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## 6 Brain Drain, Health and Global Justice

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Politicians, pundits and policy papers often suggest restrictive immigration policies as a remedy to brain drain. Among the most serious concerns is that developed states recruit badly needed health-care workers from developing states. Though I share this concern, I want to defend a paradoxical claim: the emigration of skilled workers from the developing to the developed world (brain drain) should lead us to support a more open immigration policy. The focus on brain drain in isolation obscures how migration takes place in the context of international and state-level institutions, institutions which are in some respects fundamentally unjust.

This requires a shift in perspective: instead of engaging in policies that penalise migrants to keep them in their place of birth, we should instead focus on the structural and institutional factors that lead to their emigration. Brain drain is not primarily about the movement of people. Rather, vast inequalities and human misery are the root causes. Insofar as the current regime of border controls unjustly serves as a partial cause of these inequalities, people who uphold them violate a negative duty not to harm.

This chapter proceeds as follows: first, I argue against policies that restrict emigration or immigration. Second, I address the moral wrongness of recruitment. Actions that deliberately attract skilled health-care workers away from regions in which they are desperately needed often violate a *negative* duty not to undermine institutions that provide the human right to basic health care. Third, I suggest that any realistic long-term solution to brain drain requires that attention to negative duties be extended to international institutions.

### Brain drain and the restriction of emigration and immigration

The world's most vulnerable countries lose many of their most talented and qualified people to rich economies. The loss of skilled workers is particularly devastating for health care, since the migration of health-care workers triggers a depressing cycle: the lack of basic health care devastates the society and leads to fewer people being able to acquire the necessary skills to meet society's health needs. This weakens already fragile institutions and contributes to more flight of trained professionals.

In 2004, the US, the UK, Canada and Australia had between 220 (Canada) and 293 (the US) physicians per 100,000 people (Mullan, 2005). According to a recent report by Physicians for Human Rights, 38 out of the 47 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries did not meet the World Health Organization's (WHO) recommendation of a minimum of 20 doctors per 100,000 people (Physicians for Human Rights, 2004). Ghana had only 6 doctors per 100,000, losing 70 per cent of its doctors to the developed world.

If brain drain prevents people from receiving basic health care, how should governments act? Before restricting freedom of movement and occupation, we should first examine attempts to tackle the problem that do not resort to unjustified coercion and morally repugnant restrictions of freedom. Many people leave because of low income, limited career opportunities, under-funded, under-equipped medical facilities, incompetent and corrupt administrations, woeful social security and the lack of personal safety (Alkire and Chen, 2006; Dovlo, 2006).<sup>1</sup> Governments need to ameliorate these circumstances if they want to retain skilled workers. Similarly, we should encourage attempts to facilitate voluntary circular migration, deploy remittances towards development and partner with destination countries to invest in source countries' health-care institutions.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps we can justify making education subsidies contingent on a period of service after graduation. There is also the possibility of changes to the training of health professionals to better suit their environment and discourage migration. For instance, Nir Eyal and Samia Hurst put forward a proposal for developing countries to change their curriculum to teach local rather than international medical techniques, particularly those suited to rural areas with limited access to state of the art instruments (Eyal and Hurst, 2008).

What if these measures turn out to be insufficient to stem the flow of educated migrants? States with health-care shortages might carry

out a ready but problematic solution: they could close their borders so that skilled workers cannot leave. In other words, they could restrict emigration.

This strategy has limited appeal. Many jurists and bioethicists hold that there is an asymmetry between restrictions on immigration and emigration. For example, Sabine Alkire and Lincoln Chen write, 'We reject [...] coercive means of medical professional retention' (Alkire and Chen, 2006: 166). At the same time, they recommend imposing quotas on the number of health-care workers admitted to developed states and employing temporary work visas to bring about circular migration. This exemplifies the view that states are largely free to set their immigration policy in terms of perceived national interests, but human rights law does not permit them to prevent people from leaving. Article 13 (2) of *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* reads, 'Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.'<sup>3</sup> There is no corresponding right to immigrate.

Human rights treaties are in part the outcome of bargaining and compromise, so we should be careful about uncritically treating them as moral standards. Is this asymmetry justified? A common justification for the asymmetry between immigration and emigration involves freedom of association. People do not generally have a right to join an association without the consent of its members. But, under normal circumstances, associations cannot legitimately compel members to remain. Similarly, to immigrate is to join a political association and enjoy its benefits, as well as potentially impose burdens on current members. To emigrate is to exit an association.

Emigration provides a powerful tool for withdrawing consent from a regime one has come to accept as illegitimate.<sup>4</sup> It is a key means of realising rights basic to well-being such as freedom of movement and freedom of opportunity, as well as escaping persecution and oppression.<sup>5</sup> Articles 13, 14 (the right to asylum) and 15 (the right to nationality) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights respond to the Nazi persecution of Jews and other minorities (Morsink, 1999). We should keep in mind that most people are reluctant to leave their state under normal circumstances. Emigration is a traumatic experience for many people. When people choose to emigrate, it is usually because they are not well off (in the worst cases, they are fleeing persecution or civil war) or the prospects abroad are far better. Even when they do leave, they often intend to return.

Though restricting immigration may have the same effects as limiting emigration, international law is frequently understood to hold that

the right of sovereign states to control their borders outweighs any corresponding right of people who are not refugees to gain entry.<sup>6</sup> For our purposes, let us assume that states have a right to determine, within limits, who gets in. Even so, a state's right to control its borders does not entail that they can exclude immigrants for *any* reason. For example, most people have come to regard immigration policies based on racism as morally objectionable. Is the existence of harmful brain drain a legitimate reason for limiting immigration?

Imagine that a government concerned about international development and global welfare decides to structure the immigration system so that it is more difficult for skilled health-care workers to immigrate. In contrast to most current migration regimes that favour skilled workers, immigrants from states in which brain drain causes significant harm would have to prove that they *do not* have advanced degrees.

In developing this immigration policy the government would face questions about the range of just migration policies. We would expect that a just immigration policy should respect moral equality, basic rights and procedural norms of fairness. The government would need to justify differences in treatment. Liberal societies ought not to discriminate between members and non-members arbitrarily. What counts as 'arbitrary' is open to debate, but few today would accept policies that exclude people because, for example, of their race, ethnicity or gender.

Is the fact that somebody is a skilled professional from a state in which emigration would cause significant harm a morally valid reason for coercive exclusion? This policy is quite different from an immigration system that gives priority to those most in need. Skilled workers might very well be excluded by such a system as well, but the reason would be quite different. In the case of a need-based system, the justification would be that there are people who have a stronger claim to immigrate because their situation is more burdensome. If any restriction on immigration is justified, surely a system structured around need would be permissible. But if brain drain is the reason for exclusion, the claim is quite different: skilled workers are excluded because their services are more valuable in their country of origin.

Consider the parallel case in which a Toronto hospital refuses to hire a doctor on the grounds that she would accomplish more good if she worked in the sparsely populated Canadian territory of Nunavut. Would the doctor have cause to complain? The hospital justifies its actions by noting that any harm caused to the doctor (who may be well compensated if she relocates up North) pales in comparison to the misery caused by inadequate medical care. Is this an acceptable trade-off?

We should be wary of this policy. First, it ignores what Rawls calls the separateness of persons: it conflates individuals and dismisses their individual life plans or values. The policy ignores the fact that the doctor has her own legitimate plans for her life and is not to be treated as a tool for maximising the general good. In short, it runs roughshod over individual autonomy. Within developing states, migration from rural to urban areas is, if anything, more serious than migration across borders. But few people seem willing to suggest forcing doctors to remain in the countryside. If it is wrong to constrict a Torontonian doctor's opportunities so she can only work in Nunavut, it follows that a doctor from Botswana should not be excluded from working in Melbourne *because she's a doctor*.

Second, this sort of employment policy would violate the right to freedom of occupation. Employers have a responsibility to evaluate potential employees based on merit with regard to what the job requires. There may also be reason to give some weight to need or historical injustice (for example, by favouring employees who suffer or have suffered from systematic discrimination). However, the possibility that someone might do more good in another occupation is in most cases a poor reason for denying people jobs. It denies the right to freely pursue one's economic, social and personal development.

Usually, states have no right to obligate skilled workers to dedicate themselves to the common national good that *all* citizens do not share. It is unclear what special duties skilled workers have vis-à-vis their communities. It is surely a good thing if they dedicate themselves to public service, but it seems wrong to hold that we can compel them to do so. This does not rule out the possibility of special cases under which specific people have duties to their communities that others do not share. Generally, this would only occur under exceptional circumstances that are of limited duration. For instance, it might be justifiable to draft doctors into public service during an epidemic, if they proved unwilling to help out. But if these duties become more widespread, we risk a tyranny in which the skilled are coerced into serving the rest.

Beyond their noxious effects on human freedom, policies that try to force workers to remain in a limited territory are usually inefficient. Employers cannot guarantee that employees will be awarded the position in which they would do the most good. The economy is too complex to permit this ham-fisted attempt at planning. Shortages would occur in other regions as well-meaning bureaucrats' decisions lag behind human need. In the Canadian example, some doctors would elect not to work in medicine at all rather than endure Nunavut's winters, leading to

'brain waste'. Bright students would reconsider a career in medicine, electing for less arduous degrees with more options. Indeed, concerns of rights violations do not exhaust the issue: the consequence of singling out skilled workers for potentially onerous special duties could lead to an overall reduction of human capital.

There is a parallel with the case of health-care workers in the developing world. The interaction between migration and skill acquisition is complex. The possibility of migration to the developed world may create incentives for more people to seek higher education. If some of those people decide not to migrate or return after working abroad, it might turn out that there are actually more health-care workers than there would otherwise be. Furthermore, it is not clear that there is always the infrastructure that would allow workers to perform their jobs. Doctors may not have access to antibiotics, or even sterile water. Or the government may not pay their salaries, forcing them to turn to other ways of making a living. To focus on restricting immigration in isolation from larger national and international institutions is a mistake.

### **Brain drain and recruitment**

So far I have addressed the policies that restrict movement. In source states, this would involve emigration restrictions which I have argued are morally problematic. Destination countries could restrict immigration. I have suggested that to target people because they are health-care workers unjustifiably infringes on their autonomy and freedom of occupation. It may also have the unforeseen result of reducing the opportunities of skilled workers and failing to improve the circumstances of any one else.

It is naïve, though, to think that international migration is merely a matter of workers freely choosing to seek work abroad within the context of immigration law. Rather, there are powerful agents that encourage migration. Activists and policy experts rail against the active recruitment of health-care workers from vulnerable regions. Consider the UK's *Code of Practice for the International Recruitment of Healthcare Professionals* (Department of Health, 2004). According to the code's third guiding principle:

Developing countries will not be targeted for recruitment, unless there is an explicit government-to-government agreement with the UK to support recruitment activities.

- Skilled and experienced healthcare professionals are a valuable resource to any country. Active international recruitment must be undertaken in a way that seeks to prevent a drain on valuable human resources from developing countries.

- The Department of Health and the Department for International Development have identified developing countries that should not be targeted for international recruitment under any circumstances.
- Individual healthcare professionals from developing countries, who volunteer themselves by individual, personal application, may be considered for employment.

The code intimates that international recruitment is morally wrong unless there is an agreement with the country's government. Furthermore, active recruitment from a list of vulnerable developing communities is forbidden. Though recruitment is problematic, the code allows for hiring individual health-care professionals who seek employment in the UK on their own initiative. Relatively little, however, is said about what grounds these judgements. The effect of hiring someone who comes on her own accord is likely to be the same as hiring a recruited worker.

Though the wrongness of recruitment may seem obvious to some, it is surprisingly difficult to pinpoint why this is so. In less dire circumstances, recruitment is normally a mutually beneficial practice. Active recruiting provides information to the potential employee, such as the job description, working conditions, salary and benefits. It also presents employees with the opportunity to accept the position if they so choose. Assuming that the information recruiters present is true and accurate and their audience freely chooses to act on this information, it is difficult to identify what is morally problematic.

To take a potentially perturbing example related to the public good, a powerful legal firm might 'poach' talented young lawyers from the public sector after the latter has invested resources in hiring and training them. Some people may find this example morally dubious, but most would balk at laws that prevent private firms from seeking out and enticing talented public employees. Also, many sources divulge information about opportunities, including personal contacts in companies and organisations. For example, many jobs are filled with the help of friends and acquaintances, who connect companies and qualified people. If we accept this as morally innocuous, why should we worry about the actions of a recruiter, who provides the same information? Granted, recruiters may be more aggressive and in a better position to negotiate with potential employees but it is unclear why this is morally wrong.

Under normal circumstances recruitment is morally innocuous, but when access to primary health care is endangered the situation is different. Active recruitment policies sometimes interfere with states' ability to guarantee basic positive rights owed to their constituents.<sup>7</sup> States have an obligation to guarantee that the rights of people within their territory are protected. Agents who intentionally act to prevent people from living in an environment where their human rights are honoured thus violate a *negative duty* not to cause harm. This is quite different from failing to prevent someone from entering your country to seek work. If there were a duty to do so, it would be a positive duty to take action to prevent harm. Instead, people die *because* states draw away physicians and nurses who could have saved their lives. It is analogous to a crapulous tycoon who buys up all the food in a region threatened by starvation. Normally, the tycoon is free to indulge her/his gluttony, but under these circumstances her/his actions cause people to starve.

Any rights-based account of morality must show how rights can account for differing circumstances. An example is illustrative. Canada had a net annual loss of over 500 Canadian trained doctors to the US. The moral wrongness of the American recruiters' action, however, is slight.<sup>8</sup> After all, the Canadian government has the resources to adopt policies to retain more doctors if it wished. For example, it could raise doctors' wages so that they are commensurable with American salaries or it could address many of the concerns of doctors working in the public system, creating better working conditions. The precise measures necessary to make Canadian doctors stay is an empirical issue but there is no reason to think they could not be determined and addressed. Most importantly, Canada remains capable of providing a basic level of health care to its citizens.

The case of government policies actively encouraging doctors from SSA to migrate is much more problematic. Developed states that recruit have far more resources at their disposal, so the power asymmetry is great. It is doubtful if the Ghanaian government could do much to compete with the US, for example. As well, despite health-care shortages in the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand or the European Union (EU), they cannot be compared to the devastation caused by the lack of doctors in SSA or the Caribbean. Thus, recruitment, in some contexts, involves powerful agents intentionally preventing people from accessing their right to health care.

### Brain drain in context

So far I have argued that states of immigration should not use brain drain as a reason to restrict immigration. When states allow skilled workers to

immigrate they do not violate any rights. States normally do not have a claim over where workers choose to deploy their talents due to freedom of opportunity and the importance of individual autonomy. However, under some circumstances, recruitment is wrong because people have a right to institutions that guarantee basic health care: actions that knowingly undermine these institutions *harm* people and thus violate a negative duty to not unjustly prevent people from exercising their rights.

The attention to negative duties draws inspiration from Thomas Pogge's work on global justice. Pogge is well known for his claim that we have a negative duty not to uphold unjust institutional structures, particularly at the international level, which systematically violate negative rights (Pogge, 2002; cf. Risse, 2005). For example, the institution of state sovereignty as it is presently understood allows abusive governments to borrow money internationally and sell natural resources in the global market. This provides an incentive for dictators to seize control of oil-rich territories (the resource curse), benefiting tyrants and foreign consumers at the expense of the domestic population (Pogge, 2005; cf. Wenar, 2008). Brain drain is a symptom as well as a cause of misery in a world in which hundreds of millions of people lack access to the minimal level of care necessary for a decent life (World Bank/The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2008).<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, this squalor is not solely due to bad luck, barren geography or corrupt governments but, in part, exists because many of the major institutions benefit the developed world *at the expense of the global poor*.

A global focus helps put matters in perspective. States should refrain from actively recruiting health-care workers when it contributes to the inability of states to provide basic care. However, the attention to recruitment is often misplaced and sometimes misguided. Though the short-term effects of brain drain are tragic, countries need to build sustainable institutions that will lead to long-term improvements. In some cases, recruitment may create conditions for generating remittances, return migration, medical tourism and inter-country cooperation (Macaranas and Stewart, 2007).<sup>10</sup> Push-pull factors that drive migration play a more important role than recruitment in migration flows – if people did not stand to benefit, they would not migrate.

The limitations of approaches that try to curb migration should lead us to locate brain drain in the broader context of global justice. Governments spend billions of dollars on border controls that restrict immigration. But as long as there are vast disparities in wealth and opportunity between regions, people will continue to move. As mentioned above, root causes of brain drain include the lack of health-care institutions,

corruption and insecurity in developing states as well as poverty. Insofar as these do not develop in isolation but in the context of global markets structured by economic institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and major political actors such as the Group of 8 (G8), there is a moral obligation to reform these institutions so that they do not prevent states from meeting their citizens' human rights.

It is too easy to treat these institutions as part of a natural order. In many cases, they are created to favour the interests of the powerful over the basic needs of the world's poor. This is not inevitable but a product of apathy and wilful ignorance on the part of many residents in the developed world. Their indifference ignores the fact that people lucky enough to live in democracies that protect their rights have a *causal* role in upholding the international order. Just as governments are accountable to their citizens, citizens are responsible when they fail to prevent their governments from causing harm.

Admittedly, the average citizen has only a minor role, but in aggregate people have the power to change policy. Unfortunately, most people rarely vote with an eye to global justice, instead focusing solely on domestic well-being. We see this time and again in elections that speak entirely to local concerns and interest groups. This indifference is perhaps the largest obstacle to global justice. When people have a causal role in supporting an institutional structure that leaves hundreds of millions of people destitute, they are shirking their moral obligations.

Brain drain is not primarily about the movement of people but rather concerns distributive justice. Prosperity, equitable distribution of wealth and democracy are among the best indicators of whether a population receives adequate health care. The nature and requirements of global distributive justice take us beyond the goals of this chapter. Instead, let us focus on a major element of state sovereignty: the right to control borders unilaterally and admit or reject immigration applicants more or less at will. Border controls are an obstacle to more widespread equality. The rich and poor are not only separated by borders – sometimes they are rich or poor *in virtue* of the current regime of borders. Many economists have argued that increased liberalisation of movement would lead to economic gain by increasing efficiency: the movement of workers from lower to higher wage countries allocates labour resources to where they produce the most value (Hamilton and Whalley, 1984).

Estimates vary, but Jonathon W. Moses and Bjorn Letnes develop a model which suggests that free mobility could lead to an efficiency gain

of US\$3.4 trillion, whereas Ana Maria Iregui places the efficiency gains at more than 50 per cent of the world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Moses and Letnes, 2005; Iregui, 2005). Of course, methodological questions need to be addressed and we should be cautious about accepting their figures, but the conclusion that increased migration would create a significant gain in efficiency is widely accepted (Martin, 2005). Efficiency tells us little about the distribution, but if wealth is increased through South-to-North migration, it will benefit at least some of the world's poorer people, especially those who currently lack the skills to migrate legally.

At present, most countries use class-based discrimination to determine immigration admissions (class here is understood in terms of income, education and/or profession). Migration is split between those who travel on the intercontinental airstreams with visas and checked luggage and those who set out on wobbly boats or on foot with a few belongings stuffed into a bag. The people who pass through customs flashing a passport and those who slip across borders at night are divided not by merit or by the needs of the host society but by the fact that privileged members of the world's population have structured the rules in their favour. If a politician tries to mobilise her/his constituents by railing against business and technological migrants, companies dispatch their lobbyists and file lawsuits. Senior colleagues will take her/him aside for admonishment and an economics primer. But the asylum seekers or undocumented workers who clean the offices and babysit the children of the country's managers and engineers are fair game. The world is like a country club: members, privileged by birthright, hand their car keys to the valet and stroll past the *maître d'*, while the staff sneaks around security through the back door.

If people who do not possess advanced degrees and specialised skills could escape from desperate conditions in search of work, pressure on rickety health-care systems might be eased. Admittedly, the poorest people in developing states may still not have the means to leave. But we should not overestimate these obstacles or underestimate the resourcefulness of the world's poor. Already there is a great deal of migration between countries in SSA concentrated in South Africa. Despite the violent means used to guard 'Fortress Europe' and the US-Mexico border, people do leave. They risk their lives in the desert in Arizona or on the Mediterranean, often hiring smugglers. Furthermore, the immigration of a few people leads to chain migration. Once a few people from a town or family have set up home, they can send back remittances that enable others to come.

A more liberal migration regime could lead not only to greater efficiency but also greater equality. In theory, wages would rise under open borders in the country of emigration and fall in the country of immigration, eventually reaching an equilibrium at which immigration would halt. Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson in their economic history of the mass migrations from Europe to the New World between 1850 and 1914, conclude:

European emigration had a significant impact on labour markets at home: the departure of the movers improved economic conditions of the stayers faster than would have been true without emigration – raising real wages, lowering unemployment and eroding poverty. By glutting labour markets abroad, the mass migrations must also have reduced the pace of real wage growth in immigrating countries. Thus, mass migration must have tended to create economic convergence among the participating countries.

(Hatton and Williamson, 1998: 206; cf. Hatton and Williamson, 2005)

The theoretical and empirical issues surrounding the costs and benefits of migration are fiendishly complex. Models make unrealistic or simplistic assumptions, sometimes positing rational agents who act in perfectly efficient markets without externalities. Of course, in the real world, migrants have non-economic motivations and they are frequently irrational or misled by mistaken information. This simply draws attention to the fact that the moral and empirical issues surrounding migration are complicated and that the impacts on each region and group may differ. Similarly, more needs to be said to determine whether the economics of more open borders today would necessarily resemble the past. Still, while the role of border controls varies from region to region, considerable evidence suggests that border controls often partially cause or amplify inequality.

The shift from examining the brain drain in isolation to considering it part of a global migration system bound to international economic institutions provides a surprising possibility: a significant opening of borders in a just international economic regime would very well do more to alleviate the negative effects of brain drain than measures that aim to prevent emigration. Beyond the effects on inequality, opening borders would lead to investment opportunity from abroad, and the convergence of wages in economic regions, which would lower emigration levels over the long run. The ability to immigrate legally could also encourage circular migration and its potential benefits.

It is well and good to focus on broader issues of distributive justice and work towards global institutions that allow people across the globe to flourish. Nobody seriously believes that restricting immigration will solve chronic health-care shortages around the globe. Without structural and economic development, absolute poverty will continue to ravage much of the world. Still, will focusing on brain drain not do some good in some cases, especially in the short term?

In some situations it may, particularly if states focus on improving working conditions and salaries as well as negotiate mutually beneficial compensation schemes that are filtered back into educational programmes in developing countries. Still, this resembles trying to mend cracks in a levee as water pours over the top. Developing states will continue to lose their best and brightest until the world becomes a more equitable place. It is an error to focus on brain drain with little consideration of its underlying causes. Brain drain – and migration in general – is one aspect of the globalisation which takes place in a world in which nation states are separated by massive inequalities and human rights violations. The problem is not that people seek work abroad when they are needed more at home. Rather, it is the severe problems in many states that make it entirely reasonable to seek opportunity abroad. In a global legal and economic institutional structure that systematically favours developed states, the problem of brain drain may very well lead us to advocate more open borders and an agenda of international institutional change.

## Notes

1. Dovol quotes many nurses and physicians' concerns and frustrations.
2. The Physicians for Human Rights report cited above reviews many strategies for addressing brain drain.
3. For a sample of similar statements, see Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 22 of the American Convention on Human Rights; Article 12 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; Article 20, Arab Charter of Human Rights; Article 26, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; Articles 2 and 3, Fourth Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
4. For example, among the 400,000 or so Americans who emigrated to Canada between 1968 and 1978, many were skilled workers politically opposed to the Vietnam war.
5. Not surprisingly, countries that currently restrict emigration include North Korea, China, Burma and Cuba.
6. I leave aside the debate on open borders.
7. The following argument only applies when recruitment actually causes harm. This is more difficult to establish than one might think. For example,

Michael A. Clemens (Clemens, 2007) presents evidence that chronic health shortages in Africa are largely unaffected by the migration of doctors.

8. This assumes that the doctors were recruited. Many of them probably applied for positions they knew were available.
9. For example, according to the World Bank, around 1 billion people live in extreme poverty, over 10 million children under the age of five die from disease each year and 1 million people die from malaria.
10. For example, Federico Macaranas in his 11 July 2007 Carnegie Council lecture discusses the health-care shortages in the Philippines but acknowledges that migration is a global issue and global health a responsibility that must be addressed internationally.

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# The International Migration of Health Workers


Ethics, Rights and Justice

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*for Joe*

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