Introduction

What does Lacanian psychoanalysis contribute to the well-established, but ever-renewed, discipline of ethics? Does he provide us with a new moral theory? Is it critical rejection of previous or possible moral theories? Or, is it something in between these two extremes? If Lacan is right, ethics becomes both unavoidable and irremediably incomplete, if the desire inhabiting it is supposed to culminate in a moral perspective and practice that is both unproblematic and unambiguously prescriptive. “[P]sychoanalysis might seem at first to be of an ethical order,” he remarks, in his seminar devoted to “The Ethics of Psychoanalysis.”

There are several reasons why this makes good sense, and they provide a fitting place to begin this chapter.

First, like any human practice, developing its own discourse and discipline, psychoanalysis seem to be oriented towards some sort of good, to have some sort of point or purpose (as well as standards) to it, to move within some registers of right and wrong, good and bad. Second, Freudian psychoanalysis, as one of the “hermeneutics of suspicion,” calls into question certitudes and grounding concepts of ethics or morality. If, for instance, the altruistic service towards others I display and construe as love, is possibly an expression of sublimated desires, stemming from narcissistic self-love on my part, or if my sense of duty and associated guilt is really an internalized composite assuming a space inside my psyche as the superego, does this not undermine any universal validity for most types of ethics or moralities? Third, psychoanalytic models seems to establish themselves as something like rival moral theories, providing explanations and evaluations of human action, decisions, purposes, and fulfillments.
One might expect then that if Lacan would articulate something readily identifiable as an ethics, similar to systematic treatments reflected in moral theories, it would be articulated in his Seminar 7, where he does speak of an “ethics of psychoanalysis.” But while he critically examines moral phenomena ranging from those of highly articulated moral theories, to revealing experiments ranging from those of courtly love to those of De Sade, to the “concrete ethics of generations,” placing these into the illuminating framework of his neo-Freudian psychoanalytic theory and practice, one looks in vain for any systematic and comprehensive ethics elaborated within that Seminar. Three mutually supporting reasons can be given for this.

One is that Lacan does not simply engage in unmasking, demythologizing, or genealogical critique. Where Freudian perspective reveals truths, other ethical perspectives failed to realize or had repressed the ethical perspectives, making no contribution in return to rethinking psychoanalytic conceptions or the very purposes of psychoanalysis. Instead, a dialectic develops between them, particularly since those ethical conceptions, problems, and projects form part of a significant history within which the human subject develops and orients itself. They are brought into the structured, inter-subjective Lacanian unconscious as necessary “reference points” so that even the psychoanalyst remains “submerged in, strictly speaking, moral problems.” He grants that study of “ethical systems” as “theoretical reflection on moral experience” indicates “the central significance of problems that have been posed since the beginning.” That would not itself, however, render a Lacanian ethics unsystematic, even fragmentary, in development and presentation.

Another relevant feature of Lacan’s explorations of ethics is that they are, and are intended to be, precisely that, explorations. The goal that he sets for himself is not to articulate a new ethical system, nor one incorporating or grafted onto older ones. He credits Freud with “contribut[ing] something unmatched in significance, something that has changed the problems of the ethical perspective for us to a degree that we are not yet aware of.” In speaking of “the Freudian experience as an ethics,” he sees this experience “at its most essential level,” reasoning that “it directs us towards a therapeutic form of action...included in the register or in terms of an ethics.” But this remains an experience and experiment, tied to and developed within the interplay between subjects. Lacan focuses on the “ethical dimension,” carrying out an “inquiry into ethics,” on showing “the novelty of what Freud brings to the domain of ethics.” (This means that “[o]ne uses him. One moves around within him. One takes one’s bearings from the direction he points in.”)
Yet another reason why Lacan does not provide a clear-cut, systematized ethics is that ethical matters, experiences, the entire dimension or register he picks out and focuses upon resist being separated out from other aspects of human subjects, history, and society. Different moral theories, with their varying concerns, insights, practices, and valuations, share, but also compete for, the same inter-subjective space, in which human subjects are located and anchored. Lacanian moral inquiry reveals, not only that there is more going on than one first assumes or asserts, but also that multiple dynamics assert themselves at the same time. To put it another way, all moral phenomena are by their very nature overdetermined, not only susceptible of multiple, rival interpretations, but involved at the same time with intersecting structures or constellations.

Given this privation of a systematic perspective upon, but also a consistent preoccupation with matters and theories of ethics in Lacan’s work, this chapter does not try to articulate a “Lacanian ethics.” There are already several available works admirably attempting to produce such a product. This essay does not aim at summarizing their achievements. Instead, what I intend to do is to selectively present Lacan’s perspectives on matters of ethics, orienting my discussion more to readers conversant with concepts and themes of classic moral theory than those focused on (or formed by) contemporary continental philosophy, assuming little previous exposure to Lacan’s writings but some background with Freudian psychoanalytic concepts. As much as possible, I intend to allow Lacan to speak for himself, in his own words.

The first section of this chapter examines his criticisms of the ethical perspectives and projects involved in other psychoanalytic (and therapeutic) approaches. The second (and longest) section turns to his examinations and evaluations of several main perspectives, problematics, and concepts in the history of ethics. The third section focuses on Lacan’s (re)interpretation of several core ideas from Freudian psychoanalysis and their implications for ethics.

**Psychoanalysis as a moral project**

As a therapeutic technique and as a discipline, psychoanalysis, from its origins moved within similar ranges of ethical concerns, and was structured by aims, ideals, and desires central to other moral projects and perspectives. Lacan recognizes this, noting that analytical ideals have roots in “a certain register of moral thought, that we propose to our patients, and around which we organize the assessments of their progress
and the transformation of their way into a path.” Psychoanalysis also assumed a critical function in relation to moral theories and experiences, investigating and providing interpretations of moral matters, such as the sense and force of obligation, for example, or whether seemingly altruistic choices aim at the good of another or satisfaction for the self. Such a critically interpretative function is not unique, of course, since at the least, representatives of moral theories, like Aristotle, Kant, or Bentham, likewise engaged in reinterpretation of rival theories or perspectives within their own framework.

Psychoanalytic approaches thus participate within a common human moral problematic, working out and offering (or imposing) answers to it for human subjects. This entails that, even if only implicitly, they articulate conceptions about what we are, could be, or should be, some ordering bearing on goods that are most valuable or desirable and those only apparent or derivative, certain cautions about what is impossible, illusory, or unrealistic, some reference to what we ought to do, the realm of duty, law, obligation, the nature and value of the relationships possible for us, the origins, extents, legitimacy, and objects of our desires, and the risks, choices, or disciplines relevant to our moral progress.

In his writings and seminars, Lacan criticizes nearly every other major psychoanalytic school, theorist, or framework of his time, staking out a stance uncompromisingly critical of models that convert Freud’s insights and method into oversimplifying, insufficiently self-aware, and moralized standpoints. One of Freud’s most central contributions is his insistence on the unconscious. In Lacan’s view, Freud does not entirely develop the full implications of his discovery, particularly in its connections with language, alterity, and desire. Many of his followers distort or even ignore these, substituting other conceptions and preoccupations in their place. A return to Freud means working out those implications more fully, restoring their centrality to psychoanalytic theory and practice.

Lacan stresses the importance of a symbolic register exceeding and situating the other registers through which the unconscious articulates itself, arguing: “[t]o ignore the symbolic order is to condemn Freud’s discovery to forgetting and analytic experience to ruin.” Psychoanalysis as a tradition begins through examination of the interplay between “the imaginary and reality [réel] in the mechanisms of the unconscious.” Freud followed out the “symbolic determination to which the imaginary function is subordinated,” whereas many of his followers fell into a dilemma, either “mak[ing] the imaginary into another reality” or “find[ing] in the imaginary the norm of reality.” Lacan insists that psychoanalysis'
“technique cannot be understood, nor therefore correctly applied, if one misunderstands the concepts on which it is based.” This in turn requires attentiveness to language, since “these concepts take on their full meaning only when oriented in a field of language and ordered in relation to the function of speech.”

The Freudian unconscious, as Lacan has repeated so many times, is structured like a language, transcending and anchoring the human subjects who locate themselves within it, in relation to each other, in relation to themselves, in relation to desires, drives, and objects. It is a fundamental mistake then to ignore or downplay the dimension of language, basing psychoanalytic work upon some other matter, taken as primary and fundamental. Lacan enumerates a number of candidates:

... affect, lived experience, attitude, discharge, need for love, latent aggressiveness, character armour, and the system of defences... exhaustion of fantasies, instinctual regression, outwitting of defence, mopping up of anxiety, freeing up of aggression, identification with the analysts’ strong ego, incorporation of his attributes, the dynamic... in which the object-relation is reconstructed and... the hic et nunc couple [of an ideal “genital stage”].

Relying upon these, analysts drew upon information uncovered through application of Freudian techniques and insights. Where they went wrong was not in “taking their bearings from them,” since at least certain of them represent relative advances, but in abstracting from the symbolic order, the structures of language, the unconscious, and the relations to the other. For these thematics themselves are “metaphors,” played out within the same dialectical space of the unconscious misrepresented or truncated by them. Analysts relying upon them thereby mislead themselves about the nature and objects of their activity. As a result, they also mislead themselves about possibilities of their practice, the goods that can be attained, and the evils that can be alleviated through it. They end up endorsing mistaken conceptions of the purposes and goals of psychoanalysis.

Specific criticisms Lacan levies against different movements within psychoanalysis and psychology vary and diverge. He faults behaviorism, for example, not only for its reductionism, but also for failing to lead to “any radical change in ethics, in other words, in mental habits, in the fundamental habit.” Within its perspective, the human subject, reduced to merely “an object, serves an end,” but this could be entirely arbitrary, not just the survival or dominance most contemporary behaviorists
focused upon. Existentialist psychology relies upon a “myth of immediate experience,” and against this Lacan argues: “Freudian experience is in no way preconceptual. It’s not a pure experience, but one... structured by something artificial, the analytic relation.” Reich and others following along his path similarly postulate “ineffable organic expression beyond speech.” Jungian recourse to archetypes ignores the historical, contingent status of the symbolic order. Object-relations theory likewise fails to situate the developmental relation between the real and the imaginary, the internalization of significant others as objects, into the landscape of the symbolic that provides them anchors for distinctively human meaning, desire, and action.

Lacan’s two most constant targets for criticism are advocacy of a teleology of “genital love” and an ego psychology he at times identifies with “the American way.” The former is oriented by a developmental focus on attaining a “genital stage” of maturity (after working through earlier anal and oral stages), where the subject could then treat the other person in a sexual relationship not just as an object, but as a full subject, alike to but different from oneself. This would involve an overcoming of narcissism or sadism, and ideally a full reciprocity between female and male partners, stabilized in a relationship in which sexuality and love are combined.

Lacan regards this as a fantasy of an “approximative and vague character, so tainted with an optimistic moralism... love as hygiene,” ignoring the complexities, lacks, and instabilities of the overdetermined human (sexual) condition. He tells us, for instance, that “the genital drive,” articulated differently than other drives does not coincide with, but does intersect with the ambiguous, problematic “field of love.” He notes that the genital act – that is, sex as activity “must find its place in desire’s unconscious articulation,” and that “it doesn’t secure anything.” Not only does “[g]enital love turns out to be absolutely unassimilable to a unity” in which male and female would be reciprocally interchangeable, so that it must instead be conceived of as dual, the only possibility for a unity lies in a “third party, of speech, of god.” He quips: “Goodness only knows how obscure such a pretension as the achievement of genital objecthood (l’objectalitégenitale) remains, along with what is so imprudently linked to it, namely, adjustment to reality.”

Such adjustment is also adopted as the ideal of ego-centered psychotherapy, particularly in the United States where it was “inflected towards the adaptation of the individual to the social environment, the search for behavior patterns, and the objectification involved in the notion of
'human relations.'" In Lacan's view, Freud's tripartite topography of id, ego, and superego must be relocated within his broader metapsychology, involving the symbolic register. Without this, understanding of Freud's key formula *Woeswar, sollichwerden* becomes deformed, so that "the subject, transformed into an it, has to conform to an ego which the analyst has no trouble recognizing as his ally, since it is, in fact, the analysts' own ego." Lacan rejects such an "appeal to some healthy part of the subject thought to be there in the real, capable of judging with the analyst what is happening in the transference," or making an "alliance with the healthy part of the subject's ego...appeal[ing] to his common sense." He calls the goal of "promoting the restoration of the primacy of the ego...a complete misrecognition of Freud's teaching. The total personality is precisely what Freud intends to characterize as fundamentally foreign to the function of the ego as it has been regarded by psychologists until now." This stems from the doubled aspect of otherness, of "alienation," missed by ego-focused theory. On the one hand, there is the (lower case-o) other, "the other as imaginary .... There is no way that the unity of the subject can be brought about in this direction." On the other hand, "[t]here is also the other who speaks from my place, apparently, this other who is within me. This is an other of a totally different nature from the other, my counterpart." He cautions against misrecognizing these two, the other and the Other, saying that this "lies at the origin of all the false problems.... The solution to this difficulty can only be found by distinguishing between the imaginary other insofar as he is structurally the originary form of the field in which a multiplicity of objects is structured for the human newborn, and the absolute Other, the Other with a big O." What does Lacan propose instead, in place of these other models of psychoanalysis? He advises a need for analysts in training and in practice to be "intelligent and sensitive," attentive to the subject of the analysis and, rather than simply the demands imposed by a theory or technique. This is facilitated particularly by realizing, or rather keeping in mind, that one is similarly a subject. "There are certain ways of using categories such as the unconscious, the drive, the pre-oedipal relation, and defence that consists in drawing none of the authentic consequences that they imply and considering that this is an affair that concerns others but does not go to the heart of your own relations with the world." In order to be effective and to not be deceived about our own ethical stance, one must ask, rather than set aside, the question: "What must there be in the analysts desire for it to operate in a correct way?"
The history of ethical experiences and reflections

Why does Lacan engage in recurring discussion on thinkers and movements within the history of moral theory? One reason is that certain moral theories articulate central problematic also addressed by psychoanalysis, which moves within a moral domain and is motivated by some goods or goals. So, we can expect that moral theory and psychoanalysis would share a common or at least (partially overlapping) space of action, desire, thought, and narrative. Like it or not, the psychoanalytic theorist or practitioner is involved in ethics. “There’s no reason not to put oneself to the test,” Lacan advises, “not to see how others before Freud saw the terrain in which he constituted his field.” He adds: “It’s another way of experiencing what is involved, namely that this terrain is unthinkable without the help of the instruments by which we operate ....”

This introduces a second reason, namely that a psychoanalytic perspective is needed in order to progress past ethics’ recurring impasses. This provides more than just a necessary complement to other moral theories, otherwise on the right track. Lacan’s Freudian perspective critically examines moral theories as historical manifestations of problematics of human subjects who need and strive to make sense of their messy, enigmatic, often seemingly contradictory moral experience. He counsels or teaches suspicion towards too-easy resolutions offering themselves as definitive and permanent such as Aristotle’s focus on happiness, for example, or Kant’s equally intense focus upon disinterested fulfillment of duty. His intention is to explore and provide a more adequate understanding of bases underlying moral theories, their key motifs, and the moral projects they offer to or impose upon the human subject. What Lacan is doing, in effect, is working out a complex, non-linear narrative framework within which key developments and high points of the history of ethics can be placed, setting them in relation to each other, in connection with Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic contributions and concepts, and ultimately into the practical purview of contemporary moral subjects.

Socrates inaugurates an ambiguous role, by exemplifying an imaginary investment into the power and potential of dialogue, in productive
interplay of subjects communicating out their problems, conflicts, or puzzles, expressing a “hope in dialogue to make reason triumph.”  

Without realizing it, Socrates works from the position of a master. He stumbles across, and fails to resolve a split, an aporia, between knowledge and moral value, “inaugurat[ing] this new being-in-the-world which I here call subjectivity...“realiz[ing] that science will not be able to transmit the means to achieve the most previous thing, the arête, the excellence of the human being.” This produces a “decentering,” as the enquiry into virtue(s) also provokes desire for knowledge, but “this very virtue, with respect to its transmission, its tradition, its formation, remains outside of the domain.” Successful practitioners of virtue act by an ortho-doxy, a “right” or “true opinion.” And because of this, Lacan credits Socrates with the realization that great statesmen, if they were “great men, it was because they were good psychoanalysts.”

Yet, Socrates (and still more Plato) fails to respect such a process’ contingency, employing philosophy to reveal to other masters their own inconstancies, the contradictory statuses of their own desires. What does he offer in place of that condition? An “excessive optimism” about human subjects’ capacities to adequately grasp and respond to another “ortho-” an ortho-logos – a “proper ordering,” or “right discourse.” Socrates suggests “recognition of the conditions for the good in itself would have something irresistible for man.” The problem is that we experience that “the most perfect recognition of the conditions of the good will never prevent anyone from dashing into its opposite.” He also blurs together several distinct moral problems and values. “Since Socrates, pleasure has been the search for one’s good. Whatever we may think, we are pursuing our pleasure, seeking our good.” The main problem then becomes identifying that good, rightly evaluating, and choosing the most appropriate means, all of this operating under the assumption that “a human animal...is intelligent enough to comprehend what is truly its good.”

Lacan singles out Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics as an “exemplary work,” and “one of the most eminent forms of ethical thought,” recommending its perusal to his students and returning to him frequently throughout his works. This text articulates a right order of discourse, presented as knowledge bearing upon desires, reasoning, and formation and modification of habit. In particular, Aristotle deepens the problem Socrates failed to resolve, that of akrasia, being led by our desires against what we reason or resolve. In certain respects, Aristotle is consistently on track, “full of resonances and lessons,” posing “schemas” that are “not useless,” for the Freudian. Lacan credits Aristotle, for example, with
being “intelligent enough to isolate in the intellect-agent what is at stake in the symbolic function,” and excuses his failure to grasp “that speech (une parole), even his own…. concerns jouissance, the latter nevertheless being designated metaphorically throughout his work,” by noting that the ancient Greek had not benefitted from contact with Christian revelation.44

And yet, Lacan is decidedly not advocating a psychoanalytic neo-Aristotelianism, for several reasons. First, a partiality colors or truncates his perspective. Aristotle does not want to see, or think about, or “meet” up with “perverts.”45 There remains “a whole register of desire,” that of the “monstrous” or “brutal” (theriotes, in Aristotle’s Greek) “literally situated by him outside of the field of morality,” in which, however, other moral theories and psychoanalysis is deeply interested, with the result that we see “how subversive our experience is, since it serves to render his theory surprising, primitive, paradoxical, and in truth, incomprehensible.”46 Aristotle’s ethics is in fact one idealized from the standpoint of the master, “localized, I would almost say limited to a social type, to a privileged representative of leisure.”47

Second, Aristotle’s ethics is founded upon a representative cosmology, essentially foreign to our own (post-)Christian worldview.48 The most significant part of this is where metaphysics and morals come together, in a “Sovereign Good, a point of insertion, attachment, or convergence, in which a particular order is unified with a more universal knowledge, in which ethics becomes politics, and beyond that with an imitation of the cosmic order.”49 A problem emerges in conceptualizing and realizing (rather than idealizing) this Sovereign Good, which for Aristotle is figured as eudaimonia, “happiness:” that which human beings most fundamentally desire (but typically misconstrue). But, it is also bound up with the workings of pleasure. That is the third critical point Lacan makes about Aristotle. On the one hand, “the discussion of the Nicomachean Ethics is designed to restore the true function of pleasure to its proper place,” and it is an advance that “it is given a value that is not merely passive.”50 The problem is that, even in Aristotle, pleasure inevitably draws ethics into its confining orbit:

[F]rom the origin of moral philosophy, from the moment when the term ethics acquired the meaning of man’s reflection on the condition and calculation of the proper paths to follow, all meditation on man’s good has taken place as a function of the index of pleasure. And I mean all, since Plato, and certainly since Aristotle, and down through the Stoics, the Epicureans, and even through Christian
thought itself in Saint Thomas Aquinas. As far as the determination of different goods is concerned, things have clearly developed along the paths of an essentially hedonist problematic.\textsuperscript{51}

What are the issues Lacan raises with such a problematic? Matters are not quite so simple as there being just one straight line from Aristotle all the way through hedonists, culminating in Bentham’s Utilitarianism. We can understand this more fully by attending to what he makes of a distinction articulated in a systematic way first by Aristotle, who consistently distinguishes different modalities or orders of goodness, introjecting this even into human rationality and speech (\textit{logos}), which make both family and political communities (\textit{koinoniai}) possible, into the different uses, occasions, and goals of rhetoric, and into the nature of individual relationships (\textit{philias}). Aristotle notes that “good,” as an analogical term, can legitimately refer to the pleasurable, the useful or profitable, the just, and to that difficult to pin down category of the \textit{kalon} (the “noble,” “fine,” “beautiful,” “honorable”). Lacan will follow out each of these dimensions or dynamics of the good:

Insofar as we distinguish in the sphere of ethics between two levels that are already there in classical thinkers.... the question is whether the \textit{summum bonum} should be articulated according to \textit{honestas}, that is the style of the \textit{honnétiquehomme} – and which must, therefore, be articulated as a certain form of organization, a certain life style that is located in relation to the initial sublimation – or according to \textit{utilitas}, a concept that is at the basis of utilitarianism...\textsuperscript{52}

Following out the pleasurable path leads us through the prudent management endorsed by the Epicurean tradition, the excesses and evasions of the libertines, the sublimated object of the medieval innovations of courtly love, and into several other places, which turn out to be impasses, not only for the realization of desire, but also for its understanding. It culminates in an optimistic form Lacan calls “the naturalist liberation of desire,” a project which has failed. “The more the theory, the more the work of social criticism, the more the sieve of that experience...have raised in us the hope of relativizing the imperative, the contrary, or in a word, conflictual character of moral experience, the more we have...witnessed a growth in the incidence of genuine pathologies.”\textsuperscript{53} As it turns out, the moral imperative, the commanding law, guilt and duty, do not coincide with what will best maximize pleasure and minimize pain.
Lacan points out the oscillation, the not-quite-coincidence but inescapable connection, between pleasure and the conception of the good in many moral theories. “Insofar as pleasure controls subjective activity, it is the good, the idea of the good that sustains it. That is why ethical thinkers have at all times not been able to avoid trying to identify these two terms, which are, after all antithetical, namely, pleasure and the good.”\textsuperscript{54} In fact, “the traditional moralist always falls back into the rut of persuading us that pleasure is a good, that the path leading to good is blazed by pleasure.”\textsuperscript{55} Appeal to, or orientation by, the register of good picked out as the kalon or honestum is always one step away to slipping into identification of the good with the pleasant (perhaps a higher pleasure, to be sure). Put in another way, eudaimonist traditions in ethics always risk lapsing into hedonism. Lacan notes that this constitutes a problem not because hedonists “have emphasized the beneficial effects of pleasure,” but rather “because they haven’t stated what the good consists of.”\textsuperscript{56} They eclipse, and cannot frame for us, the deeper questions of desire, goods, and jouissance.

Perhaps then the path to take is that of utility, the “profitable,” the “useful,” an order of goodness that tended in classical moral theory to be placed lower, not only than the kalon/honestum but also beneath pleasure. In modern moral thought a clear tradition exploring, reassessing, and valorizing utility develops, running from Hobbes to Hume, and passing through the French lumières, and gets drawn into a tightly knotted braid by Jeremy Bentham, the father and formulator of modern Utilitarianism. Lacan views this moral theory, movement, and approach as introducing something new into discourse on the good. This involves “a radical revolution in antiquity’s point of view on the good insofar as it can be deduced from the paths of pleasure,”\textsuperscript{57} but also “a kind of slippage...that did not constitute progress but rather a skirting of the problem, slipping from Aristotle’s view of being to Bentham’s utilitarianism ....”\textsuperscript{58}

Examining the “the ethical register of utilitarianism,” Lacan views it as relatively right, but in broader and deeper senses mistaken, not only about the good, but even about its own projects. In his view, “Freud...articulates what is basically valid in it and that which at the same time bounds it, and points to its limits.”\textsuperscript{59} What are these limits then? These might be framed by asking: What does the utilitarian take to be the good and What does reconciling general happiness with individual desire produce? Utilitarianism is often faulted by its critics for ignoring the irreducibility of goods and desires higher than those of pleasure or utility simply to those modalities of good. Lacan’s concern is somewhat
different, since he turns a suspicious ear towards discourses about the final good, the supreme good, or even the *kalon* (or *honestas*). Bentham does in effect demystify these classic conceptions, and resituates ethics “on the level of the economy of goods,” a “concatenation of circulation of goods.” But this refocus will play itself and us back into what Lacan calls “the service of goods,” entailing a deferment of the subject’s desire in favor of work, organized by power in society. Utilitarianism, just as much as Aristotelianism, exhorts a “cleaning up of desire,” whose measure is “founded on the order of things... the order of power, of a human – far too human power.”

Lacan develops another line of criticism, starting with a line of practical reasoning: “It is of the nature of the useful to be utilized. If I can do something in less time and with less trouble than someone near me, I would instinctively do it in his place.” And yet, so often, we find ourselves not wanting to do this, indeed setting ourselves higher in priority than the other. What is lacking in such a case? “[I]f anything, tenderness, namely, what may be called the difficult way, love for one’s neighbour:” that is, effective altruism, the “benevolence” advocated as a motive by Bentham. Surprisingly, on this issue, Lacan actually credits utilitarians with being “right,” writing: “They are countered with something that in effect, only makes the task of countering them much more difficult.”

One can object that “my good is not the same as another’s good, and your principle of the greatest good for the greatest number comes up against the demands of my egoism.” Why does such an objection make the very task of resisting utilitarianism more difficult? One might recall Bentham’s own anticipatory responses to such objections, or one might even in the act of setting this objection into the light, find guilt or shame evoked in oneself in unmasking one’s own selfishness. Lacan follows out a different line. We really don’t have such difficulty with utilitarianism or sacrificing for the other, as we might pretend. “My egoism is quite content with a certain altruism, altruism of the kind that is situated on the level of the useful.” In effect, Bentham’s ideal of universal benevolence sanctions my wanting, my desiring, my making a motive “the good of others provided in the image of my own,” or even “provided that it depend on my efforts.”

At one point, asking why Freud was not able to configure moral agency through utilitarianism, Lacan refines his critique to a critical point. On the one hand:

The attraction of utility is irresistible, so much that we see people damning themselves for the pleasure of giving their modern
conveniences to other people, who, they’ve got it in their heads, cannot live without their help… [W]hat is essential is that the fact that the useful \textit{utile} object irresistibly leads to the idea of sharing it with the greatest number, because it is truly the need for the greatest number that gave them the idea [in the first place.

And yet:

There is only one difficulty here, which is that, whatever the benefit of utility and the extension of its reign, it has nothing to do with morality. The latter consists primarily… in the frustration of a \textit{jouissance} that is posited by an apparently greedy law.\textsuperscript{63}

“Jouissance” is a Lacanian term ranging in meaning between “enjoyment,” “satisfaction,” and even the excess experienced in orgasm. It represents a direction or object of desire exceeding the register of happiness or pleasure, which actually restricts \textit{jouissance}. He points out that “it is not the Law itself that bars the subject’s access to jouissance – it simply makes a barred subject out of an almost natural barrier. For it is pleasure that sets limits to jouissance.”\textsuperscript{64}

In Lacan’s view, any discourse centering entirely or even primarily on pleasure, despite relative advances in understanding those matters such a discourse generates, nevertheless renders itself inadequate. Even when reorienting hedonism by adding in a sovereign or final good, sublimation, social utility, or happiness, important dimensions of our own and others’ moral experience end up being overlooked. Without taking those into account, the prospects for understanding and being more than prey to our own desires become dim. Making sense of our modern moral condition requires attentiveness to the significances of guilt, obligation, and the (moral) law, and Lacan carries this out not only by exploring Kant’s radical moral contributions and its shadow in de Sade’s, but also by working through what he takes to be key contributions from Judaism and Christianity.

In turning to the thematic of the Law, it is important to point out that Lacan does not accord the Freudian conception of the superego the same scope and agency as Freud did. He emphasizes one of its key characteristics, the implacability of the demands it places upon the subject, “operating according to an economy such that the more one sacrifices to it, the more it demands.”\textsuperscript{65} It is important not to fall into the error of strictly identifying the superego and its agency with the Law. Lacan notes: “[A]t the heart of everything that Freud taught, one
finds the following: the energy of the so-called superego derives from the aggression that the subject turns back on himself.” \(^6^6\) In fact, it is the Law that limits this escalating process of the superego, precisely as “external,” as something within which the subject is located. He stresses:

[T]he interiorization of the Law has nothing to do with the Law .... It is possible that the superego serves as support for the moral conscience, but everybody knows that it has nothing to do with the moral conscience as far as its most obligatory demands are concerned. What the superego demands has nothing to do with that which we would be right in making the universal rule of our actions.” \(^6^7\)

Lacan credits Kant with bringing ethics to a critical point in several ways. He reformulates the question of the highest, most architectonic good. Against other ethics:

Kant objects to it that the sovereign good can in no way be conceived as one small good carried to infinity. For there is no possible law to be given of what might be the good in objects. The sovereign good, if this confusing term must be retained, can be found again only at the level of the law .... \(^6^8\)

Kant also disconnects ethics from any affection or interest, seemingly sundering desire from duty, at least in theory eliminating any “pathological” motive from one’s will. \(^6^9\) He carries out, or at least imagines, a purification from desire, leaving only the Law in its place, not only outside of or before the subject, but even inhabiting and speaking within him or her. This voice “articulating in the form of a maxim in conscience, proposes the order of a purely practical reason or will there,” and this in turn demands “the maxim may be considered universal.”

Several blind spots obscure the Kantian project. The desire of the subject, even labeled as “pathological,” is not so easily sublimated into seemingly contentless universality. If that universality characteristic of the Law does attract and compel us, does it not already involve, not only constraint, but also some desire? There also turn out to be difficulties in deriving and determining precisely which maxims fit these demands, and ought to be followed, and which do not. This in turn opens the door to De Sade’s proposals, which turn out to be in certain respects just as rational, universalizable, and “pure” as Kant’s own.
If you adopt the opposite of all the laws of the Decalogue, you will end up with the coherent exposition of something which in the last instance may be articulated as follows: “Let us take as the universal maxim of our conduct the right to enjoy any other person whatsoever as the instrument of our pleasure.”

Although Lacan observes that any reasonable being would find “both the maxim and the consent... at best an instance of black humour,” and suggests this is not so much “rational” as “the sort of reasonable that is no more than resorting in a confused fashion to the pathological,” he grants it articulates a coherent moral perspective resistant to critiques from other standpoints. It signals one of several possibilities Kant's own viewpoint opens. In fact, de Sade takes matters further and illuminates our condition more fully than does Kant, as he “imperceptibly displaces for each of us the ancient axis of ethics, which is but the egoism of happiness.”

He takes us beyond an imagined opposition between Law on the one hand, pleasure and happiness, on the other, and thereby leads us into the dynamics of desire and jouissance.

This in turn leads us further back, into more classical and differently revolutionary formulations of the law – in religion, in Judaism and its successor Christianity. We cannot pretend to do justice to Lacan's complex and seemingly paradoxical stance on religion here. Instead, let us focus on three key elements of his Freudian reinterpretation of Judeo-Christian ethics: the Law's formulations and effects; the Name-of-the-Father and the death of God: and what exceeds the scope of the Law.

One of the main functions of the Law is not simply to command, but to forbid or prohibit. What object or nature desire is it that it blocks? It is desire not simply for pleasure, but for the jouissance exceeding the field of pleasure, or even happiness. Lacan returns repeatedly to Saint Paul's reference to the relationship between Law and concupiscence or desire, at one point drawing the lesson: “[W]ithout a transgression there is no access to jouissance, and...that is precisely the function of the Law. Transgression in the direction of jouissance takes place only if supported by the forms of the Law.” The Law allows there to be something beyond pleasure, opening up and maintaining possibilities for deeper desire directed towards something eclipsing pleasure's promises or satisfactions. Lacan names this ultimate object of desire the Thing, and outlines the connection between the Law and the Thing:

Is the Law the Thing? Certainly not. Yet I can only know the thing by means of the Law. In effect, I would not have had the idea to covet it
if the Law hadn’t said: “Thou shalt not covet it.” But the Thing finds a way by producing in me all kinds of covetousness thanks to the commandment....

Centered within the experience of the Law and desire is a primal but also reproduced disorder or fault, figured in Totem and Taboo’s Freudian mythology of the murder of the father, the pact of the sons, and the surprising endurance, even intensification of prohibition of jouissance, crystallizing into the Law and its dialectical relations with desire.

Lacan emphasizes connections other interpreters of Freud have overlooked or suppressed, “the function, role and figure of the Name-of-the Father” and “his entire ethical reference revolving around the properly Judeo-Christian tradition. The “Name” or “No” (nom/non in French) of the Father represents the capacity, and the exercised actuality, of prohibition, the function of the father articulating the Law and its structures. For Lacan, this figure becomes an inescapable structure of the unconscious, exercising effects upon us. It “sustains the structure of desire with the structure of the law,” but as he notes, “the inheritance of the father is that which Kierkegaard designates for us, namely, his sin.” The Law is not, as Kant attempted to figure it, purified rationality, but rather encompasses paradoxes and primal faults, including the very death of the father – that is, God, who is able to maintain and impose prohibition, even jealous demands, precisely because he is lacking in reality, but rules the symbolic order in which we rational animals locate ourselves.

What does God’s death signify for Lacan? One might assume that signals a liberation of desire. In reality, it intensifies the Law’s imposing demands, all the more as secularization becomes more explicit and widespread. He points out:

To the concupiscence gleaming in old man Karamazov’s eyes when he questioned his son – “God is dead, thus all is permitted” – modern man, the very one who dreams of the nihilistic suicide of Dostoyevsky’s hero or forces himself to blow up Nietzsche’s inflatable superman, replies with all his ills and his deeds: “God is dead, nothing is permitted anymore.”

Lacan asserts not only is God dead, but “God himself doesn’t know that...he will never know it because he has always been dead.” This realization leads to “something that changes the bases of the ethical problem, namely that jouissance still remains forbidden as it was before, before we knew God was dead.”
The Law and its bearing on desire reveals the human condition to be one “ravaged by the Word.” Is there anything that leads us beyond this Law, except for the unfigurable Freudian Thing we will turn to in the next section? Interestingly, Lacan points out two comportments that fall within the scope of our own agency to some extent. The first in the fear of God “on which a tradition that goes back to Solomon is based:” one distinct from the fear of gods from which thinkers from Lucretius to Hume sought to liberate us. He names this “the principle of wisdom and foundation of the love of God,” and notes that this affectivity “transforms... all fears into perfect courage. All fears... are exchanged for what is called the fear of God, which, however constraining it may be, is the opposite of a fear.”

Christianity recasts the Law, by reemphasizing two commandments. One of these picks up this requirement to love, “the commandment which commands that he, the father, be loved,” enunciated through “the man who made incarnate the death of God,” who Lacan tells us, “still exists with the commandment which orders him to love God.” And this is extended in turn to the difficult and dangerous second commandment of loving one’s neighbor as oneself, which he calls a “narrow passage where Freud himself stops and retreats in understandable horror.”

The Freudian unconscious and ethics

As we have seen in the previous two sections, Lacan criticizes other psychoanalytic theories, and critiques a number of moral theories. His main goal with respect to the latter is not to refute them, to liberate us from them, or to unmask them from a neo-Freudian perspective, but rather to attain clarity about where and how they work, what portions of the human experience they bear upon and orient, and where they come up short in providing us with the answers they promise. The problematic of hedonism, happiness, and pleasure, for example, is not strictly speaking wrong or false, when understood as providing structure to a part of the larger problematic within which the human subject remains caught up. Likewise the problematic of the Law, jouissance, and the death of God, reveals a deeper set of concerns destabilizing the dynamic of pleasure, does not itself provide a complete viewpoint.

In Lacan’s view, Freud leads us further into adequate self-understanding of the subject, or in broader terms, making sense of the human condition. In Lacan’s hands, central Freudian concepts or insights are reworked into an integrative architectonic providing a fuller context and understanding to moral theories, experiences, and problematic. What are the
central features of this problematic? Lacan returns to “the moral experience involved in psychoanalysis... summed up in the original imperative proposed in what might be called the Freudian ascetic experience, namely the Woes war, sollIchwerden. 83 This formula signifies an aim “of reintegration and harmony... even of reconciliation,” but one progress towards which Lacan cautions can only occur if we do not lose sight of “the self’s radical eccentricity with respect to itself,” a condition of desire, and so rethinking ethics centers upon this. In part desire is the subject’s, and so Lacan calls analysis “an invitation to the revelation of his desire.” 84 Discerning the necessary means for this leads us further into desire’s structuring environment.

“In order to free the subject’s speech, we introduce him to the language of his desire,” 85 Lacan points out. This is a key turning point, because language, and all that it brings with it (valorization, structure, ordering) exceeds the subject. Psychoanalysis reveals “there is – since there is the unconscious – something transcendent, truly transcendent, which is but what the species inhabits, namely, language.” 86 Because the unconscious is structured as a language, it is just as much the field of the other’s (and the Lacanian Other’s) desires as those of the subject. The condition of being anchored in language provides the connection to a triple concern for analysis. “Its means are those of speech insofar as speech confers a meaning on the functions of the individual; its domain is that of concrete discourse qua field of the subject’s transindividual reality; and its operations are those of history, insofar as history constitutes the emergence of truth in reality [réel].” 87

This insight allows us to better understand the significance of the distinction Lacan not only makes over and over, but even calls attention to that fact, between the three registers of the real, the imaginary, and the symbolic. The condition of the real is a convoluted and controversial subject. Suffice it to say here that the real is not identical with what we typically term “reality,” since that actually straddles the imaginary or the symbolic as well. The objects and concerns of both ethics and psychoanalysis engage the real, but always through the intermediary of the other two registers. In fact, they contribute to, expand, complicate the real, in several ways. For one, “moral action is, in effect, grafted onto the real. It introduces something new into the real and thereby opens a path in which the point of our presence is legitimated.” 88 Lacan also points out that “we make reality out of pleasure.” 89 Even the broader category of praxis itself, “concerted human action,” has as its characteristic that it “places man in a position to treat the real by the symbolic,” encountering the imaginary
in the process. So, it is the imaginary and the symbolic to which we must turn.

The imaginary is the dimension of affectively charged images, identifications of the subject with imagos of other persons, objects and partial objects of desire. It is also the register in which the subject’s ego is developed, existing in relation to its ego ideals (one’s construal of others populating one’s imaginary register) and the ideal ego (one’s construal of what one is and desires to be). The ego and the imaginary register are oriented by typically unacknowledged but operative narcissism and by an aggressivity whose “intentional pressure” can become evident to others, particularly through analysis. The famous “mirror stage” of Lacanian theory is useful for grasping this dynamic. “It brings to light the nature of this aggressive relation and what it signifies,” namely that between the ego and its other, the ego “sets itself up in a duality internal to the subject.” It also reveals that “drives and the ego are in conflict and that there is a choice that has to be made,” a choice by the subject non-identical with the ego.

Desire as structured by the imaginary involves the other from the start:

What makes the human world a world covered with objects derives from the fact that the object of human interest is the object of the other’s desire.... It’s possible because the human ego is the other because in the beginning the subject is closer to the form of the other than to the emergence of his own tendency. He is originally an inchoate collection of desires... and the initial synthesis of the ego is essentially an alter ego, it is alienated. The desiring human subject is constructed around a center which is the other insofar as he gives the subject his unity, and the first encounter with the object is with the object as object of the other’s desire.

Rendering this still more complex, “man’s desire finds its meaning in the other’s desire, not so much because the other holds keys to the desired object, but because his first object(ive) is to be recognized by the other.”

In the subject’s experience and desire, the imaginary and the real intersect with the register of the symbolic, something distinct to human beings, lacking which “no animal life would be possible for this misshapen subject that man is.” Lacan notes that the imaginary can be “linked to ethnology, to animal psychology,” but the symbolic resituates it, rendering it different, less straightforward in its potentialities
and problematic. He tells us that “the symbolic is what yields us the entire world system,” and that “this is what makes an infinitely greater number of objects enter the field of human desire than enter animal experience.” In fact, the point of the mirror stage is that development requires an infant’s entrance into and incorporation of the symbolic register, “inaugurat[ing]...the dialectic that will henceforth link the I to socially elaborated situations.” In fact, “development only takes place insofar as the subject integrates himself into the symbolic system, acts within it, asserts himself in it through the use of genuine speech. It isn’t even essential,” Lacan points out, “that this speech be his own.”

He stresses in multiple ways that the symbolic exists as a totality preceding and exceeding the subject. “It isn’t constituted bit by bit. As soon as the symbol arrives, there is a universe of symbols.” For the young child, “the symbol is already there...it is enormous and englobes him from all sides...language exists, fills libraries to the point of overflowing, and surrounds, guided, and rouses all your actions.” It pre-exists because the subject enters into a world already humanized, populated by and inherited from others, marked and shaped by their desires. This implies:

... reason, discourse, signifying articulation as such, is there from the beginning...in an unconscious form before the birth of anything as far as human experience is concerned. It is there buried, unknown, not mastered, not available to him who is its support. And it is relative to a situation that is structured in this way that man at a subsequent moment has to situate his needs.

It is within the symbolic order that the human subject undergoes the effects, or encounters the structures of the Lacanian unconscious. The function of castration and the phallus, the Name-of-the-Father, the prohibitions imposed by a God who does not realize he is dead, the Law forbidding jouissance, all of these and more exert their effects within the linguistically ordered landscape of the symbolic register, structuring and providing space, not only for the subject’s desire, nor for the desire of a “little-o” other who is the imaginary correlate of the subject, but for the Lacanian “big-O” Other.

This Other is a structure of the unconscious assuming or approximating multiple forms depending on its function, but it is always a third agency added to the dyad of subject and other; or rather, grounding their very possibilities of communication, rivalry, antagonism, relationship, and desire. As real, Lacan says, the Other is “reduced to death, a
borderline figure who answers the question about one’s existence.”

In the symbolic, however, the Other is an agency which guarantees, or makes possible as such, the other key structures and their functions – giving the Law, threatening a castration that never comes, for example. Most importantly here, the Other governs, offers, and evokes desire. The range of possible relations between subject and Other, let alone the forms the Other may be masked within, is too manifold to chart out here, but one common feature is that “man’s desire is desire of the Other,” a formula whose implications Lacan plays out at several points. One key realization stemming from this is that examination and evaluation of the subject’s own desires reveals that they are not original to his or her own being, but already reflect, depend upon, and relate to what the Other desires.

Desire of the Other is also desire for the Other, and this in turn is reflected in what Freud calls “the Thing,” an orientation of our desire, always beyond representation or signification, promising though never realizing jouissance. Lacan tells us “there is good and bad, and then there is the Thing,” beyond and supporting both of these valorizations. For Lacan, this Thing indicates the connection between ethics, desire, and the Law. He points out “I can only know of the Thing by means of the Law” and clarifies that “the moral law is articulated with relation to the real...insofar as it can be the guarantee of the Thing.” This has important implications for ethics, one of which is that “if he is to follow the path of his pleasure, man must go around [the Thing].” The hedonist problematic leads into impasses. “[W]hat governs us on the path of pleasure is no Sovereign Good.”

Does that mean we ought to reject or rework hedonism in favor of identifying and striving for a final, architectonic good? Freud radically denies “the good as such,” according to Lacan. “[T]he step taken by Freud...is to show us that there is no Sovereign Good – that the Sovereign Good, which is das Ding...is a forbidden good, and that there is no other good.” And yet, as we have seen, while recognizing the significance, indeed the indelible persistence in the symbolic, of the Law and its relation to desire in forbidding jouissance, Lacan does not advocate conformity to duty, fulfilling the commandments, obeying the law any more than he endorses a lifting of those strictures, let alone transgression for its own sake, since it will not actually produce the jouissance desired.

Lacan does suggest that “there is another register of morality that takes its direction from that which is to be found on the level of das Ding; it is the register that makes the subject hesitate when he is at
the point of bearing false witness against das Ding, that is to say, the place of desire.”

Central to the “reconsideration of ethics to which psychoanalysis leads” is not a moral imperative to fulfill one’s desires (or those of others, or those of the Other), but to progressively understand one’s desires. Within the context of analysis, a “form of ethical judgement” becomes possible in an emphatic form, articulated as a question, “Have you acted in conformity with the desire that is in you?” Notice, however, that this is no endorsement of simply following one’s desires. The question is posed in order not only to guide the subject into the complex, ongoing, iterative task of attaining clarity about the nature, objects, and origins of one’s own desires, but also to provoke a person to determine which of those desires are worth following or favoring, which to endorse and own, and which to reject or defer.

To bring these outlines of Lacan’s perspective on ethics to a close, I’d like to summarize several key points bearing on his perspective. Ethics in one form or another is unavoidable for any human subject. Moral theories, practices, reflections, and experiments are integral to the human condition. At the same time, Lacanian psychoanalysis reveals that ethics and human experience remain over determined. There is always too much going on and involved for any single moral theory, valuation, or perspective to adequately understand and allow us to successfully negotiate our way through the problematic inherent in the human condition, whether those imposed upon us by history or produced by our own situations and choices. One major advance Lacan contributes to understanding that problematic human condition is his insistence and exploration of the symbolic register, an insight taken over from Freud but considerably further developed through Lacanian psychoanalysis. Accordingly, a critical stance is warranted towards moral projects purporting to provide complete resolution or entirely clear understanding of the full range of moral matters, whether articulated by a moral theory or orienting a psychotherapeutic perspective. Put another way, in a Lacanian perspective, for any given human subject, ethics is never entirely finished.

Conclusion

Lacan reveals to us that we human subjects are radically incomplete in our development, both freer and more constrained or conditioned than we realize, necessarily existing in relation to others, desirous not only of the objects of our own formed desires, but also those of others, and of the very desire of the Other. He also shows us that, although we
can pretend to evade the domain – the disciplines, the discourses of ethics – we cannot actually escape this dimension of human existence. He situates Freudian psychoanalytic experience and insight in relation to the range of theories, practices, and problematics of ethics laboriously worked out in human history by subjects who were in the end struggling with some of the same difficulties we ourselves do in the present. None of these “ethics” turn out to be entirely sufficient, any more than does reconfiguration of Freudian analysis into a new form of ethics, but from each of them, there is something to learn, something to reflect upon, and perhaps something to incorporate in the ongoing project of situating ourselves in relation to our own others, our own desires and theirs, and our ethical commitments, decisions, and valuations.

Notes

3. Ibid., p. 71.
4. Ibid., p. 36.
5. Ibid., p. 2.
6. Ibid., p. 36.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 133.
9. Ibid., p. 207.
10. Ibid., p. 216.
11. Ibid., p. 206.
12. Ibid., p. 8.
15. Ibid., p. 205.
16. Ibid., p. 387.
17. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 251.
32. Ibid., p. 85.
38. Ibid., p. 5.
39. Ibid., p. 16.
40. Ibid., p. 20.
45. Ibid., p. 87.
47. Ibid., p. 23.
48. Ibid., p. 121.
49. Ibid., p. 22.
50. Ibid., p. 27.
51. Ibid., p. 221.
52. Ibid., p. 160.
53. Ibid., pp. 3–4.
54. Ibid., p. 34.
55. Ibid., p. 185.
56. Ibid., p. 184.
57. Ibid., p. 216.
60. Ibid., p. 314.
61. Ibid., p. 187.
62. Ibid.
66. Ibid., p. 194.
67. Ibid., p. 310.
70. Ibid., p. 79.
72. Ibid., p. 663.
74. Ibid., p. 83.
82. Ibid., p. 193.
83. Ibid., p. 7.
84. Ibid., p. 221.
89. Ibid., p. 225.
92. Ibid., p. 39.
95. Ibid., pp. 177–178.
104. Ibid., p. 76.
105. Ibid., p. 95.
106. Ibid., p. 96.
107. Ibid., p. 70.
108. Ibid., pp. 109–110.
109. Ibid., p. 314.