Is de re Belief Reducible to de dicto?¹

NATHAN SALMON
University of California, Santa Barbara

I

Yes and no. It depends on the meaning of the question. Traditionally, those on the affirmative side — predominantly neo-Fregeans — hold that Ralph’s believing about Orput, de re, that he is a spy is identical with, or otherwise reducible to, Ralph’s believing some proposition or other of the form *The such-and-such is a spy*, for some concept the such-and-such that is thoroughly conceptual or qualitative (or perhaps thoroughly qualitative but for the involvement of constituents of Ralph’s consciousness or of other mental particulars), and that uniquely determines, or is uniquely a concept of, Orput (in Alonzo Church’s sense of ‘determines’ and ‘concept of’).² Concerns over Ralph’s believing that whoever is shortest among spies is a spy while not suspecting anyone in particular have led some neo-Fregeans (not all) to qualify their affirmative response by requiring that the concept the such-and-such and its object bear some connection that is epistemologically more substantial than that between the shortest spy and the shortest spy. For example,

¹ I am grateful to the Santa Barbarians Discussion Group for its comments on some of the arguments presented here. Anthony Brueckner and Francis Dauer made particularly helpful observations.

² See for example Daniel Dennett, ‘Beyond Belief,’ in A. Woodfield, ed., *Thought and Object* (Oxford University Press 1982), 1-95 (e.g., at 84); John Searle, ‘Are There Irreducibly De Re Beliefs,’ in *Intentionality* (Cambridge University Press 1983), ch. 8, § 2, 208-17.
in his classic ‘Quantifying In,’ David Kaplan required that the concept be (among other things) **vivid** in a certain sense.³ If the question is whether a **de re** belief attribution like

(1) Ralph believes of Orttcutt that he is a spy,

logically entails in English, and is logically entailed by, the claim that for some thoroughly conceptual or qualitative concept such-and-such that uniquely determines Orttcutt in an epistemologically special manner, Ralph believes that the such-and-such is a spy, I believe the answer is unequivocally ‘No.’ (Kaplan also no longer endorses this theory.) If the question is instead whether it is in the nature of human cognition, rather than by logic, that (1) is true iff for some epistemologically special, thoroughly qualitative concept such-and-such of Orttcutt, Ralph believes that the such-and-such is a spy, the answer is still ‘No.’ If there is a Twin Earth in the great beyond, and my Dopplegänger there believes his wife to be beautiful, I nevertheless have no **de re** judgment concerning her pulchritude (how could I?), even though he and I share all the same thoroughly qualitative beliefs of the form The such-and-such is beautiful, and neither of us possesses any thoroughly qualitative concept that uniquely determines his wife.⁴

There is a significantly weaker sense in which **de re** belief may correctly be said to be reducible to **de dicto**. It is that Ralph’s belief about Orttcutt (a res) that he is a spy is identical with, or otherwise reducible to, Ralph’s belief of some proposition (a dictum) to the effect that Orttcutt is a spy — though not necessarily a proposition of the form The such-and-such is a spy where such-and-such is a special, thoroughly qualita-


tive concept of Orctutt. This weaker thesis is fairly modest as far as reducibility claims go. Nevertheless, it too has been challenged. Indeed, philosophers who make one or another of the more full-blooded reducibility claims typically reject my claim that de re belief is analyzable into belief of a proposition, as I intend the analysis.

The classic case against reducibility of de re belief to de dicto was made in Quine's 'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes.' He described a scenario, which I shall call 'Act I,' in which Ralph has witnessed a man, his face hidden from view by a brown hat, engaged in clandestine activity that prompted Ralph to conclude that he was a foreign spy. What Ralph does not realize is that the man wearing the hat is Orctutt, whom Ralph remembers having seen once at the beach and whom Ralph regards as a patriotic pillar of the community, hence no spy. Ralph has conflicting views concerning Orctutt, separately believing and disbelieving him to be a spy. On the basis of Act I, Quine argued that true de re belief attributions like (1) and

(2) Ralph believes of the man seen at the beach that he is a spy,

stand in need of regimentation. Clearly (2) should not be viewed as imputing to Ralph a de dicto belief that the man seen at the beach is a spy. Using 'B_{dd}' as a symbol for belief of a proposition, the sentence

(3) Ralph B_{dd} that the man seen at the beach is a spy,

says something very different from (2), indeed something that is false with respect to Quine's example. A crucial feature of a de re construc-


6 Kaplan symbolizes (3) as 'Ralph B 'the man seen at the beach is a spy' '. While I have altered his symbol for de dicto belief I am preserving elements of his syntax, which is aptly suited to clarifying the issues under discussion. (See especially note 22 below.)
Nathan Salmon

tion like (2), distinguishing it sharply from (3), is that the occurrence of 'the man seen at the beach' is open to substitution of 'the man in the brown hat.' It is tempting to provide (2) a quasi-formalization in:

(4) \((\exists x)[x = \text{the man seen at the beach} \& \text{Ralph } B_{dd} \text{ that } x \text{ is a spy}]\),

thus removing 'the man seen at the beach' from the scope of 'Ralph believes that.' This is equivalent to something familiar to readers of Russell:

(4') \((\exists x)[(y \text{ is a man seen at the beach } \leftrightarrow x = y) \& \text{Ralph } B_{dd} \text{ that } x \text{ is a spy}]\).

Either way, it would seem therefore that (2) is true if and only if the component open sentence,

(5) \(\text{Ralph } B_{dd} \text{ that } x \text{ is a spy},\)

is true under the assignment to the variable 'x' of the individual who uniquely satisfies 'y is a man seen at the beach,' i.e. of Orcutt. The meaning of 'B_{dd}' is such that a sentence of the form '\(\alpha B_{dd} \text{ that } \phi\)' is true if and only if the referent of the subject term \(\alpha\) believes the proposition expressed by \(\phi\) (the proposition referred to by the argument 'that \(\phi\)'). But, Quine reasoned, this yields a truth condition for (2) that is essentially incomplete. Whether it is fulfilled depends not only on what the value of the variable in (5) is but also on how that value was assigned, since Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy but does not believe that the man at the beach is. If the variable receives its value by means of the particular description 'the man seen at the beach' rather than 'the man in the brown hat' — as it seems to have done — then under that assignment, performed that way, (2) should simply recapi
tulate (3), and consequently should be false rather than true.

Quine concluded that (2) should not be seen as attributing de dicto belief at all. Instead Quine counseled that (4) and (4') be scrapped, and that (2) be seen as ascribing to Ralph a different relation — that of de re ('relational') belief — to the beach man and the property of being a spy:

(6) \(\text{Ralph } B_{dr} \text{ (the man seen at the beach, to be a spy)}\).
Is de re Belief Reducible to de dicto?

In Quine’s words, (6) “is to be viewed not as dyadic belief between Ralph and the proposition that Orcutt has [the attribute of being a spy], but rather as an irreducibly triadic relation among the three things” (op. cit., p. 106). The proposal thus echoes Russell’s “multiple-relation” theory of belief.7 Also true with respect to Act I is the following:

(7) Ralph B_dr (the man seen at the beach, ¬[to be a spy]).

Quine emphasized that the joint truth of (6) and (7) does not indicate an inconsistency on Ralph’s part.

I have argued against Quine that any sweeping proposal to parse ‘Ralph believes of α that φ_he/she/it’ into a ternary-relational assertion is doomed.8 My objection focused on specific instances involving a complicated substituend for φ (specifically, a belief ascription). This leaves open the question of whether a less ambitious proposal might fare better, at least when restricted to gentler φ like ‘He is a spy.’ Is there anything problematic about regimenting (2) and its ilk, rewriting it in the style of (6) as ‘Ralph believes the man seen at the beach to be a spy’?

There is. Quine conjectured that (6) should be seen as a logical consequence of (3).9 Kaplan labelled the inference pattern ‘exportation,’ and argued against it through his example of the shortest spy. Quine recanted, and later recanted his recant.10 Still, it would appear that the


Quine writes (6) as ‘Ralph believes z(x is a spy) of the man seen at the beach’, Kaplan as ‘Ralph Bel (x is a spy, the man seen at the beach).’


9 ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes,’ 106

predicates for *de dicto* and *de re* belief are not logically independent. Whatever the final decision with regard to exportation, the logical validity of the following inference is difficult to resist:

(I) Every proposition Ralph believes, Kevin disbelieves. Ralph believes the man seen at the beach to be a spy. Therefore, Kevin believes the man seen at the beach not to be a spy.

But if the first premise is symbolized by means of \( B_{dd} \) and the second by means of \( B_{dr} \), then a middle term is missing and the validity remains unexplained.

II

In ‘Quantifying In,’ Kaplan proposed a full-blooded reducibility thesis for modality as well as belief and other propositional attitudes. He proposed first (p. 130) that

\[ \text{N}_{dr} \text{ (the number of planets, to be odd),} \]

i.e., ‘The number of planets is such that it is necessary for it to be odd,’ be analyzed into:

\[ (\exists \alpha)[\Delta_n(\alpha, \text{the number of planets}) \& \text{N}_{dd} \ '\alpha \text{ is odd'}]. \]

The variable ‘\( \alpha \)’ may be taken as a first approximation as ranging over singular terms, but should ultimately be regarded as ranging over thoroughly conceptual or qualitative individual concepts, with the quasi-quote marks accordingly interpreted either standardly or as

I must note that exportation cannot be generally valid for all propositional attributions. Otherwise, from the empirical premise that there are in fact exactly nine planets, and the philosophical observation that there might instead have been an even number of (or more specifically, eight or ten) planets, one could validly infer that nine might have been even (or eight or ten).
Is de re Belief Reducible to de dicto?

quasi-sense-quotation marks. The first conjunct \( \Delta_n(\alpha, \text{the number of planets}) \) says that \( \alpha \) necessarily determines the object that \textit{actually} numbers the planets — in effect, that \( \alpha \) rigidly designates that number, in the sense of Kripke. Analogously, Kaplan proposed (p. 138) that (6) be analyzed thus:

\[(K6) \quad (\exists \alpha)[R(\alpha, \text{the man seen at the beach, Ralph}) \& \text{Ralph } B_{dd} \ '\alpha \text{ is a spy'}].\]

The first conjunct says that \( \alpha \) provides a \textit{de re} connection for Ralph to the man seen at the beach. In Kaplan’s terminology, \( \alpha \) ‘represents’ the man seen at the beach for Ralph. Kaplan provides an analysis for his epistemologically special notion of representation, whereby ‘\( R(\alpha, \text{the man seen at the beach, Ralph}) \)’ entails, but is strictly stronger than, ‘\( \Delta(\alpha, \text{the man seen at the beach}) \)’ (i.e., \( \alpha \) determines the man seen at the beach). It has not been established, however, that this further step is properly a matter of philosophical logic — rather than, for example, of philosophical psychology. Beyond the mentioned entailment, the exact analysis of Kaplan’s ‘\( R \)’ will not concern me here.

11 An \textit{individual concept} is a concept for (i.e. a concept whose function is to determine) an individual, and may thus serve as the semantic content of singular term.

12 Evidently on Kaplan’s account, the following sentence is alleged to be an analytic truth:

If Ralph believes the man seen at the beach to be a spy, then there is a vivid individual concept \( \alpha \) that determines, and is for Ralph a name of, the man seen at the beach such that Ralph believes ‘\( \alpha \text{ is a spy} \)’.

Similarly for its converse. I believe, on the contrary, that neither the conditional nor its converse is analytic. Even if the conditional were both necessary and \textit{a priori}, the inference from antecedent to consequent, or vice versa, does not feel to me like one that is licensed strictly as a matter of the principles governing correct reasoning and the meanings of ‘believe,’ ‘vivid,’ ‘name of,’ etc. As a matter of fact, the Twin Earth considerations mentioned in the first paragraph of this article demonstrate that the conditional need not even be true. By contrast, the mutual inference between (4) (or (2)) and (6) does feel to me to be licensed by pure logic. Cf. my remarks concerning the modal-propositional-logical system \( T \) as compared with stronger systems, in ‘The Logic of What Might Have Been,’ \textit{The Philosophical Review} 98 (1989) 3-34.
Nathan Salmon

Kaplan’s ingenious reductive analysis of de re propositional attribution might be interpreted as a proposal for dealing with any propositional attribution that involves an open sentence. One might regard an open ‘that’-clause, like ‘that x is a spy,’ as having no meaning in isolation, but as contributing indirectly to the meanings of sentences in which it occurs. A contextual definition for ‘that x is a spy’ is provided as follows: First, analyses are provided for atomic formulae \( \Pi^n(\beta_1, \beta_2, \ldots, \text{that } x \text{ is a spy}, \ldots, \beta_n, \ldots) \) containing the ‘that’-clause among its argument expressions. The most common cases are: those where \( n = 1 \) and \( \Pi^1 \) is a predicate for a de dicto modality, i.e. a modal predicate of propositions (‘necessarily true,’ ‘probably true,’ etc.); and those where \( n = 2 \) and \( \Pi^2 \) is a predicate for a de dicto propositional attitude (‘believes,’ ‘doubts,’ ‘hopes,’ ‘fears,’ ‘wishes,’ etc.). In the latter case,

\[
\beta \Pi_{dd} \text{ that } x \text{ is a spy}
\]

is analyzed as:

\[
(\exists \alpha)[R(\alpha, x, \beta) \& \beta \Pi_{dd} '\alpha \text{ is a spy'}].
\]

Plugging this contextual definition of ‘that x is a spy’ into (4) yields \((K6)\), or rather, something classically equivalent to it. More complicated constructions involving the analysandum are then subject to scope ambiguities exactly analogous to those found in Russell’s Theory of Descriptions. The negation \(~(\beta \Pi_{dd} \text{ that } x \text{ is a spy})\), for example, may be analyzed as involving a ‘primary occurrence’ of the ‘that’-clause, or alternatively as involving a ‘secondary occurrence,’ where the latter corresponds to the genuine negation of the original, un-negated analysandum:

\[
(\exists \alpha)[R(\alpha, x, \beta) \& ~(\beta \Pi_{dd} '\alpha \text{ is a spy'})]
\]

\[
~(\exists \alpha)[R(\alpha, x, \beta) \& \beta \Pi_{dd} '\alpha \text{ is a spy'}].^{13}
\]

Is de re Belief Reducible to de dicto?

One virtue of Kaplan’s analysis is that it may reduce the inference (I) to a valid argument of first-order logic. Declining any analysis of de re belief into de dicto leaves few alternatives. One may take ‘B_{dd}’ and ‘B_{dr}’ as primitives, for example, and propose Carnapian ‘meaning postulates’ for them that would enable one to derive (I). Perhaps one may save the inference instead through an analysis of the former predicate in terms of the latter.\(^{14}\) Or one may reject inferences like (I) as invalid.

Kaplan argued on somewhat different grounds that leaving the de re form unanalyzed into the de dicto is inadequate (pp. 140-3). His argument invokes a later development in Quine’s example:

In Quine’s story, \((7)\) holds. But we can continue the story to a later time at which Ralph’s suspicions regarding even the man at the beach have begun to grow. Not that Ralph now proclaims that respected citizen to be a spy, but Ralph now suspends judgment as to the man’s spyhood. At this time \((7)\) is false (pp. 141-2).

In Act II, Ralph has not changed his mind concerning whether the man in the brown hat is a spy. Thus \((1), (2),\) and \((6)\) are all still true. While \((3)\) is still false — Ralph still does not believe that the man seen at the beach is a spy — Ralph no longer believes that the man seen at the beach is not a spy.

The important feature of Act II is that Ralph’s suspension of judgment is not only de dicto but de re. Ralph’s attitudes towards Orctutt

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\(^{14}\) Quine appears to prefer this option Cf. ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes,’ section II. He there takes ‘B_{dr}’ to be multi-grade, i.e. “letting it figure as an n-place predicate for each n > 1” (‘Intensions Revisited,’ 268). This allows one to say that Ralph believes of the man in the brown hat and the man at the beach that the former is taller than the latter by writing ‘Ralph B_{dr} (the man in the brown hat, the man at the beach, \(\lambda xy [x \text{ is taller than } y]\)’. The de dicto predicate ‘B_{dd}’ may then be taken to be the limiting case of ‘B_{dr}’ where n = 2. But how exactly does this give us (I)?
still conflict, but not in the straightforward manner of believing him to be a spy while also believing him not to be a spy. Concerning Ortnutt, Ralph believes him to be a spy while also actively suspending judgment. Using ‘SJ’ as a predicate for suspension of judgment, both of the following are true in Act II:

Ralph $B_{dd}$ that the man in the brown hat is a spy  
Ralph $SJ_{dd}$ that the man seen at the beach is a spy.

The consequences of the latter regarding belief are given by the following conjunction, which provides a kind of analysis of at least the core meaning:

$\neg[Ralph \ B_{dd} \ that \ the \ man \ seen \ at \ the \ beach \ is \ a \ spy] \ \& \ \neg[Ralph \ B_{dd} \ that \ \neg(\text{the \ man \ seen \ at \ the \ beach \ is \ a \ spy})].$

Indeed, the truth of this conjunction with respect to Act II may simply be taken as stipulated.\(^{15}\) Also true, partly in virtue of the foregoing, are the following:

(6) Ralph $B_{dr}$ (the man seen at the beach, to be a spy)  
(8) Ralph $SJ_{dr}$ (the man seen at the beach, to be a spy).

Without analyzing de re belief in terms of de dicto, rendering (8) in terms of withheld belief poses a special difficulty. One is tempted to write:

$\neg[Ralph \ B_{dr} \ (\text{the \ man \ seen \ at \ the \ beach, \ to \ be \ a \ spy})] \ \& \ \neg[Ralph \ B_{dr} \ (\text{the \ man \ seen \ at \ the \ beach, \ } \neg[\text{to \ be \ a \ spy}]].$

But the first conjunct flies in the face of the continued truth of (6) in Act II. Not to mention that the second conjunct (which is the negation of

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15 I criticize this analysis (which is Kaplan’s, not mine) of suspension of judgment as being too strong, in my ‘Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt,’ *Noûs* 29 (1995) 1-20. There is no doubt in this case, however, that the conjunction is indeed true with respect to Act II.
Is de re Belief Reducible to de dicto?

(7)) is unjustified. We have no guarantee that Ralph is not acquainted
with Ortcutt in some third way. The problem is to express the withheld
belief of Ralph’s new doxastic situation indicated by (8) consistently
with (6).

The difficulty, according to Kaplan, is that the left conjunct above —
the apparent negation of (6) — is ambiguous. He writes:

Cases of the foregoing kind, which agree with Quine’s intuitions, argue an in-
adequacy in his regimentation of language. For in the same sense in which (7)
and (6) do not express an inconsistency on Ralph’s part, neither should (6) and
‘¬(6)’ express an inconsistency on ours. Indeed it seems natural to claim that
‘¬(6)’ is a consequence of (7). But the temptation to look upon (6) and ‘¬(6)’ as
contradictory is extremely difficult to resist. The problem is that since Quine’s
‘B,α’ suppresses mention of the specific name [or concept] being exported, he
cannot distinguish between

\[(∃α)[R(α, the seen man at the beach, Ralph) & ¬(Ralph B_{dd} ’α is a spy’)]]

and

\[¬(∃α)[R(α, the man seen at the beach, Ralph) & Ralph B_{dd} ’α is a spy’].

If ‘¬(6)’ is read as [the former], there is no inconsistency with (7); in fact on this
interpretation ‘¬(6)’ is a consequence of (7) (at least on the assumption that Ralph
does not have contradictory beliefs). But if ‘¬(6)’ is read as [the latter] (Quine’s
intention, I suppose) it is inconsistent with (6) and independent of (7).
So long as Ralph can believe of one person that he is two, as in Quine’s story,
we should be loath to make either [reading of ‘¬(6)’] inexpressible.16

Analyzing de re suspension of judgment in terms of de dicto in the
style of (K6) yields the following Kaplansque analysis of (8):

\[(∃α)[R(α, the man seen at the beach, Ralph) & Ralph SJ_{dd} ’α is a
spy’].

The principal consequences of this regarding belief are summed up by:

16 Ibid, 141. Here as elsewhere I have slightly altered the text for the purpose of
matching numbered expressions with the numbers used in the present paper.

95
(K8) \( (\exists \alpha)[(\text{R}(\alpha, \text{the man seen at the beach, Ralph}) \& \neg((\text{Ralph B}\text{\,}_d\,\alpha \text{ is a spy}) \& \neg((\text{Ralph B}\text{\,}_d\,\neg(\alpha \text{ is a spy}))])]. \)

This represents Kaplan’s way of laying bare the withholding of belief expressed in (8). It is perfectly compatible with (K6). Both may be true so long as the two \( \alpha \)'s are different, as are the man in the brown hat and the man seen at the beach.

The ambiguity that Kaplan sees in \(^{\neg}(6)^{\neg}\) is precisely the Russellian primary-occurrence/secondary-occurrence ambiguity that arises in \(^{\neg}(5)^{\neg}\) on the contextual-definition interpretation of his project. The important point is not whether the reader (or the current writer) agrees that the alleged primary-occurrence reading is legitimate. Kaplan’s principal point is that if \(^{\neg}(6)^{\neg}\) is interpreted so that it is the genuine negation of (6), then without analyzing de re suspension of judgment ultimately in terms of de dicto belief the withheld belief in (8) becomes inexpressible.

III

Tyler Burge has responded to Kaplan’s argument, claiming (in effect) that Quine can analyze (8) as follows:

\[ (\exists \alpha)[(\text{Ralph B}\text{\,}_d\,\text{(the man seen at the beach, }'(\lambda z)(z = \alpha)'\) \& Ralph S}\text{\,}J\text{\,}\text{\,}_d\,\alpha \text{ is a spy')]]. \]

The consequences of this for belief may then be summarized by:

(B8) \( (\exists \alpha)[(\text{Ralph B}\text{\,}_d\,\text{(the man seen at the beach, }'(\lambda z)(z = \alpha)'\) \& \neg((\text{Ralph B}\text{\,}_d\,\alpha \text{ is a spy}) \& \neg((\text{Ralph B}\text{\,}_d\,\neg(\alpha \text{ is a spy})]))]. \)

That is, there is some individual concept the such-and-such whereby Ralph believes the man seen at the beach to be the such-and-such, but

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17 In ‘Kaplan, Quine, and Suspended Belief,’ 198. I have expanded on Burge’s actual proposal, keeping to both its letter and spirit, in order to secure the full force of suspension of judgment as opposed to mere failure to believe.

96
Ralph believes neither that the such-and-such is a spy nor that the such-and-such is not a spy. This existential claim is made true by the very concept, the man seen at the beach. Comparison of (B8) with (K8) reveals that, in effect, Burge rewrites Kaplan’s representation clause ‘R(α, the man seen at the beach, Ralph)’ in terms of de re belief. For Kaplan, this puts the cart before the horse; he invokes representation precisely to analyze de re belief in terms of de dicto. But reduction of de re to de dicto is precisely what Burge rejects. Burge offers (B8) as a Quinean analysis of de re suspension of judgment in terms of both de dicto and de re belief, with de re treated as primitive, or at least as unanalyzable in terms of de dicto.18

Ironically, the idea of replacing ‘R(α, the man seen at the beach, Ralph)’ with ‘Ralph B_{de} (the man seen at the beach, ’(λz)(z = α)’)’ is originally due to Kaplan. He had suggested replacing (K6) with

\[(B6) \quad (\exists \alpha)[Ralph B_{de} (the man seen at the beach, ’(λz)(z = α)’)] \land Ralph B_{dd} ’α is a spy’\]

Acknowledging that this is not equivalent to the supplanted notion, at least when (B6) is taken as analyzed by means of R-representation, Kaplan went on to say, “Still this new notion of representation, when used in place of our current R in an analysis of the form of [(K6)], leads to the same relational sense of belief.”19

18 Whereas Burge aims to refute Kaplan’s argument for reducibility, he does not himself endorse the proposal he makes on Quine’s behalf, and instead says that the conjunction of (6) with (8) may be formulated along the lines of something like:

Ralph believes the man seen at the beach to be this man and a spy, and Ralph neither believes the man seen at the beach to be that man and a spy nor believes the man seen at the beach to be that man and not a spy, as spoken with three references to Orticutt, in his guises as this man (in the brown hat) and as that man (seen at the beach). This proposal seriously distorts the very de re locutions it employs. Indeed, it contains a contradiction, its first conjunct expressing about Orticutt exactly what the second conjunct denies.

19 ‘Quantifying In,’ 139 n30. Quine proposes (in ‘Intensions Revisited,’ at 272-73) taking ‘(∃z)[Ralph B_{de} (α, ’(λz)(z = α)’)]’ — e.g., ‘There is someone whom Ralph takes to be the shortest spy’ — as the further premise required to validate the
If Kaplan was correct about this, then he inadvertently showed the way to refutation of his argument against Quine. But he was not correct; the new notion does not strictly 'lead to the same sense' as the old. Analyzing (B6) in the style of Kaplan, one obtains (something equivalent to):

\[(B6K) \ (\exists \beta) (\exists \alpha) [R(\alpha, \text{the man seen at the beach, Ralph}) & Ralph B_{dd} \ '\alpha = \beta' & Ralph B_{dd} \ '\beta \text{ is a spy}']\].

This does not strictly entail (K6). Likewise, analyzing (B8) à la Kaplan in terms of 'R', one obtains:

\[(B8K) \ (\exists \beta) (\exists \alpha) [R(\alpha, \text{the man seen at the beach, Ralph}) & Ralph B_{dd} \ '\alpha = \beta' & \sim (Ralph B_{dd} \ '\beta \text{ is a spy}') & \sim (Ralph B_{dd} \ '\sim (\beta \text{ is a spy}'))]\]

which does not entail (K8). From Kaplan's perspective, the new notions are weaker than the old ones.

Why, then, does Kaplan say that the new notion of representation "leads to the same relational sense"? As Burge notes (p. 199), (K8) is derivable from (B8K) using the additional premise:

\[(9) \ (\alpha)(\beta) [Ralph B_{dd} \ '\alpha = \beta' \rightarrow (Ralph B_{dd} \ '\alpha \text{ is a spy}' \leftrightarrow Ralph B_{dd} \ '\beta \text{ is a spy}') & (Ralph B_{dd} \ '\sim (\alpha \text{ is a spy}') \leftrightarrow Ralph B_{dd} \ '\sim (\beta \text{ is a spy}')].\]

exportation inference from 'Ralph B_{dd} that \(\alpha \text{ is a spy}' to 'Ralph B_{dd} (\alpha, \text{ to be a spy}'). See note 10 above. Influenced by Jaakko Hintikka, Quine incorrectly glosses this proposed premise as 'Ralph has an opinion as to who \(\alpha \text{ is}. Even this stronger premise, however, is not up to the task; suppose, for example, that Ralph is of the erroneous opinion that the shortest spy is none other than Orcutt. See Igal Kwart, 'Quine and Modalities De Re: A Way Out?' Journal of Philosophy 79 (June 1982), 295-328, at 298-302; and my 'How to Measure the Standard Metre,' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (New Series) 88 (1987/1988) 193-217, at 205-6, 213-4. Quine's intent may be better captured by taking the additional premise to be instead 'Ralph B_{dd} (\alpha, (\lambda z)(z = \alpha))' e.g., 'Ralph believes the shortest spy to be the shortest spy.' This move, in turn, suggests an analysis of (6) à la Kaplan/Burge into (B6) (perhaps as part of a general analysis of attributions of de re beliefs other than identity beliefs). The alternative premise Kwart proposes, by comparison, suggests instead an analysis more along the lines of Kaplan's original (K6).
This additional premise also suffices to obtain (K6) from (B6K). No matter. If Kaplan leaned on some premise like (9) — and it is unclear whether he did — Burge clearly does not. Instead, he objects that “if Ralph is Everyman, (9) cannot be guaranteed” (p. 199). Burge does not specify the sort of circumstance he has in mind in which (9) fails, but there is no need for him to do so. Even the most thorough of logicians (let alone Everyman) does not draw all logically valid inferences from all his/her beliefs. Otherwise there would be no theorems of mathematics left to prove. Nothing as sweeping as (9) is even close to being true.

How, then, can Burge rely on the replacement strategy? He is not strictly committed, as Kaplan was, to analyzing (B6) into (B6K) and (B8) into (BBK). Nevertheless, he contends (evidently with Kaplan) that (BBK) successfully captures (K8), so that one attracted to Kaplan’s analysis cannot object to (BB8) on the ground that it does not render (8) equally as well as (K8) does. Burge cites the following considerations in support of this contention:

Now an obvious candidate for fulfilling the role of β [in (BB8K)] is α itself. If we approve the candidate, and assume that Ralph believes ‘α = α’, then (BB8K) and (K8) indeed become strictly equivalent. ... The claim that everyone believes the self-identity statement for each ‘representing’ singular expression in his repertoire is fairly plausible. Even more plausible — and equally adequate in yielding equivalence between (BB8K) and (K8) — is the Frege-like view that everyone believes some identity statement for each representing singular expression in his repertoire (p. 199).

This argument is multiply flawed. To begin with, contrary to Burge the mentioned “Frege-like view” is woefully inadequate to the task of yielding an implication of either (K8) by (BB8K) or vice versa. It is unclear what Burge means by the obscure phrase ‘approve a candidate for fulfilling the role of β.’ Both (K8) and (BB8K) follow from the assumption that Ralph believes ‘α = α’ while believing neither ‘α is a spy’ nor ‘~(α is a spy),’ for some concept α that represents Orcutt — such as perhaps the concept, the man Orcutt, whom I saw that time at the beach. In this sense, one may derive (BB8K) from the premise that Ralph suspends judgment concerning whether the man at the beach is a spy and the further premise that Ralph believes that the man at the beach is the man at the beach, by casting the man at the beach in the roles of both α and β in (BB8K) (more precisely, by two judicious applications of Existential Generalization on an appropriately expanded variant of
(K8)). But when going in the other direction, attempting to derive (K8) from (B8K), the latter is given and may be true in virtue of a pair of distinct concepts \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \). The roles of \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) have already been cast; the task is to establish that Ralph lacks further relevant beliefs. Not only the "Fregelike view," but even the stronger claim that Ralph believes the particular identity \( \alpha = \alpha' \) whenever \( \alpha \) is representing is inadequate to yield (K8) from (B8K) without the intervention of something like (9). In particular, the mere assumption that Ralph believes \( \alpha = \alpha' \) in no way permits the replacement of (B8K) by the special case where \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are the same.

To establish this, I submit Act III: A more decisive Ralph has become convinced that the man in the brown hat and the man at the beach are working in tandem. As regards Orccutt, Ralph no longer suspends judgment whether he is a spy. On the contrary, Ralph believes him a spy twice over, as it were. Further, Ralph also happens to believe \( \alpha = \alpha' \) for every individual concept \( \alpha \) in his repertoire. In particular, Ralph believes that the man seen at the beach is the man seen at the beach. When queried, 'Which one, if any, is the most trusted man in town?' Ralph points to Orccutt. As it turns out, Ralph is wrong about this; Wyman is more trusted than Orccutt. When asked whether whoever is more trusted than every other man in town is a foreign spy, Ralph hesitates momentarily and wonders, ever so briefly, before inferring (much to his dismay) that the most trusted man is indeed a spy. Until he is through hesitating and finally makes the substitution — however brief the period of hesitation may be — Ralph suspends judgment whether the most trusted man in town is a spy, even while believing both that Orccutt is most trusted and that he is a spy. (Burge presumably will not object to this hypothesis, given his rejection of (9). The hypothesis is in any case unobjectionable.)

Ralph’s suspension of judgment whether the most trusted man is a spy cannot of itself constitute de re suspension of judgment about Orccutt. Indeed, it does not even involve reference to Orccutt. Since the most trusted man in town is a concept of (determines) Wyman and not Orccutt, it cannot represent Orccutt for Ralph in the requisite manner. With respect to Act III, (K8) remains false despite the truth of (B8K). Burge’s response to Kaplan thus fails.

The significance of Act III extends beyond the fact that it yields a counter-model to Burge’s contention that (K8) and (B8K) are alike in
Is de re Belief Reducible to de dicto?

truth value if Ralph believes ‘α = α’ for each of his representing concepts α. (K8) and (B8K) are Kaplan’s analyses, respectively, of (8) and of (B8), the latter being Burge’s proposal for capturing (8) without analyzing de re belief in terms of de dicto. But the general point does not specifically concern Kaplan’s particular manner of analyzing de re into de dicto. Act III also directly refutes Burge’s account of de re suspension of judgment. The principal difference between Act II and Act III is that in the former there is de re suspension of judgment concerning Orcutt on the part of Ralph and in the latter there is not. Sentence (8) differentiates between the two acts, being true with respect to one and false (its negation true) with respect to the other. But (B8) is true with respect to both acts. Since it can be true even when (8) is false, Burge’s attempt at capturing (8) through (B8) fails.

Strengthening Burge’s clause ‘Ralph B_α (the man seen at the beach, (λz)(z = α))’ to assert that Ralph has correct de re belief (or de re knowledge) does not solve the problem. Even if Ralph were correct in thinking that Orcutt was the most trusted man, he may still hesitate before inferring that the most trusted man is a spy, thus satisfying the new formulation without thereby engaging in de re suspended judgment — unless one who believes that the shortest spy is a spy thereby engages in de re belief.20

IV

Burge’s primary concern is to reject Kaplan’s full-blooded reducibility. He objects that “if one uses ‘denote’ strictly, it is implausible that in all

20 Cf. my Frege’s Puzzle (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview 1986, 1991), at 171-2. An alternative scenario is also possible in which Ralph believes (on the basis of general suspicions) that the most trusted man in any town is a spy, and knows Orcutt to be the most trusted man in town, while not yet concluding about Orcutt that he in particular must be a spy. Such a case refutes the analysis suggested in note 19 above. Intuitively, one who believes that whoever is most trusted among men in town is a spy does not ipso facto believe of the most trusted man, de re, that he is a spy. (Notice that the description ‘the most trusted man in town,’ like ‘the shortest spy,’ qualifies neither as vivid, nor as a name of its referent, in Kaplan’s quasi-technical senses.)
cases of *de re* belief, one of the believer’s beliefs contains a thought
symbol or individual concept that denotes the *res*” (*Belief De Re*, p. 351).
By “thought symbol or individual concept,” Burge means a thoroughly
conceptual or qualitative concept. The “strict use of ‘denote’” Burge
intends is essentially Church’s use of ‘determines’ for the binary rela-
tion (which is not context-relative) between a concept and its object.

On this point Burge and I are in complete agreement. The Twin-Earth
considerations raised in the first paragraph are sufficient to demonstrate
the point. But this point does not weaken Kaplan’s argument, which is
aimed at establishing that *de re* belief is reducible to *de dicto*. Even if the
argument succeeds, it does nothing to establish Kaplan’s particular, full-
blooded way of carrying out the reduction. On the contrary, as I shall
argue in the next section, with a certain modification the same argument
can be redirected against Kaplan’s reduction.

My own version of modest reducibility is this: that *de re* belief about
an object *x* is nothing more or less than belief of the corresponding *sin-
gular proposition* (singular *dictum*) — a proposition that is about *x* by
including *x* directly as a constituent, instead of a conceptual or inten-
sional representation of *x*. Ironically, the principal argument in favor of
this form of modest reducibility begins, and proceeds, nearly the same
as Quine’s argument against reducibility. It is this: The logical form of
a *de re* attribution like (1) is better revealed by rewriting it as:

About Orutt, Ralph believes that he is a spy.

This is true in English if and only if its component open sentence,

(5') Ralph believes that he is a spy,

(or ‘Ralph *B*$_{dd}$ that he is a spy’) is true as spoken with reference to
Orutt. That is, (1) is true if and only if (5') is true under the assign-
ment of Orutt to the pronoun ‘he.’ Indeed, the pronoun functions in
(5') exactly as the free variable does in (5). It is precisely this that dis-
turbs Quine about (1). The variable/pronoun stands in a position in
which what matters is not what is referred to but how it is referred to.
By pure English semantics alone, (1) is true if and only if Ralph be-
lieves the proposition expressed by ‘He is a spy’ under the assignment
of Orutt to ‘he.’ This is also the proposition expressed by the open
sentence ‘x is a spy’ under the assignment of Orttcutt to ‘x.’ Quine could not make sense of this because of a severe limit he implicitly imposed — following Frege, and to a lesser extent, Russell — on the range of propositions potentially believed by Ralph, no one of which by Quine’s reckoning has yet been singled out. Granted, the proposition expressed by ‘He is a spy’ under the assignment of Orttcutt to ‘he’ is neither that the man seen at the beach is a spy nor that the man in the brown hat is a spy. It is a third proposition, I say, independent of these others and dismissed by Frege, Russell, and Quine as no possible object of belief by Ralph. Following Russell, we may say that the variable/pronoun in (5)/(5’) functions as a ‘logically proper name’ of its assigned referent. The open sentence expresses a singular proposition about Orttcutt, the proposition that he is a spy.21

Accordingly, I have suggested that (2), and hence also (6), should be analyzed in terms of propositional belief not by (K6) but instead by means of (something trivially equivalent to):

\[(S6) \quad (\lambda x) [\text{Ralph } B_{dd} \text{ that } x \text{ is a spy}] (\text{the man seen at the beach}).\]

This may be read, ‘The man seen at the beach is such that Ralph believes that he is a spy.’ (S6) is classically equivalent to (4). Whereas (4) provides for a logical form that in some respects mirrors that of (K6), the underlying idea is very different. It is that (2) ascribes to Ralph belief of a singular proposition about the man seen at the beach. De re belief is de dicto belief of a singular dictum about the res.22

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21 Cf. Frege’s Puzzle, 2-7. See also my ‘How to Become a Millian Heir,’ Noûs 23 (1989) 211-20; and ‘A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn,’ 223-7.

22 ‘Relational Belief,’ 216. The analysis is broadly Russellian in spirit. However, Russell himself embraced an epistemology that prevented him from accepting the analysis (and which may be part of the original motivation for his multiple-relation theory of de re belief). Quine also rejects it. Indeed, this is what led Quine to propose replacing (2) with something along the lines of (6). His objections, however, are dubious. See Kaplan, ‘Opacity,’ in L. E. Hahn and P. A. Schilpp, eds., The Philosophy of W. V. Quine (La Salle: Open Court 1986), 229-89; and my ‘Relational Belief.’

Identifying the singular proposition about Orttcutt that he is a spy with the
In addition, I have suggested that a propositional-belief attribution like (3) be analyzed as follows by means of the existential generalization of a ternary relation, $\text{BEL}$, which holds among a believer, a proposition, and something like a proposition guise or way of taking the proposition when the believer agrees to the proposition taking it that way:

$$\exists x [\text{Ralph BEL (that the man seen at the beach is a spy, } x)].$$

Putting these two proposals together, I analyze (6) as:

$$(\lambda x)[(\exists y)(\text{Ralph BEL (that } x \text{ is a spy, } y))](\text{the man seen at the beach}).$$

That is, the man seen at the beach is such that Ralph agrees to the proposition that he is a spy, taking it in at least one way in which he grasps it. Like Kaplan's rival analysis, this analysis also accommodates inference (I).

Analyzing (B6) in the manner I propose, at the first stage one obtains:

$$(\exists \beta)[(\lambda x)[\text{Ralph } B_{dd} 'x = \beta'] (\text{the man seen at the beach}) \& \text{Ralph } B_{dd} '\beta \text{ is a spy}].$$

Just as (B6K) does not strictly yield (K6), (B6S) is weaker than (S6). An additional premise like (9) (except with its bound variable 'α' interpreted as ranging over singular-term-contents, construed as including individuals as well as individual concepts) is required in order to derive (S6) from (B6S).

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23 More exactly, my view is that the dyadic predicate 'B_{dd}' is definable as: $(\lambda x)(\exists y)(x \text{ BEL } [p, y])$.

24 Alternatively, something like Kaplan's full-blooded reducibility thesis might be invoked as a third premise in addition to (9), thus removing (B6S) still further.
Is de re Belief Reducible to de dicto?

V

I analyze (8) thus:

(S8)  \((\lambda x)(\exists y)(\text{Ralph grasps the proposition that } x \text{ is a spy by means of } y \& \sim (\text{Ralph BEL [that } x \text{ is a spy}, y]) \& \sim (\text{Ralph BEL [that } \sim (x \text{ is a spy}), y]))\)(the man seen at the beach).

There are numerous similarities between (K6) and (S6'), as well as between (K8) and (S8). In particular, the analyses claim to uncover a hidden existential quantifier, which may joust with a negation sign for dominant position. This existentialism (to coin a term) is brought out in cases of de re suspended judgment, in which the negation is inserted after the existential quantifier. Despite his decidedly differing philosophical outlook, Burge’s (B8) also capitalizes on Kaplan’s discovery of the existential quantifier internal to de re suspended judgment. Like (K8), (S8) is true with respect to Act II but false with respect to Act III. Hence (B8), which is true with respect to Act III, is not equivalent to (S8), nor is (S8) derivable from (B8) together with the premise that Ralph believes ‘\(\alpha = \alpha’\) for every individual concept \(\alpha\) that he grasps.

These similarities obscure the important differences that remain between Kaplan’s analysis and mine. Foremost, where my existential quantifier ranges over proposition guises, or ways of taking propositions, Kaplan’s ranges over thoroughly conceptual or qualitative individual concepts (or over singular terms expressing such concepts). It is essentially this feature of Kaplan’s analysis that both Burge and I (and Kaplan today) find objectionable. (See note 12 above.) Kaplan located the hidden existential quantifier in the use of open ‘that’-clauses, like ‘that he is a spy’ and ‘that \(x\) is a spy,’ which have no meaning in isolation even under the assignment of a value to its free pronoun variable. In effect, Kaplan found existentialism in the very nature of de re

from (S6). Alternatively, the ‘\(\alpha’\) may be replaced by an objectual variable. Analogously, Kaplan may have intended a version of (9) in which ‘\(\alpha’\) ranges only over ‘representing’ names, in his sense, while ‘\(\beta’\) is not similarly restricted. Burge’s objection that the relevant version of (9) is not guaranteed is appropriate regardless.
propositional attribution. By contrast, I locate it in the particular phenomenon of belief. By my account, there is no logical reason to expect an analogous existentialism to occur in connection with all propositional attributions—including for example in ‘Ralph proved that’ or ‘It is necessary that.’ Indeed, if there is a primary-occurrence/secondary-occurrence ambiguity in ‘¬(5)’ under the assignment of the man at the beach as value for the variable ‘x’, there is no like ambiguity in ‘It is not necessary that there be n planets’ under the assignment of the number of planets to the variable ‘n’ (nor in ‘¬[N_d (the number of planets, to number the planets)].’)

On the other side of the coin, on my account there is also no logical reason why the competition for dominance between the existential quantifier and negation should not occur also with de dicto belief. In fact it does. Kripke’s famous puzzle about belief includes such a case. Before presenting the puzzle Kripke emphasizes that it concerns de dicto belief rather than de re. He says:

the de dicto or “small scope” reading ... is the only reading, for belief contexts ... that will concern us ... de re beliefs — as in ‘Jones believes, of Cicero (or: of his favorite Latin author), that he was bald’ — do not concern us in this paper. Such contexts, if they make sense, are by definition subject to a substitutivity principle for both names and descriptions. Rather we are concerned with the de dicto locution expressed explicitly in such formulations as, ‘Jones believes that: Cicero was bald’ (or: ‘Jones believes that: the man who denounced Catiline was bald’). The material after the colon expresses the content of Jones’s belief. Other, more explicit formulations are: ‘Jones believes the proposition—that—Cicero—was—bald,’ or even in the ‘formal’ mode, ‘The sentence ‘Cicero was bald’ gives the content of a belief of Jones’ (pp. 105-6).

In Kripke’s original example, a Frenchman, Pierre, comes to believe on the basis of cleverly crafted travel brochures that London is pretty—or as he would put it, that ‘Londres est jolie.’ Later he is hijacked to an unattractive part of London, and after learning the native language through assimilation (not through an ESL class or a French-English

25 Cf. ‘A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn,’ especially 234-47.


106
dictionary), he comes to believe that London is not pretty, without realizing that the cities he knows by the names ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ are one and the same. Even now that he is disposed, on reflection, to assent sincerely to ‘London is not pretty,’ Pierre continues to assent sincerely and reflectively also to ‘Londres est jolie.’ Kripke constructs a puzzle by pressing the question: Does Pierre believe that London is pretty? The question is not whether Pierre believes of London, de re, that it is pretty. That issue is easily settled. Like Ralph with respect to Ortcutt and his possible hidden agenda in Act I, Pierre both believes London to be pretty and disbelieves London to be pretty. But as Kripke has emphasized, his question is not this. Using our notation, we may say that Kripke is concerned not with

\[ \text{Pierre } B_{\text{dr}} \text{ (London, to be pretty),} \]

which (along with ‘Pierre } B_{\text{dr}} \text{ (London, } \neg \text{(to be pretty))’) is undoubtedly true with respect to the example, but with

\[ \text{(10) Pierre } B_{\text{dd}} \text{ that London is pretty.} \]

Kripke forcefully argues that any possible response to the question of whether (10) is true is beset with serious conceptual difficulties.

Kripke argues further that it is imprudent to draw any conclusions, positive or negative, with respect to the question. Nevertheless perhaps most commentators — including myself — are persuaded that (10), as well as

\[ \text{(11) Pierre } B_{\text{dd}} \text{ that } \neg \text{(London is pretty),} \]

are indeed true with respect to Kripke’s example. In short, I and others charge Pierre not merely with inconsistency, but with believing a contradiction. One lesson of Kripke’s puzzle is that not all contradictory beliefs subject the believer to justifiable censure.27

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27 I respond to Kripke’s puzzle, and to his objections to the solution I propose, in Fregè’s Puzzle, 129-32; and in ‘Illogical Belief,’ in J. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory (Atascadero, Ca.: Ridgeview 1989), 243-85.
Finding this conclusion unwarranted, Kripke considers a modified case for which such a conclusion is ruled out by hypothesis:

Suppose Pierre’s neighbors think that since they rarely venture outside their own ugly section, they have no right to any opinion as to the pulchritude of the whole city. Suppose Pierre shares their attitude. Then, judging by his failure to respond affirmatively to ‘London is pretty,’ we may judge, from Pierre’s behavior as an English speaker, that he lacks the belief that London is pretty: never mind whether he disbelieves it, as before, or whether, as in the modified story, he insists that he has no firm opinion on the matter.

Now ... we can derive a contradiction, not merely in Pierre’s judgments, but in our own. For on the basis of his behavior as an English speaker, we concluded that he does not believe that London is pretty (that is, that it is not the case that he believes that London is pretty). But on the basis of his behavior as a French speaker, we must conclude that he does believe that London is pretty. This is a contradiction (pp. 122-3).

As with Ralph in Act II, Pierre now both believes London to be pretty and suspends judgment. Despite the déjà vu of this second act, the transition from one act to the next in Kripke’s drama raises at least one very significant issue not raised in Kaplan’s continuation of Quine’s tale. As Kripke has laid out the problem, it is not to reconcile Pierre’s de re belief about London with his de re suspension of judgment. Kaplan has indicated one way to do this. The new problem is that Pierre seems for all the world to have a de dicto belief that London is pretty, on the one hand, but equally seems for all the world to harbor de dicto suspended judgment. With respect to Kripke’s new act, it would appear that (10) is true together not with (11) (which is clearly false) but with:

(12) Pierre \( S_{dd} \) that London is pretty.

(Compare (6) and (8) above.) Kaplan’s treatment of suspension of judgment expresses the withheld belief in (12) by:

(K12) \( \neg[Pierre \ B_{dd} \text{ that London is pretty}] \& \neg[Pierre \ B_{dd} \text{ that } \neg(\text{London is pretty})]. \)

But as Kripke emphasizes, this directly contradicts (10).

As I see it, Kripke’s puzzle is a problem of reconciliation. (Kripke sees it somewhat differently.) In this version of the puzzle, the problem is this: How can Pierre’s belief that London is pretty be reconciled with
his suspended judgment? In this respect, it is like the reconciliation problem in Kaplan’s Act II. The difference is that Kaplan’s problem concerned de re belief where Kripke’s concerns de dicto. Although the two reconciliation problems are variants of one another, Kaplan’s solution to the de re version does not extend in any straightforward manner to the de dicto. For Kaplan’s analysis of (8) into (K8) does not yield a straightforward analogue for (12); and indeed, his account of suspended judgment leads directly from (12) to (K12), whose differences with (10) are irreconcilable. What is wanted is a uniform solution to both the de re and the de dicto versions of the general reconciliation problem.

Kripke also notes (in connection with his Paderewski example) that the general problem does not in the end turn on issues concerning translation between languages. Nor does the general problem turn on a peculiarity of proper names. The same problem arises in connection with some general terms. Elsewhere I have proposed the strange case of Sasha, who believes that the condiment called ‘ketchup’ is supposed to be used with certain sandwiches, while the condiment called ‘catsup,’ which he wrongly takes to be distinct from ketchup, is supposed to be used instead with scrambled eggs. Suppose Sasha is persuaded that ketchup tastes good on hamburgers but claims to have no opinion concerning whether catsup does. Or again consider the confused native Santa Barbaran who sincerely declares, ‘When I was in England I tasted a terrific sauce made from toe-mah-toes. I wonder whether toe-ma-toes could be made into as good a sauce.’ Whether Kaplan’s strategy for dealing with de re suspension of judgment is successful or not, it has no obvious extension to this case of de dicto suspended judgment. The almost exact analogy between the problems posed by suspension of judgment in the de re and de dicto cases strongly suggests that a correct solution to any should apply to each.28

28 ‘A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn,’ 220-2. It is difficult to see how one can maintain that the belief that tomatoes make a good sauce is not a belief of a certain proposition (but instead a relation to various entities) without committing oneself to the conclusion that no belief is of a proposition.
Nathan Salmon

Pierre’s suspended judgment does not pose the same problem for my account that it does for Kaplan’s. I propose analyzing (10) and (12) into the following:

(S10)  (∃x)[Pierre BEL (that London is pretty, x)]
(S12)  (∃y)[Pierre grasps that London is pretty by means of y & ~(Pierre BEL [that London is pretty, y]) & ~(Pierre BEL [that ~(London is pretty), y])].

No contradiction follows from (S10) and (S12). The desired reconciliation is achieved. What does follow is that the x and the y are distinct proposition guises. In the example these are given to Pierre by the distinct sentences ‘Londres est jolie’ and ‘London is pretty,’ respectively.

The reconciliation is made possible through the limited commitments of (S12) as compared to those of (K12). Following the originator of the reconciliation problem, one might argue as follows:

Cases of the foregoing kind, which agree with Kaplan’s intuitions, argue an inadequacy in his regimentation of language. For in the same sense in which (10) and (11) do not express a censurable inconsistency on Pierre’s part, neither should (10) and (12) express an inconsistency on ours. But the temptation to look upon (10) and (K12) as contradictory is extremely difficult to resist. So long as Ralph or Pierre can believe of one person or city that it is two, as in Quine’s, Kaplan’s, and Kripke’s stories, we should be loath to make either (S8) or (S12) inexpressible.

If examples like Kaplan’s involving belief combined with suspension of judgment argue that de re belief is reducible to de dicto, they equally argue that the existentialism in terms of which the reduction proceeds is not peculiar to the de re notion, but internal to the de dicto notion. Recognition of this fact paves the way for modest reducibility in lieu of the more full-bodied variety. Through reconciliation comes insight.29

29 Cf. Frege’s Puzzle, 92-128.