Phenomenological reduction in Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit*: a new proposal

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Abstract

This article considers whether Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit* contains a reduction comparable to Husserl’s transcendental reduction. Various recent attempts to locate such a reduction in *Sein und Zeit* are surveyed and critically reviewed. The article then offers a new reading that identifies two levels of reduction in the text. The first level, it is argued, leads the inquiry back to the horizon of “Existenz” and the second leads the inquiry back to the horizon of “Zeitlichkeit”. The author argues that each of these reductions may be termed a “transcendental” reduction with some justification but that *Sein und Zeit* anticipates yet another change of standpoint, an even more radical “transcendental” reduction. However, the latter, which would ostensibly lead the inquiry back to the horizon of “Temporalität”, is not accomplished in the published text.
§1. Introduction

We have recently seen a flurry of discussion around the topic of Martin Heidegger’s transcendentalism. A number of scholars appear to be interested in the question of whether Heidegger—and here they are thinking primarily of Heidegger during his "phenomenological decade"—is a transcendental philosopher, and if so in what sense. This article attempts to clarify one area of this debate, an area on which no consensus has yet been reached: namely, the issue of whether there is some kind of “transcendental reduction” in *Sein und Zeit* (*SZ*), and if so how it is enacted. In this article, I argue that, while Heidegger is clearly critical of Edmund Husserl’s transcendental reduction insofar as it seeks to isolate an “absolute transcendental ego”, *SZ* nonetheless employs its own method of reduction to lead the investigation back to the transcendental horizon. More specifically, in this article I hope to establish the following three theses:

(1) In the context of Heidegger’s hermeneutic conception of phenomenology, the function of Husserl’s “transcendental reduction” or “epoché” is taken over by the method of “formal indication” (*formale Anzeige*). Like the Husserlian reduction, Heidegger’s formal indication(s) serve to establish the phenomenological attitude over against the natural attitude.

(2) Read in this light, two levels of phenomenological reduction can be identified in *SZ*. The first level is an “orienting” reduction which, through the formal indication of “existence”, leads the investigation back to the horizon of Dasein *qua* understanding of being or being-in-the-world, ultimately understood as “care”. The second level of reduction leads the investigation back from the horizon of existence to the “meaning” of
the being of Dasein through the formal indication of “temporality”. I call the first the “existential reduction” and the second the “temporal reduction”.

(3) Both reductions can be construed as “transcendental” reductions on certain definitions of the term; but the properly transcendental reduction promised at the outset of SZ still remains outstanding at the end of the text. That is, the published portion of the investigation stops short of the decisive “step back” to the properly transcendental horizon of “time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being” (SZ 1).

§2. Locating phenomenological or transcendental reduction in Sein und Zeit

Upon reading SZ, Husserl despaired to see that Heidegger had apparently “surrender[ed] both the method of my phenomenological research and its scientific character in general.” To Husserl’s mind, Heidegger had abandoned the transcendental way for anthropology, and had effected a “complete reversal of phenomenology’s fundamental standpoint.” The only possible explanation he could imagine was that Heidegger had either rejected or misunderstood his prescribed course of reductions— including, especially, the transcendental reduction. Until the mid 1970s, there seemed little reason to challenge Husserl’s judgment on this point. After all, the term “reduction” is absent from SZ and, more importantly, Heidegger’s insistence on the “facticity” of Dasein and its “being-in-the-world” seem to represent a rejection of the absolute being of the transcendental ego, and, by implication, a rejection of the reduction that grounds this conception of subjectivity.
The tide of opinion turned dramatically, however, with the publication in 1975 of the *Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. 24, the lecture series from 1927 entitled *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. In this illuminating set of lectures, Heidegger speaks explicitly of a “phenomenological reduction” that belongs to the heart of his phenomenological method. To be sure, he distances his reductive method from Husserl’s, clarifying that his own idea of reduction is not a regress from relative being to absolute being (i.e. to constituting consciousness) but a regress from entities to being. This leaves something of a puzzle regarding the precise relation between these two reductive operations. Nonetheless, the assumption that Heidegger had altogether rejected phenomenological reduction could no longer be strictly maintained. And, as things stand today, it is generally recognised that there are good *prima facie* textual grounds for assuming that *SZ* contains (or at least presupposes) a “reduction” of some sort.

But where is the reduction in *SZ*, and how are we to understand its structure and philosophical significance? Acting upon the newfound assumption that there is a reduction to be found in *SZ*, commentators have offered a variety of opinions on just where the reduction or reductions are to be located and how these portions of the text constitute a reduction. In the literature, I have discerned at least five distinct theories as to where reduction occurs in *SZ*. Each theory picks up on some point of similarity between Heidegger’s *magnum opus* and Husserl’s method of transcendental reduction as it is described in one or another of his works. Some commentators combine two or more of these theories, holding either that there is more than one reduction in the text or that the reduction is a composite of several moments or movements. I shall return shortly to the question of how the various theories might be related to each other. For now, allow me to sketch each of the five theories.
The first theory locates a reduction in the “step back” to Dasein qua understanding of being. A version of this theory is offered in an early essay by John D. Caputo. On the understanding that the essence of transcendental reduction lies in a “regress to the subject”, Caputo finds textual evidence in Die Grundprobleme and elsewhere to support the general claim that Heidegger affirms the necessity of such a regress. He argues that “Heidegger saw his fundamental ontology of Dasein, his return of the problem of Being to the being which raises the question of Being, in terms of Husserl’s return to subjectivity.” In other words, Heidegger’s study effects a regress or reduction in $SZ$ and through the regress to the questioner, i.e. in and through the isolation of Dasein as its domain of inquiry, considered not as something *vorhanden* but in its *Existenz*.

Furthermore, on Caputo’s interpretation, the reduction to the “subject” (i.e. Dasein) in $SZ$ prepares the way for the “return to Being” spoken of as the essence of “phenomenological reduction” in *Die Grundprobleme*: “The regress to Being (the ontological reduction) is made possible by a regress to Dasein’s understanding of Being (the transcendental-phenomenological reduction).” This interpretation would notionally locate the reduction in ¶2 of $SZ$.

The second theory locates a reduction in the suspension of “world” qua totality of real entities. Francis F. Seeburger provides an instance of this theory. He takes the essence of the transcendental reduction to be the “putting out of play” or “suspension” of reality, i.e. of the totality of real beings. With this in mind, he suggests that Heidegger restages Husserl’s reduction in his demonstration that presence-at-hand is a founded mode of being and in the resultant (implied) “bracketing” of this founded mode. This subtle bracketing, Seeburger argues, makes it possible for the “being-sense” of reality—or, in Heidegger’s jargon, the “worldhood of the world” (*die Weltlichkeit*)
der Welt)—to be disclosed. In this way, Seeburger finds in _SZ_ a parallel to Husserl’s suspension of “the general positing which characterises the natural attitude” by which the world is revealed to reflection as a totality of noematic correlates of intentional acts. While Seeburger himself does not expressly nominate a location for this reduction (apart from mentioning _SZ_ 65 in a footnote), his account evidently has ¶14 (and perhaps also ¶13) in mind as its location.

There are scholars who share Seeburger’s interpretation of what the transcendental reduction amounts to—i.e. a suspension of the world of real entities—and who also agree that Heidegger retains such a reduction but who are nonetheless reluctant to locate this reduction where Seeburger does. Steven Galt Crowell, for instance, argues (following Ernst Tugendhat) that a suspension of the world _qua_ totality of real entities is something that is simply _presupposed_ in _SZ_. On this view, while it is true that there is a reduction operative in _SZ_, it would be a mistake to seek to pinpoint where it is enacted in the pages of _SZ_, for it is always already in play. This disagreement notwithstanding, Crowell and Tugendhat are best regarded as exponents of a variant of this second theory.

_The third theory locates a reduction in certain “disruptions” in the course of everyday life._ This theory is given its most subtle articulation by Rudolf Bernet. In Division One, Bernet argues, we find a phenomenological reduction operative which, “through a certain _malfuinctioning of natural life_, reveals [the] correlation between Dasein’s (inauthentic or improper) existence and the familiar world to which it refers.” Bernet finds three episodes of “malfuinction” described in _SZ_, each of which underpins a particular phase of Heidegger’s ontological interpretation. These episodes reveal, respectively, (i) the being of equipment (reference, _Verweisung_; ¶¶16–17), (ii) the
spatiality of tools within a region (Gegend) (¶22), and (iii) the being-with (Mitsein) of interaction with others within the horizon of everyday communal existence (¶¶26–27). In each case, an experience of lack or absence brings about a “sudden illumination” of an existential structure, making manifest what was previously concealed. In this way, a reduction is effected in Division One.

Nevertheless, for Bernet the “malfunctioning of natural life” at the heart of the reduction of Division One does not fully satisfy Heidegger’s phenomenological ambitions. It brings into relief the being of tools, the being of the environment, and certain aspects of Dasein’s (inauthentic) being; but it does not bring into relief the authentic being of Dasein. It has to be supplemented in Division Two, therefore, by a second phenomenological reduction, one that goes deeper than the reduction of Division One. This leads us to the fourth theory.

The fourth theory locates a reduction in the “call of conscience” and/or “the experience of anxiety”. For simplicity’s sake, this fourth theory can be illustrated by carrying on the exposition of Bernet’s interpretation, for what he takes to be the “second” phenomenological reduction in SZ is in fact a version of it. The second reduction, for Bernet, occurs in anxiety. The mood of anxiety, in the first instance, allows everyday life to appear as a futile pursuit and as a flight from truth:

In the experience of anxiety, Dasein realizes how ridiculous and futile its unceasing concern for things within-the-world can be. In anxiety and especially the call of conscience, Dasein discovers itself divided between, on the one hand, the flight into the everyday affairs of worldly life (what Pascal calls “le divertissement”) and, on the other, the care it preserves for its own proper potentiality-for-being.

When anxiety causes Dasein to feel no longer at home in the world, Dasein is drawn
back to itself in a “non-place” (atopia). In this “atopia”, Dasein’s being-in-the-world is suspended, although not completely abolished. From this non-place, Dasein’s own being manifests itself to itself in a new way: it sees that the world receives its sense from Dasein and is not an absolute given, despite what das Man would have us believe.

In short, thanks to this (second) reduction, Dasein “finds itself alone in the face of its ipseity, its ‘solus ipse’”. Thus, just as Husserl’s transcendental reduction brings consciousness to its “sphere of ownness” (Eigenheitssphäre), so anxiety “sees to it that Dasein, when confronting itself and alone with itself, meets for the first time not only a new self, but also the phenomenon of its own authentic or proper being”.

The fifth theory locates a reduction in the suspension of the symbolic. The only exponent of this theory, as far as I have discovered, is Jacques Taminiaux. But his proposal is distinctive, and it is certainly weighty enough to be included here.

According to Taminiaux, Heidegger repeats in SZ the Husserlian “reduction of indication” described by Jacques Derrida in La Voix et le Phénomène: namely, a reduction aimed at securing a domain of unmediated givenness (“expression”) by excluding all mediation (“indication”). In the context of SZ, Taminiaux contends, Heidegger accomplishes such a “reduction of indication” when he shows in ¶18 that the Bewandnisanzheit of “in order to” (Um-zu) relations has its ultimate ground in Dasein as its “for-the-sake-of-which” (Worumwillen). This demonstration, in Taminiaux’s view, “in fact amounts to setting up a demarcation between the symbolic order and the intuitive non-symbolic order of pure vision.” Furthermore, like Husserl, Heidegger opts to privilege the latter over the former: “the thematization of the symbolic slip[s] into a reduction of it.” On this interpretation, however, the reduction reaches its purest realisation only in Division Two, where the world as a whole sinks away into
“insignificance” before anxious Dasein, and the “authentic self” is rediscovered. At this climactic point in the text, Heidegger construes Dasein as a being whose most intimate relation of self-possession (i.e. authenticity) is indifferent to and separable from its involvement in all the contingent, referential structures of the world(s) in which it is usually “concernfully” absorbed. Like Husserl’s transcendental reduction, then, Heidegger’s reduction is “a monadological purification” which ultimately brings to a halt the movement of interpretation at an absolute ground of intuitive self-presence or “transparency”.

§3. Critical reflections on the five theories identified above

Allow me to offer a few critical remarks on these theories before I proceed to my own reconstruction of Heidegger’s reduction(s). I shall take them in reverse order. The parallel pointed out by Taminiaux between Husserl’s reduction to the “sphere of ownness” and Heidegger’s progressive peeling back of Dasein’s concealments to reveal its “authentic” core is striking and must be taken into account by any interpretation of the methodological structure of SZ. However, the way he interprets this otherwise indisputable feature of the text is contestable. It is worth noting, to begin with, that Derrida himself is far more cautious than Taminiaux about extending his analysis of Husserl’s indication/expression distinction to Heidegger’s work. In contrast to Taminiaux, who accuses Heidegger of simply replicating the “intuitionism” of Husserl’s phenomenology, Derrida intimates in a footnote that, in his opinion, the reservations that he holds with respect to Husserlian phenomenology are, in fact, Heidegger’s own:
Concerning these problems (the starting point to be found in the precomprehension of the sense of a word, the privilege of the question, “what is...?” the relations between language and being or truth, and belonging to a classical ontology, etc.), it is only by a superficial reading of Heidegger’s texts that one could conclude that these texts themselves fall under these, Heidegger’s own objections. We think, on the contrary, without being able to go into it here, that no one has better escaped them.²⁹

No one is more cautious than Derrida when it comes to the suggestion that Heidegger simply repeats Husserl’s metaphysics of presence. And on this point the weight of evidence from the early lecture courses is surely on Derrida’s side.³⁰ If Heidegger speaks then of a return to an “authentic” self, and even to a “solus ipse”, we may do well to proceed in a similarly cautious fashion and to ask whether perhaps the “ownness” at issue here might not have some other sense than the presence of oneself to oneself in an unmediated, reflective or intellectual intuition. In short, then, Taminiaux’s application of Derrida’s scheme to SZ appears overly hasty and indeed out of step with the destructive trajectory of Heidegger’s project. As such, I rule out theory five as a guide to understanding the reductive structure of SZ.

A preferable reading of the movement towards the unveiling of authentic Dasein in Heidegger’s text is found in Bernet’s essay. Like Taminiaux, Bernet notices that there is a gradual progression in SZ towards a “sphere of ownness”, a progression which reaches its goal in Division Two in the response to the call of conscience and the experiences of guilt and anxiety. In contrast to Taminiaux, however, Bernet makes no charge of “intuitionism” against Heidegger. He does not take Heidegger to be in pursuit of self-certainty and apodictic self-evidence; nor does he regard the exhibition of “authentic” Dasein as representing for Heidegger the achievement of a “pure” phenomenological
truth. What Bernet calls the “second” reduction brings Dasein face to face with ontological truths otherwise inaccessible to inauthentic Dasein, but without claiming that these insights are apodictically certain. More modestly, for Bernet, “authenticity” betokens a mode of being in which the range of ontological “insight” available to the phenomenologist is enlarged and deepened. The reduction of Division Two thus supplements the reduction of Division One, but not by reaching an ultimate foundation. Each reduction merely “leads back” in its own distinctive way from entities to the being of those entities: from tools to readiness-to-hand and environmentality, from persons to being-with, and from the world to authentic existence. Each reduction discloses a different aspect of Dasein’s “ambiguous” or “torn” being: either as involved in the world or as exiled from the world, in the loss of itself or in the return to itself.31

Having said that, it would be misleading to follow Bernet in regarding the “malfunctioning of natural life” and the “experience of anxiety” as “reductions”. The experiences of “lack” and “absence” at the heart of theories three and four are certainly related to the question of transcendental reduction, since these experiences are, for Heidegger, precisely what “calls for thinking”; and, in this sense, they motivate the entire phenomenological project of SZ. However, it is merely question begging to assert, as Bernet does, that the experiences in question have the “effect of a phenomenological reduction”.32 This fails to explain how, for example, on one occasion a broken or missing tool presents a practical problem to be solved and on another occasion provides the impetus for an ontological reflection on equipmentality. What is the difference between the two cases, and what, methodologically speaking, creates this difference? After all, the bare experience is the same in each case. In the Husserlian context, the creation of this difference would be attributed to a “change of attitude”
(Einstellungsänderung), and effecting such a change of attitude is what “transcendental reduction” or “epoché” is meant to achieve. But what establishes an equivalent difference in ŠZ? Bernet’s account gives us little help on this question. In short, then, while theories three and four point to important facets of Heidegger’s text, they do not in fact address the problem of reduction in ŠZ as such. Their respective insights would need to be integrated into an account of Heidegger’s reduction(s), but they themselves do not provide such an account.

The question of how Heidegger establishes the difference between the phenomenological attitude and the natural attitude, I suggest, is in fact addressed more directly by theories one and two. The guiding idea of theory two, that something like Husserl’s “bracketing of the natural attitude” orients the entire phenomenological enterprise of ŠZ, seems incontestable. That is to say, whatever the status of the descriptions found in the pages of ŠZ, some kind of critical or transcendental turn is clearly in play. From the outset of Division One, the natural attitude, qua absorption in the world of entities, has been somehow put to one side so that a properly philosophical attitude can be taken up. Had it not, the peculiar descriptions of Dasein, which are evidently no longer the investigations of a naïve or ontic science, could simply not have emerged. All the same, it is not clear that Heidegger’s reduction can be so neatly confined to ŠZ §13 and/or §14 as Seeburger appears to think. While Seeburger makes a strong case that §13 and §14 contribute to a “bracketing” of the natural attitude, he might just as well have pointed to §2 (as does theory one), or to §§4, 5, §§9–11, or to §12, for that matter. Do not all of these passages play their part in orienting the phenomenological investigations of ŠZ to its proper subject matter and in the proper fashion? I shall certainly argue so below. (And if this is the case, then it suggests at the
same time that Tugendhat and Crowell go too far in regarding “the bracketing of real being” as something that is simply presupposed by SZ. There may not be one explicit moment in the text where the reader is initiated into the phenomenological attitude, but neither is it simply assumed that the reader is already oriented in the phenomenologically appropriate fashion.)

What I am suggesting, then, is that the opening sections of SZ as a whole function as a kind of “orienting reduction” which establishes the phenomenological attitude in which the investigations, at least initially, take place. As such, I read theory two as belonging together with theory one; together they describe one multifaceted reductive movement that occurs at the start of SZ. According to theory one, the reduction occurs when the subject matter of SZ is given a positive characterisation (e.g. as “understanding of being”); for theory two, the reduction occurs when the subject matter of SZ is given a negative demarcation (e.g. as “not something present-at-hand”). Theory one points to an interpretive framing, whereas theory two points to an interpretive bracketing. But, taken together, both gestures help to establish the field of inquiry. I hope to demonstrate below that this complex reductive movement can be understood in the light of Heidegger’s “hermeneutic” idea of phenomenological inquiry. This, to anticipate, will involve reading the various passages listed above as contributing to a “formal indication” of the subject matter under investigation, and as thereby performing, as I have said, an “orienting reduction” at the outset of the existential analytic.

Already in these critical remarks some basic contours of a new interpretation of Heidegger’s reduction in SZ have begun to emerge. By way of summary, allow me to make these explicit. First, fundamental to the reductive strategy of SZ is an “orienting reduction” which, through positive and negative demarcations (i.e. formal indication),
serves to establish the relevant field of phenomenological inquiry. This accomplishes a “reduction” to the extent that it overcomes the natural attitude and turns instead to the phenomenon of Dasein in its *Existenz* or *Seinsverständnis*. (Whether this “orienting reduction” really ought to be described as “transcendental”, however, is moot, for reasons that shall be discussed below.) Second, over and above this initial orienting gesture, various concrete phenomena, especially experiences of “malfunction”, “lack” or “absence” and their accompanying moods, provide the occasion for a series of “ontological interpretations” in SZ. The possibility of ontological interpretation, however, is conditioned by the “orienting reduction” insofar as it opens up the difference between the ordinary sense of these phenomena and their sense as ontological clues. Third, there is something methodologically climactic about the exhibition of authentic Dasein in Division Two of *SZ*, but we have not yet arrived at a satisfactory interpretation of this exhibition in its “reductive” significance.

§4. Reduction and hermeneutics: the “existential reduction”

At least as early as 1919, Heidegger was finding fault with Husserlian phenomenology for being oriented by theoretical (i.e. epistemological) concerns.\(^{33}\) He felt that Husserl had betrayed the methodological principle of phenomenology by making phenomenology the servant of certain traditional philosophical problems and allowing them to dictate terms.\(^{34}\) Instead, phenomenological truth ought to be allowed to emerge from certain experiences that, to use language typically associated with the later Heidegger, *elicit* or *call for* thinking. That is to say, from the time of the earliest post-
war lectures, Heidegger stressed that there is to be a passivity and contingency to phenomenological thought. It is to be reliant upon the autochthonous breaking-forth of the matter to be thought. Likewise, to “think” the phenomena that call for thinking means to answer the call: to answer it with an attempt (however provisional) to bring those phenomena to language.

This “hermeneutic” theme of call and response is worked out in Heidegger’s later writings, as is well known. But it is already present in SZ, albeit in a different configuration. It is present, specifically, in the interrelation of “φαίνομένον” and “λόγος” built into Heidegger’s very definition of “phenomenology”. The difference between these two very nearly synonymous terms is what generates the “hermeneutics” of inquiry: phenomenological discourse (λόγος) as a letting-something-be-seen is contingent upon that-which-shows-itself-in-itself (φαίνομένον), and simultaneously that-which-shows-itself-in-itself (φαίνομένον) is reliant upon being heeded by phenomenological discourse (λόγος) as a letting-something-be-seen. Hence, there is a dialogical relation between the two: the interpretive word which brings the phenomenon to language must also allow itself to be tested by the very phenomenon whose coming forth it enables. Thus Heidegger writes:

To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility [of thinking] only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves. (SZ 153)

In this way, the relation between φαίνομένον and λόγος prefigures the “hermeneutic”
or “dialogical” relation of “call” and “response” in the later work: the \( \phiαινόμενον \) is that which calls for thinking and the \( \lambdaόγος \) is the responsive word.

It is in this connection that one might venture to reintroduce the idea of “reduction”. “Reduction”, as I shall employ the term here, is a name for that first gesture of a “responsive” act in which a “word” (\( \lambdaόγος \)) is uttered in an effort to bring to language the phenomenon that calls for thinking. “Reduction”, in this sense, is the “leap into the circle” (\( SZ \) 315). This “leap in” is “reductive” insofar as it risks speaking thus and not so about its subject matter, thereby nullifying and putting out of play other possible interpretations and other possible words, perhaps even commonsense or venerable ones. It makes a “leap of faith”, as it were, by taking up some particular word in the hope that \emph{this} word might establish an ontologically appropriate interpretive horizon for the matter at hand and thereby make possible a faithful descriptive response to it. In this sense, “reduction” is what provides a way of “access” (\( Zugang \)) to that which is taken up at/as the “start” (\( Ausgang \)) and suggests a “way through” (\( Durchgang \)) whatever is concealing its subject matter (\( SZ \) 36).

What I am calling here Heidegger’s “reductive” gesture is more fully conceptualised in his theory of “\textit{formal indication}” (\textit{formale Anzeige}). Daniel O. Dahlstrom usefully glosses Heidegger’s idea of “formal indication” for us as follows:

\cite{Dahlstrom}

[It is] a revisable way of pointing to some phenomenon, fixing its preliminary sense and the corresponding manner of unpacking it, while at the same time deflecting any “uncritical lapse” into some specific conception that would foreclose pursuit of “a genuine sense” of the phenomenon.\footnote{\textsuperscript{35}}

Three central features of formal indication are mentioned here. First, formal indications
attempt to “point to” or “into” (hineinzeigen) ways of being-in-the-world; “they point into Dasein itself”. That is, they attempt to lead phenomenological inquiry back to the facticity of lived experience by providing it in advance with a rough but ontologically appropriate pointer “into” it. Second, at the same time, formal indications help to stave off the ever-threatening “uncritical lapse” into received philosophical standpoints. They do this by setting up a deliberate conceptual counterpoint to received ontological interpretations, thereby disrupting the self-evident character of our received ontological understandings and counteracting Dasein’s proclivity to lose itself in objects and objectifying rather than examining its own comportments towards objects. Or, to put this “deflecting” function of formal indication in the language of SZ, it prevents the investigation’s “fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception” from being “presented to [it] by fancies and popular conceptions” (SZ 153). Third, the “formal indication” provides a signal or lead to be followed up by further ontological investigation. As Dahlstrom clarifies, “what is ‘formally indicated or signalled’ is not given as something already complete and understandable through comparison, contrast, and classification; instead, what is ‘formally indicated’ is understandable only insofar as the philosopher performs or carries out some activity himself.” Such, in outline, is the idea of “formal indication” by means of which Heidegger fleshes out the hermeneutic theory behind what I have described as the responsive utterance of a (reductive) “word”.

We see this kind of hermeneutics at work in SZ from the outset. First, at no point does the existential analytic claim to be self-motivating; rather it portrays itself at every point as heedful and responsive. Already in the Introduction, for instance, Heidegger is at pains to show that the question of being is one that has an “ontic priority” for Dasein (¶4) and not simply an “ontological priority” (¶3). That is, we always already care about
our being; our existence is an issue for us (SZ 12). The hermeneutic of Dasein, then, promises to do nothing other than enter more fully into this self-relation: “the question of Being is nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein itself—the pre-ontological understanding of Being” (SZ 15).

As such, the questioning of being emerges as a task from within life itself and not simply in response to an extrinsic, theoretical demand. Thus SZ announces its “responsive” character—in this case, in response to the care of Dasein for its own being.

Second, within the body of the text, a series of “ontological clues” is addressed, namely the experiences and moods referred to by Bernet. Here again, the aim of the text is to allow these phenomena to be taken up as “clues” that lay bear the inadequacies of our received ontological categories and inspire or elicit from us a new interpretation. These phenomena, in a strong sense, occasion the text. That is to say, the moods and other experiences described in SZ are not illustrations; they are the very phenomena to which the interpretation seeks to witness by bringing them to language. It is not without reason, then, that Heidegger defines phenomenology in the famous ¶7 as “to let that which shows itself [Das was sich zeigt] be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (SZ 34; my emphasis). Certain phenomena have shown themselves to Heidegger, and he is obliged to witness to them. Thus, while Kant emphasised the active role played by the “tribunal of reason” in interrogating witnesses and/or evidence to find answers to the questions it poses, Heidegger stresses that this “tribunal” is only ever convened in the first place, as it were, to take up or respond to someone’s plea for justice. The imperative “to the things themselves!”’, then, ought to be read as a pledge to take up and “think” any phenomenon whatsoever that calls for thinking without fear or favour. In this way, the dynamic of call and response, of
phenomenon and logos, knits together the very fabric of SZ.

What then is the “word” that is taken up by the phenomenological thinking of SZ? By what means does it “leap into the circle” in the hope of articulating in a unified way the phenomena that call for thinking? Wherein lies its “reduction”? It lies, I suggest, in the word “Existenz”, which formally indicates the being of the entity called “Dasein”. This is the word that is pronounced in advance over all the phenomena to be discussed in the pages of SZ as the “provisional” or “preparatory” way of access to them (SZ 231); this is Heidegger’s attempt to “leap into the circle” in the right way. It establishes the attitude or standpoint of his phenomenological investigation. If this interpretation is correct, then, we might name Heidegger’s initial, orienting reduction the “existential reduction”.

Lest this word be misunderstood—or rather too easily understood—and the attempt at thinking falter from start, Heidegger endeavours in the opening sections of the text to ensure that it is properly established and takes root in the understanding and imagination of the reader. Even before the term “Existenz” is formally introduced, Dasein’s being is glossed as “Seinsverständnis” (SZ 12), and this will remain one of the key positive characterisations of Existenz. This designation, which in a sense is convertible with the primary designation “Existenz”, serves to tune the reader in to the “fore-conception” of the hermeneutic to follow. Then, in Chapters I and II respectively, this preliminary sketch of Dasein’s being is further fleshed out by the idea of “Jemeinigkeit” in ¶9 (roughly denoting Dasein’s self-relation), and by the idea of “In-der-Welt-sein” in ¶12 (roughly denoting Dasein’s world-relation).

At the same time, these positive characterisations (“fixing its preliminary sense”) are supplemented or reinforced by a series of negative demarcations (“deflecting any
‘uncritical lapse’”). I have already mentioned the negative demarcation in ¶14, cited by Seeburger, through which the world of entities is contrasted with the world qua totality of meaningful relations, and the former is implicitly placed to one side in preference for the latter. There are, however, other points at which the guiding formal indication of Heidegger’s “existential” subject matter is marked out negatively. For instance, in ¶9 “existentialia” are distinguished from “categories”; in ¶10 the analytic of Dasein is distinguished from anthropology, psychology and biology; and, in ¶11 it is also distinguished from sociology and ethnology. Furthermore, in ¶¶12–13 the “being-in” characteristic of existence is contrasted to the ontic relation of being “within the world”.

Taken together, these positive and negative demarcations set up an already rich “formal indication” of the subject matter at the heart of SZ. It only remains for this formal indication to be tested and developed as it leads us through interpretative encounters with a wide variety of existential phenomena. These encounters, in turn, gradually render the initial sketch of Dasein’s being more concrete. The interpretation thus travels along a path of discovery, verification, revision and enrichment.

Is this “existential reduction” a transcendental reduction? If we think of “transcendental” as necessarily relating to a pure transcendental ego, then the existential reduction is not a transcendental reduction, for it by no means represents the recourse to a transcendental ego immediately accessible to a reflective gaze. However, if with the majority of commentators we understand the “transcendental” domain in the broadly Kantian sense as that which provides the a priori conditions for the possibility of knowledge—or, more broadly still, for the constitution of objects—then Heidegger’s existential phenomenon of being-in-the-world is undoubtedly a transcendental phenomenon. And, by implication, the existential reduction that leads to it is a
transcendental reduction. Heidegger may be critical of Husserl’s analysis of
transcendental subjectivity as a pure constituting ego, but the analysis of Dasein is
nothing less than an attempt to show in a more penetrating fashion than Husserl what
holds the place of the constituting subject. This is nowhere more clearly asserted than in
Heidegger’s oft-quoted letter to Husserl of 22nd October 1927, in which he writes *inter
alia*: “What is the mode of being of the entity in which ‘world’ is constituted? That is
*Being and Time*’s central problem—namely, a fundamental ontology of Dasein.”

The more complex and often overlooked question, however, is whether the initial,
“orienting” or “existential” reduction qualifies as a “transcendental” reduction
according to Heidegger’s own definition of the term in *SZ*, §7. There he writes:

> Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which
> an entity may possess. *Being is the transcends pure and simple.* And the transcendence of
> Dasein’s Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and necessity of the most
> radical *individuation.* Every disclosure of Being as the *transcends is transcendental
> knowledge. Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is veritas transcendentalis.*
> (*SZ* 38)

Heidegger equates transcendental knowledge with properly ontological knowledge, i.e.
“disclosure of Being as the *transcends*”. It follows then that a reduction ought to be
called a “transcendental reduction” if and only if it leads back from entities to (their)
being. On this understanding, the “existential reduction” would seem very clearly to be
a “transcendental reduction” given that it leads back to the being of Dasein.

Things, however, are slightly more complex. While the analytic of Dasein does yield
ontological knowledge, it does not yield *universal* phenomenological ontology *per se,*
for the latter pertains not only to Dasein’s being but to being as such. The ontological
knowledge resulting from the existential analytic is, in fact, only a part of the larger whole that is the contexture of transcendental knowledge. Having said that, this part has a very special relationship to the whole: “philosophy”, which Heidegger defines precisely as “universal phenomenological ontology”, “takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has made fast the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns” (ibid.). Thus, the existential analytic, which is only a part of the whole of transcendental knowledge, also holds a peculiar priority over that whole. Consequently, as Caputo saw, while it is tempting to conflate “the regress to Dasein’s understanding of Being” with “the regress to Being”, this would be illegitimate. The two are intimately interconnected, but they are not identical. The former is an instance of the latter; but, according to a distinctive circularity, the latter is only possible on the basis of the former. In other words, Heidegger’s magnum opus is built upon the wager, as it were, that “fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein” (SZ 13).

It is by insisting on the existential side of this methodological paradox—or, more precisely, on the “remarkable ‘relatedness backward or forward’” between Dasein’s mode of being and the question of being (SZ 8)—that Heidegger shows that his methodology is still deeply committed to something analogous to the notion of transcendental subjectivity (i.e. now understood as Dasein). It is by insisting on the universal-ontological side that he shows that the existential analytic is not the terminus ad quem of philosophical inquiry. Rather, the existential reduction is merely the means by which the question of the meaning of being is to be worked out. The terminus ad quem remains the interpretation of the meaning of being, by which is meant “the
possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being” (SZ 1), or again, “the horizon within which something like Being in general becomes intelligible” (SZ 231). Therefore, while there is justification for regarding the existential reduction as a transcendental reduction according to Heidegger’s understanding of that term, it is also the case that, by Heidegger’s own admission, the existential analytic serves only as a promissory note or point of departure for that more radical “transcendental knowledge” to which the existential analytic is “on the way”. Perhaps, then, we would do well to reserve the term “transcendental” for that knowledge (and its enabling reduction) by which the meaning of being per se is in fact secured. In the next section, I shall discuss whether the second level of reduction in SZ, the “temporal reduction”, satisfies this condition and qualifies as a transcendental reduction in the sense just specified.

§5. Reduction and temporality: the “temporal reduction”

In SZ ¶63, Heidegger discusses what he describes as the necessary “violence” of ontological Interpretation. This “violence” has already been alluded to above in the idea of the “leap”. But we are now in a position to give it a fuller treatment. The “violence” of the existential analytic is felt by the reader from the beginning of SZ: there is a dissonance between our everyday notions of what human being is and the interpretation of human being imposed by Heidegger’s “existential reduction”. By the end of Division One, however, the initial emptiness of the ontological sketch of Dasein is overcome by the concrete exposition of the “care-structure” and the reader’s commitment to his or her own interpretive paradigm is forcefully challenged. By exhibiting a series of
phenomena which it appears can only be properly brought to expression by abandoning
the language of substance ontology for the language of the existential analytic, the
investigations lead the reader towards an acceptance of the text’s initially foreign
interpretive framework. In this way, the initial dissonance between the inauthentic
understanding of the reader and the formal indication of “existence” gradually
resolves—ideally, at least.

Why does this methodological reflection appear at this point in the text? It is not
accidental. It is there to prepare the reader for another “violent” event. To this point in
Division Two, the trend towards consonance has continued through the exhibition of
authentic Being-towards-death (as “anticipation”) and the attestation of Dasein’s
authentic potentiality-for-Being (in “resoluteness”). But the investigation is about to
come up against the difficulty of exhibiting Dasein as a whole: in ¶64, the existential
analytic will strike an apparently fatal challenge to *its own* discursive presuppositions.

Dasein is not a self-present “whole” in the same way as the ego of Cartesian
metaphysics. Indeed, as Heidegger contends from the very beginning of *SZ*, while our
being is so close to us that we are it, ontologically it is very far away. If this entity
“comes close” to itself, Heidegger suggests, it is not through immanent reflection but
through authentic anticipatory resoluteness. In this phenomenon, Dasein comes face to
face with itself as a “whole” in a certain sense. But in what sense? What manner of
“wholeness” or “selfhood” does Dasein possess if it is not that of a subject-substance?
What existential “unity” does Dasein exhibit? In ¶64, Heidegger asserts (in accordance
with the formally-indicative wager of the text) that “‘I’-hood and Selfhood must be
conceived *existentially*” (*SZ* 318). And taking the “selfhood” of anticipatory
resoluteness as his clue, he suggests that the authentic selfhood of Dasein be construed
as “self-constancy” (Selbst-ständigkeit; SZ 322)—not a self-thing, but a consistent, authentic mode of existing. But, again, this invites a further question: how is “self-constancy” to be conceptually articulated?

It is at this point that the existential analytic discovers the inadequacy not only of substance ontology but also of its foregoing existential categories to account for the phenomenon of existence. It becomes apparent that a shift into a new horizon of understanding is necessary. The first “word”, offered in advance in response to the matter that calls for thinking, discovers its own limits. What is demanded by this crisis (i.e. by the things themselves), then, is a second “reduction”, a second “word” uttered in response to that which calls for thinking, a word which goes beyond the horizon already disclosed through basic concept of “existence”.

To this end, Heidegger contends that “self-constancy”, which cannot be conceptualised in terms of persistence through time, be conceptualised in terms of an existential temporality. Authentic selfhood, he argues, can only be conceptualised as a way of being futural (zukünftig), of having-been (gewesen), and, consequently, of being present (gegenwärtig). These categories, or “ecstases” (Ekstasen), suggest a new horizon upon which to project the interpretive description of Dasein’s being, a horizon which Heidegger simply calls “temporality” (Zeitlichkeit). Upon this horizon, conjectures Heidegger in what I am calling his second “reduction”, the unity of the disparate elements of the preceding existential analytic can be brought to language in a unified way: “The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality” (SZ 327).

Having “thought through to the end” the path opened up by the “existential reduction”, the phenomenon of “anticipatory resoluteness” functions in this way as the
pivot point between the initial level of interpretation in \textit{SZ}, determined as it is by the formal indication of “existence”, and the radicalised, “temporal” level of interpretation of those same phenomena. Or, more precisely, the exhibition of authentic selfhood out of the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness is what \textit{demands} the step back to the horizon of the \textit{meaning} of Dasein’s being, that is, to the transcendental condition of its possibility, i.e. to primordial temporality. While Division One articulates the being-structure of Dasein as “care”, Division Two articulates the \textit{meaning} of this being-structure as “temporality”. To be sure, the field of temporality could not have been accessed had the investigation not taken its start under the provisional guidance of the existential reduction. But now that initial “leap into the circle” gives way to a more primordial “leap in”: “that which our \textit{preparatory} existential analytic of Dasein contributed \textit{before} temporality was laid bare, has now been \textit{taken back} into temporality as the primordial structure of Dasein’s totality of Being” (\textit{SZ} 436). The existential analysis is thus \textit{sublated} in a temporal analysis: it is both preserved and overcome.

Have we thus arrived at the “transcendental reduction” proper? Does the “temporal reduction” lead back (\textit{reducere}) to the properly transcendental plane as Heidegger understands it? I have already suggested that temporality discloses, on Heidegger’s account, something like the transcendental condition for the possibility of care, and as such the formal indication of temporality would have some claim to be labelled a transcendental reduction. But does it reach “the possible horizon for any understanding of Being whatsoever”, “the horizon within which something like Being in general becomes intelligible”?

Again, I think not. Heidegger projects, literally from page one, that the horizon he seeks is that of “time” as the meaning of being as such. But, by the end of \textit{SZ}, he is only
able to confidently claim that “Temporality [Zeitlichkeit, not Temporalität] has manifested itself… as the meaning of the Being of care” (SZ 436; my emphasis).

Fundamental questions remain outstanding: “How is this mode of the temporalizing of temporality to be Interpreted? Is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being?” (SZ 437).

The apparently successful working out of Zeitlichkeit des Daseins does not directly constitute an elaboration of the Temporalität des Seins (cf. SZ 17–19 and Die Grundprobleme, 324).

It appears then that Heidegger anticipates some kind of further reductive operation that would disclose not merely Dasein’s temporality (Zeitlichkeit) but the horizon of temporality as such (Temporalität), thereby laying bare the meaning of being as such. And it is evidently this enigmatic third reduction that was to have taken place in Division Three of SZ (“Time and Being”) in order to complete the task projected in the title of Part One: “The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being” (SZ ix).

Now, it is well known that Heidegger referred to his 1927 lectures, Die Grundprobleme, as a new elaboration of Division Three. We may well ask, then, whether the “third reduction”, i.e. the transition from Zeitlichkeit to Temporalität, is successfully negotiated in those lectures, and if so how. The exploration of these questions would represent an important continuation of the present analysis and would further extend our understanding of Heidegger’s method(s) of phenomenological reduction. Nonetheless, these important questions shall unfortunately have to be deferred until another time.
§6. Conclusion

We have seen that there are two levels of reduction in the published portion of SZ. The first orients the inquiry and establishes its phenomenological attitude through the formal indication of Dasein’s being as “existence”. The second radicalises this inquiry, taking it back into the horizon of the “meaning” of Dasein’s being, through the formal indication of “temporality”. It is in the identification of this second reduction that the foregoing analysis has gone beyond the five theories of reduction identified earlier. All five existing theories fail to consider the “step back” to the horizon of primordial temporality in their analysis of Heidegger’s reductive strategy. In drawing attention to the reductive significance of this transposition, the foregoing analysis identifies what I believe is Heidegger’s most radical contribution to the tradition of transcendental philosophy in general and to transcendental phenomenology in particular. In any case, it ought to be abundantly clear that phenomenological reduction remains a fundamental gesture in Heidegger’s early masterwork, despite the absence of explicit talk of “reduction”.

With regard to the issue of Heidegger’s transcendentalism, we have seen that the existential reduction has a claim to be regarded as “transcendental” by virtue of its family resemblance to the Kantian critical turn and to Husserl’s own transcendental reduction; that the temporal reduction could also be called “transcendental” to the extent that it makes manifest the “condition of possibility” of Dasein’s care-structure; and that, on Heidegger’s own definition of “transcendental” knowledge (i.e. as knowledge of being as “the transcendens pure and simple”), both the existential and the temporal reduction could be understood as “transcendental” insofar as they enable the properly
ontological analysis of Dasein. However, it has also been noted that there is a deep sense in which SZ never reaches its properly transcendental horizon, i.e. it never effects the step back to an “Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being”, despite the fact that such a “step back” is anticipated from the outset and thorough preparations are made for it.

In short, what has been uncovered in this analysis is that Heidegger practices phenomenological reduction in SZ, but not according to the letter of Husserl’s theory of reduction. Heidegger’s reduction(s) do not have the goal of securing the interpretive horizon proper to philosophical reflection with apodictic certainty; instead, reduction is conceived as a wager that risks a way of approach, a way whose philosophical significance can only be assessed “after one has gone along it” (SZ 437). Only according to this pattern can he foresee a phenomenological method being useful in the quest to “reawaken” the question of the meaning of being and to prevent it from falling once again into a slumber: “for in such an inquiry one is constantly compelled to face the possibility of disclosing an even more primordial and more universal horizon from which we may draw the answer to the question, ‘What is “Being”? ’” (SZ 26).

2 Heidegger’s concerns with Husserl’s reductions are documented most famously in *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, ed. Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1979) (GA 20), 129–57.


4 Ibid., 485. The quotation is from Edmund Husserl’s lecture, “Phenomenology and Anthropology”, of June 1931.


7 There are some exceptions to this rule. See, for instance, Timothy J. Stapleton’s cogent defence of the thesis that Heidegger rejects transcendental reduction outright in *Husserl and Heidegger: The Question of a Phenomenological Beginning* (Albany: State University of New York, 1983), 89–112, 121–25.

8 John D. Caputo, “The question of being and transcendental phenomenology”, in *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments*, vol. 2, ed. Christopher Macann (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 333–35. The evidence cited includes positive remarks made about a “regress to the subject” and even a “regress to consciousness” in *Die Grundprobleme* (esp. 103 and 444), and in Heidegger’s draft of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article (Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology, op. cit., 108–9).

9 Ibid., 334.
10 Ibid., 336.

11 Ibid., 339.


16 Ibid., 256.

17 Ibid., 259.

18 Ibid., 258.

19 Ibid., 256.

20 Ibid., 264.

21 Ibid.; cf. *SZ* 188.

22 Ibid., 256.


25 Ibid., 279.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 284–87. See SZ 343; cf. ¶40 and ¶¶56–58.
28 Ibid., 285; cf. 280.
29 Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, op. cit., 26, fn. 5.
30 For instance, in *Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)*, ed. Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1988) (GA 63), Heidegger makes it clear that apodictic certainty in matters of phenomenological description is an unrealisable dream. Phenomenological description of entities can never possess a “mathematical” level of proof for essential reasons: “The chance that hermeneutics will go wrong belongs in principle to its ownmost being. The kind of evidence found in its explications is fundamentally labile. To hold up before it such an extreme ideal of evidence as ‘intuition of essences’ would be a misunderstanding of what it can and should do” (15; Eng. trans., 12).
32 Ibid., 263.
39 Note that this understanding accords closely with the definition given to the term “reduction” in *Die Grundprobleme*, §5.
40 Cf. also SZ 11: “Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical inquiry of the positive sciences. But it remains itself naïve and opaque if in its researches into the Being of entities it
fails to discuss the meaning of Being in general. And even the ontological task of constructing a non-
deductive genealogy of the different possible ways of Being requires that we first come to an
understanding of ‘what we really mean by this expression “Being” ’.

Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme, op. cit., 1. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, in his “Nachwort” to the
Gesamtausgabe edition of Sein und Zeit, reports that Heidegger burnt his first attempt at drafting the third
Division of SZ (GA 2, 582).