certainly starting where TPBT starts leaves tensions that are open to debate, and allows that plenty of what there is to God may be “hidden” from limited creatures. But it seems a far more inclusive and productive starting place than the specific and revealed divine attributes that Speaks suggests. But note that the claim that TPBT offers a richer and more fruitful approach than CPBT rather supports than undermines Speaks’ case against CPBT. Speaks is right to say that contemporary analytic philosophers of religion would do well to examine their assumptions, especially if they hope to engage with “that than which no greater can be conceived.”