Integralism and Justice for All

Abstract (150 words): Catholic integralism is a tradition of thought which insists upon the ideal nature of political arrangements on which the Church can mandate the State to advance the supernatural good of the baptized. Thomas Pink, one of the foremost defenders, has proposed controversially that these arrangements are ideal because the Church possesses rights to civil coercive authority. But I argue this fact would not entail – by itself – the ideal nature of those arrangements. To the contrary, I argue that integralism is unjust, even assuming Pink’s claims are true. The integralist ideal necessarily involves violating moral duties toward unbaptized citizens. Integralism does so in imposing differential civic burdens upon baptized/unbaptized citizens and in implying that non-Catholics might be rightly excluded from power merely on account of religious beliefs, both without just cause. I conclude by showing that readings of the relevant Catholic teaching can be given which are non-integralist.
Catholic integralism has received a lot of attention recently, promoted by pundits and scholars alike.\(^1\) Much ink has been spilled in scholarly venues discussing historical evidence marshalled by defenders of integralism, notably Thomas Pink, who argue that the Catholic Church has rights to the coercive power of the State in service of its religious mission.\(^2\) My interest in this piece is different. I aim simply to show that integralism is unjust. To prove this, I propose two problems that illustrate the integralist position entails violations of distributive justice or the rights of non-Catholics. It is important to highlight that my argument that integralism is unjust will not require denying Pink’s controversial views about the power of the Church to direct State policy. In other words, I presume the truth of Catholicism and Pink’s controversial readings of Church documents, but show that these readings do not allow us to arrive at the view that integralism is true. What my argument attacks is not that the Church has such powers, but that there is any identifiable ‘ideal’ political arrangement in which these powers are exercised.

Pink has attempted to show that – contrary to popular perception – the Vatican II declaration on religious freedom, *Dignitatis Humanae*, is compatible with integralist positions. Appealing to arguments given by Francisco Suarez, Pink argues that the Church has rights to the coercive power or authority of the State. On this reading, “the authority to direct and coerce in matters religious …belongs to the Church. It no more belongs to the state than it belongs to private individuals.”\(^3\) Instead, the Church is a coercive authority which can impose ‘temporal penalties’ on its members.\(^4\) Further, the baptized acquire obligations to lend the Church their temporal authority in service of its mission; thus, “rulers and officials of Christian states – [fulfill] their baptismal obligations to the Church in lending her their power and resources to hold other baptized Christians to their baptismal obligations.”\(^5\) Consequently, the Church has an right, given its coercive authority to impose temporal penalties on its members, to the temporal power which baptized rulers hold, in service of its mission.\(^6\)

Pink’s interpretation of what was called the Church’s ‘indirect power’ over government therefore involves a strong thesis that the Church has God-given rights to utilize civic coercion for its own supernatural ends. I will refer to this controversial thesis about ‘indirect power’ as the ‘Suarezian thesis’ (but will not be concerned with whether his view accurately represents Suarez). Pink and other integralists claim that this strong thesis about a native or intrinsic right of the Church to the coercive power of the State is doctrinally binding on Catholics.\(^7\) But Pink’s view of that indirect power is controversial among Catholic theologians. Theologians as

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5 Pink, “What is the Catholic doctrine of religious liberty?” 41 & Pink, “The Interpretation of *Dignitatis Humanae*,” 87.

6 E.g., Pink, “What is the Catholic doctrine of religious liberty?” 14.

noteworthy as Avery Dulles, Joseph Ratzinger, and John Henry Newman explicitly reject this interpretation that the Church has native or intrinsic rights to civil coercive authority. For my purposes, I will concede the Suarezian thesis and illustrate that it is theoretically independent of integralism. Indeed, I will argue that integralism is false even if the Church did have a claim to temporal coercive power of the State. Integralism is more than the Suarezian thesis, does not follow from it, and does not strictly require it.

The essay will be structured as follows. I will begin by providing clarifications on the meaning and nature of the integralist thesis. Then I will propose two arguments to show that, even if the Suarezian thesis were true, it would not entail that integralist states are the ideal political arrangement. What I will show is that there is no good sense in which integralist states are politically ideal. This is not to say integralist states are always impermissible. There are constraints that integralists themselves accept on when integralist states are permissible, and only when these constraints are met is an integralist state supposed to be politically ideal. I will construe the constraints charitably. Then I will show both that integralism lacks any good justification for the claim that its preferred political arrangements are ideal or normative, and that integralism is unjust in ignoring moral demands made upon Catholics by non-Catholic citizens.

Unpacking Integralism

The integralist ideal admits of different formulations and has been described in a number of ways. Not all are helpful for arriving at what is unique about the view. Some propose there is no separate ‘State’ that exists over and against the Church as a distinct complete society. Instead, the Church is the only complete society, which has a temporal and a spiritual power. A danger of this formulation, however, is that it appears to delegitimize all non-integralist states. That looks overly strong. For instance, if an integralist include the distinction that non-integralist states are ‘legitimate enough’ in some respect to be able to exercise true political authority, even though they fail to meet the political ideal, then the claim about the Church being the only complete and perfect society seems a distinction without a difference. It would not be a plausible integralism on which political authority cannot be legitimately exercised outside of an integralist state or independent of ecclesial hierarchy.

The key to the integralist thesis lies in its vision regarding the primacy of the spiritual authority of the Church over merely temporal authority of the State. Integralism involves a holistic approach to the nature and scope of power: that of the Church, the State, and the way in which these (normatively) interrelate: “… there are two powers that rule [man]: a temporal power and a spiritual power. And since man’s temporal end is subordinated to his eternal end the

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11 Biblical data militates against it, since the New Testament encourages obedience to pagan civil authorities; e.g., Rom. 13:1, 1. Tim. 2:1-3; Tit. 3:1; 1 Pet. 2:13-14; Mk. 12:17.
temporal power must be subordinated to the spiritual power.” Church and State have distinct ends or aims. Church authority (exercised by the College of Bishops with its head, the bishop of Rome) aims to promote the supernatural good of its members in parallel with the authority of the State promoting the (natural) temporal good of its members. The State’s authority only extends to temporal good (although the State has duties to religious truth) and so any authority that the State exercises over the supernatural good of its citizens derives from the Church.

On this picture of the relation between the powers of Church and State, when these two come into conflict, the Church takes priority. Nevertheless, integralism does not concern merely a possible case of overlap. The State should recognize the authority of the Church (‘indirect power’) to direct the State in promoting supernatural goods. The Church thus authorizes an expansion of the jurisdictional scope of the State in order to advance supernatural goods directly, e.g., policies which punish offenses against the faith or promote Catholic worship, etc. There is no requirement that those policies advance the spiritual good in virtue of advancing some other element of the temporal good. Finally, political arrangements that facilitate exercise of the Church’s indirect power are politically ideal. Integralists believe the doctrine of the Catholic Church, as they understand it, generates a “need for a confessional Catholic State.” Integralism is therefore supposed to follow from Catholic doctrine, not (for example) from empirical data as to which arrangements produce the best outcomes.

In short, then, I will characterize integralism as the thesis that: those political arrangements under which the Church can mandate the State to directly advance supernatural goods are ideal. Countries which implement arrangements on which State power is legally or constitutionally made available for supernatural aims of the Church are ‘integralist states.’ Integralist states follow Church mandates which aim to use civil power to directly advance the supernatural good of baptized citizens. Integralists then claim that Catholic teaching mandates belief that such integralist states are the ideal form of political arrangement for a Catholic country.

Integralists nevertheless affirm there are constraints. First, achieving the supernatural good cannot involve violating the religious freedom of the unbaptized. Thomas Pink is clear that this is a requirement of Dignitatis Humanae. (Although this does not prevent ‘indirect’ coercion of the unbaptized in view of protecting the baptized from deleterious spiritual influences).

While all integralists adhere to the view that the State can directly promote supernatural goods under the direction of the Church, all do not adhere to the same vision of religious coercion. For many integralists, religious coercion potentially if not ideally includes coercive measures against, e.g., proselytism by non-Catholics. Yet John Milbank, endorsing a ‘left integralism,’ is cautious about expanding scope for coercion, although he endorses the central claim that the State should

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18 E.g., Pink, “What is the Catholic doctrine,” 11-12.

advance supernatural goods.\textsuperscript{20} Often, such questions as to whether and to what extent religious minorities will have freedom within integralist states are deferred as ‘merely prudential’ because “there is a wide range of potential applications” of integralist principles.\textsuperscript{21}

A second constraint is that integralism does not require thinking that advancing the supernatural good is of such immense importance that integralist states might ignore their duties to promote the temporal common good and dedicate all civic power to advancing supernatural goods alone. While it is true that the supernatural good of union with God is of infinite value and the natural good of filial piety to your parents is of much lesser value, Catholic moral theology does not countenance sacrificing the latter to the former. For example, if your parents are sick and need you to stay home to take care of them, then you are excused from attending Sunday Mass. Integralism has such a stipulation ‘built in’ to its concept of Church-State relations, since the State’s proper task is the promotion of the temporal common good. The State requires a form of ‘deputization’ by the Church in order to exercise civic coercive authority in advancing supernatural goods.\textsuperscript{22} And the reason for this is that the State’s proper task is not advancing supernatural goods. Promotion of supernatural goods by the State might undermine other aspects of the temporal or supernatural common good, and the Church would not be entitled to undermine the proper good of the State \textit{excessively} by its mandates.\textsuperscript{23}

Finally, by ‘ideal’ in this context, I do not think we should be overly specific. Integralists might differ on exactly the way in which such an ideal \textit{guides} policy decisions or activism. There is a sense in which, as we will see, integralists like Pink take integralist states to be normative insofar as there are moral duties incurred by baptism that regard use of political power; e.g., Christian rulers have duties to obey the Church and use political power in Her defense. The accidental circumstances that excuse Christians in political power today (as opposed to their medieval forebears) from acting on such duties are not merely variant, but abnormal; integralists have said these circumstances are “often criminal and always regrettable.”\textsuperscript{24} But we can leave these qualifications to the side. I am not going to discuss the way in which the ideal is action-guiding. My concern lies with the ideal. I will argue that integralist states do not constitute the political ideal. If integralist states constituted the political ideal, that ideal would entail that certain duties to non-Catholics do not exist or can be legitimately violated on the basis of the reasons integralists propose. But I will argue, in two different contexts, that these duties exist and cannot be legitimately violated for those proposed reasons. Consequently, the integralist ideal is unjust.

**Problem 1: Unjustified Burdens**

A significant motivation for integralism is the theology of baptism. Baptism generates moral burdens on the baptized themselves as well as others, such as godparents and parents of the baptized, and the rest of the Church. Baptism is what makes it appropriate for the Church to


\textsuperscript{21} See also Ménard and Su, 1209-1212; Edmund Waldstein, “All We Need is Everything”.

\textsuperscript{22} E.g., Pink, “Interpretation of Dignitatis Humanae,” 86; \textit{Immortale Dei}, esp. nos. 3-14, 33-35.

\textsuperscript{23} We can grant that there might be borderline cases as to whether that Church direction ‘excessively’ undermines the State’s ability to achieve the temporal common good. The constraint is only that there are \textit{some} limits.

use its pastoral authority to encourage faithfulness to those baptismal vows. Pink points out that, at the Council of Trent, the following canon was approved:

Can. 14. If anyone shall say that those who have been baptized [...] as infants, when they have grown up, are to be questioned whether they wish to ratify what the sponsors promised in their name, when they were baptized, and if they should answer that they are not willing, that they must be left to their own will, and that they are not to be forced to a Christian life in the meantime by any other penalty, except that they be excluded from the reception of the Eucharist and of the other sacraments until they repent: let him be anathema.

Pink argues that this canon exemplifies the Catholic Church’s claim, as taught de fide, that such temporal penalties are appropriate to ensure fidelity to baptismal obligations. Pink then cites documents, such as the Fourth Lateran Council’s requirement that Christian rulers aid in suppressing heresy under pain of excommunication, as verifying the Suarezian thesis of the Church’s claim to civil penalties.

Nevertheless, it bears repeating that the Tridentine canon has nothing to do with the Church’s power to employ civil penalties. Strictly speaking, the canon only requires affirming the appropriateness of penalties that go beyond the purely spiritual (exclusion from the sacraments) might sometimes be appropriate for violating one’s baptismal vows. Nor does Canon 14 unequivocally state that temporal penalties are requisite, given that it embeds the assertion about appropriateness of penalty within a conditional statement about a position where adults are to be questioned whether they accept vows made on their behalf. Even if it were granted that this were a canon applying to Church coercive power, the canon does not require us to hold that specifically civic penalties are appropriate means to ensure faithfulness to baptismal vows. The canon can be read regarding the Church’s ability to impose temporal penalties from its own means without governmental assistance. For example, the Church might only be able to inflict temporal penalties on its members such as any other private family, corporation, or association within the State is capable. Or, conversely, to withdraw various temporal goods within the Church’s power (e.g., benefices, eligibility for employment) would be the infliction of a temporal penalty by the Church upon its members in order to advance their supernatural good.

The Tridentine canon does state unequivocally that obligations incurred by baptism are incurred on account of baptismal vows made by others on behalf of the baptized, not only by baptismal vows made by the baptized themselves as competent adults. The canon does not specifically state that valid baptism alone, received (for example) irregularly without anyone making baptismal vows or by force or outside of the Catholic Church, makes it appropriate to use temporal coercive power to ensure that the baptized live as good Catholics. Baptism by itself gives the baptized moral reasons to live a Christian life, and constitutes them a member of the

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27 Pink, “Interpretation of Dignitatis Humanae,” 97-100.

Church, but the mere fact one is baptized need not always generate public obligations which make civic or temporal coercion appropriate.\textsuperscript{29}

In order to avoid such complications, we can assume charitably that integralists need not assume such a strong claim. Integralist can hold that Catholic baptismal vows in \textit{ordinary} circumstances (including infant baptism) make it appropriate for the Church to use their coercive power to ensure that people making such vows are faithful to them. The Church can then direct the State to advance the spiritual good of the baptized (assuming the Church has this power), including by coercive penalties, whether that individual would consent to these penalties, \textit{given that} such persons have made baptismal vows in regular manner and can be held accountable for them. We also assume that those who made vows as adults are more appropriate targets of sanction than those who were baptized as infants.

This being said, integralism is not merely a view that adult converts \textit{merit} being punished for violating their baptismal vows or that it is \textit{permissible} to advance their supernatural good by encouraging faithfulness through State policies. Integralists hold that a political arrangement on which the State advances spiritual goods is \textit{ideal}. An integralist state is one where all the baptized are potentially objects of direct state action that aims at their spiritual welfare. Yet one of the constraints discussed earlier requires that the unbaptized who live in integralist states are not objects of direct state action aiming at their spiritual welfare.

The integralist state can, at most, act to promote or discourage those natural goods that indirectly advance the spiritual good of the unbaptized; “The unbaptized may not be forcibly converted; but their religious activities may be restricted so as to limit their impact on the lives of Christians. […] Similarly, the metaphysical freedom of a Hindu or Shinto polytheist does not protect them from coercion, by the state, into some form of monotheistic belief as well as practice.”\textsuperscript{30} These penalties are licensed only by the way in which monotheism is naturally knowable to be true, and thus jurisdiction over natural religious goods are supposed to be (classically) within the remit of State without mandate of the Church. There is thus an asymmetry between the way in which the integralist state can act toward its baptized and unbaptized citizens.

Further, the mere fact that the integralist state takes baptism as a possible basis for state action imposes disproportionate burdens and demands on these two groups. Baptized persons are subject to possible penalties that the unbaptized are not; unbaptized persons will not be afforded any possible benefits that encourage the baptized to pursue supernatural ends. Clearly, there is a reason for these disproportionate burdens: the public, ecclesial obligations of baptism. But there are two problematic effects of the fact that the \textit{State} is being given license to enforce these obligations.

First, integralist states raise the social costs of baptism beyond what might seem reasonable or justified. (And this point is made even more severe when we include consideration of the way in which infant baptism is a normative Catholic practice.) The benefits and obligations of baptism are essentially spiritual. But, within an integralist state, the prospect of baptism involves assuming potential civil benefits and liabilities. Why think these civil burdens are reasonable? Even observant Catholics lack \textit{individual} strong moral reasons to accept such

\textsuperscript{29} Classical manuals would distinguish such persons are objectively bound by ecclesial law but nevertheless subjectively excused; see Charles Callan and John McHugh, \textit{Moral Theology}, revised and enlarged by Walter Farrell (London: Herder and Herder, 1958), no. 429. The 1983 Code of Canon Law thus treats baptized Protestants as exempt from its merely ecclesial laws.

\textsuperscript{30} Pink, “What is the Catholic doctrine,” 11, 13.
burdens. You can affirm that marriage vows are binding or morally serious and not thereby have strong reasons to create additional incentives for your future good behavior by, for example, signing a contract that adultery would be punishable by forfeiture of all your goods. Nor does the Suarezian thesis alone provide a suitably strong moral reason for an individual to assume these burdens, as it does not claim that Church use of such power is mandatory. The integralist thesis that does the normative work is the claim about an ideal political structure, and that is a logically separate thesis from the account of indirect power. One could acknowledge indirect power of the Church, as integralists conceive it, and think it should remain a dead letter.31

The same is true conversely for the unbaptized within integralist states. The unbaptized are objects of state action possibly either in having their civil liberties curtailed (to protect the spiritual good of the baptized) or in being denied benefits that baptized citizens can enjoy. For any individual unbaptized person, no individual needs to have committed anything deserving of these restrictions in order for them to apply. Any given unbaptized person might be ‘invincibly’ non-culpably ignorant of the need for baptism and have done nothing deserving of spiritual censure. Similarly, the unbaptized can meet all the same criteria for being part of the nation as any baptized person and have done nothing deserving of limitations of their liberties. There is no strong moral reason to impose these benefits/demands on any individual unbaptized person merely because they are unbaptized. The argument that integralists should make for these burdens must be a structural argument that these social costs are justified in terms of the common good.

There are nevertheless strong moral reasons to treat people equally unless we have strong reasons not to do so – an integral element of the common good lies in duties of distributive justice. Aquinas therefore notes a law is unjust “when burdens are imposed unequally on the community, although with a view to the common good.”32 Unequal burdens require strong justification in terms of moral desert or duty. Rawls’ well-known ‘Difference Principle’ proposes that we have strong reasons to treat people differently only if resulting inequalities are to ‘the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.’33 The Difference Principle thus understands distributive justice to involve a requirement that structural inequalities benefit those who are most disadvantaged. Whereas Rawls’ principle is controversial, what sort of benefit might be acceptably strong as to constitute a moral reason parallel to that represented by the Difference Principle?

First, there is no plausible parallel justification that integralists can offer that the disadvantages of the unequal distribution of burdens and demands on non-Catholic members of integralist states is being outweighed by the corresponding benefits to non-Catholics of living in integralist states. If the only justification for the integralist’s ideality thesis is that it advances the spiritual common good of the baptized, then that integralism violates a plausible principle of distributive justice by imposing unequal burdens/benefits which are not justified in terms of the good accruing to the unbaptized. One can imagine a scheme which gave greater benefits to some citizens in view of greater burdens under the law. But this is not the issue here; the greater burdens in view of which greater benefits might be given to the baptized would not be burdens

32 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologicae [ST], trans. English Dominican fathers, 2nd and revised ed. (Benzinger Bros., 1920), I-II, q. 96, a. 4, resp.
incurred in light of the temporal common good (e.g., as serving in the army might merit preferential treatment), but in terms of their supernatural good.

Second, the temporal common good unique to democratic states looks violated by these differential burdens. Recall the constraint that the Church can permissibly mandate the State directly to advance the spiritual good, if by doing so the temporal common good (or other aspects of the spiritual good) is not excessively undermined. While it hard to specify ‘excessively undermine’, there are good reasons to believe that this constraint cannot be met by integralist states that aim to be compatible with democratic governance. In contemporary democratic states, an essential component of the temporal common good is that of a public order in which the citizens collectively rule themselves and in which the organs of State power are publicly accountable.\(^{34}\) If it were legitimate on merely religious grounds to exclude some citizens from political participation, or deny them civil rights, the common good which consists in the legal equality of all citizens looks violated. Integralists treat these citizens unequally without a justification in terms of that common good which includes democratic governance.\(^{35}\)

Third, integralists might claim that living in integralist societies is better for all, including non-Catholics, and that we can know this from facts about the way that the supernatural good will impact the State’s activities. However, the integralist needs to show not only that advancing the supernatural good will benefit all, but that the political arrangement involved to do so will benefit all without undermining the temporal common good and supernatural good in other respects. That is, integralist states need to be better at advancing the good of all citizens than it might be to advance the supernatural good without those arrangements. If integralist states were not better, than the possible disadvantages to the temporal good look unnecessary and unjustified – certainly, then, integralism would not be political ideal. And even if the Church had a right to civil coercive authority, it would then be unjustified for the Church to exercise that authority if it could achieve just the same or better results without appeal to civil power.

And I see no good justification that the integralist state is better at promoting the supernatural good, while meeting the aforementioned constraints, than any other possible alternative (or even ‘realistic’ possible alternative). Proving integralist states are ideal in this way would require proving that the coercive power of the State promotes the supernatural good more effectively than any purely spiritual means (or, any non-integralist political arrangement in addition to those purely spiritual means). Is it plausible, on Catholic doctrine, that State power is more effective in advancing the supernatural good than the supernatural means given by Christ to the Church? I think not. Such a thesis appears to me not only unprovable, but – indeed – somewhat sacrilegious.

Interlude - Transition to Problem 2

Note that the first argument made no assumption as to whether the Church does have the controversial rights of ‘indirect power’ to civil coercive penalty. Rather, the argument is that it looks impossible to substantiate the integralist thesis that an arrangement on which that power is

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35 JS Mill thought legal equality did not rule out a ‘plural voting’ scheme that gave more political power to the more educated. Yet Mill argues that denying participation would be unjust; “[i]ndependently of all these considerations, it is a personal injustice to withhold from any one ...the ordinary privilege of having his voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs in which he has the same interest as other people” (*Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, Vol 19. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977: 469).
utilized constitutes the political ideal. The political arrangement which allowed the Church to mandate State policy would require justification in terms of the common good of all citizens – and that this cannot consist merely in the fact that advancing the supernatural good promotes that common good of all, but that advancing the supernatural good by means of the State does so, thereby justifying the differential burdens/benefits introduced by the constitutional arrangements. The integralist would thus need not merely to show that supernatural goods are of benefit to all in society, but that coercive civil authority advances the supernatural good better than any possible purely spiritual (and other mixed non-integralist) alternative. And this looks impossible, given Catholic doctrine that the Church lacks any political power.

Notice too that I have not argued that it would always be wrong for the Church and State to advance the supernatural good together. Rather, I argued that there is no way to conclude that the integralist political arrangement is an ideal means for advancing that good, either because the supernatural good can be advanced without an integralist state or because advancing that good by means of an integralist state adds nothing to the value of the supernatural good. Instead, there is a strong presumption against any legal mechanisms that introduce differential civil burdens/benefits on account of religion. The reason there is such a presumption is that we have duties to non-Catholics. This first problem thus argues that we have duties (in distributive justice) toward non-Catholics which cannot be violated in light of the general considerations advanced by integralists.

Nothing about the common good appears to imply we lack such duties or that ground legitimate violation of them. There simply seems to be no reason that we can arrive at from facts about the common good that licenses the violation of distributive justice required in differentially distributing burdens and benefits among baptized/unbaptized citizens. Integralists therefore can go one of two ways in response to my first argument. They can either argue that such duties (in distributive justice) toward non-Catholics do not exist, or that such duties are legitimately overridden by other duties. What follows in the second problem is an attempt to cut off both of these strategies of retreat.

The integralist thesis is that integralist states (in which Church can mandate State policies advancing the supernatural common good) are the political ideal. The situation under which integralist states are supposed to be ‘ideal’ is highly abstract, however. But it is typically conceded, for example, that the integralist State would only be feasible where baptized Christians constitute over 50% of the population, or in “a country in which the people and traditions were overwhelmingly Catholic.” Unsophisticated integralists might attempt to argue that there is nothing wrong with violating distributive justice when it concerns non-Catholics. Catholics have no moral obligations in justice toward non-Catholics in regard to their objections to an integralist constitution. But it would be highly implausible to hold that this requirement in having a majority Catholic population before establishing an integralist state were not a moral constraint, but only a matter of practical feasibility in implementing integralism effectively.

The unsophisticated position, in essence, holds that non-Catholic objections do not count simpliciter against the legitimacy of integralist state arrangements. The consequences of biting the bullet are quite significant, however. This would entail that non-Catholics could never hold political power legitimately or that non-Catholic constitutions are not legitimate, in the same way that a Nazi, warlord, or pirate government is not legitimate. If integralism took such a radical view of legitimacy, integralist states are incompatible with separation of powers, multi-party

36 Storck, 26.
37 Crean and Fimister, 99.
competitive democratic politics, and so forth. As John Courtney Murray once argued, if integralism requires that consent of the people would be an insufficient justification for any separation of power, integralism would thereby undermine the legitimacy of separation of powers and limited government or constitutionalism.\textsuperscript{38} Conversely, and more seriously, if non-Catholic objections truly did not count against legitimacy, then integralism would entail the legitimacy of ‘colonialist’ takeovers of non-Catholic populations – when feasible – so as to impose a Catholic government upon them, for their own good. Since Catholics have no moral duties to respect the legitimacy of non-Catholic government arrangements, and they have duties to promote the common good, it would be beneficent or even a duty to impose an integralist government upon non-Catholic populations. Such views have been, nevertheless, staunchly rejected by Catholic theological tradition.\textsuperscript{39}

There is something wrong with imposing a confessional state on a non-Catholic population, even when practically feasible. In line with the presumption that we construe integralism charitably, the better and more reasonable view is thus that integralist governments require a strongly Catholic population for their legitimacy. Integralists are demure as to what makes such facts relevant to legitimacy and in what ways, but it should be obvious that statistics alone are not the criteria of legitimate government.\textsuperscript{40} Clearly, integralists are not the sort who can accept typical liberal accounts of political legitimacy as requiring justification, e.g., before all reasonable citizens. Nevertheless, eccentric theories about the ‘divine right of kings,’ or natural patriarchal authority, or views of sovereignty deriving from extreme authoritarians, such as Carl Schmidt or Joseph de Maistre, are not strictly required by the integralist thesis.\textsuperscript{41} Integralists can accept some criteria according to which governmental power is constituted and exercised legitimately. And non-Catholics obviously are held to affect those conditions, given that integralist states would not be legitimate if there were too many non-Catholics (or the like).

**Problem 2: Legitimacy and Duties to Non-Catholic Citizens**

A sophisticated integralism holds that supernatural duties override our natural duties of distributive justice to non-Catholics. The basic justification will be that the supernatural common good of the Church makes demands upon Catholics. These demands include a duty to protect the Church from harm. If Catholics live under non-Catholic government, then the State might command Catholics to act against their supernatural duties. For this reason, duties to the supernatural common good override our duties toward non-Catholics. Catholics should prefer that the Church can constitutionally exercise its indirect power over government, thereby defusing constitutionally any potential conflict of religious and civil duties. We can express integralism’s thesis as the view that reasonable, informed Catholics necessarily have a rational preference for integralist states.\textsuperscript{42} This phrase then captures the normative core of what integralists need to defend.


\textsuperscript{41} Ménard and Su, 1177, 1204-1218.

The ideality of integralist government is supposed to follow from Catholic doctrine of baptism. Baptism generates moral obligations for baptized Catholics to follow the Church’s directives, including in their capacity as public officials. Recall the Suarezian thesis does not follow merely from the Tridentine canon above. That canon only teaches appropriateness of temporal punishment, not that it must be civil punishment by the State. Thomas Pink is a sophisticated integralist who thus argues that there is also a standing obligation on Christians in political office to submit their political power to the Church. He argues that Church teaching has taught that baptism generates an obligation “of Christian rulers to cooperate in the enforcement of baptismal obligations, and the kinds of penalties open to the Church to authorize.”

He adduces evidence from historical cases where the Church excommunicated rulers who failed to punish heresy in their territories, or otherwise failed in a duty “to aid her in her exercise of her coercive authority.”

Nevertheless, textual cases of the Church apparently calling upon the ‘secular arm’ with the force of moral obligation, such as Lateran IV, can be interpreted variously—we need to know why or in what way public officials are obligated by baptism to lend support to the Church. Without a clear account of those moral obligations, it would be easy to undermine integralist’s thesis that such political arrangements are ideal. Pink is diffident but admits that these obligations on Christian rulers appear to be excused outside of a constitutionally Christian state.

Even if we assume that the Church has indirect power in order to mandate Christian rulers to advance the supernatural common good, under appropriate conditions, the mere fact of that power tells us nothing about the conditions under which it is exercised legitimately, including whether it must (or ideally) be exercised by means of a constitutional mechanism. Specifically, the existence of that power does not tell us that these ‘appropriate conditions’ are politically ideal. One could thus simply deny that the arrangements under which Christian rulers cooperate with the Church to exercise her coercive authority (integralist states) are ideal. Then, a right of the Church to mandate civil coercive penalties (the Suarezian thesis) would be irrelevant to whether an integralist state is ideal.

Obligations to Aid the Church

Pink justifies that ideality in terms of an individual obligation of baptized Christian rulers to put their power at the disposal of the Church. His arguments for such an obligation derive from Suarez and Bellarmine, who argue that the Church requires this support from rulers in order

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45 Ibid., 100.
46 Ibid., 119: “It might well be that only in the context of such [Christian, integralist] states could baptism ordinarily obligate officials to exercise coercive state power on the direction of an authority distinct from the state and based on that baptism.”
47 Charles Journet, for example, was sympathetic to a point with the Suarezian thesis that the Church could call upon State power in specific instances in regard to its own members, but Journet himself denied that establishment is the ideal or that the State would have positive duties in regard to support of the Church’s mission. See Roger Nutt and Michael De Salvo, “The Debate over Dignitatis Humanae at Vatican II,” The Thomist, Vol. 85, No. 2 (April 2021): 175-226.
to protect the Church from harm. These arguments ultimately derive from those offered by Thomas Aquinas in in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 10. Aquinas argues that unbelievers do not lose their legitimate political authority over believers – believers are still required to obey pagan rulers after their conversion, as biblical sanction dictates (1 Pt. 2:13). Nevertheless, Aquinas points out that biblical evidence also dictates (1 Cor. 6:1) that believers should not put themselves under the authority of unbelievers voluntarily. The reason for this is that unbelievers having authority poses a potential danger to the faith, as when a master orders his slave to act contrary to his faith.

...it would provoke scandal and endanger the faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their superiors to comply with their commands, unless the subjects are of great virtue: moreover unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they see the faithful fall away.

Aquinas also claims that the Church has the power to overrule the legitimacy of such *dominium* being exercised over believers by unbelievers, even outside of Christian countries:

[unbelievers’] right of dominion or authority can be justly done away with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the authority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief deserve to forfeit their power over the faithful who are converted into children of God.

Aquinas’ position assumes, as Suarez later argues, that the Catholics are in control of whether to put themselves under non-Catholic rulers and does not therefore sanction revolt against non-Catholic rulers merely on grounds that they are non-Catholic. Non-Catholic political arrangements are and remain legitimate. The claim is that, if it were entirely up to Catholics, then Catholics would have obligations to establish an integralist state; these conditions only exist “…when a new subjection of the faithful to an infidel prince depends on consent and desire of the faithful.”

Catholics legitimately wish to be able to fulfill their moral obligations to their faith. If a non-Catholic government’s existence poses a standing danger to the practice of the Catholic faith, this generates the rational preference for integralist regimes. Similarly, given the Church’s supernatural mission, if the Church decided that this subjection posed a danger to the faith of the Catholics, the Church could exempt believers from their otherwise normative obedience to non-Catholic government (assuming the exemption did not otherwise undermine the supernatural and natural good, e.g., causing scandal). The possibility of civil obligations coming into conflict with or endanger the fulfilling of ‘higher’ supernatural obligations is what grounds the purported duty of Christian rulers to submit their power to the Church.

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49 ST II-II, q. 10, a. 10, resp.
50 ST II-II, q. 10, a. 10, resp.
51 Francisco Suarez, *Defensio Fideo Catholicae et Apostolicae contra Errores Anglicanae Sectae*, (1872 reprint, Naples), trans. Peter L.P. Simpson (CreateSpace, 2012), Bk II, Ch. 4, no. 5 - 6.
52 What Aquinas says elsewhere about legitimacy in government indicates that lawmaking among ‘free peoples’ (in democracies or republics) requires consent of the whole people (ST I-II, q. 97, a. 3, ad. 3). In this vein, Aquinas rejects the legitimacy of *dominium* that is imposed by force without the consent of the subject or with coerced consent (*In Sententias* II, d. 44, q. 2, ad 5). It is not plausible that, on Aquinas’ account, Catholics even when holding a majority could legitimately impose an integralist constitution on their non-Catholic fellows. Thus, Suarez understands the Church to be able to dispense Christian faithful from the power of pagan kings only when there is grave danger to the faith. Even on Suarez’ expansive notion of the Church’s indirect power it is implausible that the Church can dispense Christians from considering their fellow non-Catholic citizens’ wishes in choice of constitution merely because of the fact that those citizens are not Catholic. See Suarez, Bk II, Ch. 4, No. 7 & 12-13; Bk III, Ch. 23, No. 14.
53 Ibid., no. 5.
The Modern Situation

However, there are serious lacunae in Aquinas’ position which affect the rationale for sophisticated integralism. The Church today does the opposite of prohibiting its members to submit to non-Catholic governments. This is not an incidental policy change, but a reflection of a change in the modern situation which Aquinas did not foresee. Aquinas simply did not envision a third option of governments in which religious freedom and other human rights are protected constitutionally. It is therefore open to non-integralists to admit even the Suarezian thesis and nevertheless argue that, under governments that would protect the right to religious freedom as laid out in contemporary Church teaching, there is no principled danger to the free exercise of the faith by individual believers or to the Church’s freedom or its mission. There are consequently no good grounds, within the modern situation, for Catholics to prefer integralist states to governments that protect religious freedom.

Pink argues that non-Catholic governments which do not facilitate exercise of the indirect power pose a standing danger to the practice of the faith. For example, he argues that public reasoning will degrade into persecution of the Church without the integralist political arrangement. Since, on his reading of Dignitatis Humanae, the right to religious freedom consists in the fact that the State has no competence in matters of religion, the right to religious freedom implies a duty to recognize the Church’s competence. “Religion will only be publicly acknowledged as a good transcending state authority by those states that also publicly acknowledge the supernatural end, that is, the truth of religion in supernatural form.” If the Church is the only body which has jurisdiction over the supernatural good, the ‘secular’ State inevitably will fail to be responsive to the Church’s rights as long as it fails to confess Catholicism and put itself at the Church’s service.

Pink’s argument is fallacious. On the one hand, Pink draws a false parallel between constitutional regimes involving freedom of religion and ‘secularization.’ He argues that, apart from integralist states,

...service of a genuinely common good... is only possible if the state recognizes both natural law and the transformation of law and public reason brought about by the raising of religion to a supernatural good. No genuinely non-Christian state can be relied upon to recognize either of these things. States that do not recognize them will become confessors of false belief opposed to Christianity, and their great power will turn from supporting Christianity to opposing or even repressing it, especially in relation to its moral teaching. As the rapid movement of many western states from genuine support to increasing enmity toward Christianity illustrates, there is no stable middle way.

It is not obvious that every possible non-confessional state will inevitably believe itself capable of directing religious affairs and tend towards suppressing religion. As long as such a state adopts clear protections of religious liberty, it is hard to see why this inevitable, even given the forces of sin in the world. But Pink’s claims specifically target Jacques Maritain’s proposals on Church-State relations. Maritain had argued that the age of Christendom was a ‘sacral age’ in which functions of Church and State were not adequately distinguished, under which the State was commonly understood to have an official religion, whereas the contemporary situation is a

54 “Problem of Church and State,” 33.
‘secular age’ in which “the unity of religion is not a prerequisite for political unity.” As long as the Church can fulfill her mission without harm under these conditions, the obligations on Christian rulers to exercise political power in service of the Church’s defense now take on a different form: public officials are bound in conscience to exercise their power in keeping with Church teaching about the common good.

Pink proposes that the point of decision between Maritain’s project and integralism lies in whether “political secularization—the detachment of the state from any particular religion and so from the Church—now [provides] the best means to ensuring that religion is respected as a transcendent good, as Maritain supposed?” But this is misleading. Maritain was not arguing that detaching the State from religion is the best way to bring about respect of religion. Maritain was explicitly calling for a Christian political society which would then influence society through Christian democratic politics. Maritain holds that the State should be Christianized by a transformation of what today we would refer to as its civil society, non-governmental organizations, rather than by constitutional establishment. In modern circumstances, Maritain thinks, a ‘lay’ state would still be one that publicly acknowledged the existence of God, but need not be specifically Catholic in its confession (as long as it allowed the full freedom to the Church in advancing the supernatural good).

But then it is misleading to believe we can evaluate Maritain’s programme for Christian democracy without differentiating: whether a purported hostile secular drift in non-confessional states exerted pressure that naturally tends to eliminate or suppress attempts to Christianize civil society (making Maritain’s project hopeless) or, whether the failure of a Christian civil society in the last century decreased Christian influence over government and thereby brought about problems for Christians. The latter possibility would not show Maritain’s project of ‘Christian democracy’ to be an inevitable failure, any more than the fact that Christendom dissolved would show integralist states to be an inevitable failure. Pink is selective in his consideration of the facts.

Nevertheless, no defense of Maritain’s project is needed to see that the alternatives are not mutually-exhaustive of the logical space. We can consider a possible Catholic confessional state which protects religious freedom as understood by Dignitatis Humanae and nevertheless does not have constitutional mechanisms for exercise of indirect power. Such a confessional state would not be straightforwardly ‘secular’ but is also not an integralist state. Pink’s defense of integralism requires treating anything short of constitutional exercise of the Church’s ability to exercise Suarezian indirect power over civil coercion as ‘secularism’ that poses a danger to the Church. If confessionally Catholic non-integralist states do not pose a danger to the Church’s mission, however, integralism is false. Is it plausible that even confessional Catholic states of this sort are an inevitable danger to the Church? I see no reason to think so. Then integralist states are not required to protect the Church from harm in modernity, and so Christians have no rational preference for integralist states, just as Christian rulers have no standing obligations to put their power at the disposal of the Church.

56 Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, 160.
57 Ibid., 163-164.
59 Ibid., 175-179.
60 Ibid., 172-173.
On the other hand, Pink argues that *Immortale Dei* of Pope Leo XIII seems to teach that the union of Church and State, as ‘soul to body,’ constitutes an ideal of Christian government. This further argument aims to show that mere non-recognition of the Church’s indirect power constitutes a harm to the Church, i.e., a harm to the promotion of the supernatural good. This sort of justification, however, would be circular. What is in question is whether soul-body unity is harmed by the mere fact that political rulers do not put their coercive authority at the disposal of the Church. Under a regime of constitutional protection of the rights of the Church, the only reason that this would constitute a harm is if rulers had a *de facto* duty positively to advance the cause of religion merely in virtue of their recognition of the truth of Catholicism. The integralist cannot merely assume that the supernatural good of Catholics necessarily includes the integralist state.

It is also not Aquinas’s (or Suarez’s) argument that failure to recognize the indirect power of the Church over temporal government power constitutes a standing harm to the Church. Aquinas’ own position does not involve any claim that the indirect power of the Church must be exercised by constitutional mechanisms to advance the supernatural good in any positive way – which is what would be necessary to ground such a standing harm to the Church. The justifications for exempting believers from *dominum* of unbelievers are negative: to prevent harm that could ensue from political authority exercised by unbelievers, e.g., commanding Christians to act contrary to their faith. Aquinas does not justify the dominion of believers, for example, by appeal to the fact that State power is necessary for advancing the supernatural good.

Further, I do not see that any of these claims in *Immortale Dei* or similar magisterial claims about such union require us to hold that integralist states are the only way to fulfill the duties indicated. Indeed, it is striking that none of the documents Pink cites from the recent papal magisterium of the 19th century mentions the need for the State to facilitate the Church’s employment of its coercive power but only of the State’s need to follow the truth. While it is strictly beyond the scope of my paper, as it requires much more intensive textual work, I want to propose a general non-integralist framework for reading pre-Vatican II teaching on the duties that the State has toward the ‘true religion’ and so toward supernatural goods (the case would obviously be bolstered if one can interpret these documents such that the Suarezian thesis is not plausibly doctrinally requisite).

Imagine that the State is bound in justice to promote what is really or in truth good for human beings, as far as it lies in its power. The State would thus have obligations to obey the truth taught by the Church not as a consequence of a positive right to State power, but insofar as

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64 [Link].
66 Pope Pius XI, *Quas Primas* (originally published Dec. 12, 1925; https://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_11121925_quas-primas.html, accessed May 18th, 2022): “a public duty of reverence and obedience to the rule of Christ” and an error to hold that “Christ has no authority whatever in civil affairs” (nos., 17-18). These duties are toward “not such religion as [individuals] may have a preference for, but the religion which God enjoins, and which certain and most clear marks show to be the only one true religion,” (*Immortale Dei*, no. 6).
the Church in fact teaches the truth about supernatural goods: e.g., “what conduces to true beatitude and what hinders it are learned from the law of God, the teaching of which belongs to the office of the priest.” Church teaching on Church-State relations in subsequent eras followed this basic pattern that the Church would inform State policy by its teaching as regards the truth of the moral law and the law of Christ, whereas States have obligations to obey such laws insofar as it is in their power.

However, the obligation of the State to follow the moral law or the law of Christ ‘as it is within their power’ does not license any need for denying non-Catholics political participation in affairs of State (violating distributive justice), nor give the State any positive obligation to include constitutional mechanisms for exercise of Church authority over its policies. The State duty to the truth therefore implies nothing about the ideality of integralist states, because the recognition of truth (such as the truth about the Church as divinely-appointed teaching authority) does not generate an obligation to employ coercive authority in its favor. Ironically, we can employ Pink’s own reasoning in favor of such a reading:

“Just because some person or group or institution has a duty to recognize a given truth, it does not follow that on the same basis it need have any authority of its own to enforce that truth and coerce on its behalf. This does not follow for private individuals, nor for institutions— not even when, unlike a private individual, that institution has a coercive authority of its own in other matters.”

At most, then, State obligations towards the truth generate rational preference for constitutional recognition of the truth of Catholicism within a framework of religious freedom protections that prevent civil discrimination against non-Catholics. Such a position appears to fulfill duties of the State to ‘true religion’ without any integralist state. Consequently, there is at least one possible situation in which ‘soul-body’ harmony between Church and State can be achieved without an integralist state. Integralism is then not necessary to fulfill these duties of the State.

**Duties to Non-Catholics in Confessional States**

My first argument undermined integralist assumptions that curtailing rights would be justified in terms of the common good. That first argument was that there are strong moral reasons from distributive justice for not distributing societal burdens/benefits unfairly. Integralist states are unfair because these differential distributions are not appropriately in favor of the common good. My second argument argues that religious belief does not constitute just grounds to exclude anyone from political participation within modern situations where religious freedom can be constitutionally protected.

The only plausible grounds in which Catholics can have a rational preference for Catholic government lie exclusively in circumstances when governmental power exercised by non-Catholics would pose a serious threat to moral obligations of Catholics. In the modern world,

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68 Aquinas, *De Regno*, no. 116.
69 Leo notes that Catholics have a duty to participate in society because, “if they hold aloof, men whose principles offer but small guarantee for the welfare of the State will more readily seize the reins of government,” but he does not claim that Catholics have a duty to exclude non-Christians from government; *Immortale Dei*, no. 44.
70 Arguments that the State has obligations to ‘practice’ Catholicism by sponsoring public worship according to Catholicism (e.g., Crean and Fimister, 98-99) rely upon overly rigid analogies between the obligations of individuals and countries.
71 Pink, “Problem of Church and State,” 22, fn. 51.
however, there are no such situations, given the possibility of regimes involving constitutional protection of religious freedom. Ergo, integralist states are no longer justified. This second argument is structurally similar to those arguments that the death penalty is not justified in countries where other reasonable means can be taken to protect the common good which do not involve killing the offender.73 And, as with the strong presumption that civil government should not kill anyone when alternative means for preventing harm are reasonably available, I conclude that we have strong presumptive moral reasons not to exclude anyone from political participation on religious grounds for two reasons.

A first reason it is unjust to exclude non-Catholics from political participation is grounded on considerations of popular sovereignty. Catholics such as De Vitoria, Bellarmine, and Suarez defended a natural right of peoples to determine their own mode of government. These were intended to undercut ‘absolute’ monarchism in the form of the purported divine right of kings to rule and to legitimate resistance to tyrants (as an act by which the people exercised those rights).74 They argued, broadly, that people are created naturally equal in their capacity to exercise political authority. People therefore delegate that authority to representatives, in keeping with conditions for just exercise of that authority, whether a single king or to many individuals. The legitimacy of a government’s constitution and its continued exercise of power derive from the just delegation of that authority by the governed. This view of popular sovereignty found its way into the contemporary Catholic Church’s social doctrine.75

There is consequently a strong presumption (as a corrective to overly monarchical tendencies) that the whole people, not merely Catholics, are the subject of political authority which delegates that legitimate authority to its leaders. This fact is then what generates moral obligations to exercise political power in ways that respect the interests of all citizens, the common good, and which undergirds moral obligations not to establish constitutions which would infringe upon the natural rights of a subset of the population to determine their own mode of government. Integralism’s proposal that excluding non-Catholics from government is a political ideal requires implicit denial that such persons have any role in constituting the State as legitimate. And that is false.

A second reason it is unjust to exclude non-Catholics from political participation is grounded in the teaching of Vatican II’s Declaration Dignitatis Humanae (DH). DH makes three salient claims: [1] “all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits,” [2] “the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person,” and [3] “the right of the human person to religious freedom is to

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75 *Compendium of Social Doctrine of the Church* (Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2004), no. 395: “The subject of political authority is the people considered in its entirety as those who have sovereignty.”
be recognized in the constitutional law whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a civil right.\textsuperscript{76}

Thomas Pink’s interpretation of claim [1] is that this concerns only the scope of State action without the direction of the Church’s indirect power. On this reading, individuals should be immune from coercion in favor of religious ends except coercion as exercised directly by the Church or indirectly by the State under the former’s direction. However, DH no. 6 also explicitly qualifies claims [2] and [3] as applying to confessional (that is, potentially integralist) states as follows:

If, in view of peculiar circumstances obtaining among peoples, special civil recognition is given to one religious community in the constitutional order of society, it is at the same time imperative that the right of all citizens and religious communities to religious freedom should be recognized and made effective in practice. … government is to see to it that equality of citizens before the law, which is itself an element of the common good, is never violated, whether openly or covertly, for religious reasons. Nor is there to be discrimination among citizens.

What this implies is that – even if we accept the view that civil government can legitimately coerce the baptized under direction of the Church – religious beliefs alone are not suitable grounds for excluding someone from purely civil rights, as this would constitute a violation of the common good of society.

Without any grounds for a strong moral obligation to establish an integralist state, integralism violates justice even in this more sophisticated form. Integralism requires a rational preference, as we have seen, for setting up a constitution in such a way as to exclude non-Catholics from political participation. It is the possibility of unbelievers exercising meaningful political power over integralist arrangements which must be constitutionally excluded. This can be done in different ways. Many integralists, for example, openly embrace the ideal that baptism and citizenship should be united, holding that integralism requires the denial of full citizenship rights to non-Catholics under integralist regimes.\textsuperscript{77}

Integralists do not typically find such restrictions on political participation unjust, as integralism has traditionally been associated with monarchism. Integralists thus often reject that equal political participation of all citizens is a necessary or even a possible component of the common good, as monarchies do not involve such participation.\textsuperscript{78} The more monarchist integralist reasons that, as nobody has a natural right to political participation, rights to political participation in integralist states may be denied to non-Catholics without injustice. The less monarchist integralist might conversely reason that, even if there were such rights, natural rights have limits in terms of the common good: non-Catholics might thus be denied political participation on account of the common good of integralist states.

Vatican II’s teaching undermines the one possible basis sophisticated integralists could give for a rational preference for integralist constitutions: that excluding non-Catholics from political power is necessary to avoid conflicts of conscience among respective duties to Church and State. As long as there is a possibility of a constitutional order of religious freedom, there are no principled grounds for conflict with uniquely religious duties. \textit{Dignitatis Humane} thus rules out as unjust the exclusion of non-Catholics from government, as this is unnecessary within the


\textsuperscript{77} E.g., Crean & Fimister, 147.

\textsuperscript{78} For instance, Crean and Fimister accept a theory of legitimacy which seems essentially identical with Filmer’s position on the divine right of kings: 40, 103-107. Naturally, this is odd, given that Filmer’s views were created to oppose Catholic political views such as those of Bellarmine (see ft. 76).
modern world for securing the common good. If it would be unjust to exclude non-Catholics from government in general on the basis of their religious beliefs alone, then even monarchical integralism cannot retreat to claims that nobody has rights to political participation or to citizenship. Thus, Dignitatis Humanae rules out the possible basis for sophisticated integralism. Regimes restricting non-Catholic political participation on religious grounds alone could be ideal across-the-board only if we ignore duties toward non-Catholic citizens. Integralism therefore requires us to violate duties toward non-Catholics, which is unjust.

**Conclusion**

I have proposed two arguments that integralism is unjust. Integralist states are not necessary for achieving the supernatural common good, nor for advancing the common good of both baptized and unbaptized citizens more than other possible regimes, nor for avoiding conflicts between allegiance to the State and Catholic religious duties. Instead, integralism’s thesis that such arrangements are ideal violates strong presumptive moral reasons for treating non-Catholics equally in political contexts. Integralism involves endorsing societal burdens/benefits that skew primarily in favor of the good of the baptized alone, contrary to moral presumptions that such differences must be justified in terms of the common good of all. Integralism also involves endorsing that religious belief alone is a legitimate ground for excluding non-Catholics from political participation, contrary to the natural rights of all citizens to determine their own mode of government and contrary to Catholic teaching that such exclusion is unnecessarily discriminatory within a world where constitutional protections for religious freedom are possible. In both ways, integralism requires violation of plausible principles of justice.

There is no good reason to accept integralism as providing the only basis to oppose ‘liberalism’ or political indifferentism in today’s world. Non-integralists can accept that we need to “shape our national discourse so that religious and metaphysical questions come front and center,” and agree that “not only is this required by our adherence to the truth, but it is the only hope for a successful missionary apostolate in today’s world.” There are controversial moral and political movements which would unfairly exclude believers from the public square or, even worse, violate their religious freedom under the cover of ‘social justice’ by requiring believers to fund or participate in morally objectionable activities. But it is a false dichotomy that Catholics therefore ought to embrace injustice of one kind to combat that of another.

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79 Storck, 24.