JOHN T. SANDERS

I am not entirely sure about this, but I think I might just be one of Rorty's "us." My difficulty in being sure about this involves especially my lack of certainty concerning just what the boundaries of the relevant ethnos might be. But I hope to gain a bit of clarity from Rorty's answer to my question.

The case cited by Rorty, concerning the eventual adjustment of Europe to the Copernican worldview is a good place to begin, I think. Here is my problem: I understand pretty clearly why an absolutist might read Thomas Kuhn's detailed account of that transition as undermining the claim that progress toward the truth was made. In absolutist terms the story told by Kuhn does seem to me to subvert—and seems to Kuhn to subvert—the claims of progress and increasing verisimilitude. That is a large part of the reason why Karl Popper objected so strongly to Kuhn-style accounts of such periods in the history of science.

But pragmatists, as I understand them, have their own view of what truth and progress are. William James, quite famously, offered a straightforward pragmatic definition of truth, one which has persuaded many people not only within the United States, but all over the world. In rejecting in general the ideal of truth, I suspect that Rorty indicates thereby a rejection of this part of the pragmatic tradition. If so, I hope to learn why. But if not, perhaps Professor Rorty can clarify for me what stops a pragmatist—armed with the pragmatic definition of truth—from saying that progress toward the truth was made through the "Copernican revolution."