

there are philosophical motivations for being committed to this view that stem from wanting to be able to offer a noncircular account of concept acquisition, since Kant says very little about the process of empirical concept acquisition in the third *Critique*, it seems that we would then need to look to his account of aesthetic judgment for his commitment to primitive normativity. However, for reasons just discussed, it is not clear that the normativity involved in aesthetic judgment is sufficiently similar to the primitive normativity involved in concept acquisition. So one might ask whether Ginsborg's emphasis on primitive normativity stems more from Wittgenstein-inspired considerations than from Kant's view in the third *Critique*.

Critical comments aside, however, while the field of Kant scholarship is well trodden, over the past twenty-five years, Ginsborg has been building an original body of work that helps us rediscover the third *Critique* as making a pivotal contribution to Kant's theory of cognition and thus as a necessary complement to the first *Critique*. Now presented as a whole, *The Normativity of Nature* embodies the full force of these careful and transformative efforts.

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Samantha Matherne

University of California, Santa Cruz

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Michael McKenna, *Conversation and Responsibility*.
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I

Michael McKenna's *Conversation and Responsibility* is an ambitious and impressive statement of a new theory of moral responsibility. McKenna's approach builds upon the strategy advanced in P. F. Strawson's (2013 [1962]) enormously

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influential “Freedom and Resentment.” The account advanced aims to provide Strawson’s theory with the sort of detail that is required to fill significant gaps and respond to a wide range of criticisms and objections that have been directed against it. McKenna identifies three key elements in Strawson’s account of moral responsibility, two of which he endorses and one of which he rejects (56, compare 2–3, 45–46). The first is the claim “that moral responsibility must be understood by reference to the nature of holding responsible” (30). The second is the claim that holding responsible ought to be explained in terms of our moral reactive attitudes and practices. Taken together these two claims, McKenna notes, involve a commitment to both an interpersonal and a conative-affective theory (46). The third claim, which McKenna rejects, is that “holding morally responsible is metaphysically more basic than being morally responsible” (47, compare 3). In other words, McKenna rejects the suggestion that holding responsible is in some way *prior* to being responsible, contrary to the views of Strawson and some of his most prominent followers (3, 39–41).

It is McKenna’s aim to strike a balance between the view that holding responsible is in some way more basic or fundamental to being responsible and, at the other end of this spectrum, “the extreme metaphysical view” (41). The extreme metaphysical view maintains, contrary to the Strawsonian approach, that the question of an agent being responsible can be settled without any reference to the stance of holding responsible or our reactive attitudes. What we should be concerned with, extreme metaphysical views suggest, are relevant facts about the agent’s moral values as revealed in their conduct, about which our judgments may be true or false. On this view, the fairness or propriety of blaming and *holding* responsible depends on facts about the agent *being* responsible, not the other way round. To put this point more sharply, we may say that blameworthiness is prior to blaming. Against these metaphysical accounts, the Strawsonian view claims that any such facts about responsibility depend on our practices and are not prior to, or independent of, them. In order to understand responsible agency, we must first have in place a set of norms that structure our moral emotions. It is in this sense that priority rests with holding over being responsible. McKenna’s theory aims to find a middle position or “third option” between these two poles, one that holds that *neither* is more basic than the other (53). For this reason, McKenna describes his own brand of Strawsonian responsibility as a “modest metaphysical interpretation” (54).

McKenna’s sympathy with the suggestion that being morally responsible is in some way metaphysically more basic than holding responsible is rooted in the fact that holding responsible is meant to be a response to an agent who is responsible (51). For this reason his “modest metaphysical” account aims to place greater weight on the relevant features of the responsible agent. The crucial element that McKenna wants to give more prominence to is “quality of will,” which can itself be understood and explained with reference to Strawson’s original statement. Strawson began his own investigations with the observation that

we care a great deal about the extent to which we show regard or concern for others, as manifest in our conduct (that is, through our choices, decisions, intentions, reasons, and motives). The quality of an agent's will is a function of their good, indifferent, or ill will as it concerns others. It follows that the quality of an agent's will reflects the value and worth of that will (58–59, 94, 103, 209).

Reactive attitudes are, McKenna continues, responses to the qualities of will found in others. Although they have a cognitive component, involving beliefs about the agent's conduct in relation to our normative standards and expectations, reactive attitudes also have both an affective and a conative dimension—which gives them practical force and significance (2, 22, 64). It is our moral reactive attitudes, understood in these terms, that “help to constitute the standpoint of holding responsible” (64). Much of McKenna's analysis assumes a “narrow” construal of our moral reactive attitudes, understood primarily in terms of our negative responses to cases where an agent “knowingly and freely performs a morally wrong act from a morally objectionable quality of will” (64–65, 181). While this account does make reference to the need for a responsible agent to have free will in the broad sense of a control condition, McKenna aims to stay “neutral” between compatibilist and incompatibilist interpretations of that condition (2, 13, 58; but compare 74, where McKenna notes the compatibilist orientation of Strawsonian theories). Although McKenna's narrow focus is on actions that trigger negative responses that “rise to the level of overt blame,” he makes clear that he intends his own account to be “more inclusive” or “more liberal” than this, covering judgments of virtue and vice as well as right and wrong action (3, 200f.). Nevertheless, the paradigmatic and primary cases McKenna concerns himself with throughout much of his discussion are ones involving moral reactive attitudes that have blameworthy actions as their objects of evaluation (as suggested by most of McKenna's specific examples offered throughout the book).

With these basic features of quality of will and reactive attitudes in place, McKenna turns to what he suggests is an “extremely important point, one that cannot be overstated,” which is that regarding another person as a morally responsible agent means something in *practice* (67). McKenna describes this as his “practice-oriented treatment of reactive attitudes” because it emphasizes the public and overt nature of our reactive attitudes and the practices associated and intertwined with them (67–72). According to McKenna's account, reactive attitudes typically involve some relevant form of practical follow-through. Private episodes that lack any public expression or overt behavior are, he argues, “parasitic” on an understanding of the public cases (69). We identify the reactive attitudes in terms of the relevant behavior and expression they give rise to. Moral emotions of these kinds are not, however, mere “ejaculations” or “eruptions” (68, 71). Although they are not typically subject to voluntary control, they are subject to *rational* control, insofar as the evaluative judgments involved give scope to discarding or modifying our emotions in light of relevant consider-

ations (71, 194–95). The important issue that arises out of all this concerns what modes of expression or kinds of response in these circumstances we can deem appropriate or “fitting” to their object. McKenna’s “conversational model” (88) provides a general answer to this important question. The model is further developed and refined in the second half of the book, much of which is devoted to an extended discussion and analysis of *blame*.

Given that our reactive attitudes are (rationally) grounded in beliefs about an agent’s quality of will, we need a theory of excuses and exemptions, which will cover cases where we are provided with either reinterpretations of the agent’s conduct (for example, accidents, ignorance, and so on) or presented with considerations that suggest the agent is sufficiently incapacitated as to show that he or she is not a responsible agent or an appropriate target of reactive attitudes (for example, a young child, insane person, and so on). As McKenna notes, it is a significant gap in Strawson’s original statement of his own theory that he has so little to say about exemptions and the issue of incapacity (see Watson 2013 [1987], Russell 1992). It is at this juncture that McKenna introduces the core apparatus of his conversational model. The key elements are drawn from Gary Watson’s (2013 [1987]) “expressive theory of moral responsibility” (76–78).

Expressing reactive attitudes, Watson has argued, has a *point* only if the agent can understand them or has “a capacity to be addressed.” In this sense, we should view reactive attitudes as “incipient forms of communication,” and as such, they presuppose that agents targeted by reactive attitudes can make sense of them. According to McKenna, what is correct about this claim of Watson’s is that if an agent is impaired in this way, then he or she is incapable of participating in our complex social practices of holding morally responsible. This is not just an inability to appreciate the “challenges put to her by those who hold morally responsible” but also in the ability to *be* morally responsible (78). It is the principal aim of McKenna’s conversational model to explain and elucidate this intimate and inextricable link between being capable of “moral address” and being a responsible agent.

McKenna’s account of this connection begins with “the condition of moral sense,” which requires that responsible agents must be able to hold responsible, where holding responsible involves a moral sense or susceptibility to reactive attitudes (drawing on Russell 2004). McKenna elaborates on and extends this approach by arguing that any agent who is so incapacitated (that is, in relation to moral sense) would lose access to a range of moral reasons of an especially significant kind—“second-personal reasons” (83; drawing on Darwall 2006). Second-personal reasons, as McKenna summarizes it, involve the demand by someone with authority and standing to make such demands that you not harm them or cause them to suffer. The validity of reasons of this kind presuppose the authority of the person making the demand and the agent’s accountability to them (83).

If Darwall is correct about the very existence, nature and persuasiveness of these reasons, and to my mind he is, we have a straightforward source of support for my claim about moral responsibility's dependence on the nature of holding responsible. The practices by which others hold one morally responsible are themselves expressions of demands that as a competent agent one must be able to grasp and treat as reasons that apply to one. In the absence of this ability, a person would be unable to recognize and respond to a vast array of reasons presented to morally responsible agents. (84)

Clearly, then, as McKenna sees it, an ability to grasp second-personal reasons is essential to being a (fully) responsible agent, and an ability to grasp reasons of this kind requires being able to hold oneself responsible, where this involves reactive attitudes understood as modes of moral address (as directed at the agent).

This brings us to the *analogy* between responsibility and conversation. In the case of conversation, a competent speaker must possess both skills of expressing herself, so she can contribute to the dialogue, and the interpretative skills required for understanding those who may reply to her. These skills are enmeshed with each other, insofar as a proper appreciation of the significance of what one is saying presupposes an appreciation of the way in which it is received and interpreted by others. For a linguistic community to function properly and for effective communication to occur, both speakers and audience must share these abilities and skills (49, 85, 219). In the case of responsibility, an agent's "acting skills and her holding responsible skills are similarly enmeshed" (86). A responsible agent must, like a competent speaker, be able to appreciate the significance of her act and the quality of will with which she acts. For this to be possible, she must also be able to understand and interpret the way her acts are received and will be taken and responded to by others. Failing this, she will have no proper or adequate appreciation of the significance of what she is doing. Competence as a moral agent requires abilities on both sides of this coin, and these skills cannot be pried apart—just as the analogy with conversation and the relevant modes of speaker competence suggests (86, 97, 99–100, 196, 213).

This analysis of the conversational analogy generates a "three-stage" structure to the model that McKenna proposes. The first stage is "moral contribution," which occurs when an action or omission by an agent initiates or "opens up the possibility of a conversation about the moral value of her action" (88). This is followed by the second stage of "moral address," which involves members of the moral community directing reactive attitudes back to the agent—an analogue of conversational reply addressed back to the speaker. Finally, the third stage is "moral account," when the agent replies by offering some account of her conduct, appealing to excuses, justifications, and so on,

as they may be relevant. Viewed in these terms, responsibility is a form of “dialogue,” requiring competence by all parties involved at all three levels or stages. Incompetence or inability at any one of these stages makes “dialogue” and “communication” impossible. When we understand moral responsibility in these terms, then the basic issue that concerns McKenna about the relationship between being and holding responsible is explained and accounted for. Neither one has “priority” over the other.

What, then, is the significance of the conversational theory for our understanding of blame? One potential objection to this theory, McKenna points out, is that it is “inadequate to provide the justification for the harm in blame” (105). In dealing with this criticism, McKenna provides an extended and subtle response, carefully developed in the second half of the book. “Desert,” he notes, “is perhaps the most contentious dimension to an adequate theory of moral responsibility” (114). The background concern here is that full-fledged responsibility (that is, in the “accountability” sense, 7–8) commits us to the view that the blameworthy agent deserves blame and that this involves some harm or suffering to wrongdoers. It is McKenna’s aim to show that the conversational theory suggests that some forms of response to the wrongdoer are “fitting,” while others are not (118). A fitting response is one that is “an intelligible, meaningful, or suitable expression of one’s moral disapproval within the context of a conversation” (120). McKenna believes that the conversational theory can accommodate a credible, weak role for desert and explain what this involves (127–28, 133).

According to the conversational theory, the basic point of blame is to communicate with the wrongdoer (as per the “moral address” stage of responsibility). Given this core function or “point” of blame, it must be both public and directed at the wrongdoer. As blaming involves these modes of expression, suitably constrained by the requirements of “moving the dialogue further along” (142), it inevitably involves some form of significant harm to the wrongdoer (135, 143, 152). These harms, as associated with properly functioning blame, are accounted for primarily in terms of a certain range of “welfare interests,” such as being able to enjoy and maintain friendships, emotional stability, and so on (135, 153). It is important, says McKenna, that these practices of blaming, so constrained, not be confused with punishment (134, 144–45). In the case of blame, unlike punishment, the *intention* to harm is not essential—although harm may result, it is not what is aimed at or communicated (141, 143–46). But this still leaves the question of why blame at all if it really causes harm and suffering—where does its *value* lie? The answer to this, McKenna maintains, is that harms involved in blaming deliver three important, noninstrumental goods. They take the form of the goodness that “is located in the blameworthy agent’s commitment to membership within the moral community” and the fact that she cares about this; the goodness that is manifest in the role of the blamer showing a real commitment to morality (167–69); and, finally, the goodness in

the dynamic of the blaming process insofar as it “features dialogue aimed at resolution and reconciliation” (169). In sum, the conversational theory can account for a weak role for desert in our practices of blame, which avoids the extremes of various “metaphysical” theories while at the same time identifying the genuine value in these practices even though they cause harm to others.

II

McKenna’s conversational theory is explained and defended with admirable care and precision. It is also presented in a lucid and elegant manner (avoiding both needless jargon and gratuitous technicalities). McKenna is, moreover, a sympathetic and insightful reader and expositor of other philosophers’ work, and he is notably generous in his recognition of the various contributions that he draws from. The theory advanced is not only plausible; it is also attractively humane. The normative implications of the conversational theory are as moderate as the metaphysical demands it rests on are “modest.” The overall outlook articulated is one that has the reassuring feel of a sensible, reflective, empirically well-grounded common sense on the subject of moral responsibility. This is not to suggest, however, that the position taken is either altogether familiar or without its controversial features and claims. On the contrary, McKenna’s conversational theory is as stimulating as it is substantial, and as such, it will certainly generate discussion and criticism.

In this section, I want to raise a few general points of criticism, none of which I can do adequate justice to beyond indicating where potential weaknesses in the conversational theory may be found. The first two are criticisms that arise from within the given commitments of the Strawsonian approach and concern the two central strands of the (Watsonian) “expressivist theory” that McKenna employs to frame his own account. The first element I am concerned with is the expressivist requirement that reactive attitudes are subject to the “publicity thesis,” whereby the paradigm or central cases involve “overt publicly intelligible manifestations of these emotions; the private cases can be explained by reference to these cases” (70). This is of a piece with McKenna’s claim that holding responsible is a matter of practical concern and that blame, in particular, means something in practice (152, 154). The concern that motivates this claim, consistent with the more general Strawsonian program, is that holding responsible and blaming are not merely a matter of entertaining “a cognitive judgment” (152); here McKenna has Scanlonian views (Scanlon 1998) primarily in mind (156–57 and compare 176n). While this may be true, it does not follow that we need to choose between a narrow (Scanlonian) cognitivist view, on one side, and a more expansive expressivist view that comprehends (appropriate) forms of conduct and other modes of behavior as in some way essential to these responses.

The worry here is that, by overextending reactive attitudes and blame to comprehend relevant modes of expression in overt conduct and behavior that is conducive to conversation, we collapse an important distinction between justifying our reactive attitudes and justifying the way (when, how, to whom, and so on) we express them. McKenna is certainly alive to this concern, but I am not entirely convinced that he is successful in dealing with it. He notes, for example, that considerations justifying blame “are fundamentally backward looking” (156). On the other hand, he also maintains that when blame is so justified, it must meet the relevant standard of conversational constraints and contribute constructively to the “dialogue.” If this is the case, then justified blame (and reactive attitudes more generally) must involve a *blend* of backward- and forward-looking justifying considerations. These issues are, however, distinct and may come apart. An entirely justified sense of blame may be *expressed* in ways that fail to serve the needs of constructive dialogue (as required by the conversational model). In these circumstances, therefore, blame and its particular mode of expression may *diverge* when it comes to the issue of justification—something the conversational model cannot properly account for and fails to distinguish adequately. Justified blame may not issue in justified forms of expressing it. It follows that blame, as such, is not as tightly fused and integrated with its expression as McKenna’s conversational theory maintains. Concerns of this sort, it may be argued, suggest that the account provided of reactive attitudes and blaming is overextended, in an effort to fit the conversational model and the analogy that it relies on.¹

A related difficulty concerns the other key element of the expressivist approach, which is the conversational model’s particular understanding of “moral address.” As I noted, the conversational model places particular and primary emphasis on “the importance of an interpersonal transaction between blamer and the blamed” (180 and also 176). It may be argued, however, that this view of the relevant audience of “moral address” is too restrictive and narrow. Insofar as blame may be expressed and is then (voluntarily) addressed to an audience, it is not obvious that the primary audience need be the person blamed or the wrongdoer.² In many situations, even when the wrongdoer is still present

1. On this analysis, blame itself, although it may have a justification and a function (or perhaps multiple functions), has no *point*. What may have a “point” is the *voluntary expression of blame*, where we take the blamer to have some end or aim in view when he or she (overtly) blames the wrongdoer. In these circumstances, the blamer *doing* the blaming may have any number of audiences and/or aims in view, *one* of which may be to engage in dialogue with the person who is blamed. It is consistent with this account, however, that a person may blame someone and never express it and have, more specifically, no interest to engage in any form of dialogue with the blamed.

2. Related to this, as McKenna points out, the conversational account may be thought to be vulnerable to various counterexamples based on blaming in the absence of the blamed or blaming of the dead (174–78). Examples of this sort appear problematic

and available, those who blame someone and have been harmed or injured by them may not be at all interested in “conversation” or “dialogue” with the blamed. They may, indeed, regard any such effort to participate in such an exchange as deeply undesirable and also, perhaps, as simply *pointless*. However, this does not mean that there is no point in expressing their sense of blame to *other* audiences. Blamers may want others to endorse the norms and expectations that they believe have been violated or ignored, and they may want this with a view to securing their own moral standing, along with the norms and values at stake. A good case can be made for viewing this form of *expression* as the primary case of *overt* blame addressed to an audience—particularly in serious or grave cases. While the point of expressed blame may be to reach a third-party audience, with a view to affirmation, solidarity, or simply ethical reflection, in some cases it may involve nothing more than an effort simply to vent or soothe pent up emotional disturbance that blame may occasion. The conversational model makes all those modes of the expression of blame, targeted on an audience other than the person blamed, as secondary if not marginal cases. The general objection returns, therefore, that the conversational model is too narrow and restrictive and is unable to accommodate the complexities and variations involved in moral responsibility.

Having explained concerns that may arise with the two core “expressivist” elements of the conversational model, I want to turn, even more briefly, to a more general concern about McKenna’s project—his effort to remain “neutral” on the free will controversy (2, 13, 58, 185–86, 205). Incompatibilists may find this claim hard to accept, given its obvious Strawsonian commitments and assumptions (74). The deeper concern here, however, is that any theory of moral responsibility (in the accountability sense) is inescapably confronted with a variety of skeptical challenges familiar in the free will literature. Perhaps the most important of those are skeptical arguments rooted in the overlapping set of issues concerning luck, history, and the ultimate source of an agent’s

because they may be understood to show that blame is entirely intelligible even where there is no *possibility* of (conversational) “moral address” directed at the wrongdoer or blamed. McKenna considers counterexamples of this kind in some detail and argues that they should be handled “in terms of how the one who blames *would* respond to and . . . converse with, the one blamed were the blamer in the presence of the blamed, and were the blamer in a position to alter relevant practices in ways expressive of moral demands, expectations, disappointments, and so on” (177, my emphasis). If we draw the sort of distinction that I mention above, between justified blame and justified expressions of blame, then cases of this kind are not so problematic—since blame may be justified in the absence of there being any possibility of *expressing* blame to the wrongdoer. However, since the conversational model maintains that blame paradigmatically involves expressing blame to the wrongdoer, it needs to analyze all cases of blame in the absence of the blamed in terms of hypotheticals.

motivations and character (all of which are relevant to the agent's quality of will). These are, of course, concerns that Watson (2013 [1987]) raised and addressed in his own seminal discussion of the expressivist view. Moreover, in recent years there have been a growing number of prominent and influential defenses of skepticism about moral responsibility placed on offer, about which McKenna has little to say in *Conversation and Responsibility*. The irony here is that McKenna is unusually well placed to address these challenges, as he is one of the most prolific and influential contributors to the relevant philosophical literature relating to these matters. His critics, as well as those who are broadly sympathetic to the Strawsonian approach (including this reviewer), will likely be disappointed that he did not say more about these skeptical objections as they concern the foundations of his conversational account of moral responsibility.

Finally, while McKenna appeals to the significance of the *analogy* holding between responsibility and conversation, some may view the analogy as missing what is, perhaps, especially important about communication and language in this context. More specifically, it may be argued that it is not so much structural resemblances between conversation and moral responsibility but the actual *possession and exercise* of linguistic abilities by responsible agents that really matters here. Our ability to articulate, interpret, and discriminate among moral norms and reactive attitudes is integral to the attitudes and practices associated with moral responsibility. On this view of things, the relevance of language and communication is not so much one of analogy as of what is constitutive or essential to our making sense of the social practices in which we engage in this sphere. It is surprising, therefore, given his concern with the relevance of language and communication, that McKenna does not pursue this aspect of the language–moral responsibility relationship.

The above points of criticism, which are presented in the briefest terms, are in no way meant to suggest that McKenna has not thought through many of these matters himself, much less that they constitute major flaws in the book. On the contrary, the whole edifice of *Conversation and Responsibility*, as I have already indicated, is meticulously erected and defended. The fundamental analogy employed is both illuminating and stimulating of further reflection and debate. *Conversation and Responsibility* belongs on the top shelf of any set of readings devoted to the contemporary discussion of moral responsibility. All readers, whatever their philosophical orientation may be, will find it both challenging and rewarding. Whether in the end one endorses the conversational model or not, there can be no doubt that this is a contribution that significantly advances our overall understanding of these important and complex matters.

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Paul Russell

University of Gothenburg and University of British Columbia

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Andrew Chignell, Terence Cuneo, and Matthew C. Halteman. *Philosophy Comes to Dinner: Arguments about the Ethics of Eating*. New York: Routledge, 2016. x + 299 pp.

It's a good time to be in animal and food ethics: several strong volumes have been published in the last few years, and more are yet to come. Among them, however, *Philosophy Comes to Dinner (PCD)* deserves special attention. If you work in animal or food ethics, you should read it.

The editors' introduction contains contributor-authored abstracts, which Routledge has made freely available online.¹ So, I won't summarize *PCD*'s contents in any detail. Instead, I'll explain why I regard it as such a welcome contribution to the literature.

PCD contains discussions of many fascinating issues—among them, wild animal suffering, the ethics of artificial ingredients, and the virtues and vices of locavorism. But *PCD* is particularly valuable because it teaches two lessons:

1. Despite the many sins of industrial animal agriculture, it's hard to explain why individual consumers shouldn't purchase its products.

1. Go to the publisher's site for the book, www.routledge.com/Philosophy-Comes-to-Dinner-Arguments-About-the-Ethics-of-Eating/Chignell-Cuneo-Halteman/p/book/9780415806831, and click on "Look Inside."