A Conceptual Genealogy of the Pittsburgh School: Between Kant and Hegel

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Unlike the Vienna Circle or the Frankfurt School, the Pittsburgh School was never self-consciously constituted as a coherent or even semi-coherent group by adopting this label. Rather, it seems to have been chosen as a retrospective name that functions to draw our attention to three prominent 20th- and 21st-century philosophers whose work exhibits important commonalities and whose influence has been considerable: Wilfrid Sellars (1912-1989), Robert Brandom (1950 - ), and John McDowell (1942- ).

In collecting Sellars, McDowell, and Brandom, emphasis should be given to Maher’s (2012) outstanding synopsis of these three philosophers. Maher deserves credit for promoting the idea that these three belong to a school, with shared concerns. In doing so he builds nicely on Lance’s (2008) careful justification of using the term ‘Pittsburgh philosophy’ for describing the arc of thought that runs from Sellars through McDowell and Brandom to dozens of contemporary philosophers. However, as Wanderer and Levine (2013) point out in their review of Maher, shared concerns are not sufficient to justify the term of a ‘school’. Instead, they suggest, the term “the Pittsburgh School” needs to be justified based on how these philosophers share core metaphilosophical issues and themes, in part by thinking of themselves as inhabiting a tradition within which reflection on tradition is a central theme. This metaphilosophical self-consciousness does indeed bring Sellars, Brandom, and McDowell closer together than other philosophers who otherwise share similar concerns. Below I will develop this thought in terms of how the Pittsburgh School reflects on reflecting on Kant and Hegel’s critique of Kant *within* the idiom of ‘analytic philosophy.’ The persistent question with which I shall end is whether the return of Hegelian thought within analytic philosophy, which began as institutionalized anti-Hegelianism, is ultimately satisfying.[[1]](#footnote-1)

Two other philosophers who must be mentioned in relation with the Pittsburgh School are Richard Rorty (1931-2007) and John Haugeland (1945-2010). Though Rorty never taught at the University of Pittsburgh and Haugeland was preoccupied by a slightly differing set of concerns, both are crucial to the historical narrative. Rorty is crucial because, in addition to his philosophical contributions, Rorty also helped mediate the line of transmission of Sellars to Brandom and McDowell. Between Rorty’s *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979) and Brandom’s *Making It Explicit* and McDowell’s *Mind and World*, both in 1996, virtually nothing was written on Sellars. Moreover, it is very much Rorty’s Sellars who influences Brandom and McDowell. Due in large part to Rorty, Brandom and McDowell reject two of the most important parts of Sellars’s philosophy of mind: his rehabilitation of sense-impressions as non-conceptual episodes of consciousness and his distinction between signifying and picturing.[[2]](#footnote-2)

Haugeland deserves separate mention not because of his direct influence on Brandom or McDowell – though he was their colleague at the University of Pittsburgh for many years – but because Haugeland exerted considerable influence on philosophers who also studied with Brandom and/or McDowell at the University of Pittsburgh. In particular, Joseph Rouse, Rebecca Kukla, and Mark Lance were as influenced by Haugeland’s naturalized Heideggerianism as by the Sellarsianism of McDowell and Brandom.

In selecting Sellars, Brandom, and McDowell (and those they influenced) as if they belonged to a “school”, it is not my intention to do any of the following: (1) downplay the influence of other philosophers besides Sellars on Brandom and McDowell; (2) neglect philosophers influenced by Sellars other than Brandom and McDowell; (3) overlook the important differences between Sellars, McDowell, and Brandom.[[3]](#footnote-3) Indeed, as I will argue, there are issues on which we can align Brandom and McDowell against Sellars, Sellars and Brandom against McDowell, and Sellars and McDowell against Brandom. The future of the Pittsburgh School depends in part on whether these points of contention are productive and fruitful.

I begin with an overview of prominent philosophical themes broadly shared by Sellars, McDowell, Brandom, and others, then closely examine the so-called “Myth of the Given” in the context of the history of philosophy. I then turn to one important difference among these philosophers about how rational thought is constrained by the world, then conclude with reflection on what the return of Hegelian thought within analytic philosophy indicates about the significance of the Pittsburgh School.

The Pittsburgh School Theory of Intentionality

One of the more difficult philosophical concepts is *intentionality*. What is it for a thought or utterance to be *about* something? How can we have meaningful thoughts about fictional or even impossible entities, like Batman or golden mountains? What are we talking about when we talk about mental content? These problems, which arguably lie at the historical foundations of Western philosophy, received new urgency during the Scientific Revolution. In response to the rise of mechanistic physics, Descartes invented a new conception of intentionality in which meanings were wholly internal to the mind and immediately available to it. Despite the widespread rejection of Cartesian dualism, Descartes’s assumptions about intentionality can influence even the most anti-Cartesian of naturalists.[[4]](#footnote-4) One crucial theme in the Pittsburgh School is an explicit and sophisticated criticism of the Cartesian picture of intentionality.

As Haugeland observes in his “The Intentionality All-Stars” (1998), Sellars and Brandom (and to some extent McDowell) are *social pragmatists* about intentionality. Social pragmatism holds that all questions of content, meaning, aboutness, etc. are really questions about *norms*, and that norms are only intelligible in terms of *social practices*. The first move, from intentionality to normativity, involves how meaning or content is always governed by normative considerations. If I am looking at a window, it ought to be the case that I am disposed to think or say out loud, “that is a window.” To be the sort of creature that can think or say “that is a window” under the appropriate circumstances requires that one can discern whether the circumstances are indeed appropriate for entertaining that judgment. Perception, thought, and action are all inextricably normative affairs. In a slogan often attributed to Sellars, human life is “fraught with ought.” The second move, from norms to practices, is indebted to the rule-following considerations in Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* (2009 [1953]): norms are not rules that are applied to behavior, but rather constitutive features of our social practices. To be a norm-governed creature is to have been initiated into what Sellars (and Brandom and McDowell following him) call “the space of reasons.”

By introducing the term “the space of reasons,” Sellars specifies that reasons are *sui generis*: “in characterizing an episode or state as that of *knowing*, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says” (1963a, p. 169). Since Sellars thinks of intentional acts – acts with intentional content – as involving knowledge (in the sense of ‘knowing how’), he is committed to normativism about meaning as well as to normativism about knowledge. Reasons, which are essentially involved in perceiving, thinking, and acting, are thus *sui generis* with respect to empirical descriptions. Indeed Sellars stresses this point of continuity with the naturalistic fallacy: normative statements cannot be analyzed in terms of natural statements. More precisely, for any normative claim, there is no exhaustive set of empirical descriptions that are intensionally equivalent to the normative.[[5]](#footnote-5) Though analytic philosophers since Quine have been suspicious of intensional discourse, the Pittsburgh philosophers are not.

In doing so, the Pittsburgh School philosophers also aspire to a modest or non-reductive naturalism: the key to understanding normativity, intentionality, and rationality is not to be found in positing entities that transcend the physical universe. Meanings are things of this world; the difficult task is to understand them. In McDowell’s helpful terms, we must avoid both “bald naturalism” and “rampant platonism”. In the former case, intensional discourse and intentionality are eliminated rather than explained; in the latter case, they are reified as causally efficacious non-spatio-temporal abstracta. The need to steer a path between bald naturalism and rampant platonism is certainly shared by Sellars, Brandom, and McDowell.

The Myth of the Given

Perhaps no concept is as central to the Pittsburgh School, and as prone to a diversity of interpretations and misinterpretations, as “the Myth of the Given”. Though all philosophers influenced by Sellars share his misgivings, there is considerable disagreement about what must be done to avoid it. Accordingly, I shall first lay out what I take to be the most philosophically productive understanding of the Myth of the Given, and while not disagreeing with other interpretations (deVries and Triplett 2000, O’Shea 2005), I will do so in a way that detours through Kant and Hegel to highlight the historical significance of the Pittsburgh School.

The phrase “the Myth of the Given” is best-known from Sellars’ essay “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. In that essay, Sellars focuses for the most part on how traditional empiricism has fallen afoul of the Myth. However, he also states at the outset that

This framework [of givenness] has been a common feature of most of the major systems of philosophy, including, to use a Kantian turn of phrase, both ‘dogmatic rationalism’ and ‘skeptical empiricism.’ It has, indeed, been so pervasive that few, if any, philosophers have been altogether free of it; certainly not Kant, and, I would argue, not even Hegel, that great foe of ‘immediacy’. … If, however, I begin my argument with an attack on sense-datum theories, it is only as a first step in a general critique of the entire framework of givenness. (Sellars 1963a, pp. 127-128)

While it is controversial whether the Myth of the Given is as wide-ranging as Sellars takes it to be, I will argue that on a highly charitable interpretation of Sellars’ work, he is indeed correct.

The Given, in its most generic form, is the idea that any claims at all can be held immune from the possibility of revision.[[6]](#footnote-6) To say that the Given is a Myth is a perhaps innocuous thesis with nevertheless quite radical implications. Once we reject the Given, we will see that making any claim at all involves subjecting it to the critical scrutiny of others; hence all claims must be subjected to the assessment of others who are recognized as having the correct authority to contest it. Consequently, no claim can be made exempt from the back-and-forth of the pragmatics of rational discourse.

In their excellent and detailed analysis of the Myth of the Given, deVries and Triplett (2000) focus on the empiricist version of the Myth. In this version, sense-impressions are taken as having indefeasible epistemic authority: sense-impressions function as a final court of appeals for all assertions. But sense-impressions can play this role only if they are both epistemically efficacious (able to confer warrant on claims) and epistemically independent (not requiring warrant from claims). Epistemic efficacy depends on having conceptual form, which bare sense-impressions lack. Hence sense-impressions cannot play the foundational role that traditional empiricism requires of them.

Though deVries and Triplett are correct, their focus on traditional empiricism could result in underestimating the Sellarsian critique of the Given. For one thing, the Myth of the Given is a fatal flaw not just for empiricism but also for rationalism.[[7]](#footnote-7) Consider, for example, Descartes’s procedure of resorting to ‘what is clear by the light of reason’ when attempting to justify claims on which his vindication of the reliability of the intellect depends. As Sellars puts it, “no giving of reasons for adopting a language game can appeal to premises outside all language games. The *data* of the positivist must join the *illuminatio* of Augustine” (Sellars 1963b, p. 356): just as we no longer allow appeals to ‘what is clear by the light of reason’ as licensing claims for discussion, we should no longer allow appeals to the testimony of the senses to do so as well. There are no unjustified or self-evident claims of the sort that either empiricism or rationalism require.

The thought that neither bare sense-impressions nor the direct intuitions of reason can legitimize claims is not, of course, original with Sellars: it is one way of understanding Kant’s contribution to philosophy. Hence I shall briefly examine Kant and also Hegel’s response to Kant, because the philosophers of the Pittsburgh School can be understood as positioning themselves between Kant and Hegel yet internal to analytic philosophy. On the Kantian view, unschematized intuitions cannot constitute a judgment, nor can pure reason establish claims about ultimate reality that transcend the conditions of our embodied subjectivity. Following McDowell (1996, p. 156ff) I will present the relevant ideas in terms of what is “exogenous” to the mind and what is “endogenous” to it, and accordingly in terms of “the exogenous Given” and “the endogenous Given”.[[8]](#footnote-8) The exogenous Given is the idea that the mind can receive truths about the world that are immune to revision in light of rational discourse, whether those are grounded in the deliverances of nonconceptual sense-impressions or of pure reason unencumbered by the constraint of sensible intuition. Kant’s criticism of both rationalism and empiricism can thus be seen in terms of his rejection of the exogenous Given, given his claims about the structure of the mind itself.

Yet the difficulty for Kant lies in how he can establish his claims about the structure of the mind. To rehearse a well-known complaint, there seems to be something arbitrary in Kant’s procedure of deriving the categories of the understanding from Aristotelian logic and his account of the spatio-temporal structure of sensible intuition from Euclidean geometry. In short, Kant does not call into question “the endogenous Given”: he assumes that the mind can immediately intuit its own structures, even though it cannot immediately intuit the structure of the world. Though Kant criticized both the exogenous givenness of empiricists and rationalists, his own thought remains imprisoned with the framework of givenness – the endogenous Given.

What, then, of Hegel?[[9]](#footnote-9) On a charitable interpretation of Hegel, Hegel’s considerable achievement was to expose and overcome the endogenous given.[[10]](#footnote-10) The very reason why there needs to be a ‘phenomenology of Spirit’ is because the structures of human self-consciousness are *not* immediately intuitable; we rather must *find out* what those structures are, and test the various accounts of human self-consciousness for their dialectical adequacy. The transition from understanding to spirit, from desire to recognition, and above all from the master/slave dialectic to mutual recognition, shows that we must engage in both activity and reflection on activity to discover what Kant thought was directly intuitable: the structure of rational self-consciousness.

On these grounds, I am reluctant to endorse Sellars’s contention that Hegel was not entirely free of the framework of givenness. Rather, Sellars’s achievement is to transpose the rejection of *both* the exogenous Given *and* the endogenous Given into a philosophical framework that relies on less extravagant metaphysics. Whereas Hegel’s arguments for rejecting both the exogenous Given and the endogenous Given are integral to his absolute idealism, Sellars reaches similar conclusions within a resolute, even austere, materialist ontology. Sellars’s rejection of the endogenous Given, however, relies on his account of theory-change in science, rather than on the struggle for recognition central to Hegel’s account of how self-consciousness discovers for itself what it has always been.

Though perhaps not all Pittsburgh School philosophers would endorse this narrative, it identifies a specific line of thought that runs through Kant to Hegel. What justifies the collection of Sellars, McDowell, and Brandom as “the Pittsburgh School” is that they take up, *within* analytic philosophy (as inaugurated by Russell, Carnap, and others), a revival of Kant’s critique of both empiricism and rationalism *together with* Hegel’s critique of that critique. Not only Kant but also Hegel are crucial for assessing what Sellars, Brandom, and McDowell are attempting to do within analytic philosophy. For this reason, it is not quite true that Sellars took analytic philosophy from its ‘Humean’ phase (e.g. Carnap) to a ‘Kantian’ phase, and that it falls to Brandom (and in some respects McDowell) to follow that through to a ‘Hegelian’ phase.[[11]](#footnote-11) Instead, we should see that Sellars himself is already deeply Hegelian. If he returns to Kant (in ways that Brandom and McDowell reject), it is because he locates a dialectically stable position in philosophy of mind *between* Kant and Hegel. The questions raised by Brandom and by McDowell then turn on whether Sellars’s partial return to Kant should be endorsed or rejected. The three-way debate here turns on the question as to how we should account for the constraints on rational discourse.

A Point of Divergence: Rational and Causal Constraint

Sellars, Brandom, and McDowell share not only Hegel’s criticism of the endogenous and the exogenous Givens, but a strong interest in avoiding absolute idealism (or at least a caricatured version of that view). Yet here there striking differences between their respective views. This is because Sellars argues that it is crucial to make a strategic return to Kant and rehabilitate, within a physicalist ontology, sense-impressions as *causal and not as rational* constraints on discourse. By contrast, both Brandom and McDowell, largely due to the influence of Rorty, reject sense-impressions. On Brandom’s view, our discourse about the world is *rationally* constrained by how we keep track of our respective commitments and entitlements in a process that he calls ‘deontic scorekeeping’, while it is *causally* constrained by how phenomena interact with our ‘reliable differential responsive dispositions’. By contrast, on McDowell’s view, our discourse is rationally constrained by the world itself by virtue of how perceptual experience consists of the passive actualization of our conceptual capacities within sensory consciousness.[[12]](#footnote-12) The remainder of this section will articulate these different positions and the subsequent debates they have engendered.

Given that Sellars was writing in the 1960s, when the analytic rejection of Hegel was in full-force, it is not surprising that he endorses the view that Hegel’s analysis of consciousness and self-consciousness leads to the extravagant metaphysics of British idealism. But, since Sellars does seem to think that, for him the question is then how to prevent the slippery slope that leads from Hegel’s *Phenomenology* to nineteenth-century idealism. The solution is to retain Hegel’s rejection of both the endogenous Given and the exogenous Given but to add as a corrective that Kant was right about the need for “sheer receptivity”, or sense-impressions, as non-conceptual, non-intentional states of consciousness that have representational purport and that causally constrain the application of concepts in perception and judgment.[[13]](#footnote-13)

Here it is crucial to note the Sellars and Brandom, *but not McDowell*, deny that intentionality is a relation between mind and world. On Sellars’s view, “the non-relational character of ‘meaning’ and ‘aboutness’ [is] a thesis I have long felt to be the key to a correct understanding of the place of mind in nature” Sellars 1967 ix). If intentionality is world-relational, then every intentional object must be included in the ultimate ontology of the world, which in turn leads to problems long associated with Meinong and Husserl. In short, Sellars holds that if we want to hold onto metaphysical naturalism, then we should not think of intentionality (meaning, aboutness) as a relation between mind and world, but rather as a kind of functional classification: to say that (for example) “*Hund* means ‘dog’” is to say that “*Hund”* (in German) and “dog” in English are governed by similar pragmatic norms, including norms of appropriate use in response to perceptual stimuli and guidance of intentional action.

Though Brandom does not use Sellars’s technical apparatus, he agrees that intentionality is internal to the discursive community. On his Hegelian view, the ‘unit’ of intentionality is the whole discursive community; only through the interpretative practices internal to that community can be any attribution of beliefs, desires or other intentional states (including attributions to animals and infants). The complicated structures in which members of the discursive community hold each accountable to what they say, by tracking the respective commitments and entitlements in what Brandom calls “deontic scorekeeping”, is the very structure of rational constraint. Although Brandom allows for causal constraint by the world, he rejects Sellars’s claim that casual constraint necessarily involves non-conceptual episodes of sensory consciousness. Rather, Brandom questions whether there is really is a need for a story about what happens when causes meet reasons (Brandom 2010).

Though McDowell shares Brandom’s rejection of non-conceptual sense-impressions, he argues that we can dispense with non-conceptual sense-impressions if intentionality *is* a relation between mind and world. The passive actualization of conceptual capacities (intentionality) within sensory consciousness in response to worldly facts is precisely the constraint that we take ourselves to have and which requires philosophical vindication. If experiences were merely *caused* by the world’s impingement on our sensory surfaces, we would have at best “exculpations” for our perceptual judgments, not genuine justifications for them (McDowell 1996, p. 10-23).

We should therefore notice a crucial respect in McDowell modifies the social pragmatism of Sellars and Brandom. For Sellars and Brandom, intentional content is *instituted* by the normative commitments we take towards one another. Sellars calls this a “non-relational” theory of intentionality; intentionality is *not*, on Sellars’s view, a relation between mind and world. Following Sellars, Brandom holds that to be an intentional agent *is* to be a member of the discursive community; the discursive community as a whole is the locus of original intentionality.[[14]](#footnote-14) By contrast, although McDowell shares the Sellarsian emphasis on the logical space of reasons as *sui generis* form of intelligibility, he nevertheless also thinks that intentionality is a mind-world relation.[[15]](#footnote-15) This comes out most clearly in his thinking about perceptual judgment; on McDowell’s view, when all goes well, one directly perceives what is the case.

McDowell’s aim here is not systematic and constructive, as Sellars and Brandom are, but *therapeutic*, following the later Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy. His aim is to remove the barriers erected by hasty philosophizing against accepting a common-sense view explicated by ordinary language. For McDowell, the question is, why would we ever think that intentionality cannot be a relation in the first place? Here the contrast with Sellars is central: as Sellars sees it, intentionality cannot be a mind-world relation because if it were, then all intentional objects must be counted in our ontology. And that is not consistent with Sellars’s metaphysical naturalism. McDowell’s response would be to say Sellars is simplyassuming that the natural sciences are the whole truth about nature. But this is not so; there is also what Aristotle calls ‘second nature’.[[16]](#footnote-16)

While it is not entirely clear (even to McDowell’s sympathetic interpreters) how this solves the problem, McDowell thinks that if we can accept that the natural sciences do not exhaust the truth about nature, then we can happily accept that intentionality is a *natural relation*: what prevented us from accepting that it is both a mind-world relation *and* a part of nature is no more than the dogmatic insistence that nature is whatever the natural sciences say it is. Sellars, by contrast, *does* accept the epistemic authority of the natural sciences, which he takes to entail that intentionality cannot be a relation between mind and world.[[17]](#footnote-17) Hence, despite the complex ways in which Sellars and McDowell work out their views about intentionality through close-quarters combat with Kant and Hegel, they end up taking quite opposed views due to deeper concerns. Sellars and McDowell both aim to naturalize intentionality, but since Sellars accepts the epistemic authority of the natural sciences about what counts as natural and McDowell does not, they draw different conclusions as to whether we can naturalize intentionality successfully while retaining the common-sense view that intentionality is a relation.

4. The Pittsburgh School In Relation to Analytic Philosophy

It is no secret that the roots of analytic philosophy lie in a rejection of Hegel (Hylton 1993), though arguably this rejection was directed more at British Idealism than at Hegel proper. What, then, are we to make of the return of Hegelian thought *within* analytic philosophy, as Redding (2007) puts it? Here I want to suggest that while the Pittsburgh School is generally *correct* to urge a return to Kant and Hegel to solve the problems inherited from Russell and Carnap, it is less clear what consequently happens to analytic philosophy.

The crux of the problem can be identified in what is *missing* from Redding’s superb explication of the ‘analytic Hegelianism’ he attributes to Brandom and McDowell. As he puts it, McDowell puts to work Hegelian thoughts from the Perception chapter of the *Phenomenology*, whereas Brandom is a Hegelian of the Understanding. I agree with Redding that using those categories – what Hegel calls ‘shapes of consciousness’ – as a framework for reconciling McDowell and Brandom is highly compelling. And yet there is a problem that can be located internal to Hegel’s own thought. Put simply: Hegel does not think that reflection on shapes of consciousness is sufficient to adequately resolve philosophical problems. The dialectic that begins with reflection on “shapes of consciousness” must give way to a new reflection on “shapes of a world” (Hegel 1977 [1807], p. 265)[[18]](#footnote-18). It is not enough to critically examine the conceptual coherence and explanatory adequacy of a philosophical system considered by itself. Rather, we as observers of the unfolding of Spirit, necessarily come to realize that philosophical systems are never isolated from politics, religion, social norms, institutions, and economics. But this means that the Hegelian project becomes far broader and more wide-ranging than anything yet rehabilitated within the idiom of analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy begins with the rejection of precisely that broader systematic view; it follows the Neo-Kantian restriction of philosophy to *Erkenntnistheorie* (Köhnke 1991). This means that the recovery of Hegelian motifs *within* analytic philosophy must be also an implicit *rejection* of Hegel’s own dialectical transition from shapes of consciousness to shapes of a world.

This is *not* to say that the Pittsburgh School is problematic. On the contrary, it has yielded enormous gains in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, epistemology, and (in the case of McDowell) ethical theory. It promises to breathe new life into old debates and has promoted a vigorous research program. The question remains, however, whether Pittsburgh School philosophy will transform analytic philosophy from within into something that is no longer recognizable as such, or if Hegelian themes will be domesticated to suit the requirements of analytic philosophy as a professional discipline.

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1. My use of “conceptual genealogy” is indebted to Dutilh Novaes (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. McDowell notes that he came to Sellars through Rorty (1996, pp. ix-x). Rorty was one of Brandom’s thesis advisors. Rorty’s rejection of sense-impressions informs what deVries and Coates (2009) call Brandom’s “two-ply error” in Brandom’s reading of Sellars. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. A brief comment on ‘right-Sellarsians’ and ‘left-Sellarsians.’ Generally, right-Sellarsians emphasize the ontological priority of the scientific image and want naturalize phenomena such as values, norms, or consciousness. By contrast, left-Sellarsians emphasize the conceptual irreducibility of the space of reasons and how norms are *sui generis* with respect to the natural sciences. Right-Sellarsians include Dennett, Churchland, and Millikan. The Pittsburgh School consists of left-Sellarsians. See O’Shea (2016) for a recent introduction to this distinction and its importance. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Muller (2014) argues that a Cartesian picture of intentionality informs Rosenberg’s (2014) eliminativism about intentionality. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The emphasis on intensional equivalence is intended to capture what Sellars means by “analyzable”. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. See Williams (1999) for a concise introduction to Sellarsian epistemology. Despite the parallel with Quine’s ‘empiricism without the dogmas’ (Quine 1980 [1950]), the differences between Quine and Sellars also crucial; see Rosenberg (2007a). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Brandom’s work on logic as a semantic metavocabulary that *expresses* the norms implicit in ordinary discourse shows how to avoid “the logical Given”; see Brandom (2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Redding (2007) introduces “the myth of the endogenously given” (159) in terms of McDowell’s Aristotelian critique of Humean accounts of practical reasoning. I use the term in a different but related sense. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. For two excellent assessment of Sellars in relation to Hegel, see Pinkard (2006) and deVries (2016). The interpretation pursued here is largely due to deVries, though in the details it should be stressed that Hegel and Sellars rely on quite different arguments for similar conclusions. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Though Margolis (2010) does not use the terms ‘exogenous Given’ and ‘endogenous Given,’ his explication of Hegel’s critique of Kant shows precisely how Hegel succeeds in overcoming the endogenous Given. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See Rorty’s Introduction to the 1997 edition of *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press); see also Redding (2007). The debates within the Pittsburgh School can be thought of as being about *how* Hegelian we should be to correct the anti-Hegelianism with which analytic philosophy began. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. It is a nice question whether this entails absolute idealism under a different guise. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. For Sellars’s account of sense-impressions, see O’Shea (2010) and Levine (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. This is a Hegelian theme that Brandom develops in his theory of language; see Brandom (1994, p. 61ff; see also Brandom 2009, pp. 27-108). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. For McDowell’s criticisms of Sellars on precisely this point, see McDowell (2009 [1998]). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. “The problem posed by the contrast between the space of reasons and the realm of law, in the context of a naturalism that conceives nature as the realm of law, is not ontological but ideological” (McDowell 1996, p. 78n8). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. To clarify: Sellars *does* think that there is a relation between mind and world, but that ‘intentionality’ is not that relation. Instead, the mind-world relation is what Sellars calls ‘picturing’ (Sellars 1967, esp. p. 116-150) See Rosenberg (2007b), Price (2013), and Seibt (2016) for interpretations of this difficult notion. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. See Pinkard (2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)