A significant challenge to those views on which human beings have immortal souls or minds that survive their bodily death is that this appears to entail substance dualism. One must hold, it would appear, that humans are essentially their minds or souls; otherwise, a human person would cease to exist at death. Substance dualism, however, is a controversial view in large part due to the difficulty in giving an adequate account of the interaction between body and mind. To others, including myself, dualism also seems patently false because humans are essentially animals of a particular species, not immaterial minds. The view that human beings are essentially animals, nevertheless, does not intuitively sit well with the claim that our souls can survive bodily death. Yet if sense can be made of how these two claims are compatible, the resulting view would be far more friendly to typical naturalist views of body-mind relations than traditional dualism.

 There has been a revival of interest in hylomorphic theories of material composition, and some have applied these insights to mind-body identity, arguing precisely that a human being is a metaphysical composite whose *form,* their mind or soul, structures their *matter* to constitute what is essentially a certain kind of animal.[[1]](#footnote-1) Consequently, the hylomorphist identifies as holding a position resembling ‘animalism’ among contemporary theories of personal identity.[[2]](#footnote-2) Nevertheless, there is (unsurprisingly?) significant controversy on the status of a soul that would survive the death of the body and whether extant explanations are coherent. I focus in this paper on one prominent debate among Thomists on the question as to whether the soul *post mortem* comes to constitute the same human person as in life, although persons are not identical to their souls in ordinary circumstances, or whether the human person ceases to exist at death.

This paper, while beginning with a brief overview of that debate, is not a paper in Thomistic archeology. In fact, I do not think the Thomistic debate can be resolved by further interpretation of the texts of Aquinas, as it seems to me that all parties in the Thomistic controversy are taking stands on a matter that goes beyond them. After outlining the dialectic of that debate, and engaging with a famous paper by Elizabeth Anscombe, what I will propose is that my soul comes to constitute my *personality* after I die and this allows a satisfying way to say that I survive my death, without violating any claims made by Aquinas. My view is a Thomistic account of the personhood of the separated soul – constrained by what Thomas Aquinas claims about human beings as matter-form composites and presuming other features of his metaphysics – but has implications beyond Thomas. My proposal is intended to give us an adequate theory of the semantics and metaphysics which allows a hylomorphist to say that I survive my death, in virtue of my soul surviving my death, even though that which I am identical to – the animal that is me – ceases to exist when I die. What I will propose is that there is a coherent hylomorphic account which permits me survive my death, because hylomorphism can accommodate theories of personal identity that otherwise seem to be out of bounds to the substance dualist.

1. **The State of Play**

For my purposes, it is helpful to lay out the dialectical moves that have been made thus far in the Thomistic scholarship. What follows is merely a series of logical steps, and no temporal claims are being made – the point is to grasp how these positions developed as responses to a certain problem and to each other. At a first stage in the dialectic (representing an initial stream in the discussion), there was Peter van Inwagen. In an essay for the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* Van Inwagen posed a problem for hylomorphic theories of the human person, including that of Thomas Aquinas:

[...] if Socrates was a material thing, a living organism, then, if a man who lives at some time after Socrates’ death and physical dissolution is to be Socrates, there will have to be some sort of material and causal continuity between the matter that composed Socrates at the moment of his death and the matter that at any time composes that man. […] But ‘physical dissolution’ and ‘material and causal continuity’ are hard to reconcile. To show how the continuity requirement can be satisfied, despite appearances – or else to show that the continuity requirement is illusory – is a problem that must be solved if a philosophically satisfactory ‘materialist’ theory of resurrection is to be devised.[[3]](#footnote-3)

As noted, van Inwagen was not alone in this regard, and others too expressed worries about whether Aquinas could coherently respond to this objection.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Following van Inwagen, Eleonore Stump attempted to defend the hylomorphic approach. Stump attacked the interpretation van Inwagen offered as misrepresenting the Thomistic view. Her overarching motivation was that the view that the human person ceases to exist at death is in conflict with Aquinas’ overall theological claims.[[5]](#footnote-5) To this end, Stump appealed to a common solution to problems of material composition, the principle that “constitution is not identity,”[[6]](#footnote-6) to argue that, for Aquinas, the human being or person is not identical with what constitutes it during life (viz. both body and soul).[[7]](#footnote-7) On her view, during life, the human person is constituted, but not identical with, their body and soul together. After death, the person comes to be constituted of their soul alone, but otherwise survives their bodily demise.[[8]](#footnote-8) And, again, others came to the defense of Aquinas’ hylomorphism, adopting a similar perspective as that of Stump, with ‘survivalist’ interpretations of Aquinas subsequently defended by such as Christopher Brown,[[9]](#footnote-9) David Oderberg,[[10]](#footnote-10) and others.[[11]](#footnote-11)

Subsequent to this, however, there was a counter-reaction, represented here by Patrick Toner and Turner Nevitt. There was an uneasiness with Stump’s solution, because the texts of Aquinas seem clear – especially in Christological contexts – that a person or human being ceases to exist at death.[[12]](#footnote-12) In terms of history, too, the view seems implausible, as Aquinas’ position that Christ was not a man during the three days in the tomb were controversial and well-known in the medieval theological context.[[13]](#footnote-13) More seriously, they argued that the survivalist position requires a deep revision of important principles in Thomistic metaphysics.[[14]](#footnote-14) The ‘corruptionist’ position then bit the bullet of Van Inwagen’s critique, conceding that human beings or persons cease to exist at death, but arguing that this consequence was not problematic. Toner, for example, argues that it is just to punish a soul for the sins of the person it once composed not because the soul is identical with that person, but because the soul is “the principle of all my evil or good acts.”[[15]](#footnote-15) This seems to imply that, since I commit sins with my soul, my soul can be punished in my place. And many followed Toner and Nevitt in advocating, in contrast to the position of the survivalists, a ‘corruptionist’ position on which the human person ceases to exist at death.[[16]](#footnote-16) And thus emerged a significant division among positions in Aquinas scholarship on the way in which to understand Aquinas’ hylomorphic commitments.

The options have not seemed entirely satisfactory to many, prompting Mark Spencer, Daniel De Haan and Brandon Dahm, and others[[17]](#footnote-17) to pursue alternative strategies that fall outside of the established positions. Spencer, for example, argues that Stump’s position seems to require that an essence is dispositional, in the sense that something can be a human person (your soul alone) and nevertheless fail to have a complete human essence. Whereas Stump and typical survivalists do not concede that their position requires such a modification, Spencer openly argues that we should reject elements of the Thomistic metaphysical apparatus on which human beings are essentially material composites.[[18]](#footnote-18) This would be unacceptable to those, such as myself, who might think this involves throwing the baby out with the bathwater, radically revising our notions of essence or disposition to accommodate a marginal case. A more recent development is that De Haan and Dahm propose that separated souls are ‘incomplete persons,’ and try to develop an account of incomplete personhood.[[19]](#footnote-19) But, I think rightly, the position was criticized as seeming either to make personhood degreed (one cannot be ‘just a bit’ of a person, as one cannot be ‘just a touch’ pregnant or ‘a bit’ dead) or to merely restate the problematic in different terms.[[20]](#footnote-20) When all is said and done, however, Thomistic scholarship remains without consensus on this issue, as many have felt that the positions currently extant are unsatisfactory in various ways, and so the question of the survival/non-survival of the person after death remains an open one.

This was only a sketchof the dialectic, not a comprehensive summary. Yet from my perspective, there are two related sets of issues, one semantic and the other metaphysical. Given Aquinas’ technical meaning to the terms ‘substance’ and ‘person,’ it becomes semantically difficult to say how personal survival can occur without any enduring substance. In ordinary English, it would be relatively tautologous to say that the human *organism* or the human *animal* does not persist after death – and this seems the spirit of what Aquinas wants to say when he claims a human being undergoes substantial change at death. What you would want to say persists after death, in ordinary English, is the human *person.* But, for Aquinas, a ‘person’ is an ‘individual substance of a rational nature,’ a definition he borrows from Boethius. And the soul is not a person in this sense, because a soul is not a complete individual substance of the kind ‘human being.’[[21]](#footnote-21) Similarly, the use of ‘person’ in ordinary English is not metaphysically perspicuous, as we can say things like “I am not the same person I was back then,” and not affirm any radical loss of metaphysical identity. But, for Aquinas, the semantics carries far-reaching metaphysical weight; the term ‘person’ is central to a coherent affirmation of the Trinitarian dogma that God can be one substance and three Persons. In addition, Aquinas wants to affirm the plausible view that human persons are essentially material organisms, and that there are no persons of no or indeterminate nature. Lastly, there is a looming issue of trying to indicate how, although the soul survives death, this is a *strange* state for anything to be in – and so that the Resurrection of the body and restoration of the human organism by God is desirable. There is clearly much on the line for the Thomist.

To begin with, we should consider what semantic issues are relevant. Intuitively, I take it that what is important in attributing personal identity to a separated soul are not the strict and technical meanings of ‘person.’ What seems problematic about corruptionism is that we cannot apparently refer to the separated soul by those proper names (e.g., “Paulina”) and indexicals (“you” “her” “I”) that would refer in ordinary circumstances to the human organism it formerly composed. Consider, in illustration, the parable of Dives (‘the rich man’) in the Gospel of Luke. Dives, the rich man who sumptuously feasts and ignores the poor man Lazarus at his door, dies and ends up in the flames of hell. After seeing Abraham in paradise with Lazarus, Dives requests that Abraham help ease his suffering and this dialogue ensues:

“25Abraham said, ‘Child, remember that during your lifetime you received your good things, and Lazarus in like manner evil things; but now he is comforted here, and you are in agony. 26Besides all this, between you and us a great chasm has been fixed, so that those who might want to pass from here to you cannot do so, and no one can cross from there to us.’ 27He said, ‘Then, father, I beg you to send him to my father’s house— 28for I have five brothers—that he may warn them, so that they will not also come into this place of torment’” (Lk. 16:25-28, NRSV).

It is hard to see, on a standard corruptionist view, how any of these claims Dives and Abraham make could be true. For Dives’ soul to think “I was a human being once,” or Abraham to make similar claims about Dives as having received good things, when he is addressing only Dives’ soul, all looks strictly speaking false; how can you have been something that ceased to exist? And Dives’ soul also makes claims about *his* brothers, when the brothers are kin to Dives and not to Dives’ soul.

I will agree with the survivalist side of the debate that the truth of propositions involving person pronouns, e.g., referring to my separated soul truly as the same ‘I’ as I was when on earth, is vitally importantfor the right account of personal identity (let alone theological commitments as a Catholic). It would thus be undesirable to accept either fictionalism or a view on which these propositions are mere metaphorically, but not literally, true when thought by the separated soul. What unites both survivalists and corruptionists, however, is the presupposition (as Spencer’s discussion indirectly illuminates[[22]](#footnote-22)) that propositions involving personal pronounsare true or false depending on whether someone is numerically the same substance after death. I will argue that we should preserve the Thomistic set of commitments by denying this apparently plausible intuition and instead hold that numerical identity of *substance* is not necessary for personal identity. The view that persistence of substance is the only grounds for what makes it apt to say that “I survive” is an assumption held in common with traditional substance dualism but, I argue, is not a necessary commitment for the hylomorphist. My proposal does not nevertheless require that we fiddle with the Thomistic metaphysical machinery to get the right result either, *pace* Spencer et al.

I will constructively propose a modified version of survivalism on which the Thomist can accept truth conditions under which we can assent to true propositions about the personal identity of a separated soul with the human person it once composed in life, despite ceasing to be the same substance, and that what Dives and Abraham say in the above dialogue all can be true statements about the separated soul of Dives. The first step is to outline the semantic features of a theory of reference that would be required the separated soul to entertain true propositions about itself such as *I was once alive*, alongside the claims that, when I am alive, it is true that *I am not identical to my soul*. Such a proposal for modifying survivalism would not quite be complete, however, as I still need to say more about whatever it is in virtue of which these propositions are true. The second step will be to examine the metaphysics on which these expressions are apt. Specifically, I will argue that Aquinas has the tools to give us an account on which my personality survives my death, even when my person, or the substance that I am, does not. The relevant move is then similar to the traditional survivalist position, but does not involve violating any claims about the human person or substance being essentially bodily.

1. **Semantic Move: Anscombe and the First-Personal Pronoun**

Elizabeth Anscombe once advanced a controversial thesis that helps to illustrate the semantic features of my proposal, arguing that the first-personal pronoun “is neither a name nor another kind of expression whose logical role is to make a reference, at all.”[[23]](#footnote-23) Prime facie, her claims here might be dismissed with a withering incredulous stare, as it seems obvious that first-personal pronouns have referents and can be used in judgments of self-identity. Nevertheless, I would venture to say that Anscombe is indulging in hyperbole, reacting to a particular account of first-personal pronouns which is, I will agree, problematic. But her paper is a dialectically helpful starting point for grasping the semantic move that is a component of my modification of the survivalist position. In any event, I will defend a weaker thesis than Anscombe’s, and you don’t need to accept that first-personal pronouns are not referring expressions to grasp the point.

Anscombe presents a series of arguments against the view that, if you use the first-personal pronoun in a true proposition, then the speaker has a certain infallibility in referring to what they do – ‘guaranteed reference.’ She explains the target view as involving two different kinds of guaranteed reference: “the object an ‘I’- user means by it must exist so long as he is using ‘I’, nor can he take the wrong object to be the object he means by ‘I’.”[[24]](#footnote-24) Her examples of how this target view gets the first-personal pronoun wrong is that she points out how Descartes and other philosophers have misused true propositions involving the first-personal pronoun as premises in arguments which are supposed to entail the existence of, e.g., a *substance* that is the subject of the true ‘I’ proposition. She argues that such arguments are rightly seen as invalid. An illustration is the fact that we are fallible in making self-identity judgments; we can misidentify the thing we are. If we could not do so, views like substance dualism would seem to be *a priori* necessary truths.[[25]](#footnote-25) Similarly, taking a point from Russell, she points out that even if we correctly refer to the *ego* or *mental substance* or what-have-you in a true ‘I’ proposition at one moment, that does not guarantee that one is referring to the *same one* in a later true proposition involving the first-person.[[26]](#footnote-26)

Anscombe’s solution is to propose that first-personal pronouns refer to nothing, no objects at all, but that their truth conditions are determined by use. Despite the radical and counter-intuitive claim here, Anscombe nevertheless concedes that “we must accept the rule ‘If X asserts something with 'I' as subject, his assertion will be true if and only if what he asserts is true of X’” as part of the normal truth conditions for propositions involving personal identity. I do not think one has to accept the full radical proposal of Anscombe to see that she’s hit on something important about pronouns. It seems to me that one way of putting Anscombe’s diagnosis of the problematic belief is, on the view that first-personal pronouns imply ‘guaranteed reference,’ that the use of the first-personal pronoun in a true proposition entails that these pronouns have some *definite* *kind* of thing or particularas its referent, just as ‘dog’ always refers to members of the kind ‘dog,’ or a proper name ‘Jack’ always refers to Jack.[[27]](#footnote-27) In this light, it seems reasonable to hold that first-personal pronouns are not proper names or involve ‘definite reference,’ because they are paradigmatic *indexical* terms that take their truth conditions from the subject who expresses propositions including them.

We do not need to take Anscombe’s position to accept a weaker thesis that first-personal pronouns can refer, and they can constitute identity judgments, but that the truth of propositions involving first-personal pronouns (and other indexicals) do not determine by itself the nature of the referent of pronouns. My use of the I does not ipso facto decide whether I am identical to an animal, a cloud of particles, an immaterial soul. I can, in fact, use the ‘I’ competently, and there are clear conditions under which my statements involving the pronoun are true or false, but it is *a posteriori* which of these things I might be identical with. First-personal pronouns are indexicals and can form true propositions only when the subject uses them in an appropriate circumstance. But this means that there is a semantic possibility that the pronoun could be used in a situation where the referent was not identical, but where the subject was; e.g., it does not seem ridiculous to say “I’m not the person I once was” when the referent is distinct psychological states or moral character. So, I could assert one day that “I am a banker” and then, after quitting my job, deny this. Or, “I am Napoleon Bonaparte” can be a false proposition if thought by a lunatic in an asylum, but not if thought by Napoleon Bonaparte. The ordinary use of these indexicals indicates that there is some relevantgap in what counts as appropriate use that relies less on sameness of *referent* and more on sameness of *subject*.

The key of Anscombe’s insight that I want to adopt is that the truth conditions for the use of first-personal pronouns seem to be constrained more by *metaphysical* rather than semantic considerations, and that the semantic conditions for the correct use of the pronoun are not fixed by some definite kind of thing to which ‘I’ *must* refer.[[28]](#footnote-28) Clearly, then, there is something special about the use of the first-personal pronoun, so that its use ‘I’ expresses your self-consciousness, and it is this that you cannot fail to do when using the term competently. For this reason, even though the semantics don’t fix whether you are using the term appropriately, the appropriate dispositional attitudes involved in thinking about oneself in a first-personal way *do* necessarilyseem to involve some continuity in entity, in terms of whether the expressions of self-identity are apt and true for the subject of the attitude. If there was nothing to which I was identical, for instance, my claims about self-identity would all be false. And, although it looks impossible for someone to assert that “I am not identical to anything,” what makes this use impossible are as much semantic as metaphysical.[[29]](#footnote-29) Even Buddhists have generally felt the need to give some metaphysical account in light of which propositions about self-identity can be asserted truly, despite denying that there is a proper subject entertaining any propositional attitudes.[[30]](#footnote-30) Yet there is a theoretical possibility, illustrated by that same tradition, and by four-dimensionalism, for expanding true propositions about self-identity beyond conditions under which the subject is one and the same self-identical, enduring substance wholly present at each time it exists.

While a Buddhist might invoke a fictionalist approach to personhood (as Candrakirti does[[31]](#footnote-31)), Thomas Aquinas was not a Buddhist who denied the existence of a continuous or identical self over time; Aquinas clearly affirms that I am essentially a substance, identical with the human organism that I am, when alive. Conversely, Aquinas is clear in affirming that I am not identical to my soul. In giving reasons for the fittingness of the Resurrection of the body, Aquinas notes that the soul alone obtaining happiness would be unsatisfying in some way because “the soul, since it is part of man’s body, is not an entire man, and my soul is not I; hence, although the soul obtains salvation in another life, nevertheless, not I or any man.”[[32]](#footnote-32) Aquinas also requires that, strictly, the proper name of a person only applies to a person. So, he notes that “the soul of Abraham is not, properly speaking, Abraham himself, but a part of him.”[[33]](#footnote-33)

There is, however, an interesting parallel with Buddhism, because Aquinas is careful to say that the propositions involving the name of the person ‘Abraham’ are true, even when Abraham the man/person has strictly speaking ceased to exist and those propositions directly refer only to Abraham’s soul (a part of the person) existing separated in the afterlife. These predications referring to the deceased person can be true in virtue of “synecdoche, [by which] sometimes only a part of man is called man, especially the soul, which is the more noble part of man.”[[34]](#footnote-34) This echoes a general logical strategy Aquinas elsewhere endorses in cases where we predicate a term from a part to its whole. Aquinas affirms the semantic appropriateness of denominating a whole from one of its parts, as when we say someone is curly because their hair is curly. Yet, if we are not literally referring to the same person who existed during life when we call Abraham or Dives’ soul by their personal name “Abraham” or “Dives,” how could this kind of use of a personal name or indexical remain *apt* and not merely metaphorical?

In these cases, Aquinas claims that a whole is *aptly* denominated either because the predicate was applied to a principal part of that whole or the predicate is appropriately predicated of the whole even if only one part has that property.[[35]](#footnote-35) Thus, we can predicate true claims about a person in virtue of referring directly to a part of that person, as long as the parts are of the right kind. When we truly refer to Abraham and Dives’ souls as if they were the whole person, we seem to predicate something of a whole in virtue of a predicate applying to one of the principal parts of that whole. Note too that these predications from part to whole cannot be *mere metaphor* or fictional, as Aquinas uses this strategy in critical Christology to predicate terms of the Word from Christ’s human nature (i.e., the *communicatio idiomatum*).[[36]](#footnote-36)

Aquinas’ intuition as to why it is appropriate sometimes to use synecdoche to refer to Abraham’s soul by the proper name “Abraham” presumes, or at least is independently supported by, a view of meaning that would take content of our linguistic expressions to be assigned by a mechanism like David Lewis’ concept of ‘reference magnetism.’ In response to debates about the nature of meaning, Lewis famously held that “the assignment of contents to expressions of our language is fixed…by picking the interpretation which does best at jointly satisfying the constraints of truth-maximization and the constraint that the referents of our terms should, as much as possible, be ‘the ones that respect the objective joints in nature.’”[[37]](#footnote-37) As Speaks points out, Lewis’ view comes with a “non-trivial metaphysical price tag,” where there is an objective set of more or less natural ‘joints’ suitable for reference.[[38]](#footnote-38) But this would be a price that Aquinas is willing to pay.

Thomistic metaphysics posits many such ‘natural’ joints, e.g., natural kinds, proper accidents, substances. With a theory of meaning on which reference magnetism was presumed, sentences in which proper names for persons figure, but referring to a separated soul alone, are true. The predicates get appropriated to their soul, because their souls are principal parts of the person. On a view like reference magnetism, we presume charitably to interpret the speaker’s sentences are referring to what is, strictly speaking, merely a part of a person (their soul), and the natural referent of the proper name is, in this context, actually the soul. Thus, we can legitimately say St. Peter or St. Paul are praying for us in heaven, even though St. Peter’s soul alone is doing the praying. And this is exactly how Aquinas deals with the cases.[[39]](#footnote-39)

I suggest that such a view of meaning, combined with the considerations from Anscombe’s treatment of the first-personal pronoun, indicates that personal pronouns do not function as proper names for persons nor as requiring a definite description of the referent. In this sense, Anscombe’s point is also relevant to other personal pronouns – “we” “you” “y’all” “she/he.” If we take this to be the case, then it appears as if one could aptly refer to both a person and a separated soul of that person by the same personal pronoun, aptly saying (for example) that “you will be in heaven,” just as the separated soul might think of itself aptly as being the same “I” that once was a human being. However, this requires us to show that semantic claims are supported by the right kind of metaphysical conditions; if the soul were not related in the right way to its composite, such that these predications of self-identity were appropriately natural and truth-maximizing, it does not seem like it could truly say that it was identical with the person it composed.

For example, if my foot survived my death as a living thing, it would be hard to see how that foot could consider itself to be identical with the person it once composed, let alone entertain a propositional attitude at all. Reference magnetism would not help us, because it would not seem as if the predications were appropriately natural. Nevertheless, it seems intuitively plausible that reference magnetism-type considerations *should* apply in cases where the soul entertains propositions like *I was once a human being* or *I am John Smith*. The soul understands the relation of itself to the human being it once composed, just like we might understand our past psychological self as an earlier but continuous version of our present self; further, there seem to be important differences between a form and a material integral part. For this reason, in the next part, I will present the appropriate metaphysical machinery to understand why this first semantic move does not merely assume that it is apt to refer to a separated soul as if it were relevantly identical with the person it once composed, but that this semantic aptness has metaphysical foundations in an identity of personality.[[40]](#footnote-40)

1. **Metaphysical Move: If ‘Person’ is Not a (Natural) Sortal, ‘Personality’ Isn’t Either**

As Anscombe pointed out, the conditions for truth of self-identity claims involve primarily metaphysical, not semantic, necessities. Aquinas’ metaphysics constrains us to say that there are no actions or properties without a subject – no actions can occur without any subject at all, *pace* Buddhist eliminativists. And, to have a propositional attitude, you need an entity capable of thinking those propositions. For the Thomist, consequently, only an intellect can think and entertain the right propositional attitudes. Further, unlike asserting that I am identical or not identical to a cloud of particles, which seems to require empirical investigation to know, Aquinas holds that the soul has habitual knowledge of itself, accompanying any act of cognition it undertakes.[[41]](#footnote-41) Aquinas’s epistemology would then seem to support that the soul, if conscious, always has the kind of self-knowledge permitting appropriate use of the first-personal pronoun.[[42]](#footnote-42) Yet, beyond being able to entertain propositions and to know itself immediately, the separated soul is positively metaphysically apt to be an appropriate subject for expressions of self-identity with the person it once composed. This aptness is grounded in two features of the separated soul: that it is essentially such that the soul is disposed to constitute a person in ordinary circumstances, and that it remains numerically the same thing when it constitutes a person and when it does not.

Hylomorphism is, as noted, the view that material substances are all constituted by two metaphysical principles, matter and form. A ‘substantial form’ is what constitutes matter into a substance of some definite kind. And Aquinas is well-known for holding that there is only one substantial form in any substance.[[43]](#footnote-43) For the Thomist, matter generally conceived (i.e., ‘prime matter’) belongs to no kind. There are material objects, not ‘matter in general.’ What exists consequently is not matter in general, but particular kinds of matter; matter does not exist except as constituting a substance, informed by a substantial form. Thus, when some particular matter, like Socrates’ body, ceases to be part of a composite substance, as when Socrates dies, that matter ceases to be informed by Socrates’ substantial form, his soul, and becomes some other substance/s. The body of Socrates is not numerically identical with his corpse; they are not the same kind of object, and so cannot be the same substance.[[44]](#footnote-44) Matter is ontologically dependent on form to constitute a substance of a kind. But form can be dependent on matter as well in a different respect. In most material substances, the forms that constitute them are dependent on matter for their existence. That is, given the kind of substance that they constitute, the form does not do anything apart from make the matter to be a certain way.[[45]](#footnote-45)

Aquinas holds that the human soul, the substantial form of the human being, is not like other substantial forms of material objects. He holds that, as the human soul has activities and capacities associated with the human person that, while they require a material organ to provide appropriate sensory ‘input’ on which they (ordinarily) operate, the soul’s intellectual and volitional capacities are not capacities of any bodily organ and thus these activities do not depend on matter for its existence.[[46]](#footnote-46) However, this makes the human soul a very unique part of a material substance because, as forms are not dependent on matter for what kind of substance they constitute, the soul neither ceases to be a specifically *human* soul after death and nor ceases to be the same particular thing that once constituted a human being.[[47]](#footnote-47) Aquinas appeals precisely to these considerations about souls *qua* forms in order to argue that the Resurrection of the dead, which occurs by God’s power, does not involve the creation of a new person but, rather, that people who die will be all numerically identical with those whom God resurrects. When human beings in this life undergo changes in matter – growth, eating, excretion, amputation – what is important for persistence over time is not that the particular matter remains identical (Aquinas is not a mereological essentialist) but that the same form constitutes all the matter, diachronically, as one human being.

This means not only that the soul is such that, after death of the person, the soul can persist, but that the soul persists as numerically identical and as having a disposition to constitute a human being. These two facts lead to Aquinas claiming that the soul retains the same being that it had while constituting a person, because the soul is such that it retains not merely the disposition to constitute not a human being in general but *exactly* the same person it once constituted: the soul’s “being…is not merely in its concrete union with matter. Its being, therefore, which is that of the composite, remains in the soul even when the body is dissolved.”[[48]](#footnote-48) This is not merely to say that soul continues to exist after death, but that a soul remains the principle of substantial existence of a human being, and, indeed, of a particular person, that it was during life.[[49]](#footnote-49) In short, “there is no interruption in the substantial act of being of man”[[50]](#footnote-50) because the soul after death remains the same principle which essentially constitutes the person it caused to exist when they were alive. Aquinas takes this a decisive reason, for example, to reject the possibility of reincarnation,[[51]](#footnote-51) and, naturally, as a reason that makes it fitting for God to restore its material body to the soul at the Resurrection.[[52]](#footnote-52) But Aquinas also makes clear that, while the soul remains a particular thing, it is not properly a substance, even though it subsists when it does not compose a human being, because substances are associated with natural kinds and the human soul remains *essentially* a part of a complete material substance, not (for example) becoming a member of a distinct kind of immaterial substance.[[53]](#footnote-53) For this reason, although subsisting, the separated soul is not a person either: “Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the human species.”[[54]](#footnote-54) Because the soul is essentially the form of a human being, it cannot act as it ordinarily would in a material composite;[[55]](#footnote-55) for instance, without the brain, the soul would have no sensory content on which to exercise its intellectual powers, and so God needs to supply for what the brain would otherwise do.[[56]](#footnote-56)

My proposal requires a focus on the way that kind membership terms are functioning in the background of the hylomorphic account. Consider the generic term ‘humanity’. In Aquinas’ semantics, terms like ‘humanity’ function to pick out a certain (natural) kind of object. We can say that Aquinas holds that ‘humanity’ is a generic *sortal* term, picking out *substances* having a human nature.[[57]](#footnote-57) Since, on his hylomorphic metaphysics, human beings are such that their nature involves both matter and form, the sortal term ‘humanity’ picks out what Aquinas calls a *forma totius* of a human being – the composition of matter and form in things that are constitutive of what it is to be a human being, rather than, for example, picking out merely their substantial form (i.e., soul) alone. [[58]](#footnote-58) Material substances aren’t essentially just immaterial forms. And, thus, an object ceases to fall under the generic sortal in virtue of ceasing to have the essential principles of the kind, and a material substance ceases to exist when there ceases to be material composition. Aquinas therefore states Christ’s humanity *ceased to exist* when He died.[[59]](#footnote-59) In parallel with Christ ceasing to fall under the generic sortal ‘humanity,’ Christ also *ipso facto* ceases to be a man when His soul separates from His body and He dies on the Cross.[[60]](#footnote-60)

Recall by contrast that ‘person’ for Aquinas, following the Boethian definition, signifies an “individual substance of a rational nature.” This entails that the term ‘person’ is not a generic sortal term in the same way as ‘humanity’ is, as there is no genera or species for what it is to be an individual or particular in general; the definition we give of a ‘person’ does not pick out a nature.[[61]](#footnote-61) And, *qua* the definition, only substances are persons, which is what necessitates Aquinas’ denial that souls are persons or that a part of Abraham is Abraham. For this reason, *pace* the classical survivalist position, the slogan “constitution is not identity” is not of obvious help here. While it is true that neither my soul nor my body are identical with me when they constitute me, Aquinas thinks sortal terms like ‘human/humanity’ only apply to things identical with instances of the natural kind of organism ‘human being,’ and that non-sortal terms like ‘person’ only apply to things identical with individuals having a complete rational nature; neither of these is true of the separated soul.

Nevertheless, there *is* a term Aquinas uses which can apply to the situation of the rational soul: ‘personality’ (*personalitas*). Aquinas uses ‘personality’ in theological contexts, parallel to his use of the genericterm ‘humanity,’ as referring to things having the *disposition* to constitute a person. On one hand, in Trinitarian theology, Aquinas notes that one could refer to the Trinity either as involving three personalities – referring to the three personal properties constituting/identical with the three Persons of Father, Son, and Spirit[[62]](#footnote-62) – or as having one personality, in virtue of God having a personal nature.[[63]](#footnote-63) Personality can then indifferently indicate, in the Godhead, either what is disposed to constitute the three individual Persons individually, or the generic ‘form’ in virtue of which God’s nature is disposed to constitute a person. On the other, the use of the term ‘personality’ is critical in Christological contexts to indicate how it is that Christ’s human nature, just like any other, has a disposition to form a person. Given the fact that the individual subsistence of the human nature is provided immediately by the Person of the Word, this disposition in Christ’s human nature to form a separate human substance or a person is not actualized – *pace* Nestorianism.[[64]](#footnote-64)

Christ’s human nature had a personality, a disposition to form a person, which was nevertheless “assumed to the personality of God the Word; just as the body, when it is without the soul, has its proper species, but, when it is united with the soul, it receives its species from [the soul].”[[65]](#footnote-65) In fact, he uses this view of personality as a premise in an argument against a version of Apollinarianism that holds Christ did not have a human soul at the moment of His conception. Aquinas argues that, if we grant that “a personality of the man generated, there must needs exist a body and a rational soul. But the personality of the man Christ is not different from the personality of God’s Word. But the Word of God united a human body to Himself in the very conception. Therefore, the personality of that man was there. Therefore, the rational soul must also have been there.”[[66]](#footnote-66) That is, the personality of Christ included both the principles of the divine nature that constituted the Person of the Word *and* the principles in Christ’s human nature that would ordinarily constitute a human person (but were accidentally impeded from doing so because they had a relation to a divine one).

‘Personality,’ then, functions as what I will call a ‘non-sortal generic term’ because it picks out no determinate kind of a rational nature. You could just as easily say it is a sortal, if one specifies that it is a ‘non-natural’ sortal, because it does not pick out a *natural kind*. The important point is that ‘person’ is not a natural kind definable in terms of a genus or species,[[67]](#footnote-67) and thus the *forma totius* that refers to personhood generically, viz. ‘personality,’ does not pick out any complete nature. And, in a context such as this, the principle that ‘constitution is not identity’ now becomesrelevant. As Christ’s human nature has a disposition to be a person, in virtue of having those metaphysical principles that would ordinarily constitute an individual human person, that nature has *personality* but is not a distinct person from the Person of the Word. That is an application of the principle that constitution is not identity: the soul and body of Christ come to constitute (at the Incarnation), but are not identical with, the personality of the Word. And he employs claims about personality, in that vein, to resolve questions whether the Person of the Word is modified by coming into relation to its human soul and body.[[68]](#footnote-68)

Aquinas explicitly makes such a move in regard to the separated soul, employing a non-sortal generic term to characterize a sense in which the ‘corporeity*’* of a human being persists *post mortem* as one and the same with that possessed by the human during life, in virtue of the persistence of the soul as the principle of bodily corporeity.[[69]](#footnote-69) In similar fashion, then, we can see that there is an apt application of the non-generic sortal ‘personality’ in the claim that the soul of a person comes to constitute that person’s personality after death, even though it is not identical to it during life. It is one and the same personality of the person, given both that the principle of the personality of that person (having a disposition for constituting a person in the past and at the future Resurrection, as that principle of a person’s substantial being or actuality) is precisely what persists *post mortem*, and that the soul is numerically identical when it constitutes a person and when it does not. The continuity of personality is what allows an apt use of personal pronouns in regard to the separated soul. When I am dead, I can think truly that I was once a human being.[[70]](#footnote-70)

1. **The Resulting Position: Survivalism, Suitably Modified**

In conclusion, the metaphysical picture is that the separated soul comes to constitute the personality of the person when the composite ceases to exist, although during life the soul does not.[[71]](#footnote-71) This is a move familiar in the debate, as it is essentially the same move made by Stump. The metaphysical fact that my soul comes to constitute my personality when I’m dead is what makes it intuitively apt for us to use personal pronouns to describe its relation to the composite person it once formed. Yet the soul is a principle having a disposition to constitute my person in the appropriate circumstances, not the whole *me* that was an organism. Thus, what persists is my *personality* and not my *person,* the suffix illustrating that the soul is not a proper substance. Combined with the semantic moves I made, we therefore have a two-fold set of appropriate contexts in which the survivalist and corruptionist intuitions can be expressed. It is appropriate in some contexts to say that I survive my death, or that Abraham is in heaven, without any falsity, because the separated soul will come to constitute the personality of the person in those situations.

Nevertheless, given that my soul is not identical with my personality, it is appropriate in other contexts to say that I do not survive my death when I want to indicate that such a state would be incomplete or imperfect, given that only a part of what I am survives my death and my person will not then exist *post mortem*. On earth and at the Resurrection, it will be false to say that I am my soul, as my soul alone does not constitute my personality in these circumstances. This affirmation that a soul remains *essentially* a metaphysical part of a particular material substance ensures that the Resurrection restores something that is missing and which is essential to being a human person – I am not really a *person* even if I’m the same *personality* in the intermediate state. Some semantic mechanism like reference magnetism helps determine how, in these distinct contexts, the personal pronouns in each proposition ‘latch on’ to a distinct joint in the nature of reality. This view nevertheless resembles survivalism more than corruptionism, because the overall result is that it remains not merely semantically but also metaphysically appropriate to say that I– rather than merely one of my parts – survive my death.

There might be worries that the view detailed above is simply incoherent, by simple transitivity of identity. For it would seem as if the view requires holding that a part of me survives my death, but that I am not identical with that part. If so, then what survives my death is not identical with me. And, by the basic logic of identity, what is not identical with me is not me. However, this entails that what survives my death is not me. Ergo, the view is incoherent. My semantic point about indexicals, however, allows me to deny two moves in this reasoning, because those moves require equivocations. Recall that indexicals depend for their truth conditions on the context of use. In light of this, first, I would deny that what survives my death is not me. What I claim is that what survives my death *will be* me, when my body ceases to constitute me, but that *I am not presently* my soul. This is because the truth conditions of indexicals can sometimes, as in this case, depend on a temporal qualification. Second, I take *essential* identity judgments with indexicals to be difficult, because of the ambiguity that attaches to indexicals. For example, “I am essentially an animal” could be interpreted as “the thing that I am, *this* thing, is essentially an animal,” or “whatever is referring to itself as ‘I,’ in any context, is essentially an animal.” Anscombe attacked the latter type of interpretation, and it seems clearly false, as, e.g., an angel or God could also use the term ‘I’ aptly. The interpretation of the claim that I am essentially an animal in the first sense, however, only seems to involve an identity judgment about the referent of the indexical *in the context*.

Consider Stump’s parallel understanding of how identity claims function:

“A human person is not identical to his soul; rather, a human person is identical to an individual substance in the species *rational animal*. A particular of that sort is normally, naturally, composed of form and matter configured into a human body. Because constitution is not identity for Aquinas, however, a particular can exist with less than the normal, natural complement of constituents. It can, for example, exist when it is constituted only by one of its main metaphysical parts, namely, the soul. And so although a person is not identical to his soul, the existence of the soul is sufficient for the existence of a person.”[[72]](#footnote-72)

This allows Stump to interpret claims that “Abraham is not his soul” as only true or false depending on the context of utterance, in light of the presupposition that a person is not identical to his soul even if that person comes to be constituted by his soul alone. This results in the view that, in some contexts, one can truly say that Abraham is his soul (i.e., when he is in heaven), but, in others, it is true to say that Abraham is not his soul (i.e., when alive). The contextualism of my account, however, is no more problematic than Stump’s. Unlike Stump, I hold an individual substance of that species is essentially a particular composite of body and soul, because I want to avoid claiming that human persons are essentially such that they can exist without bodies. On my view, the *personality* of a person is constituted by, but not identical with, their body and soul in normal, natural circumstances. The personality that after death comes to be constituted by my soul alone is *identical with* the personality once constituted by my body and soul. My personality is the identical *subject* of the ‘I,’ in every circumstance, even if the referent of that indexical, the constituents of me, change. But the differing constituents of the subject correspond to the change in truth conditions, even though the subject is identical. Thus, when I say that I am essentially an animal, then, what I mean is that *this thing* that I am (what constitutes my personality in these circumstances) is essentially animal. When I am dead, by contrast, it is not true to think *I am an animal*, because my personality is no longer constituted by an animal, even though the subject, my personality, is identical with what it was when I was an animal. My personality is identical with what it is essentially, even if it is not constituted by the same person after death. Thus, the identity claims on my contextual account are coherent.

This modified version of the survivalist position would be, I think, a preferable interpretation of Aquinas, because no modification of Aquinas’ metaphysics or denial of any of his texts about the death of the person/human being/substance/supposit was necessary. Further, it would be understandable (in light of Aquinas’ theory of reference) why he would think this point about personal survival might not need explicit statement, presuming instead that predication of personal pronouns is obviously apt in the case of human souls and that we only need to appeal to something further, like synecdoche, to account for predication of proper names. Unlike solutions that re-state the problem in different terms or seem to make personhood come in degrees, the modified survivalist view is truly explanatory, because it involves taking implications of Aquinas’ hylomorphism, as they applied to his theological interests, and showing that they entail metaphysical or semantic conclusions that have not yet been pushed far enough. Too many Thomists have been operating, it seems, under the shadow of substance dualist presuppositions rather than in the sunlight of hylomorphist truth.

Apart from Thomistic scholarship, this view of *post mortem* survival remains of general interest because it illustrates a consequence of a hylomorphic account of the human being. Hylomorphism permits us to concede, in a straightforward way, many naturalist intuitions about human beings. Aquinas’ denial that human beings survive death is a clear affirmation that a human being is essentially a *material substance*. I am identical with the human animal that I am. What survives is not even a substance. What survives is the principle of a human being’s personhood, namely, their soul; not a human person, but that person’s personality. Yet, in contrast with substance dualism, the hylomorphist does not need to hold that personal identity claims are true only in virtue of the existence of a *substance* that is identical with you. Instead, the hylomorphist has resources for adopting certain strategies of understanding personal identity that would otherwise resemble Buddhism or four-dimensionalism. When I die, it will still be appropriate to say that I survive because my personality will come to be constituted by my soul alone. And, on that account, you don’t need to remain a substance to survive your death.

1. E.g., James Madden, *Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2013); William Jaworski, *Structure and the Metaphysics of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. E.g., Patrick Toner, “Hylemorphic Animalism,” in *Philosophical Studies* 155 (2011): 65-81. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Peter van Inwagen, “Resurrection,” in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* vol. 8, ed. E. Craig (London: Routledge, 1998), 296. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. E.g., Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind* (London: Routledge, 1993), 138. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Eleonore Stump, “Resurrection, Reassembly, and Reconstitution: Aquinas on the Soul,” in *Die menschliche Seele: Brauchen wir den Dualismus?* (Frankfurt-London: ontos verlag, 2006): esp. 154-160. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. E.g., Mark Johnston, (1992), Constitution is Not Identity, in: Mind 101, 89-105. Baker, L.R. (1997), Why Constitution is Not Identity, in: Journal of Philosophy 94, 599-621. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Eleonore Stump, *Aquinas* (London: Routledge, 2003), 51-52. Also see Eleonore Stump, “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism without Reductionism,” *Faith and Philosophy* 12 (1995): 505-531. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Eleonore Stump, “Resurrection and the separated soul,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas,* eds. B. Davies and E. Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 458 – 466. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Christopher M. Brown, *Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus: Solving Puzzles about Material Objects* (New York: Continuum, 2005); “Souls, Ships, and Substances: A Response to Toner,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 81, no. 4 (2007): 655–68. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. David Oderberg, “Survivalism, Corruptionism, and Mereology,” in *European Journal for Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. 4, No. 4 (Winter 2012): 1-26. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Christina Van Dyke, “Not Properly a Person: The Rational Soul and Thomistic Substance Dualism,” *Faith and Philosophy* 26 (2009): 186-204; John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 298–99. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Patrick Toner, “Personhood and Death in St. Thomas Aquinas,” in *History of Philosophy Quarterly,* Vol. 26, No. 2 (Apr. 2009): 121-138. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. See John Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Unicity of Substantial Form,” in *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages,* edited by M. Mauriege, S. Brown, A. Speer, E. Kent, and R. Friedman (Brill, 2011), 117-154. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Turner Nevitt, “Survivalism versus Corruptionism,” in *Quaestiones Disputatae,* Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring 2020): 127-144. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Toner, “Personhood and Death in St. Thomas Aquinas,” 130. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Brian Davies, *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 215–20; Leo Elders, *The Philosophy of Nature of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1997), 274–84; Robert George and Patrick Lee, *Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 66–81; John Haldane, “The Examined Death and the Hope of the Future,” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 74 (2001): 253–54. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. E.g., Jeremy W. Skrzypek, “Complex Survivalism, or: How to Lose Your Essence and Live to Tell about It,” *Philosophy, Faith, and Modernity: Proceedings of the* *American Catholic Philosophical Association* 91 (2017): 185–99. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Mark Spencer, “The Personhood of the Separated Soul,” in *Nova et Vetera* (English ed.), Vol. 12, No. 3 (2014): 863-912. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Daniel De Haan and Brandon Dahm, “Thomas Aquinas on Separated Souls as Incomplete Human Persons,” in *The Thomist,* Vol, 83, No. 4 (Oct. 2019): 589-637. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. What I mean by saying that they restate the problem is that, if one accepts the survivalists have a point about the *desiderata* for our account of the *post mortem* state, claiming one can be an ‘incomplete person’ seems just as problematic as corruptionism itself and raises all the same questions, only with different terminology. Spencer makes this point: Mark Spencer, “Survivalist, Platonist, Thomistic Hylomorphism,” in *Quaestiones Disputatae,* Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring 2020): 177-184; see De Haan and Dahm’s responses in “After Suvivalism and Corruptionism: Separated Souls as Incomplete Persons,” in *Quaestiones Disputatae*, Vol. 10, No, 2 (Spring 2020): 161-176. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. See *Summa Theologiae* [*STh*] I, q. 29, a. 1, ad. 5 (translations by the English Dominican Fathers, 2nd edition, Benzinger Bros., 1920). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Spencer, “The Personhood of the Separated Soul,” 911-912; Spencer, “Survivalist, Platonic, Thomistic Hylomorphism,” 182-183. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Elizabeth Anscombe, “The First-Person Pronoun,” in *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Philosophical Papers Volume II* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 32-33. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Ibid., 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Ibid., esp. 21-26. Adrian Haddock, “’I am *NN*’,” in *European Journal of Philosophy,* 27(2019): 960: “As it might be put: the capacity to use a name is vulnerable to errors of identification. …the same cannot be true of the capacity to use ‘I’.” [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Anscombe, 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. See Haddock, 958: “Fregean orthodoxy has it that, in using a subject–predicate sentence whose subject is a singular referring expression, the user knows what it is for a use of the sentence to be true. *Inter alia*, the user knows which object is referred to by the expression in subject position, and as such knows which object a use of the sentence turns on for its truth. […] If this is what Anscombe is rejecting, then it is clear how she can reject the idea that ‘I’ is a referring expression, without thereby rejecting the familiar rule. To reject this idea is to hold that no identifying knowledge is internal to any use of a sentence with ‘I’ as subject, and as such, that no use of such a sentence expresses a singular thought. But this does not mean that it is not possible to assign conditions of truth to uses of such sentences by means of the rule.“ [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. As Garet puts it in “Anscombe and the First Person,” in *Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofıa,* Vol. XXVI, No, 78 (Dec. 1994): “It would be objectionable if the only acceptable account of ‘I’ had to be reductive, if our use of ‘I’ had to be analysed in terms which do not themselves presuppose the first person. But there is no reason to think that our analysis is subject to such a constraint” (102). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. It seems plausible that someone who asserted such a sentence seems not as much to say something false as to be *misusing* the pronoun. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. See Jay Garfield, *Engaging Buddhism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), esp. 95-106. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Garfield, 111-114. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. *In I Co*, c. 15, lect. 2 [n° 924], translation by Fabian Larcher (*Commentary on the Letters of Saint Paul to the Corinthians,* Aquinas Institute, 2012) […anima autem cum sit pars corporis hominis, non est totus homo, et anima mea non est ego; unde licet anima consequatur salutem in alia vita, non tamen ego vel quilibet homo]. Also, *Expositio super Iob ad Litteram* (Leonine edition, 1965), c. 19: “Quod ignorans Porphyrius dixit quod *animae, ad hoc quod fiat beata, omne corpus fugiendum est*, quasi anima sit Deum visura non homo, et ad hoc excludendum subdit *quem visurus sum ego ipse*, quasi dicat: non solum anima mea Deum videbit sed *ego ipse* qui ex anima et corpore subsisto.” [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. IV *Sent.*, D. 43, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 2. [anima Abrahae non est, proprie loquendo, ipse Abraham, sed est pars ejus]. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. *De Verit.* 13, q. 5, a. 3 (translated by James V. McGlynn, S.J., Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953). See also IV *Sent.* D. 43, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 2; in III *Sent.* D. 22, q. 1, a. 1, arg 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. See the discussion in Gyula Klima, “The Semantic principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Being,” *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5, 1 (1996): 95-96. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. E.g., *STh* III, q. 16, a. 8, resp. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Jeff Speaks, "Theories of Meaning", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/meaning/, sec. 3.2.3. Reference in the quotation comes from David Lewis, “Putnam’s Paradox,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 62, 3 (1984): 227. doi:10.1080/00048408412340013. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. *STh* II-II, q. 83, a. 11, ad 5. See further *De Verit.* q. 13, a. 5, ad 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Although the corruptionists have repeated Aquinas’ claims on synecdoche, I take it to be a weakness of corruptionism’s approach to these problems that these views leave unexplained why synecdoche is appropriately applied to the soul in the afterlife, other than in a loose or metaphorical way. While the soul is a principal part of a human being, we need to specify in what respect it is principal (e.g., the quantitatively largest parts of the human being would not be addressed as the person by synecdoche), and why this permits calling the soul by the name of the person (a person being a special kind of object). [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. See *De Anima*, q. 16, ad. 8; *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. VIII, resp. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. For a full treatment, see Therese Cory, *Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. See Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Unicity of Substantial Form,” ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. *Summa Contra Gentiles* [*ScG*] IV, c. 80, 1. (translated by Charles J. O’Neil, New York: Hanover House, 1957). [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. See *STh* I, q. 76, a. 1, ad. 4-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. *ScG* IV. c. 81, 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. *ScG* IV, c. 81, 5-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. *ScG* IV, c. 81, 11. See also *De 108 articulis*, q. 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. See the debate between Nevitt and Klima in *The Metaphysics of Personal Identity: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics*, eds. G. Klima and A. Hall, Volume 13 (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016). Turner Nevitt argues that Aquinas can countenance ‘gappy’ existence of the human person (“Annihilation, Re-creation, and Intermittent Existence in Aquinas,” 101-118), whereas Gyula Klima argues that the existence of the human being continues, insofar as the human soul has the same substantial act of existence as that of the human person (“The Problem of “Gappy Existence” in Aquinas’ Metaphysics and Theology,” 119-134). [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. IV *Sent.*, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 1 (trans. Klima, op. cit.). [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. E.g., *ScG* II, c. 83. For a review of Aquinas’ claims about reincarnation throughout his works, see Marie George, “Aquinas on Reincarnation,” in *The Thomist,* Vol. 60, No. 1 (Jan. 1996): 33-52. 10.1353/tho.1996.0035 [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. *ScG* IV, c. 79, 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. See *STh* I, q. 75, a. 2, ad. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. *STh* I, q. 75, a. 4, ad. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. *De Verit.*, q. 19, a. 1, ad. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. E.g., *STh* I, q. 89, a. 1, resp. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. For contemporary discussion of substance sortals, see Richard E. Grandy and Max A. Freund, "Sortals", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/sortals/, esp. sec. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. See *ScG* IV, c. 80, 3 & c. 81, 10; Quodlibet IX, q. 2 a. 1 ad 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. *Quodlibet* II, q. 1, sc. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. *STh* III, q. 50, a. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. *STh* I, q. 29, a. 1, ad. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. *STh* I, q. 39, a. 3, ad 4; *STh* III, q. 3, a. 5, resp. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. *STh* III, q. 3, a. 3, ad 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. *ScG* IV, c. 41, 6-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. *ScG* IV, c. 49, 10. [translation mine] [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. *ScG* IV, c. 44, 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. *STh* I, q. 29, a. 1, ad. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Richard Cross goes so far as to call Aquinas’ view the ‘whole-part’ model in *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 51-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. *ScG* IV, c. 81, 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. My model would differ from De Haan and Dahm because I hold that my ‘ego’ is relevantly *identical,* not ‘radically diminished,’ in the *post mortem* state – use of ‘I’ is indexical, it does not need to refer to a single substance in order for ‘I’ to refer appropriately. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Further, there is a possible parallel to Christ’s human nature being an instrument of the Second Person of the Trinity and being drawn into the personality of the Word even when it is not itself a substance (*ScG* IV, c. 41, 10-12). [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Stump, “Resurrection, Reassembly, Reconstitution,” 168. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)