Thomas Aquinas, By Analogy, Might Share Heil’s Problems With Grounding

Abstract: Jonathan Schaffer, among others, has argued that metaphysics should deal primarily with relations of “grounding.” I will follow John Heil in arguing that this view of metaphysics is problematic as it draws on ambiguous notions of grounding and fundamentality that are unilluminating as metaphysical explanations. I take this to be an argument that “grounding” relations do not form a “natural” class, where a “natural” class is one where some member of that class has (analytic or contingent a posteriori) priority among others and explains order among other members in the class. To strengthen Heil’s criticism that “grounding” is a non-natural class of relations, I will draw on an unlikely ally. St. Thomas Aquinas’s “analogy of being” doctrine, if accurate, offers reasons that no categorical relations (like grounding relations) form a natural class.

Keywords: grounding, Aquinas, Heil, Schaffer, analogy, relation

Jonathan Schaffer, among others, has argued that metaphysics should deal primarily with relations of “grounding.” Metaphysics, on Schaffer’s view of the metaphysical project, lists not what beings exist, but investigates instead how the world is structured among levels of “being,” some of which are more fundamental than others. I will follow John Heil in arguing that this view of metaphysics is problematic as it draws on ambiguous notions of grounding and fundamentality that are unilluminating as metaphysical explanations. I take this to be an argument that “grounding” relations do not form a “natural” class, where a “natural” class is one where some member of that class has (analytic or contingent *a posteriori)* priority among others and explains order among other members in the class.

To strengthen Heil’s criticism that “grounding” is a non-natural class of relations, I will draw on an unlikely ally. St. Thomas Aquinas’s “analogy of being” doctrine, if accurate, offers reasons that no categorical relations (like grounding relations) form a natural class. Aquinas, then, shows how Schaffer’s view succumbs to Heil’s criticism that grounding is not a natural class of relations – grounding is in fact only an analogously-related set of notions, where each particular kind of grounding derives its nature from the specific ontological “category” to which it pertains. Neither mereological dependence nor existential nor causal dependence, for instance, has “natural” priority to help fix an unambiguous unity among “grounding” relations. Ironically, Aquinas has in his sights a view much like Schaffer’s ”priority monism” – the view that the universe has priority as the ground of all concrete thick particulars, which are understood as parts “grounded” in the whole – as an absurd implication of failing to attend to the metaphysical doctrine of analogy in this respect.

1. Schaffer on Grounding

Contemporary metaphysicians have only recently explicitly taken up the question of what makes for a uniquely metaphysical explanation, but a common way thinkers construe distinctively metaphysical explanation is as an explanation by appeal to relations of “grounding.”[[1]](#endnote-1) I take it that Schaffer’s emphasis on the centrality of “grounding” is representative of such a way of thinking about metaphysics as explicating kinds of existential dependence. Schaffer contrasts his view with the Quinean project, which is to say what exists: “What exists forms the domain of quantification. The domain is a set (or class, or plurality)—it has no internal structure. In other words, the Quinean task is to list the beings.”[[2]](#endnote-2) By contrast, the Aristotelian project is to point to those entities that are more fundamental – upon which beings depend for their existence. Thus, the Aristotelian and Quinean projects differ in two respects: “First, while the Quinean will show great concern with questions such as whether numbers exist, the neo-Aristotelian will answer such questions with a dismissive yes, of course. Second, while the neo-Aristotelian will show great concern with questions such as whether numbers are fundamental or derivative, the Quinean will have no concern with this further question.”[[3]](#endnote-3) One such dependence relation is the traditional Aristotelian “categories,” which Schaffer sees as “best understood as different ways of depending on the primary beings.”[[4]](#endnote-4)

Schaffer argues against any attempt to identify “grounding” with relations like supervenience or counter-factual existential dependence, which would be modal concepts leaving the ontology untouched.[[5]](#endnote-5) Rather, grounding centrally involves a primitive relation where things can “depend” upon other things for their existence in various ways; grounding is: “irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. It thus induces a partial ordering over the entities (the great chain of being), with foundations (the substances, the foundation post for the great chain of being).[[6]](#endnote-6) Consequently, Schaffer’s metaphysical task involves investigating the structure of existential dependence relations and the structures that are produced by such relations of hierarchical dependence. This leads Schaffer to posit an “ordered” (as opposed to a “flat”) ontology, where there are distinct levels of being and some beings are more fundamental than others. The more fundamental entities are those upon which others depend for their existence.[[7]](#endnote-7) In Schaffer’s case, this view culminates in a priority monism where all depends on the world/Cosmos.[[8]](#endnote-8)

1. Heil’s Response

In a recent *Synthese* article, “Truthmaking and fundamentality,” Heil directly engages with the view that grounding relations are central to metaphysical explanation. He associates grounding with claims about “fundamentality,” where metaphysics investigates the grounding relations among more and less fundamental entities. The view entailed by these claims of fundamentality, like that of Schaffer, is that reality is hierarchical; the world is an ordered set of fundamental and non-fundamental entities.[[9]](#endnote-9) Heil proceeds to argue that the notion of truthmaking provides a better conceptual approach for considering ontological dependence relations, and that such an approach shows why the focus on “fundamentality” and “grounding” is wrong-headed.

This is not because “grounding” relations are non-existent, or that there is no sense in which some things might be more fundamental than others, but rather that these terms are overly vague, including far too many disparate notions to be helpful. We might say that “grounding” and “fundamentality” pick out no *natural* class of relation; there is at most a kind of family resemblance. As Heil says, “it would be more perspicuous, in particular cases, to say which species of dependence is intended. Is it the dependence of wholes on parts? The dependence of properties on their bearers? The dependence of effects on causes? Or something else? Replacing talk of such relations with invocations of fundamentality and grounding is unilluminating, analogous to a case in which an A’s being identical with a B, is described as one in which the A supervenes on the B: true, perhaps, but yielding a net loss of information. If wholes are grounded in their parts, properties in their bearers, and effects in their causes, the grounding in question—the variety of dependence in play—is importantly different in each case.”[[10]](#endnote-10)

But Schaffer anticipates an objection that his notion of grounding is ambiguous, classing together a non-natural set of relations and having only a name in common: “I see no more reason to consider this a case of mere homonymy, than to consider various cases of identity as merely homonymous. In both cases, there is a common term, and the same formal structure. This is some evidence of real unity. At the very least, I would think it incumbent on the objector to provide further reason for thinking that the general term ‘grounding’ denotes no unified notion.”[[11]](#endnote-11) Schaffer’s response, then, is to put the burden of proof on the objector to show that grounding signifies no “unified general notion” – which, in my use of the term here, would be equivalent to showing that grounding relations do notform a natural class.

1. Aquinas on Analogy

Heil provides some considerations in view of undermining the unity of the grounding relation. If one recognizes the different species of dependence, Heil points out that: “dependence of the A’s for their identity on the B’s does not imply that the B’s reality is in some fashion attenuated relative to the A’s and certainly does not generate a hierarchy of levels.”[[12]](#endnote-12) Heil has further offered extended arguments in his *From an Ontological Point of View* that a view that reality involves levels is more broadly theoretically confused.[[13]](#endnote-13) Rather than rehearse these other arguments here, I want to turn to an unlikely ally that strengthens the criticism by offering arguments that grounding cannot be a natural class of relations. As I will argue, St. Thomas Aquinas provides us theoretical resources for thinking that Schaffer’s grounding relation is inappropriately explanatory, strengthening Heil’s criticism from an unlikely source: the analogy of being doctrine itself. Whatever cross-categorical predicates we utilize, like grounding relations, will literally mean quite different things when applied to different kinds (i.e., categories) of being.

Schaffer relies on *abstraction* to characterize “grounding” relations. Schaffer explicitly notes, “all the grounding relations are relations of abstraction. The concrete whole is always prior in nature to its abstracted aspects.”[[14]](#endnote-14) While I will return to Schaffer’s exact view of the nature of “abstraction,” there is at least superficial terminological parallels here with modern Thomistic scholarship, which, following Msgr. John Wippel, has emphasized a distinction Aquinas points out between two orders of mental operation: abstraction and separation. Abstraction (*abstractio*), as Aquinas uses the term, refers to mental operations directed at abstracting some part of the essence or nature of the thing considered. By contrast, separation (*separatio*/*compositio/divisio*) aims at the actual existence (*esse*) of what is considered.[[15]](#endnote-15) We can summarize by saying that separation is a kind of judgment about whether a thing considered exists or not (including, e.g., whether a property exists or not in a subject), whereas abstraction is consideration of a real *aspect* of a thing, such that what it considers is “separable in reality.”[[16]](#endnote-16) What Aquinas means by the latter is that abstraction involves grouping what is considered under genera and species, regardless of whether we consider properties or subject or anything else.

Wippel contrasts separation as a “negative judgment,” where one realizes what it is to be a “being” or existent is not restricted to any particular genus or species.[[17]](#endnote-17) One cannot more and more abstract out some overall genus common to all existent things, because it seems impossible to find some real *property* all things that exist have in common. In fact, then, there is here not only an epistemological point about operations of the mind, but a connection to the “analogy of being” doctrine. Aquinas argues that “being” (*ens*) cannot be a genus, in virtue of which there would be a common real (not merely notional) property of “existence”. The argument Aquinas presents hinges on the claim that a genus must be at least conceptually distinct from its specific differentia. Whatever differentia we would add to the genus of being to pick out species of being would have to be outside the genus.

We can paraphrase the argument here to note that we have to differentiate “being,” if it were a property, from other properties we could attribute to things. But being of some sort is included in any property or aspect whatsoever; *being* straight or red or coloured or a subject or even a merely an object of thought involves *being* some way or another. The only other properties not involving “being” would be non-being, absences, privations, etc., and these precisely do not exist.[[18]](#endnote-18) So it seems impossible to take seriously the position that “being” is a genus, a common attribute functioning like a property, because “being” is inseparable from any other property we could possibly attribute to anything. This is to say that the notion of “property” (or “substance”) is just something like “a way something exists,” and so “being” cannot be merely one property alongside others as it characterizes the very notion of “property.”

This allows us to outline how Aquinas understands “categories” and how these relate to metaphysics, having as its task of the scientific study of “being *qua* being.”[[19]](#endnote-19) Here I will use the term “category” to refer more broadly to any distinctly metaphysical classification or division of being, rather than referring only to the ten Aristotelian predicaments. Aquinas thinks the task of metaphysics is to distinguish both the sense in which different entities are different (namely, by reason of kind or nature of being), and the way in which entities are similar (namely, by appeal to common properties of being). But this might seem problematic on what was just said. If “being” is not a unified concept like a genus or a property common to anything that exists, on what basis can we group together metaphysical categories and consider them as accurately dividing “being”?

Aquinas follows Aristotle in the claim that “being”, or “what is”, (“ens sive quod est”) has different meanings that are related by “analogy” to a primary meaning – and the primary meaning of “being” is existing as a concrete particular substance or subject.[[20]](#endnote-20) Then he lists “modes of being,” which are the overarching categories for everything that could be called a “being,” on his ontology. Thomas lists these four: negations/privations, generation/corruption (i.e., processes of becoming), accidents (i.e., properties; Aquinas understands the ten predicaments to be types of accidents[[21]](#endnote-21)), and substantial being.[[22]](#endnote-22) Second, after listing modes of being, which are – as it were – types of beings, Aquinas goes on to argue that metaphysics also concerns itself with “common attributes” (“huiusmodi communia”) of being. Among these are concepts such as “same/different,” “unity” or “oneness”, and others.[[23]](#endnote-23) But Aquinas does not think any of these items on his lists have any one *property* in common. Rather, what it means to be a being in each case is respectively diverse, even though all senses are ordered to a primary notion, included in the concept of every other – namely, being as a substance/subject. Properties, for example, are ways *a subject* is*.[[24]](#endnote-24)*

1. Analogical Worries for Grounding

The topic of the “analogy of being” in Aristotelian and Thomistic scholarship is controversial and so I will not expand significantly on the broad outlines so far presented. However, consider whether each of the “modes of being” in Aquinas’ account is more-or-less “fundamental.” One might think, as Schaffer does, that substance is the most “fundamental.” Aquinas claims “substance” grounds the other modes, first, insofar as the *meaning* of the modes are concerned. This is to say the intelligible content (*ratio*) of other notions of “being” entail reference to “substance”-type being.[[25]](#endnote-25) Further, properties (i.e., “accidents”) exist *in* substances, and other modes have “being” only in relation to substantial being (and their identities depend on substances).[[26]](#endnote-26) This is to say they have existential dependence upon substances. But Aquinas not only thinks that properties depend upon substances for their existence, but also that, in a different order, substances *depend* on their properties! Properties determine their substances to *be* in certain ways.[[27]](#endnote-27) E.g., it is by reason of the tomato’s *redness* that it reflects light of a certain wavelength, not because of its essence as a tomato.

There is no conflict, in Aquinas’ mind, because the notion of dependence is itself an analogous one that depends on the order of “being” one is discussing.[[28]](#endnote-28) One sees this in Aquinas’ discussion of a notion closely related to contemporary concepts of “grounding”: participation (*participatio*). Aquinas distinguishes at least three related senses of “participation” and relates them to each other on the basis of the various beings discussed, such as accidents participating in subjects, or particulars participating in universals, or an effect participating in its cause, or substances participating in their accidents.[[29]](#endnote-29) Participation is a contextually sensitive predicate, requiring the specification of a sense of “being” in order to be meaningful, because the meaning of the predicate depends on the specification of a category according to which one thing participates in another. Each relation that answers to the predicate “participation” is categorically distinct. It should be obvious that, while one kind of being can participate in another, participation is not applicable to “being” itself; “that which is can participate in something, but to be itself cannot participate in anything.”[[30]](#endnote-30) It doesn’t make sense to talk of “being itself” participating in something else, as “being” is not a *thing* (as Heidegger liked to insist). What Aquinas does not explicitly state but is a clear consequence of everything said about analogy in metaphysics is that participation is an analogous notion that is “indexed” against a particular category. That “being” itself cannot participate also entails that there is no one participation relation which is cross-categorical (in Thomas’ language, participation is not a “common attribute” or transcendental property of “being”), but only the predicate is cross-categorical. Something has to be a member of an ontological category – a *thing* – to evince a particular *kind* of participation. One can’t merely participate “in general.” But, *mutatis mutandis,* grounding too is a categorical notion. We have to specify a type of thing (a category) in order to have a grounding relation, and none of these types of relation has natural priority over the others.

Returning here to Schaffer’s notion of grounding as an abstract relation, it seems the “grounding” relation is parallel to Aquinas’ “participation” relation. Schaffer could think of “grounding” being an abstraction insofar as it picks out one common property of all things – a common relation of dependence, although the relata might differ. This could be one way to construe his claim that “grounding relations should just be ways of separating out aspects that are implicitly present from the start.”[[31]](#endnote-31) But Aquinas has now shown us why this cannot be true: as in the distinctions Thomas drew in regard to “participation”, he might also hold that “grounding,” while a cross-categorical predicate, picks out no “natural class” of relations. There is no “natural class” of such grounding relations because the relations of grounding-dependence will differ in each category, and there is no single cross-categorical or even privileged meaning of that dependence. So there just is no common, generic relation “grounding,” and so no natural kind of generic “grounding” relations.

John Heil’s criticism of “levels” of being, while intended to criticize “nonreductive physicalism,” is premised on a similar viewpoint: “Pressure to countenance levels of reality—levels of being—issues from the idea that whatever serves as truth-maker for various assertions must bear an appropriate logical relation to those assertions ... a correspondence conception that we have no good reason to accept.”[[32]](#endnote-32) The “levels” view, Heil thinks, entails that there is a property corresponding to every predicate, including (for example) “exists”. This is what Heil calls Principle Phi: “When a predicate applies truly to an object, it does so in virtue of designating a property possessed by that object and by every object to which the predicate truly applies (or would apply).”[[33]](#endnote-33) This principle is entirely unnecessary and produces paradoxical conclusions.[[34]](#endnote-34) Aquinas agrees with Heil’s diagnosis: one cannot think of “being” as a common property or genus to which our existential predicates (“exists”) correspond.

A more sympathetic way of reading Schaffer is that there is a naturally *primary* meaning of the grounding relation. As Schaffer claims, “a sorting presupposes a prior dependence ordering over the entities. Categories are places in the dependence ordering. Substance, for instance, serves as both root node and focal category.”[[35]](#endnote-35) We could read this as: the primary meaning of the “grounding” relation is “to depend existentially on a substance.” But, first, analyzing grounding this way is unhelpful because “grounding” would seem to mean giving existential dependence counterfactuals. And, as Schaffer himself notes, “[existential dependence counterfactuals] are problematically contextually variable, and the analysis goes vacuous on necessary entities.”[[36]](#endnote-36) This is unsurprising from the Thomistic viewpoint, from what we have said about the context sensitivity of what it *means* for things to depend, participate, or ground in different orders of being. But, more importantly, the naturalness of this relation would still be in question. What it is for a property to depend existentially on a subject is *vastly different* from what it is for a substance to depend existentially on another; children depending on their parents to come into existence is not at all like the way the circularity of my espresso cup depends on the cup. Therefore, as Heil argues, characterizing the task of metaphysics as picking out grounding relations is unhelpful because grounding relations are not a natural class. While “being” itself has a “naturally prior” sense in the notion of “substantial being” that grounds the analogous senses of “being, there is no reason to think “grounding” is anything more than a *categorical* relation (relations are one of the predicaments, after all). As categorical, “grounding” does not have cross-categorical naturalness – there is no category to which it applies more properly than another.

Finally, it could seem Schaffer could take refuge in “fundamentality.” This can be summed up in his moniker: “Some domains are metaphysically privileged.”[[37]](#endnote-37) On one hand, Aquinas too thinks that “substance” is a more fundamental meaning of the term “being” than, for example, the way we can say an absence or privation is a “being.” Substances can even said to be more perfectly “beings” than other things, because they exist “of themselves.”[[38]](#endnote-38) But it should be noted that the way substance is more fundamental does not entail the vision of “levels” of being, but only a distinction of *category*. Aquinas distinguishes two distinct metaphysical questions about principles of being: [1] principles of “being” common because of the *meaning* of “being” (i.e., *categorical* questions), and [2] the principles of being insofar as there is an order of existential dependence among all beings (e.g., by way of universal causal dependence of all things on God).[[39]](#endnote-39)

Schaffer collapses these two distinct orders. But it is noteworthy that Aquinas thinks collapsing these two orders has disastrous consequences for your metaphysics. One could collapse the meaning of “being” to substantial being, given that you identify the *categorically* fundamental with the *causally* fundamental, and this Aquinas thinks (absurdly) entails Parmenidean monism.[[40]](#endnote-40) But, despite the apparent similarity to Schaffer’s position, there is another position more exactly analogous in the environs which Aquinas also raises as an second way to collapse these two orders: “Melissian” monism. Melissus, Aquinas claims, made a similar mistake to that made by Parmenides. Whereas Parmenides collapses “being” to its meaning in cases of substantially unified being, Melissus considers being only in terms of material dependence – the priority of a substratum to its modifications. Melissus therefore thought that there was one substance, a material unity, of which everything was a proper part. [[41]](#endnote-41) Melissian monism therefore categorically prioritizes substances, according to which other things can depend upon it like parts depend on whole or properties on substances. This has obvious parallels to Schaffer’s monism, where “from priority monism plus universal decomposition, the entirety of the actual concrete mereological hierarchy of thick particulars is generated.”[[42]](#endnote-42) But Aquinas thinks it makes the mistake of failing to understand there are fundamentally different kinds of dependence relations that vary according to the modes of being in question.

Distinguishing categorical from casual dependence undermines the Schaffer-esque “levels of reality” view. As Heil notes: “the fact, if it is a fact, that the tree decomposes into a dynamic constellation of particles does not show that the tree is less-than-fundamental entity, and certainly not that it is a ‘higher-level’ entity. Learning that the tree is a particular, organized, interactive collection of particles is not to learn what ‘grounds’ the tree, it is to learn what the tree is: what makes it true that this is a tree.”[[43]](#endnote-43) Similarly, if substances are more fundamental in the categorical sense, as Aristotle and Aquinas hold, this is only to say that substance is a central notion in what we mean by “being,” insofar as substance is that to which other meanings of “being” are referred. Even when Aquinas says that God is “*esse ipsum subsistens* (being itself subsisting)” or other similar phrases, the meaning of these phrases is not that God possesses more being as if it were more of some property, but rather that He is the prime efficient cause of everything that exists, that His existence is identical to His essence, and so forth.[[44]](#endnote-44)

I have not aimed to show more globally how Aquinas’ views would coincide with Heil’s truthmaker account of metaphysical method, or that Aquinas’ views would be compatible with the claims Heil makes in regard to our conceptual schemes being relative to our interests.[[45]](#endnote-45) Nevertheless, it should be thus far obvious that Aquinas, despite apparently endorsing a “levels of reality” view of metaphysics, employs his “analogy of being” doctrine to undermine precisely that kind of view about metaphysics. The problem with “grounding” is that it is an analogous concept. Grounding can be discussed fruitfully, but only by clearly distinguishing contexts in a way that makes Schaffer’s project otiose. Grounding relations of conceptual or causal dependence, for example, do not form a natural class that will be illuminatingly grouped together for the purposes of metaphysical explanation, and confusing the two orders is what entails a problematic priority monism. At least in regard to Schaffer’s notion of grounding, fundamentality, and priority monism, Aquinas and Heil find themselves allies.

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1. Aside from Schaffer below, see Johannes Persson, “Explanation in Metaphysics?” in *Metaphysica* 12 (2011): 165-181; Jonathan Shaheen, “The Causal metaphor account of metaphysical explanation,” in *Philosophical Studies* 174 (2017):553-578; Naomi Thompson, “Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation,” in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 116/3 (Oct. 2016): 395-402. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Jonathan Schaffer, “On What Grounds What,” in *Metametaphysics*, D. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 348. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Ibid., p. 352. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Ibid., p. 356. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Ibid., pp. 363-365. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Ibid., p. 376. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Schaffer, pp. 351, 354-356. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Ibid., p. 378. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. John Heil, “Truthmaking and fundamentality,” in *Synthese*, online (2016): 2. [https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1292-9] [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Heil, “Truthmaking and fundamentality,” 5. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Schaffer, pp. 376-377. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Heil, “Truthmaking and fundamentality,” 10. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. John Heil, *From an Ontological Point of View* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), esp. pp. 17-39. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Schaffer, p. 377. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. John Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 2000), pp.24-25. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, pars 3, q. 5, a. 3, resp. [Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei, secundum quam res intellecta aliquem gradum in entibus obtinet... Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei, quod quidem resultat ex congregatione principiorum rei in compositis vel ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur.... secundam operationem intellectus non potest vere abstrahere quod secundum rem coniunctum est, quia in abstrahendo significaretur esse separatio secundum ipsum esse rei, sicut si abstraho hominem ab albedine dicendo: homo non est albus, significo esse separationem in re.] [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. John Wippel, “Metaphysics and *Separatio* in Thomas Aquinas” in *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1984), pp. 78-79. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. C.f., Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia Libri Metaphysicae* [*Meta.*], I, lec. 9, n. 138. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Aquinas, *Meta.*, IV, l. 1, n.530-531. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Ibid., n. 535-539. [Alia enim dicuntur entia vel esse, quia per se habent esse sicut substantiae, quae principaliter et prius entia dicuntur.] [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. C.f., *Meta*. V, lec. 9. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Ibid., IV, l. 1, n. 540-543. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Ibid., IV,l. 2, n. 548. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 80-83. Beyond Aquinas, we could also appeal to the causal potency of whatever could qualify as a ‘being’ – things ‘exist’ if they effect causal differences in the world. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Cf. Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas,* pp. 81-82; Aquinas, *Meta.,* XI, l,3, n. 2197. [In his vero quae praedicto modo dicuntur, idem nomen de diversis praedicatur secundum rationem partim eamdem, partim diversam. Diversam quidem quantum ad diversos modos relationis. Eamdem vero quantum ad id ad quod fit relatio. Esse enim significativum, et esse effectivum, diversum est. Sed sanitas una est. Et propter hoc huiusmodi dicuntur analoga, quia proportionantur ad unum. Et similiter est de multiplicitate entis.] [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Aquinas, *Meta*., IV, l. 1, n. 543. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. C.f., Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, III, q. 77, a. 1, ad. 4. [non habebant ipsa esse nec alia accidentia, sed substantia eorum habebat huiusmodi esse per ea] [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri de ebdomadibus*, c.2, l. 2. C.f., Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 86-87. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. C.f., Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 97-99. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. Schaffer, p. 378. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. Heil, *From an Ontological Point of View*, p. 56. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. Ibid., p. 26. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. Ibid., pp. 30-39. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Schaffer, p. 356. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. Ibid., p. 364. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. Schaffer, p. 371. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. Aquinas, *Meta.,* IV, l. 1, n. 543. [Quartum autem genus est quod est perfectissimum, quod scilicet habet esse in natura absque admixtione privationis, et habet esse firmum et solidum, quasi per se existens, sicut sunt substantiae.] [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. C.f., *De Trinitate*, q. 4, a. 4, resp. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. C.f., Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 68-69. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. Aquinas, *Meta.*, I, l. 9, n. 140. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. Schaffer, p. 379. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. Heil, “Truthmaking and fundamentality,” 7. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. C.f., *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 13, a. 11. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. C.f., Heil, “Truthmaking and fundamentality,” 7-8. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)