That *F*

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Abstract Jeffrey King's principal objection to the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is analyzed and criticized. King has responded with a modified version of his original argument aimed at establishing the weaker conclusion that the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is either incomplete or incorrect. It is argued that this fallback argument also fails.

Keywords Demonstrative · Determiner phrase · Direct reference · David Kaplan · Jeffrey King · Nathan Salmon

1 King's QI objection

In David Kaplan's landmark study, "Demonstratives" (Kaplan 1989a), a *demonstrative* is defined as an indexical, i.e., as a context-sensitive expression, one that "requires, in order to determine its referent, an associated demonstration" (p. 490). Later Kaplan considered whether an accompanying demonstration (-type) might be replaced with a directing intention on the part of the speaker.[1] A demonstrative considered as a mere symbol in abstraction from an accompanying demonstration or appropriate intention is incomplete, determining no unique referent. A singular demonstrative pronoun, 'he', 'her', 'that', etc., used as a demonstrative in this sense, is a *bare demonstrative*. A *singular complex demonstrative* (henceforth, a CD) is a singular determiner phrase (DP) of the form ⌜this v⌝ or ⌜that v⌝, used as a demonstrative—where *v* is a common-noun phrase. Kaplan specifies at the outset

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[1] Kaplan (1989b, p. 582).

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that the expressions covered by his theory have additional non-demonstrative uses that are not covered by the theory:

> The group of words for which I propose a semantical theory includes the pronouns 'I', 'my', 'you', 'he', 'his', 'she', 'it', the demonstrative pronouns, 'that', 'this', the adverbs 'here', 'now', 'tomorrow', 'yesterday', the adjectives 'actual', 'present', and others. These words have uses other than those in which I am interested (or, perhaps, depending on how you individuate words, we should say that they have homonyms in which I am not interested). For example, the pronouns 'he' and 'his' are used not as demonstratives but as bound variables in

> For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?[2]

Thus a demonstrative, whether bare or complex, is not simply a pronoun or DP (i.e., a mere expression) *tout court*. It is such a pronoun or DP *with* a special indexical type of *use*. It is an expression coupled with a use-type *as a demonstrative*—deictically with an accompanying demonstration, or an appropriate intention, or some such thing. The DP 'that woman' might be used here as a demonstrative, there as a bound variable, and still somewhere else as still something else. A DP whose main determiner is 'this' or 'that' (henceforth, a TDP) is a CD only inasmuch and insofar as it is used demonstratively.[3]

Kaplan famously argued that a singular demonstrative, appropriately completed by a demonstration (or by a directing intention), is invariably a *directly referential singular term*—i.e., a singular term whose semantic content (with respect to a context) is simply the term's referent (with respect to that context). He argued that the accompanying demonstration functions in a manner analogous to the semantic function of a descriptive singular term. What is characteristic of an appropriately completed demonstrative is that the descriptive content of the demonstration serves only to *fix the reference*, in Kripke's sense, of the completed expression. In particular, the demonstration's descriptive content forms no part of the expression's semantic content, which is simply the expression's referent. Kaplan proposed that the semantic workings of the bare demonstrative 'that', accompanied by a demonstration δ, may be represented by means of an artificial functor, '*dthat*', with its argument-place completed by a singular term α, typically a descriptive singular term, taking over the role of a demonstration. For these purposes, it will be assumed throughout, but for the closing paragraph, that a singular definite description—a singular DP whose main determiner is the definite article 'the'—is such a term. The semantics of a completed '*dthat*'-term is given by a simple rule specifying a three-way identification:

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[2] At page 489. The occurrence of 'he' in the displayed biblical rhetorical question is anaphoric upon, but not within the scope of, the occurrence of the quantifier 'a man'. As such it is what Gareth Evans dubbed an *E-type pronoun*. Cf. Evans (1977, 1980). I have argued that examples like this demonstrate against Evans and with Peter Geach that *E*-type pronouns are bound variables. See Salmon (2006, pp. 440–446).

[3] I thank David Braun for suggesting the appellation 'TDP'.

(*DK*) For any singular term α_δ (especially as might be a verbalization of a demonstration or directing intention, δ), any context c, any possible circumstance w, and any assignment s of values to variables:

the referent of $\ulcorner dthat[\alpha_\delta]\urcorner$ with respect to c, w, and s =
the semantic content of $\ulcorner dthat[\alpha_\delta]\urcorner$ with respect to c and s =
the referent of α_δ with respect to c, the possible circumstance of c, and s.

This semantic rule (*DK*) has three immediate consequences concerning '*dthat*'-terms: they are (i) indexical; (ii) directly referential; and (iii) *de jure* obstinately rigid. That is, a '*dthat*'-term's content is a function of, and varies with, the context; the term's semantic content with respect to a context is just its referent; and as a matter of pure semantics, in every context the term refers to the same thing with respect to every possible world. These immediate consequences of (*DK*) are important, insofar as '*dthat*'-terms are put forth as a model for natural-language bare demonstratives. Kaplan observes, "Obvious adjustments are to be made to take into account any common noun phrase which accompanies or is built-in to the demonstrative" (p. 527). Typically, a completed CD of the form $\ulcorner$that $v\urcorner + \delta$ is to be represented as $\ulcorner dthat[(\text{the }x\colon x\text{ is a }v)\phi_{\delta x}]\urcorner$, where $\phi_{\delta x}$ is a formula (with free 'x') that verbalizes, and goes proxy for, the demonstration δ.[4]

Kaplan's direct-reference theory of demonstratives is famous. Its broad elements are forcefully compelling, even if not overwhelmingly so. It is possible those broad elements have ascended to the status of contemporary orthodoxy. Yet like any philosophical account, it is not without detractors. One vocal critic is Jeffrey King. In a 1999 article—later developed into a book, King (2001)—King considers particular uses of TDPs that appear not to comport at all well with Kaplan's direct-reference theory of demonstratives.[5]

Among King's objections to Kaplan's theory is a variant of a misplaced argument that Benson Mates had given years ago against the then-popular (and still popular) thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms.[6] I shall refer to this Mates-like objection of King's as his *QI objection*. The objection focuses on certain sentences in which a TDP is bound (into) by a quantifier. An example indicative of the general case is the following:

(1) Every father dreads that moment when his oldest child leaves home.

King's presentation of his QI objection is extremely compressed and sketchy. Filling in suppressed details and tacit premises, the argument evidently proceeds, at least roughly, as follows:[7]

P1: If an occurrence of expression β in a sentence ϕ_β refers to only a single thing i (with respect to an appropriate context c), then the truth-conditions of ϕ_β (with respect to c) will involve i (or make reference to i, depend upon i, etc.).

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[4] Salmon (2002b) provides a fuller description, at pp. 497–514.

[5] King (1999), primarily at pp. 157–158; King (2001), Chap. 1, primarily at pp. 10–12.

[6] Mates (1973, p. 415).

[7] The following reconstruction is based on the presentation in King (2001) and on correspondence with King (March 2, 2004).

P2: An occurrence in a sentence $\phi_{\text{that } v}$ of a TDP, $\lceil$that $v\rceil$, not within the scope of an indirect, intensional, or quotational operator, refers to only a single thing i (with respect to an appropriate context c) only if the descriptive component v semantically applies to i (with respect to c).

P3: The TDP occurring in (1) is an expression; its occurrence in (1) is bound (into) and not within the scope of an indirect, intensional, or quotational operator; and its descriptive component 'moment when his oldest child leaves home' semantically applies with respect to an appropriate context c only to (if anything) the unique moment when the oldest child of the referent with respect to c of the pronoun 'him' leaves home.

P4: The truth-conditions of (1) (with respect to a context c) do not involve only a single moment; rather they involve potentially different moments for different fathers. (King 2001, p. 10)

Therefore,

C1: The occurrence of the TDP in (1) does not refer, let alone refer directly (with respect to a context c), to some single thing. (King 2001, p. 10)

Therefore,

C2: (1) Does not express as its semantic content a singular proposition in which the referent of the TDP-occurrence therein occurs as a component.

K1: *Any sentence ϕ_β containing a directly referential occurrence of a singular term β not within the scope of an indirect, intensional, or quotational operator expresses as its semantic content (if anything) a singular proposition in which the referent of that same occurrence of β occurs as a component.* (*Cf.* King 2001, p. 1)

Therefore,

C3: The TDP-occurrence in (1) is not a directly referential singular-term occurrence. (King 2001, p. 10)

P5: The philosophical orthodoxy that demonstratives are directly referential singular terms is committed to classifying the occurrence of the TDP in (1) as a directly referential occurrence of a singular term. (King 2001, p. xi)[8]

Therefore,

C4: The philosophical orthodoxy that demonstratives are directly referential singular terms is incorrect. (King 2001, p. 12)

King is a formidable opponent. I applaud his steadfast commitment to argument as a primary philosophical tool. It is a virtue of his QI objection that its thrust is very clear. But the argument is also peculiar. Given *P4* the TDP occurring in (1) does not appear to be used as an indexical at all. The sentence (1) itself is odd, at least and especially insofar as the reader is asked to regard the TDP occurring therein as a

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[8] King formulates this premise differently: "Since the seminal work of David Kaplan ["Demonstratives"], the orthodox view of complex 'that' phrases (e.g., 'that man drinking a martini'—henceforth referred to as *'that' phrases'*) has been that they are contextually sensitive devices of direct reference" (King 2001, p. xi). He construes the orthodox thesis as extending to TDP-occurrences.

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genuine demonstrative. As long as there is more than one father in the world, given *P4* it is unclear (at least initially) how the TDP can possibly be used *as a demonstrative*, with a demonstration (or with a directing intention). It is at least as strange, therefore, to think that Kaplan's direct-reference theory of demonstratives, which extends only to indexical uses, can be overturned through consideration of such strained examples as this. If hard cases make bad law, then weird cases can do no better. The intuitions supporting the directly referential nature of standard demonstratives are far stronger and more compelling than any intuitions one might be able to muster about an alleged demonstrative use of the TDP occurring in (1)— other than perhaps the intuition that such a use is altogether precluded, at least in anything like the normal case. The use of the determiner 'that' in King's examples seems more indicative of a kind of mimicking quotation than of a CD employed by the speaker. For again, whither the speaker's demonstration (or directing intention)?[9]

2 Response

In Salmon (2006) and earlier work I criticized King's QI objection on several grounds.[10] First, as just mentioned King's examples are unusual, and appear to deviate relevantly from standard uses of genuine demonstratives. The bound TDP in (1) does not appear to be used as an indexical at all, let alone as a demonstrative. We do not have many firm intuitions about sentences like (1), besides the intuition that insofar as the TDP is to be regarded as a genuine demonstrative, the construction is odd at best, bordering on ungrammaticality (if not indeed altogether south of the border). As I said in my criticism,

> Quantification into a complex demonstrative is odd at best. Although King assumes it is permissible, almost all his examples involve, or appear to involve, a stylistically altered definite description rather than a genuine demonstrative, e.g., 'Every university professor cherishes that first publication of his'. ... Where the phrase 'that first publication of his' occurs as a genuine demonstrative, it should be possible to delete the word 'first' by pointing to the publication in question. But this is problematic with King's example.

If the TDP occurring in (1) is a definite description rather than a demonstrative phrase, the sentence is to be analyzed as follows:

(1′) [every *x*: *x* is a father](*x* dreads the unique moment when *x*'s oldest child leaves home).[11]

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[9] That the use of 'that' in King's QI-argument examples is a sort of mimicking quotation is also suggested by the fact that each of those examples employs an attitudinal locution: 'dreads', 'remembers', 'cherishes', 'forgets', etc. In others of King's examples, 'that' might function as a definite-description operator together with a narrow-scope indicator.

[10] Salmon (1995, p. 18*n*26); Salmon (2002b, pp. 534–535*n*47); Salmon (2006), especially at pp. 446–448.

[11] More fully: '[every *x*: *x* is a father](*x* dreads [the unique *t*: *t* is a moment][(the unique *y*)(*y* is an oldest child of *x*) leaves home at *t*])'. The phrase 'oldest child' might be analyzed further in terms of 'child', 'older', quantification, and identity.

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Insofar as this yields the intended interpretation of (1), then (1) cannot be used to criticize a particular semantic theory of genuine demonstratives, unless that theory denies that (1) may be correctly so analyzed. The direct-reference theory makes no such prediction.

A second countervailing fact, at least as significant as the first, is that King's premise *P5* is false. The considerations raised in the remaining premises do not connect with, let alone discredit, the direct-reference theory of demonstratives. As just noted, there is no demonstrative in (1') for the direct-reference theory of demonstratives to be right or wrong about. Nor is the direct-reference theory committed to rejecting this proposed analysis of (1). The theory that demonstratives are directly referential singular terms concerns appropriately completed bare and complex demonstratives, not the wider and more general category of TDPs (whether used demonstratively or otherwise). As noted earlier, Kaplan explicitly acknowledged at the outset that pronouns like 'he' can be used non-demonstratively—for example, as bound variables—and that his theory of demonstratives does not cover these non-demonstrative uses. There is every reason to think that Kaplan's remark was meant to cover TDPs (e.g., 'that male') and no reason to think otherwise.[12]

It is important when assessing the direct-reference theory of CDs, and especially King's QI objection to it, to distinguish sharply between an *expression* and an *occurrence* of that expression in a sentence (or other containing expression). As Frege noted, a single expression can occur in one place in its default mode and in another place in a non-customary mode of one sort or another—*ungerade*, or autonymous (Carnap), or bound by a quantifier, etc. An expression-occurrence might be identified with an ordered pair of an expression proper together with a syntactic *position* the expression occupies in a sentence. A semantic value or attribute (e.g., semantic content, or direct-reference) of an occurrence of an expression is identifiable with that of the expression itself when the expression occurs in customary mode. When the expression occurs in a non-customary mode— within quotation marks, perhaps, or within the scope of an *ungerade* operator (e.g., 'Ralph believes that')—the occurrence's semantic value can deviate from the expression's. Especially relevant to the present discussion, the semantics of a bound expression-occurrence deviates significantly from that of free occurrences. The variable 'x' occurs in customary mode in 'x is pretty'; the same variable in '$(\exists x)(x$ is pretty)' occurs there in a special and familiar kind of non-customary mode. Here 'x' is in *bondage*, where its semantics deviates from its customary semantics.

Depending on what is meant by saying that an occurrence of an expression is "directly referential," King's QI objection might succeed in overturning the excessively broad theory that TDP-occurrences are invariably directly referential occurrences. Although no one to my knowledge has proposed or believed this theory, it is useful all the same to refute it. However, King presents his QI objection as overturning "philosophical orthodoxy" (King 2001, pp. xi, 1). His principal target is not this theory without advocates. It is the theory, as proffered by Kaplan

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[12] King (2001) reports (p. 198n2) that an anonymous referee made a point closely related to this. King responds, "the view still posits two different semantic treatments for (what are orthographically) 'that' phrases." Kaplan's direct-reference theory per se is neutral concerning bound TDPs like that in (1). See footnote 16 below.

and championed by many, that CDs—TDPs used demonstratively—are invariably directly referential. As things stand with his QI objection, its sub-conclusion *C3* does not so much as touch the target theory, precisely because the additional premise *P5* is false.

At the heart of my criticism of King's QI objection is my charge that King evidently mistook the orthodoxy that CDs are directly referential singular terms to be a theory, supposedly widely held, about occurrences of TDPs in sentences: that any such occurrence not within the scope of an interfering operator like quotation, whether bound or free, contributes its referent to the proposition expressed. This seriously misrepresents the direct-reference theory on two counts. First, the direct-reference theory concerns the semantic contents of certain indexical expressions used demonstratively (and completed by a demonstration, or whatever); it does not concern the contents of those expressions as used non-indexically.[13] Just as important, the direct-reference theory holds that the expressions (as used demonstratively) are directly referential, so that any sentential occurrence wherein the expression (so used) is in its default (or "customary") mode is directly referential. The theory decidedly does not hold that all sentential occurrences of those expressions (used demonstratively) are directly referential. Whether an occurrence of a TDP used non-demonstratively is, or is not, directly referential is doubly beside the point. The content of a TDP-occurrence is relevant to an assessment of the direct-reference theory insofar as: (i) the TDP itself is used demonstratively in that occurrence; and (ii) the occurrence-content deviates from what the direct-reference theory is committed to concerning the content of such occurrences. It is highly questionable whether the TDP in (1) occurs there as a genuine demonstrative to begin with, let alone whether the content of the TDP-occurrence in (1) deviates from the direct-reference theory's commitments concerning content-occurrences of directly referential expressions.

To make his argument engage validly with the orthodoxy it is aimed against, King needs to replace the false premise *P5* with two additional premises, which together with the remaining premises yield the desired conclusion:

> *P3*: The TDP occurring in (1) is an expression; its occurrence in (1) is bound (into) and not within the scope of an indirect, intensional, or quotational operator; and its descriptive component 'moment when his oldest child leaves home' semantically applies with respect to an appropriate context *c* only to (if anything) the unique moment when the oldest child of the referent with respect to *c* of the pronoun 'him' leaves home.
>
> *C3*: The TDP-occurrence in (1) is not a directly referential singular-term occurrence.
>
> *P6*: The TDP occurring in (1) is a CD in (1) (i.e., it is used as a demonstrative in (1)).
>
> *K2*: *If a singular term β is directly referential, then every occurrence in a sentence of β not within the scope of an indirect, intensional, or quotational operator is a directly referential occurrence.*

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[13] See footnote 12 above.

Therefore,

C5: Not all CDs (TDPs used demonstratively) are directly referential singular terms.

In a recent article King directly addresses some of the criticisms of Salmon (2006).[14] The bulk of his response will be considered in Sects. IV–V below. King points out, inter alia, that his QI objection makes no use of *K2*. To clarify, King does not provide either *P6* or *K2*. I do not attribute these premises to him; he is perfectly free to disavow them.[15] The new premises play no role in his QI objection, which employs *P5* in their place. My point, rather, is that the particular argument ⌜*P1*. *P2*. *P3*. *P4*. *K1* ∴. *C4*⌝ is a *non sequitur*, whereas King's additional premise *P5*, which if invoked validates the argument, is false. The principal objective of King's QI objection is to establish *C4*. Without the additional premises *P6* and *K2* to replace *P5*, King has not touched his target. By contrast, the expanded argument obtained by adjoining the premises *P6* and *K2* to support *C5* engages validly with the theory King's QI objection aims to overturn.

The problem with the expanded argument is that not only *P6* but also *K2*—both of the replacement premises for King's *P5*—are dubious.

Salmon (2006) argues at length that *K2* is straightforwardly falsified by the paradigms of bindable directly referential expressions: the logician's individual variables, '*x*', '*y*', and '*z*'. Variables are devices of direct reference. Under an assignment of a value for '*x*', the variable is a directly referential singular term for that assigned value. The variable will function as such in all of its default occurrences. These are its bindable free occurrences. Things change the moment the variable is placed in a deviant, non-customary position—for example, in the scope of quotation marks, or in the scope of a binding quantifier-occurrence. As Frege instructed, an occurrence of a singular term within quotation marks refers (under an

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[14] King (2008). King says (p. 99*n*1) that he now uses the phrase 'complex demonstrative' to mean any TDP (i.e., any DP whose main determiner is 'that' or 'that'), not to mean more specifically *a TDP used demonstratively*, (with an accompanying demonstration, or appropriate directing intention, or the like). In fact, by 'complex demonstrative' King evidently usually means any *occurrence of* a TDP (e.g., in a sentence). The resulting conflict between King's usage and Kaplan's (which coincides with my own)—in combination with King's apparently overlooking the crucial passage in which Kaplan stipulates that his theory does not cover non-demonstrative uses, and with King's strong propensity to think of the objects of semantic valuation and attribution as expression-occurrences rather than the occurring expressions themselves—probably explain his erstwhile belief of *P5*, and hence that the considerations raised in the remaining premises of his original QI objection engage with philosophical orthodoxy. See footnote 8 above.

[15] See the previous footnote. King says in (2008) that he does not reject *K2*, but this is because he misinterprets it as a trivial analytic truth (pp. 108–110). Properly interpreted, *K2* entails that if a singular term β (the expression) is directly referential, then even a bound occurrence of β not within the scope of an indirect, intensional, or quotational operator is likewise directly referential. For present purposes, *K2* can even be replaced with the following:

K2′: If occurrences of a singular term β not within the scope of an indirect, intensional, quotational, or variable-binding operator are directly referential, then even occurrences of β *within the scope of a variable-binding operator*, but not within the scope of an indirect, intensional, or quotational operator, are directly referential.

This is falsified by variables. In any event King may reject *P6*.

assignment of a value) not to its customary referent but to itself. In the same manner, an occurrence of a variable within the scope of a binding quantifier-occurrence is induced by the interfering operator to abandon the variable's customary referent—its assigned value—and to refer instead to the variable's *bondage extension* with respect to itself, which is (in the simplest case) simply the identity function that assigns each individual in the variable's domain to itself.

3 King's TDP as CD

What about *P6*? Might the TDP occurring in (1) be used demonstratively there despite *P4*? An alternative analysis is suggestive. Interestingly, the TDP might be regarded as a genuine completed demonstrative, with its descriptive component, 'when his oldest child leaves home', regarded *a la* Kaplan as a kind of verbalized completing demonstration. So construed, (1) is analyzed as a Kaplanesque variant of (1'):

(1'')   [every *x*: *x* is a father](*x* dreads *dthat*[the unique moment when *x*'s oldest child leaves home]).

It is unclear whether (1'') has any counterpart that is genuine English, but if it does, it is (1) or something rather close to it. If *P4* and *P6* are true, I submit, then (1) is correctly analyzed as (1''). With Kaplan's '*dthat*'-operator in the arsenal, a genuinely demonstrative analysis of (1) emerges as a real possibility.[16]

At the time King wrote King (2001), Kaplan's "Demonstratives," with its key idea of verbalized demonstrations, was to my knowledge the only existing direct-reference theory that explicitly allowed for quantification (or other binding) into a completed demonstrative. Because King (2001) made no mention of the potential demonstrative analysis of (1) by means of (1''), I pointed this possibility out to King

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[16] King (2001) reports (p. 198*n*1) that when confronted with King's QI examples, Kaplan responded that his direct-reference theory was never intended to cover bound TDPs like that in (1). Kaplan has said that he did not intend the fact that '*dthat*'-terms can be quantified into to reflect any analogous feature of natural-language demonstratives. Even so, Kaplan's apparatus provides for a straightforward analysis of (1) as invoking a natural-language analog of (1'').

There is an auspicious precedent of a natural-language analog of '*dthat*': Peter Geach's wonderfully problematic sentence from Geach (1967):

> *G*: Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed Cob's sow.

I have argued that this sentence, on its most natural reading (in accordance with Geach's stipulations) is probably best analyzed by invoking a Kaplanesque demonstrative completed by a verbalized demonstration (indicated by 'the same witch'), as follows:

> *G'*: Hob **thinks** ^[∃*x*: witch(*x*)](*x* has blighted Bob's mare)^ & Nob **wonders** ^*dthat*$_{\text{fem}}$[[the *x*: supposed-witch(*x*)](Hob **thinks** ^*x* has blighted Bob's mare^)] killed Cob's sow^.

Cf. Salmon (2002a), p. 122*n*27.

In conversation Kit Fine suggested a clever revision of King's example that might appear to strengthen King's case: A father bids farewell to his daughter as she is about to leave home. He hugs her and says "Every father dreads this moment." The use of 'this moment' here, although not unnatural, is deviant. (Fine agrees.) Even if (1'') is true, there is no particular moment every father dreads. Kaplan's demonstrative operator might be employed to explain this deviant use.

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in e-correspondence (March 2, 2004). King (2008) observes that (1″) is true with respect to a context c and a possible world w if and only if every father in w dreads in w the unique moment when his oldest child in the world c_W of c leaves home in c_W, rather than the unique moment when his oldest child in w leaves home in w. King asserts on the basis of this observation that (1″) differs in modal intension from (1), and therefore provides an incorrect analysis (pp. 103–104n9, 112n21).

By contrast with (1″), (1′) is true with respect to c and w if and only if every father in w dreads in w the unique moment when his oldest child in w leaves home in w. Perhaps (1″) does provide the wrong modal intension for (1); I do not know how one can be very confident of this. But if (1″) does give the wrong intension, then the correct analysis of (1) is given instead by (1′) and *P6* is then false. One way or the other, King's original QI objection sheds no light on the direct-reference theory of demonstratives.

There is one way to test which analysis of (1) gets the right modal intension. This is to place a TDP within the scope of a modal operator-occurrence and to bind that TDP-occurrence from without. Thus consider,

(2)   Every parent x is such that the following proposition is metaphysically possible: x did not parent that oldest offspring of x's.

Which, if either, of the following captures the modal intension of (2)?

(2′)   [every x: x is a parent]◇(x did not parent x's oldest offspring).
(2″)   [every x: x is a parent]◇(x did not parent *dthat*[x's oldest offspring]).

Let us understand 'parent' as the converse of 'offspring' so that (2′) is straightforwardly untrue. By contrast, (2″) is straightforwardly true. King is evidently committed to counting (2) untrue.[17] My own intuition recoils at counting (2) itself simply untrue, and inclines toward counting (2) true, or at most ambiguous between a favored true reading and a discouraged untrue one. This test thus provides some evidence against King's account of (1) and in favor of the proposed analysis of the alleged demonstrative use of (1) by means of (1″). I am disinclined to place significant weight on this evidence, however, especially since my intuition does not count (2), any more than its predecessor (1), as straightforwardly anything other than a bit weird. The construction is unusual, and my own intuitions are shaky. (See footnote 9 above.) The test does have some utility, however. As we shall see in the next two sections, it provides compelling evidence that a new revision of King's QI objection likewise fails to cast any serious doubt on the direct-reference account of CDs. It also provides evidence against King's own theory of TDPs.

The burden of Salmon (2006) is to provide a semantic analysis for expression-occurrences, including bound occurrences like the definite-description occurrences in (1′) and the '*dthat*'-term occurrence in (1″). The semantic content of the occurrence in (1′) of 'the unique moment when x's oldest child leaves home' with respect to a context c is a certain function, $(\lambda i)[\wedge$the unique moment when i's oldest

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[17] King (2001) says that it is difficult to contrive bound TDPs that take wide scope over a modal operator (p. 93). The cumbersome formulation in terms of 'the following proposition is metaphysically possible' instead of the more natural locution 'might not have parented' is precisely to make this prospect worse than merely difficult.

child leaves home^], which assigns to any existing individual i a particular individual concept, *to wit*, the very concept expressed by the description 'the unique moment when x's oldest child leaves home' under the assignment of i as value for the variable 'x'. By contrast, the semantic content of the occurrence of the '*dthat*'-term in (1″) with respect to a context c is a partial function, $f = (\lambda i)$[the unique moment when i's oldest child in c_W leaves home in c_W], where c_W is the possible world of c. This function f assigns to any existing individual i the very moment when i's oldest child in c_W leaves home in c_W, if there is a unique such moment, and assigns nothing otherwise. (Notice that f assigns actual moments, not concepts thereof.) Analogously, the semantic content of the occurrence in (1″) of the open formula 'x dreads *dthat*[the unique moment when x's oldest child leaves home]' with respect to c is the Russellian propositional function that assigns to any existing individual i the singular proposition about both i and the moment $t_{f(i)} = f(i)$, that i dreads $t_{f(i)}$. More accurately, the occurrence's content is the individual concept or property that corresponds to this propositional function (assuming there is such a concept).[18] This fully accords with—indeed it flows directly from—the theory that the '*dthat*'-term itself is a directly referential singular term. Insofar as (1″) provides a correct analysis of (1), my own version of the direct-reference theory assigns this same function f as content with respect to c for the bound occurrence of the TDP in (1).

4 King's more recent objection

Responding to Salmon (2006), King (2008) concedes that *P5* is false and advances a new QI argument in lieu of the original objection. I quote at length:

> ... [The direct-reference theory of CDs] is a semantic proposal that claims that complex demonstratives, *the expressions*, are directly referential. ... the [direct-reference theory] semantics [doesn't] account for occurrences of complex demonstratives like the one in [(1)], since clearly in such a case a complex demonstrative can't be contributing an individual [moment] to the proposition expressed by the sentence on pain of getting [(1)]'s intuitive truth conditions ... wrong. More generally, no version of [the direct-reference theory] semantics assigns to [(1)] these intuitive truth conditions.
>
> (*Footnote*: For example, the formal semantics of [Kaplan's "Demonstratives"] actually allows wide scope quantifiers to bind variables in 'dthat'

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[18] See footnote 16 above. This individual concept is not to be confused with the concept, involved in the content of (1′), of *dreading the very moment when one's own oldest child leaves home*. Instead the individual concept in question evidently involves many different moments occurring as constituents— each moment when an oldest human child in c_W leaves home in c_W.

Arguably, no one with less than a God's-eye perspective is capable of grasping such a concept— anymore than one can directly grasp any particular moment beyond one's ken of *de re* connections. (Can we grasp the mother of all moments, the moment of the Big Bang? One is reminded of Russell's views concerning our cognitive connection to the center of mass of the Solar System.) If so, then we do not grasp the content of (1″), and in that sense we do not understand the sentence. This consideration might be turned into an argument that (1″) gives an incorrect analysis of (1). But the argument needs the premise that we understand (in this sense) (1) even when the TDP occurring therein is used demonstratively rather than as a definite description. Perhaps we do not.

terms. Thus it might be thought that the complex demonstrative in [(1)] could be treated as a 'dthat' term with the quantifier ['Every father'] binding the variable/pronoun in it. However, Kaplan's semantics ... would assign to [(1)] ... the wrong truth conditions. On Kaplan's semantics, [(1)], taken in a context is true at w ... if and only if [every father dreads in w the unique moment his oldest child leaves home in the world of the context]. But this doesn't capture the intuitive truth conditions of [(1)] ..., nor does the sentence ... even have such a reading at all! ...)

    This suffices to show that [the direct-reference theory] is at least incomplete: its account of the semantics of complex demonstratives, the expressions, gives no account of occurrences of complex demonstratives like the one in [(1)]. ...

    ... examples like [(1)] *by themselves* don't refute [the direct-reference theory] (that is, they don't show that the [direct-reference theory] semantics is the incorrect semantics for *all* occurrences (uses) of complex demonstratives) ... (pp. 103–104)[19]

This fallback argument begins with an initial sub-argument of the original QI objection: $\ulcorner P1.P2.P3.P4.K1 \therefore C3 \urcorner$ The soundness of the argument to that point is not presently in dispute. (In my view both *P2* and *C1* are false but I am not here pressing the point.) The fallback argument proceeds from the sub-conclusion *C3* as follows:

C3: The TDP-occurrence in (1) is not a directly referential singular-term occurrence.

P7: The philosophical orthodoxy that CDs—the expressions—are directly referential singular terms either does not provide any account of bound *occurrences* of CDs, or holds that the TDP-occurrence in (1) is a directly referential singular-term occurrence, or else analyzes (1) as (1″) (depending on the version).[20]

P8: The analysis of (1) by means of (1″) provides the wrong modal intension.

    Therefore,

C6: The philosophical orthodoxy that CDs are directly referential singular terms is incomplete, or else it is incorrect, as regards bound TDP-occurrences like that in (1) (depending on the version).[21]

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[19] King evidently thinks that a refutation of the direct-reference theory of CDs would involve demonstrating that the theory provides incorrect semantics for all CD-occurrences—as if demonstrating that the theory provides incorrect semantics for some occurrences (or is incorrect in some other way) was insufficient. This is mistaken but nothing of substance hangs on this point. King's fallback argument does not purport to demonstrate that the direct-reference theory provides incorrect semantics for specific CD-occurrences, only that the theory is either incorrect or incomplete as concerns bound TDPs like that in (1).

[20] In Salmon (2002b) I offered an alternative direct-reference theory that explicitly makes room for quantification into a genuine CD (pp. 523–524, 535*n*48). This theory provides for the prospect of different truth conditions for (1) if it has a genuinely demonstrative reading. The theory did not yet exist at the time of King's original QI objection. See footnote 18 above.

[21] King (2008) provides a less detailed accounting of his premises and conclusion (p. 108*n*18). That accounting fails to bring out the argument's reliance on *P8*.

This fallback QI argument retreats from the discredited premise $P5$ and aims at establishing a significantly weaker conclusion in lieu of the ill-supported $C4$. Unlike the original QI objection, the fallback argument is not put forward as a self-contained disproof of the direct-reference theory; rather, it is a proper part of a grand argument against the direct-reference theory. From $C6$ King argues further that a proper supplement to the direct-reference theory results in an ambiguity theory, which offers a direct-reference analysis of free CD-occurrences and a descriptional analysis of bound TDP-occurrences like that in (1). King had argued in the final chapter of King (2001) that, *ceteris paribus*, a unitary theory of TDP-occurrences is theoretically preferable to a hybrid theory of this sort. The grand argument is the combination of his fallback QI argument together with this separate argument.[22]

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[22] King (2008) says of the fallback argument that it is the original QI objection. (See the previous footnote.) He says that Salmon (2006) misinterprets his original QI argument, which was not meant by itself to disprove the direct-reference theory of CDs, only to show that the theory either fails to provide any account of bound TDPs like that in (1) or else provides an incorrect account (i.e., $C6$):

> ... in chapter 1 of [King (2001)] where I gave the [QI] argument, I took occurrences of complex demonstratives such as that in [(1)] merely to show that [the direct-reference theory of CDs] is at least incomplete, and so to place a burden on the [direct-reference] theorist to provide some explanation of them. And then in chapter 5 of [King (2001)] I argued against ... the conjunction of [the direct-reference theory] and what I took to be the best explanation available to the [direct-reference] theorist of occurrences like that in [(1)] ... Hence, obviously in [King (2001)] I didn't take the existence of occurrences like that in [(1)] to by itself refute [the direct-reference theory] (p. 107).
>
> *Footnote*: The argument of chapter 1 involving QI uses was merely intended to show that [the direct-reference theory] has no account of them. ... (p. 108n18)

These remarks notwithstanding, King's original text straightforwardly presented his QI objection as a self-contained disproof of philosophical orthodoxy. (Evidence is provided below in this footnote.) Others have also read the objection this way, including at least one reader highly sympathetic to King's project: Jason Stanley, in Stanley (2002). King's contention that I have misinterpreted his QI objection bears on Stanley's ringing endorsement with exactly equal force. Furthermore, the fallback argument's premises $P7$ and $P8$, and its conclusion $C6$, are no part of the original presentation of King's QI objection. Assessment of King's argument is best handled by distinguishing between the King (2001) QI objection, which was originally presented in King (1999) (see footnote 5 above) and which employs $P5$, and the King (2008) QI argument, which is presented in response to Salmon (2006) and employs $P7$ and $P8$. The more significant bone of contention (about to be addressed in the text) is whether the latter argument succeeds where the original QI objection fails.

Regarding the text: As already mentioned, King's QI objection was first presented in a self-contained article. He wrote:

> Since the seminal work of David Kaplan ["Demonstratives"], the orthodox view of complex 'that' phrases ... has been that they are devices of direct reference. ... I think it is fair to say that most philosophers with any view on the matter subscribe to the orthodoxy. Despite this consensus there is a variety of data that suggests that 'that' phrases are not directly referential (King (1999), p. 155).

(Cf. King (2001), p. xi, where these remarks occur nearly verbatim. See footnote 8 above.) Among the supposed data are bound TDPs like that in (1). King (1999) did not argue that the orthodoxy is incomplete for excluding bound TDPs from treatment. The premises $P7$ and $P8$, the conclusion $C6$, and the entire second prong of the new grand argument are altogether absent. Similarly, the introduction to King (2001) says: "The goal of the present work is to challenge this orthodoxy. ... In Chap. 1 I lay out the arguments against direct reference accounts" (pp. xi–xii). Chief among these arguments is King's QI objection. In both article and book, King explicitly stated his QI objection's ultimate conclusion $C4$, saying that the prospect of sentences like (1) "suggests ... that a direct reference account is incorrect" ((1999), p. 158; (2001), p. 12). A later passage of King (1999) repeats the argument's conclusion, saying that bound TDPs

King's fallback argument offers small improvement over the original QI objection. It still needs *P6* to engage with its target. But now *P6* is in considerable tension with another premise: *P8*. If *P6* is true (a big 'if'), then (1) is correctly analyzed by means of (1″). And in that case, it would appear, *P8* is false. Indeed, we have just seen some intuitive pull against *P8*. Contrapositively, if (contrary to our recent modal considerations) *P8* is true, then (1) correctly analyzes as (1′) after all, in which case *P6* is false.

Perhaps the TDP occurs ambiguously in (1). Maybe it can be used either demonstratively or non-demonstratively, as per the speaker's intentions. In that case, (1) may be analyzed both ways, by (1′) and alternatively by (1″), as per the speaker's intentions. The prospect of ambiguity between a demonstrative and a (more natural) non-demonstrative reading of (1) does not strike the present writer as immediately unacceptable. Even so, given *P4* there is no proper analysis of (1), demonstrative or non-demonstrative, on which both *P6* and *P8* can be plausibly maintained together. For each reading of (1), if one of King's fallback premises is true, the other is false.

I would suggest that King revise his fallback argument by modifying *P7* and *C6* as follows:

C3: The TDP-occurrence in (1) is not a directly referential singular-term occurrence.

P7′: The philosophical orthodoxy that TDPs used demonstratively[23] are directly referential singular terms either does not provide any account of bound occurrences of TDPs like that in (1), or holds that the TDP-occurrence in (1) is a directly referential singular-term occurrence, or else analyzes (1) as (1″).

P8: The analysis of (1) by means of (1″) provides the wrong modal intension.

Therefore,

C6′: The philosophical orthodoxy that CDs (TDPs used demonstratively) are directly referential singular terms is neutral, or else it is incorrect, as regards bound TDP-occurrences like that in (1).

This alternate QI argument eliminates any need for *P6*. Several facts should be noted, however. This fallback argument too backpedals from the original QI objection, replacing the original conclusion *C4* with the significantly weaker *C6′*.

Footnote 22 continued

like that in (1) constitute "evidence that 'that' phrases are not directly referential" (p. 174). In a later passage of King (2001) stylistic academic hedges are jettisoned and the conclusion is stated more emphatically: "I wish to stress that QI uses such as [(1)] just seem hopeless on a direct reference account" (p. 20).

In both article and book, conclusions *C1*, *C3*, and *C4* are explicit, while *P5* is tacitly assumed. There are no passages either in King (1999) or in the first chapter of King (2001) that suggest any of *P7*, *P8*, or *C6*. Throughout the whole of the article and the whole of the book, King does not specifically address Kaplan's analysis of completed demonstratives by means of '*dthat*' operating on verbalized demonstrations, although that apparatus neatly provides for a potential analysis (whether right or wrong) of King's QI examples. (It was for this reason that I pointed out in correspondence the Kaplanesque analysis of sentences like (1).).

[23] See footnote 14 above.

The revised fallback argument invokes *P8*, which we have seen is at least questionable, if not counter-intuitive. More to the point, no argument is needed to establish that the direct-reference theory of CDs, per se, is neutral concerning constructions like (1). The sub-conclusion *C3* is more or less beside the point. Though the new conclusion *C6′* is indeed true (even if *P8* is not), this in itself makes no trouble for the direct-reference theory. Insofar as the direct-reference theory, as it was developed at the time of King (2001), had anything to say concerning (1), it was only this: *If* the TDP in (1) is not a stylistically altered definite description, and instead is used demonstratively with its descriptive component functioning as a verbalized demonstration, then (1) is to be analyzed as (1″). If *P8* is true, this can only be because the TDP occurring in (1) is not used demonstratively there with its descriptive component functioning as a verbalized demonstration. The ultimate conclusion *C6′* is true only because its left-hand disjunct is true.

5 Response

On the basis of the observations Salmon (2006) makes in the passage quoted by display at the beginning of Sect. II above, King (2008) apparently imputes to me a specific ambiguity theory of TDPs: that free CD-occurrences are directly referential whereas a bound occurrence of a TDP, ⌜that *v*⌝, (assuming it does not directly refer to a single individual) is an occurrence of a stylistic alteration of the particular definite-description ⌜the unique *v*⌝ obtained by simply substituting the definite article for 'that'(ibid., pp. 114–116). King (2008) proceeds to refute this theory.

A disclaimer concerning Salmon (2006): I do not assert anything entailing this theory, or any other particular theory, of bound TDPs. I do not claim that quantification into a CD is ruled out. (See footnote 20 above.) I also do not claim that every bound TDP-occurrence is an occurrence of a stylistically altered definite description. On the contrary, some bound TDPs are evidently sorted variables (contrary to King's theory, on which they are quantifier-occurrences). I do not claim that every case of quantification into a TDP is to be understood as binding into a definite description. I do not even say that all of King's particular examples are to be so understood. I argue only that almost all of them either involve or *appear* to involve stylistically altered definite descriptions. Most certainly I do not claim that every bound occurrence of a TDP of the form ⌜that *v*⌝, is to be understood as the particular definite-description counterpart ⌜the unique *v*⌝ with no further embellishment—even including, for example, the occurrence of 'that man' in

> If a man shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul, that man is profited naught.[24]

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[24] The occurrence of 'that man' here is an *E*-type pronominal. King analyzes the occurrence as a complex quantifier. King (2008) assumes that I am committed to claiming that such an occurrence is a directly referential singular-term occurrence, or else equivalent to the definite description 'the unique man' (p. 115). By contrast, the *E*-type pronominal in the displayed sentence seems to be an expanded variant of the pronoun 'he'. Contrary to King's misinterpretation, Salmon (2006) argues that *E*-type pronouns are bound variables. See footnote 2 above.

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King's theory of TDPs has it that the phrase 'that man' occurring in the sentence displayed above is not a variable, nor directly referential, nor even a singular term, but in effect, an incomplete definite description whose completion is supplied by the speaker's intentions and which, thus completed, functions as a quantifier. This theory runs into trouble with modal sentences like the following:

(3)   Every bachelor is such that the following proposition is metaphysically possible: that same bachelor has a wife (and so isn't a bachelor).

Interpreted appropriately this sentence seems true enough. Yet King's theory saddles it with a logical entailment that all men are married.[25]

King (2008) makes much of the fact that any account that treats TDP-occurrences used demonstratively as directly referential, while also treating bound TDP-occurrences like that in (1) as not directly referential, is *ipso facto* a non-unitary account of TDPs in general. He argues, "of course all other things being equal, a view that gives a unified semantics for all occurrences of an expression is to be preferred to a view that posits an ambiguity and assigns different semantics to different occurrences of an expression" (p. 106). (See footnote 12 above.) Though I shall not here provide a full argument, I will make some observations against this.

It is not completely clear what is to count as a unitary semantic theory. Consider a genuinely ambiguous "word," for example the syllable 'odd'. It might be proposed that 'odd' has a univocal indexical meaning, *having this property*, where the TDP 'this property' refers either to the property of being peculiar or to the mathematical property of being indivisible evenly by two, depending on various features of the context, most importantly the speaker's intentions. This purported indexical theory is no better for being "unitary" than the ambiguity theory. It is unclear that it should even count as a *unitary* theory in any sense in which unity per se is a theoretical virtue. It is not even clear that this is a rival theory, rather than simply the same ambiguity theory with deceptive packaging.

At least as important, other things are not always equal—especially when the different types of occurrences seem intuitively to fall into two or more very different sorts with differing semantic properties. Disparate phenomena frequently call for disparate treatment. Whereof things differ, thereof a distinction is called for. As Russell taught us, one case in point is his distinction between *primary* and *secondary* occurrence. As Frege taught us, another instance results from quotation marks and yet another from *ungerade* operators like 'Ralph believes that'. Frege's distinction between customary and *ungerade* reference is insightful. Certainly it is no mistake; rather, the rejection of Frege's distinction—so-called *semantic innocence*—is blind to an important phenomenon.

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[25] See footnote 17 above. King (2008) considers an example employing a propositional attitude (pp. 114–115). Extrapolating from King's treatment of that example, he evidently judges that (3) is true with respect to a possible world w if and only if for every bachelor x in w there is a world w' accessible to (i.e., possible in) w in which: the thing z that is a bachelor identical with x has a wife—i.e., x is a married bachelor in w'. The sentence 'That bachelor (assuming he exists) is a bachelor' is analytic. It is widely recognized (although the matter remains somewhat controversial) that the sentence nevertheless does not express a necessary truth. Cf. Salmon (2002b), at p. 525.

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The central point of Salmon (2006) is that yet another instance of this same general phenomenon is the logician's variable, which may occur bound or free (or even bound and free if it occurs twice). A "unitary" account that suppresses relevant differences between bound and free variables would represent a giant leap backward relative to the contemporary Tarskian approach, which highlights and explains those differences. Analogously—and not only analogously—an account of CDs that, in the name of unity, assimilates a free TDP used demonstratively to TDPs used in a manner resembling the attributive (as opposed to the referential)[26] use of a definite description inevitably misses something significant and fundamental about CDs.

One aspect of the issue that makes it especially significant is easily overlooked. This is its bearing on a contemporary and century-old controversy concerning another category of expression entirely: definite descriptions. Are they singular terms? Or are they quantificational locutions? A consideration frequently offered in favor of the latter prospect is that, as Russell emphasized, DPs are generally quantificational—'all men', 'no rational person', 'most philosophers', 'three students', etc. The fact that definite descriptions are DPs might be taken to suggest, therefore, that they are at least likely quantificational. Against this it must be remembered that CDs are also DPs. If CDs are singular terms—as commonsense has it—they create a precedent for singular-term DPs. This leaves the door open for definite descriptions to be exactly that. There is even a perfectly good reason for a language to have two distinct categories of singular-term DPs instead of just one: Even if CDs are directly referential singular terms, definite descriptions surely are not. Singular terms of both types—directly referential and not—evidently occur in mathematical discourse ('$e^{\pi i} + 1 = 0$'). Terms of both types have their own special uses. So does a device that converts a non-directly-referential singular term into a directly referential one. It would be handy if natural language had such devices. Perhaps it already does.

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[26] On this distinction see Salmon (2004).

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