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*Leibnitz wählt zwischen der
alten und neuen Philosophie.*

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We commonly say, "There is something, I know not what, that pleases me in the matter" (*Von der Weisheit*, GP VII, 86; L, 425.)

One can compare the feeling of joy to perceiving musical harmony which Leibniz discusses in many writings¹². Musical harmony has strong aesthetic values and he stated in *Résumé of Metaphysics* (ca. 1697) that "an intelligent being's pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection" (GP VII, 290). In other words, pleasure consists of perceiving harmony, which is perfection. Even though Leibniz does not specify his views with respect to bodily action (although he was very interested in the medical sciences of his time), one can perhaps discuss harmony in the body which can contribute to the joy of the mind, reflected in the body as activity.

On this point, I will again compare Leibniz's views to Spinoza. *Ethics* 3p11 reads as follows: "The idea of any thing that increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our body's power of acting, increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our mind's power of thinking"¹³. As the psychophysical parallelism of Spinoza and Leibniz are in many ways similar to each other, I think one can take this description to apply to the Leibnizian system as well. There is also some textual evidence for this. In NE II, xx, §6 Leibniz again refers to hunger in the context of imperceptible perceptions, saying: "when the disturbance of the stomach becomes too strong it causes [mental] discomfort" (RB, 164). Likewise, he shows pity for people who have an excessively susceptible nature:

"How many insects we swallow without being aware of it, how many people we observe who are inconvenienced by having too fine a sense of smell, and how many disgusting objects we would see if our eyesight were keen enough!" (RB, 165).

To conclude, when our body enjoys great health and is being active, it can help us to think straight and practice virtue. In the case of illness or other bodily passions, it is more difficult for us to think rationally which again leads us to subordinate to negative emotions. And, as we have seen, our mind can affect the body in many ways. Besides action, confusion in our minds may lead us to passions in the form of succumbing to sensuous temptations and bad habits. By preferring good habits to bad ones we can overcome the passions little by little and transform them to actions.

¹² In a short memoir *Felicity* he also argues that music is a pleasure for the ears and aesthetical symmetry is a pleasure for the eyes (Grua, 580).

¹³ *A Spinoza Reader*, edited and translated by Edwin Curley, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1994, p. 160.

Markku Roinila (Helsinki) Uneasiness and Passions in *Nouveaux essais* II, xx

Chapter xx of book II of John Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (henceforth E) discusses emotions or passions which to Locke are modes of pleasure and pain. Despite its brevity (the chapter consists of only four and a half pages in the Nidditch edition) it is arguably the most extensive discussion of passions available in Locke's corpus. The same applies to Leibniz's discussion in the *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain* or *New Essays on Human Understanding* (NE). In addition, they offer a very interesting and captivating discussion of moral philosophy and the good life.

The chapter also provides a great platform for studying Leibniz's argumentative techniques and the differences between the two philosophers in general. Locke strives to explain the emotions with the single, unifying theory of uneasiness, while Leibniz's conception of the mind is more complex and he finds more unique ways to explain different emotions in each context. In this paper I will first present their discussion on uneasiness and then show how the differences of their views affect their discussion of some individual passions. My discussion relies mostly on chapter xx of *Essay* ("Of modes of pleasure and pain") and the *New Essays*, but as the following chapter xxi of book II ("Of power") is closely related to the theme and offers significant help in understanding their views, *I will refer to it frequently*.

Uneasiness and Disquiet

In NE II, xx, §6 Locke's spokesperson, Philalethes goes on to discuss how pleasure and pain affect our behaviour. He argues that the chief if not the only motive for human action is uneasiness which a man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing he draws his delight from. In other words, uneasiness is equivalent to desire in the sense that if a man has no desire for a certain good, he does not feel uneasiness. While delight is drawn from the present good, uneasiness is desire for the absent good. If the moral agent can be easy and content without the proposed absent good, he senses bare *velleity* (wish) which is almost an indifferent state, but not quite. It is more like the lowest degree of desire. If the desired good is impossible to obtain, the uneasiness is also "cured". Locke contrasts uneasiness with delight. Positive emotion such as love or joy is a delight of the mind whereas hate or sorrow is described as uneasiness.

"Delight, or uneasiness, one or two of them join in themselves to almost all our ideas, both sensation and reflection: and there is scarce any affection of our senses from without, any retired thought of our mind within, which is not able to produce in us pleasure or pain" (E II, vii, §2, 128)¹.

¹ I refer to the following editions: Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Edited with an introduction, critical apparatus and glossary by Peter H. Nidditch, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1975, Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*. Translated and edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996 (RB); the page numbers are identical with A VI, 6) and Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*. Edited and translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1989 (AG).

Leibniz's strategy in objecting to Locke's view is very clever. In NE Philalethes adds to Locke's material a note where he observes that the French translator (Pierre Coste) translates the word uneasiness as *inquiétude* (in English, disquiet) which is not a verbatim translation, signifying a state where a man is not quite at ease, lacking tranquillity in the soul. This state can hardly be compared to Locke's violent uneasiness – it is more reminiscent of his concept of wish or *velleity*. Later Theophilus defines disquiet as “imperceptible little urges which keep us constantly in suspense.”

This nuance in meaning proves to be of great importance when Theophilus argues that *inquiétude* fits pretty well with “the nature of the thing itself”, but uneasiness – signifying suffering which is understood as displeasure – does not. This is because desire, according to Theophilus, is not the suffering itself, but a disposition to suffering. In other words, a desire has to be notable to be a real suffering. It has to be attended. In NE II, xxi, §36 Leibniz says:

“If you take ‘uneasiness’ or disquiet to be a genuine displeasure, then I do not agree that is all that spurs us on. What usually drives us are those minute insensible perceptions which could be called sufferings that we cannot become aware of, if the notion of suffering did not involve awareness” (RB, 188).

In this way Leibniz is able to argue further that pleasure and pain are not simple, immediate ideas, but consist of multiple minute perceptions which we are not necessarily aware of. Theophilus is trying to persuade his adversary to allow for a much more complex conception of desire than what Locke holds.

One can only wonder whether or not Leibniz would ever have developed this view if he had not responded to Locke's views. In general, Leibniz discusses human action only in passing, often in an ethical context, and even then he seldom addresses deliberation in the mind². It is clear, however, that Leibniz holds Locke's concept of uneasiness as important even though he disagrees with him.

While Locke's uneasiness is based on the view that we are always aware of what is in our minds (following Descartes), Leibniz's disquiet includes the idea that a lot of what is in our mind is not noticed or attended. While Locke sees everything happening now, according to present sensations and reflections, Leibniz regards the mind as a huge warehouse of perceptions where only the most pressing concerns are dealt with in real time³.

Whereas for Locke pleasure or pain is a state, Leibniz thinks that they are formed eventually as processes where the minute perceptions cumulate and finally form a notable pleasure or pain which is attended and which might lead us into action. Leibniz argues, contrary to Locke, that we do not feel uneasiness all the time – our perceptions of suffering are mostly minute and only when they accumulate and form a clear, but confused perception⁴, we became aware of them. In this way pleasure and pain are comparable to the

² See, for example, *Memoire pour des personnes éclairées et de bonne intention* (A IV, 4, 612-621), *La félicité* (Grua, 579-581 and *Von der Weisheit* (GP VII, 86-90).

³ Later in the *Essay* Locke argues that in us there are many uneasinesses always soliciting and ready to determine the will, but the greatest and most pressing wins (E II, xxi, §47). This qualifies his view with respect to Leibniz's criticism in II, xx where he tends to regard uneasiness as a single desire.

⁴ Clear, but confused perception is defined in *Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas* as follows: “[clear cognition] is confused when I cannot enumerate one by one marks sufficient for differentiating a thing from others, even though the thing does indeed have such marks and requisites into which its notion can be resolved” (GP IV, 422; AG, 24).

sensation of warmth or light which is the result of many tiny motions. Compare NE xxi, §36:

“...if these elements of suffering (which do sometimes degenerate into suffering, or genuine displeasure, when they grow too strong) were real suffering, we could be continually wretched as long as we pursued our own good with disquiet and zealously” (RB, 188-189).

We feel little moments of suffering or pain all the time, but this does not drive us into genuine uneasiness unless these minute perceptions combine and grow and capture our attention. In the end of NE, II, xx, §6 Leibniz employs the metaphor of a clock where a continual balance exists. The German word for this balance is *Unruhe*, that is, disquiet. Leibniz argues that the clock can be taken as a model of our bodies which can never be at rest. In the body each tiny change affects the other parts of the body and forces it to restore its former balance. Thus there is a perpetual conflict which makes up the constant disquiet of the clock.

Leibniz gives hunger as an example of a disquiet or a disposition. It eventually grows in us, but only when it gets pressing enough do we become aware of it. This is a good thing – Leibniz praises God for not making us aware of everything which happens in us because we would be disturbed by even the smallest changes such as breathing and could not concentrate on the most important things in our lives.

There are an infinite number of perceptions of varying degree in the Leibnizian mind. We only become aware of them when they reach a certain level of clearness. This, again, is the exact opposite of Locke who thinks that we are always aware of everything that happens in our minds.

According to Leibniz, in the mind there are always dispositions or spurs of desire in the form of the rudiments or elements of suffering (Leibniz uses the word semi-suffering) of which we are not aware. Because they are usually not apperceived, they act as a kind of pre-taste of what is to be expected. In Leibniz's words, they “let us enjoy the benefit of discomfort without having to endure its consequences” (NE II, xx, §6, RB, 165). Because we are not aware of our desires or needs most of the time, we have an occasion to think of more pleasant things.

Opposing these minute semi-sufferings, we can gain semi-pleasures which happen when we satisfy or resist a certain spur of desire. When we can systematically oppose the minute semi-sufferings, the semi-pleasures become a whole, genuine pleasure. Leibniz argues that only through this process is it possible to experience any pleasure. There are no states of complete pleasure in themselves – they can be analysed into smaller semi-pleasures which combine and generate the notable, genuine pleasure. Pleasure and pain come in degrees, so there is no complete change. This view, of course, is related to Leibniz's theory of the continuum in nature (see GP III, 51-55).

Uneasiness and Passions

In this section I will take a look at how uneasiness is related to the passions. In E II, xx, §3 Locke argues that emotions arise out of pleasure and pain or good and evil. We can recognize them by attending carefully to our experience, as the idea of unconscious pleasure

or pain is inconceivable to Locke (E II, i, §1). Thus passions are essentially connected to pleasure which again is produced by overcoming uneasiness or to satisfying a need for an absent good. In §17 he argues that passions can affect the body and produce changes in it. They are reflected both in the body and in the mind and are not always sensible. The bodily changes which are caused by passions are not really part of the idea of passions because we need not be conscious of these bodily changes (E II, xx, §17). Leibniz agrees in principle, but says that it would be much harder to conceal the emotions if men were more observant, for emotions are accompanied with exterior movements.

We have seen that uneasiness is for Locke the chief motive for human action although he does not consider the effect of uneasiness as compulsory. In E II, xxi, §31 he asks: "What is that determines the will in regard to our actions?" and answers: "... I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view: but some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness a man is at present under" (E, 250-251).

In chapter xx of E, II Locke tries systematically to explain emotions by delight or uneasiness and does it more or less successfully (I will shortly return to this topic). There are some exceptions, however. §16 is interesting because there Locke approaches Leibniz's views, alleviating the possibility of process of pleasure and pain. He says that lessening of pain is pleasure and loss or diminishing of pleasure is felt as pain. This is essentially what Leibniz has been arguing all along – that emotion is not a state but a process which includes both pleasure and pain.

Leibniz explains different passions in different ways in points 7-17 of II, xx, relying on his basic view about pleasure and pain, but not founding his explanations solely on the one single concept like uneasiness. While Locke's uneasiness is at worst a pressing, violent and conscious striving for some known absent good, in Leibniz's view the spurs of desire are just some general restlessness of which we are not necessarily aware. However, the relationship between disquiet and emotions is clearly interwoven: the minute perceptions can affect the emotions and the emotions can give rise to further disquiet.

The problem with Leibniz's view seems to be that the disquiet does not have an object – it is only a general state of restlessness which keeps us alert: "These impulses are like so many little springs trying to unwind and so driving our machine along" (RB, 166). Mere disquiet can perhaps be called rather a mood than a clear-cut passion. Furthermore, Leibniz says himself that with passions and inclinations, we at least know what we want (NE II, xx, §6; RB, 166). Leibniz's discussion in §6 suggests that passions can build up from the disquiet in something like the following: when a number of minute perceptions or rather a set of minute perceptions which are more vivid than others are related to a certain object, it ceases to be a mere disquiet and turns into a passion of which we become aware. The following passage would support such interpretation: "...the continuation and accumulation of these [semi-pleasures] (as with the continuing thrust of a heavy body gaining impetus as it falls) eventually becomes a whole, genuine pleasure" (RB, 165).

Pleasure is built up eventually from imperceptible spurs and in this way they "provide a somewhat more distinct knowledge of our inevitably confused ideas of pleasure and of pain", as Leibniz says a little later (RB, 165). But is this "somewhat more distinct knowledge" a passion? In chapter xx Leibniz does not really explain what they are. He gives some clarifying remarks as he goes on to discuss different passions but these do not help us

very much. We have to look elsewhere in NE to find a clearer picture on the relationship between disquiet and the passions. Let us start, however, from chapter xx.

In §8 Leibniz says that there is something more in suffering (such as sorrow) than disquiet. Passions are not contentments or displeasures or beliefs, but endeavours – or rather modifications of endeavour which arise from beliefs or opinions and are accompanied by pleasure or displeasure (§9). So far, it seems clear that passions are dynamic in the sense that they are products of our minute spurs of desire and they can also give rise to more disquiet. A clearer description of the emotions can be found in NE II, xxi, §39 where Leibniz says: "Disquiet occurs not merely in uncomfortable passions such as aversion, fear, anger, envy, shame, but also in their opposites, love, hope, calmness, generosity and pride." Thus we can note that disquiet is constitutive of passions, both negative and positive ones, even in both ordinary and intellectual passions (Leibniz argues that even in joy there is always some disquiet present (NE II, xx, §8)). When we look at §41 of chapter xxi, he gives us further enlightenment:

"I believe that fundamentally pleasure is a sense of perfection, and pain a sense of imperfection, each being notable enough for one to become aware of it. For the minute insensible perceptions of some perfection or imperfection, which I have spoken of several times and which are as it were components of pleasure and of pain, constitute inclinations and propensities but not outright passions. So there are insensible inclinations of which we are not aware" (RB, 194).

Let us distinguish between two kinds of impulses, disquiet and passions. Their difference is related to their object. Minute perceptions are related to pleasure or pain and they form disquiet which is general restlessness without a clear object. This disquiet may develop into an inclination or a propensity to something, that is, a known object. This is when mere disquiet changes into a passion with a clear object. Epistemologically, the change is from obscure or clear but confused cognition to clear and distinct. The question is of a degree. When a disquiet becomes strong or pressing enough to be apperceived, it becomes a passion. In *Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis* (1684) Leibniz says:

"A distinct concept, however, is the kind of notion which assayers have of gold: one, namely, which enables them to distinguish gold from all other bodies by sufficient marks and observations. We usually have such concepts about objects common to many senses, such as number, magnitude and figure, and also about many affections of the mind such as hope and fear; in a word, about all concepts of which we have a nominal definition which is nothing but the enumeration of sufficient marks" (GP IV, 423; AG, 24).

Thus Leibniz classifies affects or emotions as a clear and distinct type of cognition which can be recognized and distinguished from other states of the mind. Furthermore, being clear and distinct cognition, the passion can be apperceived by the human mind. In this way they are very different from inclinations formed by disquiet which is at most a clear and confused perception, like colours or flavours (see GP IV, 426)⁵.

⁵ Pauline Phemister offers a somewhat similar reading in her book *Leibniz and the Natural World* (Springer, Dordrecht, 2005, 248) with the difference that she discusses in terms of appetites and distinguishes between noticeable appetites such as the desire for food and true volitions which are rational or distinct appetites. This can, however, be understood in agreement with the picture I have presented: some general disquiet may develop into hunger and again, when becoming stronger and stronger, be directed to some object such as a certain portion of food. This becomes an apperceived passion of anticipated pleasure or hope and leads into volition.

Whereas Locke argues that uneasiness is the chief motive of our actions, Leibniz thinks that there are all kinds of impulses present to the mind, from disquiet to passions as can be seen from this passage in NE xxi, §39:

“Various perceptions and inclinations combine to produce a complete volition: it is the result of the conflict amongst them. There are some, imperceptible in themselves, which add up to a disquiet which impels us without our seeing why. There are some which join forces to carry us towards or away from some object, in which case there is desire or fear, also accompanied by, a disquiet but not always one amounting to pleasure or displeasure. Finally, there are some impulses which are accompanied by actual pleasure or suffering” (RB, 192).

This perpetual conflict affects human action in the sense that the decision which follows from this conflict is usually affected by minute perceptions and is thus a kind of compromise. On the other hand, the minute perceptions prevent indifference in the mind. We are never indifferent in the sense that we do not know whether to turn to the left or right – our choice is affected by the minute perceptions always present in our mind. These mingle with the objects of our desire or hope and what happens in our body.

Some Passions

Let us now take a look at some individual passions. With respect to individual emotions, Leibniz is clearly concerned about Locke’s tendency to explain the passions with uneasiness, which, for him is something less than them and have to be understood as separate from them. In general, Locke builds upon his theory of pleasure and pain as passions are modes of them. He tends to attribute uneasiness to having a central role in negative or harmful passions and delight in positive passions. In II, xx Leibniz is trying to persuade Locke to see that his notion of uneasiness simply does not have all the implications he thinks and that it is too crude a concept to explain emotions with. In the chapter the philosophers discuss many passions. Here I can give only some samples of the discussion. I have chosen the passions of joy and sorrow which, to Leibniz, are perhaps the most important ones and anger and envy where the differences between the philosophers are most pronounced.

In II, xx, §7 Philalethes argues that joy is a delight of the soul which arises from consideration of the present or the future good. Locke’s view of joy seems to represent pure hedonism. We are delighted when we receive the good (whatever it may be). For example, a hungry man feels joy when he gets some food or even learns that he will shortly get some. A father is happy about the happiness of his children and so on. Thus the good does not have to concern the moral agent, but it has to relate to him or her in some way. It is noteworthy, however, that the delight of joy concerns the mind in the sense that it is spiritual joy (pleasures of the body being species of the delight in the mind), not bodily joy as one would perhaps expect.

Leibniz finds himself, not surprisingly, in disagreement with Locke. He laments the limits of language and presents a distinction between *gaudium* and *laetitia*, adopting a somewhat paternalistic position towards his adversary by presenting a distinction which was not employed by Locke in the *Essay* (although Philalethes presents otherwise faithfully Locke’s position). The distinction has its roots in Stoicism where *gaudium* is related to

virtue and *laetitia* is equivalent to irrational joy (gladness) or the physical aspects of *gaudium*. Augustine follows this distinction and calls *gaudium* the real joy while *laetitia* is a drunken or otherwise sensuous joy⁶.

Somewhat surprisingly, Leibniz says that Locke is closer to *gaudium*. He says that *laetitia* can also be translated as joy, “but then joy appears to me to signify a state in which pleasure predominates in us” (RB, 166). He then proceeds to give examples of these kinds of situations which show that he places himself more in the *laetitia* camp. For example, we can get pleasure out of drinking something or hearing music even when we are otherwise unhappy. This is reasonable in the Leibnizian framework, as this description of joy is quite in line with the former points of chapter xx of book II – there is no complete state of joy, but we feel it and its opposite at the same time. When pleasure dominates over displeasure, we can be said to feel joy. Another feature of joy and sorrow which Leibniz discusses in the beginning of book I of NE is the fact that they are related to a moral instinct which is innate in us (RB, 88).

For Leibniz, joy seems to be more like a motivating feeling of activity than virtue, although the Leibnizian idea of joy seems to consist both of a rational component in the sense that recognizing goodness has to do with our innate ideas and of a fleeting sensuous moment, a sense of pleasure in the mind. In this way one can say that Leibniz’s conception of joy is closer to *laetitia*. Something feels good if it corresponds with our moral instinct and the innate idea of goodness. Joy can also be related to other emotions, such as love which is discussed earlier in NE II, xx, §3-5.

Perhaps Leibniz was influenced by Spinoza, who in his definition of joy [*laetitia*] argues that moving from inadequate ideas (smaller perfection) to adequate ideas (greater perfection) increases our power and consequently our joy and therefore we should increase our knowledge of God or nature⁷. The joy comes in degrees – the more adequate ideas we have, the more perfect we will become and the more we will understand God or nature. For Spinoza, joy is not a delight; it is a species of desire being the power of acting or activity (moderate joy)⁸. Leibniz naturally does not mention his name to which he was careful not to refer except to refute him. On the other hand, he also does not mention any other sources for his views on *laetitia*.

In §8 the discussion turns to sorrow, but true to his inclination not to discuss negative matters, Theophilus in fact continues to discuss further properties of joy. Locke argues that sorrow is either a present evil or a thought (in fact, uneasiness) of a lost good which we would have had longer. Leibniz agrees with the former, but says that sorrow can be a consequence of a distressing future. That is because he thinks his definitions of joy and sorrow are better than Locke’s. They are “more true to the common usage” (RB, 167). Theophilus then presents more criticism against the concept of uneasiness. He thinks sorrow cannot consist only of disquiet and argues that even joy can include some disquiet. This is

⁶ The distinction is related to a larger difference between the Stoic and Augustinian conceptions of passions. While the Stoics treated the passions as false judgements and identified virtue with knowledge, Augustine thought that the moral value of the passions must be related primarily to the will and there can be both virtuous as well as vicious affections. Thus the choice is not between reason and passion, but among the passions. Gaukroger: “Introduction”, in: *The Soft Underbelly of Reason*, edited by Stephen Gaukroger, Routledge, London, 1998, p. 6.

⁷ *Ethics* 3p11, Scholium.

⁸ *Ethics* 3p57.

good because it gives us something to improve upon. In his words: "joy...makes us alert, active and hopeful of further success." Thus he already turns to the topic of §9 which is hope. Included here is also a theme which is central in II, xxi, that is, happiness. It is an enduring joy but it has always to be cultivated. Thus disquiet plays an important part in joy – without it, men would become dull and inactive. But joy does not consist only of disquiet, it is a much more powerful emotion – a killing emotion, in fact, as Leibniz notes: "Joy has been able to kill people, through excess of emotion, and those cases involved something more than mere disquiet" (RB, 167).

Thus Leibniz cannot accept Locke's view that sorrow consists only of disquiet or uneasiness. Like joy, sorrow is a powerful emotion and we can become aware of it in the Leibnizian framework of impulses. Pure disquiet can create in us semi-sufferings, but real sorrow is something more substantial. In addition to present evil, Leibniz thinks that the fear of future evil can move us to sorrow. This is quite obvious and it is strange that Locke did not discuss it. Even in his framework the certain knowledge that the good we are now possessing will be lost shortly should bring uneasiness – especially as in the next point, §9 he gives an opposite case of hope where future good can motivate us.

Finally, I will take a quick look at anger and envy where the differences between the philosophers are very clear. In NE II, xx, §12 Philalethes relates anger to a state of uneasiness where we have been hurt and plan for a revenge. Here one can find his basic framework of absent good in full force. The absent good in this case is our revenge for the injury we have suffered. The anger is something that is directed to another person⁹.

Leibniz disagrees strongly with Locke, not wanting to explain the passion with uneasiness. He argues that anger is a more simple emotion and consists of a violent effort to rid oneself of an evil. Against Locke he insists that anger can occur also in animals who are not subjected to [mental] injury. His other point is that we can wish for vengeance even when we are calm (in this case the passion is more of hatred than anger). So Leibniz does not want to relate anger to uneasiness in any way. Anger for him is a simple violent passion. It is not quite clear, however, what he means by an effort to rid oneself of an evil. My guess is that his idea was that when we are angry, we return to our normal state quickly after the distressing element has been thought through (compare the metaphor of a clock above). But anger can occur at anytime if the object is strong and continuous. Some might be angry all through their lives.

Another remedy to this problem is suggested by Leibniz in II, xxi where he presents a kind of self-manipulation – or moral therapy-scheme where one adopts habits in order to help in resisting strong emotions. He argues that men should make themselves laws and rules for the future and carry them out strictly, avoiding situations that could corrupt them. They should render their conceptions of real goods more vivid by engaging in the useful activities the philosopher recommends, such as farming, gardening, making conversation and reading (II, xxi, §35). Another way of calming ourselves is naturally reasoning of which Leibniz discusses in various writings. With these methods we can put the cause of our anger into context and reflect the consequences and reasons related to it. In a word, we can cure

⁹ One might argue against Locke that one can feel anger about oneself. If somebody does something stupid and he or she is aware of it, it is quite usual to say that one is angry at himself or herself. But he does not address this.

the disquiet we feel. Leibniz's remedy for passions seems to be essentially the substitution of bad habits with good ones and this is arguably effective with the passion of anger.

Envy for Locke is the uneasiness of the soul which comes from a consideration of a good another person possesses and the thought that it should belong to us (II, xx, §13). As with anger, he relates envy to uneasiness, saying that envy arises when we desire a good and it is obtained by somebody else – and we think we should have had it. Similarly as in the previous point, Leibniz is eager to show that Locke's view is too limited. He is polite, but firm in discussing envy and points out that it even has a dangerous consequence, for Locke's view would mean that envy is something which is to be accepted and it is legitimate according to one's own opinion. Leibniz also says that envy is more often a general thought about the fortune of another and hope that the other person loses his or her good without a desire to have that good to one's own possession.

Thus Theophilus wants to separate envy from the whole idea of uneasiness which is a desire for an absent good and argues that envy does not necessarily mean that one really wants the other's possession of a good, but rather that the other person is less fortunate. In other words, we envy of another's goods even though we do not care for the good in question. And this has nothing to do with the loss of an absent good or uneasiness.

Leibniz says also that goods are often parts of a larger, harmonious whole – one cannot take one single good from another person and make it into one's own. A good is a part of one's lifestyle and when taken apart from it, may not have the same kind of glory in itself. For example, if I desire the great-looking jacket of another person and, due to his misfortune, I became the new owner of that jacket, it may not look as good on me as it did on that other person simply because it does not fit me or look good with my other clothes.

Locke's Response to Leibniz's Criticism

To finish, I will reflect briefly on the possible continuation of the discussion. Had Locke not died in 1704, an exchange of thoughts could have taken place, perhaps in a similar manner to Leibniz's correspondence with Samuel Clarke 1715-1716.

When one looks at chapter xx of book II, the central doctrine concerns pleasure and pain, as the passions are presented by Locke as modes of them. The picture of human action in the chapter essentially represents moral hedonism where our action is guided by a present or absent pleasure. For a perfectionist like Leibniz this is of course a problem, as his goals are pursued by a long-term systematic virtuous action.

However, it is well known that Locke was soon aware of the problem (through criticism by his friends such as Molyneux and van Limborch) and tried to develop his views on the rationality of moral action in the later editions of the *Essay*, especially by adding a doctrine, according to which men can suspend their action in order to deliberate anew in light of substantial evidence. Leibniz read the 4th edition of 1700 which included Locke's new doctrine, but was not convinced by his efforts¹⁰ and often presents Locke as a simple moral

¹⁰ In NE II, xxi, §47 Leibniz does not regard uneasiness as a grave danger to human action. He notes that usually the suspension of desire takes place only when it is not strong enough or even when there is a strong desire, we can tame it by blocking it with contrary inclinations. He recommends good habits in order to keep the strong desires in control (RB, 195-196).

hedonist, so one would have expected that Locke would have defended his later view against Leibniz's criticism – this is supported by the fact that the topic has been popular in recent scholarship on Locke¹¹.

Second, as my discussion above shows, Leibniz was not convinced by Locke's efforts to explain various passions with the concept of uneasiness. He could not accept a single principle which would guide our moral action, so Locke would have had to persuade him with some additional arguments. A central topic in the discussion would of course have had to do with the idea of imperceptible perceptions.

So third, Leibniz would have had to persuade Locke to accept his minute perceptions which to him are so helpful in understanding human action and which are also useful in explaining disquiet and the passions. But Locke would have no doubt challenged the view that minute perceptions accumulate and develop into clear-cut emotions. He would have had trouble accepting pleasures and pains of which we are not aware. And if he was not persuaded in this by his adversary, Leibniz's whole alternative theory of human action would have been rejected by the Englishman. This, to my mind, would have been the probable outcome of the debate¹².

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Leibniz et le concept de « passion de l'âme »

Position du problème

« Ceux qui ont voulu une entière séparation et des manières de penser dans l'âme séparée, inexplicables par tout ce que nous connaissons, et éloignées non seulement de nos présentes expériences, mais, ce qui est bien plus, de l'ordre général des choses, ont donné trop de prise aux prétendus esprits forts et ont rendu suspectes à bien des gens les plus belles et les plus grandes vérités, s'étant même privés par là de quelques bons moyens de les prouver, que cet ordre nous fournit. »¹

Ainsi s'achève le très long chapitre XXI du livre II des « Nouveaux Essais », où il est question de la puissance et de la liberté, et quelques lignes avant notre passage, de la distinction entre les actions et les passions de la substance.

Si l'on ne peut expliquer par l'ordre naturel des choses que l'âme puisse avoir des manières de penser propres à sa séparation d'avec le corps, est-il possible en revanche de rendre compte de ce qui « lui » arrive quand elle est unie, c'est-à-dire selon Leibniz, *toujours*, et plus particulièrement, quand le sujet pensant est non seulement sujet de ses pensées, mais de ses passions ?

Si l'on suit le propos de Théophile, nos « présentes expériences » (dont les affections font partie au premier chef) et surtout l'ordre général des choses, interdisent de concevoir une telle séparation. Paradoxalement, c'est l'épreuve sensible et métaphysique de la constante unité formée par l'âme et le corps qui seule est susceptible de fournir les instruments théoriques de la preuve que l'âme est immortelle et qu'elle a la puissance de s'élever à la connaissance des vérités éternelles, indépendamment des affects issus du corps ; en d'autres mots, qu'elle est proprement raisonnable. Nous ne nous attarderons pas sur cet apparent paradoxe pour le moment, il nous suffit de noter que les « plus belles et les plus grandes vérités » rendues suspectes aux yeux de ceux qui n'ont pas été convaincus par l'idée d'une complète séparation de l'âme et du corps au moment de la mort, concernent certainement l'immortalité de l'âme et son élévation possible aux vérités nécessaires. Les partisans de la séparation auraient donné à l'adversaire, sans doute matérialiste, des armes de choix. Mais en quoi positivement les concepts leibniziens permettent-ils non seulement d'expliquer naturellement l'immortalité de l'âme raisonnable, mais surtout la nature de nos « présentes expériences » ? La situation est quelque peu déroutante, car en posant à titre de principe métaphysique quelques lignes plus haut que « les âmes et les esprits ne sont jamais sans organes et sans sensations, comme ils ne sauraient raisonner sans caractères »², Leibniz ménage comme un vide dans sa pensée. On n'y trouve à proprement parler aucune théorie des passions de l'âme. Comment le comprendre ?

Le « Traité des passions de l'âme », que Leibniz a lu et en partie commenté³, vient, comme on le sait, mettre à l'épreuve quelques uns des axiomes fondamentaux de la métaphysique cartésienne : si le sujet des passions est le composé humain, corps et âme formant l'unité indéfectible du siège des affects, comment maintenir inchangé l'axiome de

¹¹ See, for example, Chappell, "Locke on the Freedom of the Will", in: *Locke*, edited by Vere Chappell, Oxford University Press, 1998, 86-105 and Magri, "Locke, Suspension of Desire, and the Remote Good", in: *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, vol. 8 (2000), 1, 55-70.

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¹ « Nouveaux Essais » (NE), II, XXI, 73 ; GP V, 197.

² NE, II, XXI, 73 ; GP V, 197.

³ Voir « De Affectibus », Grua, II, pp. 512-537.