- DRAFT -

"DO NOT LET YOUR ANGER DIE": KING AND GANDHI ON ANGER, HATRED, AND NONVIOLENCE

CHEYNEY RYAN
OXFORD UNIVERSITY[1]

> "So the question is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of extremists we will be. Perhaps the South, the nation and the world are in dire need of creative extremists."
> - Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. "Letter From a Birmingham Jail"[2]

Dave Dennis was supposed to be with James Chaney the night he and two other civil rights workers were dragged from their car, tortured, then murdered on a deserted roadside in Neshoba County, Mississippi. A case of bronchitis meant Dennis had stayed at home but he felt responsible for Chaney's fate. Dennis was a chief organizer of the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer that brought in thousands of young people for voter registration and he had urged Chaney to get involved. Both were young. Chaney had just turned 20, but both were experienced activists having participated in freedom rides and lunch counter sit-ins.

James Chaney's body was laid to rest on August 7, 1964 in the segregated graveyard south of his hometown, Meridian, Mississippi. Over 500 local residents, almost all Afro-Americans, attended a memorial service and it was expected to be low key. But before speaking, Dennis looked at James Chaney's younger brother, Ben, sitting in the front row and decided he couldn't lie to him.

"I'm getting sick and tired! I'm sick and tired of going to memorials! I'm sick and tired of going to funerals! I've got a bitter vengeance in my heart tonight! And I'm sick and tired and can't help but feel better, you see, deep down inside and I'm not going to stand here and ask anybody not to be angry tonight!"

The murder of civil rights workers was neither exceptional nor unexpected, but it drew nationwide attention for the simple reason that the two others murdered, Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman, were white. But Chaney was the main target. Once they knew civil rights workers were coming, local racist groups began planning how to murder them. They met with local police officers, doctors and undertakers to learn how to murder them without leaving evidence and how to dispose of their bodies so they would

---

[1] It was my great honor to present some of these thoughts at a conference attended by Rev. James Lawson, a giant in the history of nonviolence. On that occasion, Rev. Lawson called for more extensive work in the philosophy of nonviolence. These reflections hope to contribute to that project.

[2] Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches (HarperOne, 2003), p. 289.

never be found. The answer: murder them with weapons that could not be identified and bury them somewhere and in such a way that their bodies would never float to the surface or be unearthed.

Chaney, Schwerner and Goodman were forced into the killers' vehicles and driven to a secluded country road where Chaney was tied to a tree, beaten with chains, castrated and shot while the two others were forced to watch. Schwerner was shot attempting to help Chaney, Goodman shot trying to help Schwerner. Their bodies were loaded into a car and driven to a farm pond where the owner, Herman Tucker, was waiting. Not sure if Chaney was dead yet, they fired three shots into him. Then Tucker bulldozed dirt over their bodies. Later autopsies suggested that Goodman was buried alive since there was dirt in his lungs and under his fingernails from attempting to claw his way out. Herman Tucker would later brag about his role in the murders. He was never prosecuted.

Here is Dennis's powerful testimony:

"I want to talk about right now the living dead that we have right among our midst, not only in the state of Mississippi but throughout the nation. Those are the people who don't care, those who do care but don't have the guts enough to stand up for it . . . I blame them just as much as I blame those who pulled the trigger."

And he concluded with words about those who continued to let this happen:

"Your work is just beginning. If you go back home and sit down and take what these white men in Mississippi are doing to us . . . If you take it and don't do something about it . . . then God damn your souls!"[3] Dennis's struggle with his own anger reflected his commitment to nonviolence and would lead him to question if nonviolence was a "mistake".

[I]/ Nonviolence on Trial

Political philosophers are currently engaged in a robust discussion of anger and its place in politics, much of it recently inspired by the actions of the Black Lives Matter movement.[4] My specific here will be the issue raised by Dave Dennis's struggle: the relation of anger to the politics of nonviolence.

---

[3] I urge readers to watch the video of selections of this speech at https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/freedomsummer-eulogy. The best version of the full text can be found in William H. Lawson's PhD dissertation, A Righteous Anger in Mississippi: Genre Constraints and Breaking Precedence (Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, 2005) pp. 55-60. See also Bernice Sims and David Gilkey, Detour Before Midnight: Freedom Summer Workers: James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman Made an Unscheduled Stop (SimsBernice, 2014).

[4] Along with the others cited here, I have found the following especially useful on this topic: Myisha Cherry, "Love, Anger, and Racial Injustice" in Adrienne Martin (ed.), The Routledge Handbook on Love in Philosophy (2019); Macalster Bell, "Anger, Virtue and Oppression" in Lisa Tessman, ed., Feminist Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: Theorizing the Non-Ideal. London: (Springer, 2009); Amia Srinivasan, "Anger, Virtue, and

There are several respects in which anger seems problematic for nonviolence.

One is the question of whether anger leads to violence. We shall see that this can be construed in two different ways depending on your picture of anger. One is whether anger causes violence in a physical, cause-and-effect way, like how eating spicy food can make our face flush. If violence is an automatic reaction to anger, then renouncing violence requires renouncing anger. But another way to construe it is whether violence is an appropriate response to anger. This frames it not in physicalist knee-jerk type terms but in normative ones, and in so doing I think it poses a deeper challenge to nonviolence. For if anger is itself the appropriate response to injustice, as it would seem to be, and if violence is the appropriate response to such anger, then nonviolence's ethical rejection of violence is challenged.

These pertain to the extrinsic relation between anger and violence. A further question pertains to their intrinsic relation, of whether anger is itself violent. Again, there are two ways of construing this. One is whether anger constitutes a form of violence against oneself. If the experience of anger invariably involves anguish, is this pain a violence that one inflicts on oneself?[5] The other is whether anger itself constitutes violence against another. This highlights the question of what we mean by "violence". For instance, anger is a clearly a confrontational attitude: does this make it violent? Some have claimed that anger is an inherently judgmental attitude: does this make it violent?

Questions about anger invariably raise the question of hatred, and of anger's relation to it. The worry about anger's leading to violence or being itself a form of violence is often put in terms of anger's invariably leading to hatred and the violence that hate involves. But hatred too is a complex matter. On the one hand, hatred of other people is unambiguously condemned across the political spectrum. Civil rights activists condemned segregation as above all else a system of hatred, but they did not condemn hatred per se--insofar as they endorsed hating segregation as a social system. Indeed, the political moderates that Dave Dennis condemned might be characterized as those who may have opposed racial segregation but did not truly hate it, hence did not respond to it with the right kind of anger. So hatred is a good thing aimed at social injustice, i.e. when it is political hatred and not personal hatred. Hence a worry about the wrong kind of anger might nmot be how it generates hatred but how it misdirects it by personalizing it, and in so doing depoliticizes it. But exploring this will mean saying more the nature of hatred and its relation to anger.

Oppression" The Journal of Political Philosophy (2017); and Jens Haas and Katja Maria Vogt, "Love and Hatred" in The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy.

[5] The value of suffering, in both traditions.

The major figures of nonviolence do not provide us with a developed theory of anger or hatred. Their occasional remarks and brief reflections initially suggest a good deal of agreement that anger can be both a good and bad thing: good when it empowers and focuses us, bad when it overwhelms and misdirects us. But they seem to draw quite different conclusions from its ambivalent status.

Gandhi's remarks sometime acknowledge its positive role. “I have learnt through bitter experience the one supreme lesson to conserve my anger, and as heat conserved is transmuted into energy, even so our anger controlled can be transmuted into a power which can move the world.”[6] But generally his remarks are highly cautionary or outright critical of its value. Thus, “I cultivate the quality of patience as angerlessness, and generally speaking, I succeed."[7] "Or, "As I have stated at the very outset, we must give up all external fears. But the internal foes we must always fear. We are rightly afraid of animal passion, anger, and the like." Gandhi even held that he did not have "the capacity for preaching universal non-violence to the country ... I am not advanced enough for the great task" because "I have yet anger within me".[8]

The latter remarks express what I would term an ethic of equanimity and composure. Accordingly, some have compared Gandhi's ethic with Stoicism.[9] How would it respond to Dave Dennis? At the very least, I assume it would insist on the importance of his moving beyond anger. Anger may initially be a natural and an appropriate response and even a necessary one to fuel initial actions. But it must soon be "transmuted" into something else if one is to remain balanced in one's politics and life generally.

But here is another response. The Rev. Ed King, a Mississippi native and the most visible white figure in the movement followed Dennis that night. He began," I'm glad Dave got angry tonight. Any of you who are not angry in your heart will not find the strength to go on." Indeed, he spoke of those not aroused to anger (Dennis's "living dead”) as the "coalition of the callous”. And he ended with the words, "Do not let your anger die". Rather, "Make it the righteous anger of Jesus turning over the evil things in the temple, and we may have to turn over everything in the state in the way Jesus did in the temple and that may be what faces us."[10]

---

[6] Young India, 15-9-1920, p. 6. In his book, The Gift of Anger (Gallery Books, 2017) Arun Gandhi quotes such remarks from his grandfather as “Anger to people is like gas to the automobile—it fuels you to move forward and get to a better place. Without it, we would not be motivated to rise to a challenge. It is an energy that compels us to define what is just and unjust.” (p. 18).

[7] Gandhi, All Men Are Brothers (Borodino Books, 2018), p. 105.

[8] Selected Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, ed. by Ronald Duncan (Faber and Faber, 1951), p. 43 and p. 52.

[9] Richard Sorabji, Gandhi and the Stoics: Modern Experiments on Ancient Values (University of Chicago, 2012).

[10] Cited in Lawson, op. cit., p. 60.

"Do not let your anger die..."

The admonition here is not just that anger should be "conserved" for its immediate value but that it should be cultivated and nourished as a condition of enduring commitment. Indeed, anger should be provoked if it is not already present in others, for Dave Dennis and Ed King are not just angry about what happened--they are angry at the non-anger of others; hence their anger means to elicit anger in others. This expresses what I shall term an "ethic of agitation and alarm", and it is one I find in other major figures of American nonviolence. The late John Lewis insisted that nonviolence gives a prominent place to both anger and love. "I have always believed there is room for both outrage and anger and optimism and love."[11] Barbara Deming maintained, "Our task of course, is to transmute the anger that is affliction into the anger that is determination to bring about change. I think, in fact, that one could give that as a definition of revolution."[12] Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., stated, "Nonviolence provides a healthy way to deal with understandable anger."[13]

But do the differences have to be so sharp? The first question a philosopher might want to raise is whether they are talking about the same thing. Anger, as everyone who speaks to it acknowledges, is a complex matter. When one ethic counsels against anger does it have the same picture of anger is the one that counsels in favor of it? So a principal concern of this essay will be to say more about anger, with a focus on the views of Dr. King and others in the civil rights tradition. I do so because I think their views have not been fully understood; specifically, it is not been fully appreciated how much they are influenced by the prophetic Biblical tradition as grounded in the prophetic books of the Bible and contained (in the opinion of figures like Ed King) in the teachings of Jesus.[14] Dr. King constantly quoted Martin Buber; he was deeply influenced by the Abraham Joshua Heschel whose book, The Prophets, he had with him when he was assassinated.[15] I explore this perspective in section [II], where I also make some comments on the important question of forgiveness. Then I relate it to the apparent contrast between Gandhi and Dr. King. In section [III] I discuss the relation of anger to hate. I remark on how both figures conceived of nonviolence as the fitting response to hate and how this illuminates their common commitment to self-

---

[11] John Lewis and Michael D'Orso , Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement (Simon & Schuster, 2015) pp. 230 – 231.

[12] Barbara Deming, "On Anger" Liberation Magazine, 1971.

[13] Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? (Beacon, 2010), p. 66.

[14] But the prominence of the religious dimension is stressed in histories of the movement. See Charles Marsh, God's Long Summer: Stories of Faith and Civil Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) and his The Beloved Community: How Faith Shapes Social Justice from the Civil Rights Movement to Today (Basic Books, 2006); see also David Chappell, A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow (University of North Carolina, 2005).

[15] Abraham J. Heschel , The Prophets (Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2001).

sacrifice. Let me stress that the issues I am raising here are substantial ones and so my aims are modest. I hope to say enough about anger, hatred, and the relation of both to nonviolence to suggest how further philosophical inquiry into these matters might proceed.

[II]/ Two Types of Anger

Heschel begins his discussion of anger by noting that it is deeply ambiguous. Anger, "like fire, may be a blessing as well as a fatal thing--reprehensible when associated with malice, morally necessary as resistance to malice . . . Anger may touch off deadly explosives, while the complete absence of anger stultifies moral sensibility."[16] Others note this contrast as well, but what Heschel's discussion suggests is that there are really two types of anger, which he terms "human" anger and "divine" anger, and which he sees as abiding by quite different logics. Indeed, the first type of anger is rightly termed an emotion, in the sense of a mere feeling, while the other is not an "emotion" so much as an orientation.

Here is how I understand the contrast:

The first type of anger, "human" anger, may be identified with the emotionally irate. Anger of this sort is an "emotional reaction to being hurt." Let me comment on each component. To call it an "emotional" reaction is to identify it with a set of feelings like irritation, distress, etc., which, qua feelings, are episodic, in that they come and go, and arbitrary, in how they come and go. It makes perfect sense to say of it, "I was really angry a while ago—grinding my teeth, red in the face, etc.—but I seem to have calmed down now." So we express this anger by venting it, much as steam is let off or smoke discharged. To speak of it as a "reaction" is to say that its logic is a knee-jerk one of cause-and-effect. Hence the impulsiveness that has so concerned philosophers about anger, and its immoderation, in that the reaction is often disproportionate to what caused it. Finally, to speak of it as an emotional reaction to "hurt" is to place its cause in something pain-like whose bodily dimension means that it can be experienced at any age, starting with young children. Cognitivist views of anger hold that it always embodies judgments of being wronged, but this would seem to presume a developed moral sensibility that is absent in young children, yet they still get angry.

To say that the hurt which causes it is "pain-like" points to another concern with such anger. Whether or not it involves actual physical pain, its impact is like physical pain's in its driving us into ourselves so that we lose perspective on what has happened to us and on how we are reacting to it. This loss of perspective means that we lose ourselves in our anger, so that we don't know where it's properly

---

[16] Ibid., p. 360.

aimed, and we get carried away by our anger, so that we don't know when it's properly ended. The role of forgiveness in relation to this type of anger is restore perspective which it does by placing things in their larger context--by showing, for example, that given the circumstances we could have acted the same way if placed in the other's shoes.

The second type of anger, Heschel's "divine" anger, may be identified with the righteously indignant. In calling it "divine", there is no suggestion that such anger is only experienced by God. But it is Godlike in expressing a higher part of ourselves and, in its prophetic form, in aiming to elicit (by provoking) a higher self in others. As I understand it, anger of this sort is not an emotional reaction to hurt but an "ethical response to wrong". Again, let me comment on each component.

To speak of it as an "ethical" response is to say that it does require a moral sensibility. Young children are not capable of righteous indignation; adults whose ethics remain shallow are not capable of it either—the mark of a corrupt society of the type that the prophets chastised is that no one is capable of moral indignation. But Heschel's remark suggests that their relation is a dialectical one. He speaks of how the absence of such anger "stultifies moral sensibility," as if such anger is both a condition and a consequence moral sensibility, or that type of sensibility evidenced in resistance to evil. Hence the prophetic task is one of awakening that sensibility by provoking the anger it requires.

To speak of righteous indignation as an ethical "response" is to say that its logic is not a mechanistic one of cause-and-effect but a dialogic one of call-and-response. Both types of anger have a felt necessity to them. The emotionally irate experience it as an impulsiveness; they are compelled to feel angry, but note that the relation of anger to its resulting action is an external one in that one may or may so act on one's anger. By contrast, the righteously indignant experience its necessity as an imperativeness, they are called--indeed, commanded--to it; it is response that cannot not have because it is grounded in their deepest moral sensibility. Here, the relation of anger to action is an internal one insofar as righteously indignation necessarily manifests itself in specific actions. As an ethical response to "wrong", this type of anger does embody a moral judgment, but the relation between them points to its status as an orientation.

Righteous indignation has an important emotional coloring, but I call it an "orientation" to stress several features. To begin with, it is not episodic as a matter of something that comes and goes. You wouldn't say, "I was righteously indignant a while ago but not anymore." I've noted that there are important events in my life that I'm still angry about like the Vietnam War. That doesn't mean I go around seething about it, with steam coming out of my ears. It is mainly a matter of my orientation towards it, that the subject provokes me in ways that others do not. It speaks to who I am: the moral judgment my

anger embodies is not a casual one, or just one among others, it is one with which I identify. Let us speak of it in this regard as a moral conviction. As such, it serves to orient me politically, it provides me with a perspective in a way that empowers me, which is why I see no reason to give it up. Audrey Lorde gestures towards this when she writes that anger can be a source of "progress" and "change", "and when I speak of change, I do not mean a simple switch of positions or a temporary lessening of tensions, nor the ability to smile or feel good. I am speaking of a basic and radical alteration in all those assumptions underlining our lives."[17] Achieving anger of this sort re-orients ones whole self--in this case, to take injustice more seriously.

The critique of the liberal "moderate" was a persistent theme in the civil rights movement. It was central to the most famous writing from that movement, Dr. King's "Letter from a Birmingham Jail". Dave Dennis spoke of "the living dead" whom he blamed equally for the evils to be fought. I don't think he meant that they felt nothing about them; they may have gotten upset reading about the murders in the newspaper. But while they may have piqued their sense of injustice, the murders did not speak to who they were as ones who, in the words of Thoreau, have a "personal relation to right", hence whose relation to injustice is not just one of anger but of animosity. Or as I have suggested: of hatred.

One does not "vent" the anger of righteous indignation, one bears witness to it. And what this means, as the case at hand demonstrates, is that one is not just angry about the wrong done but as much if not more angry at the non-anger of others to it; hence its political dimension. Thus bearing witness is an act of provocation, aiming to elicit an anger in others to elicit the conviction such anger embodies. What is the role of forgiveness in relation to this type of anger? I suggested that the worry about emotional irateness was a loss of perspective that forgiveness might serve to restore. With righteous indignation we gain perspective, or least affirm it. But the worry about this sort of anger is not that it drives us into ourselves but rather that it sets ourselves above others, as if we occupied different moral planes (with us the superior one). We can put this in terms of moral judgment. Righteous indignation embodies moral judgment, but the worry is that the judgment will become judgmental, i.e. it will pass from an act (of judging, about another's actions) to a posture (of judgment, towards another's person); and in so doing involve a type of violence, or at least objectification. Note that when this happens the act of judging another's actions is no longer for them, as something one means for them to share, thus losing any dialogic dimension. Forgiveness blocks this step from judgment to the judgmental via the recognition that as human beings we are all capable of even the most grievous wrong hence while we may judge others we have no right to be judgmental towards them.

How does this illuminate the relation between the views of Gandhi and someone like Dr. King?

---

[17] Audre Lorde, "The Uses of Anger," in Sister Outside (Crossing Press, 1984) pp. 124-133. See also Adrienne Rich, "The Phenomenology of Anger", in Diving Into the Wreck (1973).

It raises the question of whether the two are really talking about the same thing. Gandhi's worries about anger seem to pertain to what I have termed the emotionally irate, for example in how such anger can render us imbalanced. So the type of equanimity and composure his ethic endorses aims at controlling if not moving entirely beyond this type of anger. But the type of anger I identify with Dr. King is involved with keeping us oriented, which it does via the connection of righteous indignation with moral convictions. But this way of reconciling them poses further questions about the philosophical pictures at work in each. For example, Gandhi's view of anger/emotional irateness seems to embody a larger ethic of detachment which is commonly associated with a skepticism about the importance of self identity. The thought is that we should not cling too hard to, or make too much of, our personal identities; that we should approach personal identity with a certain lightness, or fluidity. By contrast, the stress on moral conviction in the prophetic tradition places personal identity, specifically a strong moral identity, at the heart of what being human is all about. I think this leads to interesting questions about how the two perspectives understand the notion of conscience. When I read Gandhi, my impression is that possessing a conscience is a matter of remaining open to all that is around me, especially the suffering; so it is a matter of moving outside of oneself. But when I read Dr. King, my impression is that conscience is a matter of standing firm within oneself, of being true to one's convictions come what may. But as with anger, the question is whether these are conflicting views or just responses to different problems.

[III]/ Anger and Hatred

> The root of all evil is, according to Isaiah, man's false sense of sovereignty and, stemming from it, man's pride, arrogance, and presumption. There is no limit to cruelty when man begins to think that he is the master.
>
> - Heschel, The Prophets[18]

It is surprising how little attention is given to hatred, certainly compared to anger, given how universally hatred is regarded as a political evil. It is commonly assumed for example that anger, or at least protracted anger, leads to hatred. But why can't "protracted" anger remain anger, just as, say, protracted love remains love--a deeper love, perhaps; hence protracted anger may become deeper anger, but why should this become hate? The assumption seems to be that the hateful is what we are really angry at, hence we should resist being really angry. But this is not obvious. Was Nazi hatred of Jews a matter of being "really angry" at them? On the contrary, this conflicts with the common picture of hatred a something cold or unemotional--and heartless, in that regard. Any discussion of how anger becomes hatred presumes some account of what distinguishes them in the first place, and that is what I shall

[18] Heschel, op. cit., p. 210.

address here. My reference point will be Dr. King's suggestion that the distinction involves the contrast between dialogue and monologue.

It seems to me that when I am angry at another person, I want them to see themselves through the eyes of my anger. Anger is like love in this regard insofar as my loving another person means wanting my beloved to see themselves through the eyes of my love. This can involve an impulse to change them, but if so it does this, as it were, from the inside out. By seeing themselves through my loving eyes, I may hope to awaken them to a part of themselves that needs nourishing or discouraging. Anger, when informed by compassion, may be driven by a similar hope. By seeing themselves through the eyes of my anger, another may be awakened to what needs changing in themselves. In this case, anger is not just at them but for them. This is evoked by Audrey Lord's remark that "Anger is the grief of distortions between peers, and its object is change".[19] So anger is uncompassionate when it is not dialogic in this way.

Do the hateful desire that the hated see themselves to the eyes of their hatred?

Hatred does have a communicative dimension. Indeed, I think a central feature racist hatred is to send the hated a message, and constantly receiving such a message is part of racism's evil. But it does not follow that hatred is dialogic because, while it speaks at the hated it does not speak with them, as anger eliciting change from within does. Does it speak to them? A suggestion of Aristotle's is relevant here. He suggests that while anger has the "individual" as its object hatred has "classes" as its object. This seems overly broad insofar as one be angry at groups and one can hate individuals. But it captures the important point that, insofar as hatred like racial hatred speaks to each individual hated, it does in virtue of each individuals being a member of the group hated. The logic is, as it were, from the top down: it really speaks to the group, and individuals indirectly via the group. This bears on a further claim of Aristotle's that hatred aims at the "death and destruction", i.e. the elimination, of the hated. Dramatic cases of hatred, like genocide, involve physical elimination, but hatred can also be aimed at exploitation which requires that the hated not be physically eliminated. But it requires that they be socially eliminated, via what Orlando Patterson terms "social death". What genocide and exploitation share is the objectification of the hated, that the individuals of the group hated be transformed into mere "things" by regarding them only members of a fixed class and not individuals in their own right.

Hatred is model not just in how it speaks at others but not with them, rather like shouting. The suggestion we find in King and others is that hatred originates in monologue. Thomas Merton puts it thus: "When a man attempts to live by and for himself alone, he becomes a little 'island' of hate, greed, suspicion, fear, desire. Then his whole outlook on life is falsified. All his judgments are affected by this

---

[19] Lorde, op. cit., p. 127.

untruth. In order to recover the true perspective, which is that of love and compassion, he must once again learn, in simplicity, trust and peace, that 'no man is an island'."[20] Like love (and righteous indignation), I think hatred is best understood as an orientation towards others. This would fit with the lack of feelings often associated with hatred; also, hatred is something with which the hateful identify. But love is a response to the beloved, whereas hatred is not a response to the individuals hated; nor, Merton suggests, is it even a response to them as a group. It is only an expression of something about those who hate--of their insecurities and fears, perhaps, including the fear of rendering themselves vulnerable to others.

How do we counter hate? Both Gandhi and Dr. King regard hate as one of if not the principal political evils. And both regard nonviolence as especially suited for addressing hate; indeed, this is sometimes spoken of as the principal virtue of nonviolence. So let me conclude with some words on how we might unpack this view.

The picture of hatred just sketched as essentially monologue suggests that addressing hatred in another is a matter of calling them back to dialogue. Confronting hatred with hate completely fails to do this, as Dr. King constantly stressed with regards to confronting violence with violence. But how does nonviolence succeed in this regard? A suggestion in both Gandhi and Dr. King is that nonviolence invites the other back to dialogue by disarming them. It is as if the monologue of hatred arises from being too armed, this is a way of thinking about being closed off to the other, but the disarming that is required cannot be enforced from the outside but must be elicited from the inside. For both Gandhi and Dr. King, this seems to be something that can be achieved via one's own self-sacrifice. It is by accepting a suffering for oneself that one suffers for the other, and in suffering for the other inspires them to drop their guard as it were. This is clearly compatible with the Christian image of Jesus on the Cross and it is evoked by Gandhi's remarks as well.

.

[20] Thomas Merton, "Preface to Vietnamese Translation of No Man Is an Island", in The Nonviolent Alternative (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1971), p. 110.