

PHENOMENAL REALISM AND SUBJECTIVE-OBJECTIVE DICHOTOMY

REALISMO FENOMENAL Y DICOTOMÍA SUBJETIVO-OBJETIVO

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ABSTRACT

The resolution of subjective-objective dichotomy is not lies in reduction rather grounded on the synthesis of phenomenal aspect and intentional-representational aspect of experience. We have to acknowledge the limits of both physical and mental objectivity and gradually transcend and expand the scope of physical as well as mental objectivity through neutral perspective. The Nagelian version of phenomenal realism has indicated for resolving the subjective-objective dichotomy by observing the interaction of subjective point of view and objective point of view about the reality from neutral perspective.

Keywords: subjective and objective dichotomy. phenomenal realism. dual aspect theory. physical objectivity. mental objectivity and phenomenality.

RESUMEN

La resolución de la dicotomía subjetivo-objetivo no radica en la reducción sino en la síntesis del aspecto fenoménico y el aspecto intencional-representacional de la experiencia. Tenemos que reconocer los límites de la objetividad física y mental y trascender y expandir gradualmente el alcance de la objetividad física y mental a través de una perspectiva neutral. La versión nageliana del realismo fenoménico se ha indicado para resolver la dicotomía subjetivo-objetivo al observar la interacción del punto de vista subjetivo y el punto de vista objetivo sobre la realidad desde una perspectiva neutral.

Palabras clave: dicotomía subjetiva y objetiva. realismo fenomenal. teoría del doble aspecto. objetividad física. objetividad mental y fenomenalidad.

RESUMO

A resolução da dicotomia subjetivo-objetivo não está na redução, mas na síntese do aspecto fenomênico e do aspecto intencional-representacional da experiência. Temos que reconhecer os limites da objetividade física e mental e gradualmente transcender e expandir o escopo da objetividade física e mental através da perspectiva neutra. A versão nageliana do realismo fenomênico indicou resolver a dicotomia subjetivo-objetivo observando a interação do ponto de vista subjetivo e do ponto de vista objetivo sobre a realidade a partir de uma perspectiva neutra.

Palavras-chave: dicotomia subjetiva e objetiva. realismo fenomênico. teoria do duplo aspecto. objetividade física. objetividade mental e fenomenalidade.

Background

In this paper, we are going to discuss the issue of solipsism, the resolution of the subjective-objective dichotomy, phenomenal realist's perspectives on the limits of physical and mental objectivity, and the plausibility of dual aspect theory. The demand of normative condition for knowledge about other minds through reductionism is implausible. We are going to deal with two categories of objection against the reduction of inner qualitative features of experience to physical objectivity. These are a) Appeal to mental objectivity (i.e., Phenomenal realism proposed by Nagel, Chalmers, and Putnam) b) Appeal to common sense (i.e., Moorian phenomenal realism).

On the one hand, the appeal to mental objectivity approach even though provides the objective normative conditions for knowledge about other minds, however, is unable to defend the proposed objective normative conditions against scepticism due to acknowledging the limits of mental objectivity. On the other hand, Moorian phenomenal realism even though protect against the sceptical threat through the common sensical normative condition for knowledge about other minds and through appeal to pragmatic contradiction, however, it is neither leave any space for expanding the limits of mental objectivity nor physical objectivity. I have argued that the appeal to Moorian transparency thesis by the external reductive representationalist for reduction of inner qualitative aspect of experience to physical objectivity is implausible. Because Moorian phenomenal realism advocated for one kind of epistemic foundationalism through common sense which leave no place for reduction of inner aspect of reality to physical objectivity. The demand of objective normative condition for knowledge about other minds excluding common sense will always leads to pragmatic contraction. The Moorian phenomenal realism even though succeed in reducing the threat of sceptical attack, however, unable to provide any roadmap for expanding the limits of physical and mental objectivity. I have concluded that phenomenal realism through its account of phenomenal transparency thesis provide a neutral standpoint for expanding the scope of physical as well as mental objectivity, at the same time acknowledge the irreplaceable epistemic role of phenomenality and intentionality.

The present paper focuses on the debate regarding plausibility of the phenomenal realist's attempt for the synthesis between phenomenal subjectivity and phenomenal objectivity which aims to resolve the harder problem (solipsism) and the hard problem-scepticism about phenomenality of experience. In this paper, our objective will be critically analyses the phenomenal realist's position on non-reduction of phenomenality of experience through the defense of perspectival ontology and resolving *subjective-objective dichotomy* issue without any appeal to solipsism. Solipsism is the view that the conscious agent can only have access to their own mind and can't be aware of the existence of other minds. The subject can have direct and immediate access of their own mind.

Phenomenal realism¹ is the view that:

- a) The inner phenomenal qualitative properties of experience are real experiential properties.
- b) The intentional properties of experience and phenomenal properties of experience have different irreplaceable epistemic role.
- c) The phenomenal qualitative properties are private and immediate accessible properties.

In this paper we are going to focus on three phenomenal realists those who advocate for compatibility of subjectivity and objectivity in relation to phenomenal consciousness. Those are:

1. Thomas Nagel- The View from No Where

¹ This particular paper deals with two kinds of phenomenal realism, namely, phenomenal realism based on acknowledging the limits of mental objectivity advocated by Searle, Nagel, Putnam, and Chalmers. and based on common sense as a tool against reductionism advocated by Moore.

2. Hilary Putnam- Objectivity without Object
3. David Chalmers- Dual Aspect Theory

Thomas Nagel on Dichotomy of Phenomenal Subjectivity and Mental Objectivity

The *subjective-objective dichotomy* has been an unresolvable issue in the history of philosophy. Thomas Nagel advocated that rationality can be treated as a tool for resolving this age-old problem. Because rationality not only provide the ground for objectivity of truth, rather it also acknowledges the peculiar characteristics of phenomenal subjectivity (Nagel; 1986). It's the tool for reconciliation of subjectivity and objectivity of phenomenal experience without any appeal to dogmatism, scepticism and solipsism. Rationality can justify the epistemic perspectivism as it is common and innate (or potentially exist) in every human beings, at the same time it plays the role of *universal authority* according to Nagel. The synthesis between *idiosyncratical aspect* and *universality aspect* became possible due to rationality. Reason as a tool not only eradicate biasness about perspectivism it also provides a peculiar kind of *universal authority* and enable us to universalizing the phenomenal concepts.

For Nagel, phenomenal qualitative properties of experience are the properties of subject's experience rather than properties of the external world. The phenomenal consciousness of the subject can takes place by accessing the objective reality subjectively without the necessity of introspective accessibility. In case of perception, the objective world is being perceived by the subject from their *own point of view*- the way they have access the object. The subject can never exclude their *own point of view* even if s/he attempt to ignore while undergone an experience. The subjective perspectival aspect of experience is inescapable for the subject as long as the subject cease to have experience.

Nagel has acknowledged the fact that objectification of mental reality is necessary for addressing the harder problem. For objectification of the mental aspect of reality, the subject need to have:

1. The ability to acknowledge and understand human perspectives.
2. Ability of universal concept formation about the phenomenal experience.
3. Ability to view one's own experiences from outside as events of the world².

Nagel (1986) has affirmed that the ability of phenomenal concept formation is innate in every human mind. He construed that:

The pretheoretical concept of mind involves a kind of objectivity which permits us to go some way beyond our own experiences.

Even though the phenomenal concept formation is aligned with the phenomenal subjectivity, however, that does not restrict us from speculating phenomenal conception of objectivity. The phenomenal concepts derived from first person experiences by the subject is not limited within the mental concept ascriptions to their own private experience, rather the same phenomenal concepts can be ascribed to other's mental states as well, in case they share similar phenomenal states. One can apply those mental concepts from within as well as outside of phenomenal subjectivity. Hence, the phenomenal concepts gained through first person perspective also accommodate in ascribing and generalizing the phenomenal concepts of others which is derived from third person perspective.

The ascription of phenomenal concept is not limited within one species. Some of the phenomenal concepts can also be ascribed to other species (i.e., animals) despite of having different physiological structure and behavior. Even though, the investigation of phenomenal qualitative character of experience from outside of the domain of phenomenal subjectivity- from third person perspective, can enable us in having only partial understanding about phenomenality of experience, however, at least it provides a

² See, Nagel (1986, chapter 2) for elaborated discussion. The externalists like Dretske (1995) and Harman (1990) agree with Nagel on this point that the subject need to see their experiences from outside of their phenomenal perspectivity, however, disagree on the point that the process of objectification of mental aspect of reality does not solely supervene on the faculty of external representation.

general idea about the phenomenality of experience of the subject as well as others. The general understanding of phenomenal qualitative experience will help us in setting the objective normative conditions for phenomenality of experience.

Nagel has accepted that there is a limit to the normative conditions of phenomenality of experience in incorporating all the aspect of phenomenality. He has acknowledged the incompleteness of the phenomenal objectivity- the view that the objective normative conditions will leave some perspectival aspect of phenomenality in his paper “*what is it like to be a bat*”. That is the reason why Nagel has advised to refrain from the attitude of scientism-every aspect of reality can be explained through science. He argued that, for epistemic objectivity, there is no need to rely on physical objectivity (i.e., physical reductive objectivism) for expanding the level of objective understanding about experience.

Nagel (1986; ch.2) argued that:

Objectivity of whatever kind is not the test of reality. It is just one way of understanding reality.... Still even if objective understanding can be partial, it is worth trying to extend it, for a simple reason. The pursuit of an objective understanding of reality is the only way to expand our knowledge of what there is beyond the way it appears to us. Even if we have to acknowledge the reality of some things that we can't grasp objectively, as well as the ineliminable subjectivity of some aspects of our own experience which we can grasp only subjectively, the pursuit of an objective concept of mind is simply part of general pursuit of understanding. To give it up because it cannot be complete would be like giving up axiomatization in mathematics because it cannot be complete.

Nagelian version of phenomenal realism advocates for one kind of epistemic objectivity that acknowledge the epistemic role of phenomenal subjective aspect of experience unlike representationalist³. Even though Nagel and reductive representationalist are on the same page in acknowledging the demand of objectivity for resolving solipsism, however, they differ in addressing the *incompleteness of objectivity*. Reductive representationalist argued for achieving the objectivity through ontological reduction of phenomenal experience. For instances, Dretsikian representationalism argued for ontological-reductive objectivism which Nagel try to avoid in his work. Nagel argued that for objective understanding about phenomenal experience, the ontological reduction through objectification of each and every phenomenal information is neither possible nor required. However, one may have minimal objectivity in case of the qualities of phenomenal experience. There is the need of mental objectivity which includes the conception about experiential property completely detached from physical objectivity.

The subjective point of view that is really exist in this world accommodate the conception of physical objectivity. ⁴ Nagel (1986; p. 15) construes:

Faced with these facts, one might think that the only conceivable conclusion would be that there is more to reality than what can be accommodated by physical conception of objectivity. But remarkably enough this has not been obvious to everyone. The physical has been so irresistibly attractive, and has so dominated ideas of what there is, that attempts have been made to beat everyone into its shape and deny the reality of anything that can't be reduced. As a result, the philosophy of mind is populated with extremely implausible position.

Nagel (1986; pp. 23-24) construes:

In each case there is rich evidence of conscious inner life, but only limited application of our own mental concepts-mostly general ones- to describe it... We are forced, I think, to conclude that all these creatures have specific experiences which can't be represented by any mental concepts of which we could have first-person understanding. This doesn't mean that we can't think about them in that general way, or perhaps in more detail but without first-person understanding We can use the general concepts of experience and mind to speculate about forms of conscious life whose external signs we can't confidently identify..... The aim of reaching a conception of the world which does not put us at the center in any way requires the formation of such concepts. We are supported in this aim by a kind of intellectual optimism: the belief that

³ See, Sahu (2022) for detailed analysis.

⁴ Nagel's (1974) famous article “What is it like to be a bat” defends the irreducibility of phenomenal qualitative character of experience.

we possess an open-ended capacity for understanding that which we have not yet conceived, and that it can be called into operation by detaching from our present understanding and trying to reach a higher-order view which explain it as part of the world.

The objective phenomenology can only assist us in maximal understanding about phenomenal subjective qualitative features of experience. Everything can't be grasped through objectivity. Nagel has suggested to accept the *incompleteness of objectivity*, because objectivity is just one way of understanding reality. The reality can't be entirely encompassed by thought. The world isn't our world, although it is our subjectively engaged perspectives. At the same time, the world is not entirely objective, because objective reality involves an acknowledgement of its own incompleteness. However, that does not mean the quest for objectivity is entirely redundant. Because objectivity is the best tool for expanding our knowledge from the initial understanding about the world as it appears to us.

The phenomenal concept of a particular human beings, as s/he is an instances of human species, can have maximum similar (even though not identical) phenomenal qualitative features of experience of the human species-phenomenality of experience, in case they share the similar phenomenal information of the particular mental states. A human beings may have similar point of view with fellow human beings, because of sharing same modality of experience and identical phenomenal information. However, it is not possible for human beings to grasp the phenomenality of different species, because they share different phenomenality of experience. For instances, I can neither know nor imagine the point of view of a bat for the simple reason that the phenomenality of human species is not similar with the phenomenality of experience of the bat species. Here the question may arise that as a fellow member of human species, if I can take your point of view, however, can't take the point of view of a bat, then what is the objective condition that help me in understanding your point of view only, but failed in case of bat? What is the normative condition for knowing other minds? There has been multiple attempt to address the above question in the context of responding to the problem of solipsism, however, none of them able to provide satisfactory answer. These are:

Argument from Analogy

Only the subject can have immediate and direct access to their own phenomenal qualitative features of experience⁵. The justification for one's own inner qualitative aspect of experience is grounded on non-inferential reason. However, in case of other's phenomenal qualitative features of experience, one has to be depended on inferential justification due to the inaccessibility of other's inner qualitative aspect of experience. The proponent of reductive thesis, for instances, behaviorism, identity theory, reductive naturalism and eliminativism relied upon the deductive inference for resolving the problem of other minds. For instances, the deduction of phenomenal information from the subject's pattern of behavior and prediction of their mental states come under the preview of deductive inferential justification.⁶

The argument from analogy is relied upon inductive inference. The correlation between mental states and pattern of behavior can be discovered from one's own experience and latter can be generalized through observation. From my own first-person perspective, I can know that I am directly acquainted with my mental states as a state of inner qualitative private experiential states, however, in case of other's, I can partially know about their mental states- the fact that what kind of behavior they exhibit in their ambient environment in a given particular situation. However, by analogy, I can predict the mental states of others from the phenomenal information of my own experience for awareness about other's experience. For instances, from my own experience, I can inductively conclude that dog-bitten experience is accompanied by a private inner sadness in your as well as my case. As the first proponent of analogy argument John Stuart Mill (1889; p. 243) illustrates:

⁵ See, Sahu (2023) for detailed analysis.

⁶ I have illustrated the failure of deductive ground of justification. See, Sahu (2023) for comprehensive analysis.

I conclude that other human beings have feelings like me, because, first, they have bodies like me, which I know in my own case, to be the antecedent condition of feelings; and because, secondly, they exhibit the acts and other outward signs, which in my own case I know by experience to be caused by feelings.

The way I interact with my ambient environment in a given situation, people also interact with their own ambient environment with the similar given situation in a similar way. For instances, our behavior while chased and attacked by radicalized zombie will be similar in the particular situation if we share the same phenomenology. By analogy, from my own experience, I can observe that you will exhibit similar kind of behavior while a group of radicalized parasite zombies has been started chasing and attacking you. Even though, I can't have access to your private mental states, however, through the help of inductive inferential justification, I can derive the particular phenomenal information of pain associated with zombie attack from my own phenomenal information of pain.

The argument of analogy is not entirely uncontroversial at all. There are several ground of attack to the argument of analogy.

Firstly, inductive inference cannot accumulate every instances of experience. The generalization from few instances of experience is misleading and will commit the fallacy of generalization. In case of inductive inferential justification, one single counter fact is enough to disprove the entire hypothesis. The exhibited outward public behavior can't be accompanied with one kind of mental states, for instances, a doppelganger even though exhibits identical behavior, however, his inner mental states can be different from the subject. Therefore, it establishes the fact that there is no logical connection between mental states and behavioral states and the argument from analogy is misleading.

Secondly, the application of mental concepts such as pain derived from a particular events can't be publicly applicable due to inaccessibility of other's mental life. There is neither any mechanism nor any normative condition which will guide us in the accurate application of mental concepts derived from private inner experience in similar instances of other's experience. One can still raise the question that how do we know how to use the particular mental concepts objectively?

Wittgenstein (1974) in his *Philosophical Investigation* provided a critical response to the argument from analogy. He contends that the justificatory condition for knowledge about other's inner mental life does not render on any kind of inferential ground of justification rather deeply rooted on the non-inferential ground of justification through intersubjective communication of language. Wittgenstein alleged the cartesian foundationalism as the source and primary motivation for the problem of other minds. Descartes argument for mind as the privileged and private inner states of experience does not leave any room for objective knowability of other minds. The normative condition of knowledge about other minds is grounded on objective criteria which determine the usage and appropriate application of the particular *psychological concepts*. From the observation of behavior, body language, the way s/he speak, and utterance, we can know about the mental states of a person. For Wittgenstein, the acknowledgement of private mental states does not mean there cannot be objective account of phenomenal knowledge. He argued that the usage of language is itself established the fact that there is no private language which only represents private mental states. The statement that 'only the subject can know its own mental states' is used through objective *form of life* in a particular social context. The language as a natural system for intersubjective communication is governed by the practice of *language game*. Therefore, linguistic representation is efficient enough for resolving the problem of other minds.⁷

The linguistic representation can be used for minimal understanding about mental states; however, it can't establish indubitable certainty. The utterances and statements of two subjects even though may provide minimal accuracy of understanding during intersubjective communication, however, there is no guaranty that two individual's linguistic representation will provide accurate and exact representation of thought. For instances, two individuals' utterances or statements of a table even though linguistically represent the object table, its common characteristics, however, their thought of a table may be different.

⁷ There are objections to linguistic representation and mental representation in the literature, however, we will skip that part and focus on the objective normative condition for knowledge of other minds.

While the subject X utter the word table, s/he is referring to a particular table to which s/he has already come across in his house, whereas when the subject Y utter the word table, s/he is referring to her/his own perception of the table to which s/he has come across in her/his room. Here the mental content and object of the two individuals are different even though their content of linguistic representation remained same.

The argument from analogy has the problem of providing objective normative conditions for knowledge about other minds because there is a limitation to our mental representation of thought and linguistic representation of ascribing the phenomenal concepts on others. The mental objectivity cannot incorporate the reality as it. The objective normative condition is grounded on the expansion ability of the limits of thought and language. The acknowledgement of limits of mental objectivity does not mean that we cannot transcend and extend the limits of thought and language. In fact, we are in progress of expanding the boundary of thought and language through discovering new phenomenal concepts and ascription of those phenomenal concepts through new formation of words in language⁸. We are constantly transcending, expanding and setting the limits of linguistic representation and mental representation in the evolutionary process.

The ability to transcend and expand the limits is inherently inbuilt within us. This inherent representational functions of transcending, setting new limits and expanding perspective through dialectical process are a-priorily given to us as a particular representational organism in the dynamics of evolution. If we look at the evolution of human history, then we can find out that we have been performing these inherited representational functions by constantly setting up new limits to our thought and language and gradually expanding them by acknowledging the limits of mental objectivity. Once we deny to acknowledging the incompleteness of mental objectivity and abstained from application of these inherent representational function, we will cease to progress further. Therefore, acknowledgement of the first-person perspectives and including them in the evolutionary process of transcendental dialectics of mental objectivity, instead of excluding them as most of the natural reductive representationalist has proposed, is the demand of the normative condition of mental objectivity. Imagine what could have happened if the perspective of language (i.e., formation of words and their application) in biggining of human civilization has been excluded. The origin of language is itself grounded on first person perspective. No linguistic or mental concept can take place without first person perspective of an organism. The invention of new words, mental concept, and their application, ascription of the new words to a particular mental states must have been originated from one individual subjective experience and later the ascription of word to a mental concept. The particular ascription of word to a mental concept must have been used objectively through intersubjective ascriptions.

Resolution Through Empathetic Identification

There is another ground of objective normative condition for establishing the possibility of knowledge about other minds, popularly known as empathetic identification, developed with the help of several ground of justifications. The empathetic identification⁹ is the view that I can empathetically take your first-person point of view or try to understand your inner world through conceivability, imagination or with the faculty of reason.

⁸ Wittgenstein (1974) in *Philosophical Investigation* has also suggested for observing the use of language in a particular form of life for discovering its meaning. In this evolutionary process, we are constantly breaking the limits and setting new boundary for the limits of language.

⁹ See, Wiseman (1978) for detailed formulation of empathetic identification as a response to scepticism of other minds. As he begins with defining empathetic identification as “*When someone imagines himself to be having an experience he is not really having- to see what it would be like to have the experience...*” The view that imagination, conceivability and the faculty of reason as the faculty of mind can assist us in knowing the perspective of others.

The Faculty of Imagination

Physical objectivity can only assist us in the accessibility of the physiology of a species, but not the phenomenology of that particular species. The faculty of imagination as a tool for investigating the problem of other minds has been used since Descartes. It's an objective mechanism that provide an opportunity for knowing about the mental states of others without directly accessing the particular mental states of others rather from the objective domain of outside phenomenal subjectival perspectives. Even though the subject has no direct privileged access to the phenomenal qualitative properties of others, however, people those who have the ability of phenomenal concept formation and have knowledge about use of the faculty of imagination for concept formation from given particular information about instantiation of phenomenal qualitative properties, can imagine how other human beings instantiate their phenomenal qualitative properties from their particular ambient environment.

The Faculty of Conceivability

There is a distinction between imagination and conceivability. Imagination does not follow the normativity of logic unlike conceivability. One can imagine anything without considering the logical necessity and possibilities. The *conceivability entails possibility principles* have been used in philosophy of mind by the modern philosopher like Hill (1997), Kirk (1974a; & 1974b) and Chalmers (1996) for defending non-reductionism under the influence of Descartes. The conceivability argument can defend the knowledge about other minds. One can conceive from their own experience that a particular mental states such as pain instantiate a particular phenomenal qualitative properties of experience *iff* the subject and other minds share common physiology, isomorphic environment, stimulus and exhibits similar behavior in a particular ambient environment. The conceivability of the instantiation of a particular phenomenal qualitative properties entails that it is logically possible that same kind of phenomenal qualitative properties can be instantiated in similar cases.

The logical possibility at least entails that there are no contradictory and counterfactual instances possible. People those who exhibits similar kind of behavior while undergone an isomorphic ambient environment interaction of the subject establishes the fact that the logical possibility of instantiation of phenomenal qualitative properties is reducible from conceptual level of reality to physical level of reality at least from subject's own perspectives. Hence, it is possible to reduce the same conceptual reality to physical level of reality in case of others because of sharing isomorphic forms of live, ambient environment, physiology, neurobiological function etc.

The Faculty of Rationality

Rationality can be a tool for intersubjectivity and establish the normative condition for the knowledge about others mental states. The ability of rationalization is universal in case of human beings. Rationality as a category of mind has the similar function of concept formation in every human beings. It demands the instantiation of phenomenal information for performing its phenomenal concept formation and passing the judgement about phenomenal experience. The identical verbal report about a particular phenomenal experience of the subjects establishes the fact that they had instantiated the similar phenomenal information. Because they shared rationality which works as an innate category of mind in every human beings.

The objectivity in case of shared rationality, indistinguishable phenomenal information and verbal report in an isomorphic ambient environment establish the fact that knowledge about other minds is possible. The epistemic rationality acknowledges the universalizability of phenomenal concepts among the subject those who share the physiological, neurofunctional and behavioral indistinguishability. Rationality cannot function without phenomenality especially while dealing with concrete objective reality. Hence, phenomenality became the precondition for rationality without which concrete objectivity aspect of the physical world can't be achieved. Rationality as a tool has been assist us in the

formation of phenomenal concepts. The phenomenal concepts work as a foundation of empathetic identification that helps us in materializing the principles of phenomenality.

There are some objections against the empathetic identification argument. The empathetic identification cannot be possible in case of other species, because one can't imagine, conceive, or rationalize, seeing the world the way other species experience their phenomenal states. The empathetic identification, which is construed as thinking, imaging, or rationalizing from the side of another subject's perspective, can't provide objective accuracy about phenomenal experience. A sceptic may still raise the question on normative ground of phenomenality- How can the imagination yield phenomenal knowledge of another mind? How do we know the faculty of conceivability, rationality or imagination performs its function accurately, not just fantasizing or superimposing over your phenomenal states?

It is not the case that there is no attempt to provide the normative justification for phenomenality for instances it has been commonly accepted that the subject (X) is phenomenally conscious *iff* the subject (X) has a phenomenal states (Y) and there is something like to be in phenomenal states (Y) for the subject (X). This objective normative condition of phenomenality became venerable to attack of scepticism because there is no other way to verify except direct privileged accessibility which is simply not possible for the observer to access except the subject. From the above analysis it became clear that there is a limitation of mental objectivity which is one of the primary reason behind the failure of mental representation in reducing the phenomenal properties to intentional-representational properties.

Nagelian Resolution of Subjective-Objective Dichotomy

Nagel argued that no doubt the phenomenal subjective mental states are publicly inaccessible. Our ability to conceptually distance ourselves from the entire nexus of subjective point of view and interaction with the world, detach from the subjective processes and forms of life that ground our involvement with the world confers upon us a degree of self-consciousness. The expand of objectivity will alienate us from our inner subjective points of view.

For Nagel, the mind-body problem, the problem of scepticism, and freewill arises due to a clash of conflict between two fundamental conceptions of reality such as subjective point of view and objective point of view. The first-person point of view of the world provides the information about the world as it appears to the subject through determination of their senses, culture, and forms of life. The subject has the ability to detach themselves from the subjective standpoint and view the world from the outside third person point of view. By sensing the world from objective standpoint, the subject expanded their conception of reality outwardly and encompassed more information about the reality. The neutral perspective enables the subjects to treat the subjective point of view, the world, and their interaction as objects of a more universal standpoints. The subject in the neutral perspective became a part of the interaction between mind and world at the same time detached itself and see the entire affairs from neutral perspective.

However, there is an inherent problem arises in the Nagelian neutral perspective, that is, the neutral perspective arises out of the subjectively determined view, however, the subject themselves can only attain the detached view from a place within the world. So, the internal tension between two conception of reality remains unresolvable. The subjective condition out of which the more objective view arises really do exist. However, the objective view gains its status as an objective standpoint only by excluding those subjective conditions. If the subjective conditions out of which those objective view arises exist, however then the objective view will run the risk of mistakenly considered itself to be a complete view of the world, when in fact, it isn't. It runs the risk of hastily and falsely reducing the world of appearances to mere appearances. As Nagel (1986; p. 7) illustrates:

“There are things about the world and life and ourselves that can't be adequately understood from a maximally objective standpoint, however, much it may extend our understanding beyond the point from which we started. A great deal is essentially connected to particular point of view, or type of point of view,

and the attempt to give a complete account of the world in objective terms detached from these perspectives inevitably leads to false reduction or to over right denial that certainly potentially real phenomena exist at all.”

Nagel has defended one kind of dual aspect theory which holds the view that the self¹⁰ can have both subjective qualitative characteristics as well as objective intentional characteristics independently and perform their epistemic and explanatory role without conflicting with each other as they have different role to play in unveiling process of the reality.

Hilary Putnam on Objectivity and Phenomenality

Hilary Putnam, one of the influential philosopher of the 21st century, is also argued that every aspect of reality can't be contained within the boundary of physical objectivity. The proponent of physical objectivity has been under the influence of scientism. Science as a discipline should be careful about the biasness of scientism, while engaged in activity of science-while forming and advocating for their scientific theories. Scientism is the view that everything in the universe can be reduced to objective scientific laws.

He has rejected the reduction of phenomenal qualitative features of experience to natural-representational states of the mind based on physical objectivity. At the same time, as an anti-essentialist, he has also rejected the natural isomorphism of mental representational content and natural representational object. His theory of mental objectivity does not render on correspondence of the appearance of the representational object with actual representational object. Hilary Putnam (1960; pp. 138-164) has defended the objective normative criterion for knowledge of other minds through the *multiple realizability* argument based on the view that physical reductionism, especially type identity theory, cannot true, because, a particular mental states that represent phenomenal qualitative properties of experience can be accessed by different physical states of multiple organism despite of their physical structure.

The same experiential function of phenomenal qualitative character, for instances-pain can be assigned to realize to by different organism like human beings, animal and birds as they have different brain structure and functions. The functional isomorphism¹¹ as an objective condition will not only help us in addressing hard problem but also it will assist us in understanding the other minds. Therefore, the objective understanding of the brain function for Putnam will resolve the normativity issue.

The multiple realizability thesis has been rejected for several reasons i.e., violation of causal closure of the physical principles argued by Kim (1993; pp. 280-283), and Vicente (2006: pp. 149-155), argument from the unreliability of disjunctive property by proposed by Armstrong (1978; p. 20) and argument from coordinate typologies developed by Couch (2004). if we accept the multiple realizability thesis, there can't be any space left for neuroscience in Putnamian version of functionalism.

6.5 David Chalmer's Dual Aspect Theory

David Chalmers acknowledged the independent epistemic role of phenomenality and intentionality. He argued that phenomenal qualitative aspect and intentional-representational features of experience are the two aspect of consciousness. The physical-functional properties of experience and phenomenal properties of experience are two distinguishable properties grounded on psychophysical neural states that is neither belongs to physical nor phenomenal states of experience. The psychophysical neural

¹⁰ Nagel has preferred to give importance on human brain instead of any metaphysical self.

¹¹ Putnam (1975, pp. 291- 303) in his popular work- *Mind, Language and Reality* argued that “Two systems are functionally isomorphic if there is a correspondence between the states of one and the states of the other that preserves functional relations.”

states that consist of information states (bits) can be represented through *information spaces* and manifest themselves phenomenally as well as physically at the same time. Chalmers (1996; pp. 279- 286) argued

“An Information space will have two sorts of structure: each complex state might have an internal structure, and each element in this state will belong to a subspace with a topological difference structure of its own. We might call the first of these the combinatorial structure of the space, and the second of these the relational structure of the subspaces. Much of the time, each subspace will have the same relational structure, so we can just speak of the relational structure of the space itself. The overall structure of the space is given by these combinatorial and relational structures together..... Whenever we find an information space realized phenomenally, we find the same information space realized physically. And when an experience realizes an information state, the same information state is realized in the experience’s physical substrates Principles concerning the double realization of information could be fleshed out into a system of basic laws connecting the physical and phenomenal domains.”

The phenomenal and physical realizations of information states go simultaneously. The phenomenal and the physical states are grounded on *psychophysically neutral-information states*. The realization of phenomenal or physical states of experience depends on the way they are atomistically composed. Chalmers argued that his version of the double aspect theory of information provides a plausible solution to the problem of *phenomenal-physical conflict*. As Chalmers (1996; p. 305) argued:

“The ontology that this leads us to might truly be called a double aspect ontology. Physics requires information states but cares only about their relations, not their intrinsic nature; phenomenology requires information state but cares only about the intrinsic nature. This view postulates a single basic set of information states unifying the two. We might say that internal aspects are physical. Or as a slogan: Experience is information from inside, physics is information from outside.”

The physical states are the representation of the realization of external informational states through external relation as per the laws of physics whereas the phenomenal states are the representation of the realization of intrinsic informational states through intrinsic structure of information states.

Moorian Epistemic Foundationalism and Other Minds

Moorian epistemic foundationalism tried to resolve the normativity issue of understanding about the qualitative features of experience through the ground of common sense. Moore argued that the sceptical attack on the knowledge about existence of other minds can be resolved through the appeal of pragmatic contradiction. The demand for the normative condition of understanding about phenomenality by ruling out the common sensical ground of justification will always leads to pragmatic contradiction. The Nagelian version of normativity conditions for phenomenal qualitative features of experience- the subject X is phenomenally conscious *iff* X has particular phenomenal states Q, is insufficient for responding to the sceptics. Because the sceptics can still raise the question on the verifiability of phenomenal states and experience.

The nature of phenomenal qualitative features of experience is such that there can’t be an abstract normative condition that can be verified excluding the accessibility of phenomenal properties. The foolish attempt to quantify the qualitative inner aspect of experience can’t be succeeded for the simple reason that it’s private nature itself exclude the abstraction principles. If once any kind of private experiential properties reduced to objective normative condition, then such kind of experiential properties cease to be remain as private experiential properties.

At least from the failure of reductionist, this point became cleared that neither the objective experiential properties can be reduced to subjective properties of experience (as most of the phenomenal intentionalist has made the unsuccessful attempt) nor any private qualitative experiential property can be reduced to objective properties of experience.

On the ground of common sense, it is cleared that we are not mere information representational organism like A.I machines which extracts information from the environment and act as per its modality of representational function. As a human beings, we can have access to the phenomenal experiential

property that is not just merely physical information. The accessibility and non-reducibility of aesthetic experiential properties are itself evident of the fact that the phenomenal information¹² is distinct from physical information. Anyone who denied that they can't have accessibility to the particular phenomenal information while undergone a phenomenal experience, then s/he is committing *pragmatic contradiction*. We can't convince them through any kind of objective justification except appeal to their own accessibility of particular phenomenal information.

Conclusion

If we observe the entire history of philosophy of mind, we will find out that the scepticism about other minds has been remained an unresolvable issue. As a phenomenal realist, I acknowledge the fact that the kind of success we have achieved in case of establishing the epistemic foundationalism though self-transparency about the subjective aspect of experience is not similar in the case of establishing the objective normative conditions of the world. As Nagel has suggested us that we have to acknowledge the limits of both physical objectivity and mental objectivity and gradually transcend and expand the limits of objectivity through observing from neutral perspective. The expansion of the limits of objectivity can only possible when we adopt the *transcendental dialectics*. The dialectic processes of acknowledging both the subjective point of view and objective point of view of experience from a neutral perspective in which we become the observer of entire interaction between the mind and the world, help us in moving towards universal objectivity. Another approach against the problem of other minds is to give importance on phenomenal transparency. Because phenomenal transparency can help us in synthesizing the mental objectivity and physical objectivity. The Moorian approach to scepticism about knowledge of other minds through appeal to pragmatic contradiction can resolves the problem of scepticism about other minds. However, it can't help us in expanding the limits of mental objectivity. The sceptical attack on the normativity of understanding about other minds can also be addressed though phenomenal transparency. Phenomenal transparency thesis can unveil more objective phenomenal facts through shifting our attention towards the inward journey of mental objectivity.

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¹² Phenomenal information is the information derived from the accessibility of inner private qualitative properties of experience. Let me clarify that we can have objective normative condition for the modality of phenomenal information, for instances, physiological structure, neurobiological functions of the brain, stimulus-response in a particular situation etc. However, we cannot be sure about the epistemic normative condition for accessibility of phenomenal information by excluding the subject's interaction with the environment.

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