

The Philosophy of David Kaplan
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Quantifying into the Unquantifiable

The Life and Work of David Kaplan

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Abstract and Keywords

This chapter focuses on the life and work of David Kaplan. Topics covered include the author's first encounter with Kaplan as well as the lessons learned from him; Kaplan's career in UCLA; the enduring legacy that Kaplan will leave to future generations; and Kaplan's philosophical interest.

Keywords: UCLA, Frege, philosophers, philosophical interest

I

We are gathered here to celebrate a happy milestone in the life of a special friend, David Benjamin Kaplan. Exactly one month ago, on September 17, the Earth had journeyed round the Sun exactly seventy times since the moment of his birth. Although we don't think of birthdays this way, it can be consoling to recognize that one's birthday constitutes what philosophers call a *merely Cambridge change*. Like Xanthippe's becoming a widow when the hemlock took its effect on Socrates, it is a nonintrinsic change in status in virtue of an intrinsic or "real" change in some related thing (in the case of a birthday, the Earth's periodic orbits since the time of birth). It is somewhat less comforting to acknowledge that, like Xanthippe's becoming a widow, this type of merely

Cambridge change also marks an accumulation of intrinsic changes. David has a great many non-merely-Cambridge properties that are equally celebration-worthy. It is my honor to provide a brief survey.

I once heard a speaker say, “Before I begin my talk, I would like to say a few words.” When I was asked to deliver a keynote address about David's life and work, I knew I could talk for hours about his work, but I wondered at first if there would be very much to say about his life. David's life is the Platonic Form of stability. He has been blissfully married to his college sweetheart for nearly fifty years, has been at UCLA for fifty-two years, and has lived in Los Angeles nearly his entire life. But there is much to say about his life—too much, in fact, for me to fit it all in today. David's work is only a part of his story. His life has been a rags-to-riches tale. From humble beginnings emerged a unique form of greatness not only as a philosopher but as a multifaceted, multitalented **(p. 26)** thinker, a pundit, a comic genius, a family man, a man of principle, a man of observation and a man of action, a man with a tremendous intellect and a heart to match. David is, quite simply, a force of nature. With all his energy and enthusiasm, it is hard to believe that he is even middle-aged, let alone advanced middle-aged. As long as he is alive, the UCLA philosophy department is in no danger of an energy crisis.

I begin by talking about another of David's merely Cambridge changes. To the best of my recollection, my first encounter with David was thirty-two years ago, during winter quarter 1972, when, on the encouragement—or, more accurately, at the insistence—of Harry Deutsch, I took David's course in intermediate logic. Harry had been my instructor in introductory logic during the preceding term. That was my first term at UCLA, but already I sensed that there was something very special, almost magical, going on here, especially within the logicians' wing of the department. I had completed two years as a math major at a respectable community college—including a semester-long “baby logic” course on truth tables and Aristotelian syllogisms, and another course on logical positivism taught by a former student of Hans Reichenbach—and I was struck by the obviously greater intelligence I found here. My logic TA was smarter than anyone I had ever encountered before coming to UCLA, and Harry was brighter still. There were rumors floating around about a genius named Richard Montague, who had died tragically only months before, and whom I knew only by description—as coauthor with Donald Kalish of the rigorously demanding but marvelous textbook we had used in the introductory logic course.

At the end of the term, Harry called in the two students who had performed best on his final exam, to give us a kind of recruitment pep talk, to counsel us about where to go from there. He told us that Professor David Kaplan, who was scheduled to teach the intermediate logic course the following term, was one of the most eminent, and one of the best, philosophers alive. By taking Professor Kaplan's logic course, we would be prepared to take his more advanced courses, as well as courses to be given by the great Alonzo Church and by a thirty-year-old phenomenon and former child prodigy named ‘Saul Kripke’ who would be visiting in the spring. The names—Church, Kaplan, Kripke—I had never heard before. But my very logical logic instructor spoke with such obvious admiration for these brilliant logicians that for me to ignore his solemn advice would have been illogical.

I didn't realize it at the time, but it was perhaps the second best piece of advice ever given, by anyone to anyone. That academic year of 1971–1972 was educationally the richest of my life, owing largely to David's masterful tutelage. For the next six years, until I left sunlight for ivy, I took every course that David taught. I did the same with my other teachers: Tyler Burge, Alonzo Church, Keith Donnellan, Don Kalish, and Saul Kripke. More than anyone else, it was David who would become my mentor. Under his influence I came to see just how extraordinarily fascinating **(p. 27)** philosophy is. It was only later that I came to the awareness that philosophy is *not* in fact a uniformly fascinating discipline. Some of you who have worked closely with David may not yet realize this yourselves, but some aspects of our discipline are in fact downright boring, or at best, an acquired taste. What was genuinely fascinating, I later discovered, was what happens when philosophical material is wrought by the hands of a true master.

Like everyone here, I have learned from David about many things, philosophical and otherwise, and I am continuing to learn from him. In the preface to my book *Frege's Puzzle*, I acknowledged my indebtedness to David “both for the many ideas that stem from his work and for the many intellectual benefits that accrue from being his friend.” David told me at the time that that was the nicest thing anyone had ever said of him. I still feel a touch of sadness at recalling his remark. It is no exaggeration to say that to know David is to be a student. Perhaps those of us in David's debt have not said as much as we should have because when we're speaking with him, we're too busy taking mental notes. Also, when speaking with him, it can sometimes be a challenge to get a word in edgewise. I trust this celebration will rectify that situation.

II

David wrote the following autobiographical comment: “Throughout my life, I have had the uncommonly good fortune to fall under the influence of persons of great intelligence, good humor, and tolerance. Principal among these are my wonderful parents,

Martha and Irv Kaplan, my inspiring teachers, Rudolf Carnap and Donald Kalish, and my remarkable wife, Renée Kaplan, the *ne plus ultra* of all three qualities."[1]

Irv and Martha were first-generation Americans, neither of whom graduated from college. As a child, their son attended a variety of schools, mostly in California, including a military school. His teachers considered him disruptive because he talked a lot. But he thrived at Palm Springs Elementary, which was a modern, unstructured school. Always politically active, when he was thirteen he worked on the congressional campaign of Jerry Voorhis against Richard Nixon. David's one abiding passion during his high school and early college career at John Muir School in Pasadena was jazz, and he played trumpet in a jazz combo. He was admitted to UCLA in 1951, but only on academic probation, owing to poor grades. His skill as a jazz trumpeter was limited as compared with that of his extremely talented peers, and he eventually gave up on his hope of becoming a professional musician. His career as a UCLA student was in serious jeopardy. With this inauspicious beginning, no one could have guessed **(p. 28)** that David would soon be on his way to becoming a UCLA institution in his own right.

It happened by chance. His admissions adviser, Veronica, persuaded the former music major, now undeclared, to take a course taught by her husband. This was perhaps the single best piece of advice ever given, by anyone to anyone—not only because of how well it served David (others have been equally well served by their advisers) but even more because of how well it served Philosophy. Veronica's husband was Don Kalish; the course was introductory formal logic. David agreed to take the course when Veronica assured him he would love it, and that one could do well in logic even if one knew nothing about mathematics, indeed even if one knew nothing about anything. By the end of the term, David had transformed Veronica's sales pitch into a theorem.

As many here know, Don Kalish was a deep thinker and a phenomenal teacher. At UCLA he created a uniquely supportive intellectual environment for his students, one perfectly suited to David's temperament and talent. Don didn't merely instruct; he nurtured. The intellectual environment that he created valued analytical power and insight above all else, even while it strongly encouraged the efforts of students who (unlike David) didn't meet the highest standards of rigor. It was surely at least partly from Don that David acquired his skill at cultivating and polishing the raw talent and occasional diamond-in-the-rough that parade through Dodd Hall.

The die was cast. His days of playing jazz trumpet behind him, David would instead become the Miles Davis of philosophy. David took other logic-like courses. He took every course that Don taught. But there were still problems. While David excelled in his logic -oriented courses, he didn't do as well in some of his other courses. If there was one thing that the budding logician and future eminent professor couldn't care less about, it was grades. Qua student, he was either outstanding or a failure, depending on the course. His grades during his first two years here were nearly all As and Fs, with a few Cs thrown in for good measure. I still marvel at the sanguine disinterest that his uneven performance betrays.

David took a course in inductive logic from the distinguished logical positivist, Hans Reichenbach. There he met a psych major, Renée Singer, who would become his life partner, soul mate, and wife. Most of the course was nontechnical. Renée took excellent notes but didn't study much. David tutored her on the technical bits in preparation for the final exam. Renée earned an A. Her tutor, the future Hans Reichenbach Professor of Scientific Philosophy, initially received a C, until the TAs persuaded Reichenbach to give David a B. The following year, David took Reichenbach's course on probability theory. Reichenbach died midterm, and a talented Berkeley graduate student was brought in, on Don Kalish's recommendation, to fill the void. It was Richard Montague. David learned important lessons from Richard. He became a friend and, eventually, a collaborator.

I studied at UCLA throughout much of the 1970s. I found the study of philosophy here to be a serious and rigorous enterprise while, at the same **(p. 29)** time, an immensely enjoyable experience. By that time (indeed, by the time I was born), Don Kalish had already set a special tone for the study of philosophy at UCLA—or at least for the study of logic-oriented philosophy (philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science). Richard Montague had raised the bar higher still. David continues that noble tradition. Many of us here today have had the splendid fortune of being trained in the optimal intellectual environment created by Don, Richard, David, and several others. In a labor of love, David is currently bringing the latest in technological advances to "the delightful system of boxes and cancels" (as Don called it), which Don and Richard had co-invented. David will tell you that he is doing this for a host of very important pedagogical reasons, and to make logic even more fun for students. And that is, of course, quite true. It is equally obvious, though, that he is also doing it to honor the memory of Don and Richard. It is a fitting tribute.

In 1954, Rudolf Carnap replaced Hans Reichenbach as UCLA's senior philosopher of science, raising the bar higher still. By any standard, Carnap (as he preferred to be called) was not only a great philosopher but also one of the great thinkers of the twentieth century. And by all accounts, he was a great teacher and a great guy. Carnap's students had included such philosophical luminaries as Carl "Peter" Hempel and Willard van Orman Quine. Quine described Carnap as "a towering figure...the dominant figure in philosophy from the 1930's onward, as Russell had been in the decades before," adding that "Carnap more than anyone else was the embodiment of logical positivism, logical empiricism, the Vienna Circle."[2] And like all who studied under Carnap, Quine consistently referred to Carnap as "my greatest teacher" (p. xxiii). David, still an undergraduate in 1954, became Carnap's student, while David and Renée became close friends of the Carnaps.

David buckled down and started taking grades a bit more seriously. Under pressure to complete his undergraduate degree—including a promise from his fiancée that they would not marry otherwise—he finally passed the courses he needed to fulfill the lower-division requirements. After four and a half years, he received his B.A. in philosophy in January 1956 and married Renée a few days later. He received the equivalent of a B.A. in mathematics the following year—incidentally, while working half-time as an electronics engineer doing logical design of computers at Hughes Aircraft. Carnap felt it would be best for David if he enrolled in graduate school elsewhere, but David couldn't fathom the thought of leaving the riches of UCLA. After serving as a lecturer at USC in the summer of 1957, David enrolled in graduate school here, where he attended Carnap's lectures on semantics, including his yet unpublished ideas on intensional logic.

(p. 30) In 1958, as a second-year graduate student, David studied a review by Alonzo Church of A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth, and Logic*, in which Church decisively refuted Ayer's attempt to provide definitions that would facilitate the logical positivist's task of distilling what is empirical, and hence cognitively significant, from metaphysics-laden theories. David saw that Church's result could be strengthened using a different proof strategy. At Montague's suggestion, David applied his ideas to Carnap's much more sophisticated attempt to define notions like that of *empirical significance*, and he found that Carnap's project—which Carnap had believed in for thirty years—was indeed subject to the same sort of collapse as Ayer's. When David presented his results to Carnap, Carnap was not merely gracious in accepting the legitimacy of the criticism. He was altogether pleased by the philosophical advance, even though it came at the expense of some of his central ideas. Carnap's selfless devotion to philosophy had a tremendous impact on David. I have seen the effect of this whenever I myself have offered criticisms of this or that detail in David's work. Often he tactfully rebuts my criticism; sometimes he accepts the point. Invariably, he receives my comment with characteristic humor, grace, and appreciation.

Two years after refuting Carnap's definition of empirical significance, David demonstrated that the achievement was no fluke by doing much the same sort of thing, this time with respect to Alonzo Church, who was visiting at UCLA and lecturing on his own ideas regarding intensional logic (1960–1961). Kaplan spotted a significant oversight in the axioms of LSD (Church's Logic of Sense and Denotation). One of Church's axioms, when taken together with some obvious facts, yielded the disastrous consequence that, for any object x, there is only one Fregean concept of x—for example, only one truth, only one falsehood, and (since there are necessary truths) no contingent facts whatsoever. This refutation ultimately led to Church's Revised Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation—or, as David called it, the Church Reformation—which corrected the destructive axiom. It also led to David's doctoral dissertation, "Foundations of Intensional Logic" (1964)—the last dissertation Carnap directed—which provided for the first time a set-theoretic model theory for the axiomatic logic of Fregean intensions. David's model theory could be used as a foundation for a semantics for modality. (In particular, a Kripke-style possible-worlds semantics, for example, could be constructed on this basis.)

In the grand tradition of earning a Ph.D. in philosophy at UCLA, David completed the four-year program after only eight and a half years. By this time he had already been a member of the UCLA faculty for two years. As he had with his bachelor's degree, David earned his Ph.D. under pressure, this time in order to maintain his young family's lifestyle while he would be teaching at the University of Michigan during the spring of 1964, where his salary depended on his having a Ph.D. David actually completed his dissertation while he was in Michigan, **(p. 31)** though he had already passed his final defense the previous December. In the fall of 1964, David became assistant professor at UCLA. He was promoted to associate professor with tenure the following year. He was promoted to full professor in 1970, although the promotion was delayed because some of the UC regents at the time believed David had been recommended for promotion not for the quality of his work but on the basis of his very public opposition to the firing of Angela Davis. (He was one of the plaintiffs who won a judgment that, in effect, voided the firing.)

Since then, David has been gaining accolades and international distinction. In 1979, he advanced to a special faculty status, known at UC as "above scale" (coincidentally, at the same time that he and the other members of my doctoral committee, which he

chaired, approved my dissertation). Since 1994, he has been the Hans Reichenbach Professor of Scientific Philosophy. He has served extensively in the UCLA Division of the Academic Senate, the faculty governing body. He was recently named one of the "Top 20 Professors" in UCLA's history by the publication *UCLA Today*.

III

I would like to say a word about the enduring legacy that David will leave to future generations. I can put it best by quoting another great contemporary philosopher, with whom our friend has a good deal in common. Woody Allen said, "I do not wish to achieve immortality through my work. I wish to achieve it by not dying." Like Woody Allen, David will live on through his work long after most of the rest of us are forgotten. I'll make no attempt to summarize his work. Instead, by way of an introduction to David the philosopher, I shall report some offhand remarks he has made either to me directly or in my presence. I mentally recorded these offhand remarks because I was certain they revealed something ironic, puzzling, or otherwise interesting about a brilliant philosopher. (Not to worry, David. I believe virtually none of the remarks I will quote were made confidentially.)

The first remark I will quote concerns a very particular pedagogical question. Isn't it better to teach Russell's Theory of Descriptions by having students read the chapter titled "Descriptions" from Russell's spirited monograph, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*,[3] rather than Russell's classic "On Denoting"?[4] After all, the book chapter provides a more orderly presentation of the central ideas, free of the arrogant, misplaced criticisms (e.g., of Frege) and other confusions (e.g., of **(p. 32)** use and mention) that clutter the classic article from *Mind*. David's answer is a resounding "*NO WAY!*" "On Denoting" is the richer piece, and the pedagogically more appropriate, David insisted, in part precisely *because* of the various misplaced criticisms and confusions—even including the notorious "Gray's *Elegy*" passage, which is routinely skipped over in undergraduate courses. As an undergraduate, I had studied "On Denoting" in a course with David and also in a course with Alonzo Church and in a more advanced course with Saul Kripke, and I had found the experiences extremely instructive and illuminating. Nevertheless, on hearing David's strong preference for teaching "On Denoting," I was struck by the very idea that it is sometimes actually better to teach specific material by exposing students to historically important confusions, and correcting those confusions, instead of restricting the student's exposure to the sort of elegance and precision that one finds, for example, in Church's authoritative logic text. This idea has stuck with me, and I have tried to employ it in my own teaching (with somewhat mixed results).

Another philosophy article that, like "On Denoting," presents an opportunity to instruct by clearing away some of its confusions is Quine's classic "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes."[5] In fact, although they are separated by a span of fifty years, Quine's article covers a good deal of the same conceptual terrain as Russell's, only in a more confused and biased manner—specifically, the *de-re/de-dicto* distinction, as given through quantification into and quantification within propositional-attitude contexts. David loves both of these articles and has commented extensively on each. In fact, he has contributed extensive commentaries on Quine's article to two Festschrifts, nearly twenty years apart: "Quantifying In" to *Words and Objections*, edited by D. Davidson and J. Hintikka;[6] "Opacity" to *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine*, edited by E. Hahn and P. Schilpp.[7] These commentaries represent two very distinct periods in David's philosophical development—the earlier commentary reflecting the Fregean presuppositions he had acquired from Carnap and Church, the latter reflecting the revolutionary ideas of the anti-Fregean *direct-reference theory*, of which David is a cofounder (alongside Keith Donnellan, Saul Kripke, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Hilary Putnam, and others).

In fact—and this is the second remark I will quote—I once heard David say that he has always been interested in only one philosophical problem: how to understand quantification into an oblique context. The remark **(p. 33)** immediately struck me as nonsense. I had seen David in action many times. Especially at colloquium talks by other speakers, no one is more impressive. Even on the basis of a speaker's poorly organized presentation of half-baked ideas, David courteously and elegantly takes intellectual command of the situation—clarifying the conceptual impasse that makes the project philosophically interesting in the first place, redefining the problem, reconstructing the speaker's solution, developing it, exposing weaknesses in the solution, proposing an alternative, more satisfying solution, shedding new light on issues that remain in need of further exploration. And as far as I have been able to determine, he does this regardless of the particulars: regardless of the field, the project, and the existing literature (which anyway he hasn't read). Whether it is history of philosophy, applied ethics, philosophy of action, or the philosophical significance of ballet—no matter. It is awesome to watch, not to mention a humbling experience. How could someone do this so well whose only philosophical interest is the question of how to understand quantification into oblique contexts? I'll return to this question in a moment.

On another occasion—and this is the third remark I will quote—David expressed puzzlement to me that "Quantifying In" (1968) is still the most frequently reprinted of his articles, especially when much of his subsequent work is more significant. As I mentioned, David had produced important and influential treatises that decidedly refute the philosophical presuppositions and

propensities of his earlier effort. The subsequent work included David's "Opacity," which supersedes "Quantifying In." David's widely studied work on demonstratives and the direct-reference theory also repudiated some of the central philosophical ideas of "Quantifying In." "Why always with 'Quantifying In'?" David wondered. I proposed as a possible explanation that "Quantifying In" tackles a very difficult problem for a thoroughgoing Fregean philosophy of semantics, and a general Fregean point of view will always be a very tempting stance. But my explanation was shallow, and David summarily dismissed it.

Let me try again. If there is one philosophical idea that underlies a great deal of David's work, it is that of a *singular proposition.* This is what our British colleagues call an *object-involving* or *object-dependent proposition*, that is, a proposition that is about some particular thing by virtue of that thing's occurring directly in the proposition as a proper constituent, instead of being represented therein by means of something conceptual or intensional, such as a Fregean sense (*Sinn*). As David notes, this is exactly the sort of proposition that is expressed when one uses a demonstrative appropriately in a sentence—for example, while pointing to something that is visually discernible in the context. As David also notes, it is also exactly the sort of proposition that is expressed by an "open sentence" (or open formula) under an assignment of values to its free variables.

The very idea of a singular proposition is due primarily to Russell. He had the idea well before he invented his famous Theory of Descriptions, but the idea arises quite naturally in connection with that theory's **(p. 34)** distinctions of scope. For the *primary-occurrence* reading (i.e., the *wide-scope* reading) of 'George IV wondered whether Scott is the author of *Waverley*' positions an open sentence ('Scott is *x*') within the scope of an expression of propositional attitude ('George IV wondered whether'). There is a pressing question here for the Fregean: On the primary-occurrence reading, which proposition does King George allegedly wonder about? Not so for the Russellian. If the question is raised, Russell's theory provides a ready response: The variable is a logically proper name, and the open sentence therefore expresses a singular proposition about *Waverley*'s author, under the relevant assignment. The original problem of quantifying in is a Fregean problem, not Russellian.[8]

The problem took on a peculiar spin in Quine's critique. He argued that quantification into a nonextensional ("opaque") context is meaningless, in fact semantically incoherent. Suppose, for example, that of the following two sentences, the first is true, and the second false, on their Russellian secondary-occurrence (narrow-scope) readings.

(1) George IV believes that the author of *Waverley* wrote *Rob Roy*

(2) George IV believes that the author of *The Lady of the Lake* wrote *Rob Roy*

(King George presumably knew that Sir Walter Scott had written the poem *The Lady of the Lake.* However, Scott concealed his authorship of both *Waverley* and *Rob Roy*, while letting it be known that the same author had written both novels.) Consider now the particular construction,

(3) George IV believes of the author of *The Lady of the Lake* that he wrote *Rob Roy*,

or what comes to the same thing, Russell's analysis of the primary-occurrence reading of (2),

(3′) $(\exists x)[(y)(y$ wrote *The Lady of the Lake* $\equiv x = y)$ & George IV believes that x wrote *Rob Roy*].

This construction, which involves quantification into 'George IV believes that,' is supposed to be somehow less specific, hence weaker, than either (1) and (2) in its attribution to King George. It might appear that (3) and (3′) are therefore true in virtue of the truth of (1), even though (2) is false. But, Quine argued, (3) and (3′) cannot even be assigned a univocal truth-value. For according to classical Tarskian semantics, (3′) is true if and only if the author of *The Lady of the Lake* (i.e., Scott) satisfies the right-hand conjunct,

(4) George IV believes that x wrote *Rob Roy*.

(Analogously, (3) is true if and only if 'George IV believes that he wrote *Rob Roy*' is true when the pronoun 'he' is used to designate Scott.) And **(p. 35)** there's the rub. For Scott neither satisfies nor fails to satisfy (4) (ditto 'George IV believes that he wrote *Rob Roy*') independently of how he is described. Scott satisfies (4) under the description 'the author of *Waverley*' (substituting the latter for '*x*') but not under the description 'the author of *The Lady of the Lake,*' whereas the variable '*x*' itself (and likewise the pronoun) carries with it no description whatsoever. The variable's only meaning is the individual assigned to it as value. The variable is like life: it has no more meaning than whatever meaning one chooses to give it.

Quite properly, Quine was not content with this conclusion. For King George did believe *someone* to have written *Rob Roy*—by virtue of believing that whoever wrote *Waverley* also wrote *Rob Roy*—and that someone was in fact Walter Scott. Quine proposed replacing the supposedly incoherent construction (3) with a coherent substitute, which David calls 'syntactically *de re*':

(5) George IV believes$_R$ the author of *The Lady of the Lake* to have written *Rob Roy*.

The subscript '*R*,' which stands for 'relational' (in contrast to 'notional'), indicates that the transitive verb is different from that occurring in (1) through (4). The verb for relational (*de re*) belief takes an indirect object as well as a direct object ('the author of *The Lady of the Lake*' and 'to have written *Rob Roy*'), whereas the verb for notional (*de dicto*) belief takes only a direct object ('that the author of *The Lady of the Lake* wrote *Rob Roy*'). In (2), 'the author of *The Lady of the Lake*' is within the clutches of opacity; in (5) it has been liberated, available for substitution or *EG*.[9]

Ostensibly, "Quantifying In" is a neo-Quinean program. Its burden is to provide a philosophical analysis of relational belief in terms of notional, that is, a philosophical definition of the syntactically *de re* verb 'believes$_R$' in terms of the syntactically *de dicto* 'believes.' (More accurately, the ostensible project is to provide an analysis of Quine's allegedly intension-free, antiseptic replacement for 'believes$_R$' in terms of his equally antiseptic replacement for 'believes.') "Quantifying In" analyzes (5) (roughly) as:

(5′) ($\exists\alpha$)[α **represents**$_B$ the author of *The Lady of the Lake* for George IV & George IV believes$^{\ulcorner}\alpha$ wrote *Rob Roy*$^{\urcorner}$],

where, on David's analysis, a term α **represents**$_B$ an individual *x* for a subject *y* iff α designates *x* and is also a *vivid name of x* for *y*, in a special **(p. 36)** sense of 'name *of*.' Although David does not provide a full analysis of what it is for a term (really a concept) to be a "name of" an object, he does provide a working idea.[10] The important feature is that it is not merely a matter of *fit* (which might be accidental), but a matter of a *real* connection—on the analogy of a photograph being a picture of an object even if it is a terrible picture that better resembles another object. David's **representation**$_B$ is a very special kind of designation, therewith avoiding the excesses of *latitudinarianism* (or "unrestricted exportation")—the doctrine that *de dicto* (supplemented by an existential premise) entails *de re*.

From the perspective of "Opacity," the project of "Quantifying In" is wrongheaded right from the outset. For as David shows in the later commentary, Quine's argument that (3) is incoherent is itself incorrect. Indeed, with all due respect, Russell's Theory of Descriptions together with his apparatus of singular propositions already prove that (3) is perfectly coherent. There is no need to replace (3) with (5), and hence no need to analyze (5) other than by means of (3) itself. In short, "Quantifying In" is a solution without a problem. It haggles with Quine over price, while it buys his defective bill of goods.

While this diagnosis of the situation is roughly correct as far as it goes, it misses the big picture. One need not endorse Quine's replacement of (3) by (5). Especially if one questions the philosophical propriety of singular propositions, as Frege did, one may want an analysis of (3) itself in terms of belief of Fregean "thoughts" (*Gedanken*), that is, in terms of general (nonsingular) propositions. The analysis that "Quantifying In" provides for (5) may be pressed into service for this neo-Fregean purpose.

Only now the spin is somewhat different. On Frege's view, a term cannot be assigned Scott (or anything else) as its designatum directly. Instead, the term must be assigned a sense, which independently provides an object on its own hook. For the Fregean, there are infinitely many propositions, *that the such-and-such wrote Rob Roy*, each about Scott, and none is privileged. The open sentence, '*x* wrote *Rob Roy*,' may equally express any one of them, but only by assigning the relevant sense-value to its free variable (the semantic analogue of substituting a description for the variable). As Russell put the matter, "there is no backward road" from Scott to any specific concept of him. The issue of which proposition is designated by 'that *x* wrote *Rob Roy*' turns on which particular Scott-determining sense-value is assigned to the variable. In the absence of any assignment of a sense-value to its free variable, the open 'that'-clause is without meaning.[11]

(p. 37) "Quantifying In" indirectly provides a way for a Fregean to make sense of an open 'that'-clause without resorting to singular propositions, without assigning sense-values to its free variables, and without even regarding an open 'that'-clause as a designating expression at all. This can be accomplished by borrowing an idea from Russell, that of a *contextual definition*. "Quantifying In" insightfully lays out a way of isolating a special subclass of propositions about Scott—let us call them the *representational thoughts*—that invoke a special sort of individual concept of Scott, one that **represents**$_B$ Scott for George IV. For the Fregean, although 'that *x* wrote *Rob Roy*' has no meaning in isolation, it can be given a contextual definition that uses the subclass of representational thoughts while simulating the assignment of sense-values to the free variable. Specifically, the whole

consisting of an open 'that'-clause, ⌜that φ_x⌝ with a single occurrence of '*x*' as its only free variable, occurring in an atomic sentential context,

(*C*) ψ(that φ_x)

is defined as an abbreviation for

(*C′*) (∃α)[α **represents** $_{\psi}$ *x* & ψ(⌜φ_{α}⌝)].[12]

In effect, singular propositions are deemed *logical constructs* (to use an older terminology) out of representational thoughts: discourse that appears on the surface to be about a singular proposition is revealed instead, on analysis, to be about *some representational thought or other*.

Putting 'wrote *Rob Roy*' for φ and 'George IV believes' for ψ in (*C*) and (*C′*), one obtains the following as a purported analysis of (4):

(4′) (∃α)[α **represents** $_{\mathbf{B}}$ *x* for George IV & George IV believes⌜α wrote *Rob Roy*⌝].

Plugging this in for (4) in (3′) yields a trivial equivalent of (5′). We thus blaze a new trail from (3) to (5′), via Russell's (3′) instead of taking Quine's unnecessary detour through (5).[13]

In the original, neo-Quinean project of "Quantifying In," objectual quantification into the nonextensional is shunned as impermissible quantification **(p. 38)** into the "opaque," while Quine's substitute relational sense is analyzed in terms of the notional sense. On the reconstruction just suggested, apparent objectual quantification into the nonextensional is embraced, as shorthand for legitimized quantification into the "oblique" (*ungerade*), and it is explained without resorting to Russell's singular propositions in terms of representational Fregean thoughts. Looked at in this alternative, neo-Fregean way, "Quantifying In" completes Frege's program, filling in its most problematic lacuna in a manner that is (or purports to be) sensitive to the subtle discriminations among our ordinary *de re* attributions.[14]

On the neo-Fregean project, one resists Quine's defective bill of goods, and one still gets the discounted price…on a different bill of goods. The new bill of goods is the rejection of singular propositions—or the demotion of singular propositions to the status of mere *logical construct*. But David has since come to like singular propositions. In fact, he loves them. So do I; I'd be nowhere without them. And neither would David. Does this mean that there is nothing of value to salvage from the project of "Quantifying In" for the later Kaplan (i.e., for the author of "Opacity"), or for the present me?

It does not. Let there be quantification into nonextensional contexts. Let there be singular propositions. Let George IV believe of the author of *The Lady of the Lake, de re,* that he wrote *Rob Roy*, while doubting or wondering *de dicto* whether the author of *The Lady of the Lake* wrote *Rob Roy*. Let King George do this by believing the singular proposition about the author of *The Lady of the Lake* that he wrote *Rob Roy* while doubting the general proposition. There is still a problem. For King George believes the singular proposition that Scott wrote *Rob Roy* precisely *by* believing a (more or less) general proposition, that the author of *Waverley* wrote *Rob Roy*. So do I, and so do you—just as Quine's Ralph believes the singular proposition about Ortcutt that he is a spy by believing that the man in the brown hat is a spy, and Kripke's Pierre believes the **(p. 39)** singular proposition about London that it is pretty by believing that the European city called 'Londres' is pretty. But neither King George nor we believe any singular proposition by virtue of believing that the shortest spy is a spy. In particular, we fail to believe the singular proposition about the shortest spy that he or she is a spy. We cannot even apprehend the proposition.[15] Nor do we believe any singular proposition by virtue of believing that the first child to be born in the twenty-second century will be born in the twenty-second century. Nor do we even apprehend any such proposition. And naming that future person 'Newman 1' gets us no closer to doing so.[16] There is what Derridean literary theorists would call a *difference-in-between* the two sorts of cases: Walter Scott and Ortcutt, on the one hand, and the shortest spy and Newman 1, on the other. What is the difference between them? Why can't we cognitively access singular propositions about the shortest spy or Newman 1 in the same way that we access singular propositions about the author of *Waverley*?

One possible answer is that 'the author of *Waverley*' and 'the man in the brown hat' are **representing** $_{\mathbf{B}}$ terms, whereas 'the shortest spy' and 'Newman 1' are not. Question answered, problem solved. If so, "Quantifying In" shows its far-reaching vision by coming to our rescue even in the face of our acceptance of singular propositions. We have a deconstruction of "Quantifying In" and a reconstruction of it, this time neither as a neo-Quinean project nor as a neo-Fregean one, but as neo-Russellian.

Except that none of these terms can reasonably be called "vivid." ('The author of *Waverley*' *vivid*? 'The man in the brown hat'? Give me a break.)[17] David's notion of **representation** $_B$ is, at bottom, a Fregean surrogate, or reasonable facsimile, for Russell's rather austere notion of *knowledge by direct acquaintance*. What is needed is further distance from Russell, by means of an even weaker notion of *representation*. But representation must not be weakened too much, else we stumble into the pit of latitudinarianism. I say we dump vividness and be done with it. I submit that the difference between the two sorts of cases lies in the fact that 'the author of *Waverley*' (or rather its content) is a name *of* Scott (in David's sense of 'name *of*') and 'the man in the brown hat' is likewise a name *of* Ortcutt, whereas neither 'the shortest spy' nor 'Newman 1' is a name *of* its respective designatum. And there we have our solution.[18]

(p. 40) In the course of my investigative research in preparation for this essay, I came across an internal departmental memo from the time that "Quantifying In" first appeared, in which David described the piece in these words: " 'Quantifying In' contains almost everything (of a non-technical nature) I have thought of concerning oblique contexts over a period of six or eight years. It is my most daring piece as measured by the proportion of half-baked ideas..." He then adds a remarkable disclaimer, which I had always thought was invented by another of my early influences: "...and I would not have released it had it not been for extreme pressure from the editors" (from a December 1969 memo to the departmental chair concerning his research; David apparently failed to secure the copyright to the disclaimer).

One answer to David's later question, "Why always with 'Quantifying In'?" is that it has the same sort of depth and complexity as "On Denoting." (Indeed, it has significantly more depth and complexity than "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes.") Each reading brings with it new insights and conceptual gems. And even its historically important mistakes, confusions, and "half-baked ideas" have a deeper, visionary wisdom of their own. I hope David will someday find a way to come to terms with the fact that it is a great piece of philosophy.

IV

I return now to the question of why the analytical master would say that he was always interested in only one issue. There is, I think, a two-part answer. First and more obvious, David *is* interested in other philosophical issues besides how to understand quantification into nonextensional contexts. It is just that he is not *as* interested in those other issues.

Even this might seem a bit of an exaggeration. A quick overview of David's most significant publications reveals a very much broader philosophical interest, as the speakers at this celebration will attest. One finds **(p. 41)** an interest in demonstratives and other context-sensitive expressions, in Russell's theory of definite descriptions, in Keith Donnellan's and Kripke's accounts of ordinary proper names, in modal logic and possible-worlds semantics, in general intensional logic, even in what might be termed *philosophy of syntax*, and much more—a grab bag of philosophical topics.

More to the point, with regard to other philosophical issues, there is a sense in which the specifics really *don't* matter. There is a conceptual impasse, and there is a way to think fruitfully about the problem, maybe even to solve it. That is an end in itself. David is a born problem solver, and he is a born teacher. One might even say that he is a *compulsive* problem solver and teacher. In him, the urge to combine the two whenever possible is irresistible. And no sooner does he solve a problem than he finds an even more difficult problem, maybe even a problem lurking in the solution to the first. Instead of "If it ain't broke, don't fix it," David's credo is "If it's broke, let's fix it together; and if it ain't broke, something else is." And his motto should be, "Come on, it'll be fun!" It always is.

Finally, I would like to say a word on behalf of those of us who have studied under David. Leonardo da Vinci said, "The disciple who does not surpass his master fails him." Now there was a guy who really knew how to lay a major guilt trip on his students. Reflecting on Leonardo's words, it can be consoling to remember that, as a young man, Carnap took courses in logic and some of its philosophical applications (including logicism) from none other than Gottlob Frege. Consequently, many of us here today are not only students of David and grand-students of Carnap but also, in some sense, great-grand-students of Frege.[19] We can all appreciate our intellectual pedigree. If one is going to fail to surpass one's predecessors, they might as well be unsurpassable. Also, if one is going to fail at something, one might as well do it in a very big way. I am confident that I speak for all who studied under David when I say that we feel no guilt whatsoever at having failed him by Leonardo's standards. On the contrary, it has been our privilege.

Would all of you with whom David has shared part of his life and part of himself please join me in thanking him. May he continue to be happy for many returns of the Earth to its current position relative to the Sun. Or to put it in terms of merely Cambridge change, many happy returns. **(p. 42)**

Notes:

(1.) "Afterthoughts," in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, eds., *Themes from Kaplan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 565n.

(2.) "Homage to Carnap," in R. C. Buck and R. S. Cohen, eds., *PSA 1970: In Memory of Rudolf Carnap* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1971), xxii–xxiii.

(3.) Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1919), chap. 16.

(4.) Russell, *Mind* (1905), 479–493.

(5.) Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," *Journal of Philosophy* 53 (1956), 177–187.

(6.) Kaplan, "Quantifying In," in D. Davidson and J. Hintikka, eds., *Words and Objections* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), 206–242; originally published in *Synthese* 18 (1968): 237–273.

(7.) Kaplan, "Opacity," in E. Hahn and P. Schilpp, eds., *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1986), 229–289. Quine in his replies called "Quantifying In" a "masterly essay," and "Opacity" a "fun to read workout" (p. 290).

(8.) This is not to say that there are no pressing questions for Russell in connection with quantifying in.

(9.) The logical form of (5) is that of a triadic predication, as follows: **Believes** $_R$ (George IV, the author of *The Lady of the Lake*, to have written *Rob Roy*). Quine would write (5) thus: 'George IV believes *z*(*z* wrote *Rob Roy*) of the author of *The Lady of the Lake*.' David formulates his version using passive voice: 'The author of *The Lady of the Lake* is believed by George IV to have written *Rob Roy*.' I cannot believe that the passive construction makes any difference. It is possible David disagrees.

(10.) Strictly speaking, on the "Quantifying In" analysis, the vivid name α is ultimately not a term but an individual concept, and the quasi quotation marks are *quasi* indirect-quotation marks. This leaves David's concept of *vividness* and being a *name of* something in need of further explanation. Still, one gets the rough idea.

(11.) Though they are somewhat different, Quine's argument against quantification into a nonextensional context owes more to Frege than Quine explicitly recognizes.

(12.) In calling (*C*) *atomic*, I mean that it represents an *n*-adic predicate together with *n* occurrences of syntactically appropriate terms, at least one of which is the open 'that'-clause, $\ulcorner$that $\varphi_x \urcorner$. The definition is generalizable in the obvious way (and in alternative ways, as David indirectly shows in "Opacity") to open 'that'-clauses with more than one free variable-occurrence.

(13.) I proposed this alternative, neo-Fregean interpretation in "Is *De Re* Belief Reducible to *De Dicto*?" in A. Kazmi, ed., *Meaning and Reference, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 23, 1997* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1998), 92; reprinted in Nathan Salmon, *Content, Cognition, and Communication* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chap. 15. There is at least the suggestion of this idea already in "Quantifying In," in its third footnote. Cf. also Quine, "Intensions Revisited," in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds., *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 274 n. 9; and again "Is *De Re* Belief Reducible to *De Dicto?*" 92–93n.

(14.) The original analysis purports to uncover an existential quantifier and the accompanying left-hand conjunct 'α ***represents*** $_B$ *x*' that were allegedly concealed in (5). The analysis locates the hidden restricted quantifier ultimately in the verb 'believes $_R$' for *de re* ("relational") belief. The neo-Fregean contextual-definition reconstruction purports to uncover the same restricted quantifier allegedly concealed in (3) and (3′), locating the hidden quantifier instead ultimately in open 'that'-clauses. Either way, as with Russell's contextual definitions for "denoting phrases" (determiner phrases), the restricted quantifier may compete for dominant position with other operators in more complex constructions (e.g., with the negation in 'George IV does not believe Scott to have

written *Rob Roy*,' or with that in 'George IV does not believe of Scott that he wrote *Rob Roy*'), with resulting scope ambiguities. Cf. section XI of "Quantifying In."

Influenced by section XI of "Quantifying In," I argued in *Frege's Puzzle* (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview, 1986, 1991), chap. 8, that all belief attributions—*de dicto* and *de re* alike—involve a hidden restricted existential quantifier, though a rather different one from that posited in "Quantifying In." I locate the hidden restricted quantifier ultimately in the verb 'believes,' hence in the very notion of *de dicto* belief. Cf. section IV of "Is *De Re* Belief Reducible to *De Dicto*?"

(15.) Contrary to popular opinion, it does not follow that we cannot even assert the proposition. This is something we easily can do, even if only by introducing a name.

(16.) Though doing so does enable us to assert such propositions. See the previous note.

(17.) For this reason, the author of "Quantifying In" presumably answered Quine's puzzle question 'Is Ortcutt such that Ralph believes that he is a spy?' in the negative. This despite the fact that Quine sets out his example with the explicit stipulation that Ortcutt is such that Ralph believes he is a spy.

(18.) Cf. Keith Donnellan, "The Contingent *A Priori* and Rigid Designators," in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds., *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 45–60, sec. VI, at p. 58; and my "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly," in A. Bezeudenhaut and M. Reimer, eds., *Descriptions and Beyond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 230–260; ; reprinted in Nathan Salmon, *Content, Cognition, and Communication* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chap. 18.

I regret to say that, the last I've heard, David rejects this position, on at least two grounds. First, he evidently believes that naming Newman 1 is sufficient to tear down the cognitive wall that separates us from him or her. Cf. "Dthat," in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds., *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 397. Second, David evidently believes that (5) says something stronger than (3). Specifically, he evidently believes that (5) requires King George to be *en rapport* with Scott after all—what I call a *de re connection* of King George to Scott—whereas (3) does not. Cf. "Afterthoughts," in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, eds., *Themes from Kaplan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 605–606 n. 95. I disagree on both counts.

(19.) As if that weren't enough, Hilary Putnam has proposed that an *analytic truth* be defined as any sentence that is "deducible from the sentences in a finite list at the top of which someone who bears the ancestral of the graduate-student relation to Carnap has printed the words 'Meaning Postulate.' " "The Meaning of 'Meaning,' " in K. Gunderson, ed., *Language, Mind, and Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), 174. Being David's student evidently carries with it certain rights and privileges—not to mention responsibilities.