



ARTICLES AND TREATISES / ARTYKUŁY I ROZPRAWY

Śabda in the ancient Indian grammarians' doctrines

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ABSTRACT

Notwithstanding its pivotal role in the thought of Indian early grammarians, the exact meaning of the term *śabda* remains vague and hard to determine for an inexperienced student. The difficulty is not simply due to polysemy or ambiguity. The ancient user of the term *śabda* seems entirely unaware of any distinctions within the semantic range of the word, taking its meaning for granted. The objective of the present paper is to investigate various contexts of the word in order to elucidate its meaning as understood by Indian grammarians, with particular emphasis laid on the followers of the *śabdādvaita* school.

KEYWORDS

śabda; grammarians; *spṛoṭa*; Indian philosophy

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FROM MYSTICISM OF LANGUAGE TO ITS DESCRIPTIVE GRAMMAR

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*catvāri śṛṅgā trayo asya pādā dve śiṛṣe sapta hastāso asya
tridhā baddho vṛṣabho roraviti maho devo martyām ā viveśa |*

[It has four horns, three feet, two heads and seven hands

Triply bound the bull is roaring! The great god entered the mortal] (Transl. P.S.).
(RV IV.58.3)

The above description of a rather fancy, not to say weird, creature comes from a Vedic hymn and is largely believed to be a description of a language. According to Patañjali¹ the four horns are the four parts of speech (noun, verb, preposition and particle), three feet are the three tenses (past, future and present), two heads are two essences of the word — one eternal and the other as a result of human activity, seven hands are the seven cases of the declension (*vibhakti*), the triple bonds are the three places (*sthāna*) of origin of a word, *i.e.* the chest, the throat and the head, the roaring of the bull is the word or linguistic sound (*śabda*). The word is further referred to as ‘the great god’ who enters the human beings and enables them to speak. It is by no means the only possible and existing interpretation of the mysterious four-horned and two-headed beast but all of them share the same certainty — the words of the hymn tell about language.

It hardly ever occurs to a western man that linguistics or grammar could be associated with any kind of mysticism or that they should be treated as the fundamental disciplines of all human knowledge. In India a proposition that the language is the most pivotal subject to study and that the study may bring one liberation, may pass for a platitude. In fact, the reasons for holding language and linguistics in such extraordinary reverence date back to early Vedic times. An offering ceremony was to reproduce on a microcosmic scale the macrocosmic principle of *ṛta*. Had the priest failed to perform everything to a nicety, the sacrifice would inevitably turn against him or against the one in whose favour the offering had been performed. Each sacrifice consists of some permanent elements: the fire, the offering material and the words of a Vedic hymn properly intoned. Actually, the word ‘properly’ should be emphasized all through the offer. If anything were not performed ‘properly’, the sacrifice would fail to be auspicious. On the contrary, its consequences would prove menacing for the sacrificer. Thus the priest who intoned the words of

¹ MBh 1, p. 64: *catvāri śṛṅgāni catvāri pada-jātāni nāmākhyātopasarga-nipātāḥ ca. trayāḥ asya pādāḥ trayāḥ kālāḥ bhūta-bhaviṣyad-varṭamānāḥ. dve śiṛṣe dvau śabdātmānau nityāḥ kāryāḥ ca. sapta hastāsaḥ asya sapta vibhaktayaḥ. tridhā baddhaḥ triṣu sthāneṣu baddhaḥ urasi kaṅṭhe śirasi iti. vṛṣabhaḥ varṣaṇāt. roraviti śabdāṁ karoti. kutaḥ etat. rautiḥ śabda-karmā.*

a hymn (*udgātr*) had to do his best to intone them precisely, which involved the necessity of correct pronunciation of vowels and consonants, the right pitch *etc.* The priest (*udgātr*) had to master the language, its grammar, its syntax, its phonetics included. It was the language that properly used had the power to yield success or wrongly used could cause misfortune. The language compelled respect and in the Vedic times identified with the goddess Vāc, who has been held in high esteem up to our days.

EARLY UPANISHADIC UNDERSTANDING OF ŚABDA

There is no explicit term denoting what we call 'the word'. On the one hand the Sanskrit noun *śabda* may mean 'a word', but also 'a phoneme', 'a sentence' or just 'a sound', depending on the author and on the context, on the other hand English 'word' can be understood as *śabda* or *pada*,² depending on the context. Initially *śabda* signified any sound, not necessarily even a linguistic one or one produced by means of vocal organ. The sacred syllable AUM, which covers all possible meanings of the past, the presence and the future, was called *śabda*. MāṇḍU identifies the syllable (*akṣara*) with *brahman* and with the highest self (*ātman*). Remote as the doctrine still was from the subsequent theory of Bhartṛhari, both theories share one crucial feature: both in MāṇḍU and in Bhartṛhari the issue of the *śabda-brahman* seems to be inseparably associated with the idea of time. The doctrines are obviously different,³ so that the Upanishadic concept of time can be at most considered as the germ of the Bhartṛharian theory of *kāla-śakti*, if not a parallel scheme. Nevertheless, taking into account the gap of about a millennium between Māṇḍū and Bhartṛhari, it can be assumed that the germ of the idea in the Upanishad, had a sufficiently long period of time to develop into an elaborate doctrine of the grammarian school.

COLLECTING WORDS: FIRST LEXICONS

Words, the basic meaningful components of the language, the integral part of each sacrifice, were considered sacred, therefore they became the object of collecting. Every reader of a Sanskrit text must first distinguish and isolate words which are not written separately but grouped together as far as the

² There are no lexical equivalents of Sanskrit *śabda* and *pada*, both being denoted by 'word'. Polish equivalents of *śabda* and *pada* are *słowo* and *wyraz* respectively. Cf. Sajdek, 2011: 18–20.

³ Sastri B. Gaurinath suggests: 'But we must be careful not to identify the *Śabdabrahman* of the grammarian with the *Śabdabrahman* of the Upaniṣads, for according to Bhartṛhari *Śabdabrahman* is identical with the Transcendental Reality' (Gaurinath, 1980: XXIV).

devanāgarī script allows to do so. Moreover, according to Sanskrit spelling rules, the *devanāgarī* script is expected to render all phonetic changes, including *sandhi* rules, like losing sonority of the final voiced consonant, etc. Therefore, before reading, words had to be sundered. The first text to undergo such a process was *Ṛgveda* and one of the first authors of such a textual analysis was Śākalya. His work *Padapāṭha* is an analysis of the *Sarṁbitā* text in which he not only separated words, but also isolated components of compounds so characteristic for Sanskrit. Śaunaka, the reputed author of a *prātiśākhya* known as *Bṛhaddevatā*, distinguishes a sentence (*vākya*) consisting of words (*pada*), which consist of phonemes (*varṇa*). Real collections of words, however, were texts called *nighaṅṭu*, regarded as the first lexicons in the world. Vedic texts were becoming increasingly archaic. In order to preserve the correct pronunciation of vedic words it was no longer sufficient to make a *pada-pāṭha*. The words were listed, collected and grouped according to their form and meaning. The most famous author of a commentary to a *nighaṅṭu*, Yāska, defined it as follows:

The list [of words] to memorize. This needs elucidation. Such a list is called *nighaṅṭavaḥ*. Where does it come from? From *nigamāḥ* [the Vedic words] (Lakshman, 1961).⁴

YĀSKA: CLASSIFICATION OF WORDS

It was Yāska, the author of the famous *Nirukta*, who first divided words into classes called *pada-jāta*, counterparts of our ‘parts of speech’. The classes are: name (*nāman*), verb (*ākhyāta*), preposition (*upasarga*) and particle (*niṣpāta*). The class of names includes nouns, pronouns (*sarvanāman*) and adjectives, so everything inflected for case. One of the most inspiring ideas of Yāska was associating the definitions of noun (*nāman*) and verb (*ākhyāta*) with verbal roots (*dhātu*) *as* and *bhū* respectively. Here are the definitions:

The basis of a verb is ‘becoming’ (*bhāva*), the basis of a noun is ‘being’ (*sattva*).⁵

The terms are derivatives of *bhū* and *as*, both meaning ‘be’, ‘exist’, the former denoting ‘being’ more in the sense of ‘becoming’, ‘changing’, whereas the latter ‘being’ in a more static sense. Consequently, the essence of a verb is determined by change, movement, action, whereas a noun is considered to be the motionless, changeless and static element. Yāska was arguably one of the first thinkers who associated linguistics with ontology.

⁴ Nir 1.1.1: *samāmnāyaḥ samāmnātāḥ. sa vyākhyātavyaḥ. tam imam samāmnāyam nighaṅṭava ity ācakṣate. nighaṅṭavaḥ kasmāt? nigamā ime bhavanti.*

⁵ Nir 1.1: *bhāva-pradhānam ākhyātaṁ sattva-pradhānāni namāni.*

Nearly a millenium later Bhartr̥hari, the greatest philosopher of the grammarian and śabdādvaita school, considered *bhāva* and *sattva* to be two aspects of *sattā*, the Ultimate Reality, the *śabda-brahman*. If the Reality is manifested as a sequence of time (*kāla*), it is referred to as *bhāva* or *kriyā*, without the sequence of time as *sattva*. The term *sattā* was by no means a new coinage of Bhartr̥hari, his original contribution, however, was distinguishing between *sat-tva* and *sattā*.

Subsequent thinkers of *advaita* school took advantage of the differentiation in their attempt to elucidate the ontological status of empirical reality (*vyavahāra*). The eternal, changeless, unmoving Ultimate Being 'is' (*asti*), whereas the ever-changing phenomenal world 'is being', as it were, 'is becoming'. The world cannot be predicated in terms of 'being' (*sattva*), neither can Brahman be predicated in terms of 'becoming' (*bhāva*). The principle of inexpressibility of ontological status of the phenomenal world in terms of being and non-being (*sad-asad-anirvacanīyatva*) became part of the doctrine of the *bhāmatī*-school of *advaitavedānta*.

PATAÑJALI'S INSTRUCTION IN ŚABDA: DEFINITION

The initial words of the eminent and vast commentary on Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (Śrīśa, 1891–1898) written by Patañjali are as follows: 'Here is the instruction in *śabda*' (*atha śabdānuśāsanam*). The first definition proposed by Patañjali refers to the colloquial meaning of the word: 'So *śabda* is said to be a sound (*dhvani*) which people associate with a meaningful word (*pada*). [...] Thus *śabda* is a sound (*dhvani*).'⁶ The 'association with a meaningful word' consists in the signifying power of the word (*artha-śakti*) which lies therein. That being so, whenever the sound *gauḥ* is perceived, a cow is visualized. We can easily indicate the referent when we hear *gauḥ* ('cow') or *aśva* ('horse'). Some elements of language, however, fail to 'signify' in a similar way: *atha*, *iti*, *pra*, *pari*, *upa*, *uta* etc. Should they be considered to be 'words' (*śabda*)?

The sound 'associated with a meaningful word' (*pratīta-padārthakaḥ*) requires the context of worldly practice (*loka-vyavahāra*) beyond which its meaning cannot be understood. Therefore words like prepositions (*upasarga*) and particles (*nīpāta*) are also treated as *śabda*, though in isolation they fail to have a meaning of their own. Thus the formula: 'a word (*śabda*) is a sound (*dhvani*) and meaning (*artha*)' — covers all elements of a language.

It is not sufficient for a word to be a sound. The sound must be articulated (*uccarita*), pronounced by means of our vocal organ, it must be a language sound, associated with meaning. Consequently, word (*śabda*) must have two

⁶ MBh 1, p. 19: *athavo pratīta-padārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabda ity ucyate. [...] tasmād dhvaniḥ śabdah.*

natures: phonetic, as physically pronounced (*uccārīta*) by means of speech organs and semantic, as a *signifié*, being a notion (*pratyaya*) in the recipient's mind. Hence another attempt to define *śabda*:

What is perceived by hearing, grasped by intellect, elucidated by utterance and positioned in space (*ākāśa*) — is word (*śabda*)⁷ (Transl. P.S.).

Patañjali follows the *nyāya* doctrine in which sound is the only attribute of space (*ambara-guṇa*), a vibration of ether (*ākāśa*), perceivable for the sense organ of hearing (*śruta*) consisting of the identical element, according to the Empedocles' principle 'similar by similar' (ὁμοιος ὁμοίῳ). One point, however, remains vague: how is it possible that the vibration of ether is capable to transfer a notion to the intellect. The nature of sound is identical with ether, entirely different from the mental nature of intellect. Why is an utterance accessible to the ear (*śrutopalabdhi*) capable of conveying mental contents, accessible to the intellect (*buddhi-nigrāhya*)?

Patañjali advocates the view that the meaningful element which he called *spṛoṭa* is possible to be revealed by phonemes (*varṇābhivyāṅgya*). Their connection with the meaning is permanent and eternal. To support this thesis Patañjali quotes the legendary sage Vyāḍi:

Then is word eternal or is it a result? [...] Words are eternal and in the eternal words there must be changeless, unmoved, not subject to destructibility and birth phonemes (Transl. P.S.).⁸

Words being eternal, they precede their users in time. A man seeks for the right word in himself rather than creates a word he intends to use anew, since he was born with all necessary vocabulary already present in him. If words were just human products, argues Patañjali, we would buy them from a grammarian like jars from a potter.

ARE PHONEMES MEANINGFUL? PATAÑJALI'S PROS AND CONS

Patañjali seemed to anticipate a subsequent famous polemic between grammarians and *mīmāṃsā*-school. In the opinion of the latter, the meaning lies in phonemes and nowhere else, whereas grammarians claimed the existence of a meaningful element called *spṛoṭa* which is above or beyond the physical sounds. According to them the linguistic unit like 'word' (*pada*) (the view of

⁷ MBh 1, p. 98: *śrutopalabdhir buddhi-nirgrāhyaḥ prayogenābhijvalita ākāśa-deśaḥ śabdāḥ*.

⁸ MBh 1, p. 57.96: *kiṃ punaḥ nityaḥ śabdāḥ āhosvit kāryaḥ? [...] nityās ca śabdāḥ. nityeṣu ca śabdeṣu kūṭasthair avicālabhir varṇair anapāyopajana-vikāribhiḥ*.

Maṇḍana Miśra; cf. Sajdek, 2011) or 'sentence' (*vākya*) (the view of Bhartṛhari) is indivisible and understandable only as a whole. Phonemes are artificial products of linguistic analysis of a word (*pada*), as well as word division is nothing more than a result of analysis of a sentence. Unlike a foreigner who must divide an utterance into smaller items in order to grasp the meaning, a native speaker of a language never analyses an utterance. Each utterance forms an indivisible, self-contained whole, so that any analysis of it is only a secondary and auxiliary act. Patañjali seems to be the first to pose the question: 'So do the phonemes have any meaning or are they void of any meaning?'.⁹ His answer was not straightforward. Initially he argues for the meaningfulness of phonemes, providing as many as four arguments for it. Firstly, there exist one-syllable (one-phoneme) words in the language: 'We believe that phonemes are meaningful seeing that there are one-syllable verb roots, nominal bases, affixes and particles'.¹⁰

The existence of one-phoneme words proves that one phoneme suffices to convey the meaning. It might be argued, however, that conveying the meaning is not identical with being meaningful. The second argument seems more convincing and, what makes it still more interesting is its striking similarity to modern phonology: '[Phonemes are meaningful] because a phoneme replaced by another phoneme changes the meaning [of the word]'.¹¹

A substitution of one phoneme for another results in a change of meaning, like in *kūpa* (well), *sūpa* (soup), *yūpa* (column). This leads us to the conclusion that *ka*, *sa* and *ya* are semantically different. A contemporary phonologist would indicate a distinctive feature in each of the phonemes. Patañjali was not far from the idea of binary phonological description. The third argument: 'When a phoneme is not perceived, the meaning is not understood'.¹²

In the above example the meaning changed when one phoneme was substituted for another (*y* for *k*, *s* for *k* etc.). If the first phoneme were entirely removed, the remaining *ūpa* would make no sense at all. Thus omitting one phoneme can deprive a word of its meaning. The noun *kāṇḍīraḥ* means 'an archer', but *āṇḍīraḥ* does not provide us with any knowledge (*an-artha-gatiḥ*). Should we draw the conclusion then that all the meaning of *kāṇḍīraḥ* is contained in the first phoneme? The conclusion would be valid if the omitted phoneme, pronounced in isolation, conveyed the knowledge of an archer, but it is not so. Besides, the word *ṛkṣa* ('a bear') is complete, though one phoneme *va* added at the beginning of the word would radically change its meaning (*vrkṣa* = 'tree'). Actually, the problem lies in an aggregate (*saṃghāta*). Each time a different aggregate of phonemes is pronounced. It is aggregates that have their

⁹ MBh 1, p.131: *kiṃ punaḥ ime varṇāḥ arthavantaḥ ābosvit anarthakāḥ?*

¹⁰ MBh 1, p.131: *dhātu-pratipādika-pratyaya-nipātānām eka-varṇānām artha-darśanāt manyāmade arthavantaḥ varṇāḥ iti.*

¹¹ MBh 1, p.131: *varṇa-vyatyaye ca arthāntara-gamanāt.*

¹² MBh 1, p.131: *varṇānupalabdḥau ca anartha-gateḥ.*

own meanings. Hence the fourth argument: ‘We believe that phonemes are meaningful, because the aggregates they belong to are meaningful’.¹³

A meaningful aggregate must consist of meaningful components. Were it not so, the aggregate itself would not be meaningful. Just like one man can see with his eyes, so can a group of a hundred men. On the contrary, just like a blind cannot see anything, so cannot even a hundred blind men. The conclusion is that phonemes must be meaningful, because the aggregate formed by them is meaningful.

After the above four arguments for meaningfulness of phonemes, Patañjali begins, like in a European scholastic *quaestio*, his *sed contra* argumentation. Firstly, a nominal base, like *rājan*, taking declension endings, undergoes some phonetic rules, like eliding the final *-n* before consonantal endings (*rājabbhiḥ*, *rājabbhyaḥ*, *rājasu*). The elision (*varṇopāya*) does not change anything in meaning, which would be the case if the phoneme ‘*n*’ were meaningful. Secondly, an exchange of phonemes (*varṇa-vyatyaya*) is not tantamount to an exchange of meanings (*artha-vyatyaya*), like in *siṃhaḥ* vs. *hiṃsaḥ*. Thirdly, if phonemes were meaningful, we would not be able to grasp the meaning by hearing each of them apart.

It is true that phonemes are the smallest units differentiating the meaning but they lack a meaning of their own. According to Patañjali, the smallest meaningful unit is an aggregate (*saṅghāta*), which should be regarded as an indivisible entity. Such an aggregate, consisting of phonemes arranged in the definite order, is called a word (*śabda*). To be more exact, a word (*śabda*) does not ‘consist’ of anything, even of phonemes which are only a secondary effect of analysis. A word (*śabda*) can be considered as sound (*dhvani*) and the meaningful element (*spṛṣṭa*). Their relation to the word is not equal. Sound (*dhvani*) is only an attribute of the word, whereas *spṛṣṭa* is its essence, *spṛṣṭa* is the word (*śabda*) itself.¹⁴ It can signify both individual substances (*dravya*) and universal ideas (*ākṛti*).¹⁵

Between Patañjali and Bhartṛhari there was a gap of about a millenium. The passage of time is slow in India and ideas have long lives. Bhartṛhari was a natural successor and inheritor of Patañjali and Kātyāyana.

FROM DESCRIPTIVE GRAMMAR TO MYSTICISM OF LANGUAGE

Bhartṛhari drew all possible consequences from Patañjali’s discovery of an indivisible aggregate (*saṅghāta*) as the smallest meaningful entity. An aggregate is

¹³ MBh 1, p.131: *saṅghātārthattvāc ca manyāmahe arthavanto varṇā iti*.

¹⁴ MBh 1, p.131: *spṛṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ, dhvaniḥ śabda-guṇaḥ*.

¹⁵ MBh 1, p. 56: *kīm punar ākṛtiḥ padārthaḥ āhosvid dravyam? ubhayam ity āha*. The former view was associated with the name of Vyāḍi, the latter with Vājapyāyana. According to Patañjali, Pāṇini accepted both opinions and so did he.

the word (*śabda*) because the correct understanding of its meaning involves the necessity of hearing the whole of it. For Patañjali such an aggregate was first of all a word understood as *pada* which can be the name of an individual substance or of a universal idea. For Bhartṛhari such an indivisible entity (*akhaṇḍa-pakṣa*) was the whole sentence (*vākya*) — 'one undivided word'.¹⁶ Just like a word (*pada*) is not a group of phonemes, so a sentence (*vākya*) is not a group of words. Words (*pada*) are some kind of fiction created as a result of analysing a sentence. It may happen that the whole utterance contains only one word. Seeing an animal with horns *etc.* one says: 'Cow!' — but the meaning is that of a sentence: 'What I see in front of me is a cow'. Similarly in Patañjali one phoneme could be the whole word, but the meaning was associated with the word, not with the phoneme. Were the division real, there would be no reason for desisting from further divisions, up to some physically indivisible theoretical entity like atom. Therefore Bhartṛhari says: 'There are no phonemes in a word (*pada*) and there are no components in a phoneme. It is not possible to isolate ultimately words (*pada*) from a sentence'.¹⁷

The entire sentence is one undivided word (*śabda*), one *sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari referred to a sentence (*vākya*) as to a self-contained whole. While listening to the sentence the hearer experiences a sudden enlightenment called *pratibhā* as for the meaning of the whole. Only a user of the language who is not its native speaker would analyze the sentence, separating words, sundering meanings from the general meaning *etc.* Actually, the relation of a word and its meaning (*vācya-vācaka-bhāva*) is that of identity. The word (*śabda*) and the meaning (*artha*) share the essence. Only the word is ultimately real, the meaning being its manifestation (*vivarta*) engendered by the power of time (*kāla-śakti*). In the first verse of his *Vākyapadīya* Bhartṛhari declares:

The Brahman who is without beginning or end, whose very essence is the Word, who is the cause of the manifested phonemes, who appears as the objects, from whom the creation of the world proceeds [...] (Subramania, 1965).¹⁸

The Highest Being is essentially the Word (*śabda-tattva*). To say that one Brahman is cognized as the plurality and manifoldness of the empirical world, is almost identical with stating that one Word is cognized as multitude of words in a language. In both cases the reason is superimposition (*adhyāsa*). The word 'almost' indicates the subtle difference between classical *advaita* of Śaṅkara or Maṇḍana and *śabdādvaita* of Bhartṛhari. In *advaita* the phenomenal

¹⁶ VP II.1: *eko ṅavayavaḥ śabdah.*

¹⁷ VP I.73: *pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣv avayavā na ca | vākyaṭ padānām atyantam pravibhāgo na kaścana.*

¹⁸ VP I.1: *anādi-nidhanam brahma śabda-tattvam yad akṣaram | vivartate 'rtha-bhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ.*

world (*vyavahāra*) is illusory and caused by a cognitive error. In Bhartṛhari the Word has some powers (*śakti*), especially *kāla-śakti* — time-power, responsible for the manifestation of the world of plurality. The manifestation is, it might be said, due to the will of the Eternal Word, so it cannot be treated as thoroughly unreal. The world of plurality is, as it were, the simple, undifferentiated, simultaneous *śabda* manifested through the power of time (*kāla-śakti*) as a sequence of things and events. This is the ‘proceeding of the creation of the world’ (*prakriyā jagataḥ*) mentioned in VP I.1. The crucial function of time is that of allowing and prohibiting things to come into being and to last shorter or longer. This function secures order in the world and protects it from chaos. Bhartṛhari says:

If it does not prevent and if it does not lift the prohibition, there would be confusion in the state of things, being devoid of sequence (Subramania, 1965).¹⁹

Bhartṛhari assumed three levels of speech. The audible sound produced with the organs of speech (*vāg-indriya*) is only an external manifestation (*bāhya-rūpa*) called *vaikharī*. This lowest level of speech is the subject of descriptive grammar. Before materialization in physical sounds, the speech is born in heart (*hrdaya*) as inner speech (*abhyantara*), having a mental nature. This level is called *madhyamā*. The highest level is the hidden speech called *paśyantī*, the supreme manifestation of one indivisible Eternal Word, free from any sequence or division. It is said to be the source of light in which everything is seen, like eternal, unfading moon — hence the name. Thus grammar returns to its source — mysticism of language, contemplation of the Highest Word (*parāvāk*),²⁰ the Ultimate Being, the source of all creation, the Logos.

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Abbreviations:

MāṇḍU	<i>Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad</i>
MBh	<i>Mabābhāṣya</i>
Nir	<i>Nirukta</i>
RV	<i>Ṛgveda</i>
VP	<i>Vākyapadīya</i>

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¹⁹ VP III.9.5: *yadi na pratibadhnīyāt pratibandham ca notsrjet | avasthā vyatikīryeran paurvāparya-vinākṛtāḥ*.

²⁰ For the Highest Word cf. Sajdek, 2007: 145–161.

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