The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery.

Hume, *Natural History of Religion*

A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) is widely regarded as the greatest and most influential of David Hume’s philosophical works and perhaps the greatest and most influential work in English-speaking philosophy. Ironically enough, however, despite Hume’s considerable reputation as one of the most important philosophical critics of religion, it is also generally agreed that the Treatise has little or nothing of a direct or substantial nature to do with problems of religion. According to the orthodox view, Hume originally intended to include some irreligious material in the Treatise but decided to “castrate” his work before it was published, removing a number of sections that might cause “offence.” Hume’s major contributions to issues of religion, it is said, are all to be found in his later writings—most notably his posthumous Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779). Contrary to this view, I argue in this book that it is irreligious aims and objectives that are fundamental to the Treatise and account for its underlying unity and coherence.

Almost all commentators over the past two and a half centuries have agreed that Hume’s intentions in the Treatise should be interpreted in terms of two general themes: skepticism and naturalism. Although both these themes are relevant to issues of religion in ways Hume subsequently developed and brought to light in his later works, neither the skepticism nor the naturalism of the Treatise are understood to have any particular relevance for issues of religion. With respect to skepticism, Hume is understood to advance a variety of radical, Pyrrhonian principles and doctrines throughout his work. These are supposed to undermine and discredit systematically our common sense beliefs about the world. On the other hand, with respect to naturalism, Hume is understood to aim at being “the
Newton of the moral sciences" by way of introducing the “experimental method” to the study of human nature. It is evident, however, that although both these themes surface in various ways throughout the Treatise, they stand in considerable tension in relation to each other. More specifically, Hume's strong skeptical commitments appear to discredit and undercut his naturalist ambitions with respect to the project of “the science of man.” This core tension constitutes a deep riddle lying at the heart of the Treatise. Any acceptable interpretation of this work must aim to solve it.

The key to solving the riddle of Hume's Treatise rests with Hume's fundamental irreligious aims and objectives. Contrary to the orthodox view, it is problems of religion, broadly conceived, that hold the contents of the Treatise together as a unified work. More specifically, the direction and structure of Hume's thought in the Treatise is shaped on one side by his attack on the Christian metaphysics and morals and on the other by his efforts to construct in its place a secular, scientific account of morality. The constructive or positive side of Hume's thought—his “science of man”—begins with a detailed examination of human thought and motivation based on a naturalistic and necessitarian conception of humankind. The model for this project—after which it was both planned and structured—was the work of Thomas Hobbes, the most infamous “atheist” thinker of the seventeenth century. The destructive or critical side of the philosophy of the Treatise is simply the other side of the same anti-Christian coin. That is to say, in order to clear the ground to build the edifice of a secular morality, Hume had to undertake a systematic skeptical attack on those theological doctrines and principles that threatened such a project. The varied and apparently disparate skeptical arguments that Hume advances in the Treatise are in fact very largely held together by his overarching concern to discredit and refute Christian metaphysics and morals. Among the most obvious and prominent of Hume's skeptical targets in the Treatise was Samuel Clarke, an influential Christian rationalist who aimed to refute demonstratively the “atheistic” philosophy of Hobbes.

The irreligious account of Hume's aims and objectives, I maintain, provides a framework for solving the most fundamental problems of interpretation throughout the Treatise. In the first place, only from within the framework of the irreligious interpretation is it possible to understand the specific arguments and positions Hume takes up on a variety of particular issues and topics (e.g. causation, induction, external world, personal identity, etc.). Moreover, the irreligious framework also gives us a way of explaining how Hume's more radical skeptical arguments are supposed to cohere with his ambition to contribute to the “science of man” (i.e. it serves to solve the riddle). In this way, the irreligious interpretation enables us to account for both the unity and the coherence of Hume's entire project in the Treatise—something the traditional skeptical and naturalist interpretations have failed to achieve. Finally, with these irreligious elements of Hume's intentions properly in view, it is evident, from a
philosophical perspective, that the Treatise makes a major contribution to the philosophy of religion—this being a core feature of this work that has been almost entirely overlooked. From a historical point of view, the significance of the irreligious interpretation is that Hume’s aims and objectives in the Treatise must be placed in the context of the battle between “religious philosophers” and “speculative atheists”—with Hume coming down decisively on the side of the latter. From this perspective, A Treatise of Human Nature must be judged as one the great works of the Radical Enlightenment, deserving a prominent place within an anti-Christian philosophical tradition that includes works by Hobbes, Spinoza, and their freethinking followers in early eighteenth-century Britain. In this way, from both a philosophical and historical perspective, the irreligious interpretation provides a fundamentally different account of the nature and character of Hume’s aims and intentions in the Treatise and thereby alters our understanding of the significance of this work for our own contemporaries.

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